J-A20025-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
V.L. LAURIE WILLIAMS
Appellant
No. 3195 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 15, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0000019-2013
CP-15-CR-0001853-2012
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., MUNDY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.:
FILED AUGUST 19, 2014
Appellant, V.L. Laurie Williams, appeals1 from the October 15, 2013
aggregate judgment of sentence of five years’ probation, imposed after she
was found guilty in a bench trial of one count of simple assault, and three
counts
each
of
recklessly
endangering
another
person
(REAP)
and
harassment.2 After careful review, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
The trial court summarized the relevant facts of this case as follows.
____________________________________________
1
We note that although Appellant purports to appeal from the October 31,
2013 order denying her post-sentence motion, a direct appeal in a criminal
case is properly taken from a judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v.
Borovichka, 18 A.3d 1242, 1246 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2011). Thus, we have
amended the caption accordingly.
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701(a)(3), 2705, and 2709(a)(3), respectively.
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In the early evening hours of April 24, 2012,
Meredith Armstrong [(hereinafter, the victim, or
collectively with her family, the victims)] was riding
her bicycle with a trailer attached to it carrying her
two (2) toddler sons.
[The victim] was also
expecting another child as she was pregnant during
this time period. [The victim] was riding her bicycle
back and forth on Casselberry Lane from her house
at the end of Casselberry Lane, to the Casselberry’s
residence at the beginning of the Lane, and then
back to her house. Casselberry Lane is a private
paved roadway and there are only two homes on the
lane requiring its use for ingress or egress to their
residence. The only two houses requiring usage of
the lane are owned by the Casselberry’s and
Armstrong’s respectively.
Casselberry Lane runs
parallel to Spruce Grove Lane.
[Appellant]’s
residence is located on Spruce Grove Lane and does
not require usage of Casselberry Lane for ingress or
egress.
While biking on Casselberry Lane, [the victim]
heard something approaching from behind her.
Upon looking over her shoulder, she observed
[Appellant]’s automobile approaching the rear of her
bicycle at approximately 40 m.p.h. Consequently,
[the victim] was forced to veer her bike off the
paved lane to avoid being struck by the vehicle.
[Appellant] proceeded to drive past the bicycle
without slowing down. Upon turning around in the
Armstrong’s
driveway,
[Appellant]’s
vehicle
approached the bicycle for a second time. However,
this time [Appellant]’s vehicle approached the bicycle
from the front, setting up a potential head on
collision. Once again, [the victim] was forced to
swerve the bicycle off the paved lane to remove her
family out of the path of [Appellant]’s vehicle. [The
victim] feared not only that her children and herself
could potentially get struck by [Appellant]’s vehicle,
but also that they may be injured from the bicycle
having to veer off the paved lane and on to the
grass. At no point in time did [Appellant’s] vehicle
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slow down, rather it continued past the bicycle at
approximately the same rate of speed.
As [Appellant]’s vehicle continued to travel
down the lane, without slowing down[, Appellant]
began driving more erratically. Approximately half
way down the lane, [the victim] observed [Appellant]
driving in what [the victim] perceived to be in an Sshape pattern. In other words, [Appellant] was
swerving her automobile back and forth from the
grass on one side of the lane to the grass on the
other side of the lane. At one point, [Appellant] was
driving so erratically that she drove off the lane onto
the grass causing a piece of turf to become uprooted and fly over the vehicle.
Once again, on April 26, 2012, [the victim’s
husband,] Mr. Armstrong[,] observed [Appellant]’s
vehicle in his driveway. However, instead of driving
around the circular part to turn around, [Appellant]
proceeded to make a three-point turn approximately
100 feet before reaching the Armstrong’s residence.
[Appellant] drove towards Whitehorse Road, making
serpentine movements onto the grass on both sides
of the driveway. Approximately half way down the
Armstrong’s driveway, [Appellant] made another
three-point turn, and headed back towards the
Armstrong’s residence. Mr. Armstrong was outside
his garage as [Appellant] proceeded to stop her
vehicle a short distance from him. Next, [Appellant]
exited her vehicle and threatened to repeat this
same conduct every day until the Armstrong’s
removed the fence between Casselberry and Spruce
Grove Lanes. Mr. Armstrong was able to record this
encounter on his video camera.
The vehicle
proceeded to exit the lane in the same serpentine
fashion. However, about halfway down the lane
[Appellant] abruptly pulled her vehicle over into the
grass and began collecting sticks.
