Economics, Law and Political Science
Human Dignity as the Basis of Democratic Political Culture
PETRA KLEINDIENST, MATEVŽ TOMŠIČ
School of Advances Social Studies
Gregorčičeva 19, 5000 Nova Gorica
SLOVENIA
[email protected]; [email protected]
The presence of the concept of human dignity at a broad range of legal documents has been increasing
world-widely and it seems to be a fundamental concept in the democratic societies. The article tends to
introduce not only the meaning of human dignity as a legal concept but as the common ground of
democracy as well. According to the legal system and philosophical theory we elucidate the meaning
of characteristic of “inalienability” of human dignity. By explaining the Kant's theory and emphasizing
the existence of the two dimensions of human dignity, initial and realized dignity – both essential for
the complete idea of human dignity – the article reveals a great significance of human dignity. It
represents a foundation of stabilised, well-functioning democratic system, for mutual relations within
democratic society and as well as for self-realization of the each individual as a part of democratic
society at the same point.
Key-Words: democratic political culture, legal documents, human dignity, human being,
inalienability, values
Afterwards we continue with understanding
the meaning of the concept of human dignity in
the sense to be applicable in philosophic
discussions as well as in real life situations.
We refer to Immanuel Kant as the most
important philosopher regarding human dignity
and some other philosophers presenting their
understanding and interpretations of the entire
concept. Human dignity is often taken for
granted and there are some wide spread claims
that it is too abstract concept to be definable. In
our paper we elucidate the characteristics of
“inalienability” of human dignity revealing
two dimensions of human dignity, “initial” and
“realized” dignity. Our explanation is a good
basis for clarifying the contribution of the
concept of human dignity to democratic
Western society signifying human dignity as
“constitutive element” of human being.
1 Introduction
Values and behaviour patterns are highly
relevant for functioning of political system and
society as such. They are crucial elements in
the process of collective identification (see, for
example, Golob 2009, 2013; Golob et al. 2014;
Makarovič and Golob 2015). Hence it is
substantial to explore the political culture in
order to comprehend people’s behaviour
within political space. In our paper we refer to
democratic type of political culture. For
understanding the (democratic) political
culture we tend to explore its foundation
aiming to understand the relations between
basic elements that (democratic) political
culture consists of. Deep knowledge of the
foundation of the political culture enhances
better implementation of basic values, enables
realization of individuals tendencies taking
into consideration the common good.
In our paper, we discuss democratic
political culture, particularly its common
ground – concept of human dignity. We
emphasize the relevance of this concept from
legal perspective, explore the legal regulation
of human dignity on international, regional and
national level and represent the influence
between different levels of legal regulation.
ISBN: 978-1-61804-348-1
2 Character of democratic
political culture
Prevailing cultural patterns (i.e. relationships
between different types of these patterns)
strongly determine the nature of particular
institutional form (Lockhart, 1999). There are
certain values that are more compatible with
94
Economics, Law and Political Science
The modern democratic political orientation
is based on individualism, i.e. the propensity of
citizens to take responsibility for their interests
into their own hands (while collectivistoriented people are inclined to depend on the
government or another collective entity which
thus keeps them in a position of subjects).
People who follow patterns of democractic
political culture cherish freedom, autonomy
and the liberty of the individual, pluralism and
participative orientation of the population – in
terms of their propensity to participate in some
forms of political action (like signing a
petition, joining in boycotts, attending lawful
demonstrations etc.).
This type of political culture is important
factor of democratic performance or, as stated
by Lipset (1994), one of the requisites of
democracy. Cultural climate with strong selfexpression values where tolerance, trust and
participative orientation prevail induces, as
some theorists claim, more responsive and
responsible behaviour of political elites, thus
enhancing effectiveness of democracy (Welzel
2002; Welzel et al. 2003; Welzel and Inglehart,
2003).
