The linkage of international and internal security – Brazilian contributions to
United Nations peacekeeping operations and their effect on the domestic
security sector
Paper prepared for presentation at the ECPR General Conference in Glasgow, 06.09.2014*
Preliminary draft – Please do not cite, comments welcome
Christoph Harig
PhD Candidate
King’s Brazil Institute
King’s College London
[email protected]
Abstract
The end of the Cold War and the emergence of ´new security threats´ have contributed to the rising
demand for South American states to participate in increasingly robust peacekeeping operations.
Brazil is a prominent example of this paradigm change, particularly with leading the military
component of peacekeeping forces in Haiti. Moreover, members of government and Armed Forces
see the peacekeeping experience as an exercise for fighting criminality within Brazil. Drawing on a
field trip to military units that were deployed both in peacekeeping and in internal missions, this
paper aims to deal with the consequences of peacekeeping for civil-military interactions in Brazilian
public security. With the blending of police and military tasks being a defining character of Brazil´s
peacekeeping missions and training, I aim to assess if this is going to reinforce the ´militarisation´ of
public security inherited from the authoritarian past by the ´police-isation´ of the military in internal
missions.
*
A previous version of this paper has been presented at the WISC Fourth Global International Studies
Conference in Frankfurt, 07.08.2014. All translations from German, Portuguese and Spanish sources into
English are my own.
Introduction
Over the last ten years, Brazil has tried to foster its international standing with an increased activism
in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Beginning in 2004, the Brazilian dominance of
MINUSTAH – the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti – has changed long-standing paradigms of the
country´s foreign policy such as the traditionally reluctant attitude towards robust mandates of PKO.
As not all political legacies of the last military regime (1964-1985) had been overcome, many saw the
mission in Haiti as an opportunity to enhance civilian supremacy and to accustom the military to
democratic standards.
This paper aims to scrutinise if PKO participation brought significant changes to the Brazilian Armed
Forces in two respects: at the level of civil-military relations (CMR), I am going to assess whether it
actually improved civilian supremacy; at an operational level, I try to find out more about the origins
of strategic approaches used by the military in urban areas of the Haitian capital Port-au-Prince and
Rio de Janeiro. In sum, I try to find out whether international influences are really strong enough to
trump national traditions and to alter military conduct.
Brazil´s Armed Forces still possess significant prerogatives in the political system and wide autonomy
in managing defence matters. As an example, they successfully resisted any attempts to enable legal
prosecutions of human rights violations during their last regime. Another rather anecdotal, but telling
illustration is that it took over 25 years of democracy until the government banned the Armed
Forces´ public commemorations of their last coup – which they keep calling ´Democratic Revolution´
(Bertazzo, 2012, p. 817).
Furthermore, the Brazilian military looks back at a long history of involvement in public security, not
only in times of authoritarianism. Since the return to democracy, the deployment of troops for
guaranteeing law and order (GLO) has become increasingly trivialised by ´leftist´ governments of
former opponents and victims of military rule (Harig, 2014). The legal framework for GLO operations
now allows the Armed Forces to act as a police force within Brazil´s borders and to take over the
operational control of the other public security institutions (Centro de Estudos Estratégicos do
Exército, 2007, p. 14). This led to concrete consequences for public security, notably before and
during the Football World Cup 2014, when Rio de Janeiro´s pacification strategy and the associated
military-backed occupations of favelas have raised international attention. Brazil seized the
opportunity to bolster the image of pacification by linking it to PKO: badges and the light-blue colour
of caps worn by the Força de Pacificação in Rio symbolically create a proximity to UN blue helmets.
Harig – The linkage of international and national security
2
Changing perceptions of security and consequences for UN peacekeeping
missions
With the end of the bipolar world order, security concerns shifted away from interstate war and
began to focus on ´new threats´ of transnational crime and terrorism. Particularly since 2001, failed
and failing states as well as other “ungoverned spaces” (Clunan & Trinkunas, 2010) are considered
perilous. Instability and violence are thought to endanger their peaceful surroundings: “In thinking
about spaces and security (…), the danger flows out of its origin or locus in zones characterized by
turbulence (…) to zones of order and stability” (Williams, 2010, p. 40). The international community
has therefore become increasingly concerned with containing this threat. Consequently, the
characteristics of UN peacekeeping have changed accordingly and were adapted to internal conflicts
and governance issues.
Moreover, the experience of genocides committed despite the presence of peacekeepers in former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda has sparked a debate about the appropriate degree of coercion to be used in
PKO. The so-called Brahimi report concluded that peacekeepers should be able to implement their
mandate and to protect civilians more effectively and thus called for “robust doctrine and realistic
mandates” (United Nations, 2000, p. ix). The majority of ensuing resolutions met these demands by
granting peacekeepers a much wider room for manoeuvre for protecting civilians and implementing
the mission´s mandate (Tardy, 2011, p. 152).
This development inevitably altered the role of Armed Forces in PKO. Doyle and Sabanis (2006, p. 11)
provide a useful typology for the changing nature of UN missions by dividing them into three
different “generations”. Not to be understood in a strictly chronological way, they nevertheless
represent different degrees of PKO evolution and levels of coercion (Bures, 2007, p. 409). The first
generation reflects the deployment of UN troops in a conflict between states, e.g. for securing a
buffer zone. The second generation mirrors the involvement of the UN in developing peace
agreements, particularly after civil wars. Consequently, the focus of PKO shifts away from inter-state
to intra-state conflicts. Such missions not only involve traditional military tasks like securing borders,
but also a significant component of civilian and police tasks. What is common to these two
generations is that they are based on Chapter VI of the UN charter and therefore require the consent
of the conflicting parties.
In contrast to this, “the defining characteristic of ´third generation´ operations is the lack of consent
by one or more of the parties to some or all of the UN mandate” (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006, p. 15f.).
Third generation PKO under a Chapter VII mandate effectively undermine the traditional principle of
impartiality, as UN troops inevitably have to take sides in a conflict where one or more parties do not
Harig – The linkage of international and national security
3
agree with their presence. Furthermore, third generation PKO clearly reflect the post-Cold War
concern with failing and failed states: they are not only meant to build or secure peace, but also to
engage in domestic governance issues, in which they aim at building institutions for the stabilisation
of the host nation. While the possibility to use coercion has definitely been broadened in third
generation PKO, mandates obviously authorise much less violence than in inter-state war. Armed
Forces involved in these missions are often required to complete law enforcement tasks where they
have to refrain from what they are originally trained to do – using full-scale force (Stephens, 2010, p.
461).
Brazil and the changing nature of PKO
To what extent does this development influence Brazil and its participation in PKO? Even though it is
widely acknowledged that developing and middle-income countries bear the brunt of peacekeeping
work, many authors neglect their possible agenda-setting powers. A widespread claim is that
‘Southern’ peacekeepers are being used for maintaining an impartial image of UN PKO, while the
interests and norms of ‘Northern’ states nonetheless prevail (Kurashina Whitestone & Segal, 2007, p.
19). Despite sending own troops only guardedly, developed countries still exert “disproportional
influence” (Uziel, 2010, p. 199) in the decision-making process and the design of missions. Moreover,
liberal ‘Northern’ states have been accused of pursuing their agenda aggressively with an ever
increasing militarisation of PKO since the end of the Cold War (Pugh, 2012, p. 412).
However, there is also a remarkable body of scholarship that portrays a less clear-cut division. Amar
(2012, p. 4f.) correctly highlights that literature on PKO usually neglects the innovative potential of
the ‘Global South’ as actor. To his interpretation, troop contributors from South America and other
non-‘Northern’ states were pursuing own agendas and eventually were shifting established patterns
of norm diffusion. Accordingly, “to participate in PKOs was a way to ensure that South America
would have place in the new global cartography” (Esteves, 2010, p. 624).
In the case of Brazilian PKO participations, both sides might find supporting arguments for their
respective interpretations. On the one hand, asking Brazil to take over the military command of
MINUSTAH certainly served Northern interests, for countries such as France and the United States
would have evoked heavy criticism for being visibly involved in Haiti. By delegating this responsibility
to Brazil, they did not stand out prominently but were nevertheless able to exert significant influence
(Fernández Moreno et al., 2012, p. 382). For instance, when MINUSTAH was facing a deteriorating
security situation, it was not the group of ‘Southern’ troop contributors but countries like France,
Canada and the USA as well as UN diplomats that successfully pushed for a more coercive approach
(Chagas Vianna Braga, 2010, p. 714; Kawaguti, 2013).
Harig – The linkage of international and national security
4
On the other hand, Brazil´s peacekeeping efforts undoubtedly serve its goal to be recognised
internationally as a powerful country (Sánchez Nieto, 2012, p. 174; Spektor, 2012). Yet, third
generation PKO starkly contrast to Brazil´s traditional respect for foreign countries´ sovereignty. Even
faced with the genocide in Rwanda, Brazil rejected a robust intervention of the UN and demanded
that any actions should be taken under a Chapter VI mandate (Kenkel, 2010a, p. 654). This attitude
has changed, albeit with reservations. To strike the balance between officially rejecting
interventionist Chapter VII missions and nevertheless accepting the role as leader of the military
component of MINUSTAH had been a high-wire balancing act for Brazilian foreign policy. President
Lula explained Brazil´s eventual consent by stating that its foreign policy would still be guided by the
traditional emphasis of non-intervention and the respect for sovereignty but would now also
consider an “attitude of non-indifference” (Benner, 2013, p. 3) when facing severe human rights
violations.
