Date Posted: 02-Nov-2010
Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor
Desert storm brewing
Key Points
 The international profile of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has grown
considerably in recent years due to it kidnapping Westerners in the Sahara-Sahel region.
 AQIM's desert forces are divided between rival commanders. They are heavily reliant on
local people, who supply them with critical resources such as fuel, water and food, and
also carry out kidnappings on their behalf.
 The jihadists benefit from a lack of regional co-operation, with both Mali and Algeria
remaining reluctant to take on AQIM more aggressively.
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has increased its activities in the Sahara-Sahel
region in recent years, including kidnapping Westerners. Jane's examines the
reasons for the militant group's resurgence.
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) claimed responsibility for seizing five French nationals
in northern Niger on 16 September, its most daring kidnapping to date. While the abductions
came against a background of an escalating conflict between Al-Qaeda's North African affiliate
and the French government, Paris is unlikely to launch another operation against the group
while it continues to hold its nationals.
AQIM has carried out a series of kidnappings since February 2008, when two Austrian tourists
were abducted in Tunisia. A total of 18 European nationals and two Canadians have now been
held by the group, the majority of them tourists and aid workers who were taken as they
travelled on remote stretches of road. Most of them were released after substantial ransoms
were paid to AQIM through intermediaries or detained members of the group were freed, but
two died in captivity, Briton Edwin Dyer and Frenchman Michel Germaneau.
The 16 September kidnapping was more daring than its predecessors. The victims were taken
at night from their homes in northern Nigerien town of Arlit, the centre for uranium mining
operations run by the state-owned French company AREVA. The area was protected by both
the Nigerien armed forces and private security guards. Five of the hostages are French, while a
Madagascan and a Togolese man were also taken. One of the Frenchmen, Daniel Larribe,
worked for AREVA. He was abducted with his wife Francoise. The five other men worked for
SATOM, a subsidiary of the French construction group VINCI. This is the first time AQIM has
targeted a foreign industry based in the Sahel-Sahara zone and it seems to be no coincidence
that the group targeted French interests.
Desert emirs
While the recent kidnappings have raised AQIM's international profile, Algeria's Islamist rebels
have maintained a presence in the Sahara-Sahel region, which they have referred to as the
'ninth zone' or 'southern zone', since the 1990s. Arguably the most famous Islamist
commander operating in the region is Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a one-eyed veteran of the Afghan
conflict in the 1980s who served as the southern zone 'emir' for the Salafist Group for
Preaching and Combat (GSPC). He is reputed to be heavily involved in trafficking contraband
across the Sahara and is thought to have good relations with locals in northern Mali, where he
has reportedly married into local Arab and/or Tuareg tribes.
Despite his well-established connections and ability to operate in the Sahara-Sahel,
Belmokhtar was apparently sidelined after the GSPC adopted the name AQIM in January 2007.
According to the United States government, the current overall AQIM emir in the Sahara is not
Belmokhtar, but a 43-year-old Algerian, Yahia Djouadi (also spelt Yahya Jawadi; alias Abu
Ammar), the former head of the group's military committee.
However, Djouadi has a lower profile than Belmokhtar and another emir known by the alias
Abu Zaid (French transliteration: Abou Zeid). According to the US Department of the Treasury,
Abu Zaid is 45-year-old Algerian Abid Hammadou, who leads the group's Tarek ibn Zeid
Brigade (Tariq bin Zaid Brigade), which was responsible for kidnapping more than 30
Europeans in 2003. An AQIM statement dated 21 September announced that Abu Zaid led the
most recent kidnapping in Niger. This will worry all those connected to the current hostages, as
French officials claim it was Abu Zaid who was responsible for the deaths of Dyer and
Germaneau.
While Belmokhtar's group operates mainly in the Timbuktu region of northwest Mali, Abu
Zaid's band operates for the most part in the Kidal region of northeast Mali, according to
diplomatic sources in Bamako. One Western diplomatic official told Jane's that Belmokhtar
commands around 150 men, while Abu Zaid has around 100 fighters. Some analysts put
AQIM's overall numbers in the Sahara-Sahel zone slightly higher, at around 300.