These democratically compatible values are
not equally distributed and enrooted in
different societies. It is thus important to know
how different cultural patterns influence
formation of (non)democratic values. Among
researchers was particular interest devoted to
the relationship between democratic character
of society and prevailing religions orientations
in it. Namely, historical fact is that modern
democracy first appeared in countries where
different Protestant denominations were
predominant type of religion. They were the
first that established a stable democracy as a
form of governance. Unlike them, many
Catholic countries have had major problems
with the exercise of democracy and have long
been subject to various forms of
authoritarianism (this applies in particular to
countries of southern Europe and Latin
America). The researchers explain this
particularly by decentralised nature of
Protestantism and its emphasis on the
individual relationship of the believer toward
God (for example, individual reading of the
Bible, etc.). Meanwhile, Catholic religious
community is organised in highly hierarchical
way and the lay believers have less autonomy
in the religious life than it is the case in
democratic principles than others. These are
values that are related to the modern type of
personality that ought to possess following
common
features:
independence
from
traditional authorities and anti-dogmatic way
of thinking; interest for public issues; openness
for new experiences; orientation and planning
of future, i.e. ability of ‘pleassurecontainment’; confidence in science and
reason; and high expectations on cultural,
educational and professional field (Sztompka,
1994:133). These values are based on
autonomy of individual, mutual respect and
ability of rational communication.
This leads us to the concept of political
culture. If we deal with different aspects of
political culture, we must be aware of the
complexity of this concept. Particular elements
of political culture could be in different ways
related to different aspects of political system
or there could even be a tension between them
(see, for example, Berg-Schlosser and
Rytlewski 1993). As stated by Lucian Pye
political culture is »the set of attitudes, beliefs,
and sentiments which give order and meaning
to a political process and which provide the
underlying assumptions and rules that govern
behaviour in the political system« (Pye, 1968,
218), or, stated by Almond and Verba, »the
particular distribution of patterns of
orientations toward political objects among
members of the nation« (Almond and Verba,
1963: 13). It includes both political ideals and
political norms. Political culture is a
phenomenon that involves psychological and
subjective dimensions of politics; it is a
product of collective history of a political
system and is thus enrooted in public events as
well as in private experiences.
What is of our particular interest is
democratic political culture, i.e. values and
behaviour
patterns,
compatible
with
democratic principles and supportive of
democratic development. What is meant by
democratic political culture highly matches the
concept of civic culture as established by
Almond and Verba (1963) in their famous
comparative study on political culture in five
countries. They differed between three types of
political culture: parochial, subject and
participative culture. In this context, they
clearly stated that only participative culture,
based on autonomous and active individual, is
compatible with democratic political setting.
ISBN: 978-1-61804-348-1
95
Economics, Law and Political Science
democratic arrangements in some countries
with Confucian and Buddhist tradition (Japan,
South Korea, Taiwan).
(Political) culture is a multi-layered
phenomenon, composed of different elements
that exert different impact on the behaviour of
individuals and groups. Generally speaking,
one can discern between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’
culture (Walzer, 1994; Pye, 2003). While thick
culture is essential, coherent, deeply rooted in
socialisation
process,
geographically
homogeneous, durable and exogenous from
ordinary politics; thin culture is empirical, less
binding,
endogenous
(constructed),
heterogeneous, more changeable and more
rooted in recent experience (Pye, 2003: 7-8;
Mishler and Pollack, 2003: 239-243). The both
of them should not be perceived in a mutually
exclusive way. While the core attributes are
relatively thick (stabile), they are getting
thinned as one moves from the core to the
periphery. According to Mishler and Pollack,
more basic orientations, such as ideologies,
and orientations toward more fundamental
social objects such as nation religion, and
ethnicity, would be located to the conceptual
core where culture is more thicker; less
fundamental orientations, such as attitudes,
would be located further away from the core,
where the culture is relatively thinner; while
social and political values (individualism vs.
collectivism, materialism vs. post-materialism,
order vs. freedom etc.) would be located
somewhere in between (Mishler and Pollack,
2003: 245).
There is connection between attitudes and
other cultural elements like values and
identities. While some attitudes that reflect
people’s perception of political institutions and
actors, their performance and behaviour are
rather changeable, others are related to more
fundamental issues like understanding of the
nature of democracy and other types of
political rule. They are integral part of citizen
or civil competence that consists of those
attitudes and skills that are necessary for
successful governance (Soltan, 1999: 17). It
means the ability of the citizenry to play and
active role vis a vis political authorities in
terms of participation in political process and
monitoring over conduct of power-holders.
Democracy as the type of political order
rests on particular set of values and
behavioural orientations. They form what we
Protestantism (their relationship with God is
more indirect, through the Church hierarchy
and its dogmas), resulting in less autonomy
and equality in social (and thus also political)
relations as well (Tomšič, 2002).
