Hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight 814
The Indian Airlines’ Flight 814 was hijacked after it took off from Nepal’s capital Kathmandu on December 24,
1999. Over the next eight days, as the aircraft was taken to various destinations in the region, it was revealed that
the hijackers belonged to a Pakistan-based Kashmiri terrorist group. The objective of the hijack was to secure
the release of its leaders and ideologues under captivity in India. The crisis ended on December 31, 1999 with
the release of hostages in exchange for three terrorists from Indian captivity.
For the Crisis Management
ideas, including proponents
Group (CMG) designated
of its independence. The
in India to deal with the
extreme militant school of
hijacking, it involved urgency
thought advocates freeing and
with evident issues of risk to
converting the Indian state
human lives and enforcing
into an exclusively Muslim
the law. Equally important
region ; with assistance from
were deeper issues such as
Pakistan, other Islamic nations
countering threat to its national
and fundamentalist groups
security, upholding India’s
and justifies the adoption
sovereignty, and maintaining
of militancy and terrorism
morale of its security forces. Taliban militiamen in pickup trucks arrive at the hijacked Indian Airlines against its opponents—the
as to beef up the security, Thursday, Dec. 30, 1999 at Kandahar
The crisis resolution had a plane
Indian state, its security
airport in southern Afghanistan. (AP Photo/B.K. Bangash)
significant aftermath that
forces, its agents, and nonimpacted regional security, the peace process between Muslim citizen—as jihad or “holy war”.
India and Pakistan, and the world security scenario. Several
lessons emerge from the handling of this crisis that deserve Immediate Context
incorporation in crisis plans for the future. Lok Ranjan has The Indian military and security forces had been deployed in
written a study focusing on the decision making process Jammu and Kashmir for a long time to control militant and
during the acute phase of managing the crisis of the hijacking terrorist groups. They had gained considerable ascendancy
of Indian Airlines Flight 814.
and control over a long stretch of time in mid-nineties
(1993-98) and militancy was on the wane. Several selfHistorical Background
proclaimed militant leaders and fundamentalist ideologues
The roots of the crisis go back to Indian independence from of various jihad organizations had been arrested during that
British rule in August 1947, when Pakistan was created on time. The cohorts of the arrested extremists had in the past
the basis of religious identity, with Muslim majority areas. pressed for their release by resorting to taking international
Accession of Kashmir, formerly a princely state, to India has tourists hostage. However, the Indian government had at that
been a source of dispute ever since. Its major land area is time taken a firm stand and refused to release the arrested
constituted now as the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. militants. Some intelligence information immediately before
About one-third of its land area is termed as Pak-occupied (or the hijacking revealed the possible intent of Kashmiri militant
Azaad - independent, actually in Pakistan control) Kashmir. groups to carry out a sensational strike as a show of strength.
Initially, the dispute was over which of the two nations had a The hijacking of Indian Airline Flight 814, which triggered
justifiable claim over this territory. Subsequent developments the crisis under study in this report, was such an act.
resulted in a complex matrix of many significant players and
Challenges and Consequences
giving in to the hijackers’ demands was a significant
decision option for the CMG. It appears that CMG had
suggested to the Taliban authorities—in the backdrop of
the repeated threats from hijackers— to break off with
negotiations and harm the hostages. Even while rejecting
this course of action, the Taliban were constrained to
strengthen their own forces around the aircraft and influence
the hijackers to continue negotiations while scaling down
the threat of use of force against the hostages
•Having a face–saving final settlement to the crisis
became the focus once the use of Indian forces proved
infeasible. The urgency for closure of crisis led to considering
concessions to the hijackers’ demands. A national political
buy-in for release of imprisoned militants failed when the
opposition boycotted the all-party meeting. The release of
three militants was perceived as a much smaller concession
than the hijackers’ original demand. Handing over the
terrorists to the Taliban, yet demanding that they and the
hijackers be treated in conformity with criminal law, was
done to dissociate India from any decision otherwise.
In coordinating the handling of the crisis, the CMG as the
official body faced many important challenges.
•Constraining the hijacked plane within India was
critical for better control of process and options in dealing
with the hijackers. This required readiness for use of force
and immobilization of the aircraft, but the commando team
was not able to move for timely counteraction. Attempts
to immobilize the aircraft without adequate force led the
hijackers to resort to stabbing hostages in desperation, thus
endangering human lives. Simultaneous under-estimation of
the fuel reserves of the aircraft allowed the hijackers take the
plane out of Indian territory, eliminating related options.
•Identifying and commencing contact with hijackers
was necessary to end uncertainty over their demands and
formulate response. The pre-requisite of detaining the aircraft
was attempted initially at Lahore in Pakistan and later Dubai
in UAE, by conveying requests through the External Affairs
Ministry. The reluctance of Pakistani authorities to cooperate
fully in the crisis management, though partly expected
given the uneasy relations, helped form CMG’s provisional
identification of the hijackers as Islamic Kashmiri militants.