The country´s exceptionalism and its drive to go its own way are very well summarized in the words
of a British diplomat: “Brazil is so un-aligned that it did not even align with the Non-Aligned
Movement” (Ellis, 2014). In this sense, weakening or changing traditional principles that stand in the
way of its ambitions is a recurring pattern that has also been detected in other fields of Brazilian
foreign policy (Ratton Sanchez, 2009; Zilla & Harig, 2012). In the case of PKO, the Brazilian strife for
international recognition as ‘Emerging Power’ overweighed the initial reluctance to engage robust
missions (de Figueiredo, 2013, p. 13). With this paradigm change, Brazil may have accepted to follow
a supposedly ‘Northern’ framework of PKO but used it pragmatically in order to attain its own goals.
MINUSTAH then marked the beginning of a growing activism in UN missions: in 2003, only 79
Brazilians were deployed in two UN missions. Until 2010, this number grew to more than 2,200
persons in nine operations, with the bulk being deployed in Haiti (Cavalcante, 2010, p. 150). The
number has meanwhile dropped to 1,685 (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations,
2014a), but the notable increase in PKO contributions is seen as “part of a broader international
marketing strategy” (Sotomayor Velázquez, 2014, p. 56) that aims at supporting the country´s global
standing, not least with regard to the claim for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. Given
Brazil´s past as military regime, to rely on Armed Forces as a foreign policy tool raises further
questions to which I am going to turn to now.
Harig – The linkage of international and national security
5
Civil-Military Relations in Brazil
Having experienced a large number of military regimes in the 20th century, assessing any actuation of
South American Armed Forces is inevitably linked to the quality of democracy. Despite no country in
the region being governed by Armed Forces anymore, Armed Forces were often able to preserve
prerogatives “in exchange for political subordination” (Hunter, 1998, p. 300) until today. The
conventional wisdom of CMR literature suggests that sending troops to PKO was an opportunity to
broaden the influence of civilian administrations, as they could redirect the military´s focus towards
external missions and consequently keep them away from internal roles. Ideally, external missions
would even create the “military desire to remain subordinate to civilian authority” (Pion-Berlin &
Arceneaux, 2000, p. 417). Some argue that countries like Brazil or its neighbours might use PKO as
the most appropriate way to gain professional experience for their militaries (Michael & Ben-Ari,
2011, p. 670). Multinational military actions co-ordinated by civilians are thought to enable political
control over the military as well as to improve soldiers´ ability to follow orders that originate outside
their traditional chain of command (Diamint, 2006, p. 12). The formerly military-ruled countries
Uruguay, Chile and Argentina are arguably proving such assumptions (Benítez, 2007, p. 105). South
American experts and practitioners therefore widely regard peacekeeping as a way to improve CMR
(Avezov, 2013, p. 166). This is mostly due to the civil-military interactions necessary for planning and
implementing a PKO. For instance, MINUSTAH required an unprecedented degree of co-operation
between Brazil´s diplomatic elite and the Armed Forces (Ramalho da Rocha, 2009, p. 153). However,
the Brazilian Armed Forces´ predominance in managing own affairs contradicts the conventional
wisdom.
Brazilian military rule (1964-1985) had a bigger involvement of civilian politicians in the decisionmaking process than its neighbouring counterparts (Agüero, 1997, p. 181). A two-party system was
established that included a party for the tolerated parts of the opposition (Goes, 2012, p. 5), and the
regime mostly tried to give its political decisions a legal appearance (Soares & Kuhlmann, 2005, p.
467). Military rulers not only relied on coercion but also on a mutual agreement with civilian elites in
which the military represented the final arbiter in decision making. The Armed Forces managed to
maintain a significant degree of congressional allegiance well beyond the transition to democracy
(Pereira, 2001, p. 572). By defining the conditions of the transition themselves (de Oliveira & Soares,
2001, p. 100), the Armed Forces only consented to re-democratisation in case their future possibility
to intervene in political affairs was guaranteed (Saint-Pierre & Winand, 2008, p. 61). After 1985, the
Armed Forces saw themselves as legitimate moderator in the Brazilian polity (Stepan, 1988, p. 131),
which was broadly accepted by public opinion and uncontested by the majority of the political
Harig – The linkage of international and national security
6
establishment (Przeworski, 1992, p. 147). As a result, the successful influence of the military lobby
guaranteed them significant political powers in the 1988 Constitution (Agüero, 1997, p. 185f.).
Nevertheless, considerable advances in terms of civilian supremacy have been achieved over the last
29 years. The number of military ministers has been cut back drastically, the Armed Forces accepted
former opponents as their commander-in-chief and most areas of public policy are not openly
influenced by the military anymore (Harig, 2012, p. 43). However, the example of the Ministry of
Defence shows how flawed the institutionalisation of civilian supremacy still is. Civilian-led Ministries
of Defence are theoretically regarded as a milestone for democratic CMR but in the Brazilian case
hardly contributed to improvements. After an arduous process of negotiations and resistance of the
Armed Forces, the unified Ministry of Defence was established and the three ministries of the
military branches were abolished in 1999. Yet, most of its staff consists of members of the Armed
Forces and except for the position of the minister in person, only few high-ranking positions are held
by civilians (López, 2008, p. 310). Appropriately enough, President Cardoso admitted that he did not
intend to enhance civilian control through creating the Ministry (Marques, 2004, p. 49).
Ramalho da Rocha´s comments (2008, p. 5) about the role of the Ministry of Defence summarise well
what lies at the core of the problem regarding CMR in Brazil: Despite civilian supremacy being rarely
questioned nowadays, civilians still fail to exercise authority in issues of defence. The decisionmaking process for PKO highlights this issue: initiatives to formalise it have failed so far; interministerial co-ordination in the Brazilian polity is generally hard to achieve, as ministries take
advantage of considerable autonomy in their respective area; the civilian part of the Ministry of
Defence only has minor influence in controlling military affairs; and, as in the entire policy area of
defence, there is scarcely any parliamentary participation (Kenkel, 2013, p. 337ff.). Moreover,
political guidelines on defence are very vague and do not firmly establish the participation in PKO as
a foreign policy tool (Cavalcante, 2010, p. 152).
Hence, the political establishment and the Armed Forces each see a different rationale behind PKO.
While government and the Foreign Office (Itamaraty) want to achieve advantages in global politics,
Ministry of Defence as well as Armed Forces aspire to attain institutional gains. Consequently, they
do not understand PKO as a means to re-direct their actions away from internal tasks. Quite the
contrary, a former Minister of Defence (Zaverucha, 2008a, p. 22) as well as several Army officers
(Martins Filho, 2010, p. 302), among others, expressed the desire to use the MINUSTAH experience
for improving GLO operations. Hence, the military establishment sticks to the understanding of its
role as an internal actor and it appears that PKO are rather reinforcing than changing this perception.
Harig – The linkage of international and national security
7
The widely-held idea of using PKO and other external missions in order to re-direct Armed Forces
away from internal tasks is therefore not applicable to the Brazilian case.
Militarisation of the police and police-isation of the military
While PKO arguably do not help to improve CMR, the trend of using the military for law enforcement
tasks raises further questions. The growing focus on internal issues of PKO host countries has led to a
rising deployment of UN police forces. Since the end of the Cold War, the deployment of UNPOL
(back then CIVPOL) has risen sharply: in 1988, only 35 police officers were deployed in PKO; this
number rose to 7,300 in August 2006 (Greener, 2011, p. 184) and stood at 13,056 in February 2014
(United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2014b). Despite this increase in numbers,
several problems impede successful police work in PKO: most countries do not possess enough
civilian police officers to send a sufficient number of them abroad, UNPOL lacks the logistical
capabilities to organise major expeditionary missions, and its officers are usually not equipped and
trained to do their work in a non-domestic environment. Moreover, as missions have become more
robust, UNPOL forces are required to act more aggressively. Some nations have reacted to this gap
between demand and capability by deploying police units that “specialize in the harder edge of
policing” (Greener, 2011, p. 188). The increasing use of such gendarmerie-style police forces, that
often display military characteristics in terms of “organizational structure, institutional affiliation,
doctrine or weaponry” (Lutterbeck, 2013, p. 7), clearly underlines the trend of militarising police
tasks in PKO. Moreover, UNPOL are more and more unable to overcome the high levels of crime they
are confronted with and military forces are frequently supporting or even replacing them (Greener &
Fish, 2013, p. 3).
MINUSTAH shows similar problems. With almost 2,500 officers, the mission in Haiti has the secondlargest police contingent of current PKO (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations,
2014c), but its operations suffer from a plethora of problems. First of all, the bulk of police officers
comes from countries where security forces have problematic human rights records, which provokes
concerns by the Haitian population over their appropriate behaviour. Given the ‘liberal’ agenda of
PKO with values such as democratic institution-building and the respect for human rights, there is
reason to doubt that a considerable share of UNPOL personnel may be apt for these missions
(Greener, 2011, p. 190). Furthermore, there is a huge language barrier between UNPOL and the local
population (Gauthier & Bonin, 2008, p. 9), as most countries seem to fail in preparing their police
contingents adequately in this respect. At times, police forces did not dare to enter the most
contested areas of Port-au-Prince and the military consequently had to act alone (Bolfoni da Cunha,
2008, p. 86).
Harig – The linkage of international and national security
8
In sum, shortcomings of police forces and the seriousness of crime lead to an increasing militarisation
of law enforcement in PKO, not only by heavily armed police officers but also by using the military
instead of police (Guttieri, 2004, p. 84). This mirrors the global trend of blending together police and
military tasks, in which “the traditional distinctions between military/police, war/law enforcement,
and internal/external security are rapidly blurring” (Kraska, 2007, p. 501).