In countries with other religious traditions
(Orthodox, Confucian, Islamic), introduction
of democratic rule was even less successful.
Here is separation between church/religious
and secular/political which characterizes the
tradition of Western Christianity and which is
undoubtedly an important contribution to
pluralisation and following democratisation
considerably less pronounced or is even
nonexistent. In Orthodox countries, such as in
Tsarist Russia, the political and religious
sphere were always closely related (the Tsar
was also head of the Orthodox Church), while
in Islam, religious sphere in general pervades
all areas of social life (including politics), so
we cannot talk about the institutional
autonomy of any of them. All these religious
environments emphasize hierarchy, order and
authority much more than freedom,
individualism and autonomy.
As stated by Alexis de Tocquevile in his
famous study on democracy in America,
separation between religious and political
beliefs is important for the development of
democracy since in this way the political
behaviour is not mere implementation of some
standards that are set by the absolute authority.
However, value systems have been
changing in with them also their relation
towards democracy. Nowadays, democracy is
established in every European and vast
majority of Latin American countries where
Catholicism is prevalent faith. This is a
consequence of change in the prevailing
system of values of these companies. To be
sure, there were also different social and
economic factors that contributed to this
change. However, one has also mention the
important role played by the Catholic Church
which since the second half of the 1960s
actively opposed the various dictatorial
regimes, both at the level of the universal
church as well as at the level of individual
countries where many clerics actively acted in
support of democratic change while their
organizations
harboured
pro-democratic
individuals and groups (Huntington, 1993: 7778). Furthermore, there was an introduction of
ISBN: 978-1-61804-348-1
96
Economics, Law and Political Science
for many legal documents. UDHR initially
stresses human dignity in Preamble: “Whereas
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the
equal and inalienable rights of all members of
the human family is the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace in the world…” and
continues with famous statement of Article 1:
“All human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights.” (See also Article 22 and
Article 23). Later acceptance of three core
international documents on human rights (The
International Covenants on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR, GA res. 2200A (XXI), 21 UN
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, UN Doc. A/6316
(1966); 999 UNTS 171); on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, GA res. 2200A
(XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49,
UN Doc. A/6316 (1966); 993 UNTS 3); on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (GA res.
2106 (XX), Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966), 660
U.N.T.S. 195) again underlined the importance
of human dignity. Several other international
conventions highlight the human dignity as
well: Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief (GA res. 36/55, 36
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 171, U.N. Doc.
A/36/684, 1981); Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (G.A. res. 39/46,
[annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197,
U.N. Doc. A/39/51, 1984); Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women (G.A.
res. 48/104, 48 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at
217, U.N. Doc. A/48/49, 1993)…
International legal documents concerning
human dignity influenced on regional legal
documents (for example African, Arabic, InterAmerican, European). We will exemplify this
influence with explanation how human dignity
is included in European Union (EU)
documents and documents of Council of
Europe.
It is interesting that European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR, ETS No. 5,
213 U.N.T.S. 222) as the core of Council of
Europe, despite its reference in the Preamble to
the UDHR, does not mention human dignity
explicitly. In contrast to the ECHR text, the
emphasis on human dignity is more prominent
and noteworthy in case law of European Court
for Human rights (ECtHR) - see for example
call democratic political culture. However, it
value system has its underlying property from
which all those interrelated values derive. We
can find this fundament in the concept of
human dignity.
3 Human dignity as legal concept
In contemporary democratic Western societies,
one can perceive a tendency toward autonomy
and freedom. Simultaneously, there is an
inclination to sustain society which is
characterised with people’s respect to each
other in order to reach and maintain “common
good”. Democratic political culture unifies all
mentioned goals and enables their achievement
(Damij et. al 2015) on the basis of the concept
of human dignity, which is important from
legal as well from philosophic perspective.
Human dignity as a foundation of
democratic political culture is significantly
reflected on legal ground at international,
regional and national level. Firstly we will
explore the relation between international law
and human dignity. In this regard we refer to
thought that international law must be deeply
rooted in a respect for human dignity (Capps,
2009, 9). This thinking goes in line with
international legal documents that mention
human dignity and place it as their foundation.
