Problems of Psychology in the Works of Karl Marx
Author(s): Sergej L. Rubinštejn and T. J. Blakeley
Source: Studies in Soviet Thought, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Feb., 1987), pp. 111-130
Published by: Springer
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SERGEJ L. RUBINSTEJN
(1889-1960)
PROBLEMS
OF PSYCHOLOGY
WORKS
IN THE
OF KARL MARX*
?
is not among the disciplines which
like political economy
Psychology
? were
are no psy
systematically
developed
by Karl Marx. There
treatises among
the collected
in a
works
of Marx.
But
chological
one finds
a series of remarks on various
number
of his works,
of psychology.
not externally
these
questions
Although
systematized,
an internal unity. As one develops
remarks evidence, nevertheless,
their
whole
that
content, these fragments begin to form a single, monolithic
the
entire
of
worldview
Marx.
permeates
in the field of psychology, Marx must not be treated as a
or
of the past, to be studied merely
great representative
historically
the most
philologically. We must approach him as we would approach
our
of
to
confront
his
with
the
contemporary
contemporaries,
thought
Therefore,
It is on these that psychology must concentrate;
problems.
us
for Marx
with the most
crucial of psychological
supplies
insights
serve
us
in the light of Marxist-Leninist
which, elaborated
methodology,
most modern
as guide in the construction
of psychology.
It is well known
that contemporary
abroad is in crisis.
psychology
This crisis that coincided with a rapid growth in experimental
research
?
is
like the crisis in physics that Lenin described
in Materialism
and
?
a
crisis.
It
reflects
the
Empirio-Criticism
methodological
general
conflict that is going on in contemporary
science and that
ideological
manifests
itself in a fundamental methodological
crisis in a number of
disciplines,
this crisis
another.
In psychology
that are fighting one
figures in psychology
mathematics.
schools
so bad that the leading
to ignore it. A number of leading psychologists
have
the critical nature of this period for psychology
and this
It has become
have been
written
beginning with contemporary
has led to the formation
of
unable
about
congresses.
question has repeatedly come up at psychological
At the Twelfth Congress
of German
in Hamburg
Psychologists
1931, K. B?hler referred in his opening
for rethinking of the bases of psychology.
statement
in
to the serious need1,
on the "crisis
In his own book
Studies inSoviet Thought 33 (1987) 111-130.
? 1987 byD. Reidel Publishing Company.
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112
SERGEJ L. RUBINSTEJN
in psychology"
he advances
the same thesis.2 At the Tenth International
in
of
Congress
Psychology
Copenhagen
(August
1932), W. K?hler
we
not
links
do
within psychology
that "if
find the connecting
warned
soon, we will be atomized".3
Even if one rejects Biihler's
suggested solution to the crisis, one has
was revealed
in the tensions
to agree with him that the problem
We
and
behaviorist
between
spiritualist psychologies.
introspectionist,
cannot go into these in detail here, as our present
task is to delineate
of the current
the components
can help
toward
contributions
clearly
Marx'
Marxist-Leninist
The
crisis
and
a solution
then
to show
in the
context
how
of
psychology.
of the psyche, flowing from an intro
understanding
it with phenomena
of consciousness.
identifies
psychology,
to this conception,
is to study the
the task of psychology
where
of consciousness
within the individual consciousness,
dominant
spectionist
According
phenomena
they are immediately
its being
essence
doomed
here
given. The being of the psyche consists totally in
to the search for
In contrast
in
conscious
experience.
given
in the other
seemed
that one finds
sciences,
psychology
essence
of
to remain in the Machist
position
phenomenalism:
coincides
internal
with
essence
of
appearance
(Husserl). Marx had noted that if the
with their external form, then all
coincided
things
would be the
this reading, psychology
is
science, "discovering"
already immediately given.
of
shows that it is based on the assumption
of this position
Analysis
to
aims
distin
of the psychic.
the immediate givenness
Introspection
science would
be nugatory.
the psychic
idealist
radically
guish
On
what
useless
from all objective
position:
everything
This is, of course, a
is material,
and
external
the psychic is the primary and
mediations.
that
through the psyche;
physical is mediated
it shuts itself up in an internal world
immediate given. In its immediacy
that is purely personal. To every subject are given only the phenomena
are given only to him. They
and these phenomena
of his consciousness
are, as a matter of principle, not available to any other observer. Even
of the other's psyche falls by the wayside.
indirect objective knowledege
? even
?
and this is the heart of the matter
At the same time, however
cannot
have objective
of
knowledge
subject
experiencing
claim that the data of introspection
introspectionists
psyche. Radical
the
absolutely
trustworthy.4
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the
are
IN MARX
PSYCHOLOGY
This means
that the data
of consciousness
113
cannot
be
thrown
into
but this also means
that nobody can confirm them.
by anybody,
If the psyche
is immediately
any objective mediations,
given, without
to controvert
available
then there is nothing objective
introspectionist
can distinguish
the subject nor any other observer
data on it. Neither
doubt
from belief.
knowledge
i.e.,
knowledge,
Psychology
is no
longer possible
as objective
as a science.
of the psyche that is adopted
it is just this conception
Nevertheless,
?
?
the
the
and
American
of introspectionism,
Russian
opponents
by
behaviorists.
