IN THE MATTER OF THE TUNISIA INQUESTS
JUGE AKREMI’S CLOSING REPORT:
SUMMARY BY COUNSEL TO THE INQUESTS
INTRODUCTION
This is a summary of a translation of Juge Akremi’s Closing Report into his investigation of
the attack on 26th June 2015. It was provided directly to HHJ Loraine-Smith by Juge Akremi.
It was then translated in the UK. The Inquests Team reviewed the translation for relevance
having regard to the Scope of the Inquests. Those parts of the Report which were not
relevant were not disclosed. The translation that was disclosed to Interested Persons
[DC8094] contains summaries of accounts from eye-witnesses and suspects. The Coroner
has not been provided with the statements or transcripts of interviews of any of those
individuals who feature within the Closing Report. Where necessary and appropriate
typographical errors in the translation have been corrected.
A list of relevant ciphers will be provided.
ACCOUNTS OF THOSE AT THE IMPERIAL MARHABA HOTEL
The account of Mehrez Saadi has previously been read and will not be repeated.
The accounts of the security guards employed at the Imperial Marhaba Hotel have previously
been read in full.
“AO”: the excursion liaison officer
The witness “AO” is recorded as stating that for ten years he was assigned to work in the
Imperial Marhaba as a liaison officer coordinating the Hotel residents and the tour guides
who were in charge of organising excursions for the holidaymakers in Sousse. On 26th June
2015 he was working at the Hotel. As he reached the outdoor pool, he heard a gunshot
coming from the Hotel’s private beach. He was shocked as he never expected such a
terrorist incident to happen at the Imperial Marhaba and target its residents at the beach.
He immediately made his way to the beach and saw tourists rushing around. He saw the
gunman shooting the tourists who were to the left of the Hotel. He tried to help the
holidaymakers who managed to escape to the Hotel. He took them to the reception and
helped them take refuge in the basement and in the Hotel shops. The gunman chased them
inside the Hotel. While hiding in the shop, they heard a loud shot and before the gunman had
left the Hotel - he was in fact still in the corridor - “AO” left the shop and went to the staff
private parking near the shop. “AO” got in his car and drove at once to the Riviera
roundabout 1.
“AO” informed the security guard there of the terrorist attack on Imperial Marhaba, stressing
that security officers did not intervene at all to stop the terrorist attack. He returned to the
Hotel. He stayed by the external gate and watched the incident unfold. The gunman was still
shooting and killing people inside the Hotel. The authorities did not attend the Hotel until
12.15pm. The terrorist attack lasted for about 35 minutes, during which time no security
agents intervened to stop it. “AO” stated that he was completely unclear about the reasons
for this delay. He confirmed that while waiting outside the front of the Bellevue Park Hotel he
noticed that the security officers who attended were guardsmen from the National Guard and
not from the police force and that the latter did not make any attempts to stop the terrorist
attack.
“AZ”: the Hotel Receptionist
“AZ”, the receptionist at the Imperial Marhaba Hotel, explained that upon hearing gunfire
from the outdoor pool he used the Hotel phone to call 197 2. He did not get any response but
he remained in the reception lobby until he saw the perpetrator of the terror attack entering
the Hotel from the outdoor pool area. At this point he sought safety by escaping to the
bookings office with his colleagues, “BA” and “BB”, and 15 foreign tourists. They locked the
door to that room, then tried to establish phone communication with 197. At about 12.10pm
“AZ” managed to contact “BC”, one of the tourist security agents (before his colleague “BA”
did so), and informed him that the Hotel was the target of a terrorist operation.
1
Query if this is a reference to the roundabout near to the Riviera Hotel which in turn is near to the
National Guard Control Point marked with a ‘2’ on the map at page 5 of the Core Bundle [DC8171/7].
2 197 is the number for the police (see [DC8232/13]). This number was erroneously redacted from the
Closing Report disclosed to IPs.
2
“BD”: the Hotel Hairdresser
“BD” was working in the salon opposite the indoor swimming pool and the lifts. At around
11.40am she saw customers rushing inside the Hotel. When she heard the noise of gunfire
she escaped into one of the Hotel rooms used for storing furniture. Around 17 holidaymakers
went with her. The gunman tried to open the door to the room but one of the tourists had
locked it. She stayed in the room until the security forces arrived and opened the door.
THE ACCOUNTS OF OTHER EYE-WITNESSES
“AN”
A vendor in a handicraft shop located in Nahj Amilkar. About 30 tourists hid inside his shop
for safety. He described hearing intense firing which he later learned was an exchange of fire
between the gunman and the security forces.
“AP”
“AP” owned a property located in Nahj Amilkar and was in the process of doing some
building work there. After hearing a shot from a nearby Hotel he went onto the roof of his
property. When the gunman reached the property “AP” threw a brick onto the gunman, which
apparently hit him on the head. The gunman fell to the ground as a result but carried on
shooting in the air. Eventually security guards intervened and fatally shot the gunman at the
same location.
“AQ”
“AQ” was working in the El-Kantaoui maritime leisure resort, described as being “on the left
of the Imperial Marhaba Hotel”. It is covered by two CCTV cameras. This appears to be the
tent structure visible in camera D2, i.e. the tent on the beach between the Imperial Marhaba
and Bellevue Hotels past which Rezgui walks. The summary of his account reads as follows:
“… at around 11.40, as he was under a parasol near the water preparing the jet skis
for 02 Belgian customers, he heard the sound of a gunshot coming from Imperial
Marhaba’s private beach which was about 150 metres away. As he looked, he saw a
male wearing black shorts and a black top and carrying a black bag and a machine
gun. He was opening fire at tourists laying under parasols on the left hand side of the
private beach. [“AQ”] immediately called his friend “AR”…and informed him of the
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terrorist attack that was targeting tourists in the private beach of Imperial Marhaba
Hotel and that he took his customers to safety inside Bellevue Park Hotel.
He then went on the jet ski and watched the shootings and killings perpetrated by the
terrorist. He stated that many tourists took refuge inside the sea and were not chased
by the gunman in the water. The killing at the beach lasted for about 10 minutes.
[“AQ”] then saw the gunman leave the beach and make his way towards the outdoor
swimming pool and stated that he helped the tourists, who were still taking refuge in
the sea, leave the water. Ten minutes later and before the gunman left to the outdoor
swimming pool, a marine guard boat with 02 marine guards on board arrived to the
scene. The two guards disembarked but did not chase the gunman straightaway.
They waited for about 5 minutes because, according to the interviewee, they were
reluctant to confront the assailant. Eventually, one of the marine guards went after the
gunman, who by this time had entered the Hotel. He stated that he had no knowledge
of what happened inside the Hotel, did not witness the killings committed by the
terrorist and was not aware how the other marine guards have dealt with the gunman.
He added that he remained on board his speed boat until he saw the Chief of the
Marine Guard Brigade leave the Hotel with another colleague; the Chief was holding
a firearm; he boarded a speed boat and drove it to the deep water while his colleague
headed left towards Soviva resort. The two marine guards left the terrorist inside the
Hotel; four minutes later the gunman was seen leaving the Hotel and heading right
towards Palm Marina Hotel. He walked for about 100 meters and turned back passing
in front Imperial Marhaba and throwing his mobile into the sea. He walked pass
Bellevue Park then Soviva Hotel and turn left. The interviewee stated that he did not
witness the confrontation between the authorities and the gunman neither did he see
the later passing by the leisure station - he is in charge of - on his way to Imperial
Hotel. He realised later that the gunman had walked past the leisure station holding a
parasol inside which he apparently hid his weapon. He added that he never saw the
gunman in the area before and wasn’t aware how the security authorities have dealt
with the terrorist incident inside the Hotel.”
“AS”
“AS” was working in the leisure station “to the right of the Imperial Marhaba”, i.e. the location
between the Imperial Marhaba and Palm Marina Hotels which is covered by CCTV. At about
11.37am while he was under the parasol close to the sea, “AS” heard the sound of a
gunshot. He saw the gunman reloading his weapon and opening fire on the tourists on the
right hand side of the Hotel beach as well as the tourists who left the sea. He saw the
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gunman shoot in a random manner at anyone who was still on the beach. “AS” stated that
the incident lasted for about seven or eight minutes. He had not seen the gunman before in
the area.
“AT”, “AV” and “AU”
“AT”, “AV” and “AU” were working at the maritime leisure centre on the beach to the south of
the southerly bank of sunbeds in front of the Imperial Marhaba Hotel. At around 11.40am all
three heard gunshot coming from in front of the Imperial Marhaba. “AU” saw the gunman
firing at the tourists. His water-sports centre had a CCTV camera which belonged to that
centre 3.
“AI”
The summary of the account of “AI” reads as follows:
“…On [26th June 2015] he started work in the [El-Kantaoui] resort as a speed boat
driver at about 9.00 am. Between 11.00 and 12.00, he heard the sound of a gunshot
and immediately went with his colleagues “AJ” and “AK” to the place where the
sound came from. That took them to Imperial Marhaba, more precisely to the Hotel
private beach where they witnessed the victims’ scattered bodies and saw two
security guards on horses. They heard gunshots coming from inside the Hotel and
realised that the terrorist was shooting people inside the Hotel. At that point, a marine
guard speed boat arrived and two guards disembarked, one of whom held a Steyr
machine gun. The latter was directed to the gunman who was firing shots inside the
Hotel. [“AI”]…together with his colleague “AK”, accompanied the guard to the Hotel
and as they reached the outdoor swimming pool, they saw the gunman opening fire
and shooting tourists inside the Hotel. The same guard, called “AL”, tried to shoot the
gunman who realised that he was confronted and immediately threw a hand grenade
towards them. As the hand grenade exploded, the guard tried to escape but stumbled
and fell to the ground; he dropped his weapon and lost consciousness.
