episteme
An International Journal
Of Undergraduate Philosophy
ep•i•ste•me \ep' i ste' mé\ n. [Gk. epistém (é)]: knowledge; specif.,
intellectually certain knowledge
Volume XXVIII • May 2017
Denison University, Granville, Ohio
Editor
Elizabeth VanNess
Web-Editor
Peter Heft
Editorial Board
Will Jones
Addison Gus Evans
DingXi Dennis Lu
Ryan Seibert
Paul Bass
Cesar Barraza
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Sam Cowling
Episteme is published
annually by a staff of
undergraduate students
at Denison University.
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and submissions to:
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Statement of Purpose
Episteme aims to recognize and
encourage excellence in undergraduate philosophy. The journal
offers students their first opportunity
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Episteme will help stimulate
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Episteme
An International Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy
Volume XXVIII
May 2017
CONTENTS
Statement of Purpose and Editorial Staff
2
Table of Contents
3
The End of Nietzsche’s Will to Power: Domination and Efficacy
Julian D. Jacobs, Brown University
7
Space and Sensibilia
Michael Bevan, University of Reading, U.K.
19
Representation and Reality in Monetary Theory
Aaron Weddle, University of West Georgia
34
Self-Care as a Burdened Virtue
Kirsten Donato, Albany College of Pharmacy and Health
Sciences
48
Heidegger’s Philosophy of Language in Being and Time
Polina Sandler, Brown University
58
Call For Papers, Vol. XXIX (2018)
69
The Editors would like to express their sincere appreciation for the
Provost’s Office, Kate Tull, and faculty advisor Sam Cowling for their
assistance in making the publication of this journal possible.
We extend special gratitude to the other Philosophy Department
Faculty: Barbara Fultner, Tony Lisska, Steve Vogel, John McHugh,
Jonathan Maskit, and Mark Moller for their support.
Episteme
Volume XXVIII• May 2017
Episteme is published under the auspices
of the Denison University Department
of Philosophy in Granville, Ohio.
ISSN 1542-7072
Copyright© 2016
For copyright terms, please visit
Episteme’s online home.
7
Julian D. Jacobs
The End of Nietzsche’s Will to Power:
Dominion and Efficacy
Julian D. Jacobs
T
he notion of a ‘Will to Power’ is foundational for
Friedrich Nietzsche, both through his use of it as an
explanation for ressentiment as well as for cosmological, biological, and psychological phenomena.I II
While Arthur Schopenhauer had previously posited
that humans aim primarily for self preservation, Nietzsche sought
to correct his predecessor’s views by stating that instead of a desire to maintain one’s existence, humans (as well as all other life
forms) seek to improve it.III That is, Nietzsche viewed the Will to
Power as a desire not simply to preserve a state of being; instead,
he viewed it is a drive to extend one’s power by “discharg[ing]
strength.”IV In fact, “as a fundamental instinct of life,” the Will to
Power “aims at the expansion of power and, wishing for that, frequently risks and even sacrifices self-preservation.”V Although
there are many potential manifestations of this concept, this essay
will focus on the psychological interpretation of the Will to Power and attempt to exactly asses the conditions and ends which satisfy its drive.
Nietzsche’s writing seems to indicate that the acquisition of
dominion itself VI is what satisfies a will to power. That being said,
power can only be procured effectively when certain conditions
have been met, indicating that the validation of effectiveness must
necessarily also compromise the Will to Power.VII This essay will
contend that the acquisition of dominion is not enough to satisfy a
Julian Jacobs '18 is a student at Brown University: Concentration in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). He is a Senior Staff Writer and Interviews
Associate at Brown Political Review. He is also an Opinion's Columnist for
The Brown Daily Herald and the Founding Editor in Chief of the Brown Journal of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). His favorite philosophical
texts are Hume's An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.
The End of Nietzsche’s Will to Power
8
Will to Power and must be coupled with the feeling of successfully applying one’s abilities. This conclusion can be reached by assessing why certain endsVIII are satisfying yet still produce frustration in others and why the Will to Power is insatiable. Moreover, the practical consequences that manifest from the acquisition
of dominion are derived contextually by the values a given individual has and the manifestation of power that they strive to obtain. The implication of this is that the Will to Power describes
the insatiable human drive to acquire dominion while validating a
feeling of effectiveness through the active procurement of power
against a resisting force. This essay will begin by discussing the
possibility that dominion is itself the final end of the will to power before offering the suggestion that the acquisition of any power
is satisfying insofar as it helps validate an individual’s capacity
by evoking a feeling of success.
Dominion as the End of the Will to Power
It seems most immediately plausible that Nietzsche believes the Will to Power can be satisfied by the acquisition of
“dominion.” That is, he describes how the Will to Power compels
individuals to become “master over the forces of nature, master
over his own savagery and licentiousness.”IX In this essay, dominion will be utilized as a term to describe the procurement of mastery, domination, and control of an object or individual.X While
the concepts of dominion may hold a negative connotation that
links it to callousness, brutality, and authoritarian domination,XI it
is a fundamentally neutral idea for Nietzsche whose meaning is
derived from its contextual manifestations. This is to say that dominion is the imposition of an individual’s values on some object,
ultimately shaping it to conform to the desires of that individual.
As Nietzsche put it, “[t]hat is your whole will, you who are wisest: a Will to Power—when you speak of good and evil too, and
of valuations. You still want to create the world before which you
can kneel…” XII
As a consequence, any moral evaluation of the acquisition of
dominion is contingent on the values and aspirations that manifest
in an individual’s Will to Power. For instance, a politician seeking political office with the intention of reducing income inequality and economic injustice may be subject to a completely differ-
9
Julian D. Jacobs
ent moral evaluation than if she sought to consolidate power by
propagating the hatred of minority groups. While the manifestations in each case would seemingly be very different, the politician is still engaging with the same notion of dominion by attempting to impose her values externally. Beyond this, it seems
feasible that attempts at acquiring dominion can be made for both
external objects as well as internal conditions. For example, while
a businessperson might attempt to increase her revenue in order to
acquire external dominion, a Buddhist monk might attempt to
reach a kind of internal spiritual dominion through her religious
pursuits.
However, the centrality of an individual’s values to the
manifestation of dominion may be problematic since her beliefs
and values ultimately determine the way in which dominion is
acquired and applied. Given that, it seemingly follows that an individual cannot have dominion without those values. It would be
impossible to conceptualize someone who truly had no values or
ways in which she hoped the world might change; such a person
would necessarily need to hold complete indifference to every
aspect of her existence. In this case, there would be no object or
content for that individual’s dominion to manifest as. Consequently, values seem unequivocally essential to the capacity to
acquire dominion and satisfy a Will to Power.
The chief issue that arises from this is one of redundancy:
it does not appear necessary for Nietzsche to discuss the drive to
acquire dominion as a necessary condition for the Will to Power
if an individual’s values are ultimately what motivates her.XIII
That is, it seems feasible to assert that the motivation for an increase in dominion is not a desire for power or domination at all;
instead, it may simply be the desire to see one’s values represented in a given object. However, if the desire for dominion is not
what is practically motivating an individual, there need not be a
reason for her to consider it as such. Nietzsche might as well have
concluded that an individual’s values and desires are a sufficient
motivation without needing to discuss the desire to dominate and
extend mastery. For example, if an activist is working to create
more acceptance of the LGBTQ+ community, that individual is
attempting to impose her values externally not as a means to acquire an increase in dominance and power, but instead as a means
The End of Nietzsche’s Will to Power
10
to propagate beliefs that she maintains as important. To the activist, the spread of her values is important and desirable for themselves and not as a means to increase her power. If dominion is at
all relevant in the will of this activist, it is at least secondary to
her drive to see her values externalized, thus making a discussion
of a Will to Power through dominion seem unhelpful.
However, this objection might be countered by asserting
that, since the desire to see one’s values shape an object is central
to the notion of dominion, it stands that an individual is still striving for dominion even if it is not a conscious objective. However,
this response does not seem to be completely adequate; the Will
to Power describes the motivation and drive towards ‘mastery,
domination, and power’ over some object. However, if an individual were only subconsciously engaging in a drive to acquire
dominion, it would seem like a distinct reinterpretation of the
Will to Power. Nietzsche ascribes a considerable amount of importance to the motivational influence he believes is intrinsic to
the Will to Power, making the assertion that it is only experienced
as a subordinate drive seem like a contradiction of the notion that
a satisfied will to dominate is ultimately what is gratifying. XIV
Even if this objection were to be disregarded entirely, the
Will to Power understood as a drive towards dominion remains
contestable. This is because Nietzsche provides two qualifications
on the means through which a will to power is successfully exercised: he states that an individual must activelyXV pursue his or
her goals against a resistingXVI force. Indeed, as Nietzsche explains, "I assess the power of a will by how much resistance, pain
and torture it endures and knows how to turn to its advantage."XVII
An example he uses is the biblical myth of Adam and Eve, where
God has provided all the necessities of life and allowed them to
live as immortals prior to the “First Sin.” However, Nietzsche
proclaims that the “innocent, idle, immortal, happy -- this conception [...] must be criticized above all.”XVIII This condemnation and
belief that Adam and Eve are not actually engaged in a Will to
Power is issued because their dominion was given to them by
God and not earned through the criteria that Nietzsche has delineated. That is, they did not actively participate in the process of
acquiring dominion, nor have they faced opposition in the process.XIX
11
Julian D. Jacobs
If dominion is understood as the imposition of one’s values
and desires on an object, it would not follow that it could be the
end of the Will to Power alone. Nietzsche’s restrictions on the
means by which dominion is achieved seems to contradict the notion that dominion can itself satisfy the Will to Power. For example, in the case of the social activist, it does not follow that the
imposition of her values externally requires opposition in order to
be satisfying. If Nietzsche believed that dominion is the ultimate
end of the Will to Power, it is not clear why activity and opposition are treated as necessary conditions; mastery, control, and the
imposition of values can exist without these requisites. Consequently, there must be another aim of the Will to Power that is not
satisfied by the acquisition of dominion alone, but rather by the
means through which it is achieved.
The Case for Effectiveness
In order for dominion to be the end of a Will to Power that
also satisfies the criteria Nietzsche ascribed, there must necessarily be some other component of the Will to Power that is only satisfied if an individual is actively engaged in a drive against an
opposing force. That is, in order for Nietzsche’s criteria for a Will
to Power to be consistent, that will must have an end that can be
satisfied only through the means he identifies. In order for the circumstances in which dominion is achieved to be valuable in the
appeasement of a Will to Power, those circumstances must be
represented as part of the final end of the Will to Power. As this
essay has attempted to illustrate, such a reality would not be true
if dominion alone were the end. Instead, a drive to have one’s
own effectiveness validated seems to be an essential component
of a satisfied Will to Power. While dominion is the quality of
having power over an object, effectiveness can be characterized
as a capacity to perform a certain task or achieve a desired end. It
is a validation of one’s own abilities and a means of gauging the
success of an individual.XX
One primary indication that effectiveness must be represented
in a satisfied Will to Power in some capacity is that Nietzsche’s
emphasis on resistance and activity is only consistent if efficacy
is a desired end. In order for a feeling of effectiveness to be validated, an individual must psychologically feel as though she has
The End of Nietzsche’s Will to Power
12
actively brought on her own success and overcome some obstacle
to achieve it. They must feel as though they have utilized their
own capacity and abilities in order to achieve the end. As Nietzsche says, “[i]t is not the satisfaction of the will that causes
pleasure […], but rather the will’s forward thrust and again and
again becoming master over that which stands in its way.”XXI For
example, the young adult who inherits wealth does not satisfy the
Will to Power because she has not met resistance or actively
brought on his success. In this case, the young adult has not utilized her abilities or met opposition in the process of obtaining
dominion, indicating that she has no reason to believe that she
could continue to make money. That is, while she may have
achieved an increase in dominion itself simply by having more
financial resources, there is no reason for her to believe that she
would be able to maintain this dominion and has therefore not
psychologically satisfied the Will to Power. As a consequence, a
feeling of effectiveness appears to be a necessary condition for a
satisfied Will to Power.
From this, it may seem to follow that dominion does not even
need to be achieved in order to satisfy a Will to Power because
the feeling of effectiveness alone fulfills the criteria of meeting
opposition and active engagement. For instance, a freedom fighter
who loses a hard-fought battle against a dominant force may have
physically lost dominion, but she will have exercised her Will to
Power insofar as the individual’s proficient fighting helped to validate her effectiveness. However, this objection does not seem to
be completely consistent with Nietzsche’s notion of a Will to
Power.XXII Even if the freedom fighter had experienced a battlefield loss, by surpassing expectations of her opponents as well as
her own, she has acquired dominion: she has changed his external
environment into a place in which her abilities are more respected. This indicates that the acquisition of dominion is still necessary for a satisfied Will to Power; an assessment of success and
effectiveness must be derived through an evaluation of one’s acquisition of dominion. This relationship is important not only because a validation of effectiveness must necessarily correspond
with an increase in dominion, but also because it offers an indication to an individual of their capacity to obtain more.