The whole
psychology
that one must
argumentation
is based
in favor of behavior
exclude
on
from
consciousness
the contention
that the
are available only to the subject and "are
of consciousness
to objective verification
and, therefore, cannot be the object
of science".5 The behaviorist
is based
argument against consciousness
on the introspectionist
view that one must either accept the data of
phenomena
not subject
or exclude
one cannot
them completely;
completely
?
of
On
the
basis
of
this
intro
the
consciousness.
concept
change
?
of the psyche,
and
idealism
combining
understanding
spective
to
behaviorism
reduces man to the set of his responses
mechanicism,
stimuli.
the environmental
consciousness
in the "psycho
activities
practical
as
to
the
the concrete
stimuli
responses
subject
by
logical"
tears human activity away from its roots
historical person. Behaviorism
in a second operation,
in human consciousness.
behaviorism
Further,
first
Behaviorism
form
isolates man's
of
and results, it tears human
activity from its products
runs the risk of reducing
environment
its
from
social
and
activity away
to
psychology
physiology.
isolate's
human
The
twentieth
of the dominant
trends of the
anti-psychologism
philosophic
?
?
or
Rickertian
the
whether
Husserlian
century
opposed
to
form
of
the
the
and
and ideological
concept
(in
value)
logical
to the mechanistic
trend. The
and thereby contributed
psychological
a
effort to rescue the ideological
component
through
"psychology of the
with
the
of Spr?nger)
soul" or eigentliche Psychologie
Sinnb?nder
(e.g.
found itself in three pieces:
and psychology
spectionism and "psychology of the soul".
failed
The
first
effort
to emerge
from
this
(by B?hler
behaviorism,
in the West
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intro
and
114
SERGEJ L. RUBINSTEJN
in trying to treat these three as
in the Soviet Union)
consisted
a
of
This
effort was
aspects
unitary
complementary
psychology.
forced idealism and mechanicism
from the outset as it merely
doomed
? a
summing up of errors, capable of clarifying nothing.
together
The basic approach has to be not a "synthesis" but a "fight on two
Kornilov
rather than combine errors accumulated
fronts", in order to eliminate
error
The
of introspectionism
did not lie in taking
schools.
different
by
as its object, but in how it did this; and, behaviorism's
consciousness
was not false but wrongly done. Therefore,
in ignoring neither
the psyche nor behavior,
but in
the
of
both
human
conscious
understanding
radically reconstructing
ness and human conduct in their inseparable continuity. This, we claim,
concentration
the solution
on behavior
lies
statements.
the path that can be clearly inferred from Marx'
us
to
construct
the
Marxist-Leninist
with
opportunity
provides
as a "really concrete
and actual6 science".
psychology
(soderzateTnyj)
is exactly
He
for this reconstruction
is to be found in the
point of departure
notion of human activity. In the 1844 Manuscripts,
Marxian
using a
as
Marx
defines
human
the
dis-objec
Hegelian
terminology,
activity
The
an objectification
of the subject, which is simultaneously
of the
?
in
"The
its
and
final result
great thing
object.
Hegel's Phenomenology
the dialectic of negation as the moving
and productive
principle", writes
tification
of man as
that Hegel
grasps the self-development
as
as
and tran
alienation
process,
disobjectification,
objectification
scendence of this alienation;
that he thus grasps the nature of work and
actual, as the result of
comprehends
objective man, authentic because
Marx,
"is simply
his own work".1 All
human
isman's objectification
of
activity, for Marx,
of
the
revelation
of
his
himself; or,
process
objective
work in Capital, Marx asserts very simply
"essential powers". Analyzing
the object". Thus, man's activity is
that in work the "subject becomes
in other words,
not a reaction
to external stimuli, nor is it the operation of a subject on
an object; it is "the subject becoming
the object". Thereby we find the
link not only between
the subject and his activity but also between
the
as
The
of
and
its
very
products.
activity
understanding
activity
objec
?
stresses
tification
includes
this notion: Marx
this when
already
?
in Capital
he says that "activity and the object
analyzing work
each other". To the extent
penetrate
? or
its
the transition
objectified,
objectification
mutually
that human
from
activity is
subject to object
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PSYCHOLOGY
?
115
IN MARX
in the objects of his activity (included are his feelings
since the objective
being of industry is an open
consciousness),
book of essential human powers,
concretely
laying before us human
is revealed
and
"A psychology
for which this book, that is, the
Therefore,
psychology.8
most observably
and
accessible
part of history, remains closed
present
cannot become an actual, substantial and real science."9
the activity of man reveals not only the link from
is
subject to object but also that from object to subject. Objectification
not a "transition into an object" of a ready-made
is
who
isolated
subject
What
is more,
from his own
ness.
himself
activity.
of a given conscious
just a projection
as transition to the object that the subject
unfolded wealth
of
through the objectively
It is not
It is in objectification
is formed. "Only
human
nature
is the wealth of the subjective human
sensibility either
an
or created ? a musical
for
the
ear,
eye
beauty of form, in
senses capable of human satisfaction,
as
themselves
confirming
cultivated
short,
human capacities. For not only the five senses but also the
essentially
so-called spiritual and moral senses (will, love, etc.), in a word, human
sense and the humanity of the senses come into being only through the
existence
of their object, through nature humanized."10 And,
further:
the objectification
is necessary
practically,
of the human
"Hence
human
sense
to humanize
corresponding
to
and
essence, both theoretically
senses and also create a
man's
the entire
wealth
of humanity
and
nature."11
In this way, by objectifying
in the products of his activities,
himself
?
?
is formed
"in part generated,
in part developed"
both in
to
in
statement
the
famous
and
of
consciousness,
feeling
according
.
.
man
in changing external nature,
Capital: ".
simultaneously
changes
man
his
own
nature".
immediacy,
consciousness
but
It is not
in active
in penetrating
labor
transforming
into
the depths
of inert
the world
that man's
is formed.
One further link is needed finally to demarcate
the thought of Marx
on the self-generating
from
that
of
subject
Hegel.
