DO DESCRIPTIONS HA V E ME A NI NG ? ()
W. Stephen CRODDY
I
An important component o f Russell's th e o ry o f descriptions
is the thesis that no description has any meaning. He proposes
an argument f o r th is thesis i n th e f o llo win g paragraph f ro m
My Philosophical Development (
1
):
The central point of the th e o ry of descriptions is that a
phrase ma y contribute to the meaning of a sentence with out having any meaning at a ll in isolation. O f this, in the
case o f descriptions, there is precise proof: I f 'the author
of Wa ve rle y' meant anything other than 'Scott', 'Scott is
the author o f Wa ve rle y' wo u ld be false, wh ich i t is not.
If 'th e a u th o r o f Wa ve rle y me a n t 'Scott', 'S co tt is t h e
author o f Wa ve rle y' wo u ld be a tautology, wh ich it is not.
Therefore, 'the author of Wa ve /le y' means neither 'Scott'
nor anything else — i.e. 'th e author o f Wa ve r/e y' means
nothing, Q.E.D.
The sentence «'the author o f Wa ve rle y' means 'Scott'» occurs
in t h e argument. K a re l L a mb e rt and Bas v a n Fraassen h a ve
proposed two interpretations o f this sentence. Th e y cla im that
regardless o f wh ich one is chosen, i t is impossible f o r a ll o f
the argument's premises to be true. Hence, th e y conclude, the
argument does not prove that no description has a n y meaning.
Lambert and va n Fraassen a re co rre ct in cla imin g that Russell's argument does not prove its conclusion. However, they do
not establish this. M y purpose in this paper, then, is two-fold.
( ) I am grat ef ul t o Professor K arel Lambert f o r discussions o f an e a rlie r
draft of this paper. 1 am als o indebted t o Professors Bob Cos grov e, Herman
Tavani, and Dav e Zoolalian f or t h e ir comments.
(
and
1 Schuster, 1965), p. 85.
)
B
e
r
t
r
a
n
d
R
U
S
24
W
.
STEPHEN CRO DDY
First I w i l l attempt to sh o w th a t Lambert and va n Fraassen's
criticism o f Russell's argument does n o t succeed. Then, I w i l l
establish wh y the argument does not prove its conclusion. We
will fin d th a t i t does n o t under both o f the interpretations o f
«'the author o f Wa ve / le y' means 'Scott'». So wh e re Lambert
and va n Fraassen fa ile d is th a t fo r each o f the interpretations
they suggested they d id not see the respect in wh ich Russell's
argument was unacceptable.
II
To fa cilita te o u r discussion o f the argument, le t's represent
it in the fo llo win g form:
(a) I f 't h e a u t h o r o f Wa v e / le y ' me a n s a n yt h in g o t h e r
than 'Scott', then 'Scott is the author o f Wa ve rl e y is
false.
(b) 'Scott is the author of Wa ve rley' is not false.
(c) I f 'the author o f Wa ve rle y' means 'Scott', then 'Scott
is the author o f Wa ve rie y' is a tautology.
(d) 'Scott is th e author o f Wa ve rie y' is n o t a tautology.
(e) I t is false th a t 'th e author o f Wa v e rley' means a n ything other than 'Scott', and it is false that 'the author
of Wa ve r/e y' means 'Scott', i.e. 'the author o f Wa ve rley' means nothing.
Consider wh a t Lambert and va n Fraassen have t o sa y about
this argument (
2
):
(L) Th e ... argument is va lid b u t unsound because i t rests
on an ambiguity. Fo r the f irst p re mise t o be tru e ' t
tmeans t
2
ferent'.
B u t then the second premise is n o t true since
' t
if
im u
s t
a
(
mia : Dic k ens en P ublis hing Co. , 1972), P . 157. M y it alic s .
(Encino,
2
Caa
nlif o rn
)
o u
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tn t
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o
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e
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A
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a
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F
ln
DO DESCRIPTIONS HA V E M E A NI NG ?
2
5
then ' t
cond
i = premise true, ' t
it m
of
't e a n s
t
2
2the
1
f irst premise is n o t true.