Such a relationship can be illustrated in the psychological
13
Julian D. Jacobs
consequences of not having a feeling of efficacy validated. For
example, if a writer is provided with a positive public book review as a gift from a friend, such a favor might help bolster the
success of the publication; however, it would not validate the author’s effectiveness as a writer. On the contrary, it may leave the
author in a precarious position, unsure of her abilities and capacity for success.XXIII According to Nietzsche, this failed Will to
Power can result in a feeling of frustration, impotence, or selfdoubt.XXIV In this example, the writer has a desire to be respected
for her talents, which indicates that she is assessing her efficacy
through dominion. However, since the writer has not validated
her effectiveness, she cannot expect to obtain the future dominion
that she strives for through her writing. As a consequence, her
Will to Power has not been satisfied.
This also exemplifies the emphasis Nietzsche placed on success in the face of adversity or competition as a criterion for a satisfied Will to Power. For a Buddhist monk, this may manifest
through success in battling appetitive inclinations within the
mind, while this sort of competition may be achieved through
thwarting rivals for a businessman. Nietzsche makes the point
that the Will to Power requires the confrontation and overcoming
of resistance overtly clear: “the Will to Power can manifest itself
only against resistances; therefore, it seeks that which resists
it.”XXV As a consequence, it seems that the Will to Power can only be satisfied through a feeling of accomplishment; that is, the
genuine belief that one’s acquisition of dominion was a demonstration of one’s own skills and capacity for success.
An additional point that is worth considering is why the feeling of acquiring dominion and a validated capacity only needs to
be a belief and not something that is overtly true. This is because
many people can satisfy a Will to Power through self deception
by conjuring an illusory conception of their own abilities and successes. Such a reality can be partially attributed to the need for the
intoxicating, perhaps euphoric feeling that comes from accomplishment, however contrived and delusional it is.XXVI For example, in Arthur Miller’s Death of a Salesman, Willy frequently attempts to conjure and fantasize over a deceptive assessment of his
skills as an entrepreneur. He is actively attempting to avoid the
immense disappointment and feelings of impotence that might
The End of Nietzsche’s Will to Power
14
result from coming to terms with his perpetual failure. As Nietzsche says, “[h]ere the experience of intoxication proved misleading. This increases the feeling of power in the highest degree—therefore, naively judged, power itself.”XXVII
One way in which this kind of illusory Will to Power can be
conjured is by reassessing one’s desires or convincing oneself
that the failure was a result of external circumstances or foul play.
For example, if a woman is attempting to succeed as a baseball
player, yet is not judged as effective by her teammates and is subsequently rejected, she may attempt to avoid the frustration of her
Will to Power by pretending that she was not really driven to become a baseball player. This is a way of limiting the feeling that
she has failed at acquiring dominion (the desire to impose one’s
values on an object); she denies that she ever had the values (the
desire to play baseball) that she failed at acquiring. Alternatively,
she might convince herself that players on the team conspired
against her to remove her. Doing so also allows her to avoid having to face the realization that her capacity as a baseball player is
lacking. As a consequence, she prevents her effectiveness from
being subject to criticism.XXVIII
The importance of validating one’s own effectiveness to the
Will to Power is also made clear through Nietzsche’s discussion
of it as an insatiable drive; that is, “to [perpetually] have and to
want to have more—growth.”XXIX Even if an individual were to
ascend into an authoritarian political position and receive dictatorial authority and vast amounts of dominion, this position of
extreme power would not be satisfying forever. According to Nietzsche, this is a result of the human desire to attempt to improve
themselves and experience new accomplishments, something that
can only occur if an individual is expanding their dominion.
While the kind of dictator mentioned in this example may look to
further expand his power by conquering other territories, her predicament illustrates an important point about dominion: there is a
finite amount of it. This is true in spite of Nietzsche’s contention
that “the earth is large enough and man is sufficiently unexhausted.”XXX Even if she were to become a supreme leader, the desire
to experience new accomplishments and further validate her capacities would still be a present and gnawing drive.
This insatiability of the Will to Power can also help explain
Julian D. Jacobs
15
the phenomenon of torture, which can be seen as a callous manifestation of this drive.XXXI In high positions of power, where there
are fewer challenges through which an individual can validate her
capacity, torture can be seen as a mechanism to engage with a
Will to Power. That is, by subjecting individuals to something
that will make them resist her, a torturer is exercising her capacity
for dominance and induces her own satisfaction by overcoming
this resistance. A torturer is acquiring more dominion by imposing her sadistic desires on a resisting individual, thereby serving
to validate her effectiveness and grant her a temporary thrill of
accomplishment.
Effectiveness as a Condition of Dominion
While it may possible to assert that dominion serves as a
means through which a feeling of efficacy can be obtained and a
Will to Power satisfied, Nietzsche seems to believe that the contrary is true. That is, the characterization of domination as a
means to satisfy the Will to Power indicates that Nietzsche believes dominion has qualities that also address the need to establish a feeling of efficacy. A way of reconciling this is to posit that
Nietzsche believes dominion implicitly must contain a validation
of effectiveness. That is, there is no “power over” (dominion)
without also having the “power to” (efficacy) transform the world
in accordance with one’s values.XXXII For example, a prince who
inherits the title of king upon the death of his father has experienced a tremendous increase in power; however, he only experiences an increase in dominion if he has the skills to maintain this
position and continue to conform the world to his will. This requires that he is also effective at leadership and being king; otherwise, he would never truly experience the full increase in dominion that comes from becoming a monarch. As a consequence,
Nietzsche’s notion of a Will to Power seems to be best understood as the acquisition of dominion through the imposition of
one’s values on an object and the validation of one’s efficacy and
abilities. While the manifestations and ends of this will may vary,
it is guided by the inexorable pursuit of the thrill that comes from
a feeling of accomplishment. In this regard, Nietzsche’s Will to
Power can be seen as not only a psychological explanation of a
16
Julian D. Jacobs
Notes
I
In this essay, all citations are direct from Nietzsche texts. The
abbreviations are: BGE = Beyond Good and Evil, GM = On the
Genealogy of Morality, GS = The Gay Science, WP = The Will
to Power, and Z = Thus Spoke Zarathustra
II
WP §1067, BGE §259, BGE §23
III
Nietzsche, Friedrich (1965), Schopenhauer as Educator, trans.
J.W. Hillesheim and Malcolm R. Simpson, (South Bend, Indiana,
Gateway), pp. 25-26
IV
BGE§13
V
GS §349
VI
Increases in tangible power, domination, and control.
VII
By “dominion itself”, this essay seeks to draw the distinction
between tangible increases in power and dominion that must be
acquired in particular ways as well as distinguishing between dominion acquired as a means to something else.
VIII
By “end”, this essay is describing the manifestation of the
Will to Power. For example, for a businessman, the end of his
Will to Power might be an increase in revenue.
IX
WP §702
X
This definition was inspired by Professor Bernard Reginster’s
March 8, 2016 lecture.
XI
For example, we might say that Adolf Hitler attempted to increase his dominion in Europe.
XII
Z II §12
XIII
This objection was inspired by Professor Bernard Reginster’s
March 8, 2016 lecture.
XIV
WP §423
XV
Here activity can be understood as an individual’s role as the
initiation and driving force behind any obtained dominion.
XVI
That is, a force that stands to obstruct or oppose an individual
17
The End of Nietzsche’s Will to Power
Notes Continued
from satisfying his or her Will to Power.
XVII
WP §382
XVIII
WP § 224
XIX
In order to even face opposition, it is a necessary condition
that an individual is active.
XX
This definition was inspired by Professor Bernard Reginster’s
March 8, 2016 lecture.
XXI
WP §696
XXII
This reply was inspired by a discussion with Professor Bernard Reginster on March 17, 2016.
XXIII
WP §696
XXIV
Z II §12
XXV
WP §656
XXVI
WP §48
XXVII
WP §48
XXVIII
This is an essential component of what Nietzsche calls ressentiment.
XXIX
WP §125
XXX
WP §125
XXXI
This point was inspired my discussion with Professor Bernard Reginster on March 12, 2016 lecture.
XXXII
BGE §259
XXI
WP §696
XXII
This reply was inspired by a discussion with Professor Bernard Reginster on March 17, 2016.
XXIII
WP §696
XXIV
Z II §12
XXV
WP §656
XXVI
WP §48
XXVII
WP §48
18
The End of Nietzsche’s Will to Power
Notes Continued
XXVIII
This is an essential component of what Nietzsche calls ressentiment.
XXIX
WP §125
XXX
WP §125
XXXI
This point was inspired my discussion with Professor Bernard Reginster on March 12, 2016 lecture.
XXXII
BGE §259
References
Nietzsche, Friedrich (1965), Schopenhauer as Educator, trans.
J.W. Hillesheim and Malcolm R. Simpson, (South Bend, Indiana, Gateway), pp. 25-26
Professor Bernard Reginster’s lectures in his Spring 2015
course Nietzsche.
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, Michael A Scarpitti, and R. Kevin
Hill. The Will To Power. 1st ed. Print.
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, R. J Hollingdale, and Michael
Tanner. Beyond Good And Evil. 1st ed. Print.
Nietzsche, Friedrich, and Reginald John Hollingdale. Thus Spoke
Zarathustra. 1st ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 2006.
Print.
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, and Walter Arnold Kaufmann.
The Gay Science. 1st ed. New York: Vintage Books, 2010.
Print.
Nietzsche, Friedrich, and Walter Arnold Kaufmann. On The Genealogy Of Morals. 1st ed. New York: Vintage Books, 2011.
Print.
Michael Bevan
19
Space and Sensibilia
Michael Bevan
T
here is a reasonably common view, amongst proponents of causal-realist theories of perception, which
says that objects of immediate perception inhabit a spatial realm that is totally cut-off from the one inhabited
by material beings.I The reasons for this are two:
(i) Visual percepts are often described by causal
realists as ‘colour patches,’ implying that they
have shapes and sizes, and are extended. Also, non
-visual percepts seem to be positioned; sounds can
be to the left or to the right, for example. Since any
being with extension must have a location, it follows that the objects of our immediate perception
are spatial entities.
(ii) Since the causal realist posits that the objects
of our direct perception to be non-material, it
would be odd if percepts enjoyed some spatial relation to material things. Is the brown colour-patch
caused by the table in the same location as the table? If so, then why does one directly perceive the
former but not the latter? Such percepts cannot all
be in the locations of their material causes since
some (i.e. hallucinations) have no material causes.
But if my table-shaped sense-datum is not at the
table itself, then where is it? Is it swimming behind
the cornea, or perhaps floating about the brain,
haunting the synapses? How big is the colour
patch (in meters squared/cubed?) All of these
questions, which appear non-sensical, would be
Michael Bevan is a undergrduate at the University of Reading, UK, where he is
currently in his final year studying for a BA in philosophy.
20
Sense and Sensibilia
legitimate if we were to admit that immaterial percepts inhabit the same space as material beings.
These considerations say that if causal realism is true, there is
a ‘phenomenal space’ inhabited by percepts, one which is distinct
from the space inhabited by material beings. There are dissenters,
of course: not very long ago, O’Shaughnessy took sense-data to
inhabit body-relative physical space, that is, the space inhabited
by material beings.II There are others however, Smythies being to
my knowledge the most recent example,III who explicitly postulate a second space, and it is against the latter sort of causal realist that I shall aim my objections. In what follows, we shall be
looking at the consequences of the ‘two-space’ view, and arguing
that such consequences are absurd.
1. Space Oddities
1.1. Preliminary
No matter one’s view of the ontology of ‘spaces,’ one can say
that, where x and y are spatially located entities and where xDy
reads as ‘x is some distance from y,’ x and y inhabit the same
space if and only if xDy.IV To define the class of inhabitants of a
space A then, one need only identify some inhabitant x A of A ,
and then define the class of A ’s inhabitants as I(A ) =df {y|yDxA}.
D is an equivalence relation, meaning that I(A) is identical to the
equivalence class [a]D where a ∈ I(A ). Thus, for any spaces A and
B, either I(A) and I(B) are disjoint, or I(A ) = I(B). Since if there
were some z in both I(A ) and I(B), it would follow that I(A ) = [z]
D = I(B). Therefore, spaces are either completely disjoint, sharing
no inhabitants, or completely overlapping, sharing all inhabitants.