After a few
minutes, [Appellant] reentered her vehicle and drove
off towards Whitehorse Road.
At approximately
10:30 p.m. on that same evening, the Armstrong’s
observed [Appellant]’s vehicle, yet again, enter their
driveway.
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Finally, on April 29, 2012, [Appellant] drove
her vehicle onto Casselberry Lane while [the victim]
was walking with her two children.
During this
encounter, [Appellant] offered [victim]’s children
bagels and proceeded to shout to [the victim] that
[Appellant] was going to sue [the victim] for one
million dollars and the family boat. This behavior
was repeated and captured on video as [the victims]
walked away and police arrived.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/16/14, at 1-3 (citations to notes of testimony
omitted).
Appellant
was
subsequently
arrested
in
connection
with
these
incidents, and charged with multiple counts of harassment, REAP, and
related offenses.
Specifically, at docket number CP-15-CR-0001853-2012,
Appellant was charged with three counts each of REAP and harassment. At
docket number CP-15-CR-0000019-2013, Appellant was charged with three
counts of simple assault, three counts of harassment, and two counts of
stalking.3 These cases were consolidated prior to trial. Appellant waived her
right to a jury and proceeded to a bench trial on April 18, 2013. Thereafter,
on June 14, 2013, Appellant was found guilty of one count of simple assault,
and three counts each of REAP and harassment. See Verdict, 6/14/13.
Appellant was found not guilty of the remaining counts of harassment and
____________________________________________
3
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709.1.
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stalking.4
Id.
As noted, on October 15, 2013, the trial court sentenced
Appellant to an aggregate term of five years’ probation.
On October 25,
2013, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which was denied by
the trial court on October 31, 2013.
On November 20, 2013, this timely
appeal followed.5, 6
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review.
A.
Did the [t]rial [c]ourt abuse its discretion
and/or err as a matter of law and fact in
finding
sufficient
evidence
to
convict
[Appellant] on the charge of Simple Assault Physical Menace, 18 Pa.C.S.A § 2701(a)(3),
where the evidence presented established that
the road [Appellant] and the alleged victim
were traveling on was not wide enough for
both [Appellant’s] automobile and victim’s
bicycle, and that as each were traveled
towards each other they each [] voluntarily
took evasive action so they both could pass
one another and where there was no intent to
place anyone in imminent fear of harm or
injury[?]
B.
Did the [t]rial [c]ourt abuse its discretion
and/or err as a matter of law and fact in
finding
sufficient
evidence
to
convict
[Appellant] on the charges of and (sic) [REAP],
18 Pa.C.S.A § 2705 (three counts), where the
____________________________________________
4
The record reflects that the Commonwealth withdrew two simple assault
charges prior to trial.
5
Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On May 9, 2014, Appellant filed a “Motion for Leave to File an Amended
Brief,” which was denied by per curiam order of this Court on June 3, 2014.
6
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evidence presented established that the road
[Appellant] and the alleged victim were
traveling on was not wide enough for both
[Appellant’s] automobile and the victim’s
bicycle, and that as each were travel[ing]
towards each other they each [] voluntarily
took evasive action so they both could pass
one another and where there was no intent to
place anyone in imminent fear of harm or
injury[?]
C.
Did the [t]rial [c]ourt abuse its discretion
and/or err as a matter of law and fact in
finding
sufficient
evidence
to
convict
[Appellant] on the charges of Harassment Course of Conduct With No Legitimate Purpose,
18 Pa.C.S.A § 2709[](a)(3) (three counts),
where the evidence presented established that
Casselberry Lane was a deeded easement for
their use by [Appellant], [the victim] and other
abutting
and
adjoining
neighbors,
that
[Appellant] had used Casselberry Lane to cross
over the adjacent grass to access her driveway
on Spruce Grove Lane for years until a fence
was erected between her property line and the
Casselberry Lane, [Appellant] apologized for
her action offering bagels to the [victim’s]
children, that [Appellant] did not shout
obscenities, that threats of a lawsuit for
preventing her use of Casselberry Lane to gain
access to her driveway was protected freedom
of speech and that legitimate basis existed for
[Appellant] to believe that the [victim and her
husband] were responsible for the fences
erection existed and where the Commonwealth
did not establish that [Appellant] had engaged
in a course of conduct which served no
legitimate basis[?]
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Appellant’s Brief at 3-4 (emphasis omitted).7
We begin by addressing Appellant’s claim that there was insufficient
evidence to sustain her conviction for simple assault by physical menace.
