11
Michael Oakeshott: Political
Education*
i
The expression 'political e d u c a t i o n ' h a s fallen o n evil d a y s ; in the
wilful and d is in g e n u o u s c o r r u p t i o n of l a n g u a g e w h i c h is character­
istic of our tim e it h a s a c q u i r e d a sinister m e a n i n g . In places o t h e r
than this, it is a sso c ia te d w i t h t h a t softening of the m i n d , by force,
by alarm, or by the h y p n o t i s m of the endless repetition of w h a t w a s
scarcely w o r t h saying o n c e , by m e a n s of w h i c h w h o l e p o p u l a t i o n s
have been r e d u c e d to s u b m i s s i o n . It is, therefore, an enterprise
worth u n d e r t a k i n g t o c o n s i d e r a g a i n , in a quiet m o m e n t , h o w w e
should u n d e r s t a n d this e x p r e s s i o n , w h i c h joins together t w o
laudable activities, a n d in d o i n g so p la y a small p a r t in rescuing it
from abuse.
Politics I ta k e t o be t h e activity of a t t e n d i n g t o the general
arrangements of a set of p e o p l e w h o m c h a n c e o r choice have
brought together. In this sense, families, clubs, a n d le a rn e d societies
have their 'polities'. But t h e c o m m u n i t i e s in w h i c h this m a n n e r of
activity is p r e ­ e m i n e n t a r e t h e h e r e d i t a r y c o ­ o p e r a t i v e g r o u p s , m a n y
of them of a n c ie n t lineage, all of t h e m a w a r e of a past, a present,
and a future, w h i c h w e call 's t a t e s '. F o r m o s t p e o p le , political
activity is a s e c o n d a r y activity ­ t h a t is t o say, they have s o m e t h i n g
else to d o besides a t t e n d i n g t o these a r r a n g e m e n t s . But, as w e have
come to u n d e r s t a n d it, t h e activity is o n e in w h i c h every m e m b e r of
the g r o u p w h o is n e ith e r a child n o r a l u n a t i c h a s some p a r t a n d
some responsibility. W i t h us it is, at o n e level o r a n o t h e r , a
universal activity.
I speak of this activity as ' a t t e n d i n g t o a r r a n g e m e n t s ' , r a t h e r t h a n
as ' m a k i n g a r r a n g e m e n t s ' , b e c a u s e in these h e r e d i t a r y co­operative
* © 1977 Permission granted by Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
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g r o u p s the activity is never offered the b l a n k sheet of infinite
possibility. In a n y g e n e r a tio n , even the m o s t r e v o l u t i o n a r y , the
a r r a n g e m e n t s which are enjoyed always far exceed t h o s e w h i c h are
recognized t o s t a n d in need of a tte n tio n , a n d those w h i c h are being
p r e p a r e d for enjoyment are few in c o m p a r i s o n with those which
receive a m e n d m e n t : t h e new is an insignificant p r o p o r t i o n of the
w h o l e . T h e r e are s o m e p e o p l e , of course, w h o allow themselves to
speak
As if arrangements
were
intended
For nothing else but to be mended
but, for m o s t of u s , o u r d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o i m p r o v e o u r c o n d u c t does
n o t prevent us from recognizing th a t t h e greater p a r t of w h a t w e
have is n o t a b u r d e n t o be carried o r an incubus to be t h r o w n off,
b u t an inheritance to be enjoyed. A n d a certain degree of shabbiness
is joined w ith every real convenience.
N o w , a t t e n d i n g to the a r r a n g e m e n t s of a society is a n activity
w h ic h , iike every o th e r , has to be learned. Politics m a k e a call u p o n
k n o w l e d g e . C o n se q u e n tly , it is n o t irrelevant to e n q u ire i n t o the
kind of k n o w l e d g e w h i c h is involved, a n d t o investigate the n a t u r e
of political e d u c a t i o n . I d o n o t , h o w e v e r , p r o p o s e to ask w h a t
inform ation w e sh o u ld equip ourselves with before w e begin to be
politically active, o r w h a t w e need t o k n o w in o r d e r to be successful
politicians, b u t to e n q u ire i n t o the k i n d of k n o w l e d g e w e u n a v o i d ­
ably call u p o n w h e n e v e r w e are engaged in political activity a n d to
get from this an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the n a t u r e of political e d u c a t i o n .
O u r t h o u g h t s o n political education, then, might be su p p o se d t o
spring from o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of political activity a n d the k i n d of
k n o w l e d g e it involves. A n d it w o u l d a p p e a r t h a t w h a t is w a n t e d at
this p o i n t is a definition of political activity from w h i c h t o d r a w
s o m e conclusions. But th is, I t h i n k , w o u l d be a m istaken w a y of
going a b o u t o u r business. W h a t w e require is n o t so m u c h a
definition of politics from w h i c h t o d e d u c e the c h a r a c t e r of political
e d u c a t i o n , as an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of political activity which includes a
recognition of t h e so rt of education it involves. For, to u n d e r s t a n d
a n activity is t o k n o w it as a concrete w h o l e ; it is t o recognize the
activity as h a v i n g the source of its m o v e m e n t w i t h i n itself. An
u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h i c h leaves the activity in debt t o s o m e t h i n g
outside itself is, for t h a t r e a s o n , an i n a d e q u a t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . A n d
if political activity is impossible w i t h o u t a certain k i n d of k n o w l ­
edge a n d a certain sort of e d u c a t i o n , t h e n this k n o w l e d g e a n d
e d u c a tio n are n o t mere a p p e n d a g e s to the activity b u t are p a r t of
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the activity itself a n d m u s t be incorporated in our understanding of
it. W e s h o u l d n o t , therefore, seek a definition of politics in order to
deduce from it the c h a r a c te r of political knowledge and education,
b u t r a t h e r observe the kind of knowledge and education which is
inherent in any u n d e r s t a n d i n g of political activity, and use this
o b s e r v a t i o n as a m e a n s of improving o u r understanding of politics.
M y p r o p o s a l , then, is to consider the adequacy of t w o current
u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of politics, together with the sort of knowledge and
k i n d of e d u c a t i o n they imply, a n d by improving u p o n them to reach
w h a t m a y p e r h a p s be a m o r e a d e q u a t e understanding at once of
political activity itself and the knowledge and education which
belongs to it.
In the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of some people, politics are w h a t may be
called an empirical activity. Attending to the arrangements of a
society is w a k i n g u p each m o r n i n g a n d considering, ' W h a t w ould I
like to d o ? ' o r ' W h a t w o u l d s o m e b o d y else (whom I desire to
please) like to see d o n e ? ' , and d o in g it. This understanding of
political activity m a y be called politics w i t h o u t a policy. O n the
briefest inspection it will a p p e a r a concept of politics difficult to
s u b s t a n t i a t e ; it does n o t look like a possible m a n n e r of activity at
all. But a n e a r a p p r o a c h t o it is, p e r h a p s , to be detected in the
politics of t h e proverbial oriental despot, o r in the politics of the
wall­scribbler a n d the vote­catcher. And the result may be supposed
t o be c h a o s modified by whatever consistency is allowed to creep
i n t o caprice. They are t h e politics attributed t o the first Lord
Liverpool, of w h o m A c to n said, ' T h e secret of his policy was that
h e h a d n o n e ' , a n d of w h o m a Frenchm an r e m a r k e d that if he had
been p re se n t at the creation of the w o r ld he w o u l d have said, ' M o «
Dieu, conservons le chaos'. It seems, then, th a t a concrete activity,
w h i c h m a y be described as an a p p r o x i m a t i o n to empirical politics,
is possible. But it is clear t h a t , although knowledge of a sort belongs
t o this style of political activity (knowledge, as the French say, not
of ourselves b u t only of o u r appetites), the only kind of education
a p p r o p r i a t e t o it w o u l d be an education in lunacy ­ learning to be
ruled solely by passing desires. A n d this reveals the im p o rta n t
p o i n t ; n a m e l y , t h a t t o u n d e r s t a n d politics as a purely empirical
activity is t o m i s u n d e r s t a n d it, because empiricism by itself is n o t a
concrete m a n n e r of activity at all, and can become a partner in a
concrete m a n n e r of activity only w h e n it is joined with something
else ­ in science, for e x a m p l e , w h e n it is joined with hypothesis.