Especially since 1945, the mentioning of
human dignity has enormously increased (as a
reflection of atrocities committed during
Second World War) and commonly spread in
international
and
humanitarian
legal
instruments. Development of the concept of
human dignity on international level influences
on the regional and national legal documents
as well. Nowadays we can signify it as widely
spread and endorsed concept.
Initially we cannot neglect the importance
of UN Charter (26 June 1945, 59 Stat 1031,
UNTS 993, 3 Bevans 1153) which mentions
human dignity in the Preamble: “…to reaffirm
faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person, in the
equal rights of men and women and of nations
large and small…” Universal declaration of
human rights (UDHR, GA Res 217A (III), UN
Doc A/810, at 71, 1948) regarding the human
dignity means the “culmination of a significant
historical evolution of the concept”
(McCrudden 2008, 656) and serves as a basis
ISBN: 978-1-61804-348-1
97
Economics, Law and Political Science
Charter of fundamental rights of the European
Union (EU network of independent experts on
fundamental rights, 2006, 24) European court
of justice (ECJ) expressively acknowledged
human dignity as an objective principle of EU
law (Community law) very late (Judgement of
the ECJ, Netherlands v. Parliament and
Council, Case C-377/98, October 9, 2001,
paragraph 70. See also the opinion of Advocate
General Jacobs). By this judgement, ECJ has
determined the place of human dignity in EU
Law trying to “ensure that the fundamental
right to human dignity and integrity is
observed”. We can perceive some implications
on human dignity earlier as well, for example
the opinion of Advocate General Mr. Jacobs
(Judgement
of
the
ECJ,
Christos
Konstantinidis v Stadt Altensteig, Case C168/91, 30 March 1993): “the state must
respect not only the physical well-being of the
individual but also his dignity, moral integrity
and sense of personal identity”. In regard with
Article 1 of the Charter the protection of
human dignity is the “source of the guarantee
of human rights and fundamental freedom” and
“the dignity of the human person is part of the
substance of the rights laid down in the
Charter” (EU network of independent experts
on fundamental rights, 2006, 28).
Pertaining to the case Omega of the ECJ,
opinion of Advocate General, Mrs. Stix-Hackl
(Judgment of the ECJ, Omega Spielhallen- und
Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH
v
Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn,
Case C-36/02, October 14, 2004), “human
dignity is an expression of the respect and
value to be attributed to each human being on
account of his or her humanity. It concerns the
protection of and essence or nature of the
human being per se – that is, to say – the
“substance” of mankind”. The opinion refers
also to some international documents saying
that UDHR, ICESCR and ICCPR “recognise
the inherent dignity of all members of the
human family as forming the basis of human
rights although without human dignity itself
being made a separate human right”.
This quotations implies that human dignity
is not perceived (at least from legal
perspective) as human right itself but more as
concept representing the foundation for all
human rights. It belongs to all the people in
equal extent just for the reason they are human
beings, no matter whether they are acting in
the judgement of ECtHR, 4th section, Pretty v.
The United Kingdom, application no. 2346/02,
29 April 2002. The latter clearly underscores
the respect for human dignity and human
freedom as the very essence of ECHR. Despite
the lack of indications on human dignity in
ECHR, several later documents of Council of
Europe refer to human dignity directly:
European Social Charter (ETS No. 163, 1996);
Convention
on
Human
Rights
and
Biomedicine (ETS No. 164, 1997).
On the level of EU (meaning primary and
secondary European Union law) human dignity
is perceived as a substantial general principle
which all member states of EU are led by.
Human dignity is explicitly (by written word)
mentioned in primary law of EU only since
Lisbon treaty (13 December 2007, entered into
force on 1 December 2009; consolidated
versions of the Treaty on European Union and
the Treaty on the functioning of the European
Union, Official journal of the European Union,
2010/C 83/01). Treaty on European Union as a
part of Lisbon treaty mentions human dignity
in Article 21 and Article 2. The latter has also
the substantial meaning for understanding the
core values of EU: “The Union is founded on
the values of respect for human dignity,
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law
and respect for human rights, including the
rights of persons belonging to minorities.
These values are common to the Member
States in a society in which pluralism, nondiscrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity
and equality between women and men
prevail.”