Brazil´s problem with its militarised police
The growing importance of police tasks for Armed Forces, aptly called the “police-ization of the
military” (Dunlap, 1999), is putting countries that democratised from military rule in a particularly
delicate situation. While often still trying to cut back political military prerogatives, letting the Armed
Forces carry out police tasks in PKO could eventually trigger the re-discovery of their role as internal
security provider. Having had banned internal security roles, Uruguayan politicians, for example,
allowed their contributions after rediscovering troops´ effectiveness in carrying out such tasks in PKO
(Sotomayor Velázquez, 2014, p. 154). Neither being able to root out sources of criminality nor having
police forces that could effectively counter this problem, policy-makers are often stuck between a
rock and a hard place: even if they may feel attached to the long-term goal of demilitarising the
public security sector, they frequently rely on Armed Forces when trying to produce fast and visible
results in the fight against crime. While police forces are often being distrusted by citizens, the
military is usually pretty effective and furthermore possesses high levels of public approval. Hence,
“all the elements are in place to call the military as the main force to tackle criminal activity,
especially crime related to drug trafficking” (Dammert, 2013, p. 116). Undoubtedly, Brazil is facing a
serious crime problem, especially since the return to democracy. Homicide rates have increased by
259 percent from 1980 to 2010 (Moulin Aguiar & Lopes Ribeiro, 2013, p. 4). For 2012, figures indicate
29 intentional homicides per 100,000 Brazilian inhabitants (Waiselfisz, 2014). As a comparison: the
figures for Haiti usually oscillate between 5.1 and 6.9 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,
2012). Poor metropolitan areas – favelas – are commonly associated with high levels of crime and a
low presence of state authorities, most (in)famously in Rio de Janeiro.
José Mariano Beltrame, Rio´s security secretary, once described the state´s absence as main reason
for high levels of crime (Mirkin, 2008). Similar to the logic of failed states threatening the security of
surrounding states, favelas are thus perceived as dangerous for the rest of the city. Considerable
parts of the Brazilian population are supporting hard-line public policies (Gay, 2009, p. 37) and often
consent to violent means of repression (Spanakos, 2006, p. 55f.) in the fight against crime. It may be
right that overcoming the lack of public services is a key factor to integrate the favela population, but
it is mistaken to confuse absent state services with absence of the state. Numerous state
representatives are actually present: politicians were using favela-based drug gangs as a pretext for
Harig – The linkage of international and national security
9
interventions and at the same time relied on them in order to gain electoral support in the areas they
controlled (Leeds, 1996, p. 74); corrupt police officers are involved in drug-trafficking (Reames, 2007,
p. 81); another negative example are vigilante groups. In recent years, a growing number of milícias –
composed of former or active police officers, prison guards or fire-fighters – have taken over a large
number of favelas in Rio (Pearce, 2010, p. 296), arguably at least implicitly backed by public
authorities (Gay, 2010, p. 217). Milícia members are now increasingly seeking political offices for
themselves (Ribeiro & Oliveira, 2010, p. 19). Hence, the state indeed is present in favelas, even
though mostly in an inappropriate manner.
The police are sadly no exception to this. Due to Brazil´s federal system, state governments are
mainly responsible for policing. Following a division of labour that was established during the last
military regime, the Polícia Civil is responsible for investigating crimes, while the Polícia Militar has to
perform the visible parts of policing like patrols, arrests and the control of public order (Pereira &
Ungar, 2004, p. 271). Operational and organisational characteristics may differ between states
(Husain, 2009, p. 49), but what they do have in common across the country are extremely low levels
of public confidence (Pereira da Rocha, 2013, p. 85). Police forces are mostly perceived as being
violent, corrupt, ineffective, and behaving badly.
The Armed Forces wield considerable influence over the Polícia Militar in issues such as budget or
training (Pereira & Ungar, 2004, p. 271) and the military police officially counts as reserve and
auxiliary troop of the Army (Centro de Estudos Estratégicos do Exército, 2007, p. 16). The Armed
Forces´ influence on police codes of conduct arguably have a negative impact (Paes-Machado & De
Albuquerque, 2002, p. 63). For instance, police officers may commit human rights violations while,
according to their guidelines, they still have to be regarded as a “good cop” (Costa, 2011, p. 25)
because of not breaching the principle of hierarchy. Some members of the Armed Forces believe that
the popular demand for their internal deployments is rooted in the military police´s bad behaviour,
ineffectiveness, and corruption (Centro de Estudos Estratégicos do Exército, 2007, p. 3). Police strikes
burden this close but tense relationship. Even though constitutionally prohibited, more than 60
strikes have occurred between 1990 and 2007 (Reames, 2007, p. 64), often caused by low-ranking
personnel (Zaverucha & Rezende, 2009, p. 17) that understandably pushed for improvements in their
poor salaries. It is usually the Army that is sent in to end these strikes, eventually by violent means
(Gosman, 2012).
Rio´s police, and especially the military sector, embodies the negative public image by being a major
perpetrator, instead of a preventer of violence and crime. A non-exhaustive list of detected
infractions includes cases of robbery, extortion, drug dealing, kidnapping (Gay, 2009, p. 41) and
Harig – The linkage of international and national security
10
killing innocent favela residents in downright massacres (Leeds, 1996, p. 65). Holding the police
accountable for such misbehaviour is hampered by several impediments. In the case of the Polícia
Civil, the process of inquiry is generally debarred from external control mechanisms (Costa, 2011, p.
24). Prosecutions of human rights violations and other offences by the Polícia Militar almost entirely
fall under military jurisdiction. In fact, the 1988 Constitution even deepened this legacy of
authoritarian rule by allowing for the creation of military courts at state level (Costa, 2011, p. 29).
Trials in these courts are heavily biased and result in high levels of impunity (Pereira & Ungar, 2004,
p. 272f.). For intentional homicides are being treated under civilian jurisdiction, it is remarkable that
a large number of deaths involving the police are labelled as having occurred while “resisting arrest”
(Zdun, 2011, p. 192). Military police officers can use this term in order to avoid being tried by civilian
courts, where they probably would face more serious punishments. Occasional reform efforts to
improve accountability mechanisms have failed against strong opposition from conservative
politicians and the police lobby (Reames, 2007, p. 64).
The Brazilian Armed Forces in public security
With Brazilian police forces being arguably much more violent than UNPOL and crime levels in Brazil
apparently being much higher in Brazil than in Haiti, internal deployments of Armed Forces
nevertheless follow similar patterns as in PKO: highly militarised police forces apparently cannot
solve the problem, so the military is used instead. On numerous instances, Brazil used Armed Forces
in the aftermath of spectacular actions by gangs or organised crime (Macaulay, 2012, p. 830).
Furthermore, Brazil frequently resorts to the Armed Forces in the run-up and during large events.
Hence, there is a recurring way of reasoning behind military deployments after re-democratisation:
Brazil is facing increased international interest due to particular events and simultaneously violence
and crime originating in favelas are posing both a domestic security risk and a threat to its image
abroad.
Since the end of the military regime in 1985, the country has witnessed a growing trivialisation of
military engagements in public security: troops have not only protected elections, the Carnival in Rio
de Janeiro and the visits of different popes but also repressed workers´ and police strikes as well as
manifestations and eventually kept the landless movement from invading the farm of President
Cardoso´s sons (Mathias & Guzzi, 2010; Zaverucha, 2008a). Initially, military actions in domains
originally reserved for state police forces were not based on adequate legal footing. Yet, the “trends
indicate an interest in and willingness to blend police and military functions, which if it continues
should require legislation and demand careful planning and strict civilian supervision” (Reames,
2007, p. 73). As will be shown subsequently, Reames´ call for planning and legislation has been
Harig – The linkage of international and national security
11
heard. Against the background of Brazilian CMR, it is however not surprising that civilian supervision
has only been subordinate in this process.
Most importantly, the 1988 Brazilian Constitution allows for the internal use of Armed Forces.
According to Article 142, their role – apart from the obvious primary task to defend the country – is
to be guaranteeing law and order (GLO) upon the initiative of any of the constitutional powers.
Article 142 further states that complementary laws shall establish norms for the deployment of the
military. Albeit public security being the domain of state police forces according to Article 144, the
Armed Forces meanwhile have police powers at their disposal during engagements in GLO
operations (Daladier Barros, 2011, p. 102). This situation resulted from a long process of formalising
internal military engagements.
The Lei Complementar (LC) 69 of 1991 states that Armed Forces may only act internally if the
ordinary police forces prove to be incapable of securing order (for the text of LC 69 and its
subsequent amendments, see Brasil. Presidência da República, 1999). Furthermore, LC 69
substantiated the authority of the executive branch in ordering such deployments. Particularly
President Cardoso (1995-2002) has been accused of abusing this prerogative by deploying the
military without making full use of the police first (Zaverucha, 1997, p. 15). However, not only
Cardoso “overstretched” (Flemes, 2008, p. 4) the legal framework in the following years. This is
remarkable, as the conditions as well as the room for manoeuvre for internal military deployments
have constantly been extended and already allow a frequent use. Some documents that officially
guide Brazilian defence policy hint at the process that led to this situation.
The Estratégia Nacional da Defesa (END), approved in 2008, explicitly refers to GLO operations.
Hailed by military circles as “watershed” (Maia Neto, 2011, p. 2) and “milestone” (Estado Maior do
Exército Brasileiro, 2010, p. 21) in terms of civil-military interaction for developing a defence agenda,
it was in fact almost exclusively drafted by members of the Armed Forces (Gomes de Mello, 2012, p.
55f.). In this vein, the END specifically addresses the need for a legal framework that not only
outlines the conditions and proceedings of GLO operations but also serves as protection for involved
troops. To this end, the Ministry of Defence proposed further alterations to the LCs that so far
regulated the use of troops in GLO (Brasil. Presidência da República, 2008).