'
'i
a
According
ns t oethem,
e th
de p
s ro b le m wit h Russell's argument has
to d o witd
tnh wh a ot th e y speak o f as «the f irst a n d second p re mises». Othof the a
premises
v in the above argument, the t wo in te rpretations2
et th e y suggest a p p ly o n ly to members o f (a) and (c).
Hence, when
ctl o they
h speak o f the first and second premises, th e y
are ta lkina
g
about
these t wo premises.
eg i
Lambert
a
n
d
v
a
thesis, then, i s t h a t Russell's
fc
n
o n Fraassen's
r
argumentn
n o t p ro ve th a t it s conclusion is t ru e because
cadoes
l e
it is not possible
fo r both (a) and (c) to be true under the same
ol y
interpretation.
Acco
rd in g to them, under one interpretation o f
tt
't
hr
is
i tru e b uaut (a) cannot be. I w i l l attempt t o sh o w th a t both o f
these
claims
m
ve are false. I will do this by showing that under each
interpretation
there is a possible case where (a) and (c) are both
e
e.
true.
a
dT
n
io
s
fm
t
fa
2 ethe a u
ekth o r o f Wa ve rle y' means 'Scott'» i s t h e phrase i n
'
Russell's
that th e ir interpretations o f 1
rargument
e
p
to.eThe
th e y suggest is:
1( ly m
aet nf irst
s interpretation
t
2a
nh
t a t p
')
e
i
i
rs
a
So
s under
eeth is interpretation, (a)'s antecedent wo u ld read:
n
t
fd author
'the
of Wa ve rle y' and 'Scott' do not have the same
r
e
referent.
t
u
r
2
e
e
and
h
b (c)'s
nwo u ld read:
a
u
t
v
'the
a
t
s u th o r o f Wa ve rle y' a n d 'Sco tt h a v e t h e same re ferent.
e
(
'
t
c
;
h
)
b
e
c
u
s
a
t
a
n
t
m h
n
e
o
e
r
t
n
e
b
26
W
.
STEPHEN CRO DDY
Lambert a n d va n Fraassen cla im th a t wh ile under th is in t e rpretation (a) is true it is impossible fo r (c) to be. Fo r according
to them near the end o f (L), (c) «needs» the second interpretation in o rd e r f o r it to be true. I f th e y a re correct, then there
should n o t be a possible case wh e re under this interpretation
(c) is true along wit h (a).
There is, however. I t is one where 'the author o f Wa ve rle y'
and 'Scott' do not have the same referent. In this possible case
both (a)'s antecedent and consequent wo u ld be true. W e can
see that the consequent wo u ld be tru e b y noting that 'Scott is
the author o f Wa ve rle y' is an id e n tity statement (
possible
case where 'Scott and 'the author of Wa ve rle y' do not
3
have
). S t hoe sa me
i nreferent,
a 'Snco t yt i s t h e a u t h o r o f Wa v e rle y'
would be false. I n th is typ e o f possible case, then, (a ) wo u ld
be true. A n d so wo u ld (c). Fo r in this possible case (c)'s antecedent would be false. Lambert and van Fraassen are incorrect,
then, wh e n they cla im that (c) is tru e o n ly if its antecedent is
interpreted a s « 'th e a u th o r o f Wa ve rie y' a n d 'Sco tt' ca n n o t
have different referents». Consequently, th e y have n o t shown
that under the f irst interpretation Russell's argument does n o t
prove its conclusion.
(a) also comes out true in the possible case where 'the author
of Wa ve r/e y' and 'Scott' have the same referent. Ho we ve r in
this case (c) wo u ld be false. So there is a possible case wh e re
(a) is true and (c) is false. Nevertheless this does not establish
the point Lambert and va n Fraassen intended: Th a t under the
first interpretation there is no possible case where both (a) and
(c) come out true. I t is necessary that they establish this p a rticular point, rather than simp ly that there is some possible case
where both (a) a n d (c) a re n o t true. Fo r, t h e y wa n t t o sh o w
that u n d e r th e f irs t in te rp re ta tio n th e re i s n o possible case
where all of the argument's premises are true. We will find that
under the f irst interpretation it is impossible f o r a ll o f the a rgument's premises to be true. However, we have seen that this
cannot be sh o wn b y attempting to p ro ve that it is impossible
for both (a) and (c) to be true.
