ISSUE 147
March 2013
SM2 and Sea Control:
A New Air Warfare
Capability for the Royal
Australian Navy
China’s Aircraft
Carrier:Implications for
Southeast Asia
Pacific Partnership:
Australia’s Contribution
and Benefits
Muscular Maritime
China ?
Journal of the
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Issue 147
Operation Slipper
- HMAS ANZAC
S
ince the commencement of
purpose; to increase the security and
Operation SLIPPER in 2001,
prosperity of the region by working
Australia has maintained a maritime
contribution to operations in the Middle
East Area of Operations (MEAO).
Currently this consists of a Major
together for a better future.
of people and drugs, and promote the
maritime environment as a safe place for
HMAS Anzac, which is flexibly cross
mariners with legitimate business.
HMAS Anzac is conducting
Maritime Forces (CMF) Combined Task
maritime security operations across
Forces (CTFs) 150 (counter terrorism),
the Combined Maritime Forces’ area
151 (counter-piracy) and 152 (Gulf
of operations. HMAS Anzac’s mission
maritime security).
allows her to undertake maritime
CMF patrols more than 2.5 million
Contents
SM2 and Sea Control: A New Air
Warfare Capability for the Royal
Australian Navy
4
CMF is working to defeat terrorism,
prevent piracy, reduce illegal trafficking
Fleet Unit, the Anzac Class Frigate,
tasked between US-led Combined
3
China’s Aircraft Carrier:Implications for
Southeast Asia
7
Pacific Partnership: Australia’s
Contribution and Benefits
Muscular Maritime China ? 9
16
interdictions and counter-piracy
square miles of international waters
operations, including activities under the
to conduct both integrated and
command of CTF 150. HMAS Anzac
coordinated operations with a common
entered the MEAO in July 2012. t
Japan’s formidable new strike weapon
of WWII – its aircraft carriers, and the
Darwin raid
19
Britannia Royal Naval
College Report
33
The Battle for the South China
Sea – World War II, Today and into
36
the future
Obituary: CAPT David John Ramsay 42
A Middling Power, What is the ADF
meant to do, exactly?
45
United Kingdom: National Involvement
in the Indian Ocean Region
51
World Naval Developments
56
Book Reviews
60
Front page :
AP-3C Orion
operating in the
Middle East Area of
Operations passes
HMAS Anzac during
the last operational
flight in the Middle
East before returning
home. As a farewell
gesture the Orion
dispensed flares as it
heads for home.
Issue Number 147
Visions from the Vault
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Style Notes for Headmark
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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
4
SM2 and Sea Control: A New Air Warfare
Capability for the Royal Australian Navy
By Commodore Peter Leavy
I
n June 2011 HMAS Sydney
conducted a series of missile firings
on the US Navy’s Pacific Missile Range
Facility off the coast of Hawaii. A key
aim was to prove that the upgraded
Adelaide class frigates (FFG) could
exploit the full capabilities of the
SM2 Standard Missile after a major
upgrade program that saw it replace
the previous SM1 surface to air missile.
A proven, contemporary surface to air
missile capability is a core component
of the surface force’s ability to gain
and exploit sea control. Without sea
control, a maritime force will be unable
to adequately protect sea lines of
communication or conduct maritime
as were SM1 missiles, although
the missile. To understand the large
modifications were required to the
increase in capability the SM2 will give
the US Navy’s anti-air warfare system
launcher to cater for the new missile
the RAN it is necessary to understand
and will be the major weapon in the
interface and capability. The FFG class
the differences between the SM1 and
RAN’s new Hobart class destroyers
is in service with seven nations around
SM2 missiles.
(DDG). It is a solid fuelled, tail
the world, but the RAN is the first navy
The SM1 has a nominal range of
controlled, supersonic surface to air
to attempt to integrate the SM2 into the
25nm, flies at Mach 2 and is a ‘home
missile designed to defeat the full range
class and the magnitude of this effort
all the way’ semi-active missile.1 In
of aircraft and missile air threats. It is a
should not be underestimated.
order to engage a target the ship must
power projection operations.
The SM2 missile is the mainstay of
very capable weapon, having a range of
HMAS Melbourne conducted the
first illuminate it with a continuous
90nm and speed of >Mach 3. However,
RAN’s first SM2 firing in late 2009
radar wave (known as continuous wave
it is only one variant in the Standard
against a surface target to prove the
illumination, or CWI). The missile is
Missile family. Its predecessor, the
modifications made to the combat
then fired and detects the reflected
SM1, was first test fired by the United
system and launcher. HMAS Newcastle
radar energy that is returning from the
States in 1966 and was introduced into
conducted the second firing, and first
target. The SM1 missile homes on this
the RAN Perth class DDG in the late-
against an air target, during Exercise
reflected signal until it intercepts the
1970s. SM1 was the original weapon on
RIMPAC off Hawaii in 2010. These
target.
the Adelaide class FFG and upgraded
first two firings were designed to prove
The continuous wave illumination
versions of the missile are still in service
the ships were capable of replicating
required to guide the SM1 is
with a number of navies around the
the capability of the SM1 missile that
transmitted from a dedicated fire
world. The SM3 variant is gaining
was replaced, but at that stage the
control radar on the ship that must
prominence as the weapon used in the
supporting software and associated
continue to point at the target
US ballistic missile defence system and
systems to allow the full capability
throughout the missile’s flight. The
SM6 is the next generation surface to
of SM2 to be used were still under
RAN’s FFGs have two fire control
air missile destined to replace the SM2.
development. The firings conducted
radars for this purpose, so the ships
The FFG are the first RAN ships to
by Sydney were an integral part of that
be modified to fire SM2. The missiles
development and tested a number
are fired from the same launcher
of the high level features available in
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
1 A ‘semi active’ missile detects the return
signal transmitted by the firing platform. An
‘active’ missile transmits its own radar signal
and detects the returns.
Able Seaman CSO
Maxine Wilmott
in the Operations
Room of HMAS Perth
monitoring the SM2
launch
5
Issue 147
were capable of engaging two air targets
system will be able to track all targets
details being explored and the results
simultaneously. Should the SM1 missile
in 3-Dimensions at all times. Using the
are classified, but were very promising.
lose reception of the CWI signal, the
SPY1D(V) radar (the primary radar
One firing was conducted in the
missile self destructs as there is no other
fitted to the ships) as a tracking source,
‘home all the way’ mode to prove that
method of homing onto the target.
data is continuously sent to the SM2
capability, while other firings explored
The SM2 missile has a number of
in flight by the SPY radar as guidance
various performance limits, system
significant improvements over the SM1
commands, again without the target
redundancies and operating modes,
including a greater range (90nm) and
detecting that it has been engaged.
including firing at the edge of the
speed (>Mach 3). While it can be fired
AEGIS can manage multiple weapons
designed operating limits. A number
in the same ‘home all the way’ mode
at multiple targets at any one time, with
of firings were conducted where the
as SM1 it can also be fired without
the CWI illuminators time sharing
target was deliberately manoeuvred
needing the CWI radar return to guide
illumination of the targets during the
after the missile was fired to ensure the
it until the terminal phase. In the FFG
terminal phase of the engagement.
ship’s combat system could accurately
this is known as mid course guidance
The trials Sydney conducted in
monitor the PIP and send updates to
mode, where the missile initially flies
Hawaii covered a number of key aspects
the missile. There are also a number
autonomously towards a predicted
of the SM2 missile system. The specific
of key redundancies built into the
HMAS Sydney
launching a SM2
missile on the Pacific
Missile Range Facility
off Hawaii
intercept point (PIP) calculated by the
ship’s combat system immediately prior
to launch. The ship continues to update
the PIP based on changes to the target’s
movement after the SM2 is fired with
an updated PIP being transmitted as
necessary to the missile which then
adjusts its flight accordingly. Once the
missile gets close enough the ship’s fire
control radar commences transmitting
the CWI signal for the missile to home
on the target during the terminal phase
of flight. Consequently the SM2 does
not waste energy by unnecessarily
manoeuvring early in its flight which
increases both its overall range and
its ability to manoeuvre heavily in the
terminal phase of the engagement.
The mid course guidance mode has
other advantages. CWI transmissions
are easily detected by a target so once
illumination commences, the target
gains valuable warning time of an
imminent threat. As the SM2 missile
does not need to have the target
continually illuminated with CWI
for its entire flight, there are reduced
warning queues for the target. In the
current FFG configuration, there does
need to be fire control radar support
to track the target and provide the
target’s 3-Dimensional position for the
PIP calculations. Not so with the new
Hobart class DDG as its AEGIS combat
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
6
SM2 and Sea Control:
A New Air Warfare Capability for the Royal Australian Navy
SM2 system and simulated faults were
undertaken by the RAN, the Defence
injected in some firings to test these
Materiel Organisation and a number
redundant modes.
of Defence contractors to bring the full
The results of these firings are
now being used to refine the various
software systems in the FFG with the
capabilities of the SM2 missile to the
RAN.
The RAN is now well placed to
final product to be delivered to all four
provide significant air defence capability
ships shortly. Once this happens, the
when and where it is needed and, in
RAN will have a tested and proven anti-
doing so, gain sea control in order to
air warfare capability out to 90nm from
execute military missions. t
the firing ship, which will fundamentally
Commodore Peter Leavy RAN is currently
Principal Warfare Officer (PWO) at Fleet
Headquarters. He is a Principle Warfare
Officer with service in DE, DDG, ANZAC
and FFG class ships. His last command
was HMAS Sydney during which he
undertook a range of SM2 missile firings
in Hawaii which, in part, provided the
inspiration for this article. change the way the ADF conducts air
warfare. The range at which hostile
aircraft will feel threatened by ships
has effectively increased from 25 to
90nm, significantly complicating their
ability to detect and identify surface
contacts while simultaneously reducing
their own weapon performance. This
is a tremendous advance in the RAN’s
current anti-air warfare capabilities; an
advantage that will be further boosted
once the Hobart class DDG enter
service later this decade.
The RAN’s SM2 capability will also
greatly increase the operating area that
friendly aircraft can operate in which
provides a tremendous increase in
the ADF’s air warfare capability. For
example, Airborne Early Warning and
Control (AEW&C) aircraft can operate
at some distance from the ships,
whilst remaining under the protective
umbrella provided by SM2. Indeed, the
AEW&C aircraft will provide much of
the cueing and targeting information
for the ships’ weapons to use; an
excellent example of the whole being
greater than the sum of the parts.
The combination of ships and
aircraft working together to detect and
identify air threats and then ships and
combat aircraft being able to engage
those threats will be a powerful force
SMARTER AND SAFER
UNDERWATER SOLUTIONS
...Since the beginning
multiplier for the ADF. Knowing
where a threat is situated is one thing
– SM2 brings the capability to deal
with those threats if necessary. The
trials conducted by Sydney in June
2011 validated the very good work
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
For more information, please contact: [email protected]
www.thalesgroup.com.au
Photograph © Australian Department of Defence
7
Issue 147
China’s Aircraft Carrier:
Implications for Southeast Asia
By Koh Swee Lean Collin
Synopsis
The induction of China’s first aircraft
carrier by the People’s Liberation
Army Navy (PLAN) is no cause for
overreaction by Southeast Asian
governments, from the strategic and
operational perspectives. Still, China’s
aircraft carrier programme may
provide greater grounds for concern
by 2020.
The induction into service of China’s
first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning,
amidst ongoing tensions in the East
and South China Seas, could not have
been more coincidental. Inevitably this
could provoke regional concerns in
regard to whether China would use its
newfound capability against competing
CBG to train to operate together as
dream dated from the Kuomintang
claimants in those disputes.
one cohesive fighting force can be
period in the 1940s and this was
considerably lengthy.
revived by the communist government
This might be especially so for
comparatively weaker countries in
Moreover, the Southeast Asian
in the 1980s. High-profile purchases
Southeast Asia which have viewed
maritime confines, characterised by
of decommissioned Australian and
China’s growing naval might over
narrow and semi-enclosed waters,
Soviet medium-sized carriers in the
the past decade with at least some
do not favour the operation of large-
mid-1980s and early-1990s exemplified
concern. However, should Southeast
sized carriers. A typical CBG presents
Beijing’s intent. This meant that over
Asia be overly concerned about this
a large and highly visible target with
these decades, regional governments
development?
its accompanying fleet train, which
have at least been partially desensitized
Carrier in confined littorals
increases its vulnerability to detection.
to the Chinese carrier prospect.
The accepted consensus amongst naval
could be particularly vulnerable
constitute the primary motivation
analysts is that building a full-fledged
to well-concealed asymmetric
behind Southeast Asia’s naval
carrier capability takes time. More
countermeasures, exploiting local
modernisation, China’s aircraft
than just having the aircraft carrier, it
geography, such as submarines and
carrier intent could have spurred
involves providing supporting elements
long-range missiles. The encounters
regional acquisition of such ‘cheaper’
such as escorting warships and
between US Navy carriers and PLAN
anticipatory countermeasures as
replenishment vessels, not to mention a
submarines in 1994 and 2006 as well
long-range missiles, aerial maritime
fully-developed carrier-borne aviation
as the successful attack on the Israeli
surveillance and submarines. These
complement, all of which constitute a
Navy corvette INS Hanit in 2006 by
could have helped in mitigating the
typical carrier battle group (CBG).
a Hezbollah shore-based anti-ship
potential materialisation of China’s
missile highlight such vulnerability.
aircraft carrier programme. In sum,
Southeast Asia is generally prepared for
and technical knowhow of carrier
No surprise for regional
governments
operations are acquired, diffused
The Chinese carrier programme should
carrier should not warrant any
and mustered throughout the entire
not have come across as a surprise
overreaction on the part of Southeast
CBG. The time taken for a whole
regionally. China’s aircraft carrier
Asian governments. However, China’s
A CBG is still not considered a
fully-operational fighting force until
the necessary doctrine and operational
In confined littorals, large warships
China’s first Aircraft
Carrier
Since the 1990s, even if it does not
such a contingency.
Therefore, China’s first aircraft
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
8
China’s Aircraft Carrier:
Implications for Southeast Asia
carrier programme may potentially
for such benign
present a real source of concern by
purposes. In fact,
2020 when the two planned indigenous
Beijing should
carriers, according to PLAN sources,
be aware of the
are expected to enter service in 2020
peaceful utility
and 2022 respectively. The indigenous
of such large
carrier is reported to be based on but
naval platforms,
larger than the Varyag design, implying
as its hospital
a vastly more capable vessel displacing
ship Anwei had
more than 70,000 tonnes full-load.
demonstrated in
One needs also to pay attention
its international
to Beijing’s overall attempts to build
goodwill voyages.
up its CBG capacity. This is well
Less glamorous power
projection
exemplified by the recent induction
and construction of new destroyers
optimised for fleet air defence coverage,
If Southeast Asians are worried that
conceivably with CBG air defence
the new carrier could be used to assert
in mind. This means that China is
Beijing’s maritime claims in the region,
seriously bent on pursuing a long-term
based on recent patterns of Chinese
carrier capability which is more than
gunboat diplomacy, this worry could
just a prestige pet project.
be exaggerated. China has been relying
Benign aspect of
aircraft carrier
increasingly on lightly-equipped
Given that a full-fledged CBG
warships and this trend is projected
carrier programme deserve greater
capability for China will require more
to continue as China rapidly builds up
attention of China’s Southeast Asian
time to materialise, it is premature to
such capacities.
neighbours. t
civilian law-enforcement vessels
for such functions instead of PLAN
strike the alarm bells; the actual use of
In times when its emergence as a
a carrier is arguably more crucial than
great power has come under intense
the mere possession of it. And it could
international scrutiny, the last thing
have a benign impact as well.
Beijing would want is to be seen as
Prior to the 2004 Indian Ocean
overly aggressive by exploiting its
tsunami for instance, Singapore’s
newfound naval might. The deliberate
force of new Endurance-class
low-profile induction of this first
amphibious landing ships projected a
aircraft carrier is one such gesture of
somewhat aggressive image but their
China’s reluctance to be portrayed
humanitarian deployment off Aceh
as using disproportionate force in its
in the aftermath of the disaster aptly
exercise of gunboat diplomacy.
demonstrated that these otherwise
Also, rather than an aircraft carrier
offensive-looking platforms do have
in the South China Sea, greater efficacy
their benign aspect.
and credibility can be achieved through
The Americans for instance
‘less glamorous’ power projection
Koh Swee Lean Collin is an associate
research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies (RSIS),
Nanyang Technological University. He
is pursuing doctoral studies focusing on
naval modernisation in the Asia-Pacific,
especially Southeast Asia.
deployed their carriers to good effect
capabilities such as Beijing’s rapidly
after the 2004 tsunami and the 2011
expanding amphibious assault forces,
East Japan Sea tsunami. The Thai Navy
or fourth-generation land-based
First published as RSIS Commentary
used her ‘pocket carrier’ RTNS Chakri
airpower supported by mid-air
No. 183/2012.
Naruebet for the southern floods
refueling aircraft. That would provide
disaster relief. The Chinese could take
more immediate ramifications to the
note of these instances and strive to
regional naval balance. In the shorter
utilise its future carrier capabilities
term, these aspects instead of the
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
Top: Chinese aircraft
carrier Liaoning
cruises back to a port
after its first navy
sea trial in Dalian, in
northeastern China’s
Liaoning province in
late 2012
Chinese military on
parade on board
their new aircraft
carrier
Issue 147
Pacific Partnership:
Australia’s Contribution and Benefits
9
By Rhett Mitchell
T
he public often thinks of navies
to provide free medical treatment,
Since its inception until the end of
in purely militaristic terms;
veterinary care and engineering
Pacific Partnership 2011 (PP11), the
they exist to defend their state at sea
support for developing states in the
operation has visited 15 states, treated
through force. However, navies also
Asia-Pacific region. Led by the United
approximately 348,000 patients, and
provide an important, but far less
States (US) Navy Pacific Fleet in San
completed 130 engineering projects.2
publicised form of defence through
Diego, the overarching aim of Pacific
For example, PP10 treated 109,754
military diplomacy. By visiting other
Partnership is to maintain a secure
patients, performed 859 surgeries,
states on goodwill on humanitarian
and stable region while building
distributed over 60,000 pairs of
assistance/disaster relief (HADR)
relations between participating and
glasses and sunglasses, provided 1505
missions, navies can act as informal
host states. According to Tongan
dental treatments and repaired 124
diplomats and generate soft power for
Minister of Education, Women’s
pieces of medical equipment valued
their respective state. The benefits of
Affairs and Culture, the Hon Dr ‘Ana
at approximately US$5.8 million.3 Its
soft power are significant. Soft power
Maui Taufe’ulungaki, programs such
success has also inspired other states.
generates trust between states, which
as Pacific Partnership demonstrate
China, for example, implemented
in turn increases security. Further,
“to the Pacific and the world, that the
a similar operation, Harmonious
these missions give other benefits such
defence services of the participating
Mission, in the Indian Ocean region
as interoperability and extra experience
countries are there to protect the peace
for the participants. One such mission
and security of the region, and to help
the Australian Defence Force (ADF)
improve and maintain the welfare of
participates in is Operation Pacific
Partnership.
Pacific Partnership is an annual
diplomatic military operation designed
the people.”1
Pacific Partnership evolved from
commencing in 2010.4
Pacific Partnership improves both
the perception and reputation of
participating states. Following PP06,
a survey undertaken by research
the HADR response following the 2004
organisation Terror Free Tomorrow
Boxing Day Indian Ocean Tsunami.
in Indonesia and Bangladesh showed
USNS Mercy
(US Navy)
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
10
Pacific Partnership:
Australia’s Contribution and Benefits
85% of Indonesians and 95% of
Bangladeshis supported the mission.5
local civilians and military,
helping build rapport
Further, 87% of Bangladeshis said the
with the host states, as
mission improved their perceptions
well as showing new
of the US, with general positive US
techniques for tasks such
perceptions doubling. Support for
as civilian/infrastructure
terrorism and Osama bin Laden in
construction, medical
Indonesia dropped to 12% from a
treatment and military
high of 58% in 2003.6 While Pacific
Partnership cannot claim sole
logistics.
Cultural exchanges
responsibility for diminishing terrorist
and community relations
support, continued humanitarian
between host and
assistance in Indonesia following the
participating states
Boxing Day Tsunami witnessed a drop
are just as important
in support by 25%.
as the medical and
Pacific Partnership projects are
construction work.
undertaken at the request of the host
Cultural exchanges enable
state, enabling the participating states
the participating and host
to provide the right resources for the
states to experience and
projects requested. For PP11, Tonga
understand more about
requested, amongst other things, help
each other’s culture.
refurbishing local schools, including
This improves cultural
installing solar power, water tanks and
awareness and allows
play equipment. These projects were
all sides to influence the
undertaken with the help of the local
perceptions of each other.
community. Tongan Prime Minister,
For PP09, a new way
Lord Tu’ivakano, expressed his
of conducting cultural exchanges
NGO’s and military representations
gratitude, saying:
emerged. Instead of small-scale
from five states (including the US),
I am pleased to note this year’s
interaction through work, dedicated
supported PP11.
inter-governmental approach
events were organised to interact with
where the impact and benefit
locals, particularly schoolchildren.
Partnership alternates each year
has been widened by working
The Pacific Fleet Band and US Navy
between USNS Mercy (a ‘white hulled’
closely and in tandem with the
helicopters proved popular, as they
hospital ship) and a ‘grey-hulled’ ship,
New Zealand and Australian
allowed the children to sing, dance
usually a transport/supply ship (for
governments. I am sure this will
and tour the helicopter. Personnel
PP11, the amphibious transport dock
form the foundations and perhaps
distributed toys donated by non-
USS Cleveland was the command
a model for future humanitarian
government organisations (NGO’s),
ship). While grey-hulled ships are not
missions that draw together and
which the children also enjoyed. This
hospital ships, they have the capacity
unite different parties to achieve a
allows the participants to interact with
to carry large amounts of medical
set of clearly defined goals.
7
The command ship for Pacific
a larger part of the community than
equipment and have a dedicated
One of the other benefits of Pacific
before.
medical clinic on board. By alternating
Partnership is that it works with local
between Mercy and a grey-hulled ship,
communities, educating and training
US involvement
them in professional exchanges and
Though organised and led by the US
between medical treatment and
community conferences. Community
Navy, Pacific Partnership is supported
engineering projects from year to year.
conferences cover topics such as
by states with an interest in the Asia-
natural disaster response, and give an
Pacific region as well as NGO’s such
in the region, further enhancing the
opportunity for the community to say
as Rotary International and Project
goodwill the mission receives. Mercy
what they want from future missions.
HOPE (an international healthcare
first deployed on a humanitarian
Further, participants work alongside
organisation). For example, eight
mission in the region in 1987, and
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
the focus of the mission alternates
The 1000-bed Mercy has a history
The Australian
contingent for PP12
in front of USNS
Mercy (RAN photo)
11
Issue 147
was involved in the HADR response
care, building infrastructure and
states. Neither national interests (for
following the Boxing Day tsunami.
working with locals can be just as, if
example national security) nor strategic
not more, effective in creating security
interests, such as regional security,
than militarily defeating an enemy.
can be promoted successfully without
According to the US Navy, the
primary purpose of Pacific Partnership
is to:
Soft power is created by the
positive relations with neighbouring
strengthen relationships with
attractiveness of a state’s culture,
states. By building and maintaining
host/partner states and NGO’s,
political ideals and policies; it spreads
positive relations through operations
build partner capacity to
through a state’s actions and decisions,
such as Pacific Partnership, Australia
conduct peace, stability and
validates and reinforces the state’s
is more likely to be able to positively
consequence management
common values, beliefs and lifestyles.
operations,
From an Australian perspective, with
improve host/partner state
limited hard power options, soft power
increase Australia’s national security,
HADR capacity, and
is vital for securing Australian regional
as friendly states are less likely to
improve security cooperation
interests, such as trade, resources, and
attack each other. Positive working
sea lines of communication. Australia
relationships build trust. Trust between
Other benefits for the US Navy include;
projects soft power in numerous ways,
states, particularly militaries, is integral
knowing what the emergency response
such as student and cultural exchanges,
as it allays fears that Australia is a
structure and facilities in the affected
film and television broadcasts, and
negative regional influence and sends
states and what HADR priorities in
government and NGO’s such as
the message that Australia’s military
those states will be if there is a natural
AusAID or World Vision. One of the
intent is benign. HADR missions are
disaster in the region; HADR training;
ways the Australian Defence Force
effective ways to build trust between
regional awareness, and relationship
(ADF) projects soft power is through
states.
building with participating and host
Pacific Partnership.
•
•
•
•
among partner states.8
states. The US Navy also recognises
10
influence the region.
Positive working relationships
Trust is also important in creating
the benefits of working with partner
Australian interests
avenues for future cooperation and
governments, militaries and NGO’s,
Pacific Partnership helps promote
perspective, working with regional
and seeks to continue to strengthen
Australian national and strategic
militaries allows them to understand
these relationships.
interests by building and maintaining
how other militaries operate, what
Reasons for
ongoing Pacific
Partnership
missions
positive relationship with regional
their capabilities are, and what role
trade between states. From an ADF
US Navy aircrewmen
comfort an injured
Nicaraguan woman
prior to take-off
during a medical
evacuation (US Navy)
Soft power and diplomacy
Soft power diplomacy is
important for modern states.
Soft power is the ability of
one state to influence the
actions of another through
persuasion or attraction,
rather than through hard
power measures such as
threats, sanctions or violence.