“AK” tried to move the guard from the scene while [“AI”] took the Steyr machine gun
and tried to shoot the terrorist. He couldn’t operate the machine gun and was
therefore forced to run off in the direction of the beach. He was still holding the Steyr
weapon, which belonged to the National Marine Guard, while “AK” endeavoured to
move the guard. He confirmed that he was wearing red shorts and that he was barechested.
3
Camera E.
5
As he arrived to the beach he met with “AK” who was with the guard. [“AI”] handed
the machine gun to the latter. The guard was then put in [“AI”]’s speed boat which
was driven by his other colleague, “AJ”.
He saw the terrorist leaving the Hotel afterwards. The second marine guard escaped
and stated that he had been working there for a sometime and never saw the
gunman in the resort before.”
THE ACCOUNTS OF THE POLICE: THE OPERATIONS ROOM
“Constable CI”: the National Security Police Operations Room – emergency call
receiver
“Constable CI” worked in the National Security Police Operations Room, manning the
emergency number 197. At around 11.45am the Operations Room received a telephone call
reporting that the Imperial Marhaba Hotel was under attack and that there was shooting.
“Constable CI” informed his team leader, “CJ”, and radioed the National Security Regional
Operations Room in Hammam Sousse to report that the Hotel was under attack. “CJ” and
the shift leader, “CK”, called various security headquarters and various security authorities to
inform them of the terrorist attack. “Constable CI” informed “BH”, the Director of Police
stationed at the Police Headquarters, of the terrorist attack. “Constable CI” stated that
security units directly subordinate to the Police were sent, so essentially there was a joint
security column, a rescue team, a rapid response team and the Highway patrol who were all
sent together to the scene of the incident but when they arrived, they didn’t know the area as
it wasn’t theirs.
“CJ”: the National Security Police – team leader
“CJ” was a team leader in the National Security Police. He stated that at around 11.45am he
received a call from the Operations Sector in the Interior Ministry reporting that they had
become aware of a communication from a terrorist element holed up in the mountainous
region of al-Kaf. That communication concerned a terrorist attack to be carried out in Tunisia,
although no time or location was mentioned.
“CJ” informed the Director of Police, who instructed him to disseminate it to various Police
districts in Sousse. He did not do this because when “CJ” called the National Security HQ in
6
Hammam Sousse, “Constable CI” (who had been manning the emergency 197 number) told
him that the Imperial Marhaba Hotel was under attack and that there was gunfire.
“CJ” informed his colleague “CB”, who was at the National Security HQ in Hammam Sousse
(Northern Sousse), of the need to dispatch all available patrols under their control to the
Imperial Marhaba Hotel. He then immediately contacted the Director of Police, “BH” and told
him of the incident. The Director of Police told him that he was aware of the ongoing terrorist
incident and ordered him to dispatch motorcycle patrols from Sousse Police to the scene of
the incident and to inform all security personnel of the incident. “BH” stated that he had not
yet left the Police HQ as he was coordinating the various security organisations.
“CB” was the assistant security supervisor in the operations room in the Northern Sousse
national security district (Hammam Sousse). He confirmed that at about 11.45am he
received a telephone call from his colleague “CJ” who informed him that he had become
aware of the possibility of targeting Tunisia for a terrorist attack. , Before the end of the
conversation “CJ” informed him about the targeting of the Imperial Marhaba Hotel by gunfire.
“CB” informed the head of the operations room, “CA”. All of its subordinate patrols headed to
the Imperial Marhaba Hotel.
“CM”: the Head of the National Security Police Operations Department in Sousse
“CM” was Head of the National Security Police Operations Department in Sousse. He
confirmed that “Constable CI” received a telephone call to the emergency number 197. With
“CK” and “CJ”, “CM” implemented the intervention plan whilst the terrorist attack was
ongoing. This plan included informing by radio the Director of Police “BH” (which he did
immediately), as well the National Security Police District Operations Room in Northern
Sousse, the Regional Head, the Army Operations Room the Head of Administration for the
Highway Patrol, the National Security Police Support and the Joint Column. He informed the
National Security Police HQ in Northern Sousse by both telephone and radio.
“CM” stated that the Security units subordinate to them were relatively far from the scene of
the incident. The nearest unit to the scene was the National Security Police Station in
Hammam Sousse who were directed to dispatch units, and the Tourist Security Police that
included quad bike patrols, bicycle patrols and mounted patrols, as well as a patrol car.
7
“CA”: Head of the Operations Room for the Northern Sousse (Hammam Sousse)
National Security
“CA” was the head of the Operations Room for the Northern Sousse (Hammam Sousse)
National Security area. His role was to coordinate the various security authorities.
At around 11.47 “CA” received a telephone call from his colleague “CB” in the Sousse Police
Operations Room, reporting that there was gunfire on the beach of the Imperial Marhaba
Hotel. “CA” radioed the units subordinate to him who were located in the vicinity of the Hotel,
namely the coastal security patrol, the Training Division, the National Security HQ for
Hammam Sousse, the National Security HQ in Akouda, the Judicial Police Division in
Northern Sousse and the Traffic Police HQ, as well as a Public Security patrol who were
located in Boufisha who were providing and invigilating some national-level exams. He also
contacted the heads of these bodies by mobile phone.
All of the security units headed to the scene of the incident with the exception of the Tourist
Security Division, who are the agency responsible with regard to equipment, possessing
Steyr automatic weapons that would enable them to stop the attack. They are responsible for
the initial response in tourist areas and were close to the scene of the incident. “CA” stated
that while he was present in the area, he saw the team leader of Tourist Security, 3 members
of a vehicle patrol and 2 members of a quadbike patrol. When he asked them why they were
not intervening at the Imperial Marhaba Hotel where there was an ongoing terrorist attack
with many dead, they replied that they were trying to get hold of weapons and bullet proof
vests. The team leader and the constables with him refused to respond to his instruction to
rush to the scene of the incident to halt the terrorist attack that was ongoing, adding that the
team leader was a man called “BF”.
“CA” stated that from the outset he asked the Tourist Security team leader to go to the scene
of the incident with his men but there was no response to this instruction. He stated that the
refusal to intervene to stop the terrorist attack was due to “simple cowardice”, when they
could have prevented the loss of life. He added that he directed the Tourist Security team
leader to head to the beach of the Imperial Marhaba, that a terrorist incident was ongoing at
the Hotel and that it would have taken no more than 3 minutes to intervene, considering that
the distance between the scene of the incident and the HQ of National Security is no more
than 1.5 kilometres.
8
THE ACCOUNT OF THE POLICE
“BF”: the Head of National Security Police in Northern Sousse (including the accounts
of “BG” and “DH”)
“BF” was Head of National Security Police in Northern Sousse. The Imperial Marhaba Hotel
comes within the tourist region of El-Kantaoui which in turn comes under the National
Security District in Northern Sousse.
The security units responsible for the defence of El-Kantaoui, and specifically the Imperial
Marhaba Hotel, in the first instance come under the supervision and authority of the Tourist
Security Team. This team is led by the Head of Team, “AE”. They are supplied with a 4x4
vehicle. They are responsible for conducting quad-bike patrols and reporting back to Tourist
Security. They are responsible for securing the beach-front and for mounted patrols which
are designed to support the intervention units. They have a station on the beach-front at the
Hotel Abu Sufyan 4, which is located about 2 kilometres from the Imperial Marhaba Hotel.
“BF” explained that usually a patrol was conducted on the public highway to provide security
for El-Kantaoui and the neighbouring areas. On 26th June the security patrol went in the
direction of Boufisha to provide security for the baccalaureate exams.
The tourist security patrol was equipped with 2 Steyr assault rifles, 4 magazines and bullet
proof vests and helmets. The agents who reported to the Tourist Security Team had received
training in the use of collective weapons.
A second level responsible for defence of the Hotel was the Station for National Security in
Hammam, Sousse.
The Maritime Guard was responsible for the defence of the waterline; it did not report to
“BF”.
On 26th June “BF” received a telephone call at around 11.46am from the head of the Station
for National Security in Hammam, Sousse, informing him that a detective had told him about
the targeting of a terror attack against the Imperial Marhaba Hotel. “BF” instructed him to
intervene at the Hotel. “BF” left the National Security District station where he was stationed
(about 3.8 kilometres from the Imperial Marhaba Hotel) for the Hotel. After informing the
operations room about the attack, he informed one of the security agents present (“BG”) that
he was heading to the Hotel with the security team.
4
Query if this is a reference to the Hotel Abou Sofiane which is located near to the Riviera Hotel which
in turn is near to the National Guard Control Point marked with a ‘2’ on the map at page 5 of the Core
Bundle [DC8171/7].
9
“BG” said that at around 11.45 “BF” came into his office. “BK” and “BL” were also present.
