Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Split-Ticket Voting:
An Implicit Incentive Approach
Galina Zudenkova
Department of Economics
University Carlos III of Madrid
10th International Meeting
Society for Social Choice and Welfare
Moscow, July 2010
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Motivation Literature TS in Spain
Motivation
Split-ticket voting – citizens vote for candidates from different
parties in simultaneous elections.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Motivation Literature TS in Spain
Motivation
Split-ticket voting – citizens vote for candidates from different
parties in simultaneous elections.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Motivation Literature TS in Spain
Motivation
Why do voters split tickets? What are the economic
consequences of ticket splitting?
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Motivation Literature TS in Spain
Motivation
Why do voters split tickets? What are the economic
consequences of ticket splitting?
This paper offers a novel rationale for ticket splitting:
Ticket Splitting – outcome of optimal reward scheme voters use
to motivate politicians’ performance.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Motivation Literature TS in Spain
Motivation
Why do voters split tickets? What are the economic
consequences of ticket splitting?
This paper offers a novel rationale for ticket splitting:
Ticket Splitting – outcome of optimal reward scheme voters use
to motivate politicians’ performance.
This paper studies ticket splitting in dynamic context.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Motivation Literature TS in Spain
Literature on Split-Ticket Voting
Policy balancing argument – voters split tickets to avoid
extreme policies (Alesina and Rosenthal, Econometrica 1996).
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Motivation Literature TS in Spain
Literature on Split-Ticket Voting
Policy balancing argument – voters split tickets to avoid
extreme policies (Alesina and Rosenthal, Econometrica 1996).
Budgetary externality of concentrated government spending
under uniform taxes – voters prefer fiscally conservative
President but fiscally liberal Congress (Chari, Jones and
Marimon, Amer Econ Rev 1997).
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Motivation Literature TS in Spain
Literature on Split-Ticket Voting
Policy balancing argument – voters split tickets to avoid
extreme policies (Alesina and Rosenthal, Econometrica 1996).
Budgetary externality of concentrated government spending
under uniform taxes – voters prefer fiscally conservative
President but fiscally liberal Congress (Chari, Jones and
Marimon, Amer Econ Rev 1997).
Effective oversight of Executive – voters reinforce opposition
in Legislature to monitor Executive (Bugarin, Soc Choice
Welfare 2003; Fox and Van Weelden, WP 2009).
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Motivation Literature TS in Spain
Literature on Split-Ticket Voting
Policy balancing argument – voters split tickets to avoid
extreme policies (Alesina and Rosenthal, Econometrica 1996).
Budgetary externality of concentrated government spending
under uniform taxes – voters prefer fiscally conservative
President but fiscally liberal Congress (Chari, Jones and
Marimon, Amer Econ Rev 1997).
Effective oversight of Executive – voters reinforce opposition
in Legislature to monitor Executive (Bugarin, Soc Choice
Welfare 2003; Fox and Van Weelden, WP 2009).
This paper complements the literature on split-ticket voting.
This paper analyzes ticket splitting at lower levels of
government.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Motivation Literature TS in Spain
Ticket Splitting in Spain
Simultaneous municipal and regional elections
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Motivation Literature TS in Spain
Ticket Splitting in Spain
Simultaneous municipal and regional elections
Patterns of ticket splitting:
Reelections of politicians from the same party are positively
correlated.
Reelections of politicians from different parties are negatively
correlated.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Motivation Literature TS in Spain
Ticket Splitting in Spain
Simultaneous municipal and regional elections
Patterns of ticket splitting:
Reelections of politicians from the same party are positively
correlated.
Reelections of politicians from different parties are negatively
correlated.
Voters tend to split tickets if in the previous period they also split
tickets.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Motivation Literature TS in Spain
Ticket Splitting in Spain
Simultaneous municipal and regional elections
Patterns of ticket splitting:
Reelections of politicians from the same party are positively
correlated.
Reelections of politicians from different parties are negatively
correlated.
Voters tend to split tickets if in the previous period they also split
tickets.
Ticket Splitting is more likely in small municipalities than in
large ones.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Motivation Literature TS in Spain
Ticket Splitting in Spain
Simultaneous municipal and regional elections
Patterns of ticket splitting:
Reelections of politicians from the same party are positively
correlated.
Reelections of politicians from different parties are negatively
correlated.
Voters tend to split tickets if in the previous period they also split
tickets.
Ticket Splitting is more likely in small municipalities than in
large ones.
My results are consistent with these patterns of ticket splitting.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Outline Politicians Voters Timing
Model
Outline of the Game
Sequential political agency game between politicians (mayor and
governor) and voters.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Outline Politicians Voters Timing
Model
Outline of the Game
Sequential political agency game between politicians (mayor and
governor) and voters.
Large city in region.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Outline Politicians Voters Timing
Model
Outline of the Game
Sequential political agency game between politicians (mayor and
governor) and voters.
Large city in region.
Mayor M (for city) and Governor G (for region) are elected in
simultaneous elections.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Outline Politicians Voters Timing
Model
Outline of the Game
Sequential political agency game between politicians (mayor and
governor) and voters.
Large city in region.
Mayor M (for city) and Governor G (for region) are elected in
simultaneous elections.
2 political parties.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Outline Politicians Voters Timing
Model
Outline of the Game
Sequential political agency game between politicians (mayor and
governor) and voters.
Large city in region.
Mayor M (for city) and Governor G (for region) are elected in
simultaneous elections.
2 political parties.
