The changing diplomacy of emerging middle powers: from
colonial independence to global governance
Tabata Magela Guimaraes Lima
University of London
Paper prepared for the IAPSS World Congress 2017
Budapest, Hungary
Abstract
The world order is constantly changing and so should the tools of statecraft. Diplomatic
practice must adapt to better fit the interest of the country it is serving. This is
especially true for new middle powers, which since their independence during the 19 th
and 20th century have been increasing their influence in the diplomatic arena. This
paper argues that countries like Brazil, South Africa and India have raised their position
in the international structural hierarchy and with that upgrade, they demand the
reform of the economic and political systems that are currently in place. Emerging
middle powers have been using multilateral channels to implement their national
interests in institutions like the World Trade Organization and the United Nations, but
always using their position as regional powers as a way of soft power. This paper
concludes that soft power alone cannot achieve the goal of a multipolarity and a fair
and representative global governance. According to the Realist Theory of International
Relations, great powers will not give up their interests or their world power for states
that, not so long ago, were considered as merely 'areas of imperial, commercial or
missionary expansion' (Nicolson, 1979). Some hard power will be needed to get the
changes in the status quo that they want and as history has shown, theses changes
may not come peacefully.
Keywords: diplomacy, middle powers, multilateralism, hard power, soft power
Introduction
Autonomy through participation’ (Vigevani and Ceoaluni 2007; Hurell 2008) was the
foreign policy doctrine embraced by FHC, premised on the ‘Grotian’ idea that longstanding national interests such as development and autonomy could be achieved in a
globalized and non-bipolar world by adjusting the domestic economic and political
model to ‘universal’ (meaning Western) standards, diversifying external relations, and
increasing Brazil’s role in multilateral for a on wide range of issues, including
development, security, the environment, and democracy. (Tickner, 2008)
Carl von Clausewitz in his nineteenth-century writing on war and morality applied the
term [middle power] to states that were geographically lodged between great powers,
and navigated their precarious geopolitical situation with diplomatic skill (Spies, 2016).
In order to qualify as a middle power, a state would have to be reasonably strong itself
– at least able to defend itself or offer substantive assistance to others – and would
require a reputation as ‘friendly’ and ‘reliable’ (Holbraad 1984: 23). With the expansion
of the international society, geography is no longer a requisite to be in “between great
powers”, but the definition of middle powers as friendly and reliable applies perfectly
until today.
Middle powers are known for their strategy of soft power. Diplomacy is their best
strength and their best weakness. Soft power will only get them so far. To really get
where they want to be a little more “hard power” will be needed.
This paper is the birth of an academic research and interest of mine. It plays with a
brighter future for emerging powers, including my own country, Brazil. It is a work in
progress. It starts with a research about the starts by defining what power and middle
power is. There is a lot of controversy on this theme and a clear definition is always
needed before the beginning of any such research.
The second part goes deeper into the emerging powers’ foreign policy, how they use
soft power as a strategy, but how hard power may be mandatory to accomplish their
real goals.
The third and final part digs into historical moments when the global power shift. It
gives three situations when changes in the status quo occurred and how they started
or were consequences of a war.
Middle powers are pragmatic and that is the secret of their success. They have the
luxury to being above and command small powers, yet they do not have the
responsibility to “police” the world, as great powers are expected to do. When they go
through internal crisis and lose some of their influence, they just become irrelevant in
international circles, it never gives reason for global panic, especially in trade and
economy. They can pursue their national interest and realism and other International
Relations theories cannot tell they are acting unilaterally or selfish – mostly because
they are not looking. Emerging middle powers are the future of international order.
They are new, they are fresh, they will soon be ready for a fight.
What are Middle Powers?
“The strong do what they can [what they have the power to do] and the weak accept
what they must [have to accept]” (Thucydides 1954: 118)
As many analysts would agree, defining power is not an easy task. There are many
conflicting theories of what attributes and categories should be considered when
calculating a state's influence over others. However, most scholars argue that power is
measured by capabilities. The size of a country's economy and its military are
important to measure capabilities, but they are not the only relevant points. According
to Christopher Hill, in his book The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, culture and
diplomacy are also factors to be included on the list.
Figure 1.1 Resources, capabilities and instruments (Source: Christopher Hill)
K. J. Holsti goes further and gives a definition of power as a combination of influence
and capabilities. Holsti argues that “power is (1) the act (process, relationship) of
influencing other factor; (1) it includes the capabilities used to make the wielding of
influence successful; and (3) the responses to the act” (Holsti, 1964).