“BF” informed him that a terrorist incident was ongoing at the Imperial Marhaba Hotel. He
instructed them to go to the location of the incident. “BG” armed himself with a pistol and
headed off with his colleague to the location of the incident, accompanied by the head of the
Public Security Team, “BM”.
“BF” explained that as soon as he had passed through the gate into the Security District he
received a call from the Regional Director, “BH”. He told him about the terrorist attack on the
Imperial Marhaba Hotel. He explained that no sooner had he left in his own civilian vehicle,
his way was blocked by a tourist security patrol. “BF” demanded to be allowed to travel to the
Hotel and headed directly to the Hotel. Whilst en route he received a call from the operations
who advised him that the Hotel had been surrounded and the area had been reinforced with
security patrols.
When “BF” arrived at the Bellevue Hotel he stopped the car, got out and headed straight for
the main gate of the Hotel. There he met the manager of the Hotel. He saw casualties and
could hear gunfire coming from inside the Hotel. He also heard the sound of a grenade, and
tried to ask the manager about the terrorist elements inside the Hotel and where they were
located. He told him that a lone gunman was in the process of killing the tourists inside the
Hotel.
“BF” explained that during that time a patrol arrived from the Station for National Security in
Akouda, comprising the head of the Station, “BI” and the head of the local police station, as
well as a captain from the Akouda Station, “Captain BJ”. “BF” requested that they
accompany him to combat the terror attack which was continuing inside the Hotel.
“BF” headed towards the swimming pool then they headed after that towards the beach.
They had been told by bystanders that the perpetrator had zigzagged towards the left hand
side of the beach of the Bellevue Hotel. “BF” could hear gunfire but was unable to pinpoint
the exact location of the criminal. The bystanders told him that he was proceeding along the
route facing the Soviva Hotel. He explained that the operation to eliminate the criminal did
not materialise, because the Tourist Security Patrol that he had asked to join him did not do
so. It appeared to him that they had gone against his instructions to join up with him, for
reasons of which he was unaware. He explained that the Tourist Security Patrol was capable
of putting an end to the terror attack since the agents were equipped with collective weapons
and had been trained to use them with the intention of repelling an attack – but this never
happened.
“BF” explained that this constituted disobeying his instructions and orders, stating that his
conversation with the manager of the Hotel had lasted around three or four minutes, during
which time the Akouda patrol arrive. During that time the Tourist Security Patrol had not
10
started to repel the attack, despite the fact that they were qualified and equipped to do so.
Given the type of weapons they were carrying and the nature of the Security Team, in his
estimation they were equipped and qualified to employ collective weapons.
“BF” confirmed that he reckoned that the telephone call that he received indicated that the
attack had begun at around 11.45 and that the intervention of the Tourist Security Team
would take no more than three or four minutes at the most, i.e. they could have arrived onsite at around 11.50. This did not happen for reasons that he did not know.
“BF” confirmed he had not been prepared to use a ‘collective weapon’ to repel such an
attack in view of the fact that he had not received any training in using collective weapons. In
spite of that he had tried to intervene to repel the attack but had not been able to do so,
adding that the quadbike team responsible for securing the beach-front had not intervened to
resist this attack. Similarly, with regard to the mounted team, it had not intervened to resist
this attack, for reasons that he was unaware of.
According to “BG” it took him no more than 5 to 7 minutes to get from the District HQ to the
Imperial Marhaba. He estimated that he arrived at the Imperial Marhaba about 11.52am. He
could not explain the delay that occurred in getting to site of the incident. He was certain that
there had been no delay in getting to the site of the incident to intervene in order to repel the
said terror attack.
Upon his arrival at the Imperial Marhaba Hotel, “BF” found 3 victims outside the front of the
Hotel, a further 3 victims by the outdoor swimming pool and on the beach he found that many
victims had fallen.
“BK”
“BK” was a police governor assigned to the [guidance] section in the Northern Sousse
national security district (Hammam Sousse). On 26th June his attention was drawn to the
operations room where “CA” was in the process of making a telephone call. “CA” asked him
to go to the beach at the Imperial Marhaba Hotel, informing him that there was gunfire at the
Hotel. “BK” returned to his office and told “BG” that there was a terrorist attack at the
Imperial Marhaba. It was 11.45am.
“BK” (armed with a Browning pistol) and “BG” left the area accompanied by the head of the
public security section “DH”, who was armed with a Steyr firearm. By the time they arrived at
the Hotel the terrorist had been killed. “BK” explained that it took no more than about 7 or 8
minutes to get to the Imperial Marhaba from their location. The reason for the delay was due
to a lack of clarity of information, although they knew that the terrorist incident was taking
11
place at the Imperial Marhaba Hotel, and the distance between the scene of the incident and
the district headquarters.
“DH”
“DH” was “the head of the public road section in Hammam Sousse”. Although he was offduty at the time of the attack he was heading to the area headquarters when he saw “BF”
coming out with a pistol in his hand at approximately 11.47am. “DH” was told there was
gunfire on the Selima beach next to the Imperial Marhaba Hotel. “DH” got a Steyr firearm.
“Constable BZ” was waiting in a car parked at the front of the headquarters. “DH” asked him
to go to the Hotel but “Constable BZ” told him that they had to wait for “AE”. They waited for
about 4 minutes.
“BH”: the Director of the Sousse National Police Region
“BH” was Director of the Sousse National Police Region. He stated:
“The Imperial Marhaba Hotel…was part of the Hammam Sousse National Security
District and is part of the al-Qantaoui sector that stretches from Port el-Qantaoui to
the Soviva Hotel. The security network for the area consists of a coastal security
patrol, a quad-bike patrol along the beach, a mounted patrol, and a coastguard patrol,
as well as 2 coordinated fixed posts, one of which, belonging to the Public Order
Forces is located in front of the Riviera Hotel, which is in turn almost 3 km away. The
fixed post belonging to the National Guard, post 131, is about 5 km away. These fixed
points are used to observe traffic and people and are not to be left unmanned. The
security network enables rapid intervention due to the short distance between them
and the Hotel…”
On 26th June he was in his office at the National Security Police HQ in Sousse. At about
11.45am “1st Lieutenant BR”, who works in the Public Security Police, informed “BH” that he
had received a call from his wife who worked at the Imperial Marhaba, telling him that an
armed man had stormed the Hotel and was killing foreign tourists. “BH” grabbed the phone,
called the Highway Patrol Branch Head, “Colonel BS”, and informed him that a terrorist
attack was taking place at the Imperial Marhaba Hotel. He asked him to send the patrol car
to the scene of the incident.
“BH” immediately headed to the Hotel with “Constable BT”, who was armed with a Steyr
firearm. They were driven by “Constable BU”. Whilst en route “BH” called the Head of the
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National Security District in Hammam Sousse and told him of the situation. He also called the
Police Operations Rooms and told them to send urgently a Joint Intervention Force,
consisting of Police, Army, National Guard, Internal Security and Public Order forces in order
to stop the attack. He called the commander of the Public Order forces’ barracks and asked
him to send reinforcements to the scene of the incident, particularly specialist teams under
his command. He also called “Captain BV”, the head of the Rapid Intervention Team and
told him what had happened, requesting his intervention at the scene as a matter of urgency.
Before arriving at the scene he twice called the head of National Security for the region of
Northern Sousse and informed him that there was gunfire inside the Hotel. “BH” requested
that the National Security Team leader intervene, along with two men who were with him, to
stop the attack. They did not intervene to stop the attack but deliberated over whether the
intervention would be effective.
“BH” arrived at the Hotel at approximately 12.03pm and was met by someone who told him
that he was an employee of the Imperial Marhaba Hotel and that he had managed to flee.
The employee pointed out the terrorist who had left the Hotel across the beach. “BH” and the
team with him set off towards the road leading to the beach on which the terrorist was
subsequently killed. He found the Head of the Border Police, “Brigadier BN”, accompanied
by one of his National Guard soldiers. “BH”, “Constable BU” and “Constable BT”, as well as
“Brigadier BN” and his team continued towards the beach. They went via the rear path of
the Hotel and when they reached the front, they saw the gunman heading from the beach.
“BH”, along with “Brigadier BN”, moved forward towards the gunman, who turned his
weapon towards them but did not open fire. Using his Glock pistol “BH” opened fire on him
but missed. Meanwhile, “Brigadier BN” moved towards the entrance of the building to
provide support and opened fire. The suspect fell to the ground and began to return fire. It
was not known at this point whether or not the bullets fired by “Brigadier BN” had hit the
suspect, especially as he continued to put up a fight after he fell to the ground.
“BH” then saw the suspect fall to the ground, apparently having been shot by a constable
from the Tourist Police and a Major from the National Guard.
“BH” is recorded as stating:
“The security units … i.e. the coastal patrol, the quad-bike patrol, the mounted patrol
and the coast guard are all under the supervision of the Regional Head and they are
tasked with immediate first response to an attack until specialist units arrive.