There is one other thing which we should prove before moving on. Call any part of x which possesses a location a spatial part
of x. What we shall prove is that it is impossible for a being to
only partially inhabit some space, by which we mean that for any
being x and space A , either every spatial part of x inhabits A , or
no spatial part of x inhabits A . This follows from the fact that a
being must be located at least partially wherever any of its spatial
parts are, and so will bear the symmetric and transitive D relation
to each. For example, if x has spatial parts a and b with a inhabit-
Michael Bevan
21
ing A , then we have xDa, so aDx by symmetry, and xDb, from
which aDb follows by transitivity, so that b also inhabits A .
1.2. Causation
If material beings are not spatially related to percepts, then the
space inhabited by material beings (’material space,’ or ‘M’ for
short) is totally disjoint from the space inhabited by percepts
(‘phenomenal space,’ or ‘P’ for short). But a causal realist must
say that the inhabitants of P and M enjoy some sort of causal relation. But what kind of causal relation could they possibly enjoy?
Smythies suggests that the causal relations enjoyed by the inhabitants of P and M are ‘Humean,’ where a Humean causal relation
is one of regularity: the X s are Humean causes of the Y s only if
there is a constant conjunction of Y s following X s.V For example,
Smythies might say that the table is a Humean cause of the brown
colour-patch since the presence of the table in M is always followed by the presence of an appropriately shaped brown colourpatch in P. But to say that y follows x suggests that the occurrence of y comes after the occurrence of x. So if the inhabitants of
M and P are related by Humean causal relations, then they must
be temporally related.
The trouble with saying that inhabitants of P and M are temporally and not spatially related is that this implies that spatiality
and temporality in the material realm are separable in a way that
conflicts with the broadly accepted scientific view on the matter
which says that the two are bound together quite inextricably.
The physicist will say that it is, strictly speaking, wrong to think
of material things as entering into spatial and/or temporal relations, rather they enter into spatiotemporal relations. Further, in
order for two entities to be a defined spatiotemporal ‘distance’
from each other, they must be a defined spatial distance and a defined temporal distance from each other, since the total spatiotemporal distance will be a function of these values. If the twospace causal realist wants to take current science seriously, they
will be pressured to say that the events of P and M cannot temporally relate. Material beings and sense-data, therefore, must inhabit disjoint spacetimes. This means that Smythies suggestion of
Humean causation is something of a non-starter.
22
Sense and Sensibilia
As a possible answer, Smythies might suggest something
like the following: while it may be true that events in P and M
share no temporal relations, the order of events in P matches up
with the order of events in M. Thus, the sequence of events in M:
A window is present before my eyes
A desk is present before my eyes
Birds sing in proximity to my ears
Matches up appropriately with the sequence of events in P:
A blue colour-patch appears
A brown colour-patch appears
A twittering sound occurs
Perhaps what makes each relevant event in M the cause of an
event in P is that each P-event matches up appropriately with
some M-event in terms of its place in the ordering of the two sequences. The first problem with this picture is its symmetry.
While it is true that the order of events in P appropriately corresponds to the order of events in M, it is also true that the order of
events in M appropriately corresponds to the order of events in P.
In other words, this kind of response leaves the causal realist
without the resources to maintain that the causal relation is from
M to P, and not the other way around. If this strategy is employed, could it not be possible that the occurrence of the brown
patch causes the presence of the table?
One might reply by noting that, in isolation, P-events
seem not to cause one another while M is causally closed. That is
to say, each event in M is causally determined by other events in
M. If one is against the idea of systematic overdetermination, this
will be a good reason to suppose that P-events do not cause Mevents, whereas the regularity that occurs among P-events demands an explanation which cannot be found in P alone. Granted
that P and M’s events correspond to each other, this gives us reason to suppose that M-events cause P-events in some way or another.
Michael Bevan
23
We should reply by saying that, since the causal relationship between P and M is precisely what is being questioned here,
our opponent cannot assume to have any knowledge concerning
the goings-on of M since, according to their own doctrine, we are
only directly acquainted with the inhabitants of P, and to assume
that this gives us even an indirect acquaintance with the inhabitants of M begs the question. If there is indeed no causal relation
between the two, then how can acquaintance with the inhabitants
of one give us even the vaguest knowledge of what is happening
in the other? Thus, if the causal realist cannot appeal to any facts
about what goes on in M, how can they appeal to the causal closure of M-events? In other words, to appeal to some difference
between M and P, one must assume that we have knowledge of
M. But if the causal realist is correct, this could only be the case
if there really is the very causal connection between M and P
which is here being called into doubt, and so any appeal to the
causal-closure of M-events by the causal realist will beg the question.
2. Subjects
But there is a far more interesting problem for the causal realist: us. When one is presented with the two-space view, a very
simple question arises. Where are we, the subjects of perception?
Now the subject cannot be in both P and M, for then it would be
the case that, where s the subject, I(M) = [s]D = I(P), which the
two-space causal realist must deny. Thus, either the subject of
perception is an inhabitant of P, or of M, or of neither. We now
turn to consider each of these options.
2.1. Material Subjects
There are strong reasons to think that we, subjects of perception, inhabit the space of material things. We think of ourselves
as sitting on chairs, standing in fields, and so on. If we are not
mistaken in thinking this, it follows that we inhabit M. For fields
and chairs are material things, and to be in a field or on a chair,
one must be spatially related to them. But such a supposition is
quite odd from the stance of two-space causal realism. If we are
in M, then why do we perceive the inhabitants of P and not our
fellow inhabitants of M? If we inhabit M, then to perceive even
our closest neighbour, we must perform a kind of super-
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Sense and Sensibilia
perception of an inhabitant of a totally disjoint spatial realm. Personal incredulity aside, there is an argument to be made. Consider that the primary motivation for causal (or, more generally, indirect) realism is the argument from illusion, which goes as follows:
1.It appears as though there is some F thing here.
2.No material thing with which I am now acquainted is in fact
F.
3. I must be directly aware of something which is F, else it
would not appear that way.
4. Therefore, the F thing of which I am directly aware is a
non-material entity.
Where F is some appropriate (i.e. sensory) quality, such as
colour or shape. What now becomes clear upon considering this
argument is that sense-data, being posited to account for the possibility of illusions, must always actually be as they appear to be
with respect to sensory qualities, for otherwise we might run an
argument as follows:
5. It appears as though some sense-data of mine is F.
6. But none of my sense-data are in fact F.
7. I must be directly aware of something which is F, else it
would not appear that way.
8. Therefore, the F thing of which I am directly aware is not a
sense-datum.
This conclusion contradicts causal realism altogether. Now, as
we said at the beginning, some sense-data appear to be positioned
relative to the subject. Auditory sense-data seem to be to the left
or to the right, for example, and even visual sense-data appear to
be closer or farther away. If this is the case for every sensedatum, then since sense-data must always actually be as they appear to be; sense-data must enjoy spatial relations with the subject of perception, which is impossible if the subject inhabits material space.
2.2. Phenomenal Subjects
Thus we are driven to consider the alternative, but this view
is also fraught with difficulties. If the subject inhabits P, then she
does not inhabit M, for disjoint spatial realms share no inhabitants. But then we, subjects of experience, are not on chairs, in
Michael Bevan
25
fields, or what have you. Rather, we are in a world of senseghosts, in which there are no material objects like chairs or fields,
but in which it certainly appears as if there are. If this is the case,
harking back to our remarks on inter-spacetime causation, the only promising way we might plausibly be said to interact with material beings would be through some kind of ordercorrespondence between P-events and M-events. With such a
shaky ‘causal’ connection, what could possibly account for,
among other things, the moral responsibility of subjects? Without
robust, full-blooded causal influence on the world, subjects cannot be said to fulfill their duties, help or harm other subjects, and
so on. The basic objection is that we cannot be in phenomenal
space for we are also agents who act in the material world.
Perhaps a causal realist might reply that the acting agent
and the perceiving subject are distinct beings, and so words like
‘I’ refer to different beings, depending on whether we are discussing perception or action. Of course this will not do, since what
would ‘I’ refer to in the sometimes-true sentence ‘I saw him fall
over and helped him up’? Did the being that saw the man fall
over help him up? Surely the answer is yes. Perhaps one could
reply that ‘I’ refers to two beings, taken together: the perceiving
subject and the acting agent. But this cannot be right either, for
the subject and the agent still do not perceive together or act together; the agent alone acts and the subject alone perceives. Perhaps ‘I’ could be said to refers to some mereological sum of the
agent and the subject. But from what we said before (in §1.1)
there can be no sum of bodies inhabiting disjoint spaces. This line
of questioning seems to be leading us towards a dead-end.
Finally then, if inter-spacetime causation cannot be defended, then is this two-space view, with a phenomenal subject,
really a causal realism at all? Is this two-space theory not instead
bound to collapse into idealism? For without a causal relation between M and P, we subjects have no good reason to inflate our
ontology by supposing that there is some spacetime, M, utterly
disjoint from the one we directly perceive, containing things
called ‘material objects.’ Such a supposition would grossly inflate
our ontology and so sufficient reasons to accept the existence of
material things being absent, we would be obligated to reject
26
Sense and Sensibilia
causal realism entirely and, indeed, collapse into a denial of the
existence of material.
2.3. Constructed Subjects
So, given that the subject does not inhabit P and M, and can
inhabit neither P nor M, we are left with the conclusion that the
subject inhabits neither. Might the subject inhabit some third
space? No, for such a view would be subject to the objections of
both previous sections. The subject would be no distance from
material objects, and so could not be in fields or on chairs. The
subject would be no distance from their sense-data, despite it
looking as if sense-data have subject-relative positions. More
pressingly for the causal realist, if the subject of perception is in
neither material nor phenomenal space, then the inhabitants of
each are of equal status to her. The causal realist then cannot explain the fact that the subject directly perceives the inhabitants of
P and not M, for under such a three-space view, there is no other
connection the subject has to sense-data and not to material beings.
Now to my knowledge, no one does think of the subject
as in some third space, but now we know that the two-spaces
causal realist has only one alternative left. If the subject of perception is not in any space, then the subject must be in no space
and must not be a spatial entity. But how might this be true?
Does the subject not perform perceptive acts at times? Relating
back to a previous point then, how can a thing inhabit time and
not space, given that the two are so intimately linked? If we define a subject of perception as being anything which performs
perceptive acts, and note that some such acts are performed at
times, the idea of the subject as a non-spatiotemporal being is
clearly absurd, and so the causal realist must instead conclude not
that there is a non-spatial subject of perception, but that there is
no subject of perception. If there is no subject, is there no perception either? For if perception occurs where there are perceptive
acts, and acts are performed by beings, then if a subject of perception is just a being which performs perceptive acts, the occurrence of perception entails the existence of subjects of perception. Thus in order to preserve what one could call the fundamental axiom of the philosophy of perception, that perception hap-
Michael Bevan
27
pens, the causal realist must devise an entirely different notion of
perception, one which will not construe perception as consisting
of acts. Can this be done?
We have two spaces, M and P. Well really, we have many
spaces, since my sense-data are not any distance from yours, and
so the two also inhabit distinct spaces. So there are as many phenomenal spaces as there are, or as there were thought to be, subjects. Perhaps then we might try to regain the subject as a logical
construction out of facts about these phenomenal spaces. Let us
name the phenomenological spaces PS, where ’S’ is at least naively taken as the name of some subject, and then proceed as follows:
Construction 1
(C1.1) S directly perceives x =df x inhabits P S
(C1.2) S indirectly perceives x =df x inhabits M, and there
is some y such that S directly perceives y and yRx.
Where R is some appropriate relation between the relevant inhabitants of PS and M. The causal realist can rejoice for she can at
once say that perception happens and that the truth of such locutions as ’S perceives x’ do not entail that there is any being that
performs a perceptive act. Now then, we must see what is wrong
with such a response. First we shall raise some worries with the
logical construction of the perceiving subject as it has been carried out here. We shall then examine some more general problems with the attempt to logically construct the subject generally,
and see whether these problems spell a final defeat for the twospace view of perception.
3. Constructing Perception
3.1. Constructive Quibbles
Before continuing, we must remind ourselves that our objections relating to inter-spacetime causation, and its apparent impossibility (see §1.2), still apply to the logical constructivist position. For it is necessary under causal realism that, for it to be true
that ’S’ indirectly perceives some M-inhabitant, it must be true
that ’S’ directly perceives some PS-inhabitant which enjoys some
causal relation with the M-inhabitant. So the relation yRx in
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Sense and Sensibilia
(C1.2) must imply some sort of causal relation between x and y.
While we have already objected to the possibility of such a relation under two-space causal realism, we will be putting this objection aside for the time being. I only mention it once more so
that the reader does not mistake the following nitpicking as an
implicit approval of the overarching project.
Now, consider again Construction 1. The major error with
this construction is its atemporality. Perception is something
which can occur at times, but how are we to make sense of expressions such as “S perceives x at time t” under such a construction? A straightforward translation of direct perception at a time
from C1 yields:
(C1.1’) S directly perceives x at time t = x inhabits P S at
time t.