I objectify myself
When
in my activity, I am simultaneously
involved
in an objective
context that is independent
of me and my will. I am
inserted into objective
social relations and the objective
results of my
?
determine
social
relations
the
of
my activity are the
activity
products
of
social
and
satisfaction
products
activity. "Activity
(Genuss), both in
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116
SERGEJ
content
their
social
and mode
L. RUBINSTEJN
of existence,
are
social,
social
activity
and
satisfaction."12
This
sense,
just to my practical activity in the narrower
theoretical activity. Every
takes its
idea that I formulate
in
and sense in the social usage which
it acquires
meaning
applies
but also to my
objective
relationship
not
to the objective
situation in which I formulate
it, and not
on
I
the subjective
intents and convictions
with which
just
depending
use it, just as the products
of my practical activity and their objective
content are products
of social activity: "Social activity and satisfaction
in the form of an immediate
exist merely
communal
by no means
communal
i.e., not just in reality
satisfaction-,
. . .
... in actual association
with other men.
? an
can
I
etc.
Even as I am scientifically
seldom
active,
pursue
activity
?
I am socially active because
in direct community with others
I am
?
of my activity
active as a man. Not only is the material
such as the
?
me
as
a social
to
in
which
the
thinker
is
active
language
given
own
is
I
existence
social
what
make
from
but
my
product,
activity;
activity and immediate
and spirit, experienced
for society, conscious of my nature as social."13
is not the Hegelian
the human
Therefore,
being
self-generating
if
is
in
consciousness
formed
for,
my
my
subject;
activity through the
of
this
it
is
formed
products
activity,
objectively
through the products of
myself
Imake
social activity. In its intimate essence, my consciousness
are established
in social
the objective
bonds which
which
one
practice
theoretical.
and
by
in
every one of my acts, practical and
Every
is linked to me by thousands
of bonds,
spun by the
culture that mediates my consciousness.
accumulating
I include
of my
is mediated
acts
historically
This central Marxian
notion of the formation of the human psyche
cuts through to the main problem
of these products
new
of contemporary
and
opens the way to an effectively
psychology
to the question
solution
of its object, over which
the contemporary
schools have been quarreling.
via the mediation
on the
to the basic idea of introspective
psychology
as
the psychic
the
experience
object of
(immediate
we
inMarx
find clear assertion of the objective mediation
psychology),
to the (concrete)
of consciousness.
"thanks
For, only
objectively
In response
of
immediacy
richness of the human essence"
developed
human
subjective
sensibility. All of Marx'
is achieved
statements
the wealth
on psychology
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of
IN MARX
PSYCHOLOGY
117
of the psyche. For Marx,
idea of the objective mediation
for
for
other
and therefore,
is
existing
people
language
"practically
. . .";
his
relation
with
Peter
real
consciousness
"only through
myself,
the man, similar to himself, does Paul the man come to relate to himself
as man", and so on. Thereby
is opened a path to objective
study of the
carry
this
is not subjective and it is not mediated
only by
psyche. The psyche
can
known
human
it
be
consciousness;
indirectly
through
activity and
the products of this activity since it is, in its being, objectively mediated.
On
the basis of this conception,
to be reconstrued.
The
but has
itself cannot
introspection
and
consciousness
psyche
be excluded
can be
the
is achieved
which is concrete and real. Objectivity
object of psychology,
not by breaking contact with the psychic but by basically
in psychology
of human consciousness
and activity.
transforming the understanding
in the form
labor
The Marxian
of
human
consciousness
and
analysis
the unique status of man", shows forth in all clarity in
this reconstruction
consists, how radical it is, and how it opens the
of the psyche.
path to objective knowledge
is well known: "Conscious
Marx' basic statement on consciousness
"that constitutes
what
can be nothing other than conscious
being (das
{das Bewusstsein)
of their
is the real process
and
the
bewusste Sein)
being of people
is a reflection of being, to use the expression
lives"14; i.e. consciousness
ness
of Lenin. We
consciousness"15,
man's relations
to my milieu
is my
?
relates to nothing
language is consciousness
to add that "My relationship
?
unlike the animal which
have
since
to others
are given to him;
and because of that also for myself.
existing for other people
assertions
form the core of the Marxian
essence
of consciousness
is given
relation of man
milieu
consists
in human
to milieu
notion
two
These
of consciousness.
The
to my
in the fact that my relationship
as a relation,
i.e. the real
consciousness
is mediated
through
its ideal reflection
which
is the plane on which I fix
is practically
realized in language. Language
of my operation.
In this
the being reflected by me and the processuality
are
as
I
in
the
the
is
situation
which
included
the
ideal
know,
way,
plane
?
I use to change the world
and this has to include the
operations
structure
action
As
these
activities.
through the ideal plane frees
the immediately
given situation.
man" thereby excises himself out of
Mediation
dependency
the "conscious
writes16,
and sets himself over against
Lenin
nature
of
from exclusive
on
the world
of things. Man
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ceases
to
118
SERGEJ L, RUBINSTEJN
be a slave of the immediately
actions are
given situation. His mediated
called forth not just by immediate
stimuli but also by goals and plans
that lie beyond
the immediate. He becomes
imaginative, goal-oriented
last are what
to will. These
and able
the human from the
distinguish
"Work as establishing
the unique status of man" has two main
traits: (1) "The process of work ends in a result that was present in man
animal.
already at the inception of the process,
ideally": the real act contains the
ideal, and (2) "the form of given nature changes, as does his own nature
as he defines goals that obligate his will".17 The presence
of the ideal
in
is
involved
the
character
of
the
itself.
plane
changing
activity
This
of the specificity
description
and activity in their interconnections
of the human
forms
of knowlege
in animal
confirmed
is brilliantly
cases.