As leading soft power scholar
Joseph Nye surmises, “If I can
get you to do what I want,
then I do not have to force
you to do what you do not
want.”9 Providing medical
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
12
Pacific Partnership:
Australia’s Contribution and Benefits
Army vehicles sit
in the tank deck
onboard HMAS
Tobruk
(Navy image)
they play in their states’ political/
a stable region being a key Australian
economical realities. While parts
societal structure. Understanding
strategic interest.
of Asia are becoming increasingly
these elements allows the ADF and
ADF participation in Pacific
wealthy, many Pacific states remain
Australian Government to work more
Partnership supports the 2009 White
poor. In the 2010/11 financial year,
effectively with regional governments,
Paper objectives. The White Paper
Australia contributed about $1.1 billion
mutually increasing regional security.
outlines that as a prosperous state,
in aid to Pacific states, representing
When people are healthy and have
Australia should help other states,
25% of Australia’s total aid budget,
basic infrastructure, they are less
particularly in the Asia-Pacific region,
and half of the total aid given to those
likely to rebel against the government,
and that the ADF provides specialised
states globally.12 Providing aid, both
potentially creating failed states,
capabilities on a scale that no other
financially and materially, Australia
destabilising the region. Increased
Australian Government agency can
promotes itself as a good neighbour
regional stability means there is less
supply. As the White Paper further
who cares about the interests of its
likelihood that Australia will have to
mentions, Australia has a strong
neighbouring states.
deploy the ADF within the region as a
interest in ensuring the stability and
stabilising force.
prosperity of states in the region.
Security is more than just
11
With other states vying for regional
Australia’s motivation for
participating in Pacific Partnership is
multi-faceted. Firstly, it has a purely
defending against an armed attack.
influence and exerting their own soft
altruistic element; the Australian
Non-traditional security threats,
power, it is in Australia’s interests
Government wants to help the region
such as natural disasters, terrorism
to maintain a positive regional
achieve higher standards of living.
and public health epidemics are now
relationship. This is one of Australia’s
Secondly, it provides an important
core security considerations. Pacific
key strategic interests as outlined in
HADR and interoperability training
Partnership is not designed to prevent
the White Paper. A positive regional
opportunity for ADF personnel.
an armed attack, but it is designed to
relationship means there is less
Thirdly, it develops regional security.
improve public health, infrastructure
likelihood another state can influence
Fourth, it builds relationships between
and disaster response capabilities.
the region negatively, against Australia’s
Australia and the participating and
Improving these capabilities increases
national interests.
host states, and finally, it helps promote
the stability of regional states, and
therefore the region as a whole, with
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
Australian regional policy
reflects the region’s geostrategic and
Australia’s national interests abroad.
HADR operations such as Pacific
13
Issue 147
Partnership form part of Australia’s
larger, with over 300 participants for
and other participating/host
larger diplomatic efforts. While HADR
PP10. This demonstrates the level of
states (such as New Zealand,
missions are not traditional diplomacy
importance the ADF now places on the
Japan, Papua New Guinea, East
(that is, diplomat to diplomat), they
mission.
Timor),
form part of Australia’s larger public
The LCH’s play a vital role in the
•
experience for ADF medical/
diplomacy mission. Public diplomacy
mission. Due to their shallow draft
dental/veterinary and
is whereby one state directly influences
and large cargo capacity, the LCH’s are
engineering personnel both in
the citizens of other states to shape
the perfect vessels to move personnel
their opinions, perceptions and
and supplies between the ships and
attitudes in a way that will serve the
shore. They can also access areas that
home state’s foreign policy interests.
larger ships cannot, extending Pacific
Culture, education, trade and citizen-
Partnership’s reach beyond towns
neighbouring states through
to-citizen interaction are all part of
with large ports. During PP10, HMA
public diplomacy.
creating effective public diplomacy.
Ships Labuan and Tarakan became
The commander of the Australian
floating staging bases for medical and
contingent for PP11, Commander
contributes to national security.
dental teams. Embarking an extra
Ashley Papp, RAN, said that the Pacific
According to the Department of
21 personnel each (who slept on the
Partnership’s benefits to the ADF are
Foreign Affair’s and Trade’s Public
open vehicle deck under mosquito
improved interoperability with host/
Diplomacy Handbook, public
netting), the LCH’s landed the teams
participating states and improving the
diplomacy “contributes to [Australia’s]
in the morning and picked them
lives of people in the region. Further,
national security by helping to build
up at night from remote towns and
Commander Papp added, “Working
understanding about Australia and
islands inaccessible to larger vessels.
closely with friends and allies in this
its place in the world as a stable,
This allowed an estimated
sophisticated, tolerant and culturally
13,000 extra patients to be
Effective public diplomacy
diverse nation.” These traits are all
aspects of soft power projection,
and
•
strengthening relations with
Nursing officer
Lieutenant Sarah
Jarvis with local
children on the
Indonesian island
of Siau during PP12
(RAN photo)
For PP10, the Landing
Ship Heavy HMAS Tobruk
application of soft power.
participated, greatly
However, Pacific Partnership is
enhancing the amount of
not a pure public diplomacy exercise
supplies the RAN could
as it incorporates aspects of military
transport. Tobruk also
diplomacy (military-to-military/civilian
received the honour of
interaction) and medical diplomacy
being the first non-US
(medical aid). The culmination of
command ship for Pacific
these three types of diplomacy enables
Partnership when Captain
Pacific Partnership to influence a broad
Lisa Franchetti, USN, based
spectrum of society. This provides great
herself aboard Tobruk
benefits to Australia and the ADF.
for the final leg between
ADF Contribution and
benefits
Darwin and Rabaul, Papua
The importance of Pacific Partnership
participated in Pacific
to the ADF continues to grow. Up until
Partnership since 2006,
PP08, the ADF contingent was a small
providing RAN vessels,
number of medical officers and combat
ADF medical personnel and
engineers. Since PP09, two landing
combat engineers. Pacific
craft heavy (LCH) amphibious ships
Partnership provides the
have been sent to transport equipment
ADF with benefits such as,
The Australian contingent is now
experience in HADR missions,
treated.13
making public diplomacy a practical
such as medical and building supplies.
the region and in general,
•
New Guinea.
The ADF has
•
interoperability
with the US Navy
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
14
Pacific Partnership:
Australia’s Contribution and Benefits
way in times of peace helps us to refine
Chancellor of the University of Natural
(Endnotes)
our procedures, understanding and
Resources and Environment in Papua
cooperation, so that in times of crises
New Guinea best surmised Pacific
we have already trained on how to
Partnerships importance when he said
deliver the right support, at the right
Pacific Partnership:
1 Tongan Government Portal, Pacific
Partnership Forges Enduring Friendship
in Island Communities, viewed at <http://
www.pmo.gov.to/education-womenaffairs-a-culture/2630-pacific-partnershipforges-enduring-friendship-in-islandcommunities> on 18/11/2011.
time, in the right way when needed.”14
has changed my childhood
Pacific Partnership 2012 ran
impression of soldiers and armies,
from May to August with Mercy as
and I am sure many others of my
command ship, visiting Indonesia, the
age or older…who also had the
Philippines, Vietnam and Cambodia.
impressions that soldiers cannot
Twenty four NGO’s and 16 militaries
take up saws and hammers or
(including host states) participated in
needles and medicines…only guns.
PP12, including first time states Chile,
[These efforts] will leave a lasting
Peru and the Netherlands. By the
impression on East New Britain,
end of the third leg (Vietnam), there
certainly this University and me
had been about 24,600 patients seen,
personally.15
including 680 surgeries; 7000 pairs of
This is the reason why soft power is
prescription glasses distributed; 4600
important and why ADF contribution
animals (mostly livestock) treated;
to Pacific Partnership is vital to
174 pieces of medical equipment
promoting Australia’s interests. t
repaired; 50 community service
subject matter experts exchanges;
and eight engineering projects
undertaken. Australia’s contingent is
personnel participating, but the ADF
contingent is still one of the largest of
The large number of participating
states and NGO’s demonstrates that
and soft power Pacific Partnership
generates. The fact that all four host
11 Defending Australia in the AsiaPacific Century: Force 2030, Australian
Government, 2009, pp24-25.
states have had Pacific Partnership
visits previously shows that Pacific
Partnership achieves positive results
in public diplomacy and soft power
projection. Australian participation
in HADR missions improve positive
perception of Australia, demonstrates
that the Australian Government and
ADF want to support the region, and
that Australia is a positive regional
influence with benign military
intent. Professor Phillip Siaguru, Vice
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
6 Op Cit, p4.
10Jeffrey Babb, Being Smart about Using
Soft Power, News Weekly, 7 February 2009,
viewed at <http://www.newsweekly.com.au/
article.php?id=3795> on 2 December 2011.
more states recognise the goodwill
the positive work that militaries achieve
5 Unprecedented Terror Free Tomorrow
Polls: World’s Largest Muslim Countries
Welcome US Navy; New Results from
Indonesia and Bangladesh, Terror Free
Tomorrow, 2006, p2.
9 Joseph S Nye, “Public Diplomacy
and Soft Power,” in, The ANNALS of the
American Academy of Political and Social
Science, vol 616, no 1 (March 2008), p96.
all participating states.
Pacific Partnership demonstrates
4 See Leah Averitt, ‘Chinese Hospital Ships
and Soft Power’, Semaphore, Sea Power
Centre – Australia, April 2011.
8 Pacific Partnership 2011, Department of
Defence, viewed at <http://www.defence.
gov.au/opEx/exercises/pp11/info.htm> on
18/11/2011.
smaller than previous years, with 41
undertaken.
3 Pacific Partnership 2010 Ends with Many
Firsts, US Navy, viewed at <http://www.
cpf.navy.mil/media/news/articles/2010/
sep/sep12_PP10_conclusion.shtml> on
24/11/2011.
7 Tongan Government Portal, Foreign
Militaries Join Forces to Aid Islands, viewed
at <http://www.pmo.gov.to/defence/2415foreign-militaries-join-forces-to-aidislands> on 18/11/2011.
events; 43 band performances; 30
and that they benefit from work
2 The number of patients treated varies
from 230,000 – 500,000, but based on
reports from the USN following each
mission, 348,000 seems the most accurate.
Rhett Mitchell graduated from the
University of Notre Dame-Fremantle,
in 2009 with a BA (Hons.) majoring in
History, Politics and Archaeology. He
joined the Department of Defence as
a graduate in 2010, before becoming
a researcher at the Sea Power CentreAustralia. His research interests include
Australian and American history,
and maritime strategic affairs.
12Kevin Rudd, Australian Foreign Policy
and the Asia Pacific Century, speech given at
the Brookings Institute, Washington DC, 3
May 2011, viewed at http://foreignminister.
gov.au/speeches/2011/kr_sp_110503.html
on 24 January 2012.
13 Pacific Partnership 2010 Ends with Many
Firsts, viewed on 24/11/2011.
14LCDR Priya Chandra, Setting Sail for
Pacific Partnership, RAN, viewed at <http://
www.navy.gov.au/Setting_Sail_for_Pacific_
Partnership> on 22/11/2011.
15 Pacific Partnership 2010 Ends with Many
Firsts, viewed on 24/11/2011.
Charge
16
Muscular
Maritime
China ?
U
nder new rules to come into
the laws of innocent passage through a
Imperial Japan which penetrated China
effect on 1 January 2013, China
nation’s territorial waters? Is this just
from the north and raped its way south
has announced that it plans to send
the normal behaviour to be expected of
in the 1930’s causing tens of millions of
Hainan Provincial police to board and
a rising seapower moving through the
deaths and the destruction of a way of
search ships which are acting ‘illegally’
spectrum from Brown to Green to Blue
life that generations of Chinse had built
in its territorial waters, including those
water naval capability?
over three millennia.
which are in dispute. Acting ‘illegally’
Perhaps this is the case. But there
Having myopically ignored the sea
may in practice mean that any foreign
may be a more complicated, deeply
and the development of naval power
flagged vessel in Chinese territorial
seated and historically ambiguous
since the early fifteenth century, the last
and disputed waters can be stopped,
relationship between Beijing and the
emperors of the Middle Kingdom were
boarded and searched and escorted out
South China Sea which might help
helpless to prevent the destruction
to the high seas or detained.
to explain the subtext to this recent
of the Manchu dynasty’s rigid social
The pronouncement appears to
chest beating and determination to
order by foreign merchants and
foreshadow an intention by the PLAN
be recognised as the Asian arbiter at
missionaries. Nor could they prevent
to board and search foreign vessels
sea. It is not just about who gets what
the carving out of spheres of influence
in what the owners of the ships and
maritime resources in the twenty
by the great powers of the West. The
their flag state may consider to be
first century, though that is a part of
invaders ships crossed uncontested
their territorial waters. This action
the rationale for action. It may also
the waters that China considered
would be a direct affront to regional
be about how China was treated by
came under its historic suzerainty.
governments that would require a
the seapowers of the nineteenth and
They imposed trade conditions on the
response. One of the actions deemed
twentieth centuries.
weakened and debauched Imperial
illegal by Beijing under the new
China under successive dynasties
government’s mandarins in Peking.
regulations will be ‘conducting acts
feared that invasion by barbarians
When resistance was offered in 1860
of propaganda that threaten national
would come from the east over the
the Imperial summer palace was looted
security.’ That means whatever Beijing
endless plains of central Asia. Indeed in
and burned and Peking occupied.
says it means! Clearly the right of
1276 the Mongols came from the East
Popular uprisings were crushed by the
innocent passage through such
and became the Chinese ruling dynasty.
west with relative ease as it sailed into
disputed waters will not be respected
Centuries of wall building and repair
China’s ports troops and firepower
either. The Chinese Ministry of
attest to this persistent fear that new
to meet the challenge. It was the sea
Foreign Affairs spokesman Hong Lei
barbarians were just over the border.
which ultimately was the author of this
declined to elaborate at a press briefing
Of course it was true. There were
massive loss of Chinese life, wealth and
on what might constitute illegal entry.
barbarians waiting their opportunity
prestige.
How significant is this edict?
to invade. But the ones who would
Treaties lowering tariffs and
China’s maritime neighbours are
determine China’s fate in the modern
demanding concessions, including
certainly not happy. Surin Pitsuwan,
era were not over Mongolian land
the right to navigate the Yangtze,
the Secretary General of ASEAN,
border they were over the maritime
were won from a bitterly resentful but
has called this ‘a very serious turn
horizon. They were despised nations
powerless Chinese emperor. Even
of events’, diplomatic code for an
developing technology and firepower
the infant Australia was involved in
unacceptable arrogation of new
that massively outstripped the capacity
this dubious occupation when HMCS
powers to determine behaviour at
of pre industrial China to match.
Protector sailed to China to be part of
sea by Beijing and a challenge to all
It was from the sea that the
the suppression of the Boxer rebellion
states disputing China’s version of who
European and American barbarians
in 1900. It did not take a Chinese
owns what features. What is behind
came to ‘humiliate’ China in the
Mahan to work out that the origin of
China’s determination to challenge the
nineteenth century. Later it was the
China’s misery and destruction lay in
international agreements which govern
troops of the great new Asian seapower
her failure to keep pace technologically
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
17
Issue 147
with the West and to apply the new
China as far as the territorial waters of
to accommodate itself to the fact
industrial skills to building a Navy
the rest of South East Asia’s maritime
that pronouncements will be made
which could command the waters off
states were once, and therefore should
by Beijing principally for internal
her long open coastline.
be again, under Chinese control. They
consumption. Is the pronouncement
are not in the least interested in the
on boarding vessels in territorial waters
a modern battle fleet, with the help of
From the 1890s onwards Japan built
arcane rulings of the International
just such a banner waving action
the British, and prepared for the new
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
intended to allay popular fears that
century with confidence. China had
(ITLOS) in Hamburg or the principles
China is being outfaced at sea, or is
neither the resources or the knowledge
of Law of the Sea Convention 1982.
it China’s real intent to follow up the
or the freedom to become a naval
In fact China stated when it
words with deeds at sea? Time will tell.
power. That made all the difference to
ratified UCLOS that it will not accept
these two Asian powers’ relative fates
compulsory arbitration of its maritime
ASEAN maritime powers and Japan is
in the first half of the twentieth century.
disputes. It has the right to do this
the United States which does not wish
The lesson was learned and Mao began
under UCLOS and is not the only
to find itself watching a shooting match
the process of building and buying
country to make this declaration. That
between the PLAN and vessels of its
a fleet from Moscow. The project to
opt out entitlement does not prevent
regional allies. Time will tell whether
modernise and enlarge the PLAN is
the flag state of a seized vessel from
Beijing really intends to metaphorically
never ending for China.
bringing a claim against China and that
poke a chopstick in the eye of the
may well happen if China enforces its
American eagle by attempting to
claims.
enforce its claimed entitlements to stop
Why is all this history relevant to
the first half of the 21st century and
Standing behind the smaller
China’s recent pronouncement? The
In summary the people to
men who rule China today know that
whom the Communist Party must
the capacity of the ruling Communist
be responsive are not interested in
Party to retain the ‘mandate of
the rights of Japan, the Philippines,
sent its tiny Navy to war with the Royal
heaven’, and continue single party
Malaysia, Indonesia or Vietnam
Navy in 1812 over Britain’s demand to
rule indefinitely, depends on the
to assert their historical claims to
search US-flagged ships on the High
willing participation of the mass of the
maritime features which would give
Seas seeking wartime contraband and
Chinese people in the bold experiment
them fishing and mineral rights. Such
British born sailors. Perhaps that bit of
that is the rise of China. They are riding
assertions are regarded as attempts at
naval history needs to be pointed out
the tiger! The Chinese masses must
humiliation of the motherland. The
to the more ambitious of the muscular
observe and participate in this new age
average Chinese wants to hear that
maritime converts in the Chinese
where the humiliations of the past are
the Japanese, still resented for their
Politburo before more ambit claims
now impossible.
wartime cruelty and their twisting of
are made which enrage the neighbours
Bullying of Beijing, or the
and search the vessels of friends of the
United States.
The young United States Congress
modern history, are the ones being
and cause friction with the regional
perception of it, must stop and
humiliated over their claims to these
maritime superpower whose Seventh
ultimately one suspects obeisance by
‘Chinese’ islands. The logic presumably
fleet still patrols the waters China
smaller powers must recommence
is: something must be done to assert
persists in claiming as exclusively its
after an unnatural interruption of half a
China’s new found strength with regard
own. t
millennium. With this recrudescence of
to perceived Japanese hegemonic
hope and self belief in the public mind
claims. This is something, therefore it
go certain facts about how the future
must be done! The forced closure of
will be for the Chinese people.
Japanese company’s car plants in China
Most Chinese believe passionately
by furious workers was apparently a
that Taiwan is a temporarily detached
spontaneous expression of real anger
‘renegade province’ of the motherland
over Japanese claims.
which must be returned to central
“Depth Charge” submits his work
anonymously to the Editor.
These facts about how the future
authority one way or another. This
is going to be, which are believed
should occur peacefully if possible
by the Chinese proletariat and the
and by force if necessary. They believe
ruling elite, are, for the foreseeable
intuitively that all the seas around
future, immutable. The West needs
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
18
November 2012 a number
of RAN Ships have been involved in the annual EXERCISE
Triton Warrior taking place in the EAST Australian Exercise Area (EAXA) of Jervis Bay. This is
a valuable opportunity to develop interoperability and for RAN personnel to gain new skills and develop experience.
The pictures show the testing of the new remote control surface target trials. This capability will allow the RAN to develop skills and tactics to overcomes threat
from Fast Inshore Attack Craft (FIAC).
The testing involved the Australian Maritime Warfare Centre, HMAS Darwin, 816 Squadron and the Defence Science and Technology Organisation.
76mm gun after firing, during EXERCISE Triton Warrior , HMAS Darwin.
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
19
Issue 147
Japan’s formidable new strike weapon of WWII
– its aircraft carriers, and the Darwin raid
By Dr Tom Lewis and Peter Ingman
J
apan deployed four of its aircraft
nominally the same,
carriers against Darwin in 1942. This
they were quite different
was no “air raid” as such: the Imperial
in fine detail. Soryu was
Japanese Navy had a new “wonder
completed first, in 1937.
weapon’ at its disposal and used it
She was the smaller of
accordingly. The end result was an
the two: her sister ship
overwhelming tactical victory for the
was completed two
new empire of the Pacific.
years later and was 1.5
The Imperial Japanese Navy took
thousand tons bigger: at
their different types of carrier and
20, 250 tons compared
welded them into a formidable force
to Soryu’s 18, 880.
that operated as one. This will be
Hiryu was nearly four
discussed later, but its effect was to
foot wider (about 1.2
shape a formidable force that could
metres).
overwhelm whatever target its admiral
chose it to destroy.
Soryu and Hiryu were of the same
class, named after the former. Although
While both ships carried a crew of
then that Hiryu was in every respect
1100, and were capable of 34 knots,
a better ship, but there was one
Hiryu carried two more aircraft: 73
noticeable difference: the newer vessel
opposed to 71. It might be supposed
had her island superstructure based
on the port (left) side of the ship. The
rationale behind this is discussed a little
later.
1940 naval review
aerial view (front to
back and left to right)
Tone, Settsu, Mizuho,
and Isuzu.Ships of
the World magazine
No. 40, December,
1960-1.
The Japanese carriers were generally
speaking at the forefront of the
marque’s latest ideas, but they were
not perfect. Naval historian David
Hobbs points out: “A major Japanese
weakness was the need to strike aircraft
down into the hangar to be refueled
and rearmed, a time-consuming
process in which the operating sped
of the lifts was a critical factor that
was to prove disastrous at the battle of
Midway…”1
The aircraft hangars below the
main, or weather, deck were serviced
by lifts, which descended to the hangar,
or further down to a second hangar,
to bring up and down the aircraft, the
carrier’s fighting weapon. The lifts
were complex pieces of machinery,
able to carry several tons of aircraft,
equipment, and people at a time. Their
operation was vital to the carrier’s
operation of aircraft, for if they jammed
or became battle damaged, aircraft
would be stranded above and below
until repairs were effected. Generally
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
20
Japan’s formidable new strike weapon of WWII
– its aircraft carriers, and the Darwin raid
speaking, the hangars were aft at the
of the four: the others’ being 31 knots
of construction. In fact, exactly how
stern or amidships in the middle of the
for the flagship Akagi, and 34 for the
an aircraft carrier’s vitals should be
vessel, with the bow area designated for
two smaller ships Soryu and Hiryu. In
arranged would occupy designer for
aircraft takeoffs, which were most likely
a line of advance the entire strike force
decades more to come.3
carried out without the later inventions
would be limited to Kaga’s speed so as
of catapults and certainly without ski
to retain cohesion within the protective
for the placement: one4 suggesting it
jumps. Aircraft could also be stored
force of cruisers and destroyers.
was “an experiment in determining
along the sides of the carrier for a short
Steaming into the wind was a
Sources differ as to the reasoning
whether this characteristic would
period.1
necessary operation for carriers
improve flight patterns when operating
Construction and performance
launching or recovering aircraft: it
a mixed task force of port-sided and
effectively gave 28 knots (or whatever
starboard-sided carriers.” Another5
The lengthiest carrier in the Japanese
speed the carrier could make) under
states that the rationale was as the
force, at 855 feet (261 metres) Akagi
the wings of the aircraft launching,
result of 1930s design studies which
was longer than a soccer field – 130
therefore meaning they were already
showed that “turbulence over the
yards / 119 metres – and comparatively
“flying” at that speed, and so much
flight deck aft (which affected aircraft
massive in breadth and displacement,
closer to the speed needed for liftoff.
during landing) could be reduced by
roughly equivalent to the larger USA
On landing, the wind on the aircraft’s
moving the island away from the ship’s
carriers. Like many aircraft carriers in
nose effectively meant there was
exhaust gases.” Yet another3 suggests:
the world at that time, she was a hybrid
already a brake on the aircraft’s landing.
“the island was placed on the starboard
ship, a carrier deck built on battlecruiser
Kaga’s lesser ability here meant
side because early (propeller) aircraft
or battleship lines; in Akagi’s case the
her aircraft were at a disadvantage
turned to the left more easily (an effect
former. Oddly, she was originally heavily
compared to the other carriers: that
of engine torque). Obviously such
armed with guns, the main armament
three knots when compared to Akagi
an aircraft can execute a wave-off to
of carriers being their aircraft; a
and the six knots lesser speed for Soryu
the left more easily, so the island was
leftover from her early planning as a
and Hiryu meant that the Kaga aircraft
put to starboard to be out of the way.
conventional line of battle vessel. Even
could not be so heavily loaded with fuel
Another idea6 was to allow two carriers
at Midway it would seem she possessed
and bombs.
to operate extremely closely; the left
six or eight eight-inch guns.2
Kaga’s main problem when in
Having said that, Kaga was a worthy
and right islands of a pair allowing
ship. She was some 40 feet shorter than
maximum visibility as they steamed
company with the other three carriers
the flagship but displaced 1, 300 tons
alongside, but there is no evidence of
of the Darwin group was her lesser
more. She carried one less aircraft:
this from Japanese archives so far.
speed: 28 knots making her the slowest
90 as opposed to 91. The two smaller
1 The Japanese carriers had wooden
planking decks over a lattice of steel beams,
like the US Navy’s vessels, as opposed to
British ships, which had an all-steel deck
construction. The Americans would pay
dearly for this when kamikazes targeted the
“flat-tops” in the later stages of the war: the
wooden decks were a lot more vulnerable
to impact than steel plates. The Americans
and British, the operators of large carrier
forces in the Pacific, never developed this
interesting suicide technique whereby a
pilot sacrificed his life for the devastating
impact an aircraft crashing into a ship could
achieve. Ultimately however, it did not stop
the Allied advance. (Reference discussions
between author Lewis and David Hobbs.)
2 Nihon Kaigun suggests ten 8-inch guns,
later to become eight; while Shattered Sword
gives only six. (p. 7) Akagi was completed
in 1927, after a stop in her construction to
change her from a battlecruiser to an aircraft
carrier. She was refitted in 1935 when it
would seem she was made more “carrierlike” and it would have made sense to get rid
of some guns then to save weight.