2 candidates from opposite parties at each elections: incumbent
and opponent.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Outline Politicians Voters Timing
Model
Politicians
In office, politician i ∈ {M, G} implements a policy determined
by her unobservable effort ai .
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Outline Politicians Voters Timing
Model
Politicians
In office, politician i ∈ {M, G} implements a policy determined
by her unobservable effort ai .
pi (performance of politician i) isobserved with independent and
unobservable noise εi ∼ N 0, σ 2
pi = ai + ε i
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Outline Politicians Voters Timing
Model
Politicians
In office, politician i ∈ {M, G} implements a policy determined
by her unobservable effort ai .
pi (performance of politician i) isobserved with independent and
unobservable noise εi ∼ N 0, σ 2
pi = ai + ε i
Politician i ∈ {M, G} chooses ai to maximize
Πi (ai ) −
Galina Zudenkova
a2i
2
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Outline Politicians Voters Timing
Model
Politicians
Office-motivated politician (M /G) prefers her counterpart (G/M )
to be affiliated with the same political party
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Outline Politicians Voters Timing
Model
Politicians
Office-motivated politician (M /G) prefers her counterpart (G/M )
to be affiliated with the same political party ⇒
politicians’ incentives are correlated
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Outline Politicians Voters Timing
Model
Politicians
Office-motivated politician (M /G) prefers her counterpart (G/M )
to be affiliated with the same political party ⇒
politicians’ incentives are correlated
(
Πi (ai , aj ) =
Pri (ai , aj ) + λSi Prj (ai , aj )
Pri (ai , aj ) +
λD
i (1
if S
− Prj (ai , aj )) if D
where
Pri (·) – Pr of being reelected for office i,
State S – M and G are affiliated with the same party,
State D – M and G are affiliated with different parties,
λ·i ∈ [0, 1] – strength of party alignment of politician i,
λSi > λD
i – politicians prefer incumbents,
λSi < λD
i – politicians prefer newcomers.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Outline Politicians Voters Timing
Model
Voters
Voters care about politicians’ performances
pM + pG
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Outline Politicians Voters Timing
Model
Voters
Voters care about politicians’ performances
pM + pG
Voters coordinate on retrospective reappointment rules to reelect
mayor M and governor G.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Outline Politicians Voters Timing
Model
Voters
Voters care about politicians’ performances
pM + pG
Voters coordinate on retrospective reappointment rules to reelect
mayor M and governor G.
Joint Performance Evaluation: voters condition reelection of
politician i on her own performance pi and on j’s performance pj .
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Outline Politicians Voters Timing
Model
Voters
Voters care about politicians’ performances
pM + pG
Voters coordinate on retrospective reappointment rules to reelect
mayor M and governor G.
Joint Performance Evaluation: voters condition reelection of
politician i on her own performance pi and on j’s performance pj .
Functional space of performance evaluation rules –
linear performance evaluation rules (βi , bi ) determined by
slope βi and intercept bi .
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Outline Politicians Voters Timing
Model
Voters
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Outline Politicians Voters Timing
Model
Timing of the Game
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Outline Politicians Voters Timing
Model
Timing of the Game
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Outline Politicians Voters Timing
Model
Timing of the Game
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Outline Politicians Voters Timing
Model
Timing of the Game
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Outline Politicians Voters Timing
Model
Timing of the Game
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Outline Politicians Voters Timing
Model
Equilibrium Concept
Equilibrium concept – Subgame perfect equilibrium.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Outline Politicians Voters Timing
Model
Equilibrium Concept
Equilibrium concept – Subgame perfect equilibrium.
I solve game backwards.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Equilibrium
Politicians’ Problem and Best Response Functions
Politicians are members of the same party, S
M’s problem
G’s problem
a2M
2
a2
maxaG PrG (aM , aG ) +λSG PrM (aM , aG ) − 2G
maxaM PrM (aM , aG ) +λSM PrG (aM , aG ) −
FOC
M’s and G’s reelections are independent: βM = 0, βG = 0.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Equilibrium
Politicians’ Problem and Best Response Functions
Politicians are members of the same party, S
M’s problem
G’s problem
a2M
2
a2
maxaG PrG (aM , aG ) +λSG PrM (aM , aG ) − 2G
maxaM PrM (aM , aG ) +λSM PrG (aM , aG ) −
FOC
M’s and G’s reelections are negatively correlated: βM < 0, βG < 0.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Equilibrium
Politicians’ Problem and Best Response Functions
Politicians are members of the same party, S
M’s problem
G’s problem
a2M
2
a2
maxaG PrG (aM , aG ) +λSG PrM (aM , aG ) − 2G
maxaM PrM (aM , aG ) +λSM PrG (aM , aG ) −
FOC
M’s and G’s reelections are positively correlated: βM > 0, βG > 0.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Equilibrium
Politicians’ Problem and Best Response Functions
Politicians are members of different parties, D
a2M
2
a2
PrM (aM , aG )) − 2G
M’s problem maxaM PrM (aM , aG ) +λD
M (1 − PrG (aM , aG )) −
G’s problem
maxaG PrG (aM , aG ) +λD
G (1 −
M’s and G’s reelections are independent: βM = 0, βG = 0.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
FOC
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Equilibrium
Politicians’ Problem and Best Response Functions
Politicians are members of different parties, D
a2M
2
a2
PrM (aM , aG )) − 2G
M’s problem maxaM PrM (aM , aG ) +λD
M (1 − PrG (aM , aG )) −
G’s problem
maxaG PrG (aM , aG ) +λD
G (1 −
M’s and G’s reelections are positively correlated: βM > 0, βG > 0.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
FOC
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Equilibrium
Politicians’ Problem and Best Response Functions
Politicians are members of different parties, D
a2M
2
a2
PrM (aM , aG )) − 2G
M’s problem maxaM PrM (aM , aG ) +λD
M (1 − PrG (aM , aG )) −
G’s problem
maxaG PrG (aM , aG ) +λD
G (1 −
M’s and G’s reelections are negatively correlated: βM < 0, βG < 0.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
FOC
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Equilibrium
Theorem
There exists an equilibrium (βi∗ , b∗i ) given by
  λ S , a∗ + λ S a∗
if S
j j
j i
(βi∗ , b∗i ) =
 −λD , a∗ − λD a∗
if D
j
i
j j
where a∗i is politician i’s equilibrium effort