W h a t is significant a b o u t this understanding of politics is n o t that
s o m e s o r t of a p p r o a c h t o it can a p p e a r , b u t t h a t it mistakes for a
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concrete, self­moved m a n n e r of activity w h a t is never m o r e t h a n an
a b s t r a c t m o m e n t in any m a n n e r of being active. Of c o u r s e , politics
are the pursuit of w h a t is desired a n d of w h a t is desired at the
m o m e n t ; b u t precisely because they are this, they can never be the
p u r s u i t of merely w h a t r e c o m m e n d s itself from m o m e n t to
m o m e n t . T h e activity of desiring d o e s n o t ta k e this c o u r s e ; caprice
is never absolute. F r o m a practical p o i n t of view, then, w e may
decry the style of politics which a p p r o x i m a t e s to pure empiricism
because we can observe in it an a p p r o a c h to lunacy. But from a
theoretical p o i n t of view, purely empirical politics are n o t some­
thing difficult to achieve o r p r o p e r t o be avoided, they are merely
impossible; the p r o d u c t of a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g .
T h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of politics as an empirical activity is, then,
i n a d e q u a t e because it fails to reveal a concrete m a n n e r of activity at
all. A n d it has the incidental defect of seeming t o e n c o u r a g e the
thoughtless to p u r s u e a style of a t t e n d i n g to the a r r a n g e m e n t s of
their society which is likely t o have u n f o r t u n a t e results; to try to d o
s o m e t h i n g which is inherently impossible is always a c o r r u p t i n g
enterprise. W e m u s t , if w e can, i m p r o v e u p o n it. And the impulse t o
i m p r o v e m a y be given a direction by a sk in g , ' W h a t is it t h a t this
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of politics has neglected t o o b s e r v e ? ' W h a t (to p u t it
crudely) has it left o u t w h i c h , if a d d e d in, w o u l d c o m p o s e an
u n d e r s t a n d i n g in which politics are revealed as a self­moved (or
concrete) m a n n e r of activity? And t h e a n s w e r t o the q u e s t i o n is, o r
seems t o be, available as s o o n as t h e question is f o r m u l a t e d . It
w o u l d a p p e a r t h a t w h a t this u n d e r s t a n d i n g of politics lacks is
s o m e t h i n g t o set empiricism t o w o r k , s o m e t h i n g to c o r r e s p o n d w i t h
specific h y p o th e s is in science, an end to be p u r s u e d m o r e extensive
t h a n a merely in s ta n t desire. A n d th is, it should be observed, is n o t
merely a g o o d c o m p a n i o n for empiricism; it is s o m e t h i n g w i t h o u t
w h i c h empiricism in action is impossible. Let us e x p l o r e this
suggestion, a n d in o r d e r t o b r in g it t o a p o i n t I will state it in t h e
form of a p r o p o s i t i o n : t h a t politics a p p e a r as a self­moved m a n n e r
of activity w h e n empiricism is preceded a n d guided by a n ideologi­
cal activity. I a m n o t c o n c e rn e d with t h e so­called ideological style
of politics as a desirable o r undesirable m a n n e r of a t t e n d i n g t o t h e
a r r a n g e m e n t s of a society; I a m c o n c e rn e d only w i t h the c o n t e n t i o n
t h a t w h e n t o the ineluctable element of empiricism (doing w h a t o n e
w a n t s t o do) is a d d e d a political ideology, a self­moved m a n n e r of
activity a p p e a r s , a n d t h a t consequently this m a y be r e g a r d e d in
principle as an a d e q u a t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of political activity.
As I u n d e r s t a n d it, a political ideology p u r p o r t s t o be an a b s t r a c t
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principle, o r set of related abstract principles, which has been
independently p r e m e d i t a t e d . It supplies in advance of the activity of
a t t e n d i n g to the a r r a n g e m e n t s of a society a formulated end to be
p u r s u e d , a n d in so d o i n g it provides a means of distinguishing
between t h o s e desires which o u g h t to be encouraged and those
which o u g h t to be suppressed or redirected.
T h e simplest sort of political ideology is a single abstract idea,
such as F r e e d o m , Equality, M a x i m u m Productivity, Racial Purity,
o r H a p p i n e s s . A n d in t h a t case political activity is understood as the
enterprise of seeing th a t the arrangements of a society conform to
o r reflect the chosen a b stra c t idea. It is usual, however, to recognize
the need for a c o m p l e x scheme of related ideas, rather than a single
idea, a n d t h e exam ples pointed to will be such systems of ideas as:
'the principles of 1 7 8 9 ' , 'Liberalism', 'Democracy', ' M a r x i s m ' , or
the Atlantic C h a r te r . These principles need n o t be considered
absolute or i m m u n e from change (though they are frequently so
considered), b u t their value lies in their having been premeditated.
T h e y c o m p o s e an u n d e r s ta n d in g of what is to be pursued indepen­
d e n t of how it is to be pursued. A political ideology p u r p o r t s to
supply in a d v a n c e k n o w l e d g e of w h a t 'Freedom' or 'Democracy' or
'Justice' is, a n d in this m a n n e r sets empiricism to w ork. Such a set
of principles is, of course, capable of being argued about and
reflected u p o n ; it is s o m e t h i n g th a t men compose for themselves,
a n d they m a y later r e m e m b e r it or write it d o w n . But the condition
u p o n w h i c h it can perform the service assigned to it is that it owes
n o t h i n g t o t h e activity it controls. ' T o k n o w the true good of the
c o m m u n i t y is w h a t constitutes the science of legislation,' said
B e n t h a m ; 'the art consists in finding the means to realize that good.'
T h e c o n t e n t i o n w e have before us, then, is th a t empiricism can be
set t o w o r k (and a concrete, self­moved m a n n e r of activity appear)
w h e n there is a d d e d t o it a guide of this sort: desire and something
n o t generated by desire.
N o w , there is n o d o u b t a b o u t the sort of knowledge which
political activity, u n d e r s t o o d in this manner, calls upon. W h a t is
required, in t h e first place, is knowledge of the chosen political
ideology ­ a k n o w l e d g e of the ends to be pursued, a knowledge of
w h a t w e w a n t to d o . Of course, if we are to be successful in
p u r s u i n g these ends w e shall need knowledge of another sort also ­
a k n o w l e d g e , shall w e say, of economics and psychology. But the
c o m m o n characteristic of all the kinds of knowledge required is
t h a t they m a y be, and s h o u l d be, gathered in advance of the activity
of a t t e n d i n g t o the a r r a n g e m e n t s of a society. Moreover, the
a p p r o p r i a t e so rt of e d u c a tio n will be an education in which the
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chosen political ideology is ta u g h t and learned, in w h i c h t h e
techniques necessary for success are acquired, a n d (if we are so
u n f o r t u n a t e as t o find ourselves e m p t y ­ h a n d e d in t h e m a t t e r of an
ideology) an e d u c a tio n in t h e skill of a b s t r a c t t h o u g h t a n d
p r e m e d i t a t i o n necessary t o c o m p o s e o n e for ourselves. T h e edu­
cation w e shall need is o n e which enables us t o e x p o u n d , defend,
im p le m e n t, a n d possibly invent a political ideology.