In the research of K?hler,
and
two
by pathological
experiments
traits emerge as marking primates
that are close to humans: (1) the lack
of Darstellungsfunktion
of speech i.e. the lack of the power of verbal
but the presence
of affective
representation
speech, and (2) the
on
these
of
the
pendency
primates
immediately given situation. One
to become aware of the internal bonding of these two aspects. They
of the Marxian
assertions. No less telling are
negative confirmation
on
results
Jackson, Gelb
aphasia and apraxia, obtained by Head,
where
Goldstein,
?
absence
of
the
ideal plane
is connected
behavior.
goal-directed
impossibility of purposeful,
As a precondition
of the specifically
human
ness
is also
consciousness
human
its first result.
with
de
has
are
the
and
the
?
form of activity
labor
In its essence, conscious
and
by and in transformatory
activity. Such a penetrating
inside" formative
social activity
is the decisive
in
element
is formed
"from
the
Marx'
contrasts
of the formation
conception
will make
this clear. Henri
of human
consciousness.
Some
also stresses the role of
Bergson
of intellect; the latter is formed for the needs
to act on the material world. From this postulate,
in the formation
practice
of practice
in order
concludes
that the intellect does not express con
however,
Bergson
in its interior essence but only characterizes
sciousness
the contours of
matter
as disassociated
for purposes
of practice.18 The psychologist
and
this
to
surface
turned
the
beyond
must,
therefore,
go
philosopher
material world and penetrate
into the "immediate
data of conscious
ness", since practice only reforms, but does not form the internal world
of
consciousness.
The
French
sociological
school
of Durkheim
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also
PSYCHOLOGY
talked about
IN MARX
119
the social nature
to ideology
but then they reduced
of consciousness,
or separated the psychological
and
(L?vy-Bruhl)
or excluded
consciousness
from the domain of
psychology
social (Ch. Blondel)
psychology
(H.Wallon).19
Finally, Freud did recognize
some social components
to the "I" but
which is seen as antagonis
the driving forces in the unconscious,
tically and externally related to consciousness.
In this way, decisive
is the over
for the Marxist-Leninist
notion
found
between
social and individual, external and
coming of the opposition
of the formation of
in
the
internal, accomplished
primitive conception
nature
in
the process of human
the interior
of human consciousness
action
on
in the process of social practice, and in
world,
of the subject through the products of social practice.
to these notions
is the assertion
of the historicity of con
One grows along with the other. "From its very beginning,
the external
the formation
Central
sciousness.
"and will remain
is a social product", writes Marx,
then, consciousness
such as long as there are people."20
the view that recognition
of
We sometimes find in the Soviet Union
even
and
of the genetic
of consciousness,
the historicity
recognition
This is
in general, is specific to Marxist-Leninist
psychology.
viewpoint
not the case. It is enough to refer to the principle of development
in
matter
not
in
but
in
but
the
is
the
idea
itself
view
of
evolution;
Spencer's
how it is understood.
What
is decisive
here
can best
be detected
in a contrast
between
The latter held for a not just quantitative
but
and L?vy-Bruhl.
in
the
of
social-his
of
the
transformation
process
psyche
qualitative
?
torical development
changes not only in content but also in forms
as
of consciousness
and structures. He saw the historical development
Marx
to changes on the individual plane and as bound up with
in
social
formations. He had a, so to speak, dialectical view and
changes
nature of psychic development.
the
social
However,
recognized
L?vy
Bruhl reduced sociality to a mere matter of ideology which, in turn, he
not
reducible
reduced
level of
to psychology.
Social
social consciousness.
remain at the
relations, on his account,
a matter of
Social being here becomes
to
all
real
link
loses
nature, to
Sociality
experience.
socially organized
the objective world, and to any real activity of human practice.
of the psyche
Consequently,
study of the historical
development
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120
SERGEJ L. RUBINSTEJN
in the sphere of practice, but on what is
of man at earlier stages in his develop
given in ideology. Psychology
ment appears to reflect only his religious-mythological
representations.
terms. Con
defines
L?vy-Bruhl
"primitive man" solely in ideological
turns not
sequently,
on what
all his
and
practice
happens
is pre-logical
thought
to contradictions.
insensitive
and mystical,
for
unsuited
at these early stages
Man
of intellect that K?hler attributed to
lacks even the elements
supposedly
his apes. There
is a caesura
between
the early cognitive
and the
here becomes
This basically
false
intellectual. Continuity
impossible.
on
stress
outcome
shows
the
differences
of
and politically
reactionary
As a result of this idealist treatment,
the social
ideological mysticism.
relations lose their character of driving forces of social consciousness,
and social formations become static structures.
in its very foundation;
for here people's
social
to
to
nature.
their
relations
"Work
is
counterposed
..
man
a
nature
and
above all
."21; and it is
process occurring between
the basic social category. Social relations are, above all, real relations of
idea is different
Marx'
relations
are not
in the process of their acting
among people,
production
accumulating
on nature. Only
of the
the correct understanding,
by Marx,
provided
can
essence
man
nature
of
and the social
lead to a
relationship between
correct understanding
and basically
sufficiently
profound
of the psyche.
torical development
Marx' view on the relation of man to nature was clearly
of
the his
formulated.
"Man", he writes, "is a natural being."22 "Man is the immediate object
of natural science", "nature is the direct object of the science of man.
? man
?