•Detaining the plane in a moderate Islamic country,
less sympathetic to Kashmir militants was believed to put
pressure on hijackers through the Islamic regimes to release
passengers. The likely unwillingness of these regimes was
countered through diplomatic channels, particularly the
US. The strategy worked partially as United Arab Emirates
(UAE) allowed the hijacked plane to land and negotiated
the release of 26 hostages. While the landing at Al-Minhat
military airbase had allowed the possibility of storming the
aircraft if required, the concerns of UAE authorities on this
potential embarrassment could not be sufficiently allayed;
and they allowed the plane to refuel and leave for Kabul in
Afghanistan.
•Commencing direct negotiations with the hijackers
and working with a rogue regime that India did not
recognize or have contact with became imperative for the
safety of the hostages once the hijacked plane landed at
Kandahar in Afghanistan. The identity disclosure and their
first expression of demands made clear that the hijackers
could rely on empathy from the radical Islamic Taliban.
CMG decided to mobilize the international community and
the UN humanitarian coordinator for Afghanistan, which
elicited the cooperation of the Taliban towards the explicit
humane demands for release of hostages and broad support
for Indian negotiators over several days.
•Using force to take charge of the situation without
Crisis Resolution Aftermath
•Security Forces Morale: The Indian army, paramilitary,
and intelligence agencies were critical of their comparative
non-involvement and of the compromise inherent in the final
solution. The solution considerable consternation to them
since their personnel put their lives on the line to get these
terrorists behind bars in the first place. To them, this solution
revealed a differentiation in the life of a soldier and their
civilian counterparts.
•Provocation to Terrorism against India: Maulana
Masood Azhar, floated Jaish-e-Mohammad, a new radical
outfit, after his release and traveled around in Pakistan to
rejuvenate Harkat-ul-Ansar cadres; and Mushtaq Ahmad
Zargar started preparing Pakistani youth both for jehad
against India. These militant groups exploited their perceived
victory in the hostage crisis, attracting more sponsors and
recruits. Increased terrorist activities culminated in an attack
on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, a serious
symbolic challenge to the Indian state.
•Regional / Global Security Threat: The hijacking
and subsequent increase in terrorism elicited strong Indian
response in the form of military mobilization close to
its border. Devised to assert sovereignty and to counter
perceptions of India as a soft state, this mobilization derailed
the India–Pakistan peace initiatives and increased the longterm threat to regional and world security. The networking
of terrorists also intensified the threat to international
security beyond the visible elements of the immediate crisis.
Support was provided by groups owing allegiance to Osama
bin Laden. Those groups then emerged stronger in the eyes
of their supporters and sponsors. International intelligence
sharing was inadequate partially due to the perception of this
crisis as one-off and less significant—an underassessment
that eventually let to more tragic and heinous terrorist
actions.
cockpit and to immobilize aircraft to enhance later bargaining
leverage.
•Preparedness for Handling Hijackings: Frequent
mock drills need to be carried out as per the contingency
plan provisions. Use of fire engine and ambulances, for
preventing subsequent take off by a hijacked plane should
be a part of the drill. The planning should be carried out with
attention to safety to avoid errors borne out of overconfidence.
The presence of commando units should be ensured in the
shortest possible time at the first possible site, independent
of other agents.
•Balancing Risk to Human Lives: A clear policy needs
to be developed on the sensitive issue of concessions to
terrorists vis-a-vis risk to civilian lives, in accordance with
international practice and convention. Serious incidents like
hijackings should be handled with adequate firmness even if
it is risking some lives. Resulting perceptions of illegitimacy
and wider condemnation could deter perpetrators. The
stand would however be weakened by each incident of
compromise, which can result in much larger negative fallouts at much greater costs.
•Media and Information Management: Proper,
sufficient, official information should be given to the media
for correct portrayal of the crisis situation. Inadequate reliable
information leads media coverage to tend to sensationalize
and portray the authorities poorly. Controlling access
to operational areas is essential to avoid confidentiality
violations and misreports. Adverse media reporting about
the lack of progress or dissent within higher decision making
agencies needs to be countered in a timely manner to avoid
escalated public anxiety and pressure upon the government
to compromise.
Lessons for the Future
•Better Handling of Terrorist Cases: The adopting and
timely implementation of strict laws allowing conclusive
justice and punishment of arrested terrorists and foreign
mercenaries deserves serious consideration. Detention
without conclusion of the judicial process undermines the
efficacy of India to deal with the subversion of its interests.
The portrayal of extremists’ detentions as not legal acts as
trigger for terrorist activities to demand their release and
provide bargaining chips in terrorist blackmail situations.
•Improved Intelligence: Since the region is a hotbed
of extremist movements, the importance of intelligencegathering and prompt sharing needs to be emphasized.
Possible support bases and sanctuaries for these extremists
need to be mapped. The international activities of supporters
and sponsors of these groups also need to be under better
surveillance, in better coordination of intelligence agencies.
•Higher Security Sensitization for Airlines: Standards
for checking and frisking airline passengers at entry points
need to be made more stringent through deployment of
security personnel. Frequent security audits of airport and
airline security should be conducted, both within India and
also throughout. The crew should be trained and equipped
to disallow forcible entry of unauthorized persons into the
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