In casting a r o u n d for s o m e convincing d e m o n s t r a t i o n t h a t this
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of politics reveals a self­moved m a n n e r of activity,
w e sh o u ld n o d o u b t consider ourselves r e w a r d e d if w e could find an
e x a m p l e of politics being c o n d u c t e d precisely in this m a n n e r . T h is
at least w o u l d constitute a sign t h a t w e w e r e on the right tra c k . T h e
defect, it will be r e m e m b e r e d , of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of politics as a
purely empirical activity w a s t h a t it revealed, n o t a m a n n e r of
activity at all, b u t an a b s t r a c t i o n ; a n d this defect m a d e itself
manifest in o u r inability to find a style of politics w h i c h w a s
a n y t h i n g m o r e t h a n an a p p r o x i m a t i o n to it. H o w d o e s t h e
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of politics as empiricism joined with an ideology fare
in this respect? A n d w i t h o u t being over­confident, w e may p e r h a p s
t h i n k t h a t this is w h e r e w e w a d e ashore. F o r w e w o u l d a p p e a r to be
in n o difficulty w h a t e v e r in finding an e x a m p l e of political activity
w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d s t o this u n d e r s t a n d i n g of it: half the w o r l d , at a
conservative e stim a te , seems to c o n d u c t its affairs in precisely this
m a n n e r . A n d further, is it n o t so manifestly a possible style of
politics t h a t , even if w e disagree with a p a r tic u la r ideology, w e find
n o t h i n g technically a b s u r d in the writings of those w h o urge it u p o n
us as a n a d m i r a b l e style of politics? A t least its advocates seem to
k n o w w h a t they are talking a b o u t : th e y u n d e r s t a n d n o t only t h e
m a n n e r of the activity b u t also the sort of k n o w l e d g e a n d t h e kind
of e d u c a t i o n it involves. 'Every s c h o o l b o y in Russia', w r o t e Sir
N o r m a n Angel, 'is familiar w ith t h e d o c trin e of M a r x a n d c a n
recite its catechism. H o w m a n y British schoolboys have any
c o r r e s p o n d i n g k n o w l e d g e of t h e principles e n u n c ia te d by Mill in
his i n c o m p a r a b l e essay o n Liberty?' 'F e w p e o p le ', says M r E. H .
C a r r , ' a n y longer contest t h e thesis t h a t the child sh o u ld be
e d u c a te d in t h e official ideology of his c o u n t r y . ' In s h o r t , if w e a r e
l o o k i n g for a sign t o indicate th a t the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of politics as
empirical activity p r e c e d e d by ideological activity is an a d e q u a t e
u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w e can scarcely be mistaken in s u p p o s i n g t h a t w e
h a v e it t o h a n d .
A n d yet there is p e r h a p s r o o m for d o u b t : d o u b t first of all
w h e t h e r in principle this u n d e r s t a n d i n g of politics reveals a self­
m o v e d m a n n e r of activity; a n d d o u b t , consequentially, w h e t h e r
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w h a t h a v e been identified as examples of a style of politics
c o r r e s p o n d i n g exactly t o this understanding have been properly
indentified.
T h e c o n t e n t i o n w e a r e investigating is that attending to the
a r r a n g e m e n t s of a society can begin with a premeditated ideology,
can begin w i t h in d e p e n d e n tly acquired knowledge of the ends to be
p u r s u e d . It is s u p p o s e d t h a t a political ideology is the product of
intellectual p r e m e d i t a t i o n and that, because it is a body of
principles n o t itself in d e b t to the activity of attending to the
a r r a n g e m e n t s of a society, it is able to determine and guide the
direction of t h a t activity. If, however, we consider more closely
the c h a r a c t e r of a political ideology, we find at once that this
su p p o sitio n is falsified. So far from a political ideology being the
quasi­divine p a r e n t of political activity, it turns out to be its earthly
stepchild. Instead of an independently premeditated scheme of ends
to be p u r s u e d , it is a system of ideas abstracted from the manner in
which p e o p l e h a v e been accustomed to go a b o u t the business of
a tte n d in g to the a r r a n g e m e n t s of their societies. The pedigree of
every political ideology shows it to be the creature, not of
p r e m e d i t a t i o n in a d v a n c e of political activity, but of meditation
u p o n a m a n n e r of politics. In short, political activity comes first and
a political ideology follows after; and the understanding of politics
we are investigating h a s the disadvantage of being, in the strict
sense, p r e p o s t e r o u s .
Let us consider the m a t t e r first in relation to scientific hypothesis,
which I h a v e t a k e n t o play a role in scientific activity in some
respects similar to t h a t of an ideology in politics. If a scientific
hypothesis w e r e a self­generated bright idea which owed nothing to
scientific activity, then empiricism governed by hypothesis could be
considered t o c o m p o s e a self­contained manner of activity; but this
certainly is n o t its c h a ra c te r. T h e truth is that only a man w h o is
already a scientist can formulate a scientific hypothesis; that is, an
hypothesis is n o t an independent invention capable of guiding
scientific e n q u i r y , b u t a d e p e n d e n t supposition which arises as an
a b s t r a c t i o n from within already existing scientific activity.
M o r e o v e r , even w h e n the specific hypothesis has in this manner
been f o r m u l a t e d , it is inoperative as a guide to research without
c o n s t a n t reference t o the traditions of scientific enquiry from which
it w a s a b s t r a c t e d . T h e concrete situation does n o t appear until the
specific h y p o th e s is , w h i c h is the occasion of empiricism being set to
w o r k , is recognized as itself the creature of knowing h o w to
c o n d u c t a scientific enquiry.
, ,
O r consider the e x a m p l e of cookery. It might be supposed that an
1
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i g n o r a n t m a n , some edible materials, a n d a cookery b o o k c o m p o s e
together the necessities of a self­moved (or concrete) activity called
c o o k i n g . But n o t h i n g is further from the t r u t h . T h e cookery b o o k is
n o t an independently generated beginning from w h i c h c o o k in g can
spring; it is n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n an a b s t r a c t of s o m e b o d y ' s k n o w l ­
edge of h o w t o c o o k : it is t h e stepchild, n o t t h e p a r e n t of the
activity. T h e b o o k , in its t u r n , may help t o set a m a n o n to dressing
a dinner, b u t if it were his sole guide h e could never, in fact, begin:
the b o o k speaks only to those w h o k n o w already the kind of thing
t o expect from it a n d consequently h o w t o interpret it.
N o w , just as a cookery b o o k p r e s u p p o s e s s o m e b o d y w h o k n o w s
h o w t o cook, and its use p r e s u p p o s e s s o m e b o d y w h o already
k n o w s h o w to use it, and just as a scientific hypothesis springs from
a k n o w l e d g e of h o w to conduct a scientific investigation and separ­
ated from th a t k n o w l e d g e is powerless t o set empiricism profit­
ably to w o r k , so a political ideology m u s t be u n d e r s t o o d , n o t as an
independently p r e m e d i t a t e d beginning for political activity, b u t as
k n o w l e d g e (abstract a n d generalized) of a concrete m a n n e r of
a t t e n d i n g to the a r r a n g e m e n t s of a society. T h e catechism w h i c h
sets o u t the p u r p o s e s to be p u r s u e d merely abridges a concrete
m a n n e r of b e h a v i o u r in which those p u r p o s e s are already h i d d e n . It
d o e s n o t exist in advance of political activity, a n d by itself it is
always an insufficient guide. Political enterprises, the e n d s to be
p u r s u e d , the a r r a n g e m e n t s to be established (all the n o r m a l
ingredients of a political ideology), c a n n o t be p r e m e d i t a t e d in
advance of a m a n n e r of a tte n d in g t o the a r r a n g e m e n t s of a society;
what w e d o , and m o r e o v e r w h a t w e w a n t to d o , is the c re a tu re of
how w e are a c c u s t o m e d to c o n d u c t o u r affairs. Indeed, it often
reflects n o m o r e t h a n a discovered ability t o d o s o m e t h i n g w h i c h is
th e n translated i n t o an a u t h o r i t y t o d o it.