.. .".23Hence,
is nature,
himself
The first object for man
"even history is an actual part of the history of nature, the establishment
of nature by man".24
to correct
Essential
of this "establishment
of nature by
understanding
in
how
Marx
is different
of
understanding
Aufhebung
Marx
declared
that
from that in Hegel. On the Hegelian
this "is
notion,
or
of his merely
the root of Hegel's false positivism
apparent criticism
.. ,"25?
for which
"the real is rational",
that positivism
leading to
in
The
is a
Prussian
of
the
monarchy.
justification
Hegel
Aufhebung
? a
to
lower
is
transition
from
combined
ideal
higher
purely
operation
of this lower form as "untrue", imper
with a dialectical
understanding
the lower form remains intact
fect, lower. But, after this Aufhebung,
man"
under
is a correct
the higher
form. "Having
recognized
that man
leads an external
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121
IN MARX
PSYCHOLOGY
ized life in law, politics, etc., man leads in this externalized
his truly human life."26 "Thus after transcending
religion,
life as such
for example,
a
as
it
of
he
self-externalization,
yet finds
recognizing
product
confirmation of himself in religion as religion."21
For Marx, Aufhebung
is not just an ideal operation, but a process of
not just "critique" (of the left Hegelians)
real change, needing
but
?
In the process
revolution.
of development
the
including
psycho
?
of new, higher
forms is linked not with
the emergence
logical
of the untruth or imperfection
of the lower forms, but with
perception
and
The development
of man, in this way, is not a
a
over
of
the nature of human social
process
superstructure
building
a
nature
but
it
is
of
process
by man". This develop
being,
"establishing
ment "thus indicates the extent to which his human essence has become
their real reconstruction.
a natural
become
man,
essence
for him"28, "the extent to which his human nature has
to him".29 Relative
to the psychological
of
development
a
not
to
of
the historical
the
does
reduce
development
psyche
nature
"realm of
superstructural
levels. It is not exhausted
the spirit" over the sensual and instinctual
in the fact that over the primitive
animal
i.e. thought built over the
is deeper
than this; what
were needs of man become over history human needs.
senses develop
Human
and are thereby included
in the whole
of
. . the
senses
a
".
historical
of
five
is
the
development:
development
one
labor of the whole
of
the
with
world"30;
and,
history
previous
instincts
are built
"lower drives". The
"higher
spiritual feelings",
process of development
shows the essence
stroke, Marx
therefore become
theoreticians
of this development:
"The senses have
in their praxis. They try to
immediately
own sake, but
to their subject matter
relate themselves
(Sache) for its
the subject matter
itself is an objective human relation to itself and to
. . ."31This Marxian
man
in the
remark succinctly states a key question
?
on
view
the historical
of perception
contemporary
development
liberation of perception
from the embrace of action and from the fixity
of
is the precondition
of the
forms, their "categorization",
...
stresses
Marx
the historicity of this
higher forms of human activity.
social-historical
conditions
affect the
process,
showing how changing
own
a
a
of
for
their
sake".
When
mineral
becomes
"things
relationship
the lower
it no longer appears
commodity,
ceases to be for its own sake.32
Thus,
even
elementary
feelings
to the human
and
instincts
eye
?
in its beauty,
the whole
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and
human
122
SERGEJ
L. RUBINSTEJN
? are
included in the process of historical development,
psyche
as it might be. Consciousness
is not in even and continuous
uneven
develop
in the process of historical
ment, but it does participate
development.
This is how the process of "establishment
of nature by man" is to be
of man, penetrated
understood,
i.e., as the psychological
development
to a greater depth than ever before.
at this process of development
and change, Marx
showed
Looking
a very
how it is subject to social-historical
He
in
showed
conditioning.
concrete
human
way
how
the different
divisions
as the effects
as well
of
labor
the
conditioned
on the human
of private
property
of development,
conception
revolutionary
practice
with natural necessity
from revolutionary
If
the
psy
theory.
man
on
nature
of
is
twisted
social
then
relations,
chological
dependent
psyche.
follows
psyche,
In this
to be changed. In place of the frequent bourgeois
notion
on
of unchanging
social structure based
human nature, we
unchanging
nature of all. Also
have the notion
of the changing
falling by the
the latter have
as a
is the idealist understanding
of change of consciousness
wayside
mere changing of one's mind, happening
and
spontaneously
becoming
decisive for the historical process. Only in actual socially reconstructive
?
? are
in labor
found the internal contradictions
which incite
practice
human
consciousness
to
develop.
All
the politically necessary
changes
of people's
consciousness,
restructuring
of capitalism not only in economics
find their theoretical grounding
in Marx'
nants
develops
practice.
becomes
under
the
we
face under
socialism
and
the overcoming
but also in people's
notion
influence
of how
?
the
of rem
?
heads
consciousness
of
social
historically
transformatory
Itself the product
of historical
consciousness
development,
?
the precondition
of this same historical
its
development
free but essential
component.
not only reflects the objective world, but also
consciousness
?
creates it"33, wrote Lenin. A shift in consciousness
and its form and
?
content are inseparable
is a not insignificant element in the historical
than physiological
process; it is no more epi-phenomenal
processes.
are
in consciousness
determines
consciousness.
But
Being
changes
"Human
in being that signify changed conditions
for the effecting of the
?
to a great extent through
of people who are conditioned
?
their consciousnesses
conditions. The Leninist problem
by objective
changes
activities
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IN MARX
PSYCHOLOGY
and conscious
of the spontaneous
(cf. What
but
the
transition
outside
course,
psychology,
123
is to be done?34)
falls, of
to the other is a
from one
profound psychic change.
The problem
is central to these psychological
consid
of the person
erations of Marx, and is also critical to the crisis in modern
psychology
since
introspectionism
reduces him to externals.