Belmokhtar has a reputation for being less religiously strident, while Abu Zaid is seen as an
austere character, more committed to hardline Islamist ideology. A Western diplomat in
Bamako responsible for monitoring AQIM summed up the two men: He said: "Belmokhtar is a
businessman with radical tendencies. With Abu Zaid, it's the other way around. There is a
commercial aspect to what he does, but it is mainly about jihad."
Relations between them are tense, according to the Western diplomat, who spoke to Jane's on
condition of anonymity. He said the two men communicate with each other when they need to,
but are not on good terms.
Leadership links
Belmokhtar and Abu Zaid are largely autonomous commanders, often carrying out operations
on their own initiative, according to another senior Western diplomat based in Bamako.
However, he added that sometimes they consulted with the AQIM leadership based in northern
Algeria and followed its orders. He pointed to the current hostage situation as an example,
saying AQIM was most probably slow to issue its demands because Abu Zaid was in discussion
with the overall emir of AQIM, Abdelmalik Droukdel (alias Abu Musab Abd-al-Wadud).
One aspect that appears to involve co-ordination with the AQIM leadership is propaganda. The
group's official Al-Andalus media wing issues statements on behalf of both Abu Zaid and
Belmokhtar. The Algeria-based leaders also occasionally comment on events in the southern
zone, probably having discussed the subject with the regional emirs. When the US Department
of the Treasury proscribed AQIM media chief Salah Gasmi (alias Salah Abu Muhammad) as a
terrorist in July 2008, it said he had claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of the two
Austrians and was actively involved in negotiating their release with the Austrian government.
The flow of cash and arms between AQIM in the Sahara and AQIM leadership in Algeria
apparently goes both ways. A Western embassy official said: "In the south, they get weapons,
vehicles and fuel from Algeria, but they sometimes send weapons north too. Some of the
ransom money they make from kidnappings has to be sent to the leadership."
Both Abu Zaid and Belmokhtar want the recognition of not only the AQIM leadership in
northern Algeria, but also Al-Qaeda's top leaders, the embassy official said. This desire may
have influenced the fate of British hostage Dyer, who was killed by the group in May 2009. An
article published by the Spanish newspaper El Pais in January 2010 claimed that messages had
been intercepted in which the Al-Qaeda leadership based in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border
region authorized Dyer's killing.
Militant escalation
AQIM's leaders in Algeria are likely to want to be closely involved in the fate of the French
nationals currently held by Abu Zaid, as they give the group leverage over France. The country
has been the principle target of AQIM's rhetoric, especially after 22 July, when Mauritanian and
French forces carried out a cross-border raid against AQIM in northwest Mali. AQIM confirmed
that six of its fighters had been killed in the operation.
The French government initially spoke only of technical and logistical support given to the
Mauritanians, but it was later confirmed that between 20 and 30 French soldiers had been
involved on the ground, making the operation the first in which Western forces are known to
have engaged AQIM.
The French also initially played down reports that the raid was a failed attempt to rescue
Germaneau, a 78-year-old French aid worker kidnapped by AQIM in Niger on 19 April. The
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs said: "The operation conducted by the Mauritanians
succeeded in neutralizing the group of terrorists and thwarted their plan to attack Mauritanian
targets."
French officials suggested that Germaneau may have already been dead by the time the raid
was carried out. They said his captors had refused delivery of the medication he needed for a
heart condition. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested there was no way Germaneau could
have been freed by peaceful means because AQIM had refused to provide 'proof of life' so that
negotiations could move forwards.
While AQIM released a statement on 11 July threatening to kill Germaneau in 15 days unless
France arranged the release of more prisoners, French officials said there had been no
confirmation he was still alive since the group released a video of their captive in May.
AQIM contradicted these claims. On 26 July, Al-Jazeera broadcast an audio recording in which
Droukdel said: "We announce that we executed the French hostage Michel Germaneau on 24
July 2010, to avenge the killing of our six brothers in the cowardly French raid. [French
President Nicolas] Sarkozy failed to free his compatriot in this operation but he has opened for
his people and for his country one of the gates of hell."
Sarkozy subsequently claimed the raid had been launched in the hope of rescuing the hostage.