O n 4 A ugust 1 7 8 9 , for the c o m p l e x and b a n k r u p t social a n d
political system of France w a s substituted the Rights of M a n .
R e a d i n g this d o c u m e n t w e c o m e to the conclusion th a t s o m e b o d y
has d o n e s o m e th in k in g . H e r e , displayed in a few sentences, is a
political ideology: a system of rights a n d duties, a scheme of e n d s ­
justice, freedom, equality, security, p r o p e r t y , and the rest — ready
a n d w a i t i n g to be p u t into practice for t h e first time. 'For t h e first
t i m e ? ' N o t a bit of it. This ideology n o m o r e existed in a d v a n c e of
political practice t h a n a cookery b o o k exists in a d v a n c e of k n o w i n g
h o w to c o o k . Certainly it w a s the p r o d u c t of s o m e b o d y ' s reflection,
b u t it w a s n o t t h e p r o d u c t of reflection in advance of political
activity. For h e r e , in fact, are disclosed, abstracted a n d abridged,
the c o m m o n law rights of Englishmen, the gift n o t of i n d e p e n d e n t
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premeditation o r divine munificence, b u t of centuries of the day­to­
day attending to the a r r a n g e m e n t s of an historic society. O r
consider L ocke's Second Treatise of Civil Government,
read in
America a n d in F r a n c e in the eighteenth century as a statement of
abstract principles to be p u t into practice, regarded there as a
preface to political activity. But so far from being a preface, it has
all the m a r k s of a p o s t s c r i p t , a n d its p o w e r to guide derived from its
roots in actual political experience. H e r e , set d o w n in abstract
terms, is a brief c o n s p e c t u s of t h e m a n n e r in which Englishmen
were a c c u s t o m e d to go a b o u t the business of attending to their
arrangements ­ a brilliant a b r i d g m e n t of the political habits of
Englishmen. O r consider this passage from a c o n t e m p o r a r y con­
tinental w r ite r : ' F r e e d o m keeps E u r o p e a n s in unrest and move­
ment. They wish t o h a v e freedom, a n d at the same time they k n o w
they have n o t got it. T h e y k n o w also t h a t freedom belongs to man
as a h u m a n right.' A n d h a v i n g established the end to be pursued,
political activity is r e p r e s e n t e d as the realization of this end. But the
'freedom' w h i c h c a n be p u r s u e d is n o t an independently premedi­
tated 'ideal' o r a d r e a m ; like scientific hypothesis, it is something
which is already i n t i m a t e d in a concrete m a n n e r of behaving.
Freedom, like a recipe for g a m e pie, is n o t a bright idea; it is n o t a
' h u m a n right' t o be d e d u c e d from some speculative concept of
h u m a n n a t u r e . T h e freedom w h i c h w e enjoy is nothing m o r e than
arrangem ents, p r o c e d u r e s of a certain kind: the freedom of an
Englishman is n o t s o m e t h i n g exemplified in the procedure of
habeas corpus, it is, at t h a t p o i n t , the availability of th a t procedure.
And the freedom w h i c h w e wish to enjoy is n o t an 'ideal' which we
premeditate i n d e p e n d e n t l y of o u r political experience, it is w h a t is
already i n t i m a t e d in t h a t e x p e r i e n c e .
2
^ O n this r e a d i n g , t h e n , the systems of abstract ideas w e call
'ideologies' a r e a b s t r a c t s of s o m e kind of concrete activity. M o s t
political ideologies, a n d certainly the m o s t useful of them (because
they u n q u e s t i o n a b l y h a v e their use), are abstracts of the political
traditions of s o m e society. But it sometimes h a p p e n s that an
ideology is offered as a guide t o politics w h i c h is a n abstract, n o t of
political experience, b u t of s o m e o t h e r m a n n e r of activity ­ w a r ,
religion, o r t h e c o n d u c t of in d u stry , for e x a m p l e . And here the
model w e a r e s h o w n is n o t only a b s t r a c t , b u t is also inappropriate
on account of t h e irrelevance of the activity from which it has been
abstracted. T h i s , I t h i n k , is o n e of t h e defects of the model provided
by the M a r x i s t ideology. But the i m p o r t a n t p o i n t is that, at most,
an ideology is an a b b r e v i a t i o n of s o m e m a n n e r of concrete activity.
W e are n o w , p e r h a p s , in a position t o perceive m o r e accurately
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t h e character of w h a t m a y be called the ideological style of politics,
a n d t o observe t h a t its existence offers n o g r o u n d for supposing
t h a t the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of political activity as empiricism guided
solely by an ideology is an a d e q u a t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e ideological
style of politics is a confused style. Properly s p e a k i n g , it is a
t r a d i t i o n a l m a n n e r of a t t e n d i n g t o t h e a r r a n g e m e n t s of a society
w h i c h h a s been a b r i d g e d i n t o a d o c t r i n e of e n d s t o be p u r s u e d , the
a b r i d g m e n t (together w i t h t h e necessary technical knowledge)
being erroneously r e g a r d e d as the sole guide relied u p o n . In certain
circumstances an a b r i d g m e n t of this k i n d m a y b e v a l u a b l e ; it gives
s h a r p n e s s of outline a n d precision to a political t r a d i t i o n which the
occasion may m a k e seem a p p r o p r i a t e . W h e n a m a n n e r of a t t e n d i n g
t o a r r a n g e m e n t s is t o be t r a n s p l a n t e d from t h e society in w h i c h it
h a s g r o w n u p into a n o t h e r society (always a q u e s t i o n a b l e enter­
prise), the simplification of a n ideology m a y a p p e a r as a n asset. If,
for e x a m p l e , the English m a n n e r of politics is t o be p la n te d
elsewhere in t h e w o r l d , it is p e r h a p s a p p r o p r i a t e t h a t it s h o u l d first
be a b r id g e d into s o m e t h i n g called ' d e m o c r a c y ' before it is p a c k e d
u p a n d shipped a b r o a d . T h e r e is, of c o u r s e , a n alternative m e t h o d :
t h e m e t h o d by w h i c h w h a t is e x p o r t e d is the detail a n d n o t the
a b r i d g m e n t of the t r a d i t i o n a n d the w o r k m e n travel w i t h t h e tools
­ the m e t h o d w h i c h m a d e the British E m p i r e . But it is a slow a n d
costly m e t h o d . A n d , particularly w i t h m e n in a h u r r y , I'homme a
programme
w i t h his a b r i d g m e n t w ins every t i m e ; his slogans
e n c h a n t , while the resident m agistrate is seen only as a sign of
servility. But w h a t e v e r t h e a p p a r e n t a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o n occasion of
the ideological style of politics, the defect of t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of
political activity connected w ith it b e c o m e s a p p a r e n t w h e n w e
consider the sort of k n o w l e d g e a n d t h e k i n d of e d u c a t i o n it
encourages us to believe is sufficient for u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e activity
of a t t e n d i n g t o the a r r a n g e m e n t s of a society. F o r it suggests t h a t a
k n o w l e d g e of t h e chosen political ideology can t a k e the place of
u n d e r s t a n d i n g a t r a d i t i o n of political b e h a v i o u r . T h e w a n d a n d t h e
b o o k c o m e to be regarded as themselves p o t e n t , a n d n o t merely t h e
symbols of p o t e n c y . T h e a r r a n g e m e n t s of a society a r e m a d e to
a p p e a r , n o t as m a n n e r s of b e h a v i o u r , b u t as pieces of m a c h in e ry to
be t r a n s p o r t e d a b o u t the w o r l d indiscriminately. T h e complexities
of t h e tr a d itio n w h i c h have been squeezed o u t in t h e process of
a b r i d g m e n t are t a k e n t o b e u n i m p o r t a n t : the 'rights of m a n ' are
u n d e r s t o o d t o exist insulated from a m a n n e r of a t t e n d i n g to
a r r a n g e m e n t s . A n d b e c a u s e , in practice, t h e a b r i d g m e n t is never by
itself a sufficient guide, w e are e n c o u r a g e d t o fill it o u t , n o t w i t h o u r
suspect political experience, b u t with experience d r a w n from o t h e r
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(often irrelevant) concretely u n d e r s t o o d activities, such as w a r , the
conduct of i n d u s t r y , o r t r a d e u n i o n n e g o t i a t i o n .
