THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY
M a y 7, 1955
And how scant is the respect
for
constitutional
propriety ?
The Constititution provides not
only that a Commission should
first carefully consider the quest i o n , b u t after the C o m m i s s i o n
has r e p o r t e d , i t s r e c o m m e n d a tions should be e x a m i n e d by a
Parliamentary Committee consisting of 30 members, 20 f r o m the
L o k Sabha and 10 f r o m the Rajya
Sabha.
So that this C o m m i t t e e
m a y f a i t h f u l l y r e f l e c t t h e cross
section of p u b l i c o p i n i o n , elect i o n of its members,
i t has
further been provided, should be
"inaccordance w i t h the system
of proportional representation by
means
of
single
transferable
vote." If the H o m e Minister is
i n n o m o o d t o b r o o k delay, w h y
n o t at least r e m o v e these hurdles
by another amendment of the
Constitution, in order to lend
an air of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y to his
actions ?
For
the
Government
to
proceed
in so i m p o r t a n t a m a t t e r as the
choice of language to be used in
the examinations tor the all India
services w i t h o u t w a i t i n g f o r the
Commission to tender its advice,
conveys a m o o d of impatience
w h i c h has g i v e n r i s e t o s e r i o u s
misgivings in the minds of many
w h o desire the u n i t y o f I n d i a , a s
much as the most ardent advocates o f H i n d i a n d w h o are n o t
against the development, as stated
in Constitution, of the composite c u l t u r e o f I n d i a , b u t w h o d o
n o t f e e l t h a t t h e t i m e has c o m e
yet for Hindi to replace English.
Among
the
latter,
the
most
p o w e r f u l v o i c e t h a t has b e e n r a i s ed is that of Shri Rajagopalachari.
No one can
question
Rajaji's
p a t r i o t i s m ; it is an i r o n y of fate
t h a t t h e same R a j a j i w h o h a d
gone to absurd lengths to p o p u larise H i n d i in the South at one
t i m e , has n o w t a k e n u p c u d g e l s
against it. H o w come, then, that
this ardent advocate of H i n d i
has r a i s e d h i s v o i c e t o s t o p t h i s
h e a d l o n g r u s h ? B e c a u s e h e sees i n
it a danger w h i c h , in fact, strikes
at the very root of the u n i t y of
the I n d i a n people.
R a j a j i has
only
counselled
patience; he
pleads for greater u n d e r s t a n d i n g
a n d w a r n s agaist the danger of
f o r c i n g t h e pace a n d i m p o s i n g
H i n d i o n n o n - H i n d i speaking
people.
H e does n o t raise t h e
question whether or not H i n d i
can f u l f i l the requirements of a
n a t i o n a l language. O n t h e c o n t r a r y , he thinks that it may, given
time, patience, understanding and
Steady
application
in
raising
the
standard of the language itself.
B u t before others
are
asked
to
qualify
in
Hindi
for
a l l I n d i a s e r v i c e s , R a j a j i f i r s t asks
H i n d i to qualify itself for being
chosen as the all-India medium.
Can any one language ever become
t h e national language of India? T h i s
is the basic question, the fundamental issue, in this language controversy.
A n examination o f t h i s issue may
appear to be academic and too speculative to m e r i t serious consideration
in a matter in w h i c h the C o n s t i t u t i o n has made specific provisions.
Such an attitude betrays as complete
as ignorance of the role of language
in the life of a people as of the facts
of history. It was not closed when
the C o n s t i t u t i o n was passed. In
h u m a n affairs no decision is ever irrevocable. Provisions of the C o n s t i t u t i o n w h i c h have been f o u n d to be u n workable in practice or against the
best interests of the country have been
altered, not once, but on as many as
four different occasions d u r i n g the last
five years that the C o n s t i t u t i o n has
been in force.
Welcoming
Rajaji's
courageous
and t i m e l y stand in the matter, Professor Shrinivas of Baroda University, in a letter to the Hindu, has
condemned silence on this very v i t a l
matter on the part of people w h o see
the danger b u t do not act. If n o t
arrested in time, the present attempt
to force the pace will cause aivitreperable breach i n t h e f u n d a m e n t a l u n i t y
of I n d i a a n d disrupt w h a t has taken
generations of struggle to b u i l d u p .
Silence, he thinks, w i l l be to acquiesce. Those w h o care for sanity and
aspire to march together, in accord
and in unison of spirit, should protest
and protest vigorously. N o n - H i n d i
speaking people should h o l d meetings
for postponement
of the constitut i o n a l deadline and for going slow
w i t h the use of H i n d i .
M P s should
be lobbied, individuals could help by
w r i t i n g letters to the President and
the Prime M i n i s t e r or else t h e advocates of H i n d i , the new herrenvolk
w i l l ride roughshod over those—and
they are the majority of the I n d i a n
p e o p l e — w h o have, due to no fault
of theirs, the misfortune of having
some other language as their mother
tongue.