(
3
)
R
u
s
s
E
L
L
,
o
p
.
c
i
DO DESCRIPTIONS HA V E M E A NI NG ?
27
The second interpretation o f ' t
i m e a n s
t
2 t
' i i
s
:
Undera this interpretation (a)'s antecedent wo u ld read:
n
'the
d author o f Wa ve rie y' and 'Scott'
tcan have different referents
2
wh ilec(c)'s wo u ld read:
a
n'the author of Wa ve rie y' and 'Scott'
cannot
have different referents.
n
o
Again,t consider the possible case where 'the author of Wa ve r/ey' and
h 'Scott' have different referents. A s wit h the f irst in te rpretation,
under the second one (c)'s antecedent would be false
a
in th isv possible case. Thus, (c) wo u ld be true. Also , both (a)'s
antecedent
and consequent wo u ld be true. Thus, (a) wo u ld also
e
be trude . Therefore, L a mb e rt a n d va n Fraassen a re in co rre ct
when i wh a t they cla im near the beginning of (L) imp lie s that in
orderf for (a) to be true, its antecedent «must» be interpreted as
ethe author
of Wa ve rle y and 'Scott' do not have the same re f
ferent».
Consequently
t h e y h a ve n o t sh o wn t h a t u n d e r t h e
e
second
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n
Russell's
a rg u me n t does n o t p ro ve it s
r
conclusion.
e
n
t
Iv
r
'While
e Lambert and van Fraassen failed to show that Russell's
argument
does not prove that its conclusion is true, th e y were
f
correct
i
n
th in kin g th a t i t does n o t. Fu rth e rmo re , i t ca n b e
e
shownr that it does not under each o f th e ir interpretations.
Consider
the first interpretation under which (c)'s antecedent
e
reads:n
t
s'the author o f Wa ve rle y' a n d 'Scott' h a ve th e same re ferent.
.
28
W
.
STEPHEN CRO DDY
We have seen that it is possible fo r (a) and (c) to be true under
this interpretation. Ho we ve r, i f we disregard (a) and consider
premise (b ) a n d (d ) a lo n g wit h (c), w e ca n see th a t there is
no possible case wh e re a ll o f these th re e premises a re true.
That is, if any two o f the premises are true, the other is false.
For instance, suppose that (b) and (c) a re true. I f (b) is true,
then 'Scott is the author o f Wa ve rle y' is true. Since 'Scott is
the author o f Wa ve rley' is an id e n tity statement, i f the statement is true it follows that 'the author of Wa ve rle y' and 'Scott'
have th e same referent. I n wh ich (c)'s antecedent wo u ld b e
true. Un d e r t h e f irs t in te rp re ta tio n i f (c ) i s tru e , t h e n ' t h e
author o f Wa v e rley' a n d 'Scott h a v in g th e same re fe re n t is
sufficient for 'Scott is the author of Waver/ey' to be a tautology.
Therefore i f (b) and (c) a re true, then 'Scott is th e a u th o r o f
Wa ve rie y' wo u ld be a tautology. Thus (d) wo u ld be false.
We have shown that if (b) and (c) are true, (d) is false. Therefore it follows that if (d) and (c) are true then (b) is false, and if
(b) and (d) are true then (c) is false.
For example, i f (d) a lo n g wit h (c) is true, th e n 'th e author
of Waver.ley' a n d 'Scott' d o n o t h a ve t h e same referent. I n
which case 'Scott is th e author o f Wa ve rle y' wo u ld be false.
Consequently, (b) wo u ld be false. Therefore if either (b) o r (d)
is true along wit h (c), then the other is false.
Now, let's assume that both (b) and (d) are true. I f (b) is true
then, as we already noted, the antecedent of (c) wo u ld be true.
Since (d) is the negation of (c)'s consequent, i f (d) is true, (c)'s
consequent is false. So if (b) and (d) are true, (c) is false.