The u n d e r s t a n d i n g of politics as the activity of a t t e n d i n g to t h e
arrangements of a society u n d e r t h e g u i d a n c e of a n independently
premeditated ideology is, t h e n , n o less a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a n the
understanding of it as a p u r e l y e m p ir ic a l activity. W h e r e v e r else
politics may begin, they c a n n o t begin in ideological activity. A n d in
an attempt to i m p r o v e u p o n this u n d e r s t a n d i n g of politics, w e have
already observed in principle w h a t needs to be recognized in o r d e r
to have an intelligent c o n c e p t . Ju st as scientific hypothesis c a n n o t
appear, and is im p o ssib le t o o p e r a t e , e x c e p t w i t h i n an already
existing tradition of scientific investigation, so a s c h e m e of e n d s for
political activity a p p e a r s w i t h i n , a n d c a n be e v a l u a t e d only w h e n it
is related t o , a n a lr e a d y existing t r a d i t i o n of h o w t o a t t e n d t o o u r
arrangements. In politics, t h e only c o n c r e t e m a n n e r of activity
detectable is o n e in w h i c h e m p i r i c i s m a n d the e n d s t o be p u r s u e d
are recognized as d e p e n d e n t , alike for their existence a n d their
operation, u p o n a t r a d i t i o n a l m a n n e r of b e h a v i o u r .
Politics is the activity of a t t e n d i n g to t h e general a r r a n g e m e n t s of
a collection of p e o p l e w h o , in respect of their c o m m o n recognition
of a m a n n e r of a t t e n d i n g t o its a r r a n g e m e n t s , c o m p o s e a single
community. T o s u p p o s e a collection of p e o p l e w i t h o u t recognized
traditions of b e h a v i o u r , o r o n e w h i c h enjoyed a r r a n g e m e n t s w h i c h
intimated n o direction for c h a n g e a n d needed n o a t t e n t i o n , is t o
suppose a p e o p l e i n c a p a b l e of politics. T h i s activity, then, springs
neither from i n s t a n t desires, n o r from general principles, b u t from
the existing t r a d i t i o n s of b e h a v i o u r them selves. A n d the form it
takes, because it can t a k e n o o t h e r , is t h e a m e n d m e n t of existing
arrangements by e x p l o r i n g a n d p u r s u i n g w h a t is i n t i m a t e d in t h e m .
The a r r a n g e m e n t s w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e a society c a p a b l e of political
activity, w h e t h e r they a r e c u s t o m s o r institutions o r la w s o r
diplomatic decisions, a r e a t o n c e c o h e r e n t a n d i n c o h e r e n t ; they
compose a p a t t e r n a n d a t t h e s a m e t i m e they i n t i m a t e a s y m p a t h y
for w h a t does n o t fully a p p e a r . Political activity is t h e e x p l o r a t i o n
of that s y m p a t h y ; a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y , relevant political r e a s o n i n g
will be the c o n v in c in g e x p o s u r e of a s y m p a t h y , p r e s e n t b u t n o t yet
followed u p , a n d t h e c o n v i n c i n g d e m o n s t r a t i o n t h a t n o w is the
appropriate m o m e n t for r e c o g n i z i n g it. For e x a m p l e , t h e legal
status of w o m e n in o u r society w a s for a l o n g tim e (and p e r h a p s
still is) in c o m p a r a t i v e c o n f u s i o n , b e c a u s e t h e rights a n d duties
which c o m p o s e d it i n t i m a t e d rights a n d duties w h i c h w e r e never­
theless n o t recognized. A n d , o n t h e v i e w of things I a m suggesting,
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the only cogent reason t o be a d v a n c e d for the technical
'enfranchisement' of w o m e n w a s t h a t in all o r m o s t o t h e r impor­
t a n t respects they h a d already been enfranchised. A r g u m e n t s d r a w n
from abstract n a t u r a l right, from 'justice', o r from some general
concept of feminine personality, m u s t be regarded as either
irrelevant, o r as unfortunately disguised forms of the o n e valid
a r g u m e n t ; namely, t h a t there was an incoherence in the a r r a n g e ­
ments of the society which pressed convincingly for rem edy. In
politics, then, every enterprise is a consequential enterprise, the
p u rsu it, n o t of a d r e a m , o r of a general principle, b u t of an
in tim a tio n . W h a t w e have to d o w ith is s o m e t h i n g less imposing
t h a n logical implications or necessary consequences: b u t if the
intim ations of a tradition of behaviour a r e less dignified o r m o r e
elusive th a n these, they are n o t on t h a t a c c o u n t less i m p o r t a n t . Of
course, there is n o piece of mistake­proof a p p a r a t u s by m e a n s of
which w e can elicit the intim ation m o s t w o r t h w h i l e p u r s u i n g ; a n d
n o t only d o w e often m a k e gross errors of j u d g e m e n t in this m a t t e r ,
b u t also the total effect of a desire satisfied is so little t o be forecast,
t h a t o u r activity of a m e n d m e n t is often found to lead us w h e r e w e
w o u l d n o t go. M o r e o v e r , the w h o l e enterprise is liable at any
m o m e n t to be perverted by the incursion of an a p p r o x i m a t i o n to
empiricism in the pursuit of p o w e r . These are features w h i c h can
never be eliminated; they belong t o the character of political
activity. But it may be believed t h a t o u r mistakes of u n d e r s t a n d i n g
will be less frequent a n d less disastrous if w e escape the illusion t h a t
politics is ever a n y t h i n g m o r e t h a n t h e pursuit of i n t i m a t i o n s ; a
conversion, n o t a n a r g u m e n t .