Figure 1.2 (Source: K. J. Holsti)
So, when talking about the relation between power and states, is it common to
structure them in a hierarchy – great, middle and small powers. As Chris Alden wrote
“Underlying each of these categories is an acknowledgement that they represent a
different capacity for independent action within the international system, producing
distinctive strategies that inform their foreign policy and engendering a diversity of
relationships between states and international organisations” (Alden, 2006). But which
state should be included in which category is still a matter of debate. For example,
Laura Neack considers the United States as being the only great power, while other
powerful countries like Great Britain, Japan and Germany, together with regional and
traditional middle power, are categorized as secondary powers, meaning they “lack the
power requisites to be central, major powers [..] and stand behind the single great
power” (Neack, 2003). In contrast, Peripheral Realist Carlos Escude gives a more
complex division of power, by separating countries into three hierarchical types - rulemakers (UNSC Great Five plus Germany), rebels (Iran, North Korea) and rule-takers –
plus several subcategories. Many definitions have very interesting points, but I will save
them for a future discussion. For now, I would like to use the definition of middle
powers given by Yolanda Kemp Spies in the SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy
(Constantinou et al, 2016). Spies separates traditional middle power from new middle
powers. In one hand, she defines traditional powers as states that use “niche
diplomacy” to have global reach, since they lack superpower capabilities (Spies, 2016).
And although that may also be a feature of emerging powers, traditional powers
distinguish themselves by the wish to maintain the status quo. This category of states is
usually self-determined middle powers, as is the case of Canada in 1942 (Chapnick,
2000:189), followed by Australia, Japan and the Scandinavian countries (Spies, 2016).
On the other hand, new powers or emerging powers argue that the current
international system is unfair and unrepresentative and use their strong diplomatic and
multilateral influence to change the status quo. They are, in their majority, semiperipheral states, regional hegemons and act as leader and representatives of the
developing world.
Using Holsti’s analysis of power by combining capabilities and influence may be the
best way to understand how the emerging powers have reached the position that they
are today. Their physical capabilities are limited, compared to the great and
superpowers, but that does not stop them from using every diplomatic resource in
their hands to influence the international system at a multilateral level. Another
strategy to get more influence is to use their positions as regional powers. If we
consider regionalism as a microcosm, emerging powers are the hegemons and many
times they act as the region’s spokesperson in conferences and negotiations. And
demonstrating the “ability to maintain order and stability” is “considered a crucial step
towards acceptance of global power” (Tickner, 2012).
Is soft power enough?
Emerging middle powers have proven to be resilient. Not only have they fought against
colonialism, after their independence they been through many internal and territorial
crises and yet they have risen to the top of the list of world’s greatest economies. Brazil
went through a military dictatorship, South Africa experienced Apartheid and India’s
immense social problems, plus a dispute with its neighbour, Pakistan, both of which
hold nuclear weapons. As a reflection of their developing country characteristics, their
foreign policies have their ups and downs, but they share one thing in common and
that is the reliance on soft power and the lack of hard power (even though India does
have and South Africa once had nuclear weapons).
Christopher Hill defines hard power as “targeted, coercive, often immediate and
physical”, while soft power is “indirect, long-term and works through persuasion” (Hill,
2006), “getting others to want what you want” (Nye, 1990). Hill argues that soft power
is the future and hard power is becoming increasingly redundant. “Carrots are
replacing sticks”. This is especially true to describe diplomacy of middle powers, not so
much the foreign policy of great power. Joseph Nye explains perfectly why that is. As he
writes in Soft Power (1990), the “term soft power is increasingly a leitmotiv in the
discourse on middle power diplomacy, precisely because it steers clear of the
unilateralism that hard power implies”. Middle powers use soft power as a strategy to
gain more influence in international fora, after all, their potential for success during
negotiations of any nature significantly increases if they are discussing in a table with
dozens of other countries, the majority of whom are part of the global South and likely
to support the middle power, than it would be to negotiate a face-to-face bilateral
agreement with a major power, for example the United States, which would hold
greater advantage.
Soft power diplomacy was able to give some glory to middle powers in the
international arena, but not enough to fulfil their ambition of global governance. One
of the main complaints is the lack of representation in the United Nations Security
Council. Brazil and India, together with Germany and Japan constitute the G4,
countries that are lobbying for a get a permanent seat in the UNSC given their
economic and regional power – they also defend the idea that two African nations
should also join, but which nations is still being debated. So far, there has been no
significant reaction from the Big Five (United States, China, Russia, United Kingdom and
France) to expand the group. There are single supports, such as the US officially
supporting India for a seat, but no real changes are expected anytime soon. Middle
powers are gaining ground in trade – Brazil wining against the United States in the
cotton and orange juice disputes at the World Trade Organization are good examples –
but the game is still controlled by Western rules and Western powers.