However, [“BH”] explains that he discovered that the Station Head for National
Security, “BF”, didn’t intervene to stop the attack, [instead] remaining outside the
Hotel. He also discovered that none of the coastal, quad-bike, mounted or coastguard
patrols intervened at the Hotel to stop the terrorist attack, remaining outside the Hotel
13
until the perpetrator of the attack had carried out his terrorist operation, and he does
not of the reasons why they didn’t intervene. He also acknowledged that the Station
Head of National Security did not open fire at all against the offender, in fact, when
the interviewee reviewed what ammunition had been used, he discovered that the
Station Head of National Security, “BF” hadn’t fired a single round at the offender and
had not intervened to stop the attack and that the security detachments under his
charge who were tasked with protecting the Hotel had not intervened either to stop
the attack; they only surrounded the Hotel. When the shooting began on the beach, a
coast guard patrol was present and didn’t intervene to stop the terrorist who killed
many tourists on the beach before heading inside the Hotel, adding that one of the
two guards there had the ability to fire at the perpetrator of the terrorist attack, kill him
and put an end to the attack. It is unjustifiable that this didn’t happen. The two guards
came down to the beach after the attacker heading toward the swimming pool and
one of them fainted, although [“BH”] didn’t know why, whilst the second guard started
to get rid of his uniform and mingled with the crowd of onlookers. The guards were
armed with Steyr assault rifles and would have been in a position to stop the attack at
the very beginning. A member of the public named “BW” provided this information
and added that he grabbed the weapon belonging to the two guards and followed the
terrorist inside the swimming pool area and fired at him but the weapon jammed so
he gave it back to the guards. [“BH”] states that this information is corroborated and
solid, according to the investigations that he has carried out and according to the
administrative search carried out by the General Inspectorate of the Interior Ministry
who has the authority to carry out such investigations and the statement of a city
guard working at the Hotel has confirmed it…“BX”, “Constable BY” and “BZ” … were
located no more than 3 minutes from the scene of the incident. [“BH”] explains that he
informed the above mentioned patrol in a timely manner but that they didn’t intervene
within the appropriate timeframe.
He stated that none of the periodic patrols; the coastguard patrol, the quad bike patrol
on the beach, the mounted patrol and the patrol by the area head were more than 5
minutes away from being able to intervene, at most. The terrorist attack allegedly
commenced at 11.45 and it would have taken perhaps 6 or 7 minutes away from the
scent of the incident at the most. These units were the initial first response who
should have been the initial reaction to the terrorist attack whilst specialist teams
were arriving. These first response teams are equipped with everything necessary to
intervene to stop this attack, including weapons and bullet-proof vests. The security
authorities directly responsible for first response are the Tourist security, the Area
Head, the mounted patrol, the quadbike patrol, and the Coastguard patrol; they are
14
the authorities who were resent in the vicinity of and surrounding the scene of the
incident but they didn’t intervene to stop this attack although it wouldn’t have taken
them more than 6 or 7 minutes at most to reach the scene and put an end to the
attack on the beach; this didn’t happen. … the competent security authorities had not
intervened in a timely manner, adding that the security authorities could have
prevented loss of life by simply placing a security guard in the area who could have
countered the offender and ended the attack; this didn’t happen. …
He added that this terrorist attack happened due to the lack of intelligence regarding
the offender, allowing him to access the area without causing any concern, by using
stealth and camouflage. The Head of the HQ for National Security in Northern
Sousse is responsible for the Imperial Marhaba Hotel and is located about 8 km
away. It took him around 10 minutes to reach the incident scene and he used his
weapon to confront the offender.”
“AE”: the Divisional Head of the Tourist Security Police in Sousse
“AE” was the Divisional Head (or ‘OC’) of the Tourist Security Police in Sousse. He stated
that the Tourist Security Division’s post is located in the al-Qantaoui Gardens Residence,
belonging to the Tenmiya Tourist Company in Northern Sousse. The Tourist Security
Division also has an office in the National Security Police Station in Northern Sousse where
the Division’s weapons are stored.
“AE” was responsible for the policing of the tourist district, including the Imperial Marhaba
Hotel. The Tourist Security Division were responsible for protecting it.
“AE” explained that the Tourist Security Police in Sousse comprises the Divisional Head and
12 constables. The Division is equipped with 2 Steyr assault rifles and 8 sidearms. They had
2 bullet-proof vests and 2 ballistic helmets. The Division had a four-wheel drive vehicle which
was of an average technical condition. They also had a four-wheel drive quadbike which was
loaned to them.
On 26th June 2015 the security team comprised “Constable BZ”, a company officer,
assistant “Constable BX” and “Constable BY”. The 2 assault rifles were racked in their
vehicle and they were equipped with 2 bullet proof-vests and 2 ballistic helmets. According to
“AE”, “Constable BX” was trained in the use of the assault rifles but not the 2 constables
(although “Constables BY and BZ” did claim to have been so trained). “AE” stated that the
officers had been trained in the use of the Steyr assault rifle as a first response to counter
any attack, however “they were unable to do so because of the capabilities available to them,
15
i.e. because of the type of weapons they were using, because of their equipment and training
to deal with this particular type of terrorist attack. He stated that they had received no
weapons training since 14 January 2011…whilst [“AE”] was working as the OC of the Tourist
Division, his personnel had not received any training in weapons handling.”
“AE” had not told the security authorities about the Tourist Security Division’s lack of
readiness to handle the automatic weapons as it wasn’t his job to do so, rather it was the
responsibility of the security authorities themselves.
“AE” stated that the sidearms were not in the vehicle and the constables were not carrying
their sidearms. “AE” is recorded as stating:
“…the reason for this was that Hotel owners and managers had complained about
weapons being carried in their Hotels, which had made them leave their sidearms. He
stated that this was a personal decision that was taken without the knowledge or
approval of the relevant Security Authority. Despite the fact that one of them was
meant to take his weapon with him and on most occasions…on the day in question,
none of the Security Personnel, including the interviewee himself, were carrying their
sidearms.”
“AE” stated that whilst he, “Constable BZ”, “Constable BX” and “Constable BY” were in the
patrol vehicle he received a call on his mobile phone from a citizen, “CN”, who told him that
there was gunfire in the area of the Soviva Hotel. It was about 11.45am. “AE” stated that
during the call he was at the Hannibal crossroads, about 3.5 kilometres from the Imperial
Marhaba Hotel 5.
The information “AE” received was confirmed when “Constable BX” received a phone call
informing him that the Soviva area was being targeted by gunfire.
“AE” decided that instead of heading to the scene of the incident they should travel to the
National Security Police Station to get more weapons “as the vehicle was only equipped with
2 Steyr Assault Rifles, 2 Bullet-proof vests and 2 helmets, which was insufficient to counter
any terrorist attack”. The Station was about 50 metres from their location.
They stopped the car in front of the Station, got out and headed straight inside to put on
bullet-proof vests and to try to obtain additional weapons (bearing in mind that they only had
two assault rifles) however they were unable to get weapons from the team there. They then
headed to the Highway Patrol Division to try and get weapons there but they did not find any.
He stated that this search lasted about 5 minutes.
In fact, it appears that Juge Akremi obtained footage from the surveillance camera fixed at
the Station and that this shows that “AE” spent more than 8 minutes inside the station.
5
See point 6 on the map at page 5 of the Core Bundle [DC8171/7].
16
“AE” states that “BF”, the Head of the National Security Police Station, met him at the main
entrance of the Station and told him that the Soviva area was the target of a terrorist attack.
“AE” stated that “BF” “didn’t give him any instructions, or that he may have done, but that he
can’t remember what they were. He stated that he panicked and was afraid because there
was an armed attack on the Tourist Area for which he was responsible.”
When “AE” arrived at the Soviva Hotel someone told him that he thought that the offender
was in the Soviva Hotel so they headed inside, but they did not find him there. “AE” then
received a call from the central Operations Room at the Interior Ministry in Tunis telling him
that the suspected gunman was in the Imperial Marhaba Hotel. “AE” then went to the
Imperial Marhaba where he was told that the gunman was on the beach. He went to the
entrance opposite the Bellevue Hotel where he saw the terrorist coming from the beach. The
gunman opened fire on “AE” and his team.
“AE” stated that when he arrived at the Imperial Marhaba there were no other security
elements there, however, when he zig-zagged to the entrance where the perpetrator was, he
came across the Director of the National Security Police, “BH”, and the Station Head, “CO”.
“AE” stated that the Security Unit with responsibility for protecting the beach was the
quadbike patrol, led by “CQ", with “Constable CP": this patrol not under his supervision but
was under the direction of the National Security Police Operations Room in Northern Sousse.
“AE” denied “BF’s” assertion that he (“AE”) disobeyed the instruction to go straight to the
Imperial Marhaba to stop the attack. According to “AE”, “BF” was trying to shift the blame to
him, especially as it was “BF”, as the National Security Police Station OC, who is the first
person responsible for the tourist district.
“AE” stated that he was not advised to post
security patrols to protect the tourist district, particularly the beach, that patrols were posted
on the beach in the Andalus area and that a patrol was placed at the entrance to the Soviva.
“AE” added that “BF” did not inform him that the terrorist attack was taking place at the
Imperial Marhaba.
“AE” denied receiving an instruction from “CA” to intervene immediately in the attack.
“AE” stated that “the Tourist Security Division is not equipped and not trained to intervene
and counter an attack of this kind. The interviewee stated specifically that he had sent
reports about this issue and had received no response, especially since the tourist district
had been targeted by a terrorist attack. The interviewee stated that the National Security
Police did not reinforce the Division with any additional equipment or personnel and added
that the Police did not provide sufficient security to the aforementioned tourist area and that
the Tourist Security Division alone were not capable of providing security protection for the
coastal strip, especially as the Tourist Security Division is also tasked with other duties.”