But does t refer to some time of M’s, or of PS’s? Since M and PS
do not share a timeline, as it were, and since events in each are un
-amenable to standard temporal comparison with each other (i.e.
no PS-event truly precedes or is preceded by any M-event), t cannot be some time at which both PS-events and M-events occur.
Now, since direct perception does not explicitly involve M, it is
acceptable to say that in (C1.1’), t must be some time at which P S
-events occur. But then consider indirect perception, which involves both spaces. A mechanical translation of indirect perception at a time, from C1.2, yields
(C1.2’) S indirectly perceives x at time t =df x inhabits M,
and there is some y such that y inhabits PS and yRx, at
time t.
But this cannot do, for t cannot be a time at which M-events and
PS events both occur since then M and PS would share a timeline.
So perhaps we can sketch an alternate construction which avoids
this problem. As a preliminary definition where X is some space,
we will define an X-time as some time t to which events that take
place in X bear some temporal relation (i.e. precedence, simultaneity, etc.) We shall denote X-times tX, then proceed as follows:
Construction 2
(C2.1) S directly perceives x at tPs =df x inhabits P S at tPs.
Michael Bevan
29
(C2.2) S directly perceives x at tM =df x inhabits P S at tPs,
and tM ∼ tPs.
(C2.3) S indirectly perceives x at tPs =df x inhabits M at
some M-time tM, and there is some y such that S directly
perceives y at tPs, and yRx, and tM ∼ tPs.
(C2.4) S indirectly perceives x at tM =df S indirectly perceives x at tPs, and tM ∼ tPs.
R is the same as-yet-unanalysed relation from C1, but we also
introduce a new relation, ∼, which means something like
‘corresponds to.’ Through the use of this sort of correspondence
between M-times and PS-times, the causal realist might be able to
solve the problem of temporal relation between M-events and PSevents. So, while M-events and PS-events cannot be genuinely
temporally related, a sort of pseudo-temporal relation might still
be thought to hold, and to ground the truth of statements such as
’S indirectly perceived the chair while she directly perceived the
sense-data caused by the chair.’ The relation ∼ might then be defined in terms of event-ordering (cf. §1.2). So, if sequences of Mevents and PS-events match up in some adequate way, we can say
that the relevant members of one sequence are pseudosimultaneous with those of the other. More precisely, let p = (p1,
p2, …, pn) be an n-tuple of PS-events arranged in chronological
order, and m = (m1, m2, …, mn) be a likewise-arranged n-tuple of
M-events. Then, if and only if p and m enter into an appropriate
relation (such as the event sequences in §1.2), one can say that
each m i is pseudo-simultaneous with each pi, so that the time at
which m i occurs ‘corresponds to’ the time at which pi occurs. The
main point of such a definition is that pseudo-simultaneity relations between events can be grounded by correspondences between event-sequences. I cannot think of a solid objection to this
sort of approach, but regardless of whether this particular definition of pseudo-simultaneity fails, C2 appears to be the right way
to go for the logical constructivist. For if locutions such as ’S perceives x’ are true at times, which they are, then they must be true
at both M-times and PS-times, and such can be true universally
only if these times can enter into some sort of general correspondence with each other.
30
Sense and Sensibilia
3.2. Unconstructed Subjects
Now, pulling away from particular logical constructions of
the subject, we shall now be criticising logical constructivism
about the subject in general. First, we must stress that a logical
construction is not a being of any sort. For it to be true that x is a
logical construction, it must mean that there is no such being as x
and that all true locutions which appear to imply the existence of
this ‘x’ can be restated in a way that preserves the logical content
of the locution whilst removing the apparent ontological commitment. In the case of the subject then, to say that the subject of
perception is a logical construction is first to say that the subject
does not exist, and second to say that all meaningful locutions
which appear to imply the existence of the subject are either
false, or amenable to appropriate paraphrase. I mean to suggest
here that this is not so for two reasons, the first of which was
hinted at briefly in §2.2. Certain sentences such as the following
are true. I saw the chair and went to sit down on it. I heard a loud
noise and went to see what caused it. In both, the subject of perception is described as performing actions. But a logical construction cannot perform actions. In other words, it is unclear
how a logical constructivist might deal with any sentence of the
form
(α) S perceived x and consequently did φ.
It is clear that, for the causal realist, this cannot be read in the
standard way, as synonymous with:
(α1) S perceived x and consequently, S did φ.
For ’S’ is not really a being, and so cannot perform actions. In
other words, (α1) entails that there exists some being which perceived x and did φ, which the constructivist will wish to deny,
and yet the constructivist ought to allow that locutions such as (α)
are sometimes true, for they are sometimes true. Perhaps then, the
logical constructivist could read (α) as synonymous with:
(α2) S perceived x and consequently, H did φ.
Where H is some being. So for example, the logical constructivist
might say that ‘John heard a loud noise and so went to see what
caused it’ is true if and only if (i) an appropriate aural sensedatum inhabits PJohn and (ii) some being consequently behaves in
an appropriate fashion. The problem with such a reading of (α) is
Michael Bevan
31
that it yields an explanatory gap. W hy does the perception of x
result in the consequent performance of φ? The reading (α1) gives
us a partial explanation, since under this reading the subject is the
agent, and so the sequence of events is explained by the fact that
the subject’s perception of x influences that same subject to φ.
But (α2) leaves us with the question of why the perception of x
(which is analysed merely as the occurrence of x in the spatially
disjoint phenomenal realm) influenced any material being’s behaviour at all, and specifically why it resulted in H, rather than
some other being, performing φ. The second reason I have for
doubting constructivist is that they would make all agents logically blind. If no subjects of perception are beings, then no beings
are subjects of perception, and so agents are not subjects of perception. By necessity, they do not see, hear, feel, smell or taste
anything. This point is similar to the last, but I think that it is
worth highlighting it in its own right, seeing as it is particularly
implausible.
The final reason I have for dismissing constructivism is
that, without there being a real subject to act as intermediary, causation from phenomenal to material spaces is implausibly immediate. On a traditional causal realist picture, we can tell the following sort of story: the presence of the bus before my eyes causes the occurrence of a red colour patch in my phenomenal space.
My perception of this colour patch then causes me to stand up and
get on the bus. If we erase the subject from this story, the whole
thing becomes quite wild. The presence of the bus before agent x
causes, but does not precede or coincide with, the occurrence of a
red colour patch in a spacetime utterly disjoint from the spacetime
inhabited by x and the bus. This occurrence then causes, but does
not precede or coincide with, x’s standing up and getting onto the
bus. Again, even if inter-spacetime causation in defensible, the
complexity of this explanation of events makes it repulsive in absence of good independent reasons to suppose that it is true. Because of this, along with my two previous points, I cannot imagine that the causal realist can take logical constructivism as a live
option.
4. Recapitulation
32
Sense and Sensibilia
So, the positing of a second spatial realm to serve as the
abode of percepts must be mistaken. Firstly, it seems to make the
requisite causal relations between material and phenomenal
events impossible, in the light of our scientific understanding of
spatiality and temporality. Secondly, the two-space causal realist
cannot answer the simple question of where we, the subjects of
perception, fit into their picture. And if the two-space causal realist denies the existence of the subject altogether, she runs into further absurdities. In light of these objections I take it as plain that
the causal realist must take sense-data as being located in material
space. For my own part, this serves as an enthymeme to the conclusion that causal realism tout court is untenable, for one-space
causal realism (in which sense-data are taken to inhabit material
space) seems to me even less defensible. My reasons for rejecting
one-space causal realism go beyond the current scope, though
they are essentially articulated in the introduction, under point
(ii). At the very least, I hope that the points made in this paper
serve to deter would-be two-spacers from assenting to what
amounts to be an untenable position.
Michael Bevan
Notes
I
cf. Henry Price, Perception (Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1954 reprint), 246 – 252. By ‘causal realist’, I refer to those thinkers
who hold that one perceives material beings via the perception of non-material entities, whose existence is caused by
material beings.
II
Brian O’Shaughnessy, ‘Sense-data’ in: Smith (ed.) John
Searle (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 173
III
John Smythies, “Space, Time and Consciousness” Journal
of Consciousness Studies 10(3) (2003): 47 – 56
IV
A substantivalist about space can admit this, and would
say that it is true of spaces. A relationist, on the other hand,
can take this to be a reductive paraphrase: all it is for things
to be ‘in the same space’ is for them to be some distance
from each other.
V
Smythies, “Space, Time and Consciousness”, 47 – 48.
References
Price, H. H. Perception. Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1954.
O’Shaughnessy, B. “Sense-data” In John Searle, edited by
Barry Smith, 169 – 188. Cambridge University Press,
2003.
Smythies, J. “Space, Time and Consciousness” Journal of
Consciousness Studies 10(3) (2003):47 – 56
33
Kirsten Donato
34
Self-Care as a Burdened Virtue
Kirsten Donato
S
elf-Care as a Burdened Virtue
In this paper, I complicate the moral lives of patients,
specifically the mentally ill, and the moral burdens they
face when addressing one’s self-care in managing
chronic mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia or bipolar disorder. Much attention has been paid to the moral aspects of the doctor-patient relationship, and the moral responsibilities of doctors.
Bioethics, though, often limits its discussion of the moral responsibilities of patients. I will articulate how self-care is an opportunity for patients to take control over their morality.
The goal of this paper is to demonstrate that self-care is a
burdened virtue among the mentally ill. In this paper, self-care is
defined as a combination of three factors: 1) self-awareness of
current health status, 2) one’s place in the world, and 3) ability to
take action to promote one’s wellbeing through this awareness.
Additionally, I will argue for my points above using a conception
of the mentally ill as an oppressed group; for the sake of brevity, I
am going to assume this conception of the mentally ill, rather than
argue that it is true.
As I understand the mentally ill as an oppressed group, I
utilize Tessman’s work (Burdened V irtues) where she defined
Kirsten Donato is a senior studying public health and medical humanities at
Albany College of Pharmacy and Health Sciences in New York. Her philosophical interests are in virtue ethics, feminist bioethics, and medical ethics.
She will continue on to pursue graduate studies in public health where she
hopes to contribute philosophy ideology into practice and research. This paper
was originally written as an assignment for ETH410: Special Topics in Bioethics for professor Dr. Barry DeCoster. She would like to thank him for his guidance, inspiration, and continuous support through this philosophical journey.
35
Self-Care as a Burdened Virtue
“burdened virtues” as those traits that help one obtain human
flourishing, but also detract and negatively impact the well-being
of one’s self, which inevitably lead to the chance of great pain
and suffering in the individual.I A burdened virtue both contributes to and inhibits human flourishing, especially for members of
oppressed groups.
Self-care is both enduring unchangeable factors associated
with the diagnosis and having the courage and fortitude to respond, along with an attempt to flourish under these factors. Mentally ill individuals experience well-documented hardships related
to their treatment. They also have deficiencies in self-awareness
in times of grave danger. Self-care provides mentally ill patients
the ability to act in their best interests at all times, but specifically
during times of instability. Self-care for a mentally ill patient is
not the same as a mentally healthy patient taking responsibility
for her health or acceptance of the sick role; the addition of selfcare complements patient responsibility.
To help discern why self-care is a virtue, and specifically
a burdened one, I will use the narrative of a schizophrenic patient
from a popular book, The Quiet Room by author and fellow patient advocate, Lori Schiller. I will explore the following three
questions: What is the nature of the virtue of self-care? What
would it look like to practice self-care? Why is the virtue of selfcare needed in the mentally ill population? Finally, I will compare self-care in two different populations, women who experience oppression and the mentally ill. In doing so, I will point to
the differences between the two, and also begin to explain why
self-care is a burdened virtue in the mentally ill, but one for oppressed women.
What is a Virtue?
As Aristotle defines it, virtue is the development of good
moral character. Such character is created, transformed, and refined by good or virtuous actions. Virtuous actions are seen to be
the comfortable middle between the opposing vices of excess and
deficiency.II Alasdair MacIntyre, in his modern approach to Aristotelian virtue, distinguishes internal versus external goods,
which can be associated with excellence versus effectiveness.III
Kirsten Donato
36
Internal goods are those that are gathered by the participation in
the practice whereas, external goods are just happenstance and
occur through random chance of the situation. In that, internal
goods can be considered goods of “excellence” and external
goods to be goods of “effectiveness”. To clearly understand what
virtues are and what they mean, it is imperative that a virtue is
displayed through a range of practices, with both internal and external goods. In addition, through those practices, critical assessments and other measures must be taken within the actual practice itself so as to ensure the virtue applies properly and an intended social purpose is met. For example, wastefulness is excessive spending of money and stinginess is the opposite; generosity
lies in the middle. Generosity is the center between giving just
enough while not inflicting self-harm via martyrdom by giving
everything away.IV
A virtue is defined by MacIntyre as an “acquired human quality where the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us
to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the
lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such
goods.”V MacIntyre’s beliefs can be summarized as a mechanism
where virtue results from both action and character in a cyclic
relationship where deliberation and rationality are central. This
virtue mechanism is required for maintaining a specific social
role and for excelling in a specific area of practice under that
role. By definition, practice is “any coherent and complex form
of socially established cooperative human activity through which
goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course
of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with
the results that human powers to achieve excellence, and human
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically
extended.”VI Therefore, virtues do not exist only out of actions
but as some culmination of actions, practice, and character. It is
important to note that both good character and good activities are
dependent on social, historical, and cultural contexts.