Treaty on European Union (Article 6: “The
Union recognises the rights, freedoms and
principles set out in the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union of
7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on
12 December 2007, which shall have the same
legal value as the Treaties.”) refers to EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights, Official
journal of the European Union, 2010/C 83/02
(Charter) which is also placed in the field of
primary law of EU. Thereby Treaty on
European Union recognises all the principles
set out in the Charter. Charter mentions human
dignity in the Preamble, Article 1, Article 25
and Article 31. Considerable meaning has
Article 1 with title “human dignity”: “Human
dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and
protected.” According to Commentary of the
ISBN: 978-1-61804-348-1
98
Economics, Law and Political Science
circumstances. It depends only on the fact
being human as such.
Despite extensive legal documents and
interpretations on the concept of human dignity
it appears a question, how to explain wide
spread common characteristic of inalienability
of human dignity. Our exploring concerns also
the most important philosopher Immanuel
Kant who is considered even as a »father of the
modern concept of human dignity« (Bognetti,
2003, 66). Here we refer to the following
question: “Does the word “inalienable” mean
that no one is able to take human dignity away
from someone or rather that no one should take
it away?” With other words, is one really not
able to destroy human dignity (inalienability in
descriptive sense) or rather no one should
violate it or take it away (inalienability in
prescriptive sense)? (Ni, 2014, 174-178). How
to clear up this confusion?
- If inalienability implies that one has no
possibilities to take human dignity away
(inalienability in descriptive sense), further
follows the dilemma why there is an
existence of many legal documents in
order to protect and keep human dignity?
Why would someone protect something
that is impossible to destroy? If human
dignity is inalienable in descriptive sense,
there is no necessity for special
enhancement, fortification and protection.
- If inalienability implies prohibition of
violating human dignity (inalienability in
prescriptive sense), further follows the
question: is one able to violate only the
partial extent of human dignity or full
extent as well? Furthermore, would total
deprivation, reduction of human dignity
denote the destruction of human being’s
essence?
Our solution of above described (complex
and very relevant) dilemma does not neglect
any of mentioned facts and offers entire
clarification of human dignity in descriptive
and prescriptive sense. Our key to explain the
“inalienability” of human dignity cumulates
both claims: nobody is able to take away
someone's dignity as well as nobody should
take it away. How to interpret and argue our
crucial statement? For creating our solution we
refer to distinction between two dimensions of
human dignity: initial and realized dignity.
Regarding the literature expression “two
dimensions” indicates “two conceptions”, “two
line with law or against the law, children or
elderly, foreigners or citizens, they are all
endowed with the same extent of inherent
human dignity. For example a delinquent has
exactly the same amount of human dignity as
all other people and must be respected as the
human being with own value with all rights
and duties deriving from it.
We want to stress the substantial connection
between human dignity and democratic
society. Human dignity is nowadays placed in
the core of modern democratic constitutional
systems. German constitutional regulation of
human dignity is for example very explicit and
followed by many legal documents. Therefore
human dignity is recognised as the "highest
value of the Basic Law, informing the
substance and spirit of the entire
document", as "fundamental constitutional
principle dominating all parts of the
constitution" (Walter, 1998, 16). Moreover the
significant connection is emphasized by above
mentioned
regional
and
international
documents as well judicial interpretations. For
example ECtHR emphasizes that “tolerance
and respect for the equal dignity of all human
beings constitute the foundations of a
democratic, pluralistic society” (Judgement of
ECtHR, Case of Gündüz v. Turkey,
Application no. 35071/97, December 4, 2003,
paragraph 40). By signifying human dignity as
the essence of democracy and as the
foundation of democratic political culture, one
is able to self-determinate and self-realize
own-self in regard with principles of reaching
and sustaining the common good.
4 The meaning of the concept of
human dignity: revelation of two
dimensions of human dignity
In classical Roman thought the concept of
dignitas hominis meant “status”. Appointment
to particular public offices brought with it
dignitas (McCrudden, 2008, 656; see also
Lebech, 2004). Considerable shift forward in
contemporary society in comparison with
Roman thought represents the general principle
that possession of human dignity and its extent
are not dependent on person’s social status,
characteristics, behaviour or any other
ISBN: 978-1-61804-348-1
99
Economics, Law and Political Science
take away someone's dignity. In regard with
this dimension of human dignity is impossible
to ruin the essence of human.