!
2

λSi )
(

1
1

if S

 √2πσ q1+(λS )2 + q1+ λS 2
( i) !
j
∗
ai =
2

(λDi )

1

√1
q
q
if D
+

2
2
 2πσ
1+(λD
1+(λD
j )
i )
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Dynamics
Transition Probabilities between states S and D
State S – voters do not split tickets
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Dynamics
Transition Probabilities between states S and D
State S – voters do not split tickets
Galina Zudenkova
State D – voters split tickets
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Dynamics
Transition Probabilities between states S and D
State S – voters do not split tickets
State D – voters split tickets
positively correlated reelections
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Dynamics
Transition Probabilities between states S and D
State S – voters do not split tickets
State D – voters split tickets
positively correlated reelections
negatively correlated reelections
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Dynamics
Transition Probabilities between states S and D
State S – voters do not split tickets
State D – voters split tickets
positively correlated reelections
negatively correlated reelections
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Dynamics
Transition Probabilities between states S and D
State S – voters do not split tickets
State D – voters split tickets
positively correlated reelections
negatively correlated reelections
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Dynamics
Transition Probabilities between states S and D
State S – voters do not split tickets
State D – voters split tickets
positively correlated reelections
negatively correlated reelections
Independently of the current state, the next state is more likely to be state S.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Dynamics
Transition Probabilities between states S and D
Notation: Pkl – Pr that city in state k will next be in state l.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Dynamics
Transition Probabilities between states S and D
Notation: Pkl – Pr that city in state k will next be in state l.
Lemma
The matrix of the equilibrium transition probabilities P
"
#
PSS PSD
P ≡
=
PDS PDD