N o w , every society w h i c h is intellectually alive is liable, from
t i m e t o time, t o abridge its tradition of b e h a v i o u r i n t o a scheme of
a b stra c t ideas; a n d o n occasion political discussion will be con­
cerned, n o t (like the debates in the Iliad) w ith isolated t r a n s a c t i o n s ,
n o r (like the speeches in Thucydides) w i t h policies and traditions of
activity, b u t with general principles. A n d in this there is n o h a r m ;
p e r h a p s even s o m e positive benefit. It is possible t h a t the distorting
m i r r o r of an ideology will reveal i m p o r t a n t hidden passages in the
t r a d i t i o n , as a caricature reveals the potentialities of a face; a n d if
this is s o , the intellectual enterprise of seeing w h a t a t r a d i t i o n looks
like w h e n it is r e d u c e d t o a n ideology will be a useful p a r t of
political e d u c a t i o n . But t o m a k e use of a b r i d g m e n t as a technique
for e x p l o r i n g t h e in tim a tio n s of a political t r a d i t i o n , t o use it, t h a t
is, as a scientist uses hypothesis, is o n e thing; it is s o m e t h i n g
different, a n d som ething i n a p p r o p r i a t e , t o u n d e r s t a n d political
activity itself as the activity of a m e n d i n g the a r r a n g e m e n t s of a
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society so as t o m a k e t h e m agree with the provisions of an ideology.
For then a c h a r a c t e r has been attributed to an ideology which it is
unable to sustain, a n d w e m a y find ourselves, in practice, directed
by a false a n d a misleading guide: false, because in the abridgment,
however skilfully it has been performed, a single intimation is apt to
be exaggerated a n d p r o p o s e d for unconditional pursuit and the
benefit to be h a d from observing w h a t the distortion reveals is lost
w h e n the d i s t o r t i o n itself is given the office of a criterion;
misleading, because the a b r i d g m e n t itself never, in fact, provides
the w h o le of the k n o w l e d g e used in political activity.
T h e r e will be s o m e p e o p le w h o , though in general agreement
with this u n d e r s t a n d i n g of political activity, will suspect that it
confuses w h a t is, p e r h a p s , n o r m a l with w h a t is necessary, and that
i m p o r t a n t e x c e p tio n s (of great c o n t e m p o r a r y relevance) have been
lost in a hazy generality. It is all very well, it may be said, to observe
in politics t h e activity of exploring and pursuing the intimations of
a tradition of b e h a v i o u r , b u t w h a t light does this throw upon a
political crisis such as the N o r m a n C o n q u e st of England, or the
establishment of the Soviet regime in Russia? It w ould be foolish, of
course, to d e n y t h e possibility of serious political crisis. But if we
exclude (as w e must) a genuine cataclysm which for the time being
m a d e an end of politics by altogether obliterating a current
tradition of b e h a v i o u r (which is not w h a t happened in Anglo­
Saxon E n g l a n d o r in R u s s i a ) , there is little to support the view that
even the m o s t serious political upheaval carries us outside this
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of politics. A tradition of behaviour is not a fixed
and inflexible m a n n e r of d o i n g things; it is a flow of sympathy. It
may be t e m p o r a r i l y d i s r u p t e d by the incursion of a foreign
influence, it m a y be diverted, restricted, arrested, or become dried­
u p , a n d it m a y reveal so deep­seated an incoherence that (even
w i t h o u t foreign assistance) a crisis a p p e a rs. And if, in order to meet
these crises, there w e r e s o m e steady, unchanging, independent
guide to w h i c h a society­might resort, it w ould n o d o u b t be well
advised to d o so. But n o such guide exists; we have no resources
outside the fragm ents, t h e vestiges, the relics of its o w n tradition of
behaviour w h i c h the crisis h a s left u n to u c h e d . For even the help we
may get from t h e t r a d i t i o n s of a n o t h e r society (or from a tradition
of a vaguer so rt w h i c h is shared by a n u m b e r of societies) is
conditional u p o n o u r being able to assimilate them to our own
a r r a n g e m e n t s . T h e h u n g r y a n d helpless m a n is mistaken if he
supposes t h a t h e o v e r c o m e s the crisis by m e a n s of a tin­opener:
w h a t saves h i m is s o m e b o d y else's knowledge of h o w t o cook,
which he c a n m a k e use of only because he is n o t himself entirely
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i g n o r a n t . In short, political crisis (even w h e n it seems to be im p o s e d
u p o n a society by changes beyond its control) always a p p e a r s
within a tradition of political activity; a n d 's a l v a t i o n ' comes from
t h e u n i m p a i r e d resources of the tr a d itio n itself. T h o s e societies
w h i c h retain, in changing circumstances, a lively sense of their o w n
­ identity a n d continuity (which are w i t h o u t th a t h a t r e d of their o w n
experience w h i c h m a k e s t h e m desire to efface it) are t o be c o u n t e d
f o r tu n a te , n o t because they possess w h a t others lack, b u t because
they h a v e already mobilized w h a t n o n e is w i t h o u t a n d all, in fact,
rely u p o n .
In political activity, then, men sail a boundless a n d b o tto m le s s
sea; there is neither h a r b o u r for shelter n o r floor for a n c h o r a g e ,
neither starting­place n o r a p p o in te d destination. T h e enterprise is
t o keep afloat o n a n even keel; the sea is both friend a n d e n e m y ;
a n d the s e a m a n s h i p consists in using the resources of a traditional
m a n n e r of b e h a v io u r in o r d e r to m a k e a friend of every hostile
occasion.
A depressing d o c trin e , it will be said — even by those w h o d o n o t
m a k e the m i s t a k e of a d d i n g in an element of c r u d e determinism
w h i c h , in fact, it has n o place for. A t r a d i t i o n of b e h a v i o u r is n o t a
g r o o v e within w h i c h w e are destined to grind o u t o u r helpless a n d
unsatisfying lives: Spartam nactus es; hanc exorna. But in the m a i n
the depression springs from t h e exclusion of h o p e s t h a t w e r e false
a n d the discovery th a t guides, reputed to be of s u p e r h u m a n w i s d o m
a n d skill, are, in fact, of a s o m e w h a t different c h a r a c t e r . If t h e
d o c t r i n e deprives us of a m odel laid u p in heaven to which w e
s h o u l d a p p r o x i m a t e o u r b e h a v i o u r , a t least it does n o t lead us into
a m o r a s s w h e r e every choice is equally g o o d o r equally to be
d e p l o r e d . A n d if it suggests t h a t politics are nur fur die
Schwindelfreie, t h a t sh o u ld depress only those w h o have lost their nerve.
5
T h e sin of t h e a c a d e m i c is th a t he takes so long in c o m i n g t o t h e
p o i n t . Nevertheless, there is s o m e virtue in his dilatoriness; w h a t he
has to offer m a y , in the e n d , be n o great m a t t e r , b u t at least it is n o t
u n r i p e fruit, a n d t o p lu c k it is the w o r k of a m o m e n t . W e set o u t to
consider the kind of k n o w l e d g e involved in political activity a n d t h e
a p p r o p r i a t e sort of e d u c a t i o n . And if t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of politics I
h a v e r e c o m m e n d e d is n o t a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , there is little d o u b t
a b o u t t h e k i n d of k n o w l e d g e a n d t h e sort of e d u c a t i o n w h i c h
b e lo n g s t o it. It is k n o w l e d g e , as p r o f o u n d as w e can m a k e it, of o u r
t r a d i t i o n of political b e h a v i o u r . O t h e r k n o w l e d g e , certainly, is
desirable in a d d i t i o n ; b u t this is the k n o w l e d g e w i t h o u t w h i c h w e
c a n n o t m a k e use of w h a t e v e r else w e m a y have learned.
Michael
Oakeshott
233
N o w , a t r a d i t i o n of b e h a v io u r is a tricky thing to get to k n o w .