Id. at 12.
Specifically, the crux of Appellant’s claim is that the
Commonwealth failed to establish that she possessed the requisite “intent to
place [the victim] in imminent fear of imminent serious bodily injury.” Id.
For the following reasons, we disagree.
When addressing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, our standard of
review is well settled. We must “review the evidence admitted during the
trial along with any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that
evidence
in
the
light
most
favorable
to
the
Commonwealth.”
Commonwealth v. Crawford, 24 A.3d 396, 404 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(citation omitted). “Any doubts concerning an appellant’s guilt [are] to be
resolved by the trier of fact unless the evidence was so weak and
inconclusive that no probability of fact could be drawn therefrom.”
Commonwealth v. West, 937 A.2d 516, 523 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal
denied, 947 A.2d 737 (Pa. 2008).
Moreover, “[t]he Commonwealth may
sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable
doubt
by
means
of
wholly
circumstantial
evidence.”
Commonwealth v. Perez, 931 A.2d 703, 707 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations
____________________________________________
To the extent Appellant’s arguments in Issues A and B are interrelated, we
will address them concurrently.
7
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omitted).
“[T]he trier of fact, in passing upon the credibility of the
witnesses,
is
free
to
believe
all,
part,
or
none
of
the
evidence.”
Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1220 (Pa. 2009) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, Rivera v. Pennsylvania,
560 U.S. 909 (2010).
The crime of simple assault is codified in the Pennsylvania Crimes
Code and provides, in pertinent part, as follows.
“A person is guilty of
assault if he … attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of
imminent serious bodily injury[.]”
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(3).
“Serious
bodily injury” is defined as “[b]odily injury which creates a substantial risk of
death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss
or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2301.
The elements which must be proven for simple assault under Section
2701(a)(3) are that the defendant attempted to put the victim in fear of
imminent serious bodily injury, and took a substantial step toward that end
through the use of physical menace or frightening activity. Commonwealth
v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 726 (Pa. Super. 2003), citing Commonwealth
v. Little, 614 A.2d 1146, 1151 (Pa. Super. 1992), appeal denied, 618 A.2d
399 (Pa. 1992).
Instantly, our review of the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, as the verdict winner, reveals that there
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was sufficient evidence to establish that Appellant intentionally put the
victim in fear of imminent serious bodily injury on the day in question, and
did so by the use of physical menace.
The record establishes that in the
early evening of April 24, 2012, the victim was bicycling up Casselberry Lane
with her two minor children in the bicycle’s “taxi” trailer when she observed
Appellant’s automobile traveling at a high rate of speed, and was forced to
veer off the roadway on two separate occasions.
N.T., 4/18/13, at 15.
Specifically, the victim testified as follows.
Q.
What, if anything, did you see after you
observed [Appellant’s vehicle] coming out of
her driveway?
A.
I continued driving down Casselberry Lane with
my children, and I turned into
the
Casselberrys’ [driveway], and we were headed
back up Casselberry Lane towards my house
when I heard something behind me as I was
on my bike, and I looked over my shoulder and
see (sic) [Appellant] coming up behind us in
her car at what I perceived to be a high rate of
speed. And at that point she did not appear to
be slowing down, so I drove off of the lane to
the left with my children. She continued past
me without slowing down.
At that point I turned back onto the road.
I presumed she was going to my house for
some reason, or to see my husband, and I
drove back up the lane on the bike. And from
the time I was driving up the lane she had
gone and looped around our driveway, this was
my perception, and was coming back out of
our driveway. So we were now coming at each
other like this, and I was on the road. And
when we were probably about 15 feet apart, I
swerved off to the right side of the road to
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remove my children out of the path of her car.
And she swerved to the right, and we passed
each other.
Id. at 17-18
The victim further testified, based on her observations and experience,
that Appellant’s vehicle was traveling approximately 40 m.p.h at the time of
this incident, and at no point did Appellant attempt to yield or slow down.
Id. at 18-21, 24. The victim also noted that, after Appellant passed her a
second time, her vehicle began swerving in a serpentine fashion from one
side of Casselberry Lane to the other, causing turf to fly over her vehicle.
Id. at 18.8
As a result of this incident, the victim testified that she was placed in
fear for her own safety as well as the safety of her two minor children who
were in the bicycle’s “taxi” trailer at the time.
Specifically, the victim
testified as follows.