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
Akagi even had a downward-
carriers Soryu and Hiryu operated 71
pointing main funnel on the starboard
and 73 respectively.
side, showing the type of experiments
The two smaller carriers showed
the results of around a further decade
of thinking relating to carrier design.
Completed in the late 1930s as opposed
to the 1920s, they were faster; more
efficient2 in their power delivery than
their bigger sisters – so using less fuel –
and in Soryu’s case more graceful; she
was a purpose-designed carrier from
the keel to the island superstructure.
Akagi and Hiryu both – most
notably and oddly – had their islands
placed to the port, or left, side of the
ship. This was related to the constant
experimenting which was being carried
on in the carrier world at the time
that had been undertaken to control
the flow of heated air and how it might
3 Haze Gray & Underway suggests:
“Initially the island was placed on the
starboard side because early (propeller)
aircraft turned to the left more easily (an
effect of engine torque). Obviously such
an aircraft can execute a wave-off to the
left more easily, so the island was put to
starboard to be out of the way….Once the
starboard side position was established
and a few carriers were built in that
configuration, it became difficult to change.
Pilots used to landing with the island to
their right would be confused on a ship
with the island on the other side. There was
nothing to be gained by moving the island,
so it stayed in the same place. Once angled
decks were introduced this became even
more important, since the deck angle would
have to be changed to move the island.” See
http://www.hazegray.org/faq/smn5.htm
21
Issue 147
A Japanese carrier
under construction
(Simon Loveday)
affect aircraft performance. Whatever
enormous range of aircraft, compared
hits often the projectile passed straight
the rationale, these two ships, despite
to ships, meant that they could fly long
through the aircraft’s side; and out of
their different class and ten years of
distances and then attack shipping. The
the other, not making enough damage
thinking inbetween their construction,
big guns of the carrier’s force (and in
to bring down the craft. Many a pilot
spent their lives with their islands to
some cases, the carrier also had large
survived combat in WWI and II
the left. At least their pilots could not
anti-ship guns fitted) were ill-suited to
bringing home an aircraft shredded
get confused and land on the sister
anti-aircraft fire, lacking often elevation
with hits, but still flying. Pilots found
ships Kaga and Soryu… landing on the
to fire upwards to a sufficient height;
quickly that armouring themselves
wrong deck indeed something that has
reload speed necessary to engage a fast
– with backseat-armour for example
indeed happened in the tremendously
moving aerial target, and accuracy –
– was a most useful measure to keep
intricate world of carrier operations.
the solid shell even deflected forward
the machine under control from a live
Akagi and Hiryu remain the only two
of the target accurately being too small
pilot.
carriers in the history of the marque
in its frontal area to achieve sufficient
to have islands to port. But once the
hits; something like a shotgun spread
were the quick firing weapon such
starboard side position was established
seemed a better alternative.
as the Oerlikon, with its large 20mm
The best shipborne AA weapons
and a few carriers were built in that
Consequently during WWII
configuration, it became difficult to
anti-aircraft defences sprouted from
aircraft in its vitals or hit the pilot. The
change.”
carrier and escort ships like quills
heavy machinegun – the .50 calibre –
from porcupines. They consisted of
also had a spread of shot, a big enough
7
Carrier defences
round most effective if it caught an
two main types: quick-firing, small,
calibre, and sufficient muzzle velocity
Ironically, the biggest threat to the
fast projectiles; and machineguns,
to do good damage to an aircraft. It
safety of a carrier by the end of 1941
preferably of a heavy enough calibre
was rather like using a shotgun against
was aircraft – other people’s coming
to make a sufficient hole in whatever
the flying machines, but it was a big
your way armed with hostile intent.
they hit. While aircraft were sometimes
shotgun: smaller calibres such as those
It was becoming obvious that the
too thin-skinned to withstand such
in .303 didn’t do enough damage.
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
22
Japan’s formidable new strike weapon of WWII
– its aircraft carriers, and the Darwin raid
Such weapons
were effective, but
not to one hundred
percent. Often an
aircraft would get
through the fusillade
of shot fired at it,
and successfully fire
a torpedo or drop a
bomb; divebombers
– aircraft diving
from a considerable
height and releasing
a bomb – indeed
being a new
weapon but one
that was quickly
taken up given its
effectiveness both on
land and – hopefully
– at sea; proven in
the Spanish Civil
the uptake as to what it actually was
three-man Nakajima “Kate” – which
War with the Stuka, and thought to be
they were firing against. Some aircraft
could carry gravity-drop bombs, or
a new weapon for the sea war. And so
were slow biplanes, and easily enough
torpedoes for anti-ship strike, and
it proved: in the carrier battles of the
identified. But most on both sides were
Aichi “Val” two-man divebombers,
Pacific and against conventional ships
fast metal monoplanes, looking similar
primarily designated for shipping
such as the Tirpitz, the divebomber was
enough to non-flying people as to be
attack. To protect the bombers the
to be an effective if short-lived weapon.
easily confused with the hostile’s side’s
single-seat Mitsubishi “Zero” – the
The dive-bomber was to prove most
machines. The incidents of “friendly
proper designation was “Zeke” – flew
vulnerable to anti-aircraft weapons,
fire” began in the early years of WWII,
with the bomber force and warded off
given the attack configuration of
and rapidly became worse.
enemy fighters. The range of this strike
descending rapidly in a limited square
The ultimate AA weapon was
force was in the region of hundreds of
of sky, and also conventional fighters.
however the defending side’s own
miles, depending on the load carried,
While at Midway the divebomber
aircraft, deployed far enough away
superseding the big guns of the
struck hard at the Japanese carriers
from the strike force so as to ensure
battleship, which could fire up to many
and indeed proved decisive, as warfare
insufficient “leakage” of a massive aerial
miles, depending on the size of the gun.
technology evolved so did the dive-
incoming force could not get through
bomber’s capabilities diminish, and
to attack the ships. This meant that
Aircraft at sea
post WWII it disappeared from
some aircraft had to be deployed as
Ever since someone in a navy thought
armouries across the world.
defending fighters. Obviously they
that aircraft at sea were a good idea,
Shipborne AA defences had an
had to be given guidance apart from
the concept of keeping them there has
unintended, bitter, but understandable
the aircrew’s own eyes, and so radar
been one eagerly embraced by some
side-effect. Anyone in a ship having
was seen very quickly as being totally
seaman, initially rejected by others, but
been attacked by an aircraft, especially
necessary to the defence. Radio linked
eventually accepted by all.
if they had seen the consequences of
everything together in a complicated
a successful torpedo or bomb strike,
but workable solution.
was extremely nervous about being
The aircraft were also an attacking
Aircraft at sea have distinct
advantages. Historically, they were
first useful for reconnaissance – seeing
the victim of such an onslaught.
force. Three main single engine types
where the other side’s ships were so you
Consequently AA crews tended to
were carried by the Japanese fleet.
could more effectively attack them, or
be quick on the trigger and slow on
Bombers – the Allied-designated
spotting the fall of shot from your guns.
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
A scene on the deck
of the carrier Akagi
(Courtesy Bob Alford)
23
Issue 147
In this respect they were rather like
all. The rise of air power, many have
airborne; they needed flammable fuel;
those aircraft – balloons – employed in
argued, sealed the fate of the battleship.
they needed mechanical specialists to
the American Civil War: a means to an
Large and cumbersome, the battleship
tend them, and they were quite delicate
end. The concept of towing a balloon
was a dinosaur by the twenties and
in construction – hardly suitable to be
from a ship was experimented with
thirties and fatally vulnerable to air
carried in quantity aboard a rolling,
but did not eventuate as a custom and
attack according to this school of
pitching, and often leaking ship. They
aviation at sea was not really a concept
interpretation. The debate has been
needed a new specialized crew to
until necessity arrived.
characterised as one that split navies
fly them, and what were these new
between a younger, dynamic group
technically-minded people: officers or
came out to bomb Royal Navy warships
who argued the case of the supremacy
sailors?
it was realized that an on-board aircraft
of aviation against the older men who
would be the best means of chasing
remained wedded to their reactionary
being the future of the aircraft carrier
them away. It was quickly seen that
ideas of all-big-gun ships engaging
was far from certain. The role of those
aircraft could be catapulted from a
each other in blue water. Geoffrey Till
operating air operations over the sea
ship, or they could be lowered over
has argued that such interpretations of
was also the subject of much debate
the side to take off on water. But how
the Royal Navy are crude caricatures.
and often acrimonious argument –
could they be recovered? The concept
He sees the Navy as one in which
should it be land-based aircraft or
had been tried: in 1912 Lieutenant
technological innovation was being
carrier-borne machines that filled this
Charles Samson had flown a biplane
discussed the whole time and informed
position?
off a platform on board the battleship
doctrinal debate. According to Till, air
HMS Africa. Fighters were duly fitted
power was taken seriously, but as an
still the king of the sea battle, and this
to several warships. The problem of
unproven force it could not be allowed
concept was carried through to every
how to recover such a machine was one
to dominate thinking and planning
other navy as well. But events in the
worth pondering over. Crash-landing
entirely.”
war quickly began to change matters
When WWI arrived and Zeppelins
– and losing – the aircraft was feasible,
The carrier was much experimented
As WWII dawned and came into
In Britain in 1939 the battleship was
The loss of the British carrier
but losing the pilot too was too much
with after the War. The ‘big gun’
Glorious is a good illustration of
to ask, especially when the through-
battleship was still though the ambition
how concepts were embedded.
life training and expense of a pilot was
of all seamen officers, and the carrier
The situation is best described in
considered.
was seen as an aid to sea battle: useful
John Winton’s Carrier Glorious, but
for finding submarines perhaps, and
essentially this British ship was part
launch and/or recover the aircraft was
for carrying aircraft to sea, where they
of an invasion of Norway in 1940. The
one much experimented with in WWI,
did have their uses, but not otherwise
attack was a failure, and repulsed by
and eventually success was achieved
a key element of sea power. This idea
a strong German defence the British
in limited form. The light battlecruiser
was hotly debated by some theorists
withdrew. Glorious was steaming back
Furious was converted into an aircraft
however, who saw possibilities for the
to Britain, escorted by two destroyers,
carrier and the first ever successful
striking power of the ships.
when she was surprised, and quickly
The concept of a deck from which to
deck landing occurred in August
Aircraft though in the main were
sunk by two German battleships, the
1917 when Squadron Commander
not keeping up. The machines of the
Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau, despite
EH Dunning landed his Sopwith Pup
time were often slow, both in their
the best efforts of the two escorts,
on board. Aircraft carriers in WWI
top speed, thus limiting in a time/
who were also sunk. Glorious, despite
however were in their infancy and
range equation, and in their approach
having aircraft available, did not have
their use was much decried; derided,
speeds, thus meaning they were
one flying in reconnaissance, which
applauded and otherwise argued about,
vulnerable in any idea of attacking a
would have saved her, let alone in a
as indeed aircraft themselves had been
ship with bombs or guns. They were
mode where they could have defended
argued about during the war.
frail too – a hail of machine-gun fire
her. Her commanding officer – Captain
was quite possible fatal to any aircraft
Guy D’Oyly-Hughes – did not rate
of Battleships and British Society, notes
hit. Aircraft had many annoying
aircraft carriers highly, and indeed
”Naval historians have debated whether
features which were detrimental to
was contemptuous of their aircraft’s
the Royal Navy (and indeed any other
ships carrying them: they usually
defensive abilities, and furthermore,
navy) should have built battleships at
needed wind over the deck to become
annoyed by such things as course
Indeed, Mark Connelly, the author
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
24
Japan’s formidable new strike weapon of WWII
– its aircraft carriers, and the Darwin raid
deviations he would have had to make
of Bismarck in May 1941 by
an attached sub-sea component of
to turn into the wind to launch and
aircraft launched from the
submarines. The purpose of this flotilla
recover the aircraft.
carrier Ark Royal; she was then
of vessels was to protect the carriers – a
sunk by ships of the RN.
prime target – and also to let offensive
Over the next five years the
The attacks on tactical land
operations be carried out unhampered
Significant combat events utilizing
air bases in the Pacific, where
by hostile combatants. The Darwin
aircraft carriers included:
islands were bombed and
raid group was no exception. Three
The attack on Pearl Harbor
strafed by aircraft before troop
cruisers – heavy units Tone and
by the Japanese forces in
landings.
Chikuma, and light cruiser Abukuma;
The battles of the Coral
were present, their big guns’ primary
Sea and Midway which
task was to keep offensive surface
significantly utilised carriers.
vessels at a considerable distance from
mindset of such officers was shattered.
•
December 1941. This massive
•
•
assault smashed many useful;
heavy warships, and would
•
•
have destroyed aircraft carriers
As the war came to a close the
the carriers. Mitsuo Fuchida, the Air
too, if they had been there.
usefulness of carriers in the public eye
Group commander, and historian
The attack on distant land
came more to the fore. The role of the
Masatake Okumiya, also suggest that
targets by airborne carrier-
battleship had not been devalued so
two battleships, Hiei and Kirishima,
based assets, such as that upon
much as reconsidered. Especially in
were also present, although this is not
Darwin on 19 February 1942.
the Pacific, the strategic concern was
borne out in other sources. It is an odd
The use of aircraft bypassed
to take and invest land bases, hence
notation, because Fuchida was writing
shore heavy gun defences
the attacks on places such as Saipan
only 13 years after the raid, and one
designed for use against
and Okinawa. As these were islands,
would presume the presence of two
battleships, which would
they needed to be bombarded by
huge vessels as this would have been
otherwise have closed the coast
naval-based gunnery, which included
indelibly noticeable.8
and shelled their target. The
attacks by aircraft, before the ground
installation of heavy guns on
troops went in. Indeed, the more
shore meant such ships were
bombardment the better, because this
Cruisers: Heavy Cruisers x 2; Light
Cruiser x 1
vulnerable to these attacks.
saved Allied lives. Although the heavy
The aircraft, as an alternative,
guns of battleships were most useful,
were able to fly around such
aircraft could often hit what ship-based
guns, and were only partially
guns could not, utilising rockets and
vulnerable to small rapid-firing
bombs to great effect, and often flying
gun systems.
in support of infantry, where heavy
The attack on Japan by the
guns would have endangered friendly
aircraft of Lieutenant Colonel
troops.
James H. Doolittle in April
•
1942, launched from the
evolved: the ‘escort’ carrier, which the
aircraft carrier USS Hornet.
Americans often called a ‘jeep’ carriers,
This daring raid, using B-25
as opposed to the main battle type.
“Mitchell” medium bombers,
The difference was usually in tonnage
especially lightened for the
– around 8,000 tons as opposed to 20-
take-off, made an especially
30, 000 tons. The concept of a strategic
useful psychological raid on
carrier – one that was specifically
Tokyo.
designed for land attack, and designed
In August 1942 the carriers
to influence foreign affairs, was in the
Eagle, Indomitable, Victorious
future.
and Furious provided air cover
•
Different carrier types had
along with the re-supply
Protection force
of aircraft to Malta as part
Grouped with every carrier whenever
of operation Pedestal.
she was in a combat zone was a surface
The finding and disabling
protection force sometimes including
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
The design of Tone and Chikuma was
25
Issue 147
quite different to Western cruisers.
Their firepower was concentrated
identical.
ahead, behind, and “up threat” – in the
The heavy cruisers Takao and Maya
direction from where any danger might
forward of the bridge, and the aft
– both Takao-class – were deployed
emerge – the underwater warriors
end of the ship was kept for flying
from Palau from 16 February as distant
silently sought out enemy ships that
operations. The six seaplanes they
cover, meaning they were most likely
might be trying to close the carrier
each carried were very useful for
positioned between where it was
group and attack. They took good care
reconnaissance, especially when she
thought any elements of the ABDA
not to be near the force itself, else the
was working with an aircraft carrier
force ships would be. Although details
escorting destroyers perceive them
group.
have not been located, this would most
falsely as a threat, and attack them. This
likely have been between the main
is a technique still practiced today with
archipelagic islands near the Sunda
modern carrier groups.
The two ships were virtually
9
Strait, as being the most likely choke
Finally, the submarines were often
point through which enemy vessels
used between the carrier force and
would have to pass.
the target to recover downed aviators.
A “screen’ of seven, some suggest10
Surfaced, they could see a reasonable
eight, destroyers was also engaged to
distance along the axis of flight to
shield the group from submarines,
and from the target, and would be
although their torpedoes and guns
positioned accordingly. They could
were also useful against surface vessels,
also be used as long distance scouts
although this may well have been at
to report on weather, although in this
a cost of themselves, their light build
function they were gradually being
meaning no armour was carried.11
A submarine force was also grouped
displaced by aircraft.
with the attack force, ironically the
Flying operations
three remaining boats of the Sixth
Launching and recovering aircraft
Submarine Squadron which had
involved the whole carrier force. The
attacked Darwin the preceding month.
aircraft carriers themselves had to turn
In an operation which remains a
into whatever wind was available, to
revelation to most even today, four
give wind over the wings of the aircraft
submarines had laid mines and
and therefore help lift them off the
attacked a convoy in mid-month,
decks. Turning large ships such as these
culminating in an action where one
called for a lot of searoom, and turning
of the vessels – the I-124 – had been
with them was the whole protective
defeated in a close-range battle with
force.
12
the corvette HMAS Deloraine. The
Once the aircraft “armada“ had
279-foot (85 metre) boat, with her
been launched – on 19 February 1942,
80 crew on board, still lies outside
188 aircraft in total indeed necessitates
Darwin harbour today. The other
such a word – the carriers could
three submarines had fled, causing
resume a different course, usually one
the Japanese High Command to think
that took them towards where their
again about a methodology for closing
aircraft would be returning from, in
down the northern port. Vengeance
case any were damaged and low on
for their fallen comrades must have
fuel. This had to be tempered with
been on the minds of the three other
caution however, as it was usually
submarine crews on board the I-121,
the direction from where attack
I-122, and I-123.
might eventuate. Given a strike could
The submarines’ task was also force
take some hours, the carriers and
protection, but in a different manner
their escorts often would steam in
from the close-range protection the
a “racetrack” pattern, a large figure
surface ships provided. Roving far
eight, for example. When the aircraft
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
26
Japan’s formidable new strike weapon of WWII
– its aircraft carriers, and the Darwin raid
returned the carriers would again
have to turn into the wind, this time to
lower the landing speed at which the
aircraft touched down, to be caught
on arresting wires and dramatically
stopped. In Darwin the direction of
the incoming flight was more known
and the steaming pattern altered
accordingly.
The intricate complexity of the
carrier operations was immense.
It resembled a ballet of men,
flying machines, weather, and ship
operations. Aircraft were brought up
from below the deck on lifts somewhat
larger than Western carriers, as IJN
aircraft did not have as capable folding
wings – the Kates had folded wings,
the Vals only folded wingtips – and
readied for flight. The pilot and ­– in
the divebombers and vertical bombers
killed the crew the ship would often
most difficult aspect of operations
– aircrew, boarded and the engine was
complete the destruction.
from a carrier was landing on the
started. The aircraft was pushed and
Once in the air the pilot was master
deck. The tail hook landing was always
pulled into position for takeoff, guided
of his craft to a degree, but he was
challenging. There were sometimes
by signalers armed with a complex
usually to be part of a formation that
accidents and I saw aircraft crash and
set of hand movements to signal the
would be part of a massed attack. Upon
aircrew as to how the aircraft would
return the aircraft would approach
assist with engine and brakes. Once
the carrier from astern of the ship,
The Japanese Commanders
in position the engine was accelerated
which was steaming at high speed
At the start of 1942 the Japanese
while the aircraft was held in position
to give a headwind that would assist
carriers of the First Mobile Striking
by its brakes and restraining cables.
the landing. Most navies employed
Force were the most powerful
a “batsman” at this point who would
naval force on earth. Referred to
attacked Darwin had catapults
assist the aircraft pilot by signals,
more simply as Mobile Fleet, it was
is unlikely. One source suggests
indicating he was too high, low, fast,
commanded by Vice Admiral Nagumo
“Japanese carriers also began to be
slow, or off course. An aircraft could
Chuichi, who flew his flag from the
equipped with catapults just before war
be “waved off” at this point, meaning a
carrier Akagi. Some sources refer to
broke out, starting with the Shokakus.”
fly over of the ship; rejoining
However, another source suggests:
the line of aircraft waiting to
Whether the four carriers which
“All takeoffs were deck launches, as
“land on” and having another
Japanese carriers had no catapults.”
attempt. Crashes on deck
13
An aircraft handler would give the
were not infrequent, and
final permission for release, and with
for this eventuality – or any
the engine at full power the aircraft
other emergency – firesuited
would accelerate at maximum along
men in helmets were kept
the deck and into the air over the bow
at instant readiness, ready
of the ship. Failure of machine or men
to take to a crashed and
at this point was usually fatal: a “cold
possibly burning aircraft with
shot” meant the carrier would often
fire axes and retrieval of the
run straight over the top of its aircraft,
crew. Fighter pilot Tsunoda
and if the impact of the crash hadn’t
Kazuo recalled: “To me the
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
Detail of the port side
of either Akagi or
Hiryu. Note the gun
sponsons. (Darwin
Military Museum via
Simon Loveday)
the pilots were usually killed.”14
Japanese pilots
Masao Asai and
Masao Sato aboard
carrier Akagi, 19381939, with Zero
fighter
27
Issue 147
Japanese carrier
power at sea. With
the island on the
port side, this is
either Akagi or
Hiryu. Two other
carriers in the
background leader
three battleships
or battlecruisers,
with two or three
carriers behind
(Simon Loveday,
Darwin Military
Museum)
Mobile Fleet as “Nagumo’s Carrier
Task Force”15 or “Nagumo Force”.16
However, Nagumo himself had little to
do with his own air operations. While
a competent officer, he was “largely
passive and not terribly innovative”.17
Little if nothing of the success of the
force can be attributed to Nagumo.
It was rather a case of being in the
right place at the right time: he was
commanding a superior weapon
system which was employed using
effective and successful doctrine.
While the Pearl Harbor attack was a
celebrated success, Nagumo failed to
order a further strike. This may have
crippled the base infrastructure, and
according to Admiral Nimitz could
had famously led the Pearl Harbor
to crack an egg, this was the time”.26
have lengthened the Pacific War for
attack. Fuchida himself led the B5N
Certainly this was a curious use of the
Kate unit on Akagi. Also from Akagi
force at this critical time, especially
another two years.18
Fortunately for Nagumo, he had
was a veteran fighter pilot who led the
given that the two carriers of Division
a number of talented officers serving
Zeroes, Lieutenant Commander Itaya
5 (Shokaku and Zuikaku) had also
under him who were deeply committed
Shigeru. Another influential officer
participated. Thus in the two months
to the development of high quality,
was Lieutenant Commander Egusa
following Pearl Harbor, Akagi and
massed naval airpower. The stand-out
Takashige, who led the D3 Val unit
Kaga steamed long distances but faced
was Nagumo’s air officer, Commander
onboard Soryu. He was the recognised
only negligible opposition.
Genda Minoru, who has attracted
superlatives such as “brilliant”19
and “house genius”.20 It was Genda
22
23
Japanese expert on dive bombing.
Further, Genda respected him as being
a “God-like” combat leader.24 Egusa
It was in early February when they
arrived at Palau and made rendevous
with Hiryu and Soryu. These carriers
who first pushed for the carriers
had led the crucial second wave dive
had detached after Pearl Harbor to
to be grouped together in a single
bombing attack against ships at Pearl
support the Wake Island occupation.
command. It was also Genda who
Harbor. Indeed, virtually all of the
So the best carriers of Mobile Force
had designed the daring Pearl Harbor
flying leaders at Darwin were Pearl
were again re-united and the first
operation, so he was largely responsible
Harbor veterans. At least 80% of the
mission was to strike Darwin. Douglas
for developing the air doctrine that
aircrews themselves must have been
Lockwood, writing the first book on
enabled aircraft from different carriers
similar veterans.
to operate together effectively as a
25
The Darwin raid would be
single force. As this was so new, there
the first time the carriers of
was nobody else suitably credentialed
Division 1 (Akagi and Kaga) and
to critique his plans. Nagumo himself
Division 2 (Hiryu and Soryu) were
was certainly unable to do so. Hence
to operate together since Pearl
the air operations of Mobile Fleet “were
Harbor. Indeed the Division 1
disproportionately the responsibility of
carriers had initially returned
a single individual”.21
The core architect of the Darwin
Pearl Harbor attack,
7 December 1941.
A Japanese Navy
Zero fighter (tail
number A1-108)
takes off from
Akagi, on its way to
attack Pearl Harbor
during the morning
of 7 December
1941. (Official US
Navy Photograph,
National Archives
Collection)
to Japan. They then only faced
insignificant opposition during
air strike was undoubtably Genda.
raids against Rabaul and the wider
However he had a cadre of very
New Guinea area in January. It
experienced and capable aviation
was in reference to these raids
leaders. Chief among these was
that Fuchida made the comment
Commander Fuchida Mitsuo, who
“if a sledgehammer had been used
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
28
Japan’s formidable new strike weapon of WWII
– its aircraft carriers, and the Darwin raid
the Darwin raid, and interviewing
regarding Darwin itself, and did not
the aviator, claimed that Fuchida saw
expect serious opposition. Perhaps
Darwin as similar to Rabaul, and thus
this overconfidence led to what was
the sledgehammer and egg metaphor
perhaps the only oversight during the
was again valid.
operation. During attacks elsewhere,
27
However it is clear that the Japanese
the Japanese were meticulous in
recognised the strategic value of
attacking all air bases in the vicinity
Darwin in regard to their operations
of the target. However at Darwin
in the Netherlands East Indies. The
they failed to attack Batchelor, just 50
Japanese Navy General Staff had
miles south of Darwin – less than 20
approved the Darwin attack as soon
minutes flying time31 for the bombers.
as possible after Pearl Harbor. Genda
Batchelor was very significant in that it
defined around the capital ships. But
himself ‘recommended that it be
was used by American heavy bombers.
in November 1940 the Royal Navy
28
The commander
RAAF Wirraways had been dispersed
launched the first entirely carrier
of Carrier Division 2, Rear-Admiral
there from Darwin. Batchelor was also
aviation anti-ship strike of the war,
Yamaguchi, wanted to attack Darwin
the only location outside of Darwin
when Italian battleships were sunk or
himself using only Hiryu and Soryu.
to be allocated AA guns. So this
disabled in the port of Taranto. This
He first made this proposal on 20
oversight is unexplained, especially as
effectively put the potentially powerful
January, when the Division 1 carriers
the field would usually be easily seen
Italian capital ships out of the war, and
were far away in the New Guinea
from the air given the relatively thick
helped secure the balance of power
area. However, it is also recorded that
surrounding jungle. But it seems the
for the British in the Mediterranean.
the first target”.