Regionalism is a good plus for these powers because it gives them control of their
regions, and as Soares de Lima (2008) states “Recognition at the global level often
demands regional recognition first, especially in the case of countries such as Brazil
that lack ‘hard’ power”.
Between so many ambitions, a question that comes up is if emerging middle powers
are revisionist states. The term “revisionism” has gained some bad reputation, it is
often associated with rebellion and, as Randall Schweller puts it, “to undermine the
established order for the purpose of increasing their power and prestige in the system”.
No one can argue that Russia and North Korea are revisionist states, they are very
proud of their status and make sure the world knows. China is still a matter for debate
because of its very prudent and cautious foreign policy, although it has the capabilities
to successfully challenge the status quo, so far it has not made any claims that it wants
to. If, with this definition, we then analyse Brazilian foreign policy, most would agree
that Brazil does not fall under the category of a rebel. But if we consider revisionist
states as being just the opposite of status quo states, meaning they want a change in
the status quo, with no references on how aggressive this change would take place,
then all the countries mentioned above would be on the top of the list of revisionist
states. Emerging powers’ official discourse is that they do not want a revolution, or
maybe they want just a “soft” revolution, but the point is that they do not what a
revolt or turmoil that would disturb the international peace. They tend not to admit
how big their “taste for power and influence” (Tickner, 2008) really is, but if one day
they fell they are powerful enough to do admit it to their regional neighbours and to
rest of the world, this discourse will change very fast.
What were the historical circumstances for past changes in the
international system?
There are three ways history has shown the world order can change and all three ways
eventually bring conflict:
1. The fall of empires is known to create vacuums of power and consequently bloodshed,
either between the newly independent states for reasons of ethnic differences or
territory dispute, or because of opportunistic neighbours who see a chance to expand
their power and domain. Examples of this phenomenon is the fall of Rome and the
period best known as the “dark ages”; the collapse of the Ottoman Empire as an
explanation for the Middle Eastern conflicts (Woodward, 2011); and the breakup of
the Soviet Union and the conflict of Yugoslavia.
2. The second way is a classic for the realist theory of International Relations. According
to Kenneth Waltz, the most stable world order is the balance of power, when ther
great powers balance each other out creating a system of checks and balance that
brings stability. Waltz argues that the Cold War, even though it has war in its name,
and the bipolar world is the most stable of its kind, and Henry Kissinger praised the
system constructed by the great power in the 19th century, the Concert of Europe, as
the most stable. Either way, a balance of power brings stability and a power
unchecked can bring conflict. When this happens, as realists say, other lesser powers
will try to balance the Hegemon and only succeed in restoring the balance of power
thought war. This was the case with the Peloponnesian war, against Athens; Thirty
Years’ War, against the Habsburg dynasty the Napoleonic Wars, against a French
hegemony in Europe; Crimean War, against a Russia; and World War Two, against
Germany.
3. Great changes to the international system were witnessed in three occasions: after the
Napoleonic Wars with the creation of the Concert of Europe; after World War I with
the creation of the League of Nations; after the end of World War II and the creation
of the United Nations. In all three occasions the war victors decided to establish
multilateral fora to try to avoid conflicts in the future and all three occasions, these
changes were created and controlled by the great powers of the given time. Smaller
powers contributed for that to happen and engaged in the negotiations, but the great
powers ultimately had veto power.
Major changes in the structure of the international system have been the
consequences of war or were followed by conflict. The aspirations of emerging middle
power to reach the top of the hierarchy mainly through soft power and diplomacy are
unprecedented. These countries already have a net of supporters, mostly through the
South-South cooperation, but they still take a peaceful approach and rarely confront
the great power directly. This behaviour may be proven to be a difficult, if not
impossible, path to reach their ambitious goals.
From rising powers to fallen powers?