Inevitably, any trouble in this mechanism can result in outcomes such as poor cultivation of virtue, issues related to character, and the resulting actions of the individual. Furthermore, we
must note the difference between internal and external goods in
37
Self-Care as a Burdened Virtue
relation to practice. As previously described, a practice is a complex, cooperative social activity where excellence can be
achieved through understanding of the goods involved in the activity. In continuation, external goods, are related to a competition where there are winners and losers. However, these are just
objects that seem beneficial but do not improve one’s virtue. In
contrast, internal goods are based on the outcome of the competition and the benefit of the achievement to the entire community.
Two key points are crucial to remember: first, the acquisition of
virtues is a means to an end. Second, that relationship is one of
internal, rather than external, goods.
The Nature of Self-Care as a Virtue
To understand how a virtuous patient should engage modern psychiatry, one must notice that the practice of medicine is
dependent on social and historical forces. Thus, the patient suffering from mental illness cannot be separated from the social and
historical forces that created both the conception of mental illness, nor from the related forces that created the mentally healthy
patient. Patients enacting self-care are working through the practice of medicine via the patient-provider relationship. In schizophrenia, patients often go through waves of their disorder, including the active phase known as the hallucinations, delusions, and
disturbance in their thoughts and feelings; while they also can go
through periods of passive, less symptomatic schizophrenia.
Often, the mentally ill patient is thought to have failed or
is deemed incapable of being responsible for herself, in attending
to her physical, mental, and moral well-being. As an example,
consider the work of Lori Schiller, a psychiatric patient challenged with the burden of her illness and the challenges that follow. An excerpt from an interview with Lori Schiller states:
People would say to me, 'Why do you want to kill yourself? Are you depressed?' More than anything else I wanted relief. I couldn't listen anymore. I could see those faces
on the walls laughing at me or telling me I had to die. VII
Furthermore, her life still comes with a price. She is constantly
aware of her illness, has to manage her medications, and has to
Kirsten Donato
38
cope with a variety of responses from individuals who attend her
book signings or other public events. These responses can be particularly challenging when she encounters individuals who have
misconceptions about schizophrenia or her experiences living
with a mental illness.VIII Elsewhere, Schiller discusses how her
suicidal ideations often kept her calm and centered because it followed what the Voices wanted her to do. She begins by saying:
“As frightening as these potential suicidal scenarios seem, they
are all held for me a real ending of tranquility and eternal peace.”
She precedes this by discussing how she received her diagnosis:
Eventually, I entered the ‘revolving door’ into the socalled mental health system. The doctors, so dapper and
professional in their psychiatric style and attire, told my
parents that I was a paranoid schizophrenic who had little
chances of getting better. My diagnosis was just another
‘sick chronic psychiatric patient’ to be shoved away forever in some hospital. IX
Moving forward, we should recognize that these scenarios are but
two examples of what schizophrenia patients might cope with as
part of their diagnosis. Through these examples, the virtue of self
-care will be explored.
Here, it is helpful to clarify the nature of self-care, particularly in contrast to other standard virtues with which patients
might engage. Above, I defined self-care as a combination of self
-awareness of current health status and place in the world, along
with the ability to take action to promote one’s wellbeing through
this awareness.
Self-care is not “responsibility for self.” Responsibility is
based on a person’s intentions, whether voluntary or involuntary.
Moral responsibility is too much for the mentally ill. Furthermore, a person is responsible for their character because a person
develops their character through their actions.X Responsibility is
a process that occurs when acting as a normal agent. The mentally ill are often unable to take complete legal or moral responsibility and are unable to act as a legal or moral agent. Thus, the virtue of responsibility does not fit the need required by this group
and is rather unattainable for them.
39
Self-Care as a Burdened Virtue
Due to this, self-care is a virtue that can be achieved by
the mentally ill, versus responsibility for self, which requires
agency that might not always be achieved in this population. Selfcare is more manageable for the mentally ill than responsibility;
although it is weaker than the virtue of responsibility, it is still an
important virtue.
Furthermore, self-care is not reducible to “prudence.” Prudence can be defined as a reluctance to take risks or overcautiousness; it also can be termed as rational choice or practical
wisdom. Prudence is the ability to govern and discipline oneself
by the use of reason. Likewise, it also incorporates a course of
action that is related to perfection of ability. To explain, without
prudence, virtue is practically impossible because a balance is
unattainable. Self-care is a different virtue than prudence because
prudence lends too much towards perfection and an absolute balance without being too cautious or too practical. Self-care is
about self-awareness and the ability to act for an individual’s best
interest, whether or not it is practiced in too practical or too cautious a method.
In The Rules of Insanity, Carl Elliott discusses the differences
between ignorance and compulsion and how that relates to the
responsibility of an individual. Ignorance is defined as a person
not being aware of their actions, whereas compulsion is defined
as a person not being able to help what he or she is doing. In a
schizophrenic patient, often the individual lacks awareness of his
or her actions, which means that he or she also is not in control of
character because of the inability to rationalize and deliberate.
In this mechanism, based on MacIntyre’s previously-defined
theory of practice, it seems impossible for a mentally ill person to
be virtuous. Prudence suggests that the person must perceive and
understand the situation appropriately and further act on behalf of
that perception. The perception and judgement required are already in question in responsibility, but in prudence, character is
more than just the sum of actions. Mental illnesses, especially
schizophrenia, stunt a person’s ability to advocate and determine
what is best for one’s personal welfare. This negates any possible
self-protectiveness, especially in regards to the virtue of prudence.XI
The mentally ill have no opportunity to achieve the flourish-
40
Kirsten Donato
ing associated with the virtues of responsibility and prudence. If
living is about the ability to experience emotional connections,
responsibility, flourishing, and other internal goods related to the
virtue of self-care, then, the mentally ill do not have the opportunity to follow the definition of human flourishing with those
virtues. This is because the patient is unable to practice the virtue
of self-responsibility or prudence properly due to his or her illness. This does not mean these individuals are incapable of practicing self-care or other virtues; it means that the practice of selfcare and related virtues rely on the development of multiple social identities in an individual, and intermingle depending upon
the current mental state. This kind of care-taking is beyond the
scope of medical professionals or family members. Instead, it is
about the individual and her understanding and perception of the
limitations of illness.
Self-Care Enacted
The practice of self-care is challenging to achieve in practice, as is true with most of Aristotle’s virtues. As previously described, self-care is defined as a combination of self-awareness of
current health status and place in the world along with the ability
to take action to promote one’s well-being through this awareness. For example, self-care in the mentally ill could be patients
taking the initiative to discuss medication side effects they are
experiencing with their providers and, further, having an open
conversation about what can be done in the future to prevent
those side effects, whether through discontinuation of the medication (safely) or counseling services. In many cases, individuals
may feel that they are betraying themselves by having those open
conversations, in particular the case of schizophrenia, where voices may be telling them to do otherwise.
Honoring oneself is related to recognition and giving reasoning for choices and emotions.XII It is extremely difficult to
maintain personal honor while also sacrificing oneself through
the burdened virtue of self-care. To clarify: honoring oneself is
completely separate from self-care, but I will use the nature and
practice of honoring oneself to further understand the virtue of
self-care. Self-care, in contrast, is not at all about recognition but
41
Self-Care as a Burdened Virtue
rather about self-respect and preservation of the self through alternative and preventative methods such as plans for “bad” days
for loved one to follow or additional friendships and connections
to maintain the “good” mental health status rather than a spiral
downwards. Self-care in psychiatric patients enables actions to
take place even when they might not be able to honor themselves
because a specific level of awareness and rationality is not being
reached. Therefore, they must practice self-care, which entails
putting responsibility and care in the hands of those trusted and
respected to make decisions on behalf of the individual. This can
further help to limit the damage that can ensue from their inability to practice self-honor. Self-care also is about understanding
the various levels of involvement required for proper psychiatric
care. This includes therapists, doctors, family members, and social workers as part of the treatment regimen and allowing open
communication networks between any and all of these people.
Another important distinction of self-care is that self-care
is a particular obligation that mentally ill patients owe themselves. The repetitive nature of chronic mental illness requires a
significant amount of endurance. The virtue of self-care can help
prevent further hospitalizations and better mental health outcomes. Thus, interestingly, virtues-including self-carehave a great
social benefit.
Being mentally ill does not require the patient to be selfsacrificing, but rather the illness creates difficulties for the individual and health care professionals interacting with these individuals. If psychiatric patients choose not to practice self-care,
they are cheating themselves out of the life they are guaranteed.
In addition, self-care is about the realization of one’s own obligations to oneself and the recognition of the work one has to do so
that others may help. A common question could be, does a severely mentally ill patient, such as a schizophrenic, have autonomy or rational decision-making skills? This balancing act is hard
enough in a healthy patient, but once a psychiatric patient is
tasked with understanding various facets of human character and
related actions, the challenge of virtuous actions can become
overwhelming and further perpetuate a struggle for human excellence in a psychiatric patient. Therefore, the actual virtue of selfcare eliminates some of the baggage associated with other virtues
42
Kirsten Donato
(such as prudence and responsibility). Self-care is practiced when
the patient is autonomous and able to make competent decisions
whereas self-care is enacted when the patient is unable to act for
one’s best interests.
Self-Care as a Burdened Virtue: Differences in the Mentally
Ill and Women
How is self-care enacted in other groups facing oppression, as women, different from its enactment by mentally ill patients? Oppression is the use of authority, law, or physical force,
in an inequitable manner, to prevent others from being free and
equal; a systematic mistreatment of a targeted group.XIII Identity
is something that is unchosen, however, it also is about who we
are as individuals in relation to everyone else.XIV Self-care among
women is about taking action and claiming responsibility over
their environments and identities in order to gain autonomy and
independence as women. In contrast, self-care in the mentally ill
is about understanding the different realms of mental stability and
lucidness associated with the illness and developing skills to act
properly in those different realms, especially in circumstances
where self-sufficiency is not possible due to the lack of choice in
mental illness.XV
The practice of self-care is different for women and the mentally ill. A woman who is constantly undergoing inappropriate
scrutiny by her male coworkers can go to her human resources
department and report the coworkers; in this, she is taking action
not only for her benefit but also for all women. Oppression, remember, works to cause harm to both the individual woman, and
because of its systemic quality, women as a group or category.
Alternatively, the act of reporting the event or whistleblowing
could negatively impact her career by potentially leading to a demotion (or lack of promotion). Another example is standing up
for women’s health and reproductive rights. Though this is fueled
by political and religious controversy, the root of the situation is
still about women’s health and the right she has over her own
body. By addressing topics such as free contraceptives, women
that actively discuss this with other women or the media, are acting virtuously through self-care and maintaining their identity and
43
Self-Care as a Burdened Virtue
rights as women. However, women who bring attention to this
issue in an unjust manner can cause strife and further violence or
discrimination of women.
For someone who has schizophrenia, developing an action
plan for an alternate social identity can be self-care. Specifically,
Lori Schiller knew she had schizophrenia and decided not to tell
anyone for quite some time. This is going against self-care because she, as a mentally ill patient, has an obligation to practice
self-care and to advocate for herself when she is able to do so. If
not, she is inhibiting her ability to flourish as a human being because she is not pursuing a virtuous life. When she finally told
someone, Schiller was able to release some autonomy, ensuring
that when she was unable to take proper actions for herself, someone would be able to act in her best interest. This is a problem
that often affects schizophrenics because they are unsure whether
they have individual autonomy because the illness makes them
feel otherwise.
At the same time, by asking for help, Schiller was able to start
connecting with others. This small step was part of a much bigger
step in social support, which is self-care. She also could have
practiced self-care by telling her family members and friends
about her illness and symptoms sooner than she did. The education and knowledge could have prevented one of her many suicide attempts and also could have taught those close to her about
schizophrenia so they could help to reduce the stigma and weight
she had to bear. Each of these examples demonstrates a way that
she could have developed a social identity capable of handling
the worst of her schizophrenia while also developing another social identity that allows her to take part in advocating for both
herself and other mentally ill people. But how does involving others contribute to the virtue of self-care? Through the nature of self
-awareness and, therefore, the actions made to benefit oneself,
reaching out to trusted individuals grants the mentally ill a specific level of autonomy in hard situations; that is the virtue of selfcare.