I had my two young children behind me, so my first
concern was for their safety. We were on a bike,
and [Appellant] was in a car. So there is certainly a
difference in those two modes of transportation. My
concern was not only that potentially my children
could get hit by a car, or that I could get hit by a car,
but also the bike that I had, it was not meant to
drive in the grass. It’s not a mountain bike. So
____________________________________________
The victim’s husband also testified that on April 26, 2012, he observed
Appellant’s vehicle enter his driveway on multiple occasions, travel on
Casselberry Lane “at a high rate of speed” and “screech[] [its] tires[,]” and
proceed to drive in a serpentine pattern down the roadway. N.T., 4/18/13,
at 93, 97-99.
8
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driving off the road onto the grass, it could have
caused the child carrier to flip or turn over. So I
think there were several different areas that my
children were in danger.
Id. at 25.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court, sitting as
factfinder, could reasonably infer that Appellant’s actions were done so with
both the intent and physical menace necessary to place the victim in fear of
imminent serious bodily injury to both herself and her two minor children.
See Reynolds, supra. Accordingly, Appellant’s contention that there was
insufficient evidence to sustain her conviction for simple assault by physical
menace must fail.
Appellant next argues there was insufficient evidence to sustain her
convictions for REAP. Appellant’s Brief at 16. Specifically, Appellant avers
that “[t]he record as a whole is devoid of any evidence of a gross deviation
from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe under the
circumstances of … this case.”
Id. at 19.
Appellant maintains that the
Commonwealth failed to prove she possessed the requisite intent for REAP.
Id. at 16, 21. We disagree.
“A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he
recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another person in
danger of death or serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705. “The mens
rea for the crime of [REAP] is a conscious disregard of a known risk of death
or great bodily injury to another person.” Commonwealth v. Fabian, 60
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A.3d 146, 155 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted), appeal denied, 69 A.3d 600 (Pa. 2013). “To sustain a conviction
for [REAP], the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant had an actual
present ability to inflict harm and not merely the apparent ability to do so.
Danger, not merely the apprehension of danger, must be created.”
Commonwealth v. Martuscelli, 54 A.3d 940, 949 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
In the instant matter, the evidence adduced at trial, as previously
discussed, established that Appellant operated her vehicle in such a manner
that the victim was twice forced to veer off Casselberry Lane out of fear of
serious bodily injury to herself or her children. See N.T., 4/18/13, at 17-20,
25. Given Appellant’s high rate of speed and erratic driving on the evening
in question, we agree with the trial court that Appellant demonstrated a
“conscious disregard of a known risk of death or great bodily injury” to
victim and her children, thereby satisfying the requisite mens rea for REAP.
Fabian, supra; see also Trial Court Opinion, 1/16/14, at 4-5. Moreover,
this conclusion is supported by the testimony of the victim’s husband, who
noted that, following his observations of Appellant’s erratic driving on the
evening of April 26, 2012, Appellant yelled, “I’m going to do this every day
until you take those fences down.”
Appellant’s
contention
the
N.T, 4/18/13, at 99.
evidence
convictions for REAP must also fail.
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was
insufficient
to
Accordingly,
support
her
J-A20025-14
Appellant further argues, albeit parenthetically in both Issues A and B,
that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions for both simple
assault and REAP, given the narrow width of Casselberry Lane and the fact
that, as they were traveling towards each other, “[Appellant and the victim]
voluntarily took evasive action so they both could pass one another[.]”
Appellant’s Brief at 12, 16. We disagree.
Contrary to Appellant’s characterization of this incident as one where
both parties merely took voluntary evasive action to pass one another, the
testimony of the victim reveals she twice veered off Casselberry Lane out of
the fear or danger of imminent serious bodily injury resulting from
Appellant’s conduct.
See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701(a)(3), 2705.
the victim testified as follows.
Q.
Now, when [Appellant] was coming up from
behind you, why did you have to go off of the
lane?
A.
I was nervous at the rate of speed that she
was traveling. I was on a bike and she was in
a car and I didn’t want to put myself or my
children in danger.
Q.
Was there enough room on that lane for her to
have passed you if she just stayed on the
lane?
A.
No, I don’t believe so.
Q.
And when she was traveling towards you now
coming back from your residence, and she was
ten to 15 feet away from you –
A.
Yes.
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Specifically,
J-A20025-14
Q.
-- why did you have to, or why did you veer off
the road at that time?
A.