In August 2001, a decree by President Cardoso gave the military command the right to take over the
partial or entire operational control of state police forces involved in GLO operations, subject to
consent of the respective governor (Centro de Estudos Estratégicos do Exército, 2007, p. 33). The
decree also granted the Army the same powers as the Military Police during GLO operations
(Zaverucha, 2005, p. 150). The Army attained the formal right to arrest suspects in 2004, and
Harig – The linkage of international and national security
12
President Lula extended these rights to Navy and Air Force shortly before leaving office (Bertazzo,
2012, p. 814).
Passed in 2010, Article 15, §7 of LC 136 established that GLO operations definitely fall under military
jurisdiction (Brasil. Presidência da República, 2010). According to Article 9 of the Código Penal
Militar, to which LC 136 refers, all crimes committed by troops during GLO operations – except for
crimes dolosos contra a vida, literally “malicious crime against human life” – shall therefore be
judged by federal military courts. Legal experts within the Armed Forces lament this small exception
in the military penal code and suggest that military jurisdiction should be valid in any case. They
argue that only military courts possessed the necessary knowledge for adequately judging crimes
committed by soldiers (Ferreira de Melo, 2010, p. 9f.). The Garantia da Lei e da Ordem-manuals of
2013/2014 (Brasil. Ministério da Defesa, 2013, 2014) uphold the validity of military justice and
further formalise GLO operations with a more precise doctrine. The draft once more did not follow
civilian initiatives but the military´s demand for a framework that regulates their actions during large
events, pacification efforts or police strikes (Lima & de Souza, 2014). Even though the Ministry of
Defence denied any relationship between the document and the wave of protests in 2013 (Tosta,
2014), it is undeniable that the doctrine was going to frame military actions during demonstrations.
To some critics, the first version denominating “movements” and “organisations” as possible
“opposing forces” reminds of the National Security-Doctrine used by the military regime and reflects
how poor the Ministry of Defence is exercising civilian supremacy (Fuccille, 2014). The Ministry of
Defence withdrew some polemical formulations in the second draft but made clear that nothing
essential would be changed (Cantanhêde, 2014). Comparing second and first draft of the GLOmanual, the new version arguably allows for an even wider scope of military action. In sum, it meets
the Armed Forces´ longstanding demands for a better regulation of their internal deployments and
thus, provides legal ‘protection’ for its members through the validity of military justice.
GLO operations, in contrast to the regular public security provision by the police, are only allowed
episodically and have to be carried out in a determined frame of time and space. However, the
recent Football World, for whose duration the government issued a “preventive” GLO measure
(Werneck, 2014), is certainly a good example for the frequent overstretching of the legal framework:
troops were then protecting airports, hotels and streets used by football teams, foreign government
officials as well as the heads of FIFA. Doubts remain whether the police wouldn´t have been able to
perform the majority of these tasks.
Harig – The linkage of international and national security
13
MINUSTAH and domestic pacification
As I have shown, the Brazilian Armed Forces have gained considerable experience and legal backing
for carrying out tasks in internal security. This coincides with the recent pacification strategy in Rio de
Janeiro, where Armed Forces play a significant role in taking over favelas. But how does the
historically developed role as an internal security provider affect the military in PKO? And does PKO
in return affect pacification? According to Dandeker and Gow (1999, p. 64), the extent to which
Armed Forces are able to adapt to the demands of peacekeeping depends on their respective
military ethos. They argue that some countries´ Armed Forces, such as the USA, may feel historically
inclined to combat, while others, for instance Sweden, developed an ethos that fits well with
peacekeeping. Other authors suggest that such differences gradually lost their significance by
common experiences of participating in PKO (Kurashina Whitestone & Segal, 2007, p. 11). This line of
argument is appealing at first sight but has been developed with case studies of established
democracies. Hence, it is not covering democratising countries from the ‘Global South’ and therefore
misses out on the most significant share of troop contributors in PKO.
Internal tasks have always been central for South American militaries´ roles and self-perceptions, and
external warfare has long ceased to be important. Since the Chaco War between Bolivia and
Paraguay in the 1930s, the region has not experienced major inter-state armed conflicts. Throughout
the Cold War, South American militaries perceived Communism as the most dangerous external
threat. This did not lead to external warfare but resulted in the heavy internal involvement of Armed
Forces that ended up in military regimes dominating the political scene in the 1970s. As a result,
there still exists
“a fundamental contradiction between the philosophy and practice of the military
institution in South America. As the armed forces emphasize the defense of the nationstate against external threats as their primary existential and nationally legitimizing
purpose, their actual institutional interests and internal political role in their respective
societies appear to take center stage in their functions.” (Martín, 2006, p. 164)
As a result of this contradiction, formal elements of military culture such as doctrine, education and
training have been mostly focused on external warfare. Notwithstanding this paradoxical situation,
the broad operational experience of these troops in providing domestic services has even been seen
as an ideal match for the new realities of PKO.
Strategic approaches in pacification and MINUSTAH
In fact, it is particularly the experience in poor urban environments that enabled the Brazilian Armed
Forces to lead a mission that had to confront armed groups in shantytowns of Port-au-Prince. Some
go so far as to say that Brazil´s know-how gives them a “comparative advantage over Northern
Harig – The linkage of international and national security
14
troops” (Kenkel, 2010a, p. 653) in these sorts of missions. As a result, the military component of
MINUSTAH has been dominated by Brazil: until today, it is the largest troop contributor (United
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2014d) and unlike the usual pattern of rotating
leadership in PKO, Force Commanders have always been Brazilian (Kenkel, 2012, p. 29).
In reverse order, the experience in Haiti gives the Armed Forces a chance to use their peacekeepingproven tactics in contributing to domestic public security. In the words of a former assistant to the
Force Commander, ”improving the security situation presents an opportunity to apply lessons
learned in Haiti to other situations” (Chagas Vianna Braga, 2010, p. 717). Government officials
reportedly share this view and the former Minister of Defence José Viegas considered the experience
in Haiti as an exercise for the fight against criminality within Brazil (Zaverucha, 2008b, p. 140). In the
run-up to major sports events such as the Football World Cup 2014 and the Olympic Games 2016,
the Armed Forces were consequently used as ‘Pacification Force’, particularly in the city of Rio de
Janeiro.
Officialised by a decree in 2011 – yet in fact started earlier –, Rio´s strategy of ´pacifying´ favelas
comprises four stages: (i) tactical intervention, (ii) stabilisation, (iii) implantation of pacifying police
forces (Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora – UPPs), and finally (iv) evaluation and monitoring. Stage (i)
and (ii) lie in the responsibility of the Polícia Militar´s special operations battalion (BOPE, 2014),
which has frequently been accused of not intending to arrest but rather to kill suspected criminals
when raiding favelas (Zdun, 2011, p. 192). If a military participation under GLO is requested, troops
usually also take part in stages (i) and (ii). Important to note is that the beginning of the occupation is
usually publicly announced. This gives criminals time to escape the contested area but is mainly
meant to reduce possible confrontations with drug traffickers and thus possible ´collateral damage´
among ordinary citizens (Pachico, 2012). Still, 37 people, mostly bystanders, died when police and
military jointly invaded the Complexo do Alemão in December 2010. Furthermore, over 400 drug
traffickers managed to escape, some of them allegedly being driven away by corrupt police officers
(Interview with Ignacio Cano in Melo, 2012, p. 47; Sotomayor Velázquez, 2014, p. 88).
Despite negative side-effects, the pacification strategy has been widely lauded for its innovativeness
and the apparent success in improving security. Perhaps, large parts of this praise are owed to
successful public relations-efforts by the federal and Rio´s state governments. In fact, pacification
largely just repeats prior – mostly failed, never sustained – approaches of public security in Rio: the
idea of expelling criminals and occupying favelas with force combined with an ensuing intent to
develop stronger ties between communities and the police dates back to the 1980s (Moulin Aguiar &
Lopes Ribeiro, 2013, p. 27); supporting or even replacing the police with Armed Forces started in
Harig – The linkage of international and national security
15
1994, when around 1,500 soldiers invaded as well as occupied more than 50 favelas (Bertazzo, 2012,
p. 814; Reames, 2007, p. 73). While the recent pacification approach has initially been claimed to
reduce violence and crime, the overall picture deteriorated in the course of time. UPP units have
been accused of various crimes and killings of innocents. Some argue that gangs were still
dominating pacified favelas but only abstained from openly carrying guns (Interview with Ignacio
Cano in Melo, 2012, p. 46). Recent violent attacks on UPP stations in the Complexo do Alemão (O
Estado de São Paulo, 2014) suggest that traffickers are now openly contesting the authority of police
forces again, which in sum casts doubts on the long-term success of pacification. Notwithstanding
these at best mixed results, Rio´s pacification strategy has been transferred to over twenty federal
states (Sotomayor Velázquez, 2014, p. 88) and even considered to be exported to Argentina (Center
for Legal and Social Studies, 2012, p. 186). The military ´Pacification Force´ that occupied the favelacomplexes Alemão and Penha during Operação Arcanjo between December 2010 and July 2012 – up
to this point of time the largest internal military deployment since the return to democracy with
around 1,800 soldiers (Stochero, 2012) – was explicitly linked to the experience of PKO in Haiti.
In the first half of MINUSTAH, the strategy deployed in the Haitian capital Port-au-Prince was the
“progressive occupation” (Aguilar, 2012, p. 231) of one gang-controlled slum area after another,
followed by establishing pontos fortes – strongholds – in order to maintain a constant presence of
soldiers. The military divided the city into different zones, with green zones being considered secure,
yellow ones as insecure and red zones as ´critical´. When Brazil took over the military command of
MINUSTAH in 2004, four large central areas of the city (Carrefour, Cité Soleil, Bel Air and Cité
Militaire) were marked as red and numerous surrounding areas as yellow. In the beginning, Brazilian
commanders had tried to refrain from robust use of force but gradually applied more aggressive
tactics. Until 2006, MINUSTAH troops had already managed to increase the number of secure areas
significantly and surrounded the core gang areas in parts of Cité Soleil and Cité Militaire. It was the
killing of two Jordanian PKO soldiers in 2006 that finally triggered regular and violent incursions into
Cité Soleil (Sotomayor Velázquez, 2014, p. 139). From then on, it took two more years until
MINUSTAH troops also controlled these areas (Rotatori, 2014). Soldiers adapted their behaviour
accordingly to where they were operating. The robust approach in red zones gave rise to criticism
that claimed it was apparently “legitimate to hunt down and eliminate gang members” (Higate &
Henry, 2010, p. 41) in these areas. Moreover, dozens of innocent civilians were killed during military
raids in Cité Soleil, with the walls of their shacks not being solid enough to protect them from stray
bullets (Zibechi, 2007).