With all of this, where is self-care? It is part of both action
and character, but also connected to rationality and deliberation.
Self-care is impossible for an individual to enact as a virtue, to
help survive that oppression, without also negatively influencing
44
Self-Care as a Burdened Virtue
her own well-being, given that self-care is a burdened virtue. The
most engaged struggle around the virtue of self-care is separating
it from being self-regarding, and therefore not a virtue at all. As
Tessman argues in Burdened V irtues, self-concern may not be
considered morally virtuous because a virtue is supposed to be
other-regarding rather than self. The difference between selfconcern and self-care is that, in self-care, the mentally ill patient
is directly associated with providing evidence, support, and education for others to then assist in taking care of said mentally ill
person. If Lori Schiller had educated, say, her close friends about
her wishes for when her schizophrenia went into an active stage,
they would be able enact her best interests. This serves both the
good of other’s well-being and her own. In acting with self-care,
Schiller would have been self-aware of her current health status
by educating her friends and then she would have taken action to
promote her own well-being by developing a plan for when her
schizophrenia is active.
Conclusion
In conclusion, self-care is combination of self-awareness of
current health status and place in the world, along with, the ability to take action to promote one’s wellbeing through this awareness. This is accomplished by the education, compassion, and
caring which someone provides for the mentally ill individual.
Self-care is more than just bodily care, and self-care is beyond
responsibility or prudence. Self-care is a burdened virtue that acts
in self-preservation for both the individual and the mentally
healthy population. Self-care is different than personal responsibility for individual health. Self-care as a burdened virtue has two
facets. First, self-care is the attempt to thrive despite oppressive
factors associated with a diagnosis. Second, self-care allows mentally ill patients to develop the actions and enact those actions
necessary to take responsibility and better their lives as well as
other members of the group.
45
Kirsten Donato
Notes
I
Tessman, 2005.
Aristotle and Ross, 2009.
III
MacIntyre, 2007.
IV
MacIntyre, 2007, Miller, 1994.
V
MacIntyre, 2007, pp. 191.
VI
Ibid., 187.
VII
Schiller, 1994.
VIII
Lombardi, 1994.
IX
Schiller, 1994.
X
Elliot, 1996.
XI
Lebacqz, 1985.
XII
Andre, 2015, pp. 45.
XIII
Frye, 1983.
XIV
Lindemann, 2006, pp. 43-45.
II
XV
Ibid., 46-47.
46
Self-Care as a Burdened Virtue
References
Andre, Judith. “Honoring Oneself.” In W orldly V irtue: Moral
ideals and Contemporary Life. Lexington Books. 2015.
Aristotle, W. D. Ross. Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2009.
Bailey, Alison. "Privilege: Expanding on Marilyn Frye's
‘Oppression’" Journal of Social Philosophy, 1998, 104-19.
Elliott, Carl. "Mental Illness, Aristotle, and the Straight Rule of
Responsibility." In The Rules of Insanity Moral Responsibility and the Mentally Ill Offender. Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1996.
Frye, Marilyn. "Oppression." In The Politics of Reality: Essays in
Feminist Theory. Trumansburg, N.Y.: Crossing Press, 1983.
Lebacqz, Karen. "The Virtuous Patient." Philosophy and Medicine 17 (1985): 275-88.
Lindemann, Hilde. "The Importance of Who We Are." In A n Invitation to Feminist Ethics, 39-57. Boston: McGraw-Hill,
2006.
Lindemann, Hilde. "Feminist Ethics of Care and Responsibility."
In A n Invitation to Feminist Ethics, 86-103. Boston: McGraw
-Hill, 2006.
MacIntyre, Alasdair. “The Nature of the Virtues.” In A fter V irtue: A Study of Moral Theory, 181-203. University of Notre
Dame Press, 2007.
Miller, David. “Virtues, Practices, and Justice.” In A fter MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alisdair MacIntyre, 245-254. Wiley, 1994.
Kirsten Donato
References Continued
Tessman, Lisa. Burdened V irtues: V irtue Ethics for Liberatory
Struggles. Studies in Feminist Philosophy. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2005.
Young, Iris. "Five Faces of Oppression." In Oppression, Privilege, and Resistance, 40-65. McGraw Hill, 2004.
47
Aaron Weddle
48
Representation and Reality in Monetary
Theory
Aaron Weddle
A
ccording to Susan Haack in “The Real, the Fictional, and the Fake,” “sortal terms”I have to be applied
to the term “real” in order for it to become clearer.
She makes this distinction specifically regarding a
problem she has with fictional characters where although “there
really are fictional characters, those fictional characters aren’t real.”II However, in the article she makes multiple distinctions between things either being real or fictional. Although she dispels
the syntactic paradox that exists in fictional things really existing
but not being real, she applies the division of the real and fictional very liberally.
Haack approaches these distinctions from the basis of her
“innocent realism.” This principle suggests that there is “one real
world” which contains everything from thoughts and objects of
the imagination, to physical objects and social institutions: generally everything both physical and imagined.III Although she includes institutions in her “innocent realism,” I will argue in this
paper that even with “sortal terms,” she fails to take into account
how social structures and attitudes determine whether something
is real or not. I will make this argument on the basis of the monetary system. Haack comments on the monetary system when she
distinguishes between real and counterfeit money to demonstrate
that some entities can be either real or fictional. However, this
account fails to appreciate that real money may not be treated as
such outside of a specific culture, although it is still real money.
This implies a possible normative relativism regarding reality,
Aaron Weddle graduated from the University of West Georgia with a B.A. in
Philosophy in 2016. His philosophical interests include Metaphysics, Political
and Social Philosophy, and Religion. He recently accepted admission to a PhD
program at SUNY Binghamton, where he will continue to pursue these interests. When he is not writing about philosophy, Aaron likes to write and read
fiction, listen to music, and play the occasional game of tennis.
49
Representation and Reality in Monetary Theory
where a thing may be true or real in one culture, but differ immensely in another.IV This argument will be based upon what the
monetary system represents in differing cultures. In the first section of the paper, I will summarize the article by Susan Haack to
which I am responding. In section two I will use the monetary
system as a basis to criticize her distinction of the “real” as necessarily needing “sortal terms,” suggesting that this distinction is
insufficient in regards to certain institutions. The third section
will consider a counter argument to this criticism of Haack’s
method. In the fourth section I will summarize and conclude that
Haack’s theory is unable to sufficiently account for the monetary
system.
Susan Haack is concerned with the idea that there can really
be fictional characters, but the characters themselves aren’t real.V
She wants to find a way to dispel the paradox this suggests, so
that what is meant by “real” can be clearer. Haack approaches
this problem by first looking at various contrasting terms to
“real.” She first considers “real” as contrasted with “fake” or
“supposed.” She uses this definition of real to contrast real money and counterfeit money, as well as other “real” items and their
imitations. The idea of the “real” is important to her theory of
reality as it gives her room to consider how the products of the
imagination affect our concept of reality and the “real.”
Haack first considers the definitions of “real” offered by
other philosophers. She considers the philosophical definition of
“real” as meaning “independent of us,” and then considers the
definition of “real” as being simply “mind-independent.” She is
dissatisfied with these definitions, as in her view of reality ideas,
thoughts, and all of the products of these mental faculties are real; that is, they all exist in one reality.VI After exhausting her distinctions of both physical and imaginative things, all of which
take place in her conception of reality, she then applies the
“sortal terms” to the idea of imagination.
Haack’s application of sortal terms to the imagination
serves as a foundation for her later application of these terms to
fiction. She makes three distinctions regarding the imagination.
Firstly, there is an imagined X, which is later followed by a real
X. Secondly, the X is purely imagined and not acted upon. Finally, X is once again imagined but instead of later becoming real, it
Aaron Weddle
50
instead becomes a physical representation of X.VII
Haack is concerned in the third section of the article with
the intricate nature of reality and the degrees in which it can be
manifested. This concern stems from her concept of varying degrees of truth and fiction in reality, and their ability to coincide
with one another. She exhausts a seemingly limitless number of
examples of different degrees of fiction, representation, and their
respective relationship to what is “real.” For the purpose of the
article and the resolution of her problems with fiction in reality,
she settles on simply analyzing fictional characters and places
(and not the nature of their various representations). Although she
limits her focus, Haack claims that the distinctions she makes are
also applicable in a more general sense to the imagination and the
products of the imagination, as well as representation in reality.
Finally, Haack attempts to construct a new way of talking
about what is “real” to avoid paradox when we speak about
things which are “fictional.” Haack attempts to resolve this paradox by asserting that when we use the humdrum version of
“real,” which she describes as contrasting to “fake,” we are referring to “real X.” She argues that the same treatment of the term
“real” is also necessarily implicit in the metaphysical use of the
word “real.” She claims that when the matter is treated in this format, you can say without contradiction that there are real fictional
people, but these same fictional people are not real people. By
distinguishing the specific term X to which “real” is being applied, we are able to avoid the paradox.VIII
In this paper, I argue that Haack’s application of “sortal
terms” is not sufficient to explain social institutions. Her use of
the real by distinguishing it with a “sortal term” does not take into
account how institutions vary from culture to culture. While she
includes institutions in her concept of “one real world,” the neat
segmentation of reality according to her “sortal terms” appears to
be insufficient regarding the cultural tendencies and trends that
come with some institutions. While she makes distinctions regarding the monetary system, her distinction only extends to real
money compared to counterfeit or play money. According to the
St. Louis branch of the Federal Reserve, there are two types of
“real” money: representative money and fiat money. Representative money is defined as a certificate or token that can be ex-
51
Representation and Reality in Monetary Theory
changed for the underlying commodity. Fiat money is defined as
money that does not have intrinsic value and does not represent
an asset in a vault somewhere.IX Taking into account these two
types of money, as well as how the value of money differs between cultures, I intend to show that although all of these things
can exist in “one real world,” the specific value of currency or
the type of currency used is normatively relativistic.X By this I
mean that outside of any given culture with a set standard of economic values, currency may be treated differently or not as such
at all.
Representative money does not necessarily refute Haack’s
principle of reality. In this version of the monetary system, money represents some “real” thing, or real “X.” This could be anything from “real gold” to “real cows,” with gold or cows respectively being the “sortal term” to which “real” is applied. While
these things are real, the physical money itself is also real. The
value of the money in this system, however, is contingent on
what “real” object it represents. The value of these real objects to
a culture is where the real-ness begins to become relative. While
it is true that two physical currencies in two separate cultures can
both physically exist as real objects at the same time, the values
of these currencies may differ in many respects. An example of
this is if one currency represented a standard or stock of gold,
while the other one represented a commodity, such as cattle. Cattle in one society may be as valuable as gold, or even more valuable. This theoretical society that uses cattle as a medium of exchange may not have any immediate use for gold as a commodity.
In contrast to representative money, fiat money is defined
as having no intrinsic value, and does not represent anything
which may have a clear intrinsic value (e.g., sheep, gold, cattle,
etc.). While representative money in itself does not have intrinsic
value, it often represents something which may have intrinsic
value. Fiat money does not represent any tangible asset, but instead is money solely because some authority decides it is money. This type of money represents an institution that is even less
based in reality than representative money. While representative
money represents a “real” asset in the world, fiat money represents a confidence in the ability to spend money for goods and
Aaron Weddle
52
services. The entire system of fiat money is based on the values
that one particular culture or society deems appropriate.
Given these two basic forms of money, Haack’s distinction of the “real” according to “sortal terms” can be revisited.
Earlier in the article, she argues that something can be simply imagined X, or imagined as X and then become “real X,” or imagined X and then become “a physical representation of X.”XI These
distinctions create problems in the reality of the monetary system,
as money either represents an asset, or represents something completely intangible, such as being money solely based on a social
contract. Haack considers the implications of this in her article,
“The World According to Innocent Realism.”
In this article, Haack maintains that if fictionality comes
in degrees, then it follows that reality comes in degrees.XII This
argument poses a plausible solution to the problem with money,
as one form of money which represents something may be “more
realistic” than one based solely on social contract but still exist in
Haack’s “one real world.” However, I find this distinction to be
insufficient for dispelling the argument against money as being
universally “real.” Physically, money is a tangible object in reality; you can hold it, touch it, and you can use senses to determine
what it is. The form money takes varies from culture to culture,
but the institution of money at least is plausibly universal. So regarding money in this basic manner, yes, the institution of money
is part of “one real world.” Even the things that money represents
are part of this one world. Values, ideas, and anything relating to
the monetary system partake in this principle of “innocent realism.” However, this leaves room for a complex problem of relativism. Haack may be applying the principle liberally enough to
encompass ideas like relativism, but admitting that all of these
values and ideas are valid in reality leaves room for cultural or
normative relativism to be a regular aspect of this allencompassing principle of “innocent realism.” If things relative
to each respective culture are considered real, it begs the question
of whether valid money in one culture remains “real” when
brought into another culture.