Yamaguchi’s reasoning made reference
to a surprise attack by American
Japanese never knew about Batchelor.32
The strike weapon that produced this
stunning result was just 24 fabric-
destroyers on a Japanese convoy off
The Japanese strike weapon
Balikpapan. He wanted all bases within
The Japanese carriers had one unique
carrier – perhaps a force more likely to
a radius of 600 miles of intended
advantage over any other carrier force
have been thought useful for scouting
in the world: they combined their
than as a strike force.
29
operations to be attacked.
Darwin
covered biplanes flying from a single
was certainly within such a radius in
aircraft into one formidable weapon, to
regard to Timor, for example.
be used decisively against any target.
unnoticed by the Japanese, who studied
33
Such a stunning result did not go
Other carrier-operating nations had
Taranto closely. It ultimately led to
Darwin much earlier. However
not yet understood and undertaken this
the formation of the First Air Fleet in
Yamamoto himself made it clear that
tactical idea. Given all of the aircraft
April 1941: for the first time carriers
four carriers would be used, even
from any Japanese carrier force – at
were being combined together as was
though it meant delaying the attack.
Darwin 188 aircraft operating against
natural with the “big gun” ships. This
Accordingly, on the afternoon of 9
a target of town and shipping – this
has been called a “truly revolutionary
February Yamamoto sent Southern
meant the air fleet armada was virtually
development” that transformed naval
Force Telegraph Order No. 92 to the
unstoppable. No matter how good the
aviation from an ancillary role to
carriers. This assigned Mobile Fleet
defender’s countermeasures were, and
“a decisive arm of battle”.34 Within
to attack Darwin one day before the
at Darwin they proved not to be very
months this led to the well planned and
invasion of Timor was planned to
good, the countermeasures would be
commence, around 19 February. The
overwhelmed, and the target swamped
order also comprised a second part
and devastated.
The Japanese could have attacked
which sent Mobile Force into the
The first years of WWII had at first
Indian Ocean to destroy enemy forces
seemed only to confirm the supremacy
south of Java.
of the “big gun” ships. The British
These plans make it clear that
leader Churchill fretted about the likes
Darwin was considered an important
of the raider Bismarck and whether
target. Genda said simply “the
the Germans would employ the newly
planning was a comparatively easy
surrendered French battleships. Naval
task”.30 He had good intelligence
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
operations and sea power were still
Japanese raid carrier
article/Kate replica
aircraft in 2005,
with ordnance slung.
(Photo by Captain
Joe Broker)
Val escorted by
a Zero. Note the
divebomber’s
undercarriage does
not retract. (Photo by
Victor G. Archer)
29
Issue 147
perfectly executed Pearl Harbor strike.
The Japanese were the first to
combine the air fleets of multiple
carriers into a single strike force.
Even until Midway and beyond,
the big American carriers operated
independently – indeed, depending
on the carrier itself, some squadrons
from a single carrier were unable to
execute properly coordinated attacks.
The Japanese, however, were able to
get multiple squadrons from multiple
carriers into the air at one time,
and co-ordinate them successfully
to overwhelm a designated target.
At Pearl Harbour, two strikes were
launched from an unprecedented six
big fleet carrier decks. Both strikes
comprised a mix of fighters, divebombers and torpedo bombers (also
Coral Sea in May, at the crucial Battle
only about half of the aircraft on a
used as conventional “level” bombers).
of Midway the following month only
single carrier could be assembled on
Including the fighters that flew
four of the major fleet carriers could be
the deck at any one time. At both Pearl
combat air patrols over the carriers, an
assembled. These were the same four
Harbor and Midway, such “deckload”
incredible force of over 400 modern
carriers of Division 1 & 2 that attacked
strikes were launched.36 This meant
aircraft were utilised during the
Darwin in February. In this respect, the
that the first strike at Pearl Harbor
operation.
attack on Darwin counts as one of the
comprised 180 aircraft, or about half
few great carrier raids mounted by the
the full attack strength.37 A second
the “day of infamy” which began the
formidable Combined Fleet before it
wave was launched afterwards with the
Pacific War and brought the United
was decimated at Midway.
remainder of the aircraft.
Pearl Harbor is remembered as
Darwin was unusual as a maximum
States into WWII. However, it was
However, the Darwin raid was
revolutionary in fully utilising this
unusual in comparison to the other
strike was launched in a single wave.
newly discovered combined power of
big raids. Recently, and drawing on
Thus the first half of the strike was
carriers for the first time. Matching
contemporary Japanese sources,
launched, and kept waiting while the
Japanese military doctrine perfectly,
authors Jonathon Parshall and Anthony
remaining aircraft were brought up
the carriers delivered overwhelming
Tully, have pointed out that a critical
from the hangar deck. This was quite
power to a particular point in a surprise
practice in Japanese carrier operations
a complex business, as each elevator
attack, hoping to deliver a knock-out
was “deckload spotting”, whereby half
brought up one aircraft at a time, which
punch. They did deliver a hefty blow to
of the potential aircraft force could be
would then be man-handled into a
the American battleships, but the great
launched at one time.35 The lighter
irony was that they missed the only
aircraft, namely the Zero fighters,
Tully refer to this practice of launching
force that would ultimately reckon with
would be spotted forward as they
the entire air group as being “probably
them on anything like equal terms: the
needed much less of deck-length
impractical” as the first wave would
US fleet carriers.
to take off. The heavier aircraft, the
burn up precious fuel waiting for
two-seat divebombers (D3A1 “Vals”)
the second wave to join them. They
great Kido Butai carriers were fated to
and three-seat attack bombers (B5N2
suggest it would take at least half an
never again operate together. Five of
“Kates”), would be further back.4 But
hour to complete. In fact, this appears
them combined together in the Indian
4 Allied code names for Japanese aircraft
were formalised later in 1942, so their use in
context of the Darwin raid is not historically
correct, but are used here because they are
so widely recognised. However, the term
“Zero” refers to the Type 0 Naval Fighter,
to be exactly what happened during
But after Pearl Harbor, the six
Ocean in April 1942. However, due to
damage and aircraft losses to the two
Division 5 carriers at the Battle of the
Kittyhawk & Zero
fight over Darwin
on 19 Feb 1942.
Painting by Bob
McRae
precise position on deck. Parshall and
rather than being the code name, which
was “Zeke”. The “Vals” were Type 99 carrier
bombers; the “Kates” were Type 97 carrier
attack aircraft.
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
30
Japan’s formidable new strike weapon of WWII
– its aircraft carriers, and the Darwin raid
the Darwin strike. Japanese records
wave, after the defenders had been
refer to a three-Zero Combat Air
fully roused, angry, and fighting back
Patrol being launched at 0615h.
as hard as they could. Surprise would
38
Commander Fuchida, the same famed
pay dividends and minimise losses.40
leader of the attack force who led the
Besides, a second strike was planned
Pearl Harbor strike, took off in his B5N
to take place anyway, only with land-
attack bomber from Akagi at 0622 ...
based bombers at high altitude. These
most likely he followed the nine Zeroes
would go in unescorted as the carrier
from his carrier, and possibly some of
strike would destroy any local fighter
the lighter divebombers as well. But
opposition, which the Japanese knew
after take off, his aircraft did not depart
would not be significant. Evidence
from the vicinity of the carriers until
of the Japanese disregard for Allied
0700, almost three-quarters of an hour
air strength was a Combat Air Patrol
later. This is consistent with waiting
of just three Zeros being maintained
for the second deckload of aircraft to
over the carriers during the day (from
be brought up, spotted on deck and
a total pool of 15 aircraft held for
launched from each of the four carriers.
this purpose). This is consistent with
Given the changed circumstances, it
expecting, probably at most, a prowling
is most likely that both deckloads were
flying boat or reconnaissance aircraft.
spotted differently on 19 February,
This did, in fact, occur as will be related
and probably did not comprise evenly
later.
balanced proportions of aircraft. Other
Darwin was always seen as a raid
factors, such as cruising speed and
against a relatively weakly defended
overall range would have been taken
target. As Fuchida would later famously
into account. One source suggests
comment: “It hardly seemed worthy of
the divebombers took off last, and
us. If ever a sledgehammer was used
39
used their faster cruising speed (as
to crack an egg it was then”.41 So there
compared to the Kates) to catch the
was never a need to consider a second
main force en route. However the
carrier strike. Also, a single strike
take-off times quoted vary hugely
allowed the Mobile Fleet to do their
with that given in the Japanese Official
business and return north as quickly as
History. Also, technicalities, such the
possible, thus limiting their exposure
fact that the Vals could only use the
near Allied territory. Lingering in
middle elevator due to only having
the area increased the possibility,
folding wing-tips, rather than full
however unlikely, of enemy attack by
folding wings (such as the Kates),
some means. Finally, because of the
meant that a selection of aircraft in
perceived weakness of the target, the
This is a draft extract from
each deck-launch was more likely. This
carriers could get reasonably close to
their new book – Carrier Attack!
is consistent with the Zeroes being
the target, thus permitting the luxury
Darwin 1942 – which is just
stowed forward in the hangars, the Vals
of extra time in the air burning fuel.
being released. The work is a
midships, and the Kates, which needed
The Japanese plan was to launch the
technical analysis of the 19
the greatest deck-length for take off,
strike at a point 80 miles south of Babar
February raids on Darwin, which
were aft.
Island, well into the Arafura Sea. This
killed around 250 people, and
gave an approximate range to target
sunk 11 ships.
So why was Darwin different in
having just a single, maximum aircraft
of around 200 miles. This is similar to
strike? Clearly, the recent experience of
other raids flown at this time – Pearl
Pearl Harbor loomed large in the minds
Harbor was also launched from a
of the Japanese planners. Among
other things, most of the aircraft losses
at Pearl Harbor were in the second
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
similar range of 200 miles.42 t
Dr Tom Lewis and Peter Ingman are the
authors of Zero Hour in Broome, 2010,
Avonmore Books, which described the
March 1942 attack by nine Japanese
Zero fighters on Broome – the secondmost devastating air raid on Australia,
in terms of loss of life.
31
Issue 147
(Endnotes)
1 Hobbs, David. A Century of Carrier
Aviation: the Evolution of Ships and
Shipborne Aircraft: USA: US Naval Institute
Press, 2009. (p. 146)
2 Parshall, Jonathan, and Anthony Tully.
Shattered Sword. USA: Potomac Books,
2005. The authors suggest Soryu could
“outrun Kaga at only 40% power.” (p. 9)
3 The angled flight deck, allowing landings
while takeoffs were being carried out at
the bow of the ship, was to be a 1950s
concept, as was the mirror landing system,
and the ski jump – all ideas of the Royal
Navy. Nuclear engines from the USA were
a massive improvement, giving speed,
enormous endurance, and limitless range.
The use of helicopters and the development
of the “commando carrier”, made for
amphibious landings, were significant.
(Accessed June 2012.) Mark Stille agrees in
Imperial Japanese Navy Aircraft Carriers
1921-1945.
14Tsunoda Kazuo served as a fighter pilot
in the Imperial Japanese Navy from 1937
to 1945. He gained the rank of Lieutenant
and was credited with 13 aerial victories,
many of them Australians he fought in New
Guinea. 89 years old when interviewed, he
was living in a cottage in the countryside in
Chiba Prefecture where he was interviewed
by Peter Williams and translator Yayoi
Akaboshi.
15Gill, G. Hermon. Royal Australian Navy
1939-1942. Melbourne: Collins, 1957.
(p.591)
16Fuchida, Mitsuo. Midway The Battle
that Doomed Japan. Hutchinson of London,
London, 1957, uses “Nagumo Force”
throughout, e.g. p.55
4 See the WWII database http://ww2db.
com/ship_spec.php?ship_id=A465 The
authorative Hobbs’ A Century of Carrier
Aviation. (p. 148) notes this rationale, but
says there is no evidence to support it.
17Tully and Parshall. (p.14)
Also see for a further in depth discussion
with more factors Polmar, Norman, and
Minoru Genda Aircraft Carriers: A History
of Carrier Aviation and Its Influence on
World Events. Volume 2. (p. 72). Google
ebook. http://books.google.com.au/
books?id=6z7quhWS-BoC&dq=port+island
s+aircraft+carriers&source=gbs_navlinks_s
20Tully and Parshall. (p.17)
5 Shattered Sword. (p. 7)
6 See Hobbs, pages 147-148.
7 Hobbs, David. (p. 139)
8 Fuchida, Mitsuo, and Masatake
Okumiya. Midway – the Japanese story.
London: Cassell and Co.; 1992. (p. 63)
9 Combined Fleet website. http://www.
combinedfleet.com Accessed May 2012.
18 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_
Pearl_Harbor accessed 25 November 2012
19Fuchida (p.43)
21Tully and Parshall. (p.17)
22Lockwood, p.8 refers to Itaya as an
“already established ace”. However he does
not appear in the list of Japanese naval
fighter aces in Hata, Izawa and Shores.
Japanese Naval Air Force Fighter Units and
their Aces 1932-145. Grub Street, London.
2011.
23Tagaya (p.21)
24Parshall and Tully. (p.132)
25Parshall and Tully p.88: at Midway in
June 70% of Val dive bomber crews and 85%
of Kate bomber crews were Pearl Harbor
veterans. Some months earlier at Darwin
these ratios must have been even higher.
10A brief discussion on the http://www.jaircraft.org discussion forum led to a
suggestion that the destroyer Yugure was
also present. 28 November 2012.
26Fuchida (p.56)
11Combined Fleet website. http://www.
combinedfleet.com Combined Fleet
movements 15 February 1942: DesRon 1’s
ABUKUMA departs Palau with the Carrier
Striking Force’s CarDiv 1’s AKAGI, Car
Div 2’s HIRYU and SORYU, CruDiv 8’s
CHIKUMA and TONE and DesDiv 17’s
URAKAZE, ISOKAZE, TANIKAZE and
HAMAKAZE and DesDiv 18’s KASUMI,
SHIRANUHI and ARIAKE. Accessed May
2012.
28Lockwood. (p.6)
12 See Darwin’s Submarine I-124, published
by Avonmore Books, and written by Tom
Lewis. (2010)
13See “Japanese Carrier Operations: How
Did They Do It?”
Article first appearing in
the Spring 1995 issue of The Hook magazine,
published by The Tailhook Association.
Author: Carl Snow, Tailhook Association
archivist. http://www.ussessexcv9.org/pdfs/
Japanese%20Carrier%20Operations.pdf
Darwin on 4 April 1942 and a large number
of documents were recovered from it.
Airfields were marked at locations such as
Daly Waters and Katherine, but there was
nothing marked at Batchelor.
33 Shattered Sword analyses this
comprehensively, and for the authors, makes
this deduction for the first time.
34 Shattered Sword (p.86)
35 Shattered Sword (p.86)
36At Midway the second strike was never
launched: the Japanese carriers were
famously caught while frantically re-arming
these aircraft for attacking the US carriers
that had just been detected; they had been
prepared with weapons for a ground strike
against Midway.
37By the time of Midway, the Japanese
carriers were short of aircraft. The first wave
against Midway comprised just 108 aircraft.
38These times and subsequent detail are
taken from the DMM translation of Senshi
Sosho.
39Tagaya. (p. 49)
40Most of the first wave P.H. losses were
the torpedo bombers, that had to fly
dangerously low. Ignoring these losses, the
first wave losses at Pearl Harbor were just
a handful of aircraft – indeed, virtually the
same as “Darwin” (where no torpedoes were
used).
41Lockwood. (p.5)
42Francillon. (p.8) In emergency
circumstances longer range raids were
launched, for example on 20 December
1941 Carrier Division 2 struck Wake island
from around 350 miles, although the force
comprised only divebombers and fighter
escorts.
27Lockwood, Douglas. Australia’s Pearl
Harbour. Melbourne: Cassell. 1966. (p.5)
29 Senshi Sosho.(p.1-2) Bôeichô Bôei
Kenshûjo Senshishitsu [Military History
Department, National Institute of Defense
Studies, the Defense Agency] ed. Ran’in
Bengaru-wan hômen kaigun shinkô sakusen
[The Dutch East Indies and Bengal Bay
Area: Naval Advance Operations]. Senshi
Sôsho vol. 26. Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha,
1969.
30Lockwood. (p.7)
31The Kate bombers had a 235 mph
maximum, and a 161 mph cruise speed.
Francillon, Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific
War, which were translations from the
Japanese manufacturers, gives B5N2 Kates 140kts at 3,000m, and D3A1 Vals - 160kts at
3,000m. (Courtesy Bob Alford.
32Email from Bob Alford 27 November
2012. A Betty bomber crashed near
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
33
Issue 147
Britannia Royal Naval College Report
By Midshipman Joshua Armstrong
“M
idshipman Armstrong,
Captain’s Cabin.” There
are not many good things that start
by being called up to see the Captain,
but as I gave my uniform a once over
and gingerly knocked on Commander
Sonter’s door to present myself, the
then Commanding Officer of HMAS
Anzac, I was greeted with a smile and
a signal informing me I had won the
Commodore Harry Adam’s Prize. To
my relief.
The winning of this prize, which
involves a one week exchange with
Britannia Royal Naval College,
Dartmouth, a return flight to London
and $500 was for me one of the greatest
honours to be able to represent our
Navy at such a fine institution. In my
brief time I learnt a great deal, had
an amazing time and made excellent
friends. If I had one criticism is that it
was not long enough!
and a passing out parade week.
In most respects college life is very
capacity at the college whilst
completing their studies, of which it
similar, easier in some respects with
is the equivalent to our Phase I & II
is the Initial Naval Training Officer
less time allocated daily to Drill, and
of JWAC. This was perfect for me as
course which is of a similar length
harder in others, especially regarding
of which the course had a very high
and purpose to NEOC. At the time
the leadership assessments judging
proportion of those selected to be
of my visit the course was two terms
by the amount that fail. Of interest is
Submariners and we were all essentially
both consisting of 14 weeks with
the hierarchy that exists at the college
at the same stage of training. IWOF
leave inbetween. The first term
due to there being three courses being
itself much like the early phases
focused on basic Military and Naval
present at different stages. Up until the
of JWAC focuses on Navigation,
skills, beginning with a two week
passing out parade course members are
Mariner Skills, Rules of the Road and
militarisation period much like ITP,
considered Officer Cadets, and are only
Meteorology. In addition, it includes
and ending with the ‘Assessed Basic
given any form of rank following their
strategic studies, time on a bridge
Leadership Exercise’ on (and in) the
militarisation training to proceed on
simulator as well period on one of the
hills, rivers and bogs of Dartmoor.
IFT, which consists of a white tab either
Colleges Yachts with the opportunity to
Term 2 was primarily spent onboard a
worn on their sleeve or under their
gain a RYA Day Skipper ticket.
capital ship for 10 weeks, followed by
substantive rank on their epaulette.
exams and the ‘Maritime Leadership
Following the parade they are entitled
proceed to a nine month posting
Exercise’ assessing Mariner and
to wear their full rank and are given
onboard a surface vessel of any variety
Navigation skills on the river Dart.
their commissions.
of size and purpose, with a four week
The primary course of Dartmouth
This has now been altered to a three
For my time at the college I was
From IWOF Warfare Officers
Navigation coursed in that period
term of consisting of ten weeks each;
essentially a member of the Initial
at HMS Collingwood, across the
of again the first being Militarisation,
Warfare Officer Course, the third
harbour from Portsmouth, followed
Marinisation with more focus on
term for Warfare Branch officers at
by week long assessment ashore to be
instruction in strategic studies and
Dartmouth. And as IWOF students
awarded their NWC. This is probably
maritime leadership, then Initial Fleet
have passed out, they are termed
the greatest difference in our training
Time of 8 weeks, an examination week
Seniors and act in a Leadership
that their first significant time on the
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
34
Britannia Royal Naval College Report
bridge is to gain their Watch Keeping
Certificate, of which the awarding
of lies not in the hands of their
Commanding Officer, but following
assessment on a Bridge Simulator.
After this they proceed to a 14 week
course back at Collingwood for
Divisional Officer and warfare training
before commencing Submariner
Training or being posted to a Surface
vessel for Endorsement.
As I visited in December I was
welcomed by sleet, bitter winds, and
cold rain, but also had plenty of blue
sky over the beautiful college and town
not very familiar sit down discussion
much to their surprise. Perhaps as a
that is Dartmouth and BRNC. The
with the Commodore commanding the
punishment we had a fairly intense PT
college itself sits on a hill over looking
college. Commodore Williams noted
session early in the morning, followed
the very picturesque English town on
how both our Navies have recently
by more Uckers and a journey up the
the river Dart which the college backs
began to operate closer together in
river for lunch. During my visit I was
on to. This naturally leads itself to
recent years considering our shared
able to organise a visit to Plymouth and
plenty of time on the water on their
history, of which he was full of praise
see much of the Fleet including HMS
variety of motor boats and yachts,
for our Navy and stated the respect
Ocean and a very impressive Vanguard
as well as late night runs ashore to
for which it is held. This seemed to be
Class SSBN. Later in my own time I
a number of the pubs in the area.
a fairly familiar theme throughout my
was able to visit Portsmouth and see
Arguably just as good as the blue water
time.
HMS Victory.
and white sands of Jervis Bay.
However, as it was the last week
My visit as well as the journey of
for IWOF there was not an awful
those I spent time with during the week
before me had experience something
lot scheduled for them to do. I was
ended with the Passing out Parade
of a tailored program, I had however
therefore able to watch a lot of fairly
overseen by the First Sea Lord Admiral
said that I was more than happy to
awful English TV, learn Uckers and
Stanhope and the Winter Ball. For
do what ever it is that the rest of the
generally get to know the other Officers
those graduating the highlight was
IWOF officers were doing. I was
and Cadets as I just blended into the
marching up the stairs, the prerogative
not disappointed. First up Monday
scenery. As I walked the magnificent
only of those who are commissioned
morning was Parade practice, and
halls, passing various portraits and
much like our own tradition on the
although I was told I didn’t have to
model ships navigating its labyrinth
Quarterdeck at Creswell. This then
march on the day, it was said to the
of passageways, I found everyone was
culminated the next evening at the Ball
squad they were looking a bit thin
exceptionally friendly, if not curious. As
which lasted into the early hours of the
on numbers. I offered to march if it
to the culture at the College, I found it
following morning.
made things easier, if only to be polite.
very similar to Creswell, if only being
Luckily it was the last I heard of it, and I
a little bit more formal in some areas,
was given a nice VIP seat at the Parade
but on other end of the scale more
amongst the various visiting high
boisterous.