But is silence on this issue really as
bad as all that? T r u e , one should n o t
be dogmatic about such a matter.
H i s t o r y provides many examples of
h u m a n folly in the matter of language as others. Nevertheless, f a i t h in
reason and sanity abides;
it is n o t
shaken so easily. People of this country cannot be p u t i n t o strait jackets
in the matter of language. Languages
do not develop by d i c t a t i o n ; t h e l i f e
and inspiration of a language is the
spoken
w o r d . Expression is man's
prime urge. It w i l l not be stilled or
stifled by a diktat from any body.
South of the 17th Parallel
A T Geneva, Ho C h i M i n h made
substantial
concessions
in
signi n g the Agreement. V i e t m i n h abandoned its direct claims to Laos and
C a m b o d i a . It accepted
a demarcat i o n l i n e , w h i c h temporarily divided
V i c t N a m i n t w o , for cease-fire i n
Vict Nam.
M i l i t a r y and semi-military terms and conditions of the
Geneva Agreement have been implemented
according
to
schedule.
Cease-fire conditions have been established in all the three I n d o - C h i n ese States. V i e t m i n h has honoured
the obligations undertaken at Geneva.
It is a d m i t t e d by the I n d o - C h i n a
A r m i s t i c e C o m m i s s i o n that t h e problems relating to cease-fire evacuation
of forces and release of war prisoners
and civilian internees have been
" satisfactorily solved " in all the
three States.
But the military terms of the
Geneva Agreement had p o l i t i c a l
counterparts.
I n none o f the three
I n d o - C h i n a States have the
parties
and powers concerned, other than
538
Vietminh,
faithfully
implemented
the p o l i t i c a l conditions of the
Geneva Agreement. America was
not a signatory to the Geneva Agreement, t h o u g h she promised to abide
by the terms of the Agreement.
I m m e d i a t e l y after the Geneva Agreement, America established S E A T O .
Laos and C a m b o d i a were specifically
mentioned as areas w h i c h w o u l d be
defended and protected in the pursuit o f S E A T O Powers' policy t o
contain C o m m u n i s m i n South-East
Asia. T h i s was an open violation of
the spirit and letter of the Geneva
Agreement. T h i s is one of the reasons w h y t h e M a n i l a Treaty is cond e m n e d as a menace to peace in
Indo-China and in South-East Asia.
Future developments in Laos and
C a m b o d i a may yet worsen t h e situation in Asia and the Far East. In
t h e ' m e a n w h i l e , events i n South V i e t
N a m are i m m e d i a t e threats
to t h e
smooth
implementation
of
the
Geneva Agreement. A t Geneva, t h e
interests concerned agreed to create
May7,
THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY
conditions i n South V i e t N a m under
w h i c h itee and fair elections c o u l d
be h e l d to decide t h e f u t u r e status
of I n d o - C h i n a . France and A m e rica assumed t h e responsibility for
establishing a stable and democratic
government i n South V i e t N a m s o
that elections c o u l d be h e l d next
year. Developments i n South V i e t
N a m are d i s t u r b i n g reminders of t h e
failure of France and America to
discharge t h e responsibilities undertaken b y t h e m . I n b o t h its m i l i t a r y
and p o l i t i c a l aspects, t h e situation
in South V i e t N a m is a direct sequel to the French c o l o n i a l rule.
America's ulterior interests a n d m o tives have i n t r o d u c e d a d d i t i o n a l c o m plications to t h e disquieting situation
i n South V i e t N a m ,
To assess the significance of developments i n South V i e t N a m , i t i s
necessary to appreciate t h e
nature
and c o m p l e x i o n of t h e forces in
conflict w i t h each other. I n S o u t h
V i e t N a m , life, society, politics and
the
army are d o m i n a t e d
by t h e
three sects w i t h their powerful p r i vate armies. Of the three sects,
C a o D a i is t h e most p o w e r f u l . H o a
H a o is t h e next in importance.
B i n h X u y e n , the group w h i c h
has
been fighting a losing battle in t h e
Saigon-Cholon
sector against t h e
Diem
regime's forces, is t h e least
influential.
Cao D a i and H o a H a o
are spiritual sects w h i c h were
encouraged to become p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y
organisations by the F r e n c h d u r i n g
the
colonial war in
Indo-China.
B o t h Cao D a i and H o a H a o were
i n i t i a l l y sympathisers o f
Ho Chi
Minh,
Later,
these
two
sects
deserted H o C h i M i n h and entered
i n t o an alliance to fight V i e t m i n h .
Reasons for this dissension are obscure.
B u t France e x p l o i t e d this
dissension to equip t h e armies
of
Cao D a i and H o a H a o w i t h modern
weapons to fight her battle against
Ho
Chi Minh.