Indeed, it m a y even a p p e a r to be essentially unintelligible. It is
neither fixed n o r finished; it has n o changeless centre to which
u n d e r s t a n d i n g c a n a n c h o r itself; there is n o sovereign purpose to be
perceived o r invariable direction to be detected; there is no model
to be copied, idea t o be realized, or rule to be followed. Some parts
of it may c h a n g e m o r e slowly than others, but none is immune from
change. E verything is t e m p o r a r y . Nevertheless, though a tradition
of b e h a v i o u r is flimsy a n d elusive; it is not w ithout identity, and
w h a t m a k e s it a possible object of knowledge is the fact that all its
p a r ts d o n o t c h a n g e at t h e same time and t h a t the changes it
undergoes are p o t e n t i a l within it. Its principle is a principle of
continuity: a u t h o r i t y is diffused between past, present, and future;
between the old, the n e w , a n d w h a t is to come. It is steady because,
though it m o v e s , it is never wholly in m o tio n ; and though it is
tranquil, it is never w h o l l y at r e s t . N o t h i n g that ever belonged to it
is completely lost; w e are always swerving back to recover and
m a k e s o m e t h i n g topical o u t of even its remotest m om ents: and
nothing for long r e m a i n s unmodified. Everything is temporary, but
nothing is a r b i t r a r y . Everything figures by comparison, not with
w h a t stands n e x t t o it, b u t w ith the w h o l e . And since a tradition of
behaviour is n o t susceptible of the distinction between essence and
accident, k n o w l e d g e of it is unavoidably knowledge of its detail: to
k n o w only the gist is to k n o w nothing. W h a t has to be learned is
n o t a n a b s t r a c t idea, o r a set of tricks, n o t even a ritual, b u t a
concrete, c o h e r e n t m a n n e r of living in all its intricateness.
It is clear, t h e n , t h a t w e m u s t n o t entertain the hope of acquiring
this difficult u n d e r s t a n d i n g by easy m e t h o d s . T h o u g h the knowl­
edge we see is m u n i c i p a l , n o t universal, there is n o short cut to it.
M o r e o v e r , political e d u c a t i o n is n o t merely a matter of coming to
u n d e r s t a n d a t r a d i t i o n , it is learning h o w to participate in a
conversation: it is a t o n c e initiation into an inheritance in which w e
have a life interest, a n d the e x p l o r a t i o n of its intimations. There
will always r e m a i n s o m e t h i n g of a mystery a b o u t h o w a tradition of
political b e h a v i o u r is learned, a n d p e r h a p s the only certainty is that
there is n o p o i n t at w h i c h learning it can properly be said to begin.
The politics of a c o m m u n i t y are n o t less individual (and not more
so) t h a n its l a n g u a g e , a n d they are learned and practised in the same
m a n n e r. W e d o n o t begin t o learn o u r native language by learning
the a lp h a b e t, o r by l e a r n i n g its g r a m m a r ; w e d o not begin by
learning w o r d s , b u t w o r d s in use; w e d o n o t begin (as we begin in
reading) w ith w h a t is easy a n d go o n to w h a t is m o r e difficult; we
do n o t begin a t s c h o o l , b u t in the cradle; a n d w h a t w e say springs
6
234
Political
Education
always from o u r m a n n e r of speaking. A n d this is true also of o u r
political e d u c a t i o n ; it begins in the enjoyment of a tra d itio n , in the
o b s e r v a t i o n and imitation of the b e h a v i o u r of o u r elders, a n d there
is little o r n o t h i n g in the w o r l d w h i c h comes before us as w e open
o u r eyes which does n o t contribute to it. W e are a w a r e of a past a n d
a future as s o o n as w e are a w a r e of a present. L ong before w e are of
an age to ta k e interest in a b o o k a b o u t o u r politics w e are a c q u irin g
t h a t c o m p l e x a n d intricate k n o w l e d g e of o u r political t r a d i t i o n
w i t h o u t which w e could n o t m a k e sense of a b o o k w h e n w e c o m e
t o o p e n it. A n d the projects we entertain are the creatures of o u r
t r a d i t i o n . The greater p a r t , then ­ p e r h a p s the m o s t i m p o r t a n t p a r t
­ of o u r political e d u c a tio n w e acquire h a p h a z a r d in finding o u r
w a y a b o u t the natural­artificial w o r l d into which w e are b o r n , a n d
there is n o o t h e r w a y of acquiring it. T h e r e will, of course, be m o r e
to acquire, a n d it will be m o r e readily acquired, if w e have t h e g o o d
fortune to be b o r n into a rich and lively political t r a d i t i o n a n d
a m o n g those w h o are well educated politically; the lineam ents of
political activity will earlier become distinct: b u t even the m o s t
needy society a n d the m o s t c r a m p e d s u r r o u n d i n g s have s o m e
political e d u c a tio n t o offer, a n d we t a k e w h a t w e can get.
But if this is the m a n n e r of o u r beginning, there are deeper
recesses to e x p l o r e . Politics are a p r o p e r subject for a c a d e m ic s t u d y ;
there is s o m e t h i n g t o think a b o u t and it is i m p o r t a n t t h a t w e s h o u l d
think a b o u t the a p p r o p r i a t e things. H e r e also, a n d everywhere, the
governing c o n s id e r a tio n is th a t w h a t w e are learning to u n d e r s t a n d
is a political t r a d i t i o n , a concrete m a n n e r of b e h a v i o u r . A n d for this
reason it is p r o p e r t h a t , at the academ ic level, the study of politics
sh o u ld be an historical study ­ not, in t h e first place, hecause it is
p r o p e r to be c o n c e rn e d with the past, b u t because w e need to be
c o n c e rn e d w ith the detail of the concrete. It is t r u e that n o t h i n g
a p p e a r s on the present surface of a tr a d itio n of political activity
which has n o t its roots deep in the past, and th a t n o t to observe it
c o m i n g into being is often to be denied t h e clue to its significance;
a n d for this reason genuine historical study is an indispensable p a r t
of a political e d u c a t i o n . But w h a t is equally i m p o r t a n t is n o t w h a t
h a p p e n e d , here o r th e re , b u t w h a t p e o p l e have t h o u g h t a n d said
a b o u t w h a t h a p p e n e d : the history, n o t of political ideas, but of the
m a n n e r of o u r political thinking. Every society, by t h e underlinings
it m a k e s in the b o o k of its history, c o n s t r u c t s a legend of its o w n
fortunes which it keeps u p to d a te and in which is hidden its o w n
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of politics; and the historical investigation of this
legend ­ n o t to e x p o s e its e r r o r s b u t to u n d e r s t a n d its prejudices ­
m u s t be a pre­em inent p a r t of a political e d u c a t i o n . It is, then, in the
Michael
Oakeshott
235
study of genuine history, a n d of this q u a s i ­ h i s t o r y w h i c h reveals in
its backward glances the t e n d e n c i e s w h i c h are a f o o t , t h a t w e m a y
hope to escape o n e of the m o s t insidious c u r r e n t m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s
of political activity ­ the m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g in w h i c h i n s t i t u t i o n s
and procedures a p p e a r as pieces of m a c h i n e r y d e s i g n e d t o a c h ie v e a
putpose settled in a d v a n c e , instead of as m a n n e r s of b e h a v i o u r
which are meaningless w h e n s e p a r a t e d from t h e i r c o n t e x t : t h e
misunderstanding, for e x a m p l e , in w h i c h Mill c o n v i n c e d himself
that something called ' R e p r e s e n t a t i v e G o v e r n m e n t ' w a s a ' f o r m ' of
politics which could be r e g a r d e d as p r o p e r t o a n y society w h i c h h a d
reached a certain level of w h a t h e called ' c i v i l i z a t i o n ' ; in s h o r t , t h e
misunderstanding in w h i c h w e r e g a r d o u r a r r a n g e m e n t s a n d
institutions as s o m e t h i n g m o r e significant t h a n t h e f o o t p r i n t s of
thinkers and statesmen w h o k n e w w h i c h w a y t o t u r n t h e i r feet
without knowing a n y t h i n g a b o u t a final d e s t i n a t i o n .