This problem is evident when making the distinction between real and counterfeit money. Although the distinction between the two is made, “real money” can differ specifically from
53
Representation and Reality in Monetary Theory
culture to culture. If you tried to pay for an item in Russian rubles
in an American market, it is probable that they will reject your
currency. While the ruble is just as real as the American dollar as
far as money is concerned, it is not real to the culture of America,
in-so-much as it lacks value in that culture. In this context,
whether a given currency is real is dependent solely on the value
it has within an institution. While you can have your currency
exchanged to match that of a particular culture, the reality of the
institution is still based on the values of that particular culture.
The problem deepens when the two basic types of money are
considered on this point.
Representative money is often based on a standard or asset which gives it value. While the culture determines which asset
is valuable enough to standardize their currency on, the object of
consideration often still holds intrinsic value across multiple cultures. While not all cultures may value cattle as a basis for trade,
it is enough of a commodity that even if currency is not accepted,
it is still likely that you could barter the cattle for another object
of value. In the case of fiat money, however, relativism takes
precedence. Since fiat money represents nothing but the authority
of itself (after it is deemed valuable), it holds no value apart from
that which it has in the culture in which it exists. Its value is
based on the confidence that other people will accept it as legal
tender.XIII This system of thought pertaining to what is valued in
any specific culture almost ensures societal relativism, with the
only familiar concept being the universal idea or system of money. Money holds as being more “real” when it represents a commodity that exists in reality and not a social contract, but even by
this social contract, the assets it represents can be highly relative.
The only reason that this latter form of monetary representation
could be potentially more real is if the money is an asset or represents an asset, it can be traded on the basis of its own value (e.g.,
cattle, sheep, gold, corn, etc.).
Thus, Haack’s requirement that “real” always take a
“sortal term” is insufficient to identify culturally specific problems regarding the value of money. While she can distinguish
between what is “real” and “fictional” by utilizing this method,
she can do little to distinguish two equally “real” forms of currency within this system. She cannot argue that one form of currency
Aaron Weddle
54
is “more real” than the other, as they are all part of the same basic
system of monetary economics. She agrees that this system is
“real” in her argument regarding “innocent realism” when she
claims that her idea of reality includes “social institutions, roles,
rules, and norms.”XIV This leaves room for the point to be argued
that even though, on her view, reality comes in degrees, even
these degrees can be relative to culturally defined values.
One might argue that because economics is a system or
institution in Haack’s “innocent realism,” the only relativism it
displays is descriptive relativism because money is a fact about
the world, and its variations are merely different descriptions of
the same thing.XV This means that the initial problem goes away
because the relativism is being treated as simply having cosmetic
differences, and not acting differently between cultures. Since
money is part of every culture in some form, the system of money
itself of course will have differences. The only way that this relativism can be treated as normative is if the values pertaining to
the monetary system differ from culture to culture. This argument
for descriptive relativism is mundane because often it regards minute differences in properties that are real in each culture (e.g. eye
color, height, etc.). Since the institution of money both exists in
the real world and is universally common, it is likely that it would
be approached in this manner. However, when you examine the
content of the institution, rather than the institution itself, a problem arises in the treatment of this as merely descriptive relativism. The main basis of the problem is that the monetary system
involves direct communication and exchange between multiple
cultures and societies. This interaction means that if the relativism is merely descriptive, the value of currency should not
change between cultures, even if the form it takes does.
While the American dollar and the Russian ruble are both
“real” money, their respective values are contingent on the society from which they originate. If both represented an asset in reality, the problem would be more easily rectified. For example, if
the dollar and ruble both operated on a standard of gold, they
would both represent a similar asset. Even then, however, the value one society places on gold may differ wildly from that of another society, and this can cause problems in exchanging assets.
The problem becomes even more complex when certain curren-
55
Representation and Reality in Monetary Theory
cies from these various economic systems operate as fiat money,
rather than representative money. The specific currency loses almost all inter-cultural value and can only exist as valid in the
confidence of its own economic system because it only holds value in a society where it is said to be valuable.
Considering this, while institutions can potentially be universal and real, the intricacies of each institution may remain relative in a normative sense. This relativism is normative only because cultures can interact with one another and the currencies
which they use in one country may not be acceptable in another.
While this provides a basis for normative relativism, it may also
be argued that this problem is circumvented by international currency exchange markets. In these markets dollars can be exchanged for rubles, rubles for euros, and so on. This argument
does not take into account, however, the relative nature of the
store of value per currency and also does not take into account
the implications this relativism has for other institutions besides
that of monetary economics.
The value of a dollar is less than the value of a euro. To
buy a euro, it is necessary to spend more than one dollar, because
the euro has a larger store of value than the dollar. Once again,
this is dictated by certain social and cultural norms and their respective values. While Haack asserts that there is one single
world in her “innocent realism,” it seems that certain aspects of
this realism also make “real” certain relativisms. With this in
mind, dividing “real” versus “fictional” with the use of “sortal
terms,” as well as determining that all of this happens in one
world, does nothing to explain how reality differs among those
with different systems of value.
Haack says that the “real” can be divided into “sortal
terms,” where both reality and representations of reality can be
“real.” I argue that her concept of reality does not take into account culturally specific values defined inside of “real” institutions. One might object that while these institutions may be based
on social or cultural norms, they are still “real,” especially according to Haack’s “innocent realism.” I would reply that even if
all these values are “real” according to Haack’s view of “innocent
realism,” the specific properties and standards of these institutions is contingent on culturally defined values.
Aaron Weddle
Notes
I
These “sortal terms” can be characterized as a modifier for a
term. In the case of the term “real” they modify it and further
categorize its relevant meaning and usage according to the
circumstances in which it is being used.
II
Haack, 2013, p. 209.
III
Haack, 2015, p. 11.
IV
Swoyer (Website).
V
Haack, 2013, p. 209.
VI
Ibid., p. 211.
VII
Ibid., p. 213.
VIII
Ibid., p. 216.
IX
St. Louis Federal Reserve (Website).
X
Swoyer (Website)
XI
Haack, 2013, p. 213.
XII
Haack, 2015, pp. 15-16.
XIII
St. Louis Federal Reserve (Website).
XIV
Haack, 2015, p. 12.
XV
Swoyer (Website).
56
Representation and Reality in Monetary Theory
57
References
C. Swoyer. 2003. “Relativism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. "Functions of Money." Accessed July 3, 2015. https://www.stlouisfed.org/education/
economic-lowdown-podcast-series/episode-9-functions-of
-money.
Haack, Susan. 2013. "The Real, the Fictional, and the Fake," SpazioFilosofico n.8, pp.209-217.
Haack, Susan. 2015. "The World According to Innocent Realism," forthcoming in Werner Gephardt, ed. The New Realism, Klostermann Verlag, Frankfurt am Main
(Germany).
Heidegger’s Philosophy of Language in Being and Time 58
Heidegger’s Philosophy of Language in Being and Time
Polina Sandler
I
n Being and Time Martin Heidegger does not provide a
substantial theory of language however, there are several
parts of the text dedicated to language, and it has clear
importance for the ontology of Dasein. Language is no
less important for Heidegger, who gets many of his insights from literal translations of the Greek words and
introduces plenty of neologisms, which are crucial for explicating
his views. In this paper I will provide an account of Heidegger’s
discussion of language in Being and Time in order to argue that
the truth of Heidegger’s conception of Dasein depends upon the
distinction he draws between discourse and language. Furthermore, I will argue that if this distinction is collapsed, his theory
would deny the possibility of truth in the world. First, I will outline the difference between discourse [Rede] and language
[Sprache], and show that discourse seems to be privileged above
language. Then, I will describe Heidegger’s theory of logos and
his polemic against the previous philosophical tradition with regard to the notion of ‘truth..’ Next, I will explain Heidegger’s
views on cognition (understanding and interpretation), where I
will identify points of ambiguity. In conclusion, by addressing
Heidegger’s own use of language, I will show how this ambiguity
could be resolved in order to avoid the collapse of the distinction
between discourse and language, and show that this distinction
Polina Sandler is a senior philosophy concentrator at Brown University. She is
interested in aesthetics and philosophy of music, but she is quite puzzled and
very much trying to make sense of modern critical theory and its persistence
into the field of humanities (ironically not in philosophy), looking for some
"truth" beneath it. To take a break from excruciating (inter)play of differences,
Polina listens to opera and studies groundbreaking productions that challenge
all conventions of the genre. In the free time (or when it becomes unbearable
to see another nude Traviata), she does belly dancing and learns Norwegian.
59
Polina Sandler
plays a far more important role in Being and Time than
Heidegger makes it seem.
For our inquiry, we should first outline how Heidegger
distinguishes between discourse and language. Discourse, according to Heidegger, is a fundamental existential phenomenon, the
main purpose of which is to ensure a basic understanding of the
world. In contrast, language is a way in which discourse communicates or articulates itself. Language is an inherited system
that Dasein encounters in the world, and which allows for the expression of Dasein’s understanding. Furthermore, language is a
totality of words, or at least this is the way we encounter it in the
world. In light of this distinction, I will argue that language and
discourse have different kinds of Being, but in some moments of
Heidegger’s inquiry, he conflates the two such that it is hard to
tell which category is at play. I would also like to discuss the possibility that it is actually language, and not discourse, that discloses the world to us.
I. Logos and Truth
Heidegger’s first explicit discussion of discourse in Being
and Time is when he explains his method and describes the task
of phenomenology. He etymologizes the term “phenomenology,”
by analyzing the Greek words phenomenon and logos. Already,
Heidegger dismisses the duality of the ideal and the real, which
had permeated philosophical tradition since antiquity onwards.
Furthermore, according to Heidegger, Dasein is inseparable from
the world. Thus, Heidegger investigates Being, by focusing on
Being-in-the-world (Da-sein), the fundamental feature of Dasein.
Heidegger’s introduction of a new kind of relation between
Dasein and the World, establishes a correspondence between the
ideal (what is in Dasein’s consciousness) and the real (what is in
the world); an act of the disclosure.
Broadly speaking, the task of phenomenology for
Heidegger is to let things show themselves as they are.
“Phenomenon” is the way in which a thing shows itself to us.
When defining “phenomenon,” Heidegger is very much opposed
to the word “appearance”, because it is ambiguous, suggesting
that an entity is either making itself manifest or hiding itself by
seeming to be something that it is not. Furthermore, logos is, for
60 Heidegger’s Philosophy of Language in Being and Time
Heidegger, of crucial importance as it represents his divergence
from philosophical tradition. He claims that the Greek word logos
[ “word”] was mistranslated and thus misunderstood by Instead,
Heidegger determines logos to mean discourse [Rede, “talk”],
which is opposed to the translation of logos as “judgment” or
“assertion.” In the philosophical tradition, these words are fundamentally synthetic because, by producing a judgment, one asserts
a correspondence between two entities. For example, a relationship between “something said” and the fact about which it was
said exists. Primarily, this relationship has been one of judgment,
which corresponds to fact, therefore is true when the fact is true.
Discourse, on the other hand, does not assert anything, in the traditional sense. However, in what is said it communicates what is
being talked about: it shows something as something, i.e. as it
really is. Additionally, Heidegger emphasizes the preposition
“as,” because it reflects the key relation of the phenomenological
inquiry. Phenomenology studies things as they manifest themselves to us. Heidegger calls this “as” of assertion apophantic
[Greek: “making known”], not because it demarcates two different things and asserts a connection between them, but because
‘as’ establishes a unity in which what is said goes together with
what it is said about. Moreover, we can make assertions only on
the basis of our understanding, and not on the basis of facts. With
regard to logos, Heidegger mentions that the Greeks actually did
not have a special word for language to separate it from discourse.I Because logos in the sense of talking about something in
the first place meant an apophantic assertion,in the sense that every speech act exhibited something or made manifest,, language
and discourse have different ontological foundations..
Likewise, the Greek word for truth is “aletheia,” which
Heidegger interprets literally as “not-concealing”. He believes
that the fundamental meaning of truth is “uncovering”. Although
he does not deny that truth can pertain to a judgment as a determinable value (as in truth-functional logic, for example, where
one can assign truth-values to sentences), he considers this traditional concept of “truth as correspondence” to be grounded in the
phenomenon of “truth as uncovering.” This allows Heidegger to
claim that logos is something that actually does reveal truth, but
truth which is defined in completely different terms than that of
61
Polina Sandler
classical tradition. Heidegger’s interpretation of truth is one not in
a sense of correspondence, but in a sense of either covering up the
thing as it is and hiding it behind something else (which amounts
to us seeing seeing the things as false) or uncovering and showing
the thing as it is in itself (being true). One may hereby conclude
that the main ontological function of discourse is uncovering, and
therefore telling the truth.