He said: "The group's base, which was destroyed [in the raid], could have been where Michael
Germaneau was being held. Given we were convinced he was doomed to certain death, we had
a duty to attempt to snatch him from his captors."
AQIM disputed the French claims that Germaneau was dead by the time of the raid. In a
statement, the group said the French authorities were well aware of its demands and that it
had been in "constant contact with them through intermediaries", just as it had been when it
kidnapped Pierre Camatte, whom it abducted on 25 November 2009. Camatte was freed on 23
February 2010 after Mali released four AQIM militants from prison, a move welcomed by the
French government.
The claim that Germaneau had been killed after the raid was supported by an unnamed Malian
official, who told AFP that the hostage had been subsequently beheaded in front of Abu Zaid.
"He was still alive during the raid, but hidden in a mountainous zone in the Kidal region," he
said. However, AQIM's reluctance to hand over Germaneau's body, which would have revealed
when he died, suggested this may not have been the case. The group tried to justify this on
the basis that France had yet to return the bodies of four Algerian hijackers killed by French
commandos in December 1994.
AQIM's retribution continued on 25 August, when a suicide bomber was shot dead as he
attempted to ram his explosive-laden vehicle into the military barracks in the southeastern
Mauritanian town of Nema. An AQIM statement gave a different version of events, claiming the
bomber, Idris bin Muhammad al-Amin (alias Abu Ishaq al-Shanqiti), had caused significant
casualties when he drove a vehicle carrying 1.2 tons of explosives into the barracks. The
statement described the target as a base for Mauritanian soldiers who are directly involved in
the "French war against the mujahideen".
The AQIM statement claiming responsibility for the 16 September kidnapping in Arlit was also
couched in anti-French rhetoric, saying the 'crusaders' were plundering uranium belonging to
Muslims, while exposing locals to dangerous radiation and gases. AQIM also seems to be aware
of the importance of Niger's uranium mining industry, claiming France had been stealing "this
strategic resource" for several decades. Niger supplies around a third of the uranium France
needs for the nuclear reactors that generate between 75 and 80 per cent of its energy.
Elusive enemy
Having confirmed that Germaneau had been killed, the French government promised action
against AQIM. Sarkozy pledged that the group would be punished for killing the hostage, while
Prime Minister Francois Fillon declared: "We are at war with Al-Qaeda."
In waging this conflict, France has an ally in Mauritania, which has a number of reasons for
aggressively tackling AQIM. The group has managed to recruit successfully in Mauritania,
where it has carried out many attacks. Much of President Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz's
legitimacy, both at home and abroad, is built on a promise of strong action against terrorism.
As the 22 July raid proved, he is also open to foreign support. The French military is also
helping to train special detachments of Mauritanian troops.
To counter the AQIM threat, Mauritania has increased its security presence in its desert regions
and has been trying to exert some control over who crosses its borders. Mauritanian forces
took the fight into northern Mali again in September, apparently without direct French
assistance. The operation began when Mauritanian forces attacked AQIM fighters across the
border on 17 September. By 19 September, the Mauritanians were claiming they had killed 12
AQIM fighters and lost six of their own soldiers. AQIM later released a photograph of the
equipment it claimed to have captured from the Mauritanian soldiers.
While Mauritania is keen to take on AQIM, it will need foreign help to achieve a significant
victory. A Western ambassador in Bamako told Jane's: "I think the most recent raids by
Mauritania on AQIM in Mali show the limits of what they are capable of doing. During both
offensives, there were serious communication and logistical problems."
These problems will have to be resolved if the Mauritanians are going to be nimble enough to
catch militants who have become well adapted to the environment. The group's propaganda
videos show highly mobile bands of fighters who use Toyota Land Cruiser pick-up trucks, some
of them armed with heavy machine guns, giving them the ability to travel hundreds of
kilometers in a day. These vehicles have petrol engines, allowing them to outrun diesel
vehicles, an official based at a Western embassy in Bamako told Jane's.
AQIM's desert fighters also have Kalashnikov assault rifles, PK machine guns, rocket-propelled
grenade launchers and, according to Malian troops who have clashed with the militants, night
vision equipment. Former hostages report that the militants have access to satellite telephones
and internet. Sometimes the group will move close enough to a populated area so they can
use normal mobile telephones.