We have seen, then that o f the three premises (b), (c), and
(d) i f a n y t wo are true, i t fo llo ws th a t th e t h ird one is false.
Hence, u n d e r th e interpretation o f ' t
i m the
have
e asame
n s referent'
t
it is impossible fo r a ll o f the premises
of
2 Russell's argument to be true. Therefore, u n d e r th is in t e rpretation
'
a t h e sa rg u me n t' does
t n o t p ro ve t h a t 't h e a u t h o r o f
Wa
ve
rley'
means
nothing.
i
a
n
d
t No w le t 's co n sid e r th e a rg u me n t u n d e r L a mb e rt a n d v a n
Fraassen's
second interpretation. A s wit h the f irst one, u n d e r
2
this in te rp re ta tio n the argument does n o t establish th e thesis
Russell intended. The reason wh y has to do wit h the first p re -
DO DESCRIPTIONS HA V E M E A NI NG ?
2
9
mise. A s we noted, under the second interpretation (a)'s antecedent reads:
'the a u th o r o f Wa ve rle y' a n d 'Scott c a n h a ve d iffe re n t
referents.
If we consider the paragraph b y Russell quoted a t the beginning of this paper, we can see that he intended for his argument
to prove not o n ly that 'the author of Waverley• means nothing
but th a t a ll other descriptions mean nothing. In o rd e r f o r h is
argument to prove this thesis about e ve ry description, i t must
not be possible fo r premise (a) to be false. Fo r if it is, then it is
possible t h a t so me d e scrip tio n means something. I n wh ic h
case, Russell wo u ld n o t h a ve p ro ve n th a t e ve ry description
means nothing. I t is wit h regard t o th is p a rticu la r p o in t th a t
Russell's argument is unsuccessful. Fo r under the second in te rpretation it is possible fo r (a) to be false.
Wh a t shows t h is is t h a t f ro m th e fa ct th a t 'th e a u th o r o f
Waverley' and 'Scott' can have different referents i t does n o t
fo llo w that 'Scott is the author of Wa ve rie y' is false. That is, if
(a)'s antecedent is tru e i t does n o t f o llo w th a t it s consequent
is tru e . Rather, t h is f o llo ws i f 'th e a u th o r o f Wa ve rle y' a n d
'Scott' d o h a ve d iffe re n t referents. I n o rd e r f o r 'Scott is th e
author o f Wa ve rle y' to be true, a ll that is required is that 'the
author o f Wa ve rle y' a n d 'Scott' h a ve th e same referent. 'th e
author o f Wa ve rle y' and 'Scott' can have the same referent and
it be possible fo r them to have different referents (
4is the author o f Wa ve rie y' can be tru e and i t be possible f o r
'the Sauthor
of
Wacveorlety' tand 'Scott' to have different referents.
).
o
' S
That is, (a)'s consequent can be false and the antecedent true.
Consequently, under the second interpretation it is possible fo r
(a) t o be false (
5
).(
iey4' a n d 'Sc ot t ' b o t h t o h a v e t h e s ame re f e re n t a n d t o h a v e d if f e re n t
referents.
)
(T
Lambert
h
5
and v an Fraassen's. Their's is t hat i t is n o t pos s ible f o r (a) t o be
true.
)i O ur's is t hat it is pos s ible f o r (a) t o be false. I t does not f o llo w f ro m
ourO
s c laim t hat i t is not pos s ible f o r (a) t o be t rue.
i
u
rs
cd
li
f
a
if
e
m
r
a
e
b
n
o
30
W
.
STEPHEN CRO DDY
Lambert and va n Fraassen, then, d id p ro vid e t wo in te rp re tations under wh ich Russell's argument is unacceptable. Wh a t
they d id not establish is the respect in wh ich the argument is
unacceptable u n d e r each o f t h e ir interpretations. Un d e r t h e
first interpretation the argument is unacceptable because it is
impossible fo r a ll o f the premises to be true, in p a rticu la r (b),
(c), and (d). Un d e r the second, th e argument is unacceptable
because it is possible fo r premise (a) to be false.
West Chester State College
West Chester, Pennsylvania
W
.
Stephen CRODDY