The second dimension of human dignity is
realized dignity. As initial dignity implies that
dignity cannot be entirely taken away due to its
inalienability, realized dignity implies that
dignity could still be damaged or violated.
Here we pertain to Formosa and Mackenzie’s
(2014, 877) characteristics of what they call
“achievement dignity”: not permanent or stable
property (it could be just temporary) and not a
matter of degree therefore a person can have a
bigger or smaller extent of dignity than others.
When we say that someone lost his/her dignity
we have in mind the realized dignity.
“Dignified behavior” thus relates to realized
dignity and refers to behavior appropriate to
status of a subject who is endowed with initial
dignity (See Sensen, 2011, 146). And even if
entire realized dignity of a man is eroded and
destroyed, he/she still possesses the initial
dignity as the essence of each person. The
degree of realized dignity depends on two
elements, both inevitably necessary for
possessing the full extent of realized dignity:
- my attitude towards myself (self-respect)
- my respect or attitude towards others (and
vice versa).
Man is independent, rational, capable of selfdetermination and able to take decisions on the
basis of his/her own free will. Due to this
ability to use free will a man must be regarded
as a subject, never as a mean. Mentioned
thinking has its deep root in Kant’s philosophic
theory. In regard with our concept of human
dignity we refer to the following practical
imperative: »Act so that you use humanity, as
much in your own person as in the person of
every other, always at the same time as end
and never merely as means« (Kant, 2002, [Ak
4:429]). It is often called »dignity principle« or
»principle of humanity« (Monteiro, 2014,
206).
The scheme described above helps to
understand substantial concept of human
dignity as a ground of democratic political
culture, which all other elements of democratic
political culture derive from. It offers also the
explanations on relation between human
dignity and elements as human rights, freedom,
solidarity, tolerance etc.
sub concepts”, “two types” of human dignity.
We are using rather our own term in regard
with advanced understanding and clarification
of the entire concept. The terms “initial” and
“realized” dignity are used also by Sensen
(2011, 162-163) to explain difference between
traditional and contemporary paradigm
regarding the concept of human dignity (See
also Giesinger, 2012, 609-620); by Formosa
and Mackenzie (2014, 875-892): “status
dignity” and “achievement dignity”; by
Neuhäuser and Stoecker (2014, 298-309):
“human dignity” and “dignity proper”; by
Schroeder (2010, 118-125): “inviolable
dignity” and “aspirational dignity”; by Darwall
(1977, 36-49): “appraisal respect” and
“recognition respect”.
Initial dignity, as the first dimension of the
concept of human dignity, denotes respectworthy status because human has an absolute
inner worth. It indicates standing that sets the
demand for esteem and respectful treating or
behavior. With other words, we have to respect
a human being due to his/her “initial dignity”.
Taking into consideration the fact that all the
people are endowed with “initial dignity” only
for the reason they are human beings, we are
drawing the conclusion, that “initial dignity” is
the essence of human. It derives from human
nature as such and differentiate human beings
from other species. According to Kant, it
ennobles human being before all creatures
(Kant, 2007, [9:489]). Initial dignity
constitutes a human being therefore we signify
it as “constitutive element”, inseparable
element of human being.
We enrich our explanation of “initial
dignity” with Formosa and Mackenzie’s (2014,
877) characteristics of what they call “status
dignity”: permanent, stable and not a matter of
degree. Being human thus means to be a bearer
of “initial dignity”. The clarification of initial
dignity goes in line with some Kant’s
denotations of human dignity as inner,
unconditioned and incomparable worth. Kant
implies that having dignity means to be
elevated above all price, and to admit no
equivalent. He explains how we can
distinguish the price from dignity. If something
has a price it has a relative value. What has a
price is such that something else can also be
put in its place as its equivalent (Kant, 2002,
[Ak 4:434-436]). The initial dignity perfectly
elucidates our statement that nobody is able to
ISBN: 978-1-61804-348-1
100
Economics, Law and Political Science
work?, Intricate web of factors beyond money
and prestige, PloS one, Vol. 10, No. 7, 2015.
4. Huntington, Samuel. 1993. The Third Wave:
Democratization in the Late Twenieth Century,
University
of
Oklahoma
Press,
Norman&London.
5. Bognetii, Giovanni. 2003. »The concept of
human dignity in European and U.S.
constitutionalism«: European and U.S.