International Relations is full of papers, dissertations and studies on great power
politics. International relations as an academic study was indeed created to try to help
avoid conflicts between the great powers. The bloody results of the Great War were so
traumatizing that something needed to be done about it. Most IR theories are
Eurocentric and, in general, it is much easier to find research on US foreign policy than
it is to find about less powerful states. It is true that speculations about World War III
could be more exciting and thrilling, but there is something fascinating about the
behaviour of middle powers – to be more specific, emerging middle powers. They are
newly independent states (no longer than 200 years of independence), and yet they
are challenging the current world order. They excel in the diplomatic arena - as
diplomacy is their best weapon - and they are using globalization and multilateralism to
get what they want.
The rising powers, such as Brazil, India and South Africa, were seen in the last decade
as the stars of the international system. All eyes were on them and theories started to
emerge about how would these countries take their place in the grownup’s table:
would they replace Europe as America's most important allies? Or is this the end of the
unipolar world and beginning of multipolar one? It sounded like a promising future,
but, then, a couple of years ago, everything changed and the rising stars were no
longer rising, but declining powers. Brazil went into its worst recession reaching a
negative growth in 2015, South Africa's government is crumbling and India is too busy
in its conflict with Pakistan and having diverging interests with its BRICS partner, China.
Suzanne Nossel in her very interesting article for Foreign Affairs (July 6, 2016) gives
many insights about the fall of the rising powers, including some suggestions of how
the United States should react to this descend and predictions of a ambipolar world,
“where power is diffuse and national fortunes rise and fall to a rhythm too complex for
any theory to adequately reflect” (Nossel, 2016). Nossel argues that during these
economic and political crises, these countries could only prove that they are too
unstable to global govern and reassure America's “indispensable” power. Where I
believe Nossel missed was when she did not consider the reconquer of their ranks.
Since colonial times, Brazil, India and South Africa have shown great resilience. Since
colonization, to independence, to authoritarianism, to protectionism, to democracy, to
rising power. These three countries have taken the lead in the developing world, they
have a dominant presence in fora of environmental issues, global trade and nuclear
proliferation, they have a strong opinion about sovereignty versus intervention and
they are not to give up their position now. In their short history as independent states,
they still have a lot to learn, but they can and will be part of the great power's table in
the future.
Rising powers' diplomacy and foreign policy are characterized by their use of soft
power through multilateralism which “allows them the leadership roles as
representatives of the global South” (Spies, 2016). They are very successful in the art of
soft power, but their hard power is limited, mostly because of their lack of great power
status. Hard power is sometimes present in their regional domain, but it is not always
so clear because of their transparent, altruistic and advocate for peaceful behaviour.
The problem is that their aspirations do not match their strategies. Their instinct,
specially Brazil’s, is to win by consensus (Burges, 2008), and as history has shown many
times, soft power is not enough to make significant changes in the international
system. Four significant changes can be recalled and all of them were direct
consequences of general wars: Westphalia Peace (after the Thirty Year’s War),
Conference of Europe (after the Napoleonic Wars), League of Nations (after World War
I) and the United Nations and the current international system (after World War II). So,
the realization of their dream without instigating conflict is very unlikely.
Possible future scenarios could include the creation of stronger multi-level alliances to
balance the hegemonic power of the United States (the BRICS could become more
than an economic partnership, but also political and military); or World War III could
break between the US and Russia and the middle powers could take the opportunity
and demand a more representative reconstruction in the aftermath of the war; either
way, emerging powers have only started their path to the top, there may be some
bumps in the way, but they have the potential to be great.
Research on middle powers will be very valuable in the near future and will be of great
importance to policymakers and scholars in the field of developing countries. The
literature has a mainly focus on great power politics, because of the impact that
powerful countries have in the international arena, but the study of, what could be, the
next great powers means mistakes in analyses of state behaviour in the past could be
avoided by the knowledge of the path they achieve their capabilities, how far are they
willing to go to keep their position in the raking and what diplomatic tools should be
used to do so. Research in this field is new and scarce. The mainstream international
relations theories have trouble to explain middle power politics or it is limited to
regional politics. The goal of research should be to get to a more general theory that
will explain the behaviour of the less powerful in a more practical and pragmatic way.
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Tabata Magela Guimaraes Lima, 27, from Belo Horizonte, Brazil, is currently pursuing a
Bachelor's Degree (Hons) in International Relations at the University of London
International Programmes with academic direction from the London School of
Economics and Political Science (LSE). She is also enrolled in a preparatory course on
Diplomacy and Brazilian Foreign Policy at Damasio Educational. She is a member of the
IAPSS Student Research Committee on IR Theory and she is also the IAPSS Ambassador
to Brazil. Her research interests are in the field of international relations, diplomacy,
conflict resolution, international law and international politics in developing countries.