I had been told that in the past those
ranking officers and dignities. A novelty
I certainly experienced a work hard
for a Midshipman, and to the benefit of
and play hard attitude amongst the
a very grateful Sub-Lieutenant who was
junior officers centered around a strong
my host for the week who also gained
culture of banter. This was perhaps best
a seat.
epitomised during the comedy night
This was then followed by a very
that was staged, in which not many
familiar Quality Control session
cadets or staff got off lightly. It was also
regarding their course content, and a
the scene of my first and last Fosters,
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
35
Issue 147
On the whole what I found
interesting was a strong warfare
culture that pervaded nearly all
aspects of training, which results
in Young Officers of all branches
having a great sense of context for
their training and of purpose. It was
evident even at Dartmouth that the
RN has embarked upon program to
combat ‘Sea Blindness’ and although
aimed at the general public and the
political class, educating their Young
Officers about the purpose of the Navy
is seen as the first stage of that. As
stated, the IWOF curriculum includes
more billets and courses in both Navies
important that it has ever been. And
amongst other tertiary level subjects
open beyond a handful of designated
although our use of primarily US
a period of Strategic Studies which is
exchange postings. This would
developed weapons systems has in
accredited by Plymouth University.
surely benefit career satisfaction and
the past led us away from the Royal
Perhaps the ADF could greater utilise
development, but more importantly
Navy, our proven common procedures
the considerable academic facilities
help cooperation and provide a cost
remain the same, and this is arguably
of ADFA in this capacity for all of its
advantage considering the contraction
more vital to cooperation. As the First
officers. In their first year RAN Officer
of defence budgets across the Western
Sea Lord, Admiral Stanhope said at the
would be superior navigators and
world in contrast to the developing
passing out parade :‘the Royal Navy
perhaps a more grounded officer due
arms race in both our Oceans to our
remains as the gold standard in the
to their time in the fleet on the bridge,
North.
world’, and having seen this first hand I
but an RN officer would have a better
From what I have observed there
have no doubts.
idea of the Navy, its job and the world
is certainly a capacity, a willingness
off the bridge. This initial investment
and clear benefits for our navies to
Navy so unique, as well as lucky, is
What makes the Royal Australian
early in a Warfare Officers career
work together beyond our current ad
that it able to utilise the resources
seems beneficial as it provides a solid
hoc Task forces and handful of short
of US defence industry and employs
foundation for the future.
exchanges. Talking to a number of
these advanced platforms using Royal
Royal Navy officers there is a genuine
Navy principles and procedures.
officers in the past completed their
desire to work more with the RAN,
Thus through the combination of the
training at Dartmouth, it is a suitable
and other Commonwealth navies,
best of both worlds, Australia has
place to be reminded of our previous
reflecting a more global outlook
one of the most respected Navies
bonds. It seemed in an effort to
rather than a solely North Atlantic
worldwide and certainly one of the
mature and be independent we let slip
and the European Continent focus.
most effective. It is through exchanges
opportunities and strategic knowledge
Considering at any one time the Royal
like this at Dartmouth, whether they be
that could have been shared. News
Navy maintains permanently in the
operational or cultural, that facilitate
that we will taking advantage of
Indian Ocean four Minehunters, a Bay
this continued strength. I will certainly
the RN’s strength in Amphibious
Class Dock Landing Ship, at least two
take any opportunity in the future to
operations and ASW is certainly the
Warships and an SSN, we have clear,
work with the Royal Navy to return
step in the right direction, as is that
and growing, mutual interests in a body
and apply that deep knowledge and
we are providing opportunities for
of water far from any current US Naval
experience in our region, and am
those laid off during the latest round
base.
very grateful that I now also have
Perhaps considering that Australian
of UK defence cuts. Although there
So whilst much is made these
colleagues that I can call upon in the
are not many Wardrooms these days
days about Joint Warfare across the
future. I therefore encourage every
that don’t have a RAN Officer with an
services, and this is certainly a great
Junior Officer to write about issues
English accent, surely however more
force multiplier, in reality coalition
that matter to them, and apply for this
integration is possible through making
war fighting across navies is more
fantastic opportunity. t
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
36
The Battle for the South China Sea – World War II,
Today and into the future
By Midshipman Joshua Armstrong, winner of the 2011 Harry Adams essay contest
This article is dedicated to the 3,505 US
Submariners who are still on eternal
patrol. Having sacrificed their lives in
World War II, by the highest ratio in the
United States Military, so that today we
may live in Peace and Freedom. May
that never be necessary again.
forming 1.6% of the United States
focus on what lessons can be learnt
Navy1 sank 55% of tonnage.2 Thus why
and applied by the RAN and its allies
Japan’s then Prime Minister Hideki
from the US Campaign in the Pacific,
Tojo named the Submarine War on
as those nearly identical sea lanes
shipping as a major reason of why the
and materials pass through the very
allies defeated Japan.
same region the US fought Imperial
3
Whilst this proved successful
Japan those years ago, and may be
in the 20th century, such a strategy
an area of conflict in years to come.
could be just as useful in 21st century
I therefore discuss the development
he appearance of military
as the US’s naval dominance in the
and motivations for China’s current
installations on seemingly
region comes under challenge by The
strategy, and argue that the US’s
insignificant atolls, with oil deposits
People’s Republic of China. This is
strategy in the Pacific that used
beneath and oilers passing by as naval
fundamental to Australia’s security
submarines in the 1940’s to attack
vessels perform exercises in the middle
as 70% of Australia’s trade moves
Imperial Japans Sea Lines could be
of one of the world’s busiest shipping
through4 the South China Sea, which
used to safeguard Australia’s interests
channels, the South China Sea is
China claims and has treated like its
in 2030 and beyond. This is because the
fast becoming the most strategically
own territorial waters, believing it has
strategic geography of the South China
important area in the world. Add to
“indisputable sovereignty”5 over the
Sea region has changed little over
this Taiwan and the US 7th Fleet, on
area. The protection of our trade, fuel
time, with WWII Imperial Japan and
its edge in the context of petroleum
supply, sea lanes of communication and
the People’s Republic of China today
politics, all creates a volatile mix in
our northern approaches are named
sharing much the same strategies and
a region where intimidating, risky,
therefor in Force 2030. 6 Crucial too
vulnerabilities.
muscle-flexing manoeuvres are
is our alliance with the US, forged
increasingly common.
during the Pacific Campaign, and the
T
The South China Sea Today
protection that provides, including
Recent tensions have involved a more
Sea has been dubbed by some as the
guaranteeing free passage on the high
assertive posture by China over its
“Second Persian Gulf”, whilst this
seas.
claim of the South China Sea and
For this reason the South China
currently refers to the estimated large
energy deposits, it too more and more
is a vital Sea Line of Communication
for shipping and military operations.
But perhaps more ominously the tag is
fitting as it enters a new age of similar
turmoil and geopolitical wrangling, to
possibly become the world’s central
focus of conflict in the coming century.
However it was only 70 years
ago that the South China Sea was a
key battleground in World War II.
Following Imperial Japan’s attack on
Pearl Harbor, both powers engaged in a
campaign to gain control of this sea, in
which the US was to prove victorious.
Crucial to the Allied victory in the
Pacific was the US Submarine service
devastating campaign against Imperial
Japan’s homeland as well as its Naval
and Military forces, which despite
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
The aim of this paper then is to
particularly over the contentious
37
Issue 147
Regional arms race? Malaysian Scorpeneclass submarine KD
Tunku Abdul Rakman
(Photo by Chris
Sattler)
Paracel and Spratly island chain. No
only to Saudi Arabia, about 25 times
Sea is “historically proven” and is
less than nine states have claimed
larger than China’s current oil reserves
therefore non-negotiable. However
sovereignty in various7 areas, as it has
and eight times its gas reserves,13
to support their position under the
potentially more natural gas than Saudi
making it the world’s largest. This
UN Convention, it has occupied
Arabia and more oil than Iran8. This
would therefore make it an energy
the disputed islands by setting up
is despite the doubt that surrounds
superpower in its own right.
military outposts on the previously
such estimations due to the difficulty
China as a result of its desire for
uninhabited islands as a means to
of exploration in such a politically
power and security has begun a new
extend its exclusive economic rights
sensitive area.
Great Game in the Asia-Pacific with an
and sovereignty over the entire sea.
The motivation for China’s policy
armed forces modernisation program
This policy however is not recent,
is clear: energy security. As of 2010,
that has sparked a region-wide arms
with China only recently coming into
55% of its oil was imported9, more
race, accompanied by its militarisation
enough power to implement it. It can
importantly, this is growing with some
of the South China Sea in the disputed
certainly be seen to be inline with
predictions saying that this import
territory. China has repeatedly not only
China’s 1982 maritime plan, which
reliance will be as high as 78% by
stated it has indisputable sovereignty
set out a naval strategy into three
2030.10 That level was well beyond
over the Sea, but has just as often
geographical and chronological stages;
what the Global Times, a Chinese
backed up such statements with the
firstly control of the water inside the
Communist Party produced tabloid,
interference of foreign vessels in the
first island chain, which includes the
says is the “globally recognized energy
vicinity of its claims. This has resulted
Paracel and Spratley Islands from 2000
security alert level of 50 percent”.11 For
in numerous incidents resulting in the
to 2010. Secondly, from 2010 to 2020,
this reason, the Global Times states;
damage of namely Vietnamese and
to control the waters out to the second
China has expanded exploration in the
Filipino Oil and Gas Exploration, as
island chain to Guam and Indonesia,
South China Sea to ease dependence
well as fishing vessels. Both leaders
and finally from 2020 until 2040
on Foreign Oil, which it estimates
of the respective states have clashed
challenge US hegemony in the Pacific
contains over 50 billion tons of
with Beijing over its actions, calling for
and Indian oceans.14
crude oil and more than 20 trillion
China to follow the UN Convention
cubic meters of natural gas, with
on Laws of the Sea, which they
operational aircraft carrier, China
the exploitation of these deep-water
believe cannot be used to justify their
is behind schedule in terms of pure
resources stated in the Government’s
territorial claims.
sea control. However it possesses a
12th Five-Year Plan (2011-15). This
12
would give China oil reserves second
China in turn has stated that
its ownership of the South China
Although it now has a close to
powerful anti-access capability in the
first island chain; having numerous
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
38
The Battle for the South China Sea
– World War II, Today and into the future
Surface to Air Missile Batteries, antiship ballistic missiles to [hopefully] sink
US Carriers, and a large and advanced
submarine fleet. 15 In terms of this
later capability at 70 boats, 21 for the
South China Sea alone, China is the
greatest littoral submarine operator in
the world. As in late 2010 a new type of
diesel-electric attack submarine (SSK)
was launched, said to be of Chinese
design with a advanced propulsion
system possessing greater submerged
endurance.16 Specifically, China has
built up a military presence on both
Islands group, including naval infantry,
3D Radars and surface-to-air missile
batteries.17 It has also launched two
new landing platform dock vessels
Navy inflicted little damage on the
This was critical as two of the
designed for amphibious operations,
Merchant fleet or the Imperial Japanese
objectives of the Pacific campaign were
and has based more of its naval forces
Navy in the first year of the war, for
to stop Japan’s enterprises overseas and
south, closer to the Islands.
reasons including faulty torpedos, and
to deny the homeland of food and raw
timid submarine captains, but mainly
materials so as to ruin their economy 27.
subtly both diplomatically and
because it had a focus on Mahanian
As China’s exports account for nearly
militarily to the developing situation.
doctrine22, with the Admirals wanting
40% of its GDP28, and 90% of its trade
China has warned the US off involving
submarines to focus on ‘glamourous’
is transported by sea, it too would be
itself in the dispute, following Secretary
warships 23. Success in decisive battle
vulnerable to such a campaign.29
of State Hillary Clinton’s statement that
was to come later, especially in 1944.
18
The US in turn has responded
the US had a “national interest” in the
It was not until 1943 following the
Common Sea Lanes, Trade and Energy
Vulnerabilities
South China Sea and could facilitate
rectification of issues in these areas, as
talks. So too it has often deployed
well as in ULTRA, intelligence derived
Certainly the most important attack
the Japan-based carrier USS George
from the cracking of the ‘Maru Code’24,
on the Japanese logistics chain was
Washington and her battle group into
that the attrition of Japan began by
against its oil supply which was both
the South China Sea. Furthermore
attacking its Merchant fleet, oilers
devastating and comprehensive as
the US has increased and upgraded
and transports,
its presence re-committing itself to
otherwise known
the region militarily, including raising
as the ‘war of the
the number of attack submarines.20
Maru’25.
19
With Australia’s cooperation, it is also
This resulted
currently conducting a Global Force
in a reduced
Posture Review to balance against a
flow of materials
rising China. Simply, The United States
and energy to
does not intend to be surprised in the
the Japanese
Pacific again.
homeland, as
The US Campaign in the South
China Sea During World War Two
Even before World War II, it
well as to the
frontline, crippling
production in
had been clear to the US Navy that
nearly every
the use of blockade via Submarines
industry, thereby
of Japan would be essential to any
also halting their
coming conflict.21 However the US
war machine.26
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
Seawolf-class fastattack submarine
USS Connecticut
(Courtesy US Navy)
Torpedoed
Japanese destroyer
photographed
through periscope
of USS Wahoo or USS
Nautilus, June 1942.
(US Navy Historical)
39
Issue 147
Japan was not only heavily reliant on
same Sea Lanes from Sumatra, Java and
to US forces. 48 Furthermore later in
oil for domestic production, but even
Borneo.39
the war submarine attacks on the
more so for the operation of its military
and naval forces: the ‘lifeblood of the
South East Asia Defensive Perimeter
experienced 32nd and 35th Infantry
divisions in the New Guinea theatre
Japanese war machine’ . Thus the
Because of Japan’s reliance on oil, the
were diverted troops nearly 800
Munitions Minister said after the war
Japanese Army conceived the control
km from their destination.49 This
that ‘the shipping shortage and the
of the South East Asian Archipelago
was amongst many other transport
scarcity of oil were the two main factors
as a way to protect the approaches to
sinkings, which were the second
that assumed utmost importance in
Japan, as well as to gain resources for its
favoured targets after oilers.50 This
Japan’s war efforts’ 31.
operations on the Chinese mainland.40
therefore demonstrates the difficulty
With Imperial Japan’s ‘defensive
of amphibious operations in the South
production in Japan’s advances
sea wall’ consisted of both a ‘outer
China Sea Archipelago in the face of a
on the front line 32, but also naval
defensive perimeter’ and a ‘secondary
Submarine threat.
operations. After 1943 Japan’s lack of
line’ . The Chinese People’s Liberation
oil was the IJN’s single most important
Army Navy has also committed itself to
there should be no ‘illusion’ that
constraint,33 because it alone required
having free manoeuvre within the ‘two
Australia and the US stand alone in
1.6 million barrels34 monthly to run.
island chains’42, and is seeking to block
the Pacific, and will both contribute
It has even been suggested by a US
access to China via its sea lanes from
forces to preserve collective defence in
military report that if submarines had
the US military. In both geography
the area 51. However there is nothing
focused on the tankers immediately
and purpose there is a striking parallel.
to say conflict in the South China
30
This success was critical in stopping
41
43
As stated in the ANZUS treaty
The viability of such defensive
Sea, especially over energy alone, is
would have been critical a year earlier.35
positions is questionable in the face
inevitable. China has stated that it is
This shortage in turn denied Japan the
of sustained attack because of their
committed “to a peaceful resolution
ability to win any decisive naval battle,36
vulnerability in the disruption of
of the South China Sea issue through
forcing many IJN ships off the sea and
these sea lanes. This was seen during
bilateral dialogues and consultations
head home for fuel.37 Furthermore
the Pacific Campaign with Japan’s
with related parties” and “will not
the US Submarine Service’s focus on
communications inside and beyond the
resort to the use of force or the threat
attacking commercial vessels was not
defensive perimeter being devastated
of force.”52 China and Japan have also
exclusive to decimating IJN vessels,
by US Submarines, in what has been
in the past been able to agree on joint
especially in the successful year of 1944.
called the most successful blockade
exploration of gas in the East China
The ease at which the USN was able
in Naval History.44 Indeed Corbett
Sea where there are overlapping
to disrupt Japanese oil supplies and
observed that the principles that
claims of Economic Exclusion Zones.
trade should be concerning for China
govern the attack and defence of trade
China however has shown it is
as it faces much the same external
are similar to overseas expeditions ,
willing to make short terms sacrifices
liabilities, especially so in its reliance
and that transports and the enemy’s
in soft power to guarantee a long
on imported energy. This demonstrates
army, not his fleet, should be the
term defence from potential foreign
that the South China Sea is never likely
“principle object.”46 And although the
interference, with recent incidents and
to be a “Chinese Lake” as seaborne
collapse of the Japanese economy was
tension in the South China Sea being
supplies cannot be guaranteed, a
fundamental to the war effort, a major
only symptoms of China’s growing
pressing issue for China as 95% of its
objective of the US submarine war was
maritime assertiveness world wide,
imported energy needs are transported
to cut off of supply between Japan47and
demonstrated in its deployments to
by Sea . This is all the more case for
their military bases, thus following
Anti-Piracy operations in the Gulf of
protecting stationary and difficult to
a Corbettian Maritime rather than a
Aden and its evacuation of Chinese
defend offshore oil and gas platforms.
purely Naval Strategy.
Nationals from Libya.
after Pearl Harbor the fuel shortage
38
So too, Imperial Japan and modern
45
Imperial Japan’s defensive perimeter
But whilst this paper has looked
China share much of the same sea lanes
plan was to prove ineffective. As
at the vulnerability of China, it is
with China seeking to protect its oil
by 1942 the US strategy was clearly
fundamental to understand Australia’s
supplies passing through the Yellow,
successful during the US Guadalcanal
sea lanes could come under just
East China and South China Sea.
campaign, where the Japanese army
as much threat from blockade and
Imperial Japan’s supplies used those
received only 10% of supplies, relative
submarine action. Australia too is
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
40
The Battle for the South China Sea
– World War II, Today and into the future
heavily reliant on trade passing through
the South China Sea and energy
imports, and must improve its ASW
capability. Just as importantly the RAN
or USN could employ this strategy
with submarines offensively so to fight
any conflict at a distance. Thus clearly
justifying Australia’s expansion of the
Submarine Service to twelve more
capable vessels.53 Therefore whether
during World War II, the Falklands
and into the future, submarines are
not simply weapons of sea denial, but
the best platform in which to exercise
Command of the Sea, especially
through blockade, and create affect
upon the land.
This can serve as a lesson today
for Australia as a middle power, or
on the other hand as a warning for
the status quo or revisionist power
alike, as Australia could easily use a
similar model to interdict shipping in
the Indian Ocean. The US Submarine
strategy in the South China Sea was
devastating to Imperial Japan because
of its territorial strategy, reliance on
energy imports and exposed sea lanes.
The conclusion of this article then is
that in dealing with a future challenge
in the region, the strategies of the past
can certainly provide a guide, with
the burden to protect the freedom of
Australia likely to fall upon the Silent
Service in the Asia Pacific century, just
like the last. t
(Endnotes)
1 Poirier, M. 2008, ‘SILENT VICTORY:
America’s Pacific Submarine Campaign of
World War Two’ ea Classics, March 2009
2 Blair, C. 2001. Silent victory : the U.S.
submarine war against Japan. Naval Institute
Press, Annapolis, p.878
3 Morison, S.E. 1998, ‘Thoughts on Naval
Strategy, World War II’, Naval War college
Review, Winter, 1998. p. 63
4 Baldwin, Commander, C. 2001,
SEABORNE TRADE FLOWS IN THE
ASIA PACIFIC PRESENT AND FUTURE
TRENDS, Sea Power Institute, Canberra,
Available from Internet: http://www.navy.
gov.au/w/images/Working_Paper_9.pdf
accessed 3 April 2011
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
5 Washington post, 2011 ‘Beijing claims
‘indisputable sovereignty’ over South
China Sea’ July 31, 2010, Available from
Internet: http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/30/
AR2010073005664.html
6 Department of Defence 2009, Defending
Australia In The Asia Pacific Century Force
2030 - Defence White Paper 2009, AGPS,
Canberra, Available from Internet: http://
www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/
defence_white_paper_2009.pdf p. 42-43,
7 Jane’s Navy International, 2010, ‘PLAN
spearheads China’s ambitions for a greater
regional sphere of influence‘ Jane’s Navy
International, 20 October 2010
8 Bloomberg, 2010, ‘China Says Its South
Sea Claims Are `Indisputable’, Bloomberg,
29 July 2010, Available from Internet: http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-30/
china-has-indisputable-sovereignty-insouth-china-sea-defense-aide-says.html
9 Global Times, 2011, ‘Oil bonanza in
South China Sea’, Global Times, 21 April
2011, Available from Internet: http://special.
globaltimes.cn/2011-04/645909.html
10 Vasan, Commodore, R. S., 2010,
‘China’s Maritime Ambitions: Implications
For Regional Security’, Eurasia Review,
Available from Internet: http://www.
eurasiareview.com/china’s-maritimeambitions-implications-for-regionalsecurity-20012011/, accessed 10 April 2011
11 Global Times, op cit.
12 ibid.
13Michael Richardson, 2011, ‘Beijing’s
troubling South China Sea policy’ Japan
Times online , 28 April 2011, Available from
Internet: http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgibin/eo20110428mr.html
14Captain Stacy A. Pedrozo, USN , 2011,
‘China’s Active Defense Strategy and its
Regional Impact’ Transcript of Testimony
before the House of Representatives
U.S.-China Economic & Security Review
Commission , 27 January 2011, Available
from Internet: http://www.uscc.gov/
hearings/2011hearings/written_testimonies/
hr11_01_27.php
15Council on Foreign Relations , 2009,
‘China’s Security Future’, Transcript, 19
October 2009, Available from Internet:
http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-securityfuture/p20678
16Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto , 2011,
‘Indonesia and the South China Sea dispute’,
Jakata Post, 7 April 2011, Available from
Internet: http://www.thejakartapost.com/
news/2011/07/04/indonesia-and-southchina-sea-dispute.html
17LaGrone, S., 2010, ‘Chinese flag planting
causes swell in disputed area of South
China Sea’ Jane’s Navy International, 1
September 2010
18 Jane’s Intelligence Review, 2011, ‘Waves
of concern - Southeast Asian states plan
naval defences’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 14
April 2011
19Edward Wong , 2011, ‘Beijing Warns
U.S. About South China Sea Disputes’, The
New York Times, 22 June 2011, Available
from Internet: http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/06/23/world/asia/23china.html
20 Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, 2011
‘Commander of US Seventh Fleet renews commitment to Asia’,
Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, 22 February 2011
21 Roscoe, T. 1949, United States submarine operations in World
War II, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, p.169
22 Graham, E. 2006, Japan’s sea lane security, 1940-2004 : a matter
of life and death, Routledge, New York p.80
23 Hall, R. 1982, The underwater war, 1939-1945. Blandford Press,
Poole, Dorset. p.122
24 Winton, J. 1993, Ultra in the Pacific: how breaking Japanes codes
and cyphers affected naval operations against Japan 1941-1945,
Naval Institute Press, Annapolis p. 137
25 Graham, op cit, p.80
26 ibid p.328
27 ibid p.304
28 Trading Economics, 2011, China Imports March 2011, Trading
Economics, Available from Internet: http://www.tradingeconomics.
com/Economics/Exports.aspx?Symbol=CNY accessed 16 April 2011
29 China People’s Daily, 2007, ‘China joins shipping elite’ China
People’s Daily, 29 November 2007, Available from Internet: http://
english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6311629.html accessed
16 April 2011
30 Wheeler, K. (1981). War under the Pacific, Time-Life,
Alexandria, New Jersey, p. 160
31 Poirer, op cit.
32 O’Lavin, Lieutenant Commander, B. 2009, Mahan and Corbett
on Maritime Strategy, paper presented to Naval War College,
Newport, Rhode Island. Availalbe from Internet: http://www.
dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.
pdf&AD=ADA509453 accessed 3 April 2011
33 Graham op cit. p.88
34 Poirer, op cit.
35 Roscoe, op cit. p.339
36 O’ Lavin, loc cit.
37 Roscoe, loc cit.
38 China People’s Daily, op cit.
39 Wheeler, Op Cit. p. 160
40 Spectre, R., 1985, Eagle against the Sun: The American War with
Japan, Free Press, New York, p.76-7
41Roscoe op cit. p.303-304
42 Yoshihara, T. and Holmes, J., 2008, Asia looks seaward power
and maritime strategy, Praeger Security International, Westport,
Connecticut p.102-103
43 Jane’s Defence Weekly, 2011, ‘Analysis: China White Paper hints
at platform, strategic developments’, Janes Defence Weekly, 8 April
2011
44 Reeve, J., 2001, Maritime Strategy and the Defence of the
Archipelagic Inner Arc - Working Paper 5, Sea Power Centre,
Canberra p.5
45 Corbett, J. 1911 Some Principles of Maritime. Strategy,
Longmans, Green and Co. London, reprinted by AMS Press, New
York, 1972 p. 285
46Corbett p. 237, 240, 286
47Roscoe op cit. p.304
48Poirer loc sit.
49 ibid
50Wheeler op cit. p.168
51Department of External Affairs, 1952, Security Treaty between
Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America [ANZUS],
opened for signature 1 September 1951, [1952] ATS 2 (entered into
force 29 April 1952).
52 Global Times, 2011, ‘Keep Sea issue simple, says Beijing’,
Global Times, 15 June 2011, Available from Internet: http://
www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/articleType/ArticleView/
articleId/661629/Keep-Sea-issue-simple-says-Beijing.aspx
53Department of Defence, Op Cit. p. 70-71
42
o bit u ar y
C
aptain David Ramsay was one
of the Fleet Air Arm’s finest.
He did everything at jet speed,
whether in the air, on the golf course,
tennis court or just out and about
exercising. When you work closely with
someone for over 30 years and respect
them as an officer and gentlemen, when
Captain David John Ramsay
y
a
s
m
a
R
J
d
i
v
a
aka
‘Checkmate
1 – Ramsdog’
D
oam, ranr
they are taken from you, the loss is felt
in the last group of Australians to
very deeply. The shock and deep loss
undergo training at Dartmouth where
and sadness at Captain Ramsay’s passing
he shone as a young seaman officer. He
will be felt even more keenly by his wife
demonstrated his enormous potential
Janine, his children James, Nicholas and
and was awarded the Queen’s medal
Juliette as well as the extended Ramsay
in 1970. Having been dux of his year at
and McInerney families. For close
Dartmouth, Captain Ramsay completed
friends and former shipmates, the ‘Dog’
another nine months of operations and
was special and will forever remain so.
weapons courses in the Portsmouth
Captain Ramsay had an amazing
area. It must have been during this time
career with many highlights. There
David became fixated on British car
were also many challenging jobs along
technology – his beloved Rovers.
the way. First as a seaman officer, then a
On his return to Australia, David
fighter pilot and Air Warfare Instructor,
completed his Bridge Watch keeping
Naval staff officer, several sea postings,
Certificate training in HMAS Brisbane
Shore and Sea Command, Royal Yacht
during her 1971 tour of duty as the
attachment, post graduate study, back
last RAN Ship to operate with the US
to back postings as the Naval Attaché
Seventh Fleet in Vietnam.
in Indonesia, and then a return to
In 1972 Captain Ramsay underwent
Indonesia in a very important public
flying training with the RAAF displaying
service role. What more could have this
his superior flying skills by graduating
Naval Officer jammed into his life?
dux of 84 Pilots Course. I was fortunate
rubbing shoulders with Royalty as the RAN Contingent
to have been on the Pilots course behind
Officer in HMY Britannia during the Royal Tour. He then was
Captain David Ramsay was born
in Sydney in 1948. He was born into a
David, and whilst there was a rank
posted to 805 Squadron and embarked in HMAS Melbourne
naval family and with his mother and
differential between us, he was always
for a memorable Spithead Review deployment to the UK. On
three sisters, accompanied his naval
extremely supportive and a great role
return to Australia David was posted to RANAS Albatross as
father around Australia and overseas
model. On his return to the Naval Air
the Station Air Warfare Instructor.
until January 1963, when he joined the
Station, Captain Ramsay started his fast
Naval College at Jervis Bay as a Junior
and furious flying career with the Fleet
the Royal Navy flying Sea Harriers during the introduction to
Entry cadet midshipman. Captain
Air Arm, completing his operational
service of that aircraft. I had the pleasure of instructing David
Ramsay’s entry into the Navy must
flying training on Skyhawk fighter/
on the finer points of hovering in a Wessex helicopter prior to
have been a great thrill for his father,
bomber aircraft in December 1973.
his departure. He again displayed his outstanding flying ability
who eventually retired from the Navy
Captain Ramsay served on 805 front
and professionalism.
as a highly decorated Commodore
line squadron embarked in HMAS
who went on to be the Governor of
Melbourne and then underwent
the Royal Navy requested he stay for an additional six months
Queensland from April 1977 to July
the Air Warfare Instructor course,
to continue assisting training and trials during and after the
1985. After graduation in 1967, David
teaching OFT students the finer points
Falkland’s conflict. He returned with the family to Nowra as
served as a Midshipman in HMA Ships
in air combat and weapons delivery
Commander (Air) in 1983 until the Government’s decision to
Yarra and Sydney, spending most of the
techniques. He was a natural instructor.
scrap the fixed wing element of the Fleet Air Arm and retired
year in the Far East.