17
“Constable BY”, “Constable BX” and “Constable BZ”
“Constable BY” was part of the team led by “AE”. He stated that he had been trained in the
use of the Steyr assault rifle and pistol and to deal initially with any armed attack that may
occur. “Constable BY” stated:
“At some point between 1100 and 1200, he was in the [four-wheel drive] vehicle
accompanied by his co-workers; team leader “AE”, “Constable BX” and “Constable
BZ”. When they arrived at the Hannibal Crossroads, located about 100 metres from
the National Security Police Station in Northern Sousse and about 1500 metres from
the Hotel Imperial Marhaba, his colleague “Constable BX” received a telephone call
informing him of gunfire on the beach level with the Soviva and Imperial Marhaba
Hotels. He stated that the Soviva, Imperial Marhaba and Bellevue Park Hotels all
have the same entrance and after informing the team leader of the information, the
team leader ordered the driver to head to the National Security Police HQ in Northern
Sousse to obtain more equipment. He stated that the vehicle was equipped with 2
Steyr Assault Rifles, 2 bullet proof vests and 2 ballistic helmets. Additionally, each
officer was armed with a sidearm. He immediately donned the bullet proof vest and
grabbed a Steyr assault rifle. His colleague “Constable BX” also grabbed the other
Steyr assault rifle.
He stated that the equipment available in the vehicle was enough for an initial
response to deal with the attack in question. However, the team leader told them to
head for the station and this is what they did as they team leader was in command.
As soon as they stopped, they were met by the Station Head who told the team
leader that there was gunfire at the Hotel Imperial Marhaba, but the team leader
informed him that he was getting hold of more equipment and with this, the Station
Head headed off in the direction of the Hotel Imperial Marhaba. [“Constable BY”]
waited outside the vehicle whilst the team leader and his two colleagues went inside
the station. He stated that the team leader and his 2 colleagues were away for 8
minutes and that he does not know the reason for this, confirming that he waited for
them so that they could head to the scene of the incident and deal with the terrorist
attack. He also confirmed that it takes no more than 3 minutes to reach the Imperial
Marhaba Hotel and the that the first telephone call came at around 1146 and that they
arrived at the scene at 1159. He confirmed that the reason they didn’t intervene
immediately to stop the terrorist attack was due the team leader and the fact that they
obeyed his orders. He stated that they then headed towards the Imperial Marhaba
Hotel and when they arrived at the Soviva Hotel, them met several members of the
18
public as well as the Hotel Manager, ZAHRA IDRIS, who informed them that there
was shooting inside the Hotel. They went straight to the Soviva Hotel, exited via the
rear door and moved to the entrance leading to the beach where they saw the
offender moving from the beach and being engaged by armed security forces
personnel. He confirmed that the blame for the Tourist Security Police’s lack of
intervention to stop the terrorist attack lies above him, with the team leader.”
“AE” stated that “Constable BY” was not trained to assess the security situation. “AE” stated
that he had given “Constable BY” a Steyr assault rifle but that he didn’t use it as he was “a
newbie and as such didn’t order him to intervene to stop the attack.”
“Constables BX and BZ” were also part of the team led by “AE”. Like “Constable BY” both
“Constables BX and BZ” claimed to have been trained in use of the Steyr rifle and smaller
weapons. In their view they were both capable of dealing with any armed terrorist attack that
may occur. They confirmed that they had 2 Steyr assault rifles, 2 bullet proof vests and 2
ballistic helmets. In “Constable BX’s” view, the equipment located in the vehicle is sufficient
to provide an initial response to any armed terrorist attack.
“Constable BX” explained that at about 11.47am 6 he received a telephone call from the
receptionist at the Hotel Soviva Hotel stating that gunfire could be heard coming from the
beach [N.B. in the second account “Constable BX” states that he received this call at about
11.45am]. “Constable BX” assessed that the time of the call was at about 11.47am from the
time which was displayed on his mobile telephone. “Constable BX” informed “AE” who,
seconds later, received a second telephone call that confirmed the information that
“Constable BX” had received. At this point they were inside the vehicle at the Hannibal
crossroads, about 2.5 kilometres from the Imperial Marhaba Hotel and the Soviva Hotel.
“Constable BX” stated that it would not have taken more than 2 minutes to reach the scene
of the incident, however, “AE” told the driver “Constable BZ”, without explanation, to head to
the National Security Police Station in Hammam Sousse. “Constable BX” stated that logic
dictated that they should go directly to the scene of the incident as the car was equipped with
2 assault rifles and each officer was also equipped with a sidearm. There were also 2 bullet
proof vests and 2 ballistic helmets which was enough equipment to initially counter the
terrorist attack. However “AE” told them to head to the National Security Police Station in
Northern Sousse. “Constable BZ”, the driver of the vehicle, questioned “AE’s” instructions
as “the logical thing to do would be to head straight for the scene with as little delay as
possible, in order to stop the terrorist attack”.
“Constable BZ” stated that once at the station they searched the building for about 5
minutes or more. They did not find any other weapons.
6
N.B. in the second account “Constable BX” states that he received this call at about 11.45am
19
“Constable BX” stated that he did not know how long they were in the station, however
when they eventually arrived at the scene of the incident they encountered the gunman
coming from the direction of the beach. “Constable BX” opened fire using the Steyr rifle but
he did not know if he hit him or not. “Constable BX” stated that it takes no more than 2 or 3
minutes to reach the scene of the incident, therefore having received the call at 11.47am
they could have arrived at the scene at 11.50am. “Constable BZ” confirmed that it would
have taken 2 minutes to travel the 1.5 kilometres from the National Security Station in
Sousse to the Imperial Marhaba Hotel. Despite this, by the time that “AE” and his team
arrived the perpetrator of the terrorist attack had finished killing.
“AE” stated that “Constable BX” “was not qualified to assess the readiness of the Division to
stop the terrorist attack and that his colleague’s statement was an attempt to absolve himself
of any blame by placing it on [“AE’s”] shoulders.”
“Constable CP” and “CQ”
“Constable CP” and “CQ” were both assigned to the Tourist Security Division in Northern
Sousse. They had received training in the use of various weapons, including the Steyr
assault rifle, but according to “Constable CP” “he was not capable of using the assault rifle
as he had not received any training in about 5 years”. On the day of the attack their duties
involved accompanying the Tourist Security Division to patrol on a four-wheel drive quadbike.
They were each armed with a Browning pistol with 5 rounds of ammunition.
They were at the National Security Police Station when “AE” and his team arrived. “AE”
informed them that the Soviva tourist district was being attacked by gunfire and hand
grenades. “CQ” denied that “BF” had instructed him (“CQ”) to go to the scene and stop the
terrorist attack.
“Constable CP” and “CQ” deployed to the Club El-Kantaoui Hotel on the quadbike.
They arrived after the terrorist had been killed despite the Security Station in Northern
Sousse being no more than 2 kilometres from the Imperial Marhaba Hotel. Whilst en route
some members of the public approached “Constable CP” and “CQ” and handed 2
Kalashnikov magazines to them. The members of the public told them that the perpetrator of
the terrorist attack had left the Hotel and was heading towards the path next to the Soviva
Hotel.
When asked why they did not arrive at the Hotel sooner, “CQ” and “Constable CP” stated: (i)
the quadbike was in a very poor condition, it was too slow and was incapable of driving over
20
sand; (ii) the road was congested; and (iii) they had insufficient information about the exact
location of the attack.
“CK” and “CR”: the mounted police officers
“CK” and “CR” were assigned to the Mounted Unit in Sousse and on 26th June 2015 were
assigned to work with the Tourist Security team. They were on horseback and patrolled the
beach. They were each armed with a Browning pistol and 5 rounds of ammunition but did not
have bulletproof vests or ballistic helmets. Their role was to monitor the beach to protect
tourists and to deal with any public disorder.
At about 11.50am they were approached by an individual who told them that there was
gunfire at the Green Park Hotel (according to “CK”) or the Imperial Marhaba Hotel (according
to “CR”). “CK” called the Sousse Public Order Operations room. “CR” called the National
Security Police in Sousse on 197. At this stage they were next to the al-Hamra Hotel, about
2.5 kilometres from the Imperial Marhaba. They were told to attend the incident, however it
took about 30 minutes to arrive, by which time the terrorist had been killed.
According to “CK” the reason for their delay in arriving at the scene was the caution they had
shown in getting there, especially as the Operations Room had told them that the perpetrator
was armed with a Kalashnikov assault rifle.
THE MARINE GUARD
“CC”: the Director of Naval Border Police
“CC” was the Director of Naval Border Police, whose area of responsibility included Monastir,
Sousse and Benabel Naval Districts. He stated that he is the head of Sousse Naval District,
which consists of the Naval Border Team and a Naval Advisory Team. “Captain CD”
oversees 3 locations in the Naval Border Team, including the Coastguard HQ in al-Qantaoui,
which in turn is responsible for the Imperial Marhaba Hotel. The Coastguard HQ is
commanded by “Commander CE” with about 17 personnel. It has a twin engine launch, a
car and a four-wheel drive sand bike. The role of this unit was to counter any external
aggression on the coastal strip within its area of responsibility. The security of the beach
itself is the responsibility of the appropriate local guard and police unit. The HQ is not
responsible for intervening to stop terrorist attacks.