Notwithstanding the loss of civilians´ lives, taking over Cité Soleil has afterwards been acclaimed as
“an important example of UN peacekeeping successes” (Fernández Moreno et al., 2012, p. 385).
Harig – The linkage of international and national security
16
Brazil has taken most of the credit, as its battalions were in charge of Port-au-Prince´s most critical
areas (Sotomayor Velázquez, 2014, p. 137). It was particularly under Force Commander General
Antonio Carlos dos Santos Cruz (2007-2009) that the military component of MINUSTAH obtained
control over gang-controlled neighbourhoods in Port-au-Prince. Santos Cruz´ commanding role
during MINUSTAH has been used to justify his nomination as Force Commander of MONUSCO, the
United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DR Congo. There, Santos Cruz heads the
deployment of the Intervention Brigade – a unit that for the first time in the history of UN missions is
actively using offensive measures to combat insurgent groups. It is probably too early for remarks
that consider this “a new phase of the (...) general history of UN peacekeeping missions” (Nogueira &
Hussey, 2013, p. 5). However, it shows that the domestically informed PKO strategic approach of
Brazil has raised awareness among the UN peacekeeping establishment.
Differences
Despite all resemblances between pacification and PKO, there also are some important differences. I
do not aim at giving an exhaustive overview here, rather at highlighting two important points. The
first distinction refers to civil-military interactions. After occupying slums in Port-au-Prince, soldiers
provided basic services to the population for which they relied on historical experience in remote
regions of Brazil, where Armed Forces are oftentimes the only representatives of the state. There,
they are frequently carrying out ações cívico-sociais (ACISO) in order to support communities in areas
of health, education or cultural activities (Aguilar, 2012, p. 230). As it is the rule, not the exception in
PKO, Brazilian troops closely interact with NGOs and other civil society organisations. The Brazilian
NGO Viva Rio is among the most prominent examples (Kenkel, 2010a, p. 656). During pacification
however, troops are scarcely contributing to social services. Here, such tasks are reserved for the
pacifying police forces and other state agencies. Moreover, NGOs are usually keen on keeping their
distance from the military. Viva Rio, for instance, does not want to work jointly with the Armed
Forces in favelas (Sotomayor Velázquez, 2010, p. 637). An Army officer deployed in both missions
reasonably declared that NGOs within Brazil probably feared later retaliations by gangs if they would
be seen as closely related to the Armed Forces (Garcia, 2014).
Secondly, the legal framework of UN PKO and GLO is obviously different. During my visit to a military
brigade whose members participated in MINUSTAH and Operação Arcanjo, several soldiers
mentioned that both missions are lacking a clear-cut ´enemy´ and that it was sometimes hard to
strike the right balance between the protection of civil rights and guaranteeing security. However,
they also admitted that the Chapter VII-mandate gave them much more leeway for robust actions
against illegal armed actors in Haiti than in Rio. Such wide room for manoeuvre had its downsides
(particularly in the first half of the mission), as the disproportionate use of force in residential areas
Harig – The linkage of international and national security
17
led to a large number of deaths among innocent slum-dwellers and significantly harmed the
acceptance of MINUSTAH among locals (Cockayne, 2014, p. 13).
Similar problems
What both types of missions have in common is the lack of accountability in cases of eventual human
rights violations or other misbehaviour. UN PKO generally do not enable adequate prosecutions of
peacekeepers (Odello, 2010). In the Haitian case, the population voiced numerous accusations of
wrongdoings that were mostly overheard. Moreover, MINUSTAH only hesitantly informed about
eventual prosecutions and often treated suspects far too leniently (Gauthier & Bonin, 2008, p. 18).
Such impunity obviously harms the perception of MINUSTAH´s legitimacy among the population and
consequently endangers the long-term success of the mission. The Brazilian dominance complicates
the issue further: Sotomayor (2014, p. 142) accuses Brazilian Force Commanders of willingly not
reporting misbehaviour of their compatriots in order to protect the Armed Forces´ prestige.
MINUSTAH regulations also impeded civil and criminal actions against PKO soldiers. In sum, Brazilian
troops in Haiti are ‘protected’ by a framework of legal and institutional circumstances that creates
high levels of impunity. If one shares the view of Haiti as a ‘training ground’ for internal missions, this
is certainly a point to worry about.
Rulings on GLO and several Leis Complementares have widened the possibility of using the military as
replacement or supporter of ordinary police forces. Moreover, the legal framework guarantees the
validity of military jurisdiction for troops when exercising such tasks. This may be well received by
military circles but is very likely to have negative consequences for accountability. Military courts
usually tend to acquittals and light sentences when soldiers are facing trials for human rights
violations (Kyle & Reiter, 2012, p. 28) and Brazilian military courts have the particularly bad
reputation of being “used defensively to protect police and military personnel accused of human
rights abuses against civilians” (Pereira, 2001, p. 561). GLO operations are therefore prone to the
same accountability issue that haunts actions of the Polícia Militar. Impunity is already one of the
major problems in the relationship between police and population, and there are no reasons to
believe that possible misbehaviour of soldiers in public security would be treated differently.
Feedback effects and consequences
Feedback effects between pacification and PKO are manifold: a significant component of troops for
Operação Arcanjo was drawn from Haiti-veterans. In reverse order, troops for MINUSTAH have later
also been selected due to their pacification experience. In both kinds of missions, troops are carrying
out police tasks, such as patrols and checkpoints, or establishing pontos fortes within contested
areas. An Army Major who firstly had been deployed during Operação Arcanjo said that he learnt a
Harig – The linkage of international and national security
18
lot from exercising such tasks in Rio and that the domestic experience helped immensely for
commanding troops in Haiti. He essentially summarised the pacification deployment as a one yearlong training for PKO (Garcia, 2014).
Some commentators suggest that peacekeeping has triggered pacification: “Armed Forces´ actions in
the hills of Rio cannot be comprehended without the prior experience in Haiti” (Marcos Cintra cited
in Biehler Mateos, 2011). Others contend that PKO has probably fewer consequences for pacification
than the historical internal role has for the Brazilian troops abroad: “Rather than importing new
doctrines from overseas (...) Brazilian troops export their conventional policing roles” (Sotomayor
Velázquez, 2014, p. 89). Probably, the truth lies somewhere in the middle, and trying to detect the
origins of particular tactics would reflect a chicken-egg problem. What is evident is the result of two
types of military deployments being mutually supportive. Moreover, reciprocal effects between PKO
and domestic missions may significantly shape public security in Brazil: in an interview, Army
commander Enzo Martins Peri once admitted that MINUSTAH and pacification are both used to
develop and enhance a public security model that could be employed across the country (Gazeta do
Povo, 2011).
To a certain degree, the development of the pacification strategy is informed by the historical role of
the Armed Forces and their regular usage as replacement and supporters of police forces. Yet, the
increased PKO engagement also coincides with an effort to actually train troops for such operations
they were already carrying out for a long time. Only in 2005, the Army founded its peacekeeping
training centre (CIOpPaz) (Brasil. República Federativa, 2012, p. 67) and the Navy followed suit in
2008 (de Oliveira Junior & Góes, 2010, p. 16). This made Brazil a latecomer in its region: Uruguay
founded its training centre in 1982, Argentina in 1995, and Chile in 2002, respectively (Kenkel, 2010b,
p. 587). According to Kenkel, PKO training centres are crucial for civil-military interactions and the
exchange of norms and experiences between troops and the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations, as they are the place “where military peacekeeping culture meets national military
cultures” (2010b, p. 587). From this perspective, training and educating soldiers for PKO could serve
to translate arguably ‘liberal’ norms and values of UN missions to militaries with a dubious past.
However, one can hardly detect a transmitting mechanism. The UN does not issue any compulsory
training standards or guidelines for training centres and countries are therefore free to train their
troops according to their own respective doctrines (Sotomayor Velázquez, 2014, p. 98). Due to the
considerable military autonomy, training curricula and exercises in Brazil are hardly influenced by
civilians. This is problematic in the sense that military education keeps on promoting traditional ideas
of preserving institutional prerogatives and being the saviour of the nation (Estre, 2012, p. 100).
Harig – The linkage of international and national security
19
With own training centres for Army and Navy, Brazilian PKO training used to diverge according to the
distinct doctrines of military branches. Instructive to know here is that the Navy had made greater
efforts to get rid of Cold War-inspired doctrines than the Army (Martins Filho, 2007, p. 16) and thus
arguably conducted much more adequate PKO-training than its counterparts. Sotomayor (2014, p.
86) therefore suggests that delegating the command of the joint training centre CCOPAB (founded in
2010) to the Army reinforced their backward looking views. These are now putatively being
transferred to the entirety of Brazilian PKO contributors, as CCOPAB trains members of all three
military branches as well as civilians and police forces prior to their respective deployment (Centro
Conjunto de Operações de Paz do Brasil, 2013, p. 49).