Captain Ramsay loved instructing and
his favourite toys, the Macchi and Skyhawk jets. I know
the students loved him.
this was a tough time for David and many of his fixed wing
As a Sub-Lieutenant, David
experienced time in the UK and was
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
Captain Ramsay had a brief stint
In 1979 Captain Ramsay was posted to exchange duty with
After completing his embarked time and exchange service,
colleagues.
43
Issue 147
o bit u ar y
we served together in Creswell. The
convinced the Chief of Navy at the time not to cut ties with
Officer HMAS Success bringing her into
David was then posted as Executive
time working for David confirmed
the Fleet Air Arm Museum.
naval service. This was a challenging
my previous opinion of this fine naval
posting which required the ship
officer and gentlemen.
to spend many months alongside
David was then posted as
Captain Ramsay’s last working challenge brought all his
skills to the fore, including his Indonesian language skills,
insight into Asian culture, aviation experience and astute
conducting engineering acceptance
Commanding Officer Success, followed
staff skills. The Department of Infrastructure and Transport
trials and testing.
by a subsequent change in career
benefited from David’s presence in Indonesia, where he
direction, and post-graduate language
worked with distinction until his untimely passing on 4 Sep
month posting as the Director of
Captain Ramsay then had a 12
training and back to back posting as the
2012. So much so were his skills appreciated, Captain Ramsay
Sailors’ Posting prior to a promotion
Naval Attaché in Indonesia. These were
was awarded the Secretary’s Award for excellence in 2011.
and posting to HMAS Creswell as the
challenging and demanding times with
Commanding Officer. It was during
Australia rebuilding international ties
as a Naval Officer and excelling at every task you undertook.
this posting that I also was posted to
with Indonesia, just prior to the East
Your sense of humour, humility, skill and professionalism were
Creswell as Captain Ramsay’s Executive
Timor confrontation.
unsurpassed. Combined with your devotion to family, you
Thank you Captain David Ramsay for your contribution
Officer, the first and possibly last time
In 1997, Captain Ramsay was
were one of the finest officers and gentlemen I have had the
two birdies ran a Naval Establishment.
awarded the Medal of the Order of
privilege to serve with in the Australian Defence Force. God
It was an absolute privilege to work
Australia for meritorious service to
bless you and keep the formation tight. t
closely with David. We made some big
Naval Aviation leading to the formation
inroads into junior officer training and
of the current Commander Fleet Air
“When once you have tasted flight, you will forever walk
relationships with the newly formed
Arm organisation. After transferring
the earth with your eyes turned skyward, for there you
Australian Defence Force Academy.
to the Naval Reserve in 2001, David
have been, and there you will always long to return”
Our families enjoyed the Creswell
conducted a study that saved the FAA
– Smithsonian publication
community life and activities. I have
Museum from being disestablished
many fond memories of some of the
and many of his recommendations to
high jinx David and I enjoyed whilst
restructure and resource the museum
Commodore Geoff Ledger DSC, AM RAN (Ret’d)
Ships Systems Solutions
Blohm + Voss Naval
[email protected]
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
45
Issue 147
A Middling Power
What is the ADF meant to do, exactly?
By Hugh White
I
n trying to explain the purpose of
our armed forces, defence ministers
often fall back on that plangent phrase
“the defence of Australia”. In a recent
speech to the Australian Strategic
Policy Institute (ASPI), Defence
Minister Stephen Smith reminded his
audience that the 2009 Defence White
Paper “underlined that Australia’s
most basic strategic interest remained
the defence of Australia against direct
armed attack”. He then foreshadowed
that the next White Paper, promised
some time next year, would come to
the same conclusion.
This appealingly simple idea, that
the reason we have a defence force
is to defend ourselves against direct
attack, has been central to defence
policy for at least the past 40 years,
and the public seems to accept it. But
support an election in Cambodia,
that the mother country’s protection
few people in government or Defence
or even to try to reconstruct
could not be taken for granted, but also
think that Australia faces any credible
Afghanistan. We only spend that
that they could not defend themselves
risk of major military attack, and fewer
kind of money to protect ourselves.
without Britain’s help: the continent
still believe we could defend ourselves
Decade after decade, the biggest
was too big, the population too small,
if we did. As a result, neither the
share of the defence budget has gone
and their potentially threatening
government nor Defence has taken
on capabilities, such as fighter jets,
neighbours, though poor, were too
what is supposed to be the main task
major warships, submarines and
numerous to be fended off without aid.
of the ADF very seriously, which goes
heavily equipped land forces, that
a long way to explaining why Defence
are irrelevant to the lighter tasks we
with developing Australia’s defence
has been lurching from one arms
have been sending the ADF off to do.
policy. We couldn’t depend on our
procurement or maintenance fiasco to
If these capabilities make sense at all,
allies to defend us because we couldn’t
another.
it would only be in fighting a major
be sure they would be willing or able
war. Yet hardly anyone believes this
to send forces halfway around the
our shores, the ADF has always had
is a realistic prospect, let alone a
world when crisis struck. Yet we had
something to do – peacekeeping in
winnable one. No wonder Defence
to depend on our allies, because we
the Middle East, nation-building
doesn’t seem to know what it’s doing.
could not defend the continent alone.
Of course, apart from defending
This dilemma racked those charged
This kind of muddle is not new.
These conflicting realities drove us
Indonesia or fighting bushfires in
Australians first started thinking about
in two separate directions – to build
Victoria – but these aren’t reasons
their security in the 1880s, when the
forces to support our allies wherever
enough to have a defence force.
rise of powers like Germany, Russia
they fought, in the hope they would
This financial year Australians are
and the United States started to
reciprocate when we needed them,
spending $24.2 billion on defence;
challenge British power. Until then,
and to do what we could to defend the
that’s more than $1000 for each
they had blithely assumed that the
continent unaided. In trying to do a
Australian man, woman and child.
Royal Navy would always be on hand to
bit of both, we ended up doing neither
We don’t willingly spend those sums
defend them. As Britain’s power waned,
well.
just to lend a hand in Somalia or
Australians began to realise not only
in East Timor, tsunami relief in
Once a two-carrier
Navy…HMAS
Melbourne, with
Westland Wessex
flying, escorts
Sydney on passage to
Vietnam.
(Courtesy RAN)
In the 1970s, things started getting
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
46
A Middling Power
What is the ADF meant to do, exactly?
easier. China seemed less a communist
menace and more a promising partner.
adversary.
This made self-reliance rather easy.
in a crisis the US would not be able
or willing to support Australia. And
Indonesia stopped being so threatening
Indonesia had a large army, but weak
lastly, if Indonesia realises its potential,
and became a mostly responsible
naval and air forces. Australia’s navy
we will for the first time face on our
neighbour. Above all, surprisingly, the
and air force were always superior,
doorstep a great power, one with an
US emerged from failure in Vietnam as
thanks mainly to Australia’s much
economy much larger than our own
the uncontested leader of Asia. After
greater GDP.
and the capacity to build formidable air
Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, Mao
But “the foreseeable future” is now
and naval forces.
accepted US primacy in return for
past. In 1976, no one expected the
Washington’s recognition of Beijing’s
Asian century, or foresaw that within
to rely on our allies for security, it
communist government. The likelihood
40 years China would be on the verge
becomes less and less certain that we
of a major direct attack on Australia
of overtaking the US economy, and
can.
decreased, and we were confident that
India would be following fast in its
if any serious threat did develop, the
footsteps. No one could have foreseen
is the task of the Gillard government’s
US would come to help. Consequently,
that Indonesia’s GDP would surpass
new defence White Paper, due in
Australia felt more secure from direct
Australia’s, and that the country would
2013. The 2009 White Paper, released
armed attack than at any time since the
be spoken of as a great power in its
by Kevin Rudd, tried and failed.
Pax Britannica had begun to fray in the
own right. These things have come to
Though it went further than previous
1880s.
pass, sweeping away the assumptions
attempts in describing the trends in
that have framed Australia’s defence
Australia’s strategic circumstances, the
to take responsibility for its own
policy for more than a generation. We
government ducked taking any serious
defence. In November 1976, the Fraser
haven’t really escaped the old dilemma
decisions by assuming nothing much
government tabled a White Paper
between defending ourselves and
would change before 2030. They talked
that said we should be able to defend
relying on distant allies; we have just
big about Australia as a “middle power”
the continent without direct combat
enjoyed respite from it, and now the
in the Asian century, but kept plans for
support from our allies. Self-reliance in
holiday is over.
new capabilities almost exactly where
All this emboldened Australia
the defence of Australia has been the
China’s rise, and the broader
Just as we need more than ever
Finding a way through this maze
John Howard had left them. Since then,
main tenet of our defence policy ever
ascendancy of Asia, is the biggest shift
even these modest plans have been
since.
in the distribution of global power in
filleted by repeated budget cuts. The
at least a century, and the biggest shift
2012–13 budget is 10% below last year’s
1976 White Paper boldly predicted
But defence against whom? The
in the balance of strategic forces in
in real terms. All the headlines about
that the powers of Asia – India,
our region since Australia was settled
plans to double the submarine fleet
China and Japan – would not pose
by Europeans. The implications for
from six boats to 12 overlooked the key
any strategic problems for Australia,
Australia’s defence are fairly clear,
fact that 20 years from now we will still
and that our defence policy could
and very significant. Firstly, the era of
have only six boats, and we won’t have
therefore afford to ignore them.
Asian stability based on uncontested
12 until almost 2050.
“No more than the former Great
American primacy has come to an
Powers of Europe,” it stated, “can
end. A new, significantly different yet
need to do much better if Australia’s
we expect these powers individually
stable order in Asia may emerge, but
defence policy is to respond to the
to play a large military role in
we can be far from sure that this will
challenges of the Asian century. It
strategic developments directly
happen, or that it will last. We therefore
must start by offering a far more
affecting Australian security in the
face a much greater risk of major-
sophisticated account of the risks
foreseeable future.” True enough,
power rivalry and conflict in Asia
we might face – especially from
none of the Asian powers was foolish
over the coming decades. Secondly,
China. In the 2009 White Paper,
enough to risk threatening a close
as the economies of China and other
and in things he said publicly and
American ally. With Asia’s main
countries continue to grow, the US will
privately as prime minister, Rudd
players off the board, we only had to
demand more support from its allies,
gave the impression that he saw
be able to defend ourselves against
including Australia, especially if it aims
China’s growing power as a threat,
our immediate neighbours – and
to retain its power in Asia. Thirdly,
but it is not that simple. At present,
Indonesia was the only conceivable
there remains a significant risk that
nothing in China’s policy and
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
Next year’s White Paper will
47
Issue 147
outlook justifies an assumption that
changes in Asia are happening, and
policy insight and imagination,
it will threaten Australia militarily.
how little time we have to decide
to address it squarely – so don’t
It is possible for China to continue
how to respond. After all, the key
hold your breath. If the response is
to rise peacefully, if a way can be
changes are already far advanced,
fudged, we are likely to end up with
found to accommodate its growing
and any response will take time to
the worst of both worlds. We will
power and ambition within a new
implement. Should the next White
waste a lot of money on things we
Asian order that also protects
Paper conclude that we will need
don’t need, while still not doing what
everyone else’s vital interests.
different kinds of armed forces in
is required to stop us sliding swiftly
Helping to create this kind of new
the 2040s and 2050s, when by some
into the ranks of the small powers.
regional order is perhaps the most
projections, China’s GDP will be
Which, in fact, is exactly what we are
important diplomatic imperative
double that of the US, we have to
doing now.
Australia has ever faced.
start building them now.
Yet there is a clear possibility that
Most importantly, the new White
We can define a middle power as
able to stand up to one major power
these efforts will fail, and that Asia will
Paper must decide whether Australia
without relying on another. So should
become fractured by major-power
will hang on to the objective
we be one? To answer this we need
rivalry. So while China’s emergence
we set ourselves in the 1970s –
to weigh up the costs of building the
does not threaten Australia, it
that of defending the continent
armed forces we’d need against the
overturns the stable regional order
independently against a direct
benefits of reducing risk. Looking at
of the past 40 years, and raises huge
military attack – in circumstances
risk first, Australia is in many ways
questions about what will replace
where a threat from a major power
an intrinsically secure country. We
it. Likewise, there is no reason to
can no longer be as easily dismissed.
are – or at least have been – far from
assume a stronger Indonesia threatens
The alternative is that we rely ever
the major centres of world power, with
Australia, but it similarly increases our
more deeply on the US, even as its
neighbours much weaker than us.
long-term strategic risks: the stronger
relative power in Asia declines. This
We possess a huge territory not easily
Indonesia becomes, the more serious
is perhaps the most fundamental
dominated, and we are surrounded by
the consequences for Australia if we do
strategic question we face, testing
vast oceans. Add to this that we have
come to blows.
our seriousness about being a middle
had the region’s dominant military
power. It will take real political
power as our close ally, and Australia
courage and leadership, as well as
seems very unlikely to be attacked,
The new White Paper will also
need to recognise how fast these
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
48
A Middling Power
What is the ADF meant to do, exactly?
which is precisely why for the past 40
to take the possibility seriously, and
Australia. The other approach would
years “the defence of Australia” has
have not yet woken up to how the
be to attack directly the forces being
seemed such a hollow policy precept.
changing strategic setting makes it
projected towards us. This looks
In the next 40 years, our island-
essential that they do so. Designing
inherently easier, and less likely to
continent geography will continue to
large-scale campaigns is not the
lead to escalation. Most importantly,
ensure that only radical changes in
ADF’s kind of thing. Australia’s
it would allow us to exploit the
the political, economic and strategic
military has always been focused
fact that it is much easier to stop
settings in Asia will substantially
on tactics – the business of fighting
someone else projecting power over
increase the risk to Australia. But
battles on the ground – an area in
the sea than it is to project power
such changes are indeed underway. If
which they excel. It has been happy
oneself.
Indonesia fulfils its potential to become
to leave higher level questions, such
a major power, distance will do less
as deciding which battles to fight,
naval strategists call ‘sea control’ from
to protect us than it has done. Other
to our allies. The ADF does not feel
‘sea denial’. Sea control is the ability to
powers will be much stronger than
at home with these questions, and
protect your own ships by preventing
they have been, and more inclined to
I suspect even feels intimidated by
others from attacking them, and is
compete with one another, so it follows
them. It seems uneasy about taking
needed to safely advance by sea. Sea
that the risks of us being drawn into
on the responsibility for defending
denial is the ability to attack an enemy’s
major-power rivalry and conflict must
Australia independently, and
ships, and thus deprive it of sea control.
also be higher. Australia’s strategic risks
reluctant to open up discussion that
The most crucial operational fact for
will also depend on how we behave
might entail significant changes to
the defence of Australia is that sea
as the region evolves. Our policies
the kinds of forces we require. The
denial is much easier to achieve than
towards our neighbours will make a big
ADF would rather stick to what it
sea control. This hasn’t always been so.
difference in how we’re viewed. It is not
knows, and successive ministers,
Back in the days when Britannia ruled
clear that we really understand this yet.
with no appetite for hard questions
the waves, protecting your own ships
and harder answers, have been happy
and attacking the enemy’s were almost
to leave them be.
two sides of the same coin. Technology
Perhaps the most we can say at
this stage is that, while the risk of
direct attack on Australia will remain
To most of us, the idea that
Here, we need to distinguish what
has now shifted the advantage to sea
quite low in the Asian century, it will
Australia could stand up alone against
denial, and this trend shows no sign of
nonetheless be higher than we have
a major power seems far-fetched. Our
reversing. This means Australia should
known for several generations. We
experience as part of global coalitions
be able to achieve sea denial against
should try to reduce this risk through
in the two world wars makes us
even a major power without too much
diplomacy and other non-military
think that success in a conflict means
trouble, if we focus our efforts on it
means, particularly by promoting a
vanquishing the enemy and occupying
single-mindedly.
stable regional order that minimises
their territory. Against a major power,
great-power rivalry. But we cannot
Australia is never going to be able to do
finding ships and sinking them.
assume this alone will work, so we
that independently. The most we could
Finding the ships means building an
must at least consider building the
hope to achieve would be to raise the
effective and reliable surveillance
armed forces we would need to defend
costs and risks of attacking Australia
system capable of covering
ourselves from a major power without
to the point where it is not worth an
Australia’s air and sea approaches
relying on America.
enemy’s while. But, fortunately, that
thousands of kilometres from our
may not be as hard as we might think.
shores. We already have some of the
What kinds of forces we would
need exactly, and how much these
There are two ways it could be
Sea denial has two essential steps:
key elements, including the JORN
might cost, are then the critical
done. One approach would be to
over-the-horizon radar system, and
questions of military strategy for
threaten an adversary’s own country
technological innovations should
Australia’s defence. We would
with a direct attack –“to rip an arm
make it easier to enhance this over
expect the ADF and the Defence
off any major Asian power that
the next few decades. In the age of
Department to devote much effort
sought to attack Australia” as my old
Google Earth, a ship moving slowly
to answering them. My impression
friend and colleague Ross Babbage
over the surface of the sea is not that
is that they have done no such thing.
so colourfully put it. This defence
hard to find. Sinking ships is not that
Like the rest of us, they find it hard
might suit a nuclear power, but not
difficult either. Today’s torpedoes
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
49
Issue 147
and missiles make ships easy to
has shaped the debates that have raged
weakness in Australia’s demography
target and very hard to defend.
over whether the boats should be large
or skills base. Although it is crystal
Indeed, most of the technologies in
or small, designed here or overseas, to a
clear that our current defence force
today’s warships are devoted to self-
new design or off the shelf. Little or no
and department aren’t up to the task,
protection rather than attack.
thought has been given to the two most
as long as we can get access to key
The challenge is to carry the
critical issues: numbers and timing.
technologies, Australia has the capacity
torpedoes or missiles within firing
Once we start to ask how Australia
to build and operate the kinds of forces
range. It makes no sense these days to
might defend itself with a sea-denial
we would need to defend ourselves. It
carry them in a warship, which is itself
campaign, it becomes clear that we
would simply take a lot of work.
both expensive and vulnerable. Instead,
need at least double the 12 submarines
they are most effectively carried in
currently being planned. At the same
Whether we should build the forces to
submarines and aircraft. Within range
time, there is no need for the exotic
defend ourselves independently in the
of airbases, aircraft are cheaper, but
and expensive options that are adding
Asian century depends on how much it
beyond that range – anything over a
so much to the cost, risk and schedule
would cost. New technologies such as
few hundred kilometres – submarines
of the proposal. What Australia needs,
drones could help to keep some costs
are the sea-denial platform par
if we decide to invest in the capacity
down eventually, but there’s no dodging
excellence, because they are so
for independent defence over coming
the fact that independent defence will
difficult to find. That makes them
decades, is large numbers of good,
cost a lot of money – certainly a lot
perhaps the most important single
quiet, lethal boats optimised solely for
more than we have been spending
capability for the independent defence
the task of sinking ships. And we need
recently. There is, however, one big
of Australia, because the further from
them soon.
offset – the potential for savings. We
our shores we can start to deny the
A big fleet of submarines like this
Which brings us back to money.
waste a lot of money in defence in ways
sea to an adversary, the further its
would cost a great deal of money, and
large and small, but the biggest drain of
costs and risks rise. What’s more, over
would only be one element of a range of
all is the billions spent on capabilities
coming decades, submarines might
capabilities needed for the independent
we do not need.
be the only way we can project power
defence of Australia. Effective denial
against significant military forces in
of our air and sea approaches would
building three air warfare destroyers
the Western Pacific. The advantages of
require a much larger air force than
(AWDs) at a cost of $8 billion. We
sea denial over sea control only work
we have been planning – perhaps 200
simply do not need them. We do need
in our favour so long as we are not
front-line combat aircraft rather than
smaller, cheaper warships, such as the
trying to project power using ships
the 100 being considered. It would
Anzac frigates for low-level operations,
ourselves. Australia has no serious
also, perhaps surprisingly, require a
but the AWDs are equipped at great
chance of achieving sea control against
somewhat larger and more heavily
cost for high-end naval battles. They
any major Asian power, even in our
equipped army, because a maritime-
are supposed to escort and protect the
own immediate maritime approaches.
denial posture relies on there being a
huge new amphibious ships in which
That means if we want the ability to
substantial land presence to drive up
our army, like US marines, might be
use armed forces to protect our wider
the scale of forces the enemy has to
deployed to assault the territory of an
strategic interests in a major-power
project. So the ADF needed for our
enemy in a major war. Yet this scenario
conflict, submarines could be the only
independent defence would look very
is fanciful. Even with the AWDs, we
option we have.
different from the force we have known
have no chance of achieving sea control
for the past 40 years, or indeed since
against a capable enemy. Just as it is
World War II.
easy for us to achieve sea denial against
This is why the government’s failure
to make the new submarine project
work is so serious. Most of the myriad
Obviously, building and operating
The Gillard government is currently
an adversary, it is easy for them to deny
problems have come about because the
this force would make unprecedented
us. The amphibious ships would stand
government has no coherent idea about
demands on the ADF and the
too high a chance of being sunk with
what the submarine fleet is supposed to
department. We could hardly expect
all troops on board to ever be put to
do. In fact, the project has been driven
the outfit that has failed to crew and
sea, and even if they went to sea and
not by strategic imperatives but by
maintain a fleet of six submarines to do
found their way ashore, a couple of
commercial concerns about where the
any better with 24 or more. But these
thousand soldiers would have little
boats will be designed and built. This
problems do not reflect any inherent
if any strategic effect. In any major
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
50
A Middling Power
What is the ADF meant to do, exactly?
conflict, amphibious assault is simply
and ’60s we spent an average of 3.3%
not a credible option for Australia, and
of GDP, so this would take us back to
in low-level contingencies amphibious
what we spent before the great strategic
forces would not need AWDs to
changes of the early 1970s allowed us,
protect them.
for a time, to ignore the possibility of
This appalling waste of money
and effort is happening because the
conflict with great powers.
Australia could afford this level
Howard government ordered these
of defence spending. It would mean
ships, on the advice of Defence,
higher taxes, but our tax levels are still
without anyone apparently having
quite low compared to those of other
thought through whether these would
countries. Nonetheless, to go down
contribute cost-effectively to achieving
this path would be a huge decision.
Australia’s strategic objectives.
Despite what the industry lobbyists say,
Yet even if we cease wasting money,
defence spending is in the end a form
an independent defence capacity is
of consumption, not an investment. We
going to be expensive. It is impossible
should only spend this much money if
to give a precise figure, but if we were
the strategic risks of the Asian century
careful to spend money only on the
are grave. It is quite possible that they
capabilities we really needed, it would
will be. This is what the next defence
cost between 3 and 4% of GDP. For the
White Paper must assess. For the first
last 20 years, we have spent an average
time in a very long period, our political
of about 2% of GDP on defence, so that
leaders are going to have to take
means a steep increase. But to put it in
defence seriously. t
historical perspective, during the 1950s
Dr Hugh White is Professor of Strategic
Studies at the Australian National
University. He is also a Visiting Fellow
at the Lowy Institute for International
Policy. His work focuses primarily on
Australian strategic and defence policy,
Asia-Pacific security issues, and global
strategic affairs especially as they
influence Australia and the Asia-Pacific.
Become a
Member
TODAY
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
51
Issue 147
United Kingdom: National Involvement
in the Indian Ocean Region
By Fay Clarke, Future Directions International Pty Ltd Research Assistant
Key Points
• Conscious of the current straitened economic circumstances, the UK is pursuing “commercial diplomacy” by seeking new
markets in burgeoning Indian Ocean region economies.
• Within the Indian Ocean region, the UK’s diplomatic resources have been strategically pivoted towards the emerging
economic “powerhouses”.
• The Indian Ocean continues to be vital to British strategic maritime interests. The UK maintains a naval presence within the
Indian Ocean region and plays a leading role in counter-piracy and maritime security efforts.
• The United Kingdom is committed to promoting its values abroad and uses its former colonial links to help forge and
strengthen relationships.