21
On 26th June “CC” was working in the Administration of the Naval Border Police, about 15
kilometres from the Imperial Marhaba Hotel. At around noon the Naval Border Police
Operations Room received a call from an individual who stated that he could hear gunfire
from the Bellevue Park Hotel opposite the Imperial Marhaba Hotel. “CC” despatched the
naval patrols operating in the area. The Operations Room directed “Commander CE” to
attend the scene. “Commander CE” was accompanied by “Corporal CG”. “CC” stated that
from a naval perspective, the security authority responsible for an attack on the Imperial
Marhaba Hotel was the responsibility of “Commander CE” and “Corporal CG”.
At 12.10pm “Commander CE” informed the Operations Room that the patrol boat had been
fired upon. “CC” attended the Hotel, however by this stage the gunman had been killed. “CC”
stated that the huge scale of casualties was due to a lack of intervention within the correct
timeframe, adding that all the security authorities who were responsible for the Imperial
Marhaba Hotel are to blame for this.
“Commander CE”: the OC of the Coastguard HQ in El-Kantaoui 7
“Commander CE” explained that he was the OC of the Coastguard HQ in El-Kantaoui, which
has a post in the marina at El-Kantaoui. The HQ comprises 16 personnel and is equipped
with a naval launch, a patrol vehicle, a four-wheel drive quadbike and 14 Steyr assault rifles.
“Commander CE” accepted that the Imperial Marhaba Hotel was within his area of
responsibility. The base’s role was to supervise leisure and fishing boats, and to secure the
border. In the event of an armed terrorist attack on the beach, its role is to intervene to stop
such an attack.
On 26 h June “Commander CE” and “Corporal CG” were in an inflatable boat, number 642.
“Commander CE” had his Steyr rifle and 2 magazines, each containing 20 rounds of
ammunition, however, “Corporal CG” was unarmed because he had not been trained in the
use of firearms. At about 11.40am “Commander CE” received a call on his mobile phone
from the Sousse Naval Operations Room informing him of gunfire at the Hotel Imperial
Marhaba.
“Commander CE’s” account is as follows:
“When he received the call, he was located about 1500 [metres] from the Hotel
Imperial Marhaba 8. [On hearing this, [“Commander CE”] headed directly to the scene
of the incident and witnessed the victims of the terrorist attack on the beach. The
7
Also ciphered as “ER”.
In a subsequent account, “Commander CE” stated that they were 2.5 kilometres from the Imperial
Marhaba Hotel.
8
22
offender had gone towards the outside swimming pool and [“Commander CE”]
witnessed him in the process of firing at the tourists who were there at the outside
pool. He confirmed that he made his Steyr rifle ready and fired 2 rounds at the
perpetrator of the terrorist attack, who was still located at the outside pool, he was
able to identify him and [fired 2 rounds] although he didn’t hit him. Then,
[“Commander CE”] saw the perpetrator take a hand grenade from his right pocket
and throw it, but it didn’t explode. [“Commander CE”] then stumbled and fell next to
the pool and where he fainted through terror and panic that the terrorist may have
another hand grenade. He confirmed that he didn’t know what happened after that
because he had fainted. He was assisted by two security personnel and doesn’t
remember anything after that. He confirms that the last place the offender went was
inside the Hotel, but couldn’t specify the exact location. He stated that his state of
health prevented him from effectively dealing with the terrorist.”
In a subsequent account “Commander CE” stated that he was: “overcome with terror,
slipped and fell onto the floor and dropped his weapon. A member of the public picked up his
weapon and handed it back to him. The interviewee witnessed the perpetrator of the attack
heading towards him and so the interviewee decided to flee, however lost consciousness
and fainted. He came to and continued his route back to the beach. The interviewee then hid
behind a parasol until he saw the offender leaving the scene where he had committed the
terrorist attack. He stated that he tried to stop the attack but that he couldn’t because the
terrorist attack was unexpected and that he, being a security official was unable to counter
attacks of this type.”
“Corporal CG”: the naval guard
On 26th June “Corporal CG” was the pilot of a dinghy and was crewed with “Commander
CE”. They were assigned to the El-Kantaoui naval base. Contrary to the account of
“Commander CE”, “Corporal CG” explained that he had been trained in the use of weapons
and was prepared and qualified to deal with any type of attack. “Corporal CG” also stated
that on the day he took his assault rifle but for unknown reason “Commander CE” did not
take his weapon.
Between 11.30am and midday “Commander CE” received a call on his mobile phone from
the area naval operations rooms in Sousse informing him that the Imperial Marhaba Hotel
was under armed attack. They were 5 kilometres away from the Imperial Marhaba Hotel; it
would take no more than 10 minutes to get there.
23
“Commander CE” told “Corporal CG” to head directly to the Hotel. On arrival, “Commander
CE” took “Corporal CG’s” firearm and headed into the Hotel as bystanders pointed out the
terrorist attacker inside the Hotel. “Corporal CG” took off his shirt fearing that the terrorist
attacker would notice that he was a security guard and that he was wearing a National Guard
uniform. “Corporal CG” remained beside the rubber dinghy whilst “Commander CE” was
inside the Hotel. He explained that he heard gunfire coming from his Steyr firearm, then
gunfire from a Kalashnikov and the explosion of a hand grenade. He explained that he
remained on the beach and did not know what was happening inside the Hotel just as he did
not know how “Commander CE” would deal with the terrorist attacker.
He then two saw Hotel security personnel carrying “Commander CE”. He thought that
“Commander CE” had been injured by gunfire so he loaded him into the dinghy and moved
away from the scene of the incident knowing that the terrorist attacker was inside the Hotel
intending to kill tourists. “Corporal CG” saw the terrorist coming out of the Hotel.
“Corporal CG” stated:
“…he heard gunshots coming from inside the Hotel, an exchange of fire and also the
sound of a hand grenade. Then, he saw his colleague "ER" approach the beach with
two people and he was told that the OC had fainted, picked up his weapon and left
the scene as he could not operate it as it was jammed. The interviewee saw the
offender heading towards the beach and at that point, he and his colleague were a
distance away from the scene, although he witnessed the offender then leave the
beach and head left. He stated that the reason he didn’t intervene to stop the attack
was that he didn’t have any weapon on him he could use to stop the attack. He did try
to use his weapon it was unserviceable.”
“Corporal CG” took “Commander CE” to the al-Kantaoui port where he was taken to a local
hospital. “Commander CE” was unconscious.
“Corporal CG” thought that “Commander CE” had become unconscious due to the
explosion of the hand grenade that was thrown by the criminal.
THE NATIONAL GUARD
“Brigadier BN”: the Regional Manager of the National Guard in Sousse
“Brigadier BN” was the Regional Manager of the National Guard in Sousse. The Hotel did
not fall within his jurisdiction. Although he was not responsible for security, he was informed
24
of the attack at the Imperial Marhaba on the 193 telephone number 9. When questioned he
could not remember the content of the call, but he was able to go back to the archive of
recorded conversations on the regional phone. He was able to confirm that the telephone
conversation included discussion of the targeting of tourists located at the Imperial Marhaba
Hotel with gunfire. He armed himself with his firearm, a Steyr, and 2 magazines of live
ammunition and put on a bullet-proof vest. He went directly to the Hotel with agents “BO”
and “Corporal BP” (who were also armed with firearms and wore bullet-proof vests) and the
head of the District Guard, “BQ”.
On arrival at the Hotel “Brigadier BN” saw 3 security and military vehicles. He was told by
bystanders that the gunman was escaping along the beach. “Brigadier BN” took his weapon
and left for the beach accompanied by “BH” and “Corporal BP”.
“Brigadier BN” came upon the gunman:
“The criminal directed rounds towards him and [“Brigadier BN”] was compelled to
return fire in an attempt to defend himself from the bullets. He was then able to
secure a position beside a building and a vehicle and aimed his fire directly at the
criminal, who fell to the ground. He then stood up again and continued his progress,
and it appeared that he was trying to detonate a grenade that was on his person. He
continued moving then weaved to the left and then to the right, and then he fell down
there. He had been injured by other bullets. He explained that his ammunition had run
out and that is what had caused him, after he had injured the criminal at the first
opportunity, to take cover in one of the locations…
He confirmed that as soon as he had become aware that a terrorist attack was
ongoing at the Imperial Marhaba Hotel he had intervened in a security capacity –
despite the fact that the said location where the terrorist incident had taken place was
not in his jurisdiction. It was a matter for intervention by any security agency, as long
as the action was a terrorist one. He explained that the heavy fatal toll could be
traced back to negligence of the first responders to resist the terror attack, whether
that was to do with the Marine Guard or security patrols concerned in terms of
intervention, who were in close proximity to the location of the incident – especially as
their intervention would have required no more than three minutes. He explained that
despite the distance between the Regional National Guard and the location of the
incident he had been able to arrive in around eight minutes. He was certain that the
fault was not to do with the security structure, but rather it had to do with the actual
intervention to repel to this attack…”
9
193 is the number for the National Guard (see [DC8232/13]).
25
The Akouda Police: “CX” and “Commander CW”
“CX”, was a police officer, at the national security base in Akouda. The Imperial Marhaba
Hotel is about 5 kilometres from the base but is not under his jurisdiction. It falls within the
jurisdiction of the Hammam Sousse national security district, the Hammam Sousse national
security base and the tourist national security team.