Apart from arguably promoting the Army´s ideological superstructure, considerable parts of training
at CCOPAB reflect the Army´s experience in policing urban environments. From my own visit to this
training centre in February 2014, I can only confirm that the gradual use of force and non-lethal
weapons, patrolling urban areas as well as interactions with civilians and media indeed constitute
central points of Brazilian PKO training. Hence, CCOPAB clearly achieves synergy effects. Certain
training grounds resemble the environment in Haiti as well as domestic settings (e.g. shacks built on
a steep slope) and one can easily perceive how PKO exercises could also prepare soldiers for just
another favela incursion.
The Army has further adjusted itself to frequent internal missions and created a dedicated GLO
training centre (CIOpGLO) in 2005. Here, soldiers are prepared for actions in favelas or during police
strikes and the school is meant to gradually improve the doctrine for internal developments (Gomes
de Mello, 2012, p. 96). Compared to CCOPAB, the GLO training centre is still very small. However, it
was due to be extended in order to satisfy the ever growing demand (Stochero, 2012) and is likely
going to host plenty of soldiers in the years to come. There are reasons to doubt that training soldiers
for police tasks is designed to change the military mindset, though. An Operação Arcanjo-veteran
who became commander of CIOpGLO reiterated that graduates remain to be trained for war. Even
though exceptional policing was one of their constitutional tasks, he insisted that “we cannot lose
our intrinsic character as an Army. We are not the police.” (Coronel Schubert Ferreira, cited in
Stochero 2012).
Conclusion
This paper has shown that the conventional wisdom of linking PKO with an international
harmonisation of values and doctrines as well as an increase of civilian influence on Armed Forces is
in large parts not applicable in the Brazilian case. The country has rather exported traditional
Harig – The linkage of international and national security
20
approaches of militarised public security to the international stage and uses PKO participation for the
further refinement of its urban pacification strategy. After all, the trend of blending military and
police tasks in PKO provides an ideal training opportunity for the Brazilian approach. In this regard,
civilian authorities mostly refrain from exercising leadership and grant the Armed Forces autonomy
in training guidelines and doctrine development. International experiences are then in turn
implemented at home. The result is a further militarisation of Brazil´s already highly militarised public
security provision.
The Armed Forces – at least officially – used to see sustained GLO missions as not desirable and
therefore expressed their interest to limit these missions to exceptional circumstances (Coelho
Cortês, 2008). In some statements however, the traditional reference to the ‘exceptional’ character
of these operations has made way for “semi-permanent” deployments (General Alberto Mendes
Cardoso, cited in Klinguelfus Mendes, 2012, p. 19) in public security. Apparently, the military is
accepting a significant internal role and increasingly prepares its soldiers for the performance of
police tasks (Centro de Estudos Estratégicos do Exército, 2007, p. 22). Thus, the background of PKO
and pacification missions significantly contributes to the police-isation of the military.
The de-militarisation of public security has been identified as a major step towards ending or at least
mitigating violence exerted by state security agents in Brazil (Bonis, 2013). However, the parallel
developments of militarising public security and police-ising the military show that Brazil is not going
to achieve this goal in the foreseeable future. Quite the contrary, federal politicians have created a
legal framework that allows for frequent deployments of troops in GLO. Moreover, these internal
deployments take place under the same terms of military jurisdiction which have caused many
problems in terms of accountability and eventually impunity for misbehaving police officers. On an
operational level, critical scholars (e.g. Dammert, 2013, p. 124; Deheza & Ribet, 2012) doubt the
effectiveness and appropriateness of soldiers doing police work due to their lack of proper training. It
remains to be seen if the ever-growing number of Brazilian soldiers trained for and used in police
tasks during PKO and GLO can refute this argument.
Despite widespread and justified normative concerns about using the military as police and
reasonable doubts about their appropriate reactions in critical situations, empirical evaluations of
soldiers exercising police tasks in PKO and domestic missions are equally scarce. In this respect,
further research needs to be done. Surveys on how soldiers have adapted to the different necessities
in PKO could provide useful insights but have so far only focussed on established democracies
(Broesder et al., 2014; Caforio, 2007). Thus, they did not discuss the area of tension between the
problematic past of military regimes, the domestic experience of policing and the possible change of
Harig – The linkage of international and national security
21
military ideology by participating in PKO for democratising countries. To my knowledge, no attempts
have ever been made to approach this issue on the individual level of soldiers. Recent studies on the
effect of PKO on militaries also lament that no surveys on the perception of South American
peacekeepers exist (Sotomayor Velázquez, 2014, p. 8). At a later stage of this project, I aim at filling
this gap by conducting surveys with soldiers that participated in MINUSTAH, domestic pacification,
both and none of these missions. This should contribute to emerging research on how soldiers
behave according to their prior experiences (Ruffa, 2013) and shed light on the appropriateness of
using soldiers for police tasks in PKO and public security.
Literature
Agüero, F. (1997). Toward civilian supremacy in South America. In L. Diamond, M. F. Plattner, Y. Chu & H. Tien
(eds.), Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies Themes and Perspectives. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Aguilar, S. (2012). Uma cultura brasileira de missões de paz. In C. Brigagão & F. Fernandes (eds.), Diplomacia
brasileira para a paz. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão.
Amar, P. (2012). Global South to the Rescue: Emerging Humanitarian Superpowers and Globalizing Rescue
Industries. Globalizations 9(1): 1–13.
Avezov, X. (2013). The New Geopolitics of Peace Operations: A Dialogue with Emerging Powers: South America
Regional Dialogue. Journal of International Peacekeeping 17(1-2): 162–170.
Benítez, R. (2007). América Latina: operaciones de paz y acciones militares internacionales de las fuerzas
armadas. Foro Internacional 47(1): 99–116.
Benner, T. (2013). Brazil as a norm entrepreneur: the “Responsibility While Protecting” initiative. Global Public
Policy Institute Working Paper. Berlin.
Bertazzo, J. (2012). Brazilian Security and Defence Policy under President Dilma Rousseff: Transition and Initial
Challenges. Critical Sociology 38(6): 809–821.
Biehler Mateos, S. (2011). Ajuda ao próximo e ao distante. Desafios ao desenvolvimento 8(65).
Bolfoni da Cunha, J. (2008). A Experiência Operacional do 7o Contingente do Batalhão Brasileiro no HAITI:
Mudança de Fase. Coleção Meira Mattos - Revista das Ciências Militares 19: 84–89.
Bonis, G. (2013). É possível desmilitarizar a polícia brasileira ? Carta Capital. Retrieved October 12, 2013, from
http://www.cartacapital.com.br/sociedade/por-uma-policia-desmilitarizada-1509.html
BOPE. (2014). Missão Pacificação. Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais. Retrieved July 22, 2014, from
http://www.bopeoficial.com/o-batalhao/missao-pacificacao/
Brasil. Ministério da Defesa. (2013). Garantia da lei e da ordem. Brasília: Ministério da Defesa.
Brasil. Ministério da Defesa. (2014). Garantia da lei e da ordem. Brasília: Ministério da Defesa.
Brasil. Presidência da República. Lei Complementar N°97 (1999). Brasília: Casa Civil. Subchefia para Assuntos
Jurídicos.
Brasil. Presidência da República. Estratégia Nacional da Defesa (2008). Brasília: Casa Civil. Subchefia para
Assuntos Jurídicos.
Brasil. Presidência da República. Lei Complementar N° 136 (2010). Brasília: Casa Civil. Subchefia para Assuntos
Jurídicos.
Brasil. República Federativa. (2012). Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional. Brasília.
Broesder, W.A., Op den Buijs, T.P., Vogelaar, A.L.W. & Euwema, M.C. (2014). Can Soldiers Combine Swords and
Ploughshares? The Construction of the Warrior-Peacekeeper Role Identity Survey (WPRIS). Armed Forces
& Society (Online First).
Bures, O. (2007). Wanted: A Mid-Range Theory of International Peacekeeping. International Studies Review 9:
407–436.
Harig – The linkage of international and national security
22
Caforio, G. (2007). Officers’ Professional Preparation and Issues posed by New Military Missions. International
Review of Sociology 17(1): 87–104.
Cantanhêde, E. (2014). Após críticas, Defesa irá alterar manual para tropas. Folha de São Paulo. Retrieved
February 14, 2014, from http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2014/01/1402694-apos-criticas-defesaira-alterar- manual-para-tropas.shtml
Cavalcante, F. (2010). Rendering peacekeeping instrumental? The Brazilian approach to United Nations
peacekeeping during the Lula da Silva years (2003-2010). Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 53(2):
142–159.
Center for Legal and Social Studies. (2012). The current agenda of security and human rights in Argentina. SUR
International Journal on Human Rights 9(16): 172–188.
o
Centro Conjunto de Operações de Paz do Brasil. (2013). Revista Informativa • n 01 • Ano 2013. Rio de Janeiro.
Centro de Estudos Estratégicos do Exército. (2007). As Forças Armadas e a Segurança Pública. Coleção Meira
Mattos - Revista das Ciências Militares 15: 20–40.
Chagas Vianna Braga, C. (2010). MINUSTAH and the Security Environment in Haiti: Brazil and South American
Cooperation in the Field. International Peacekeeping 17(5): 711–722.
Clunan, A.L. & Trinkunas, H.A. (2010). Conceptualizing Ungoverned Spaces: Territorial Statehood, Contested
Authority, and Softened Sovereignty. In A. L. Clunan & H. A. Trinkunas (eds.), Ungoverned Spaces.
Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Cockayne, J. (2014). The Futility of Force? Strategic Lessons for Dealing with Unconventional Armed Groups
from the UN’s War on Haiti’s Gangs. Journal of Strategic Studies (July 2014): 1–34.
Coelho Cortês, G.L. (2008). As Forças Armadas e a Segurança Pública. Coleção Meira Mattos - Revista das
Ciências Militares 17: 25–32.