She didn’t appear to be slowing down in any
way. And based on what happened on the way
up the road, I was nervous that she could hit
the bike or my children or myself.
Q.
Okay. And again, was there any room, if you
had not veered off … was there any room for
her to pass you when she was traveling in that
direction towards your bike?
A.
No.
N.T., 4/18/13, at 19-20.
Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant’s
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on this basis is devoid of merit.
Lastly, Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain
her convictions for three counts of harassment.
Appellant’s Brief at 24.
Specifically, Appellant contends that the Commonwealth failed to present
sufficient evidence at trial that she possessed the requisite intent to harass
or annoy the victims, or “had engaged in a course of conduct which served
no legitimate basis.”
Id.
In support of her contention that she had a
legitimate basis for her conduct, Appellant argues as follows.
Casselberry Lane is a private lane, which [the
victims], [Appellant] and other neighbors, who live
adjacent to and abutting the lane have or claim to
have a deeded easement (60 foot right-of-way which
consists of 20 foot cart way and 20 feet on each
side) for their use and access to their property.
[Appellant] had a regular habit of using
Casselberry Lane. Since they moved to Casselberry
Lane, [the victims] had known that [Appellant] had
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used Casselberry Lane to cross over the adjacent
grass to access her driveway on Spruce Grove Lane
for years until a fence was erected between her
property line and the Casselberry Lane easement.
When the fence was being erected [the
victims] sat in beach chairs watching the installation
for hours, which [Appellant] saw and believed that
they were responsible for it. [The victims] knew that
[Appellant] had an aversion to the fence as it
prevented her from using Casselberry Lane to gain
access to her driveway.
Id. at 26.
Appellant further argues, albeit parenthetically, that her
purported “easement” to use Casselberry Lane as an ingress and egress to
her property somehow negates the ‘no legitimate purpose’ element of
Section 2709(a)(3). Id. We disagree.
Read in relevant part, a person will be found guilty of the offense of
harassment “when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another, the
person … engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which
serve no legitimate purpose[.]”
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(a)(3).
A “course of
conduct” is defined as,
[a] pattern of actions composed of more than one
act over a period of time, however short, evidencing
a continuity of conduct. Acts indicating a course of
conduct which occur in more than one jurisdiction
may be used by any other jurisdiction in which an
act occurred as evidence of a continuing pattern of
conduct or a course of conduct.
Id. at § 2709(f). Moreover, the “intent to harass may be inferred from the
totality of the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 72 A.3d 719, 721
(Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).
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In the instant matter, the trial court, sitting as fact-finder, concluded
that there was ample evidence to support Appellant’s convictions for three
counts of harassment under Section 2709(a)(3).
1/16/14, at 6-7.
Trial Court Opinion,
The trial court opined that the Commonwealth met its
burden of proving “that [Appellant] repeatedly engaged in a course of
conduct designed to harass and annoy [the victims] which served no
legitimate purpose.”
Id. at 7.
Specifically, the trial court reasoned as
follows.
[Appellant] erratically drove her vehicle onto
Casselberry Lane multiple times without the need to
do so. In addition to twice running [the victim’s]
bicycle and attached child trailer off the road,
[Appellant] entered [the victims’] driveway multiple
times without permission or a legitimate reason to
do so.
The evidence adduced at trial established that
[Appellant] had no reason to use Casselberry Lane in
the way described herein. There are only two homes
on the lane, which are owned by the Casselberry's
and [the victims] respectively. Because [Appellant]’s
residence is located on Spruce Grove Lane, she does
not require usage of the lane for ingress or egress to
her residence.
Furthermore, the evidence presented at trial
established that [Appellant] repeatedly drove onto
[the victims’] property, attempted to provide bagels
to [the victims’] children, shouted obscenities at
[the victims], promised to continue this course of
conduct every day until [the victims] removed the
fence between Casselberry and Spruce Grove Lanes,
and threatened [the victims] with frivolous law suits.
Because the trier of fact found the Commonwealth’s
evidence to be credible, [Appellant]’s third argument
is without merit.
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Id. (citations to notes of testimony and footnote omitted).
Upon careful review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, as the verdict winner, we agree with the trial court’s
conclusions that sufficient evidence was presented at trial to sustain
Appellant’s convictions for harassment.
Accordingly, we conclude that
Appellant’s argument to the contrary must fail.
For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Appellant is not
entitled to relief in the instant appeal.
October 15, 2013 judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/19/2014
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Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s