On
reduces
man
to
internals
and
behaviorism
is viewed
from a "depth
scene, the person
or
a
of
Freudianism
from
perspec
psychology"
perspective
personalist
tive (W. Stern), both of which are foreign to Marxism.
of
Symptomatic
the contemporary
the situation of psychology
in the USSR
is the fact that our psychology
?
?
a psychology
that wants
to be Marxist
has been treating the
a
or
of
the
from
Freud-Adler
Stern viewpoint.
person only
problem
Of
course, within Marxist-Leninist
person should be central and should
Outside
of its links with the person,
because
logical
of the
the problem
psychology
a
receive
totally other treatment.
one
who
cannot
are
understand
psycho
material
development
and material
production
"people
communication
account
can only be idealistic. To this approach
that
Marx opposes
another that "begins with the
developing
are thereby changing
their
as
as
well
their thought and the products of their thought"35.
reality,
The forms of consciousness
do not develop
in some
autonomously
are
or
sort of autogenesis;
the
attributes
functions
of
the
real
they
to
In
which
abstraction
from
the
whole,
person,
any
they belong.
of consciousness
begins with
actually
consciousness,
existing individuals
and considers
consciousness
only
as their
consciousness".36
cannot be reduced to an analysis of
psychology
or functions
and functions. These very processes
impersonal processes
of
writes
are, for Marx,
"Man",
Marx,
"organs
individuality".
"appro
Therefore,
Marxist
essence
in an all-sided way, thus as a
priates to himself his manifold
whole man." In this participates
each of his "human relations
to the
?
world
seeing, hearing smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, perceiving,
?
in short, all the organs
of his
sensing, wishing,
acting,
loving
individuality..
Without
conception
everything
,".37
one cannot activate
such an approach,
is a social
that human
consciousness
psychic
is socially
conditioned.
Social
the basic Marxian
product
relations
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and
are
that
those
124
SERGEJ L. RUBINSTEJN
one meets
not just isolated sense organs or psychic processes,
as a person. The determining
influence of social relations and
work is exercised only through the person.
inclusion
of the person
in psychology
should not lead to
But,
where
but man
or with
is not identical with consciousness
person
as
is asserted in spiritualist psychology.
self-consciousness,
In his analysis of Hegel's
Marx
cites among
the
Phenomenology,
errors that of taking the subject always as consciousness
or self-con
The
psychologism.
sciousness
or,
are not
more
exactly,
abstract
consciousness.38
But,
although
to
the person,
both consciousness
and self
are essential
the person
for the person. Both
and its
?
relations with others depend on consciousness
which
since it is a
?
is a property
property of matter which can be either conscious or not
of the human person, without which itwould not be what it is.
they
consciousness
identical
as
But the essence
of the person
In a
is to be a set of social relations.39
to the history
of the word
investigation
special
came
notes
an Etruscan
A.
it
that
from
"persona",
Trendelenburg
source and indicated a social function. B?hler notes that this meaning
an internal essence
has been subverted so that the word now designates
as
to
extent
to which how one
and
raises
the
the
question
(Wesensart)
fulfills one's
devoted
social
essence
to one's essence. Evidently
role belongs
and his social relations are external
for B?hler
one
to the
the person's
other, and the term "person" indicates now one, and now the other; it
comes
to the Etruscan
closer
sense, i.e. "mask"40, than to interior
essence. The
series of social functions
that a man has to fulfill in
society remain exterior to his person.
bourgeois
The human person in general is formed only through his relations to
other people. Only in my relations with other people do I form myself
as a human being: "Only through his relation with Peter
the man,
come
man
to relate to himself as man.
similar to himself, does Paul the
is for him
the same time, Paul as such, in all his Pauline corporeality,
an instance of the species 'man'."41
to the ideas prevalent
In counterpoise
in contemporary
psychology
?
where biological
and psycho-pathology
appears as the
conditioning
self-sufficient
ego, defined by
primary immediate given, as the absolute,
At
determined
constitutional
the depths of biologically
?
for Marx
and
mediations
of
social
bonds
pendent
inde
peculiarities,
the person and his
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PSYCHOLOGY
rejection
125
are mediated
is
by social relations and its development
as
of
these
relations.
the
However,
just
by
dynamics
so
is not rejection
of the psychological,
of psychologism
is not rejection of the biological. Psycho-physical
of biologism
consciousness
mainly
IN MARX
determined
rejection
nature is not overcome
or neutralized,
but mediated
by social relations
nature
becomes
man!
and, voil?,
A revolution
in psychological
of man was also occa
understanding
sioned by Marx' notion of human needs.
to that of instinct, must enjoy a
in contrast
concept of need,
in
Lack of attention to needs
Marxist-Leninist
psychology.
higher place
to idealism. "People
in the context of human conduct
leads necessarily
are inclined", writes Engels,
"to explain
their actions
through their
The
thoughts, instead of through their needs (which, of course, are reflected
in the brain) and, in this way, over time arose the idealist worldview
which took over, especially at the end of the ancient world."42 With use
of need, the whole doctrine on the motivation
of human
a
new
different
from
that
based
acquires
wholly
interpretation
In contrast
to rationalist notions,
needs
instincts and inclinations.
of the notion
conduct
on
express
of human
the claims
needs
are
often
"nature"
and
into
of
context
the human
with
organism.
instincts and
brought
social relations are
inclinations,
they are not the same. The mediational
a product of history, while instincts are only physiological.
to acquire a significant place
in
The notion of need is beginning
to
in
As
his
address
the
noted
Tenth
Inter
contemporary
psychology.
Although
on hunger
A. Katz was concentrating
Congress,
Psychology
and appetite in the context of a "psychology of need".43 E. Clapar?de44
and K. Lewin45 reported along similar lines. ... It appears that in the
course of historical development
not only are new needs built on the
national
original instincts but
the ever-complexifying
of man
become
these
social
human
rebuilt in function of
latter are themselves
?
to use Marx' words, the needs
relations
needs.