Summary
Archipelago and three islands formerly
lease is due to expire in 2016, with the
Though no longer an empire, the
belonging to the Seychelles) is the only
possibility of a 20-year extension built
United Kingdom still maintains an
remaining UK territory within the
into the original agreement. Despite
interest in the Indian Ocean region. As
region although, according to the 2006
overcrowding concerns, given the
a global power, the UK sees the Indian
Brits Abroad study by the Institute
current US strategic pivot towards the
Ocean as critical to its own economic
for Public Policy Research, there are
Indo-Pacific, it seems unlikely that
success. In addition to security
over an estimated 1.9 million British
interest in Diego Garcia will diminish
interests, the strategy of “commercial
persons living in the greater Indian
in the future.
diplomacy”, which taps into the rise of
Ocean region. The BIOT atoll of Diego
a number of Indo-Pacific economies,
Garcia is leased to the United States
interests in the Indian Ocean. In part
the continuing geostrategic relevance
to house its major Indian Ocean naval
due to the legacy of the primarily
of the Middle East and longstanding
base. Diego Garcia is strategically vital:
mercantile British Empire, the UK
Commonwealth links from a colonial
it sits at the centre of the Indian Ocean,
has a sizeable commercial shipping
past in Africa, provide the basis for
offering roughly equidistant access to
industry operating within the region.
the UK’s national involvement in the
all major shipping lanes and to the rim
Total British shipping revenue for 2010
Indian Ocean region.
and island states of the region. The US
stood at £12.6 billion ($19.3 billion),
The UK has important commercial
US FA-18F Super
Hornets (foreground)
fly in formation with
two Indian Navy Sea
Harriers, bottom, and
two Indian Air Force
Jaguars, right, over
Indian Navy aircraft
carrier INS Viraat
(Courtesy US Navy)
Analysis
Security and Geostrategic
Interests
For much of the twentiethcentury, the United Kingdom
was the preeminent power
in the Indian Ocean, a region
considered crucial to the
commercial activities of the
British Empire. Today, the
strategic presence of the UK is
on a considerably diminished
scale and Sino-India and SinoAmerican rivalries (real or
perceived) tend to overshadow
the strategic presence of other
actors in the region. The British
Indian Ocean Territory (the
BIOT, comprising the Chagos
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
52
United Kingdom: National Involvement in the Indian Ocean Region
of which almost £9 billion ($13.8
in its former
billion) came from overseas trading,
colony of Kenya:
much of which would be conducted in
a neighbour
the Indian Ocean region. The Indian
of Somalia
Ocean region is vital to Britain’s
and regional
strategic maritime interests, and the
“diplomatic
UK is a major stakeholder in promoting
hub” for the
maritime security. Admiral Sir
Foreign and
Trevor Soar, the Royal Navy’s former
Commonwealth
Commander-in-Chief Fleet, confirmed
Office (FCO).1
the strategic importance of the Indian
Whitehall
Ocean to the UK, when he told Future
recognises that
Directions International that, out of the
Somali piracy ‘cannot be solved at sea’
its efforts to “rebalance” the flagging
25 per cent of the Royal Navy units that
and has led multilateral diplomatic
UK economy through international
are deployed at any one time, it is likely
efforts to support the return of stable
trade and investment. The ongoing
that over 50 per cent of the Navy’s
governance to Somalia. In February
economic instability of the Eurozone
manpower and assets will be located in
2012, the FCO hosted the London
(Britain’s most important export
the Indian Ocean.
Conference on Somalia, attended
market) and the slowdown of Britain’s
by over 50 states, to plan future
own national growth, in addition to a
multilateral counter-piracy efforts in
nation-building, counter-piracy and
weakened ability to project influence
regional danger zones, particularly
humanitarian relief efforts in Somalia.
abroad, have led the UK to seek new
around Somalia and the Gulf of Aden.
UK support for the African Union force
markets and pursue opportunities
The UK is a significant contributor
combating al-Shabaab militancy was
within the growing economies of the
to the anti-terrorism and anti-piracy
underscored and, that same month,
Indian Ocean region.
Combined Task Forces 150 and 151.
a British Ambassador to Somalia was
The Royal Navy currently provides the
appointed for the first time since the
reduction of the British diplomatic
Commander and headquarters for the
fall of former dictator Mohammed Siad
presence worldwide following the
European Union’s Operation Atalanta,
Barre in 1991. The September 2012
implementation of government-wide
charged with combating Somali piracy.
election of Somali President Hassan
austerity measures, there has been
In October 2011, London authorised
Mohamud and a new parliament
a clear strategic reorientation and
the carrying of armed guards by
was greeted with cautious optimism
streamlining toward the economic
British merchant vessels transiting
by the UK, as a key member of the
‘powerhouses of the near future.’2 The
the Gulf of Aden, Strait of Hormuz
international community backing the
adoption of “commercial diplomacy”
and other “chokepoints” along major
‘roadmap to end the transition’.
has seen the creation of the FCO
The UK plays a leading role in
sea lanes. The United Kingdom has
also capitalised on its Commonwealth
connections to broker co-operation
Trade and Diplomacy:
“Commercial Diplomacy”
While there has been a general
Business Charter and the UK Trade
and Investment portfolio, which
identifies a number of Indian Ocean
with countries such as Mauritius, the
Trade and commercial interests are
economies, including India, Indonesia,
Seychelles and Tanzania, as well as
now more than ever positioned at
Malaysia and Singapore, as key high-
the self-declared state of Somaliland
the centre of the United Kingdom’s
growth ‘target markets’.3 British exports
to prosecute suspected pirates and to
diplomatic engagement with the Indian
to Indonesia alone, for instance,
imprison those convicted of piracy.
Ocean region. In 2011, the British
increased by 44 per cent in 2011.
The United Kingdom, like the
Government launched a new strategy
US and EU, has a considerable stake
of “commercial diplomacy” as part of
in restoring stability to Somalia and
1 In addition, in March 2012, a UK firm
made the first ever discovery of oil in
north-western Kenya, presenting a prime
opportunity for increased British FDI in the
East African coastal state. ‘Kenya Strikes Oil
For First Time in History’, Economy Watch,
27 March 2012. http://www.economywatch.
com/in-the-news/kenya-strikes-oil-for-firsttime-in-history.27-03.html
preventing destabilisation from
spreading to geo-strategically and
commercially significant states along
the East African coast. The UK remains
the largest foreign direct investor
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
2 Jeremy Browne MP, ‘Navigating the
Emerging Order: the UK and the Emerging
Powers’. Transcript of speech given at
Chatham House, 20 July 2011. <http://
www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/
files/public/Meetings/Meeting%20
Transcripts/200711browne.pdf>.
3 UK Trade and Investment, 18 May
2010, ‘High Growth Markets: Be a Part of
Tomorrow’s World’. <http://www.ukti.gov.
uk/uktihome/item/108062.html>.
Royal Navy Multirole
Hydrographic and
Oceanographic
Survey Vessel HMS
Echo (H 87)-photo by
Michael Nitz
53
Issue 147
India and Indonesia are seen as
growing Indian Ocean economies
support for human rights and political
particularly important and, in recent
through multilateral means. London
freedoms, including the release of
years, London has commenced annual
is spearheading efforts to negotiate
political prisoners, as a necessary
strategic business summits with
European Union Free Trade
precondition for the strengthening of
them. The bilateral UK-Indonesia
Agreements with Singapore and India,
bilateral ties between the two countries.
Partnership forum covers the key
and hopes to bring both sets of talks to
policy areas of foreign policy and
a conclusion by the end of 2012. The
and expand its already strong economic
international security issues, trade
UK was also a major player in bringing
ties to the wealthy Persian Gulf states.
and investment, climate change and
about the suspension of EU economic
In recent years, the UK has become
sustainable growth and education.
sanctions (excepting the continuing
more reliant on foreign energy imports
The range of issues reflects not only
ban on arms sales) against Burma in
as domestic natural gas and crude oil
the commercial diplomacy strategy,
April 2012. Accompanied by a business
production declines; it is now a net
but also the UK’s interests in regional
delegation, Prime Minister David
energy importer. It is critical for the
stability and supporting democracy
Cameron became the first Western
UK to maintain friendly relations with
in Indonesia as part of a strengthened
leader to visit Burma, during a four-
international suppliers, rather than risk
ASEAN regime. Britain also views its
day scoping tour of Burma, Malaysia,
restricted access to long-term supply in
highly creative and productive science
Indonesia and Japan taken shortly
an age of austerity. Qatar, for instance,
and technology industries as a critical
before EU sanctions were suspended.
accounts for 60 per cent of British LPG
asset, with research and development
The trip also demonstrated the close
imports. Qatar is also an important
an important “pull factor” for UK
alignment of British business and
bilateral investment partner for the UK
trade in the competitive Indian Ocean
diplomatic interests in the region, with
and a key stakeholder in the energy
marketplace.
the UK eager to explore economic
trade within the Indian Ocean region.
The UK has also pursued
“commercial diplomacy” with
The UK has sought to consolidate
opportunities within Burma but
It is not just energy that is critical
reiterating its firm committed to
to UK interests within the Gulf. The
Sailors chock and
chain an Indian Navy
Chetak helicopter
to the flight deck
of the guidedmissile destroyer
USS Fitzgerald
as amphibious
command ship USS
Blue Ridge passes
behind (USN photo)
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
54
United Kingdom: National Involvement in the Indian Ocean Region
area has lucrative markets for UK
healthy two-way trade, cultural and
the two countries have held regular
exports in financial, training and
historical ties and knowledge-sharing,
AUKMIN defence and foreign policy
educational services, plus specialist
with numerous bilateral agreements
summits, the fourth of which took
technical products including defence,
in health, law, science and technology.
place in January 2012. Major items
engineering and industrial equipment.
Recreational travel remains the
of discussion included constructive
Saudi Arabia is the UK’s largest market
primary contributor to the services
engagement with China, reform in
for goods and services outside of the
trade on both sides. Amongst the
Burma, counter-piracy efforts (and
OECD and Britain’s most significant
major Australian exports to the UK are
the increased role of India in such
trading partner in the Middle East.
gold (totalling $4.5 billion in 2011-12),
operations) and Australian support
Oman and Kuwait are also significant
coal and lead. The main UK exports to
for UK engagement in the Indo-
markets for Britain. British arms
Australia include medicines, platinum,
Pacific via the Five Power Defence
manufacturers hold major contracts in
silver, printed materials and passenger
Arrangements (FPDA). The FPDA
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, while the UK
motor vehicles. Australia is seen as
brings together the UK, Australia,
is the largest foreign investor in Oman,
a safe market for British investment
Singapore, Malaysia and New Zealand
with high levels of bilateral trade in
and an attractive base for Indo-Pacific
and has remained in place for over
addition to defence co-operation and
regional operations, primarily in the
40 years, with joint training exercises
educational exchanges.
infrastructure, pharmaceuticals and
held each year.6 In common with
energy industries. The Department of
the United States, New Zealand and
in Bahrain, which hosts the United
Foreign Affairs and Trade notes that
Canada, the UK and Australia are
Kingdom Maritime Component
the UK is the second-largest source of
also members of a number of military
Command (UKMCC) headquarters
total foreign investment in Australia
interoperability programmes that
and the Royal Navy’s Armilla Patrol,
and the second-largest source of
can, at times, incorporate an Indian
tasked with ensuring the safety of
foreign direct investment in Australia,
Ocean aspect: the ABCA (American,
British vessels in the Persian Gulf and
behind only the United States.4
British, Canadian, Australian and
London maintains a naval presence
Arabian Sea including minehunters,
UK investment in Australia has
New Zealand)Armies Programme, the
submarines and surface combatants.
proved resilient despite the global
naval AUSCANNZUKUS (Australia,
Bahrain purchased nearly £3 million
economic slowdown. Following the
Canada, New Zealand, United
($4.6 million) worth of military
post-2008 downturn which had a
Kingdom, and United States), ASIC
equipment in the April-June quarter
significant impact upon the UK, British
(the Air and Space Interoperability
of 2012. Additionally, British Prime
FDI into Australia increased by $1.8
Council), the military scientific and
Minister David Cameron has recently
billion in 2009. The UK currently
technological Technical Co-operation
closed deals with Saudi Arabia and the
exports more to Australia than it does
Programme and intelligence agency
United Arab Emirates on the sale of the
to India or China (although Australia
linkages.
Eurofighter Typhoon. These advanced
is only Britain’s thirty-third largest
aircraft are being purchased to replace
source of imports.)5 With its focus on
Security Partnership in 2009 pledged
the ageing Panavia Tornado, first
emerging economic powers, the UK’s
to further co-operation on intelligence
introduced in 1979.
new “commercial diplomacy” strategy
sharing and responses to emerging
may alter the proportion of British
security challenges. In 2011, a
exports to Australia.
Memorandum of Understanding
As lucrative as its trade relations
with the Gulf States are, the UK may
not be able to take them for granted.
The United Kingdom and Australia
A bilateral UK-Australia National
pledged further collaboration in
The Gulf States are also seeking
have a long history of defence and
science and innovation to aid counter-
increased commercial engagement
security co-operation. Since 2006,
terrorism and national security
with emerging and established
4 Australian investment in the UK is
considerable, with over 1,500 Australian
companies active in Britain, largely in the
financial services sector, but also including
dual-listed resources companies, such as
BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto. ‘United Kingdom
Country Brief’, DFAT, March 2012.
5 Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
‘Country Profile: Australia’. http://www.fco.
gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/traveladvice-by-country/country-profile/asiaoceania/australia?profile=all
measures. Australia remains an
Asian powerhouses such as India,
South Korea and Japan and those
relationships may come to take priority
over those with “Old World” powers
such as the UK.
Britain and Australia maintain a
strong relationship, characterised by
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
important market for UK defence
6 The FPDA entered into force in 1971
as a security guarantee for Singapore and
Malaysia and has continued since. Despite
no longer having a major military presence
in the region, the UK retains assets in
Singapore including a refuelling depot at
the Sembawang dockyard, which also hosts
warships from the Australian, New Zealand
and United States navies.
55
Issue 147
exports. Given their considerable
a continued source of skilled migration
vital to the United Kingdom’s
history of military, defence and security
to Britain, and currently 60 per cent
maritime strategic interests and the
co-operation, in addition to Australia’s
of intra-company transferees to the
UK will continue to play an active
strategic position in the Indo-Pacific
UK are from India. The importance of
role in regional security efforts, both
region, bilateral engagement between
these links with India is underscored
unilaterally and multilaterally. Seeking
the UK and Australia in these areas
by the strong support of the UK for the
to revive its own flagging economy,
may increase over the coming “Asian
proposed European Union FTA with
the United Kingdom will continue
Century”. On the other hand, the UK
India.
to pursue new markets through such
does not yet actively participate in
The United Kingdom is also
strategies as “commercial diplomacy”.
major multilateral maritime security
keen to promote its values alongside
As a global power, the UK may find
initiatives such as the Indian-initiated
diplomatic, commercial and strategic
it has increasingly to compete with
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, or
engagement with the Indian Ocean
influential rising regional powers to
take part in the Exercise Malabar
region. As such, London has been a
secure opportunities and strengthen
operations, which Australia, India and
firm supporter of democratisation
existing relationships, despite retaining
Singapore all do.
and political freedoms in countries
strong ties to many former colonies.
such as Burma, Somalia and Egypt.
The United Kingdom is, however, well
Prime Minister David Cameron was
placed to offer mutually-beneficial
The United Kingdom offers a
the first foreign head of state to visit
opportunities in trade, defence,
number of special higher educational
Egypt following the Arab Spring.
education and skills training and
opportunities, particularly to
The Department for International
knowledge-sharing in specialist areas of
Commonwealth students, through
Development also offers considerable
science and technology, to help achieve
initiatives such as the Chevening,
aid initiatives to various Indian Ocean
its commercial goals in the Indian
Marshall and Commonwealth
countries, including India, Kenya,
Ocean region. t
Scholarships. Large-scale migration to
Bangladesh and Burma and offers
the UK from Commonwealth countries
incentives to support the UK’s regional
Any opinions or views expressed in this
in the Indian Ocean region has
policy objectives.
paper are those of the individual author,
Cultural Interests
enhanced cultural ties; Indian migrants
constitute the largest ethnic minority
Conclusion
resident in the UK. Indian nationals are
The Indian Ocean region remains
unless stated to be those of Future
Directions International.
The Japan Maritime
Self-Defense Force
destroyer JDS
Kurama leads the
guided-missile
destroyer USS
Fitzgerald, flying
their battle flag,
and the Indian Navy
guided-missile
destroyer INS Ranvir
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
56
World Naval Developments
By Dr Norman Friedman
P
erhaps the most surprising
development in this year’s
Euronaval show, in Paris this October,
was the public interest in naval ballistic
missile defense shown by several
important companies, presumably
reflecting new official interest. The
US Navy has been on anti-ballistic
missile patrol since 2004, and NATO
has accepted a land installation in
Romania. However, many Europeans
have argued against embracing this
type of defense to avoid offending the
Russians, who regard it as an attempt
to devalue their own nuclear forces.
This is an increasingly sensitive
issue as the Russians find that they
cannot afford anything remotely
matter if the Iranians decided to touch
like the scale of military investment
off a Middle Eastern War. Ballistic
directly at the Iranian program. It
achieved by the old Soviet Union,
missile defense may be the best way
would probably be entirely possible
hence cannot modernize or maintain
to counter the future Iranian nuclear
to deliver weapons to Iranian targets,
their non-nuclear forces on anything
threat.
but the Iranians have dispersed their
like the old scale. More and more that
The West is currently attempting
A second possibility is to strike
nuclear program and they have also,
leaves Russian nuclear forces as the
to convince the Iranian regime to
it seems, hardened it. Evaluations of
core of Russian national military power.
abandon its program by imposing
this option tend to offer to delay the
The United States has consistently
economic sanctions. Advocates of
Iranian program by a year or so, but
argued that its evolving national missile
sanctions point out that the Iranian
not to destroy it. There is no reason to
defense system is directed against
economy is visibly crumbling.
imagine that the Iranian government
attacks far smaller than anything
However, the sanctions seem not to
would be friendlier a year or so from
the Russians might mount. Outside
have had much effect on the regime (as
now, particularly after having been
Russia it is usually assumed that the
opposed to, on the Iranian population).
attacked. How much would that delay
system, both in the United States and
One reason why is that sanctions which
buy? Complete destruction of the
in Europe, is directed at least initially
damage a country’s economy tend to
Iranian program would be a different
against the rising threats of Iranian
strengthen the hand of the regime at
proposition, but that would probably
and North Korean missiles. NATO has
which they are aimed. The regime
require a nuclear strike, which would
formally accepted emplacement of the
becomes the only source of increasingly
kill millions of entirely innocent people
US Phased Adaptive Approach system,
scarce goods. For that matter, the
­­–an unthinkable means of dealing with
based on the naval Aegis system, in
population generally blames the
a postulated future threat raised by
Central Europe.
sanction-setters rather than the regime
Presumably the Europeans are
for its problems. That is certainly
now increasingly alarmed at Iranian
what happened in Iraq under UN
progress. This is not to suggest that any
sanctions. The sanctions did prevent
European imagines that the Iranians
Saddam Hussein from maintaining his
will suddenly decide to immolate some
air defenses, but that mattered only
major city. Rather, it must be the fear
when Iraq was invaded. Advocates of
that, once they have the ability to do
sanctions generally imagine that they
so, the Iranians will apply pressure
are an effective alternative to war, not
whenever they want to force European
a means of making an eventual attack
policy. That might become a critical
more effective.
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
Fire Controlman 2nd
Class Matthew E Bell
mans a SPY-1B (V)
radar console in the
Combat Information
Center aboard the
guided-missile cruiser
USS Shiloh. (US Navy
photo by Lieutenant
(JG) Nelson H. Balido)
Iranian Navy missile
boat
57
Issue 147
a few men in Qom or in Tehran. An
for deterrence). It certainly helps that
attack on Iran which did not destroy
the Aegis system to be emplaced in
the country would likely cement
Europe has repeatedly proved itself, so
government support and undermine
that the Iranians would have to bet that
any opposition.
defenses would be effective.
Then there is deterrence: if the
Three companies displayed ballistic
Iranians do launch an attack, surely
missile defense systems at the show.
they must contemplate nuclear
EADS (European Aerospace Defense
retaliation. Unfortunately it is not clear
Systems), a Franco-German company,
whether the Iranian leadership would
showed a model of an Exoguard missile
be deterred by the threat of nuclear
which could be fired out of either the
retaliation. Some Iranian statements
US Mk 41 vertical launcher or the
suggest that they would welcome
French Sylver (as in the current Franco-
setting off a nuclear war, which they
Italian frigates). It also displayed a
say would result in the victory of their
model of the kinetic energy kill vehicle
version of Islam – but that may be
which the missile would carry. There
and control element. That EADS feels
no more than poker-playing. That is
were no accompanying brochures, but
there is a need for this kind of software
aside from the question of whether
the missile figured in a formal report
suggests that European governments
a nuclear threat against the Iranian
to the French Senate last year. Perhaps
are increasingly interested in ballistic
population would necessarily affect
more significantly, EADS displayed
missile defense.
those ruling Iran. This type of question
software intended explicitly to teach
has always bedevilled nuclear strategy.
officials and military decision-makers
Fincantieri, the Italian warship builder.
Probably the only effective deterrent
not yet familiar with ballistic missile
Included in its large array of warship
would be a direct threat to the Iranian
defense how it would work. The
models was a theater ballistic missile
leadership; but what if the leaders
software simulates engagements,
defense surface combatant, a frigate
actually believe what they say about the
showing how and when decisions
equipped with an Arleigh Burke class
desirable outcome of such an attack?
have to be made and how many
type SPY-1 radar and with six sets of
We have never been particularly good
opportunities a given missile system
vertical launchers (eight cells each)
at understanding truly alien cultures,
has to intercept an incoming threat.
for the defensive missiles (it also had
as witness the failure of US deterrent
Presumably this relatively simple
what looked like Harpoon launchers
policy against Japan in 1941.
software is designed so that it can be
amidships and the standard Italian
grown into a missile system command
76mm gun forward and a RAM missile
The new idea is that a program like
Iran’s can be countered by deploying
SPY-1 Variants
(Courtesy Defense
Industry Daily)
The second company was
Japanese WWII
carrier power at sea.
Two other carriers in
the background lead
three battleships or
battlecruisers, with
two or three carriers
behind (Simon
Loveday, Darwin
Military Museum)
ballistic missile defense, which may be
able to neutralize the Iranian weapons
after they are launched. This is actually
another form of deterrence, which is
always an attempt to affect a potential
enemy’s calculations. It can certainly
be argued that no ballistic missile
defense is foolproof. However, any
Iranians contemplating an attack would
not be at all sure that the defensive
system would fail. If it worked, they
would be in a rather embarrassing
position. They would have fired a dud
while waiting to see whether the West
fired back with something a lot more
massive and more effective (there is no
question of substituting missile defense
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
58
World Naval Developments
launcher aft, as well as a big bow
sonar). Full load displacement was
given as 6550 metric tons, considerably
less than that of a US destroyer (but
with only about half as many vertical
launcher cells); overall dimensions were
144 x 19.7 m. No maximum speed
was given, but the ship was designed to
cruise at 15 kts (range 6000 nm).
The Italian model could be
interpreted not as an approach to
European markets, but rather as a
potential contender for the current
Saudi Eastern Fleet competition. As
displayed, the frigate is equipped with
US rather than European weapons and
sensors (the Saudis would probably
buy US equipment, even if they bought
probably other powers would almost
which may have been intended as an
a non-US hull). This interpretation
certainly much prefer the Saudis to
alternative to the SPY-1 which equips
suggests that the Saudis want the
invest in missile defense rather than
Aegis ships (there was no explicit
system largely for its ability to deal with
in nuclear weapons of their own, the
connection to ballistic missile defense).
ballistic missiles. They are certainly
existence of which would probably
The Saudi competition may also
vitally interested in defense against
induce further governments to acquire
explain why the Korean shipbuilder
Iranian missiles, because they see Iran
their own nuclear weapons. Egypt,
Daewoo exhibited (for the first time
as their main regional threat. Saudi
which historically has sought the
at a Euronaval), since it is currently
Arabia seeks to lead the majority
leadership of the Arab world, would be
building large Aegis ships. Again,
(Sunni) branch of Islam. As such it
a prime candidate.
Daewoo made no explicit connection
competes against the Iranian-led Shia
Reportedly other contenders for
to missile defense, although South
(Shi’ite) branch. Each conceives the
the Saudi order include France and
Korea is interested in countering
other as heretical; each has an activist
the United States. The competition
existing and future North Korean
wing which advocates destroying the
seems to explain why the US stand
ballistic missiles.
other. For example, the majority of
included a model of the Lockheed
people killed by the Sunni Al Qaeda
Martin (displacement hull) version of
the European electronics giant, whose
movement have been Shi’ites, not
the Littoral Combat Ship adapted as a
Dutch naval branch (formerly Signaal)
Westerners.
small Aegis ship
In the past, the Saudis have been
with the SPY-1F
interested in deterrents against Iran,
radar (which is
beginning with ballistic missiles bought
probably much too
from China during the Iran-Iraq
small to support
War of the 1980s. There have been
ballistic missile
suggestions that the Iranian nuclear
defense). The
program will (or perhaps already
French DCNS
has) trigger a Saudi nuclear program,
company showed
because to be without a bomb would
an evolved
make Saudi Arabia intolerably
version of the
vulnerable (Israel is generally assumed
current Franco-
to have a substantial nuclear arsenal,
Italian FREMM
the great question being why or
frigate featuring
whether it is not an effective deterrent
a fixed four-face
against Iran). The United States and
active-array radar
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
Japanese Maritime
Self Defence Force
ship JS Makinami
at RIMPAC. (U.S.
Navy photo by Mass
Communication
Specialist 1st
Class Michael R.