Constitutionalism. Paper presented at Unidem
Seminar, European commission for democracy
through law. Göttingen, 23-24 May.
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/document
s/default.aspx?pdffile=CDLSTD%282003%29037-e.
6. Capps, Patrick. 2009. Human Dignity and
the Foundations of International Law. Oxford:
Hart
Publishing.
http://gen.lib.rus.ec/book/index.php?md5=278
64f204d766ea0f7757d89be295c82
7. Darwall, Stephen. 1977. “Two Kinds of
Respect” Ethics 88 (1): 36–49.
8. Formosa, Paul, and Catriona Mackenzie.
2014. “Nussbaum, Kant, and the Capabilities
Approach to Dignity.” Ethical Theory and
Moral Practice, no. January: 1–18.
doi:10.1007/s10677-014-9487-y.
9. Giesinger, Johannes. 2012. “Kant on Dignity
and Education.” Educational Theory 62 (6):
609–20. doi:10.1111/edth.12000.x.
10. Golob, Tea, Sebastjan Kristovič and Matej
Makarovič, European transnational social
fields and identifications: the significance of
transnational participation and structured
positions in the individual and national
context, European Journal of Science and
Theology, Vol. 10, No. 5, 2014, pp. 1-20.
11. Golob, Tea, Slovenian migrants in
transnational
social
spaces:
exploring
multilayered identifications and ambivalent
belongings. Anthropological notebooks, vol.
15, No. 3, 2009, pp. 65-77.
12. Golob, Tea, Imagining a home in a world
of flux: challenging individualisation and
transnational belongings, Polish Sociological
Review, Vol. 182, No. 2, 2013, pp. 153-164.
13. Kant, Immanuel. 2007. Anthropology,
History, and Education. Ed. by Robert B.
Louden and Günter Zöller. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
14. Kant, Immanuel. 2002. Groundwork for the
Metaphysics of Moral. Trans. and ed. by Allen
W. Wood; With essays by J.B. Schneewind,
5. Conclusion
Democracy does not appear and develop in an
“empty space”. It needs certain cultural
conditions for its prosperity. We are speaking
about value orientations and behavioural
patterns that compose democratic political
culture and which both elites and general
public adhere to. Without this, democratic
institutions can easily became mere facade
under which practices that have nothing to do
with the “spirit of democracy” take place.
Without this, negative phenomena like
clientism and corruption can get their
momentum (see, for example, Prijon 2012).
Weakly enrooted democratic culture can pose
serious problems for societal steering (see, for
example, Rončević and Makarovič 2010, 211;
Makarovič et al. 2014; Makarovič 2000),
harming performance of institutions (for
specific example see Makarovič et al, 2011)
and hindering political and social participation
(Makarovič and Rek, 2014).
Democratic political culture is composed of
several more or less compatible and
interrelated elements. These elements rest on
the concept of human dignity. The later
represents a foundation of stabilised, wellfunctioning democratic system, for mutual
relations within democratic society and as well
as for self-realization of the each individual as
a part of democratic society at the same point.
As normative architecture of democratic
polity derives from the concept of human
dignity, the institutions of this very type of
political setting (especially judicial system) are
designed to protect dignity of its people.
Relationship between institutional system and
cultural platform of society is thud mutually
reinforcing.
References:
1. Almond, Gabriel A. and Sydney Verba.
1963 The Civic Culture. Boston: Little, Brown
and Company.
2. Berg-Schlosser, Dirk in Rytlewski, Ralf.
1993. »Political Culture in Germany: A
Paradigmatic Case«, v: Berg-Schlosser, Dirk in
Rythlewski, Raff (ur.), Political Culture in
Germany, Macmillan Press, Houndmills, 3-12.
3. Damij, Nadja, Levnajić, Zoran, Rejec Skrt,
Vesna, Suklan, Jana. What motivates us for
ISBN: 978-1-61804-348-1
101
Economics, Law and Political Science
Marcia Baron, Shelly Kagan, and Allen W.
Wood. New Heaven: Yale University Press.
15. Lebech, Mette. 2004. “What Is Human
Dignity?” Maynooth Philosophical Papers, 2:
59-69.
http://eprints.nuim.ie/392/1/Human_Dignity.pd
f.