Therefore,
of need we find human
in the place of abstract
conduct, but also in opposi
idealist conceptions
tion to a biologistic
theory of these needs: the key lies in history, over
which these needs are experienced.
In this way, the emphasis on needs over instincts provides
for the
of psychological
motivation.
This supplies a rich picture of
historicity
the basic motivations
of human activity and overcomes
the temptation
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126
SERGEJ L. RUBINSTEJN
?
e.g. in Freudian pan-sexualism
wealth and variety of historically
circle of motivations
ever-widening
which
directly on
"the importance
depends
?
to look for one
single
source. The
needs provide
for the
accumulating
of human conduct,
the meaning
of
concrete
conditions.
"We saw",
historical
writes Marx,
under socialism of a wealth of human
and a new object of production:
needs, both a new sort of production
of essential
human
there is a new manifestation
forces and a new
enrichment
property",
assertion,
dependence.
of human
stresses
Marx
"we observe
But,
historically
essence."46
on
in view
"Under
of
the
of private
of this
conditioning
the dominance
social
the opposite":
every new need creates a new
the "hypothesis
of socialism"
this wealth
of
?
on ever
ever varied and developing
needs
the path to rich, full and dynamically
developing
developing
?
opens
higher planes
stimuli for human activity.
to these ideas on motivation,
In addition
there isMarx' understand
as
conditioned
of
and
interests
historically
socially
driving forces of
ing
of needs
is connected
by Marx with
activity. The historicity
idea of historically
variable
talents. "Differences
among natural
in individuals", writes Marx,
"is not only cause but also
endowments
Marx
in Capital
of
writes
that industrial
of
division
the
labor."47
effect
human
the
production
in turn,
and,
for production.48
This means
are the ground of the emergence
of
with
individuals
requires
those talents that are needed
develops
that the natural
certain
talents
gifts of the workers
the natural gifts
labor, but this division also influences
in
that are not given in a fixed form, but vary over history, especially
to developed
In
forms of capitalism.49
the emergence
from primitive
the division
of
fact, the division of labor leads to the formation of specialists who bear
. . ."50, and the further
of
development
only "part of a social function
are
but aggregates
of unintegrated
forms individuals who
automation
social functions.
nature of the person
in his needs
is concretised
The psychological
and mediated
and talents. This nature is in essence conditioned
by the
same social-historical
in which
conditions,
they are formed. This
of the person
and his structures on the social-historical
in his account of the reign of
is acutely described
by Marx
confirms
Even
Proudhon's
Communism
objectively
private property.
to abstract from
the power of private property,
through its attempt
dependence
formation
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PSYCHOLOGY
individual
talents.51 Denial
to the fact
of reference
positive
The
127
IN MARX
of the person
is, essentially,
"only one way
that private property
tries to affirm itself as
sociality".52
of human
products
tions of human
activity that are "concretized"
objectifica
are, thanks to their
(of the essential powers)
under the domination
of private property. As a
essence
alienated
objectivity,
result every new need
that can be the source of new human wealth
a new dependency
alienation occurs.
and, as these accumulate,
? not
of
the overcoming
this alienation
ideally and metaphysi
becomes
Only
i.e. by establishing
cally, but actually and concretely
through revolution,
? can
Communism
full
the
of the individual.
guarantee
development
"The overcoming
of private property means
therefore
the complete
of all human senses and aptitudes
but it
emancipation
(Eigenschaften),
means
senses
this emancipation
because
these
and
precisely
aptitudes
have become human both subjectively and objectively."53
the accomplishment
the development
guarantees
Only
relations
strength
to people
is not
of the individual
of
true human
relations
in the collective
of the human person. The wealth of actual
the actual, spiritual wealth of man, and the
is to be found in that of the collective. The
toward
to genuine
and impersonality
is foreign
tendency
levelling
Communism.
Marx pursued
the question of the levelling of talents in
his polemic with Lassalle
in the Critique of the Gotha Program. Lenin
further developed
these ideas when discussing
the rights of vagabonds
The current campaign against "wage-levelling"
are practical
in appreciating
the gifts of each worker
under socialism of this theoretical assertion of Marx.
in State and Revolution.
and
for care
realizations
Only
in the collectivity
fully his gifts; only
did Marx
see
in the collective
the
individual
is the person
as able
to
free. When
develop
Marx
talks of "personal freedom" he is consciously
departing from the
that term has in bourgeois
meaning
society, where the person is free as
a bird ? free to die of hunger!
can be formal and negative or concrete and positive:
Freedom
the
former asks
'free from what', while the latter asks 'free for what?' Marx
caj guarantee
that only the collective
in the second
freedom
sense since it opens the path to full development
of the individual. In
the 1844 Manuscripts
Marx describes
the true collectivity:
"Commun
as
ism
of private property as human self-alienation,
positive overcoming
shows
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128
SERGEJ
L. RUBINSTEJN
and thus as the actual
appropriation
of the human essence through and
for man; therefore as the complete and conscious
restoration of man to
himself within the total wealth of previous development,
the restoration
as com
of man as a social, that is, human being. This Communism
as completed
is humanism,
humanism
it is naturalism.
pleted naturalism
It is the genuine
between man and nature
resolution of the antagonism
it is the true resolution
and between man and man;
of the conflict
between
existence
and
and self-affirmation,
objectification
freedom and necessity,
and species. It is the riddle of history
solved and knows itself as this solution."54
essence,
individual
in this article, of course, not resolved
the wealth of ideas
can
which psychology
gain from the works of Marx. We have only
some
to
touched
mentions
that are relevant
upon
by Marx
lightly
on
central problems,
that
the
of
object
psychology
including
(the
We
have
and
and of its relations to human existence),
problem of consciousness
even
on
on
scan
and
the person. But
that
this rapid
shows
development
us that Marx provides psychology
with a complete
system of ideas. In
the context
of
the foundations
trace the basic
ideas
the path along which
of Marxist-Leninist
his
methodology
lines of a psychological
and
toward
system
point
can become
"a contentful and genuine
psychology
science".