Nevertheless, to be c o n c e r n e d only w i t h o n e ' s o w n t r a d i t i o n of
political activity is n o t e n o u g h . A political e d u c a t i o n w o r t h t h e
name must embrace, also, k n o w l e d g e of t h e politics of o t h e r
contemporary societies. It m u s t d o this b e c a u s e s o m e at least of o u r
political activity is related t o t h a t of o t h e r p e o p l e ' s , a n d n o t t o
know how they go a b o u t a t t e n d i n g t o their o w n a r r a n g e m e n t s is
not to know the course th e y will p u r s u e a n d n o t t o k n o w w h a t
resources to call u p o n in o u r o w n t r a d i t i o n ; a n d b e c a u s e t o k n o w
only one's own tradition is n o t t o k n o w even t h a t . But here a g a i n
two observations m u s t be m a d e . W e did n o t begin y e s t e r d a y t o
nave relations w ith o u r n e i g h b o u r s ; a n d w e d o n o t r e q u i r e
constantly to be h u n t i n g o u t s i d e t h e t r a d i t i o n of o u r politics t o find
some special formula o r s o m e merely ad hoc e x p e d i e n t t o direct
those relations. It is only w h e n wilfully o r negligently w e forget t h e
resources of u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d initiative w h i c h b e l o n g s to o u r
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236
Political
Education
practices and purposes of others (as the eclectic Z e u x i s is said to
have tried to c o m p o s e a figure m o r e beautiful t h a n H elen's by
p u t t i n g together features each n o ta b le for its perfection) is a
c o r r u p t i n g enterprise a n d one of the surest ways of losing one's
political balance; b u t t o investigate the concrete m a n n e r in which
a n o t h e r people goes a b o u t the business of a t t e n d i n g t o its a r r a n g e ­
m e n t s may reveal significant passages in o u r o w n t r a d i t i o n which
might otherwise remain hidden.
T h e r e is a third d e p a r t m e n t in the a c a d e m i c study of politics
w h i c h must be considered — w h a t , for w a n t of a better n a m e , 1 shall
call a philosophical study. Reflection on political activity m a y ta k e
place at various levels: we may consider w h a t resources o u r
political tr a d itio n offers for dealing w i t h a certain situation, or w e
m a y abridge o u r political experience i n t o a doctrine, w h i c h may be
used, as a scientist uses hypothesis, t o e x p lo re its i n t i m a t i o n s . But
b e y o n d these, and o t h e r m a n n e r s of political thinking, there is a
range of reflection the object of which is t o consider the place of
political activity itself on the m a p of o u r total experience. Reflec­
tion of this sort h a s gone on in every society which is politically
conscious a n d intellectually alive; a n d so far as E u r o p e a n societies
a r e concerned, the enquiry has uncovered a variety of intellectual
p r o b l e m s which each generation has f o r m u la te d in its o w n w a y a n d
h a s tackled with the technical resources at its disposal. A n d because
political p h i l o s o p h y is n o t w h a t may be called a 'progressive'
science, a c c u m u l a t i n g solid results and reaching conclusions u p o n
w h i c h further investigation may be based w ith confidence, its
history is specially i m p o r t a n t : indeed, in a sense, it h a s n o t h i n g b u t
a history, which is a history of the incoherences p h i l o s o p h e r s have
detected in c o m m o n ways of thinking a n d the m a n n e r of solution
th e y h a v e p r o p o s e d , rather th a n a history of doctrines and systems.
T h e study of this history m a y be s u p p o s e d to have a considerable
place in a political e d u c a t i o n , and the enterprise of u n d e r s t a n d i n g
t h e tu r n which c o n t e m p o r a r y reflection h a s given t o it, an even
m o r e considerable place. Political p h i l o s o p h y c a n n o t be expected t o
increase o u r ability to be successful in political activity. It will n o t
help us t o distinguish betw een good a n d b a d political projects; it
h a s n o p o w e r t o guide or to direct us in the enterprise of p u r s u i n g
t h e intim ations of o u r tra d itio n . But the patient analysis of t h e
general ideas w h i c h have c o m e t o be connected w i t h political
activity — ideas such as n a t u r e , artifice, r e a s o n , will, law, a u t h o r i t y ,
obligation, etc. — in so far as it succeeds in r e m o v i n g s o m e of t h e
c r o o k e d n e s s from o u r t h i n k i n g a n d leads to a m o r e econom ical use
of c o n c e p ts, is an activity neither t o b e o v e r r a te d n o r despised. But
Michael
Oakeshott
237
it m u s t be u n d e r s t o o d as an explanatory, not a practical, activity,
and if we p u r s u e it, w e m a y hope only to be less often cheated by
a m b i g u o u s s t a t e m e n t and irrelevant argument.
Abeunt studia in mores. The fruits of a political education will
a p p e a r in the m a n n e r in which we think and speak about politics
and p e r h a p s in the m a n n e r in which we conduct our political
activity. T o select items from this prospective harvest must always
be h a z a r d o u s , a n d o p in io n s will differ about w h a t is most impor­
tant. But for myself I should hope for tw o things. The more
p r o f o u n d o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of political activity, the less we shall
be at the mercy of plausible b u t mistaken analogy, the less we shall
be t e m p t e d by a false o r irrelevant model. And the more thoroughly
w e u n d e r s t a n d o u r o w n political tradition, the more readily its
w h o le resources are available to us, the less likely we shall be to
e m b r a c e the illusions which wait for the ignorant and the unwary:
the illusion t h a t in politics w e can get on w ithout a tradition of
behaviour, t h e illusion t h a t the abridgement of a tradition is itself a
sufficient guide, a n d the illusion th a t in politics there is anywhere a
safe h a r b o u r , a destination to be reached or even a detectable
s t r a n d of p r o g r e s s . ' T h e w o r l d is the best of all possible worlds, and
everything in it is a necessary evil.'
NOTES
This is the case, for example, with Natural Law; whether it is taken to be
an explanation of political activity or (improperly) as a guide to political
conduct.
Cf. 'Substantive law has the first look of being gradually secreted in the
interstices of procedure.' Maine, Early Law and Customs, p. 389.
E.g. a society in which law was believed to be a divine gift.
The Russian Revolution (what actually happened in Russia) was not the
implementation of an abstract design worked out by Lenin and others in
Switzerland: it was a modification of Russian circumstances. And the
French Revolution was far more closely connected with the ancien
regime than with Locke or America.
To those who seem to themselves to have a clear view of an immediate
destination (that is, of a condition of human circumstance to be
achieved), and who are confident that this condition is proper to be
imposed upon everybody, this will seem an unduly sceptical understand­
ing of political activity; but they may be asked where they have got it
from, and whether they imagine that 'political activity' will come to an
end with the achievement of this condition? And if they agree that some
more distant destination may then be expected to disclose itself, does not
238
A
Political
Education
this situation entail an understanding of politics as an open­ended
activity such as 1 have described? Or do they understand politics as
making the necessary arrangements for a set of castaways who have
always in reserve the thought that they are going to be 'rescued?'
The critic who found 'some mystical qualities' in this passage leaves me
puzzled: it seems to me an exceedingly matter­of­fact description of the
characteristics of any tradition — the Common Law of England, for
example, the so­called British Constitution, the Christian religion,
modern physics, the game of cricket, shipbuilding.