Costa, A.T.M. (2011). Police Brutality in Brazil: Authoritarian Legacy or Institutional Weakness? Latin American
Perspectives 38(5): 19–32.
Daladier Barros, M. (2011). O poder de polícia das Forças Armadas. Revista UNI 1(1): 95–110.
Dammert, L. (2013). Militarization of Public Security in Latin America: Where Are the Police? Latin American
Security: Canadian and International Perspectives. Calgary Papers in Military and Strategic Studies
(Occasional Paper 9): 115–132.
Dandeker, C. & Gow, J. (1999). Military culture and strategic peacekeeping. Small Wars & Insurgencies 10(2):
58–79.
De Figueiredo, M.V. (2013). Brazilian Bid for Recognition as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council
During Lula Administration: a Dialectical Appraisal. Paper presented at the 54th ISA Annual Convention,
San Francisco.
De Oliveira, E.R. & Soares, S.A. (2001). Brasil. Forças Armadas, direção política e formato institucional. In M. C.
D´Araujo & C. Castro (eds.), Democracia e Forças Armadas no Cone Sul. Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV.
De Oliveira Junior, A. & Góes, F.L. (2010). A Presença Brasileira nas Operações de Paz das Nações Unidas.
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada. Texto para discussão 1516. Brasília.
Deheza, E. & Ribet, U. (2012). The Remilitarisation of Latin American Streets. RUSI Analysis. Retrieved June 23,
2014, from https://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4F7477C049F92/#.UzKjnYWPRco
Diamint, R. (2006). Democracy and Defense. Hemisphere 16: 10–13.
Doyle, M.W. & Sambanis, N. (2006). Making War and Building Peace: The United Nations since the 1990’s.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Dunlap, C.C. (1999). The police-ization of the military. Journal of Political and Military Sociology 27(2): 217–232.
Ellis, A. (2014). What they can´t teach you at King´s. Speech delivered by British Ambassador to Brazil A. Ellis at
King’s College London, 12.05.2014.
Estado Maior do Exército Brasileiro. (2010). O processo de transformação do exército. Brasília.
Esteves, P. (2010). Peace Operations and the Government of Humanitarian Spaces. International Peacekeeping
17(5): 613–628.
Estre, F. (2012). O dilema de Janus: os jovens oficiais entre o passado e o futuro. In H. Klepak (ed.), Formación y
educación militar: Los futuros oficiales y la democracia. Buenos Aires: Red de Seguridad y Defensa de
América Latina.
Fernández Moreno, M., Chagas Vianna Braga, C. & Siman Gomes, M. (2012). Trapped Between Many Worlds: A
Post-colonial Perspective on the UN Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). International Peacekeeping 19(3): 377–
392.
Ferreira de Melo, R.N. (2010). O Poder de Polícia das Forças Armadas. Jusmilitaris. Retrieved May 01, 2014,
from http://www.jusmilitaris.com.br/novo/uploads/docs/glo-rafael.pdf
Harig – The linkage of international and national security
23
Flemes, D. (2008). Brasiliens neue Verteidigungspolitik: Vormachtsicherung durch Aufrüstung. German Institute
of Global and Area Studies. GIGA Focus Lateinamerika 12. Hamburg.
Fuccille, A. (2014). Qual é a direção política das Forças Armadas ? Carta Capital. Retrieved February 14, 2014,
from http://www.cartacapital.com.br/politica/qual-e-a-direcao-politica-das-forcas-armadas- 5086.html
Garcia, M. (2014). Q&A-Session during visit to 4a Brigada de Infantaria Motorizada, Juiz de Fora, 26.02.2014.
Gauthier, A. & Bonin, P. (2008). Haiti: Voices of the Actors. A Research Project on the UN Mission. Fundación
para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior. FRIDE Working Paper 52. Madrid.
Gay, R. (2009). From popular movements to drug gangs to militias: An anatomy of violence in Rio de Janeiro. In
K. Koonings & D. Kruijt (eds.), Megacities: The politics of urban exclusion and violence in the Global South.
London: Zed Books.
Gay, R. (2010). Toward Uncivil Society: Causes and Consequences of Violence in Rio de Janeiro. In E. D. Arias &
D. M. Goldstein (eds.), Violent Democracies in Latin America. Durham: Duke University Press.
Gazeta do Povo. (2011). Atuação da Força de Pacificação no Complexo do Alemão é prorrogada até julho.
Gazeta
do
Povo.
Retrieved
July
22,
2014,
from
http://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/vidaecidadania/conteudo.phtml?id=1184367
Goes, I. (2012). Zwischen Wahrheit und Amnesie. Die schwierige Aufarbeitung der Militärdiktatur in Brasilien .
Ibero-Analysen (25).
Gomes de Mello, M.A. (2012). A estratégia militar brasileira e o Exército: uma análise da política declaratória
de defesa. Fundação Getúlio Vargas Rio de Janeiro.
Gosman, E. (2012). Sube la tensión en Brasil : choques en Bahía entre militares y policías en huelga. Clarin.
Buenos Aires. Retrieved April 04, 2014, from http://www.clarin.com/mundo/Sube-Brasil-disturbiosBahia-militares_0_641336016.html
Greener, B. (2011). The Rise of Policing in Peace Operations. International Peacekeeping 18(2): 183–195.
Greener, B. & Fish, W. (2013). Police – military interaction in international peace and stability operations.
Working towards guidelines for action. Australian Government. Australian Civil-Military Centre Paper
01/2013. Canberra.
Guttieri, K. (2004). Civil-military relations in peacebuilding. Sicherheitspolitik und Friedensforschung 22(2): 79–
85.
Harig, C. (2012). The Armed Forces as Security Agency and the Civil-Military Relationship in Brazil. Revista
Estudos de Política 1(2): 30–49.
Harig, C. (2014). The paradox of Brazil’s militarised public security. Strife Blog. Retrieved July 11, 2014, from
http://strifeblog.org/2014/07/11/the-paradox-of-brazils-militarised-public-security/
Higate, P. & Henry, M. (2010). Space, Performance and Everyday Security in the Peacekeeping Context.
International Peacekeeping 17(1): 32–48.
Hunter, W. (1998). Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile: Present Trends, Future Prospects. In F.
Agüero & J. Stark (eds.), Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America. Miami: North-South
Center Press.
Husain, S. (2009). On the Long Road to Demilitarization and Professionalization of the Police in Brazil. In N.
Uildriks (ed.), Policing Insecurity: Police Reform, Security, and Human Rights in Latin America. Lanham:
Lexington.
Kawaguti, L. (2013). ONU quer levar ao Congo experiência brasileira no Haiti. BBC News. Retrieved June 07,
2014, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/2013/04/130424_general_rdc_lk.shtml
Kenkel, K.M. (2010a). South America’s Emerging Power: Brazil as Peacekeeper. International Peacekeeping
17(5): 644–661.
Kenkel, K.M. (2010b). Stepping out of the Shadow: South America and Peace Operations. International
Peacekeeping 17(5): 584–597.
Kenkel, K.M. (2012). Brazil and R2P: Does Taking Responsibility Mean Using Force? Global Responsibility to
Protect 4: 5–32.
Kenkel, K.M. (2013). Brazil. In A. J. Bellamy & P. D. Williams (eds.), Providing Peacekeepers. The Politics,
Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Klinguelfus Mendes, C.A. (2012). Considerações sobre a Força de Pacificação empregada no Rio de Janeiro.
Military Review (Julho-Agosto): 19–27.
Kraska, P.B. (2007). Militarization and Policing-Its Relevance to 21st Century Police. Policing 1(4): 501–513.
Kurashina Whitestone, Y. & Segal, D.R. (2007). New Missions or Old Missions for New Actors. International
Review of Sociology 17(1): 5–24.
Kyle, B.J. & Reiter, A.G. (2012). Dictating Justice: Human Rights and Military Courts in Latin America. Armed
Forces & Society 38(1): 27–48.
Harig – The linkage of international and national security
24
Leeds, E. (1996). Cocaine and parallel polities in the Brazilian urban periphery: Constraints on local-level
democratization. Latin American Research Review 31(3): 47–83.
Lima, M. & de Souza, A. (2014). Uso de Forças Armadas em ações policiais divide especialistas. O Globo.
Retrieved February 14, 2014, from http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/moreno/posts/2014/01/24/uso-deforcas-armadas-em-acoes- policiais-divide-especialistas-521904.asp
López, E. (2008). Control civil sobre militares. Argentina, Brasil y Chile en perspectiva comparada. In La
Administración de Defensa en América Latina. Estudios comparados (Tomo 3.). Madrid: Instituto
Universitario “General Gutiérrez Mellado” de Investigación sobre la Paz, la Seguridad y la Defensa.
Lutterbeck, D. (2013). The Paradox of Gendarmeries: Between Expansion, Demilitarization and Dissolution. The
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. SSR Paper 8. Geneva.
Macaulay, F. (2012). Deepening the Federative Pact? The Dilma Government’s Approach to Crime, Justice and
Policing. Critical Sociology 38(6): 823–834.
Maia Neto, J. (2011). O processo de transformação do Exército Brasileiro: um estudo sobre os reflexos da era
do conhecimento. Coleção Meira Mattos - Revista das Ciências Militares 24.
Marques, A.A. (2004). El Ministerio de Defensa en Brasil: limitaciones y perspectivas. Revista Fuerzas Armadas y
Sociedad 18(3-4): 27–51.
Martín, F.E. (2006). Militarist Peace in South America. Conditions for War and Peace. New York: Palgrave.
Martins Filho, J.R. (2007). The Brazilian Armed Forces in the Post-Cold War Era: What Has Changed in Military
Thinking ? University of Oxford Centre for Brazilian Studies. Working Paper CBS-85-07. Oxford.