A senior Western diplomat in Bamako said: "The group is perfectly armed for desert warfare
and can move fast. Moving in the desert is not easy, you have many different types of terrain hard sand, soft sand and rocks - and they can manage them all." A Malian government official
said hunting the group on their turf would be tough. "Look at Afghanistan, with all the
American power there, they did not manage to kill Osama bin Laden. Why do they think they
can succeed here?," he said.
Weak points
Nevertheless, there are many who believe a decisive military victory against AQIM is possible
in the desert. While its bands move often, it is theoretically possible to fix their location every
time their members use satellite phones.
It should also be possible to deprive AQIM of essential resources. One former Malian Tuareg
rebel leader, who was active as recently as 2006, told Jane's: "I know how fighting in the
desert works. You can defeat Al-Qaeda quite easily." He suggested that one way to move
against AQIM would be for armed forces to guard the wells in the desert. "They can not last
long without water," he added.
The same applies to fuel. One embassy official in Bamako said: "AQIM are on the move a lot
and every 500 km you need fuel. The armies in the region are the only people with access to
fuel. The fuel is stocked near wells and it is sold to AQIM for a profit."
Indeed, AQIM relies heavily on its local links for food, fuel and information about coming and
goings in the region. The population in the north of Mali is extremely poor and any income they
can make from selling animals and other foodstuffs to AQIM fighters is a welcome bonus.
The group has also used locals, including ethnic Tuaregs, to carry out kidnappings, according
to a Western embassy staffer in Bamako who follows AQIM. He said outsourcing kidnappings
has proved a highly successful strategy. These small local groups can operate much more
discretely in the areas from which they originate and require no regular upkeep from AQIM,
just a one-off payment when hostages are handed over.
With AQIM channeling some of its ransom money back into the impoverished region's
economy, it will be difficult to persuade locals to sever their links to the group, even though its
hardline Islamist ideology has attracted little support in northern Mali.
Regional cooperation
At the same time, the battle against AQIM in the Sahel-Sahara is complicated by the differing
policies of the various states involved. While all the governments are ostensibly committed to
tackling the jihadists, some are far more cautious than others.
Mali is particularly reluctant to take direct action against AQIM's sanctuaries in the north of the
country. Diplomatic sources told Jane's that Malian security forces know where AQIM is based,
but have yet to be given the order to attack. Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure has
warned against a purely military approach. "We are not going to win this battle unless we win
over the population. They are what is at stake here. Our victory will not be just a military one,
it will be one based on development," he said in May.
This policy probably partly reflects Mali's lack of military capacity and concerns that AQIM
could inflict serious damage in an all-out confrontation that would result in the jihadists
branding the government as 'apostate'. To date, AQIM has carried out few attacks on Malian
security forces, has not directly criticized President Toure's government and has conducted
most of its kidnappings in neighboring countries.
While the cross-border operations in July and September showed that Mali is not sensitive
about its territorial sovereignty, Mauritania can venture only so far into its neighbor’s territory.
Only Algeria, which has by far the most powerful military in the region, is well placed to tackle
Abu Zaid's stronghold in Kidal. Despite being on the receiving end of most of AQIM's attacks,
the Algerian government has been surprisingly reluctant to take advantage of Mali's open
borders to crack down on the jihadists.
Algeria also seems to be opposed to the growing Western involvement that the kidnappings
have attracted to the region. It is sponsoring a strictly regional initiative against AQIM, which
has included establishing a joint military command in the southern Algerian town of
Tamanrasset and a joint intelligence structure in Algiers. Meanwhile, it did not send any
representatives to the G8's Counter-Terrorism Action Group conference held in Mali in October.
This initiative aimed to provide a forum for frontline states, partner nations and international
institutions to discuss how to deal with the threat of Islamic militancy in the region.
So while France has promised a war on AQIM, without the support of Mali and Algeria it is
extremely unlikely any effective action will be taken against the group in the near future. Even
if it had the necessary regional support, France would be unlikely to carry out another raid
against a group currently holding five French nationals. Therefore, AQIM may be reluctant to
give up its human shields.