McCormick)
The third company was Thales,
Iranian kilo class
submarine
59
Issue 147
company showed a version of its
the Standard Missile (hence relatively
Smart-L long-range three-dimensional
easily adapted to ballistic missile
radar l adapted to missile defense
defense). It is reportedly closely related
specifically for the Royal Netherlands
to the S-1850 radar of the French-
Navy. The passive array of the standard
Italian-British PAAMs system, though
Smart-L is replaced by an active array,
that radar apparently has a different
and the radar is adapted to use special
antenna which might not be as easily
ballistic missile defense waveforms.
adapted to active operation. The
It can operate in either staring or
existing Smart-L can be adapted (using
rotating mode. In the staring mode,
new software) for shorter-range missile
the radar can detect a missile at a range
defense, with an effective range of
of 1800 to 2000 km (about 1000 nm);
about 600 km. This version was tested
in rotating mode, detection range
off Hawaii in 2006 against ballistic
is roughly halved because the radar
missile targets.
puts much less energy onto a given
The missile defense exhibits
cell in space (detection range depends
represented a small proportion of
on how much energy pours onto a
the Euronaval show; what seems
target). A company representative
significant is that they were present at
commented that a rotatable radar
all. They suggest a shift in European
offered the political advantage that the
governmental attitudes, and probably
Russians would not consider it directed
also an increasing suspicion that
specifically against them (presumably
nothing short of an unacceptable
he had a land-based version in mind).
attack can prevent the Iranians from
The Royal Netherlands Navy is the
completing nuclear weapons and
launch customer.
mating them with ballistic missiles. t
Norman Friedman’s latest book is The
Naval Institute Guide to World Naval
Weapon Systems
Smart-L is integral to the DutchGerman naval air defense system using
Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force
destroyer JDS Haruna-photo by Michael Nitz
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
60
Book Reviews
supplies on anchored ships, and he was
readable prose author Wilson takes
not universally known and marvelled
apart the stories, but he is also to be
at for his everyday activities. These are
congratulated for a side-effect: in his
just repeated aspects of the tale – the
analysis he also tells the tale of Gallipoli.
story that many would rather believe.
Dust Donkeys and
Delusions
By Graham Wilson
So should the statue be melted
Not that Wilson stops with the
down, or all of them reassessed, for
simple. For example, he analyses the
in fact there are other statues, and
300 or so journeys Simpson is reputed
memorabilia. Wilson does not say
to have taken with his donkey, between
that Simpson should be dismissed,
the time of his landing and the day he
or forgotten. Rather, he is asking
was killed. The calculations eventually
for people to not affix qualities that
sound like an algebra problem: “if
are in the end rather insulting to the
one soldier with a donkey takes 105
ordinary bloke concerned, Private John
minutes to bring one casualty down to
Kirkpatrick Simpson.
the beach, how long will it take…” and
The book is well illustrated with
so on. Wilson shows convincingly that
black and white photographs of the
Simpson could not mathematically
time. An exhaustive collection of
have done what was ascribed to him.
notes, appendices, a bibliography,
Also analysed completely and
and an index will assist those who
Published by Big Sky Publishing for
the Army History Unit.
Softcover, 402 pages
Reviewed by Tom Lewis
competently are the other aspects of
wish to follow up any of this research
the story. Was Simpson “missed out
for themselves. Dust Donkeys and
for a Victoria Cross?” No, he wasn’t –
Delusions is well written; beautifully
in fact he wasn’t even recommended.
researched, and thoroughly
Was this due to some intransigence
recommended. t
It’s questionable as to whether the
author spends I think, too much time
Dr Tom Lewis recently exposed many
Australian War Memorial’s statue of
analysing the characters of two of these
myths of the battlefield in Lethality
Simpson and his donkey will have to
men: Colonel Howse, and Lieutenant
in Combat, a study of the realities of
be melted down after the revelations of
Colonel Sutton.
combat through six wars.
Dust Donkeys and Delusions, but as the
by those above him? No, although the
Did Simpson make “lightning
immortal Duke is reported to have said,
dashes” into dangerous ground to
it will be a near run thing. For author
rescue downed men? Was he at greater
Graham Wilson, in this comprehensive
risk than others? Was he revered by the
survey of the story, has demolished
Indian soldiers, and did he exert mystic
almost everything that Australia
command over animals? Did all on the
understands to be fact in the pervasive
Anzac peninsula mourn his death, with
myth of World War I’s Private Simpson
“a hush” falling over the battlefield?
and his donkey.
Was he technically “a deserter” from
I say “myth” deliberately here,
his real task? All this and more – to be
because Wilson has proved his case.
all of these things Simpson would have
He takes on the simple aspects of the
been a busy man who didn’t need sleep
story: Simpson was said to be a tall,
– are shown to be just part of the myth,
Australian, larrikin soldier with an
much of it growing after the campaign.
applauded sense of humour. Simpson,
In the end author Wilson shows
in fact, was from Britain, of a height of
Simpson to have been just an
about five foot eight inches – about 174
ordinary soldier, doing an ordinary
centimetres ; possessed an offence-free
job – one done by others too. It was
personal records, and was not, as per
not Simpson’s fault to have these
legend, given to drinking his mates’
stories made up about him, for he was
beer, leading a raid on officers’ food
dead by then. In calculated yet very
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
61
Issue 147
and details of their equipment; they
are particularly helpful for learning
recognition features that illustrate the
slight differences that existed between
them. I had not seen a photograph of
a Supermarine Seagull III on Australia
before she was fitted with a catapult
and found that image particularly
interesting. The line drawings by AD
Baker III and the colour artwork by
Eric Leon are excellent.
For modellers, the book reviews
every product from which models of
a County class cruiser can be created,
County Class Cruisers
By Les Brown
Seaforth Publishing
ISBN 978-1-84832-127-4
64 pages including line drawings,
coloured artwork and numerous
black and white photographs
£14.99 recommended
Reviewed by Commander David
Hobbs MBE RN (Ret’d)
some of which are now collectors’
items long out of production and only
available at specialist sales but most
are currently available. They range in
scale from 1:3000 for war-gamers to
Wingfield at War
By CAPT Mervyn Wingfield DSO DSC RN
1:128 for a floating, radio-controlled
Edited by Captain Peter Hore RN
model. Accessories that allow basic
Whittles Publishing, Caithness, 2012
www.whittlespublishing.com
hardback; 168 pages with 30 b/w
photos, GBP £16.99/ $US 21.95
recommended
ISBN 978-1-84995-064-0
kits to be improved are also described.
The central section includes colour
photographs of completed models,
including a 1:700 model of HMAS
Australia. Some of these are scratchbuilt and the spectacular close-up shots
of them allow levels of detail to be seen
Reviewed by Commander David
Hobbs MBE RN (Rtd)
This attractive monograph is the
that could not easily be picked out in
latest in a series that cover British,
black and white photographs of the
American, German and Japanese
real ship. If anyone reading this review
warships of World War II. Whilst
has ever thought of building a model
This is the first in a series of books to
intended primarily for ship modellers,
County class cruiser, this book will
be edited by Peter Hore and published
they contain a wealth of detail about
provide the stimulus to get started!
by Whittles in the UK which have as
individual ships that will not be found
However, this modestly-priced
their basis the previously unpublished
in other publications, including
paperback gives a lot of general detail
memoirs of people who were connected
coloured artwork that shows the
about the County class together with
with the sea. This autobiographical
camouflage schemes that distinguished
individual ship histories and will be
work by Mervyn Wingfield was written
several ships during the war. That for
of interest outside the ship-modelling
for his family and made available to the
HMAS Canberra shows her as she
community. I recommend County
editor by his son who also helped with
was in May 1942 after her last wartime
Class Cruisers to anyone who wants to
the selection of photographs. Peter
refit.
know more about these iconic ships. t
Hore has taken the original document
The first section gives details of
and set it into context by carefully
the class design and construction
adding footnotes and endnotes which
and the second describes the careers,
amplify references to people, places and
modifications and refits of individual
ships with which the modern reader
ships, those for HMA Ships Australia,
might not be familiar. He also provides
Canberra and Shropshire running to
an unobtrusive, historical framework
several pages. Photographs are well-
within which the story can be located.
chosen to illustrate different ships
Mervyn Wingfield was a submariner
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
62
Book Reviews
who commanded three boats, Umpire,
through the eyes of the author which are
navies have changed over time, and,
Sturgeon and Taurus during World
carefully edited to ensure their accuracy.
in turn, how the past continues to
War II; he did not serve with the RAN
I thoroughly recommend it. t
influence the way these navies see
but his stories of the RN from 1925
themselves today. Whereas most
onwards describe an organisation
studies concentrate on capability,
that will be familiar to generations of
this study also examines the ideas
Australians who were trained by or
behind naval contributions to national
who served with the RN. He spent
power. As maritime strategy in the
time on the China Station during the
21st century increasingly moves
1930s in the submarine Odin, sister
towards naval cooperation instead of
ship of the Otway and Oxley operated
confrontation – in Geoffrey Till’s words,
by the RAN between 1927 and 1931,
towards post-modern naval strategy
and writes of a way of life that is now
instead of modern naval strategy – the
almost forgotten with quiet humour
importance of the cultural dimension
that brings his adventures to life in
has increased.1 This book addresses the
the reader’s imagination. His wartime
intent, as well as the capability, of each
exploits included surviving a collision
South-East Asian navy.
The navies of South-East Asia have
in the North Sea; spending a winter
been neglected in contrast to the major
operating with the Russians in the
Arctic; penetrating a Norwegian
Fjord by passing through a minefield;
surfacing off St Nazaire in full view of
German guns to act as a navigation
marker for a raiding force; fighting
cavalry in the Northern Aegean and, not
least, commanding the first British boat
to sink a Japanese submarine.
Navies of South-East
Asia: A Comparative
Study
Asia-Pacific navies, particularly China
and Japan. In the past, perhaps not
surprisingly, considerable effort has
been applied to strategic and academic
James Goldrick and Jack McCaffrie
studies of the rise of China and the
Cass Series: Naval Policy & History, No. 50
Routledge, London & New York, 2013
States and its major allies. Unlike the
subsequent impact upon the United
great naval races of the early 20th
Reviewed by Dr Gregory P. Gilbert
century, however, when the global naval
experiences, especially those who held
Every year a number of publications,
navies were largely irrelevant. All navies
submarine command for as long as he
such as The Military Balance and Jane’s
operating in the Asia-Pacific today
did, but Mervyn Wingfield went on
Fighting Ships, report recent intelligence
must take the small to medium navies
to enjoy a successful post-war career,
on the world’s navies, Much of this
of South-East Asia into account, as
reaching the rank of captain. He
material is of considerable value as
the various navies are likely to play an
served in a number of appointments
it generates thoughts on how such
increasingly significant role.
including command of an air station,
physical changes influence our own
staff appointments and time as a
strategic outlook but often we are left
development of ten of the region’s
naval attaché. I particularly enjoyed
wanting more. There is a yawning gap
navies: the Royal Brunei Navy,
the account of his time in command
in our understanding of why each of the
Burma’s Navy, the Royal Cambodian
of the reserve fleet in the Gare Loch
world’s navies are changing, and of how
Navy, the Indonesian Navy, the Royal
in Scotland during the mid 1950s in
other nations see themselves applying
Malaysian Navy, the Republic of the
which he states, modestly, that he was
sea power. We need to enter the cultural
Philippines Navy, the Republic of
made an honorary member of the
dimension!
Singapore Navy, the Royal Thai Navy,
Many of his contemporaries
were ‘burned out’ by their wartime
Royal Northern Yacht Club principally
Navies of South-East Asia:
powers predominated and smaller
Stand-alone chapters detail the
the (now defunct) South Vietnam
because he was prepared to move
A Comparative Study provides
Navy, and the People’s Army of
a battleship or a cruiser to different
a comprehensive survey of the
Vietnam Navy. The development of
moorings in order to clear the yacht
development and operations of the
each navy is placed within its national
racing course.
navies of South-East Asia since the
context with considerations of
end of World War II. The authors use
1 Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the
Twenty-First Century, 2nd edn, Routledge,
London and New York, 2009, pp. 1-19.
Wingfield at War is a delightful book
that gives insight into historical events
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
history to describe how the selected
63
Issue 147
economic, technological, and national
South-East Asia and the Asia-Pacific
research. Skilled biography based on
development, as well as the origin of
century. Unlike many other books on
eyewitness interviews can be a most
the respective navies. For example, the
navies, this one puts the reader in the
effective pathway into the much larger
British Royal Navy exerts a ‘hidden’
same cultural mindset as those who
story within which a life was lived. So
influence on the strategic outlook
serve within the navies of our region.
it is with this excellent new biography
and operational effectiveness of the
It is a tool for peace and stability, for
of Lieutenant Sam Stening, RANVR,
Royal Malaysian Navy. In turn, this
cooperation and understanding, as well
by noted Australian naval historian Ian
has benefited and hindered the Royal
as for common values and customs.
Pfennigwerth.
Malaysian Navy’s development. The
This book is one of the building
Sam Stening was an inspirational
‘British model’ remains important for
blocks of the global maritime
RAN medical officer serving the needs
the navies of Malaysia and Singapore,
partnership which is needed to secure
of his fellow POWs working as slave
even today, just as it does for the
the maritime commons. Navies of
labourers in Japan for four long and
Australia and New Zealand navies.
South-East Asia should be mandatory
brutal years. Post war he was a pioneer
The US Navy’s methods differed
reading for all permanent naval
Australian neonatologist. This was a
significantly from the British, and
members who need to engage with
rare, if not unique medical career. The
affected the development of the South
their counterparts in regional navies. It
lives that Sam saved during his years of
Vietnamese, Philippine and Thai
should be kept within reach of anyone
captivity were those of men suffering
navies in an altogether different way.
involved with maritime strategy,
all the horrors and deprivations of life
The Indonesian Navy and the People’s
capability, intelligence, or international
as prisoners of Japan. For the rest of his
Army of Vietnam Navy experiences
engagement. Every ship and every base
medical career he kept alive the most
were, at one time or another, influenced
needs to have a copy at hand. t
tiny and fragile newborn premature
by a Russian approach, and again
babies. The common denominators
they generated both favourable and
between these two parts of his life were
unfavourable results. These ten chapters
his skill, ingenuity, compassion, and his
are unique and valuable, potted
determination never to give up while
histories of each South-East Asian navy
life continued to flicker. He claimed
over the last 70 years or so.
to be a merely a medical officer,
Both authors, James Goldrick
and to be, ‘not very brave.’ In reality
and Jack McCaffrie, have had long
he modelled from captivity, for his
and illustrious careers with the
generation, naval leadership in the very
Royal Australian Navy (RAN), and
highest traditions of both the medical
it shows. They both have extensive
branch and the wartime RAN and was
operational experience and are known
rightly decorated for his courageous
for their intellectual contribution to
leadership of men.
the RAN; however it is their in-depth
Sam Stening was a young Sydney
knowledge and experience in navy-
doctor who on the outbreak of war
to-navy engagement that comes to
volunteered for the RANVR. He was
the surface in Navies of South-East
Asia. In a thousand subtle ways, the
authors have navigated through dense
minefields, and avoided cultural
sensitivities, without holding back
when important stories needed to be
told. They do not kowtow to national
or political pressures and they are not
unintentionally biased in the way that
some Western authors (including some
Australians) often are.
The book is a direct and honest
guide for everyone who is interested in
In Good Hands: The Life
of Dr Sam Stening, POW
By Dr Ian Pfennigwerth
ISBN: 9780987227836
BELLONA 2012
www.publish-me.com.au
Reviewed by
LCDR Desmond Woods, RAN
Naval History, like all other history,
depends on good scholarship and
posted to HMAS Canberra to find his
feet as a new naval doctor. By June 1941
he was in HMAS Waterhen on the
“spud run” to Tobruk. On this most
hazardous of delivery runs Waterhen
was badly damaged by bombing and
later sank. Fortunately no lives were
lost in this first RAN ship lost to the
enemy in World War II. That escape
without lost of life is where the Navy
and Sam Stening’s luck ran out.
After leave and marriage to Olivia
in August 1941 he was posted to join
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
64
Book Reviews
Captain Hec Waller’s HMAS Perth
may have rested for posterity. In Good
holds lacked any sanitation and
which he found to be a highly efficient
Hands has corrected that omission in
previously healthy men died in as
and happy ship. He was the junior
public knowledge and done justice to a
little as ten days of heat exhaustion,
medical officer. He was not to see his
great Australian. This is a story of what
dysentery dehydration and despair. The
new wife for four years.
happened to Sam after Perth was lost.
survivors were barely fit to stand far
The first account intended for the
He faced a regime of callous,
less work when they arrived in Japan.
public of the life and death of HMAS
senseless beatings, indifference,
The stupidity of this inhumane regime
Perth in the Battle of Sunda Strait was
corruption and outright theft on the
seems never to have been a sufficient
written in 1953 by Ronald McKie in
part of the third rate Japanese troops
cause for moderating it in the interests
his book Proud Echo. McKie describes
and Koreans who made up the POW
of having men fit to work at the other
Sam Stening’s first weeks as a POW
guards. Sam negotiated for his men
end of the passage.
doctor treating his shipmate survivors:
with a succession of their equally
Sam for much of his captivity was
“…Many of the more severely
insensate Japanese officers who initially
the only officer in ‘other ranks’ camps
wounded did not survive the ordeal
treated reasonable requests by Sam
having to exercise command over
of the hours in the water, which
for improvements in sanitation and
traumatised men of many nationalities.
was covered densely with fuel oil.
for adequate food and medicines with
Rarely was he among Australians. This
Surgeon Lieutenant S.E.L.Stening,
contempt, and more violence, while
may partly explain why his reputation
RAN who was wounded, was
profiting personally from the misery
in his homeland has never been fully
amongst those saved: they were
they inflicted. Sam took the beatings
acknowledged and his name is hardly
picked up by a Japanese destroyer
and gradually wore down opposition by
known. Most of the men who, despite
and transferred to the Somedong
his dignity, logic and quiet courage.
his skilled ministrations died, most
POWs were forced to work in an
of the lives he saved or made more
Maru, on which they were
imprisoned for a week.
inefficient unskilled POW slave labour
bearable were American, Canadian or
After some days a Japanese Army
regime, demanding human muscle
British – not Australian.
surgeon came with two assistants
power in mines and docks, on a very
and good equipment, and with
low calorie diet. It resulted in semi-
not giving way to the incessant and
the help of Stening and a petty
starvation, lowered resistance, injury
inhuman demands of the Japanese for
officer dressed the wounds, though
and diseases. These included beri
slave labour from sick men while still
insufficient dressings were left for
beri, malaria, dysentery and diphtheria
retaining the ability to be influential
after care. Some 300 men were then
and the ever present weakness
with the camp commandants.
taken to Serang in trucks, where
and muscular wastage caused by
Remonstration without redress was
they were kept in the gaol and
emaciation. Clear evidence that men
pointless. Sam had to decide who got
cinema. Only after ten days were
were in a state of physical extremis was
the limited supply of Red Cross food
the medical officers released from
no impediment to their being made
and medication which got through to
the gaol cells. Stening had only a
to work 14 hour days in biting cold or
him after being pilfered by the hungry
dressings forceps and scissors and
suffocating heat using the last reserves
guards. The allocation of food was a
very few dressings with which to
of health and strength. The lack of
life and death decision which he had to
work and quite inadequate drugs
rest and food meant that strength
make daily for years. There was never
to treat the dysentery and malaria
was never able to be replenished
enough lifesaving medicine to go round
which soon beset the 600 men in the
before the gruelling pointless regime
and Sam had to use his ingenuity to
prison compounds. After a month,
resumed. Work and torture were
obtain more from local Japanese – at
during which two deaths occurred,
indistinguishable and equally lethal.
great risk to himself.
Stening and twelve other officers
Sam Stening was moved through
Sam had to tread the line between
In addition to the external enemy
were taken to Batavia and shipped
eight POW camps and was frequently
he had to deal with the hostility felt
to Japan….”
the only western trained doctor
by men who believed that they had
If Ian Pfennigwerth had not
available to treat hundreds of men
been betrayed by the actions of the
undertaken his research interviews for
who, like himself, had arrived in Japan
Dutch East Indies Government. Ian
this book McKie’s account is where the
in infamous “hell ships”. These were
Pfennigwerth writes of this: “Many if
public record of this remarkable but
cargo carriers where the conditions
not most of the American and British
little known RAN officer’s war service
below hatches in grossly overcrowded
survivors of the Battles in the Java
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
65
Issue 147
Sea brought with them not only the
he was effectively alone in command
teacher and physician.”
smouldering humiliation of their defeat
for years. It is hard to imagine a more
One of his former POW charges wrote:
and the burden of the memory of lost
testing set of circumstances for any
Sam often tried to prevent the
comrades, but the conviction that it
junior officer to be placed in. Sam’s last
bestial parades and beatings and
was ‘ all the fault of the Dutch’”. Sam
service to the prisoners was to prevent
was beaten himself. His request for
was called on to mediate and try to
them gorging themselves on food when
medicine paid off and rice dust was
resolve disputes which threatened to
the camps were liberated before they
allowed into the camp to add to the
tear the fragile multi-national POW
were ready for a normal diet. Those
rice food. Men were suffering from
community apart.
who ignored his advice died.
malnutrition, colds, bronchitis,
He also had to deal firmly with a
In 1945 Sam returned to Sydney and
dysentery, eye conditions, burns,
few uncontrolled NCOs from many
set about re-making his medical career
abrasions, bruises, broken bones,
nationalities who, in the absence of
and finally starting married life. When
frostbite. Men could not walk,
their officers, had plans for running the
a true understanding of the magnitude
many were unconscious. Imagine
camps as they saw fit without reference
of his achievement in captivity became
the Herclean effort by “the Doc”;
to legitimate military authority. In
known to the Australian Government
no letup for him.
the absence of the ability to enforce
Sam was awarded the Distinguished
It is appropriate that this book has
military justice or disciplinary
Service Cross. His medical colleagues
appeared in the 70th anniversary year
sanctions Sam used his intelligence and
knew little about his war service and
of the loss of HMAS Perth. Given all
moral force to largely keep a lid on this
Sam did not enlighten them.
that we know of her gallant Captain,
self interest and undue influence which
Sam was one of the pioneers
and his dedication to his men, one
were always incipient. He was dealing
engaged in creating the role of neonatal
must conclude that had Hec Waller
with starving, ill clothed conscripts,
paediatrician in Sydney. For many
lived to know of the service that Perth’s
who knew that not everyone was
years this was another rather solitary
newly joined junior medical officer was
going to survive the hell they were
battle as the majority of the medical
to perform while a prisoner of Japan
living through. It was his constant
establishment were unconvinced of the
he would have been full of admiration
moderating influence and care that
need for children’s specialists. Post war
and gratitude for the care and skill
prevented a “Lord of the Flies“ scenario
the general attitude of senior members
that Sam showed for Perth’s men and
being played out where the strong
of his profession was that children and
later so many others who had fallen
preyed on the weak and survival of the
babies were, medically speaking, just
into captivity. Sam waged war on
fittest became the only law.
small adults and could be successfully
the cruelty, neglect and barbarism of
treated by GPs. Sam led his junior
the camps that the Japanese Empire
junior medical officer to be dealing
colleagues in wining recognition that
administered. In the midst of bestiality
with such complex matters, providing
this was not so and that the care of
and despair he kept hope alive for men
leadership and ethical example to
the new born and sick young children
who needed to be in his good hands.
hungry men while retaining his own
needed specialist training and new
morale and sustaining others was
technology if the best results for infants
well illustrated new biography is
heroic. Australians rightly honour
and ‘sick kids’ were to be obtained.
highly recommended. It should be
the surgical skill, determination and
There must be thousands of Australians
read by Junior Officers studying
courage of Lieutenant Colonel Edward
now in mid life and older who owe
leadership. It will be of interest to all
‘Weary’ Dunlop as he protected and
their existence to Sam and his team’s
readers who care about the history
defended his exhausted men being
dedication to keeping them alive and
of the Navy’s medical branch and the
brutalised on the Burma railway.
oxygenated when they arrived in the
capacity for moral leadership of an
However ‘Weary’ was an experienced
world prematurely and jaundiced at the
RAN junior officer when required by
senior officer, with other more junior
Sydney Women’s Hospital in Crown
wartime circumstances to exceed all
officers with him to confide in and to
Street. His particular expertise was in
expectations of his rank and experience
share the burdens of command. Sam
the area of paediatric allergies. Sam
and to lead by serving his men. t
was experiencing the same mindless,
died in 1983. One of his colleagues
robotic violence directed at himself and
wrote: “ People who worked with him
his men, as Weary Dunlop and other
and his team had a great respect for his
senior officers of POW camps, but
clinical acumen. He was an excellent
For an inexperienced RANVR
This thoroughly researched and
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
66
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
67
Issue 147
O
rdered in the early 1960s to
in March 1965 at Defoe Shipbuilding
and naval gunfire support. During the
provide limited area air defence
in Bay City, Michigan, this photograph
1970s and 1980s the ships received
for the fleet, the three American
of Perth nearing completion shows
regular weapon, sensor and C2
designed Charles F Adams class guided
her Supply Officer, Commander Ian
upgrades and remained extremely
missile destroyers (DDG), HMA Ships
Crawford (left) and Executive Officer,
effective ships, Brisbane serving
Perth (II), Hobart (II) and Brisbane
Commander Ian Richards conferring
in the 1991 Gulf war providing
(II), introduced wholesale changes into
on the upper deck. Shortly thereafter
air defence and fighter control for
the RAN. Farther and faster than any
Perth began sea trials in Lake Huron
US Navy aircraft carriers. The last
previous developments, the need to
before formal commissioning at Boston
DDG decommissioned in 2001, her
absorb new technologies, an unfamiliar
on 22 May 1965.
withdrawal necessary due to high
naval lexicon and a modern computer-
The DDGs provide an excellent
personnel requirements and the
based logistic support system, pushed
example of the long-term flexibility
increasing cost of mechanical upkeep
the navy away from its British roots
of a well-designed warship. All three
rather than the obsolesence of her
and down the path towards becoming
were employed during the Vietnam
warfighting systems. t
a uniquely Australian service. Taken
War providing maritime interdiction
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
68
ANI On-line: A guide to the new website.
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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
69
Issue 147
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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
HMAS Anzac’s Ship’s Boarding
Team prepares for boarding
operations in international
waters in the Middle East Area
of Operations (MEAO). Since the
beginning of Operation SLIPPER
in 2001, Australia has maintained
a maritime contribution to
operations in the MEAO