Binh Xuyen
be
came p r o m i n e n t o n l y recently w h e n
i t seized c o n t r o l o f t h e V i e t N a m
police forces t h r o u g h the connivance
o f Bao D a i .
A m e r i c a are n o t disinterested observers, Bao D a i has never approved
D i e m and his government. Bao D a i
was a French creation. France s t i l l
seems to stick to their puppet. T h i s
aspect of the a l i g n m e n t has preGeneva implications. B u t it is diffic u l t to appreciate France's
support
to B i n h X u y e n , a sect w h o m the
other t w o sects
are reluctant
to
recognise because of its
association
w i t h vice and police. It is possible
that Premier D i e m , w i t h active
A m e r i c a n support, has succeeded in
upsetting the calculations of the
F r e n c h authorities on the spot.
France's
antipathy to D i e m
was,
perhaps, influenced by the assumpt i o n that the private armies of the
three sects w o u l d c o m b i n e to oust
Diem.
B i n h X u y e n and
Hoa Hao
are opposed to D i e m . B u t he seems
to have entered i n t o an alliance
w i t h Cao D a i ,
Latest reports i n d i cate t h a t this formidable
alliance
between D i e m and Cao D a i has
convinced A m e r i c a of the policy of
1955
lending
full
support
to
Diem.
France is opposed to any such policy.
T h u s t h e c o n f l i c t i n g machinations o f
France and America intensify p o l i tical chaos and instability in South
Viet Nam.
D i e m has played his cards cleverly. I n his defiance o f Bao D a i ,
he had the tacit support of A m e r i c a .
In his decision to fight the private
armies of t h e sects, he k n e w that he
w o u l d have to fight only against t h e
B i n h X u y e n army. Developments
since last year's A r m y crisis w o u l d
seem to suggest that he was always
sure of support of t h e Cao D a i sect.
France's alleged support to the B i n h
X u y e n a r m y is d i f f i c u l t to appreciate
unless
it be that France
expects
Hoa Hao
t o join B i n h X u y e n
in
c o n t i n u i n g t h e c i v i l war in the c o u n tryside. T h o u g h the situation remains
obscure, movements of Ba
Cut's army indicate t h a t France
may not be w r o n g in her anticipations. Ba C u t , t h e head of one of
the Hoa H a o groups, is a fanatic m i l i tary leader w h o is v i o l e n t l y a n t i - C o m m u n i s t and is vehemently opposed to
the Geneva Agreement. It is clear
what General E l y was relying o n .
H e was depending o n B i n h X u y e n ' s
control
over
the
Saigon-Cholon
police.
He was relying on Ba C u t
to fight D i e m ' s forces. Some such
assumptions made A m e r i c a
hesitate
before l e n d i n g her open support to
Diem.
O n e i n t r i g u i n g aspect of R u r i t a n i a n
conditions i n South V i e t N a m needs
emphasis. D i e m seems to be in cont r o l of t h e Saigon-Cholon sector. B u t
he c o u l d n o t have gained c o n t r o l
w i t h o u t the support of Generals P h u ong and T h i n h , t w o p r o m i n e n t Cao
D a i m i l i t a r y leaders. Saigon is under
the c o n t r o l of a m i l i t a r y junta led by
these t w o Cao D a i Generals. It was
these t w o Generals w h o p r o c l a i m e d
the dismissal of Bao D a i as H e a d of
the State, dismissed the D i e m Gove r n m e n t and ordered D i e m to lead a
republican government. These t w o
Generals m a y have f o u n d it expedient
t o accept the c i v i l authority o f D i e m .
B u t it is clear that Saigon is n o w ruled
by a m i l i t a r y junta led by t h e t w o Cao
D a i Generals. D i e m accepted t h e
offer of these t w o Generals to head a
republican government only after consultations w i t h M r Kidder, the A m e r i c a n Charge d'Affaires i n Saigon. I t
is evident t h a t America is aware of
the m i l i t a r y complexion of the reorganised D i e m G o v e r n m e n t . A m e rica may find it d i p l o m a t i c to support such a regime. M o r e relevant
are t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of such a m i l i t a r y
regime in Saigon on t h e promised
elections n e x t year.
A t the t i m e o f last year's A r m y
crisis,
Premier D i e m succeeded in
r e m a i n i n g in power by offering cabinet posts to leaders of Cao D a i and
H o a H a o sects. I n M a r c h last, a l l
the three sects formed a U n i t e d
F r o n t to demand increased
association
w i t h the D i e m
Government,
As Premier D i e m discerned considerable disunity i n t h e U n i t e d
F r o n t , he started his manoeuvre of
playing
one sect against
another.
In this struggle for power between
t h e sects a n d a m o n g t h e sects a n d
t h e r S f i s i s : G o v e r n m e n t France a n d
332