16. Lockhart, Charles. 1999. 'Cultural
contributions to explaining institutional form,
political change and rational decisions',
Comparative Political Studies, vol. 32, no. 7,
pp. 862-893.
17. Makarovič, Matej and Tea Golob,
Increasing fluidity of identifications in the
context of individualisation: identification with
the European Union. International social
science journal, 2015, pp. 1-13.
18. Makarovič, Matej and Mateja Rek, Power
and Influence-Based Political Participation in
European Democracies., Sociológia, Vol. 46,
No. 6, 2014, str. 686-705.
19. Makarovič, Matej, Janez Šušteršič in Borut
Rončević, Is Europe 2020 Set to Fail? : the
cultural political economy of the EU grand
strategies, European Planning Studies, Vol.
22, No. 3, 2014, pp. 610-626.
20. McCrudden, Christopher. 2008. “Human
Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human
Rights.” European Journal of International
Law 19 (4): 655–724. doi:10.1093/ejil/chn043.
21. Mishler, William and Detlef Pollack. 2003.
‘On Culture, Thick and Thin: Toward a NeoCultural Synthesis. In: Detlef Pollack, Jörg
Jacobs, Olaf Müller and Gert Pickel (eds.):
Political Culure in Post-Communist Europe.
Aldershot: Ashgate.
22. Monteiro, A. Reis. 2014. Ethics of Human
Rights. Springer International Publishing.
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-03566-6.
23. Ni, Peimin. 2014. “Seek and You Will Find
It; Let Go and You Will Lose It: Exploring
Confucian Approach to Human Dignity.” Dao
13: 173–98. doi:10.1007/s11712-014-9381-2.
24. Neuhäuser, Christian and Stoecker, Ralf.
2014. “Human dignity as universal nobility.”
In: The Cambridge Handbook of Human
Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, edited
by Marcus Düwell, Jens Braarvig, Roger
Brownsword and Dietmar Mieth. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 298–309.
25. Prijon, Lea. Clientelism and Slovenian
Public
Administration
Reform.
Polish
Sociological Review, No. 189, pp. 545-560.
ISBN: 978-1-61804-348-1
26. Pye, Lucian. 1968. 'Political Culture'. In:
D.L. Sills (ed.): International Encyclopedia of
the Social Sciences. London and New York:
The Macmillan Company and the Free Press.
27. Pye, Lucian. 2003. 'Culture as Destiny'. In:
Detlef Pollack, Jörg Jacobs, Olaf Müller and
Gert Pickel (eds.): Political Culure in PostCommunist Europe. Aldershot: Ashgate.
28. Schroeder Doris. 2010. “Dignity: one, two,
three, four, five, still counting.” Camb Q
Healthc Ethics. 19 (1):118-125. doi:
10.1017/S0963180109990302.
29. Soltan, Karol E. 1999. 'Civic Competence,
Attractiveness and Maturity'. In: Stephen L.
Elkin and Karol. E. Soltan (eds.): Citizen
Competence and Democratic Institutions, The
Pennsylvania
State
University
Press,
University Park, 17-37.
30. Sztompka, Piotr. 1994. The Sociology of
Social Change. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Tomšič, Matevž. 2002. Politična stabilnost v
novih demokracijah. Ljubljana: ZPS.
31. Walter, Christian. 1998. “Human Dignity
in German Constitutional Law.” In The
Principle of Respect for Human Dignity:
Proceedings of the UniDem Seminar.
European Commission for Democracy through
Law.
Montpellier,
France.
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/document
s/CDL-STD(1998)026-e.aspx.
32. Waltzer, Michael. 1994. Thick and Thin
Moral Arguments at Home and Abroad. Notre
Dame.
33. Welzel, Christian. 2002. “Effective
Democracy, Mass Culture, and the Quality of
Elites: The Human Development Perspective”,
International
Journal
of
Comparative
Sociology, Vol. 43 (3-5), 317-350.
34. Welzel, Christian and Ronald Inglehart.
2001. Human Development and the
“Explosion” of Democracy. WZB, Discussion
Paper, WZB: Berlin.
35. Welzel, Christian, Ronald Inglehart and
Hand-Dieter Klingemann. 2003. “The theory
of human development: A cross-cultural
analysis”, European Journal of Political
Research, Vol. 42 (3), 341-379.
102