A
task now
serious
research work
to use concrete
Soviet psychology:
the potentialities,
by accomplishing
and the factual material,
both in theory
its methodological
position and conscious
stands before
in order
to actualize
the unity of both methodology
to strengthen
and in practice,
service
to the construction
the USSR,
where
we
of a classless
students
was central for the whole
of Marx
is under way in
society which
and Lenin are carrying on what
life of Marx.
NOTES
*
in Sovetskaja
Vol.
7, No.
1, 1934. On Rubin
Originally
psichotechnika,
published
see Ted Payne,
S. L. Rubinstejn
and the Philosophical
Founda
stejn's life and career,
tion of Soviet Psychology,
1968.
Dordrecht,
Reidel,
1
Cf. Bericht
?ber die XII Kongress
der Deutschen
Gesellschaft
f?r Psychologie,
hrsg.
von Kafka,
Jena, 1932, S. 3-6.
2
Cf. K. B?hler,
Die Krise der Psychologie,
Jena, 1929.
(Izd. 2-e. Cf. s. 1?2 and 27
28).
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PSYCHOLOGY
3
4
Cf. Zeitschrift
f?r A ngewandte
Psychologie
In Russia,
this position was taken by Nikolai
IN MARX
129
1933,1.
Grot, aWundtian.
J. B. Watson,
the Standpoint
Psychology
from
of Behaviorism,
Philadelphia,
1924.
Lippincott,
6
i F. Engel's,
K. Marks
the Early Works),
Iz rannich
M., Gt,
proizvedenij
(From
str. 595.
1956.
L. D. Easton,
Kurt H. Guddat
of the Young
(English:
(eds), Writings
Marx on Philosophy
and Society, Anchor,
1967. p. 311).
7
Ibid. str. 627. (English: p. 321)
8
Ibid. str. 594. (English: p. 309)
9
Ibid. str. 595. (English: p. 311)
10
Ibid. str. 593-594.
(English:
309)
11
Ibid. str. 594. (English:
309)
12
Ibid. str. 589. (English: 305)
13
Ibid. str. 590. (English: 306)
14
iF. Engel's
K. Marks
Soc. t 3, str. 25.
15
Ibid. str. 29 (note 2).
16
Cf. V. I. Lenin, Poln. sobr. soc., t. 29, str. 85.
17
Marks
iEngel's,
Soc., t. 23, str. 189.
18
Cf. H. Bergson,
Evolution
cr?atrice, Paris, 1911.
19
Cf. H. Wallon,
Le probl?me
de la conscience,
1929.
later
Paris,
biologique
(Wallon
abandoned
this position)
20
Marks
iEngel's
Soc., t. 3, str. 29.
21
Ibid. t. 23, str. 188.
22
. . ., str. 631.
Marks
iEngel's,
Iz rannich
(English: p. 325)
23
Ibid. str. 596.
24
Loc. cit.
25
Ibid. str. 634. (English: 329)
26
Ibid. str. 634. (English: 329)
27
Loc. cit.
28
Ibid. str. 587. (English:
303)
29
Loc. cit.
30
Ibid. str. 594. (English: 309)
31
Ibid. str. 592. (English:
308)
32
Ibid. str. 594. (English:
309)
33
V. I. Lenin, Poln. sobr. soc., t. 29, str. 194.
34
/?>/?,t.6,str.28-53.
35
Marks
iEngel's
Soc., t. 3, str. 25.
36
Loc. cit.
37
. . . , str. 591.
Marks
iEngel's,
Iz rannich
(English: 307)
38
str.
625.
Ibid.,
39
Marks
iEngel's,
Soc., t. 3, str. 3.
40
A. Trendelenburg,
'Zur Geschichte
des Wortes
"Person"', Kantstudien
13, S.
1908,
4-5.
41
Marks
iEngel's,
Soc., t. 23, str. 62 (Note 18).
42
Ibid., t. 20, str. 493.
43
See his address
and Appetite'
?ber den Kongress
der Deutschen
'Hunger
(Bericht
5
Cf.
f?r
Gesellschaft
same theme.
Psychologie,
hrsg. XII
von Kafka,
1932,
S. 285)
and
his book
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
on
the
SERGEJ L. RUBINSTEJN
130
44
Revue philosophique
'La psychologie
Cf. E. Clapar?de,
fonctionnelle',
1926.
K. Lewin,
Cf. especially
Versatz. Wille und Bed?rfnis,
Berlin,
46
. . . , str. 599.
iEngel's,
Marks
Iz rannich
47
Ibid. str. 611.
48
Marks
iEngel's,
Soc., t. 23, str. 361.
49
to Chapters
12 and 13).
Ibid. (Notes
50
Ibid. str. 499.
51
. . ., str. 586.
Marks
iEngel's,
Iz rannich
52
Ibid. str. 587.
53
Ibid. str. 592. (English: 308)
54
Ibid. str. 588. (English:
304)
45
Translated
byT.
from the Russian
J. BLAKELEY
(Boston College)
with
ALEX
the editorial
help of
KOZULIN
(Boston University)
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1933,1?2.