At approximately 11.45am “CX” received a call from “Captain BJ”, who was off duty but
informed him there was gunfire at the Soviva tourist resort. He immediately contacted the
commander of the town police station in Akouda, “Commander CW”, told him about the
terrorist attacks and asked him to come to the base to take him to the scene of the incident
as he had no means of transport. “Commander CW” arrived after about two minutes. “CX”
armed himself and travelled with him to the scene of the incident. “Captain BJ” stopped
them and got into the vehicle. They headed for the Imperial Marhaba Hotel. There, they
found the area commander, “BF”, standing in front of the main door of the Hotel. They
entered the hotel together. “CX” explained that it took about 10 minutes to get to the scene of
the incident, however, as soon as they entered through the Hotel’s main door, it became
clear to them that the attacker had left the Hotel.
“Commander CW” stated that at approximately midday he was phoned by the police
governor, “CX”, whilst at the public security base in Akouda. He was told that the Soviva
tourist resort was under fire. “Commander CW” confirmed that he and “CX” met (“CX”
having a pistol and a Steyr firearm) and immediately set off for the Soviva which was about
five kilometres away. On arrival, they were told that the gunfire at the Imperial Marhaba
Hotel. They headed straight there and they found the area commander “BF”. They entered
the Hotel together and heard gunfire which appeared to be between the security services
and the terrorist suspect. “Commander CW” explained that, when they entered the Hotel,
the gunman had already left. “Commander CW” confirmed that he entered the Imperial
Marhaba with “BF”, “CX” and “Captain BJ” whom they had found waiting for them at the
Soviva intersection about 400 metres from the Hotel.
According to “Commander CW”, upon arrival at the Imperial Marhaba Hotel, he had not
seen the tourist security patrol but had only found the area commander “BF” who was
standing in front of the Hotel holding a pistol. He noted that “BF” did not intervene to stop the
terrorist attack. “Commander CW” did not know why.
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OTHER ACCOUNTS
“CO”: Head of the Hammam Sousse judicial police division
“CO” was the head of the judicial police division in Hammam Sousse. The Imperial Marhaba
Hotel was under his jurisdiction however he stated that “his intervention was confined to
judicial matters only. As for the matter of tourist security, it is under the jurisdiction of the
head of tourist security which in turn is under the jurisdiction of the northern Sousse national
security district.”
“CO” stated that on 26th June he received a call on his private telephone from a ‘tourist
motivator’, “CT”, who informed him that an armed man had started firing bullets at tourists on
the beach of the Imperial Marhaba Hotel. “CO” stated that he immediately contacted the
head of the national security district in northern Hammam Sousse, who advised him to go to
the scene with security officers. “CO” took a Beretta firearm and went to the Hotel with “CS”
(the assistant head of the base), who had a Steyr firearm.
On arrival at the Hotel, the Hotel guard told him that the terrorist had fled into the Soviva
Hotel. “CO” “CS”, “BH”, “Constable BX” and two security officers (“CU” and “CV”) entered
the Soviva Hotel but did not find the gunman. They were then informed by bystanders that
the terrorist was on the coast road. They went there and saw the terrorist coming from the
direction of the sea. Another security officer exchanged fire with the terrorist. “CO” and his
companions were forced to withdraw as the terrorist started firing continuous rounds, which
landed close to them. A joint security patrol from the National Guard and the army arrived
and one of them fired at the terrorist who fell to the ground. “CO” did not know whose round
had hit the terrorist but it was from one of members of this patrol.
“CO” explained that the northern Sousse National Guard base was approximately 8
kilometres from the Hotel and it would have taken no more than 10 minutes to get there.
“CO” believed that he had arrived at a suitable time to stop the attack even though the attack
had concluded.
“CS”: the Deputy Head of the National Security Police Station in Hammam Sousse
“CS” was the Deputy Head of the National Security Police Station in Hammam Sousse,
which is about 3 kilometres from the Imperial Marhaba Hotel.
At about 11.40am or 11.50am on 26th June, “CO” (the Head of the National Security Police
Station) informed “CS” that a member of the public had provided information about shooting
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at the Imperial Marhaba Hotel. “CS” grabbed a Steyr rifle, “CO” grabbed a Berretta rifle and
they both donned bullet-proof vests. According to “CS”, he had never received training in the
use of weapons other than a pistol. They headed to the scene of the incident, however as
they were in a private vehicle (not an official vehicle) and as the traffic was slow and dense,
they did not arrive in time. By the time that “CS” did arrive the terrorist was in the road
adjacent to the Hotel. “CS” tried to intervene by using his weapon.
“COMMANDER DE”: commander of the judicial police section in northern Sousse
(Hammam Sousse)
“Commander DE” was the commander of the judicial police section in northern Sousse
(Hammam Sousse). The Imperial Marhaba Hotel came under a security structure consisting
of the tourist security team, itself consisting of a cavalry patrol, a bike patrol and a mounted
[vehicle?] patrol. This team was responsible for security of the northern Sousse tourist resort
by intervening to stop any terrorist attack on any tourist Hotel under its jurisdiction. It was
equipped with sufficient security equipment such as body armour, protective helmets, and
unit weapons which are capable of stopping any terrorist attack. The team was positioned
locally. The national security base at Hammam Sousse was authorised to intervene to stop
any terrorist attack. The Hammam Sousse national security district was also prepared and
responsible to intervene to stop such attacks.
“Commander DE” explained that the role of the judicial police section was to prosecute and
fight crimes in general, however that did not mean that this team would not intervene in the
event of a terrorist incident.
“Commander DE” stated that at approximately 11:45am, whilst he was heading for the
market in Hammam Sousse with security officers, “DF” and “DG”, he received a call from the
commander of the operations room of the Hammam Sousse national security district
informing him that the Kantaoui tourist resort had been targeted by gunfire.
He was in a vehicle equipped with 2 sets of body armour and 2 Steyr firearms. He and his
two colleagues were qualified to use these weapons to stop a terrorist attack as they had
received specialist training.
When he heard about the incident, they were 5 to 7 kilometres away from the scene and
headed directly there. On arrival at the entrance of the Soviva Hotel, it was clear to him that
there was gunfire between security personnel and the terrorist suspect who had left the Hotel
and followed the road alongside to the Bellevue Park Hotel. “Commander DE” stated that
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the reason for the delay was due to him having been some distance from the scene of the
incident, in addition to the road being congested at that peak time of day.
THE MILITARY
“Colonel DJ” was the regiment commander of the intervention units’ barracks in Sousse.
The role of the intervention units is to reinforce the security structure of the security services
under and outside of the Sousse district jurisdiction at the request of the district or the
general command in Tunis. The intervention units are not assigned to provide security to the
tourist resorts, with the exception of the patrol with the joint convoy, or when requested.
At approximately 11.55am “Sergeant DC” received a call on his mobile phone from his
colleague, “DI”, enquiring about the fact that there was gunfire in the resort of Kantaoui.
“Sergeant DC” went straight to the operations room, contacted his superior, “Colonel DJ”,
and told him that the resort was being targeted by gunfire.
“Sergeant DC” then received more information from his colleague “DA” who informed him
that the Imperial Marhaba was being targeted by gunfire. “DA” had heard this from security
officers at static point 1 at “Riviera”.
“DA” was working in the operations room of the intervention unit under the supervision of
“Sergeant DC”. At approximately 11.55am “DA” received a call from her colleague, “DD”
who was working at the Riviera intersection as part of a static security patrol. He informed
her that gunfire was targeting an hotel (he did not state which) and that he saw tourists
fleeing. “DA” immediately informed the “Sergeant DC” who in turn took measure to contact
those who needed to be informed. “DA” contacted the joint convoy patrol by radio and
informed it about the targeting by gunfire of the Imperial Marhaba Hotel. She advised it to
head to the Riviera intersection as, at that time, she was not sure that it was the Imperial
Marhaba Hotel that was being targeted by gunfire. She then contacted various security units
to inform them that the tourist resort was the subject of a terrorist attack.
“Sergeant DC” contacted the commander of the rapid intervention section, “Captain BV” and
informed him about the incident. “Colonel DJ” told the commander of the rapid intervention
section to go to the scene of the incident. 3 groups were sent to the Hotel, which was 16 – 18
kilometres away from the intervention unit’s headquarters. By the time they arrived the
attacker had been killed.
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“Lieutenant CY”: the regional regiment for maintaining order in Sousse
“Lieutenant CY” had been assigned to the regional regiment for maintaining order in
Sousse. On 26th June he was responsible for overseeing a joint convoy of the police,
National Guard and army. The role of the convoy was to protect against terrorism and
intervene in a terrorist incident. It was made up of four groups: the public security group, a
group from the Sousse intervention regiment, a group from the national army and a group
from the National Guard. These groups were equipped with “support and unit weapons”.
At approximately 11.55am the joint convoy was located at the Ma'had Ali intersection in
Bourguiba near the railway section at Kalaa Kebira, about 5 kilometres from the Imperial
Marhaba. “Lieutenant CY” received a telephone call from the operations room of the
intervention regiment and then another from the province operations room. He was informed
that there was a terrorist attack at the Imperial Marhaba and that rounds were being fired at
the Hotel. “Lieutenant CY” was directed to attend.