Martins Filho, J.R. (2010). Tensões militares no governo Lula (2003-2009): a pré-história do acordo com a
França. Revista Brasileira de Ciencia Política 4: 283–306.
Mathias, S.K. & Guzzi, A.C. (2010). Autonomia na lei: as forças armadas nas constituições nacionais. Revista
Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 25(73): 41–57.
Melo, V. (2012). Stanford University Research Trip Report - New Public Security Policy in Favelas of Rio de
Janeiro.
Michael, K. & Ben-Ari, E. (2011). Contemporary Peace Support Operations: The Primacy of the Military and
Internal Contradictions. Armed Forces & Society 37(4): 657–679.
Mirkin, J. (2008). Cómo luchar contra la inseguridad ciudadana en América Latina. Safe Democracy. Retrieved
April 08, 2014, from http://spanish.safe-democracy.org/2008/09/23/como-luchar-contra-la-inseguridadciudadana-en- america-latina/
Moulin Aguiar, C. & Lopes Ribeiro, L.M. (2013). Old problems and old solutions: an analysis of Rio de Janeiro ’ s
public safety policy and its impact. HASOW - Humanitarian Action in Situations other than War.
Discussion Paper 7/2013. Rio de Janeiro.
Nogueira, A.D.M. & Hussey, M. (2013). A Brazilian as Commander in Chief of MONUSCO in the Congo: what are
the implications for Brazil? (No. October 2013). BRICS Policy Center. BRICS Monitor October 2013. Rio de
Janeiro.
O Estado de São Paulo. (2014). Teleférico do Alemão é fechado após ataques contra UPP. O Estado de São
Paulo. Retrieved July 22, 2014, from http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,teleferico-do-alema
Odello, M. (2010). Tackling Criminal Acts in Peacekeeping Operations: The Accountability of Peacekeepers.
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 15(2): 347–391.
Pachico, E. (2012). A Year After Historic Military Invasion, Rio Slum Preps for Police Units. InSightCrime.
Retrieved July 18, 2014, from http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/a-year-after-historic-militaryinvasion-rio-slum-preps-for-police-units
Paes-Machado, E. & De Albuquerque, C.L. (2002). Jungle I.D.: Educational Reform Inside the Brazilian
Paramilitary Police. Policing and Society 13(1): 59–78.
Pearce, J. (2010). Perverse state formation and securitized democracy in Latin America. Democratization 17(2):
286–306.
Pereira, A.W. (2001). Virtual Legality: Authoritarian Legacies and the Reform of Military Justice in Brazil, the
Southern Cone, and Mexico. Comparative Political Studies 34(5): 555–574.
Pereira, A.W. & Ungar, M. (2004). The Persistence of the “Mano Dura”: Authoritarian Legacies and Policing in
Brazil and the Southern Cone. In K. Hite & P. Cesarini (eds.), Authoritarian Legacies and Democracy in
Latin America and Southern Europe. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press.
Pereira da Rocha, A. (2013). Polícia, violência e cidadania: o desafio de se construir uma polícia cidadã. Revista
Brasileira de Segurança Pública 7(1): 84–100.
Pion-Berlin, D. & Arceneaux, C. (2000). Decision-Makers or Decision-Takers? Military Missions and Civilian
Control in Democratic South America. Armed Forces & Society 26(3): 413–436.
Harig – The linkage of international and national security
25
Przeworski, A. (1992). The Games of Transition. In S. Mainwaring & G. O´Donnell (eds.), Issues in democratic
consolidation: The new South American democracies in comparative perspective. Notre Dame: University
of Notre Dame Press.
Pugh, M. (2012). Reflections on Aggressive Peace. International Peacekeeping 19(4): 410–425.
Ramalho da Rocha, A.J. (2008). Prioridades claras, necessidades ocultas e o Plano Estratégico Nacional de
Defesa. Revista Liberdade e Cidadania 1(2): 1–16.
Ramalho da Rocha, A.J. (2009). Política Externa e Política de Defesa no Brasil: Civis e Militares, Prioridades e a
Participação em Missões de Paz. e-cadernos CES 6: 142–158.
Ratton Sanchez, M. (2009). O Brasil e a OCDE: uma aproximação “pelas bordas.” Centro de Estudos de
Integração e Desenvolvimento. Breves CINDES 13. Rio de Janeiro.
Reames, B.N. (2007). Neofeudal Aspects of Brazil’s Public Security. In M. R. Haberfeld & I. Cerrah (eds.),
Comparative Policing: The Struggle for Democratization. London: SAGE.
Ribeiro, P.J. & Oliveira, R. (2010). The Impact of Militia Actions on Public Security Policies in Rio de Janeiro.
Transnational Institute. Crime & Globalisation Debate Papers March 2010. Amsterdam.
Rotatori, C. (2014). Presentation during visit to 4a Brigada de Infantaria Motorizada, Juiz de Fora, 26.02.2014.
Ruffa, C. (2013). What Peacekeepers Think and Do: An Exploratory Study of French, Ghanaian, Italian, and
South Korean Armies in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. Armed Forces & Society 40(2): 199–
225.
Saint-Pierre, H.L. & Winand, É. (2008). Brasil. In I. Sepúlveda & S. Alda Mejías (eds.), Administración de la
Defensa en América Latina. Análisis nacionales (Tomo 2.). Madrid: Instituto Universitario “General
Gutiérrez Mellado” de Investigación sobre la Paz, la Seguridad y la Defensa.
Sánchez Nieto, W.A. (2012). Brazil’s Grand Design for Combining Global South Solidarity and National Interests:
A Discussion of Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti and Timor. Globalizations 9(1): 161–178.
Soares, S.A. & Kuhlmann, P.R.L. (2005). Las relaciones civiles-militares en Brasil. In J. A. Olmeda (ed.),
Democracias frágiles. Las relaciones civiles-militares en el mundo iberoamericano. Valencia: Tirant lo
Blanch.
Sotomayor Velázquez, A.C. (2010). Peacekeeping Effects in South America: Common Experiences and Divergent
Effects on Civil–Military Relations. International Peacekeeping 17(5): 629–643.
Sotomayor Velázquez, A.C. (2014). The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper. Civil-Military Relations and the
United Nations. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Spanakos, A. (2006). In/Securing Citizens in Democratic Brazil. In S. R. Pattnayak & L. S. Gustafson (eds.),
National and Human Security Issues in Latin America. Democracies at Risk. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.
Spektor, M. (2012). Humanitarian Interventionism Brazilian Style? Americas Quarterly (Summer 2012): 54–59.
Stepan, A. (1988). Rethinking Military Political Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Stephens, D. (2010). Military involvement in law enforcement. International Review of the Red Cross 92(878):
453–468.
Stochero, T. (2012). Para Exército , ocupar Alemão é mais difícil que guerra e missão no Haiti. G1 Globo.
Retrieved November 10, 2013, from http://g1.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2012/08/para-exercito-ocuparalemao-e-mais-dificil-que- guerra-e-missao-no-haiti.html
Tardy, T. (2011). A Critique of Robust Peacekeeping in Contemporary Peace Operations. International
Peacekeeping 18(2): 152–167.
Tosta, W. (2014). Defesa prevê Forças Armadas no papel de polícia. O Estado de São Paulo. Retrieved February
14, 2014, from http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/impresso,defesa-preve-forcas-armadas-no-papelde- policia,1121347,0.htm
United Nations. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000). New York.
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (2014a). Monthly Summary of Contributions June
2014. New York.
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (2014b). UN Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet: 28
February 2014. New York.
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (2014c). UN Missions Summary of Military and Police:
30 April 2014. New York.
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (2014d). UN Mission’s Contributions by Country June
2014. New York.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2012). Intentional homicide, number and rate per 100,000
population. Vienna.
Harig – The linkage of international and national security
26
Uziel, E. (2010). O Conselho de Segurança, as operações de manutenção da paz ea inserção do Brasil no
mecanismo de segurança coletiva das Nações Unidas. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão.
Waiselfisz, J.J. (2014). Prévia do “Mapa da Violência 2014. Os Jovens do Brasil.” Rio de Janeiro.
Werneck, A. (2014). Militares também vão atuar nos centros de treinamento da Copa. O Globo. Retrieved May
29, 2014, from http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/militares-tambem-vao-atuar-nos-centros-de-treinamentoda- copa-12641634
Williams, P. (2010). Here be Dragons. In A. L. Clunan & H. A. Trinkunas (eds.), Ungoverned Spaces. Alternatives
to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Zaverucha, J. (1997). The 1988 Brazilian Constitution and its Authoritarian Legacy: Formalizing Democracy while
Gutting its Essence. Paper presented at the Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association,
Guadalajara.
Zaverucha, J. (2005). FHC, forças armadas e polícia. Entre o autoritarismo e a democracia (1999-2002). Rio de
Janeiro: Editora Record.
Zaverucha, J. (2008a). The «Guaranteeing Law and Order Doctrine» and the Increased Role of the Brazilian
Army in Activities of Public Security. Nueva Sociedad (213).
Zaverucha, J. (2008b). La militarización de la seguridad pública en Brasil. Nueva sociedad (213): 128–146.
Zaverucha, J. & Rezende, F. da C. (2009). How the Military Competes for Expenditure in Brazilian Democracy:
Arguments for an Outlier. International Political Science Review 30(4): 1–23.
Zdun, S. (2011). Difficulties Measuring and Controlling Homicide in Rio de Janeiro. International Journal of
Conflict and Violence 5(1): 188–199.
Zibechi, R. (2007). Krieg gegen die Armen. ila (304): 41–42.
Zilla, C. & Harig, C. (2012). Brasilien als »Emerging Donor«: Politische Distanz und operative Nähe zu den
traditionellen Gebern. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. SWP Studie 7/2012. Berlin.
Harig – The linkage of international and national security
27