Furthermore, Heidegger defines the primary ontological
function of discourse, by introducing the “hermeneutical circle,”
which shows that interpretation can emerge only on the basis of
already existing understanding. It is the structure of this circle of
interpretation that reflects the condition of Being for Dasein. He
argues that the word “logos” is etymologically connected with the
Greek words legein and legomenon, meaning “to exhibit” and
“what is exhibited,” respectively. Legein is a capacity of human
reason, and therefore logos can also signify “reason” (which
makes it possible to translate logos into Latin as ratio - “reason”).
Legomenon, by definition, is something that underlies the process
of addressing to whatever is exhibited, it does not exist independently of being addressed (that allows logos to signify the
ground which causes it to say something). However, logos and
legomenon cannot be equivalent because legomenon as the
ground will always underlie the logos. So logos qua legomenon
(i.e. “discourse as what is exhibited,” or “speech as what is said”)
is a ratio, in a sense that one is related to the other, and this ratio
establishes a new signification for the logos: the signification of
the relation (i.e. logos and the thing can exist only as a relation
between the two things). The ontological definition of discourse
is thus threefold: how it discloses a thing, what ii disclosed, and
the relation that it establishes between the how and the what. In
other words, logos is defined as exhibiting something and also as
exhibiting itself in this relation.
II. Understanding and Significance
As mentioned earlier, Dasein and the world exist inseparably from each other. The world is already there when Dasein
gets into it. That is why Heidegger calls this condition of being-in
-the-world “fallenness” or “thrownness.” Understanding is a fundamental way of getting knowledge about the world - the
62 Heidegger’s Philosophy of Language in Being and Time
“uncovering” of discourse is made possible through understanding. Dasein’s main mode of existence is Care; i.e. it is always
concerned with its existence and it understands the world primarily in terms of the possibilities which it can take up, and therefore
its relation to the world is fundamentally practical. Such practical
activities as producing, discussing, or accomplishing something
would be examples of Care. We see things in the world also in
terms of possibilities, i.e. we see them as “ready-to-hand” (as
equipment).When we use equipment on a regular basis, we never
understand explicitly the use which has already been assigned by
the world to this piece of equipment. For example, we do not
make it explicit when we take a pen to write something, that the
pen is the tool for writing. We use it in order to write something,
but not as “something that writes.” But this assignment of the use
is already present in the world in which this pen exists.
Heidegger is interested in the analysis of the phenomenon
of the world - “the Worldhood of the World.” As described in the
previous part, the phenomenon is related to us in a way that it is
something that manifests itself, or, in Heidegger’s words,
“announces itself.” The phenomenon of the world reveals itself
through the “assignments and referential totalities” between the
items of equipment and how they are referred to. One might think
that this happens independently of Dasein. However, the only
reason that these hold together is precisely Dasein’s understanding of the world. Since we encounter the world as ready-to-hand,
the phenomenon of the world can only be explained in terms of
our relation to it, of our being directed “towards-the-world” in
taking up our possibilities. For Dasein the world exists for-thesake-of Dasein because the primary way it understands the world
is in terms of possibilities. It is important to note that discourse as
well is characterized by its “aboutness,” so in disclosing the
world to us it already gives us what in the world we should consider our possibilities, such that we understand the world existing
for the realization of our possibilities. Our understanding assigns
to the whole world this “significance,” such that it has a meaning
in its totality. Therefore, the items in the world are disclosed to
us as having significations or meaning.
Heidegger’s use of the word “significance” (or
“meaning”) is ambiguous: it can either denote “signifying some-
63
Polina Sandler
thing” [Bedeutung] or “having importance” [Bedeutsamkeit] for
us. These two meanings of “significance” imitate a similar wordplay to that of the two meanings of logos. It can also be seen in
terms of the hermeneutical circle: our understanding gives significance to all items in the world, but how significant they are is also dependent on our fundamental relatedness to the world as
“thrownness.” Heidegger mentions in his discussion of significance that “the Being of words and of language” is founded upon
these significations.II By this he means the connection between
understanding and discourse is a way in which they both constitute the foundations of language. Since both understanding and
discourse are equiprimordial (i.e. equally prior,) with relation to
Dasein, and ensure the possibility of disclosure, then language
should have a different “founded” type of Being. I shall return to
this point later in more detail.
III. Interpretation and Assertion
We understand the world in terms of our possibilities.
However, understanding usually happens implicitly, because we
are existentially not “knowers,” but “doers.” Since we are already
thrown into the world and see things as they are, we do not think
whether, for instance, the pen is a tool for writing in order to
write something, we simply write with it. However, when a tool
we are using, the pen, breaks, we suddenly realize the ‘toolness’
of this pen, and start seeing it as a tool for writing. In this moment, when we see something as something, our understanding
becomes explicit and switches into the mode of interpretation.
Interpretation happens through the hermeneutic “as.” We
are asserting something that has already been disclosed to us
about this thing: its preconception. Moreover, we receive this preconception as a disclosure through discourse. Yet Heidegger argues that entities within-the-world have meaning [Sinn; it could
be better to say “make sense,” in order to capture the connection
preserved in German with another meaning of the word,
“reason”] only when they have been discovered by us.III Meaning
is articulated through our understanding and does not belong to
the entities as a property, but to Dasein itself (“...only Dasein can
be meaningful or meaningless”).IV If we remember that one of the
significations of discourse was the capacity of the human mind to
64 Heidegger’s Philosophy of Language in Being and Time
make sense or to understand, we can see that sense becomes one
of the existentialia of Dasein. We notice again the structure of the
hermeneutical circle: things obtain meaning because Dasein, being thrown into the world, endows them with meaning. In this
instance, Heidegger does not mention words and does not inquire
whether they have meaning. Therefore, language (as a totality of
words) seems to be excluded from giving sense or making sense
of things. It does not bear meaning (contrary to discourse, which
discloses it through the act of understanding) and meaning is acquired and revealed on some more primordial level.
By analyzing assertion as a particular kind of interpretation, Heidegger clearly distinguishes assertion from logos to disassociate himself from the classical tradition, where they were
merged and assertion was the primary ‘locus’ of truth. Because he
has established the meaning of truth as disclosure (contrary to
truth as correspondence); truth cannot be contained in the assertion itself, which is grounded in understanding and therefore has
a derivative nature.
Assertion, unlike understanding, is a ‘vocal’ phenomenon,
because assertion primarily articulates. Heidegger mentions three
dimensions of an assertion: it points out, it predicates, and it communicates. In “pointing-out,” the assertion does not first assert
and then judges whether what has been said is true or false of the
object, but rather points out at this object as it is and not as a part
of the sentence which refers to this object. Therefore, it preserves
the possibility of truth as disclosure. An example of predication,
“the ball is heavy,” asserts a “heaviness” only after the heaviness
has been experienced. i.e. It was disclosed to us, so we have to
take a step back from our practical considerations caused by
“heaviness,” interpreting what we have felt and settling it into a
statement. Communication is sharing our relatedness to the world
(Being-in-the-world) with others, i.e. asserting that we are here
and we have had such-and-such a disclosure.
It is most important to note Heidegger’s discussion of the
existential-hermeneutical ‘as’ (or of theoretical judgments). He
describes the process of the transformation of our understanding
which shifts our understanding of things from being ready-tohand to present-at-hand. When we want to talk about something
in terms of its presence in the world (but not in terms of our pos-
65
Polina Sandler
sibilities), we want to separate it from the equipmental totality of
the world in which we live. Thus, in order to perform theoretical
tasks, we assert things independently of our concerns about them.
IV. Language
Logos as a philosophical category (i.e. through the hermeneutical ‘as’), becomes present-at-hand and manifests itself as
an entity (it stops working as an ontological foundation, but is
being questioned as one). As mentioned earlier, Heidegger took a
Greek word logos and distinguished its two meanings: discourse
and language. Previously, he was “exhibiting” logos as a phenomenon, letting it “speak” on its own, or disclose itself. Now
that he takes up the hermeneutic approach, or the approach of interpretation, Heidegger sees logos only as a totality of words, that
is to say, language.
Language is a totality of words that can exist for us either
as a tool, or as something present-at-hand. For example, when we
use language to communicate, it is encountered as ready-to-hand
(so we treat it practically), but when we engage with a philological analysis of a text, we look at the words in the text as at present
-at-hand, not from a practical perspective. Heidegger writes that
language has a different being from that of the discourse, because
language is grounded in the Being of discourse, and discourse is
equiprimordial with understanding: together they are the existentiale of Dasein. Heidegger regards language as an existential category, where discourse and Dasein “meet” each other. He claims
that language is a “worldly” being of discourse, precisely for the
reason that it is the only way Dasein could understand discourse.
Discourse expresses itself through language, and but the former
can also potentially be covered-up by the latter, and this is most
likely to happen precisely when discourse is being interpreted.
However, even if discourse gets “disguised” or “veiled,” it remains a basic structure; it exists as an existentialia of Dasein, and
only waits to be uncovered. Eventually, one might still see language as creating a “gap” between Dasein and discourse, but it
still can seem unclear why Heidegger needs so that this “gap”
existed. He could eliminate the difference between discourse and
language and still claim that Dasein can misinterpret the logos
and that is how the covering-up of the truth from Dasein happens.
66 Heidegger’s Philosophy of Language in Being and Time
Language is primarily the instrument of interpretation,
because it communicates. Expression is one of the characteristics
of assertion, as an assertion must be “spoken” out. Consequently,
without language we would not be able to make assertions of the
existential-hermeneutic kind. Also only through language can we
express the hermeneutic shift from the ready-to-hand to the present-at-hand, i.e. we can bracket the word from its context and
place it into a different one. When we take a word, we see the
form of this word (i.e. letters or sounds that comprise it), while at
the same time we understand the its meaning. For example, when
we look at the word “dog,” we understand that what it stands for
is “an animal that barks.” On the other hand, we could look at the
word “dog” as an example of “a word,” and it would be irrelevant to us which word from the totality of words is written, a
“dog,” a “cat,” or anything else, because what it stands for is
merely “a word”. In this sense in the “dog” words manifest themselves as a totality.
This analysis strikingly resembles the schema of the
“hermeneutical circle.” This circle can be accessible and described only through the means of language that is by definition
interpretive. Any word can stand for the hermeneutical circle, because it is the “how” (its sounds and letters) and the “what” (its
meaning), and also establishes the relation between the two by its
definition (in virtue of being a word). This is how Heidegger creates a relation with respect to the logos.
In hermeneutical analysis, the Being of logos manifests
itself only as an assertion. However, this should not happen when
we talk about logos in the meaning of discourse, because discourse can either disclose or conceal, it cannot interpret. It cannot
include two possibilities of disclosure simultaneously (i.e. to
show its form and its content at the same time, since it is impossible to perceive both at the same time), because otherwise it would
be impossible to tell the truth. Truth can be either disclosed or not
disclosed: when it is, then it should stand alone. Discourse as a
phenomenon wants to communicate to us through the apophantic
“as.” The “as” that establishes a unity, a fundamental relation of
already being there and seeing things “as” they are between the
Dasein and the world. While the hermeneutical “as” separates the
two by being able to shift between the ready-to-hand and the pre-
67
Polina Sandler
sent-at-hand. Heidegger needs this distinction, because he is engaging in a phenomenological inquiry which, by definition, has
“demonstrative precision.” It exhibits Being as it is, without covering it up, or, in other words, he wants to get a true (even in the
sense of “truth as disclosure”) analysis of Being. If he conveyed
all his analyses on the basis of language, he would be left with the
“truth” claims that can always potentially be misinterpreted.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, I have attempted to show that for
Heidegger’s purposes the distinction between the logos as discourse and logos as language is crucial. Without it, his analysis
could never claim to be true. However, the main tool of his account is language and the hermeneutical “as,” justifying his conclusions. Eventually, the hermeneutical circle, being a circle of
interpretation, shows that it is not discourse, but language which
underlies Dasein’s understanding. Therefore one can further argue that language is the primordial mode of Dasein’s thrownness
into the world. Language, however, being the main tool of any
interpretation, may cast doubt on the possibility of the truth of
this interpretation, unless it is grounded in discourse, which allows this possibility.
68 Heidegger’s Philosophy of Language in Being and Time
Notes
I
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquire and
Edward Robinson (New York: Harper Perennial Modern
Thought, 2008), 209.
II
Ibid., 121
III
Ibid., 193
IV
Ibid., 193
V
Ibid., 60
References
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Translated by John
Macquire and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper Perennial
Modern Thought, 2008.
Episteme
Denison University’s Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy
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