The joint convoy arrived at the scene at approximately 12.05pm, coinciding with the arrival of
the province commander, “BH”, three civilian security personnel and a town police car. He
explained that, as soon as he arrived at the front of the Hotel, he was told that the suspect
had left the Hotel and was on the beach.
“Lieutenant CY” took the path adjacent to the Hotel towards the beach. As soon as they
went round the bend the terrorist appeared, coming from the beach. The terrorist fired rounds
at them, forcing them to respond. They returned fire but were forced to withdraw because the
suspect had a suspicious object in his possession.
The suspect was struck by a round fired by “Major CZ” who was accompanied by the joint
convoy of the National Guard.
“Lieutenant CY” stated that the joint convoy intervened without delay, as soon as it received
the telephone call. However it appears that there was a delay in them being contacted
initially to inform them of the terrorist attack but “Lieutenant CY” did not know the reason for
that.
THE ACCOUNT OF “DL”: SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE MINISTER OF THE
INTERIOR RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY MATTERS
“DL” was the Secretary of State to the Minister of the Interior responsible for security matters.
“DL” is recorded as stating that on 26th June 2015:
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“[H]e convened a meeting which included all security parties during which they
discussed the protection of tourist groups from possible terrorist attacks and a plan
for urgent intervention was established. He explained that he examined the fixed
surveillance cameras in Sousse national security district, which showed that the
tourist security team vehicle patrol and bike patrol deliberately slowed down and did
not intervene to stop the … terrorist attack at that time. He explained that this patrol
was prepared and equipped to intervene to stop the … terrorist attack but did not do
so. He confirmed that the … patrol, which should have intervened first, did not
intervene to stop the … terrorist attack and committed what is considered a serious
mistake, and that its delay was deliberate and unjustifiable, and that it had the
capability to put an end to the … terrorist attack before the assault on the Hotel. He
confirmed that responsibility for this matter rests with the tourist security team as it
wasted a considerable amount of time by arriving after 8 minutes in the area with no
justification. This was despite the commander of the Hammam Sousse national
security district advising the afore-mentioned team to go with him to the Imperial
Marhaba Hotel, considering that this Hotel had been targeted by a terrorist attack. He
explained and that the excuse given the afore-mentioned team that it went to look for
body armour and weapons is unjustifiable as the vehicle was equipped with enough
weapons to stop the … terrorist attack, in addition to the fact that the search for
additional weapons did would require this amount of time. He confirmed that the …
team did not arrive at the Hotel until after the terrorist attack had completed his
killings, and after the … terrorist had been killed. He explained that this was
absolutely unjustifiable and confirmed that what this team … committed amounts to
an offence for which it must take the blame. He also added that, based on previous
meetings, it had been agreed with the director of the national security district in
Sousse, and within the framework of the security plan, to locate a security unit two
kilometres from the Imperial Marhaba Hotel. However, this unit was not located there
for reasons he did not know, and that the ... security unit would have been capable of
intervening to prevent the … terrorist attack, this did not happen. The commander of
the Sousse national security district, “BH”, is responsible for locating this unit but in all
cases the security unit that is located at the scene of the incident. It was the tourist
security unit mounted in the car and quad bike that should have intervened
considering their proximity to the scene of the incident, and considering its absolute
jurisdiction for the protection of the afore-mentioned Hotel, which did [not] happen for
the reasons previously mentioned.”
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THE ACCOUNT OF “DN”: THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE TUNISIAN SECURITY
UNION
“DN” was a police governor and was the Secretary General of the Tunisian Security Union.
“He explained that in July 2014, a national strategic counter terrorism plan was
prepared and that the national security general command, as the representative of
the Interior Ministry and its leaders, participated in this plan on the matter of terrorism,
along with a number of other intertwined parties such as the Foreign Ministry and the
Ministry of Religious Affairs under the supervision of the government leadership.
British counter terrorism experts also participated in this plan. A comprehensive
national plan was prepared and its adoption to deal with terrorism was agreed upon in
terms of the preparatory work, protective measures and confrontation measures, the
latter referring the intervention to stop the terrorist attack. The implementation of this
plan beginning from August 2014 was agreed upon. He noted that, with regard to the
participation of the British experts in these meetings, this was granted by the national
security advisor at that time, “DO”. During these meetings, the agreement was
reached in accordance with the plan agreed upon by the personnel of the intervention
operations to stop terrorist attacks with teams specialising in prevention and
confrontation, just like in terrorist crime investigation, as teams specialising in terrorist
crime have been assigned, as well as a judicial framework specialising in the
investigation of terrorist cases. Following that, the matter of intervention to prevent
terrorist attacks is assigned to teams specialising in that field. Following that, the
security network available in the area which is subjected to a terrorist attack is
composed of a support element for the specialised security teams and their
preparation to deal with terrorist crime. Agreement was reached, following that, on
setting up specialist security teams inside the police or National Guard district
according to jurisdiction. He explained that these security teams are composed of
security personnel on security and operational readiness with the necessary means
to enable them to fight, including transport, available weapons, individual protection
such as protective armour, various logistic means with specialist personnel, and the
capability to stop a terrorist attack especially since the terrorist groups are using very
advanced weapons such as Kalashnikov weapons which cannot be dealt with or
confronted by individual pistols or unit weapons such as the Steyr. In addition to that,
the mental readiness of these teams requires training on the use of the
aforementioned weapons, and on dealing with terrorist attacks given their
professionalism. He explained that this plan was not implemented and was not
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executed at all, and that those responsible for that will be evaluated by the judicial
bodies. He noted that there were no personnel from either the police or National
Guard districts in teams of this type. He explained that the responsibility rests on the
shoulders of those did not execute this plan, he also added that the reason that the
plan was not executed is due to the cancellation of the Director General of National
Security's plan. It is a major element of his job to mobilise security formations to stop
a terrorist attack with regard to the general supervision of the various security
formations. He has the authority to make the security decision to mobilise all of the
security formations whether police or National Guard or intervention teams. He noted
that the previous plan relating to the Secretary of State for Security Matters is a
political plan and not an operational one and this is what hindered the role of the
security establishment in dealing with terrorist incidents, especially the efficiency in
the intervention to stop the terrorist attacks.”
SEIFEDDINE REZGUI’S PREPARATION FOR THE SHOOTINGS
We include in this part of the summary only those matters which are considered to fall within
the defined scope of the inquests. Evidence obtained by Juge Akremi indicates that:
The Imperial Marhaba Hotel was identified in 2015 as a possible target by a terrorist cell
operating in the Sousse region. The cell had been asked to monitor an easy target. It was
targeted because a considerable number of foreign tourists stayed there and few Tunisians.
Members of the cell carried out a reconnoitre of the hotel and made contact with Rezgui. He
was guided through the location, carried out his own observations and was informed that the
attack would take place on 26th June. He was supplied with a Kalashnikov, five magazines
(each containing 30 bullets), three hand grenades and fireworks to cause confusion amongst
the civilians. He was also provided with a beach umbrella in which to conceal his weapon.
Transport and accommodation near to the Hotel were provided.
He was picked up at approximately 11.25am with his weapons, which included a large IED
and an amount of explosive. He was carrying a black shirt and black shorts. He got into the
car with the driver and went to the scene, where the driver dropped him in a side road and
left.
What took place at the scene has been the subject of extensive evidence. It was
intended that the perpetrator of the attack would continue until he was killed. The driver of
the vehicle has not been identified.
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ACCOUNT OF “DS”: SEIFEDDINE REZGUI’S FATHER
“DS” is the father of Seifeddine al-Rezgui. He explained that Rezgui was a student in the
higher institute for studying technology. Initially his son did not practise religion, but in the last
year and a half, he had become religious. “DS” denied that there had been any change in his
behaviour and character during this time.
POST-MORTEM EVIDENCE RELATING TO REZGUI
On 26th June 2015 a post-mortem examination was conducted by the Chief of Forensic
Medicine “Dr. ES” and his medical team on the body of Seifeddine Bin Abdul Hakim Bin
Mohammed Rezgui. The examination revealed that Rezgui had been shot 20 times. The
cause of death was gunshots. Toxicological tests revealed the presence of a drug, the main
effects of which include “the feeling of exhaustion, aggression and extreme anger that leads
to murders being committed. Another effect of these drugs is that they enhance physical and
mental performance.”
THE ASSESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE OF TIMING AS RECORDED BY JUGE AKREMI
Juge Akremi provided only a limited amount of primary material from which we are in a
position to assess timings. However in his Closing Report he stated that having regard to “all
the evidence received, all the technical investigations carried out on the mobile phones of
security forces personnel and the fixed phones at security locations, and the evidence from
the surveillance camera” he made the following observations:
1. The terrorist attack started at about 11.45am and ended at about 12.25pm. It took 40
minutes to neutralise the terrorist.
2. “AE” spent more than 8 minutes inside the National Security Police Station in Northern
Sousse. “AE” could have intervened and stopped the terrorist attack in no more than 3
minutes. In fact it took “AE” more than 30 minutes to arrive at the scene and he and his
team arrived about 3 minutes before the exchange of fire between the terrorist and the
security authorities.
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3. It took “CQ”, “CP”, “BZ”, “BX” and “BY” about 35 minutes to reach the scene of the
incident. In fact, it should have taken them no more than 5 minutes.
SAMANTHA LEEK Q.C.
JONATHAN DIXEY
AARON MOSS
COUNSEL TO THE INQUESTS
February 2017
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