λSM +λSG
λSM +λSG
1
1
1
1
+
arctan
−
arctan
S
S
S
S
2
π
1−λM λG
1−λM λG 
2 π




D
D
D
D
λM +λG
λM +λG
1
1
1
1
+
arctan
−
arctan
2
π
2
π
1−λD λD
1−λD λD
M G
Galina Zudenkova
M G
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Dynamics
Transition Probabilities between states S and D
Notation: Pkl – Pr that city in state k will next be in state l.
Lemma
The matrix of the equilibrium transition probabilities P
"
#
PSS PSD
P ≡
=
PDS PDD


λSM +λSG
λSM +λSG
1
1
1
1
+
arctan
−
arctan
>
S
S
S
S
2
π
1−λM λG
1−λM λG 
2 π




D
D
D
D
λM +λG
λM +λG
1
1
1
1
+
arctan
>
−
arctan
2
π
2
π
1−λD λD
1−λD λD
M G
Galina Zudenkova
M G
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Dynamics
Transition Probabilities between states S and D
How does the current state affect probability that the next state
is state k, k ∈ {S, D}?
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Dynamics
Transition Probabilities between states S and D
How does the current state affect probability that the next state
is state k, k ∈ {S, D}?
If politicians prefer incumbents (λSi > λD
i , i ∈ {M, G}) then
PSS > PDS
Galina Zudenkova
and
PDD > PSD
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Dynamics
Transition Probabilities between states S and D
How does the current state affect probability that the next state
is state k, k ∈ {S, D}?
If politicians prefer incumbents (λSi > λD
i , i ∈ {M, G}) then
PSS > PDS
and
PDD > PSD
⇒ Voters are more likely to split tickets if in the previous period
they split tickets.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Dynamics
Transition Probabilities between states S and D
How does the current state affect probability that the next state
is state k, k ∈ {S, D}?
If politicians prefer incumbents (λSi > λD
i , i ∈ {M, G}) then
PSS > PDS
and
PDD > PSD
⇒ Voters are more likely to split tickets if in the previous period
they split tickets.
If politicians prefer newcomers (λSi < λD
i , i ∈ {M, G}) then
PSS < PDS
Galina Zudenkova
and
PDD < PSD
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Dynamics
Transition Probabilities between states S and D
How does the current state affect probability that the next state
is state k, k ∈ {S, D}?
If politicians prefer incumbents (λSi > λD
i , i ∈ {M, G}) then
PSS > PDS
and
PDD > PSD
⇒ Voters are more likely to split tickets if in the previous period
they split tickets.
If politicians prefer newcomers (λSi < λD
i , i ∈ {M, G}) then
PSS < PDS
and
PDD < PSD
⇒ Voters are more likely to split tickets if in the previous period
they did not split tickets.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Ticket Splitting in Small Municipalities
Region consists of n municipalities.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Ticket Splitting in Small Municipalities
Region consists of n municipalities.
Each municipality is pivotal in regional elections with
probability proportional to its population share.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Ticket Splitting in Small Municipalities
Region consists of n municipalities.
Each municipality is pivotal in regional elections with
probability proportional to its population share.
Governor G cares less about party affiliation of small-town
mayors.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Ticket Splitting in Small Municipalities
Region consists of n municipalities.
Each municipality is pivotal in regional elections with
probability proportional to its population share.
Governor G cares less about party affiliation of small-town
mayors.
Novel result: Split-ticket voting is more likely in small
municipalities than in large ones.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Ticket Splitting in Small Municipalities
Region consists of n municipalities.
Each municipality is pivotal in regional elections with
probability proportional to its population share.
Governor G cares less about party affiliation of small-town
mayors.
Novel result: Split-ticket voting is more likely in small
municipalities than in large ones.
Intuition: governor cares less about party affiliation of mayors in small
municipalities ⇒
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Ticket Splitting in Small Municipalities
Region consists of n municipalities.
Each municipality is pivotal in regional elections with
probability proportional to its population share.
Governor G cares less about party affiliation of small-town
mayors.
Novel result: Split-ticket voting is more likely in small
municipalities than in large ones.
Intuition: governor cares less about party affiliation of mayors in small
municipalities ⇒
politicians’ incentives are less correlated ⇒
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Ticket Splitting in Small Municipalities
Region consists of n municipalities.
Each municipality is pivotal in regional elections with
probability proportional to its population share.
Governor G cares less about party affiliation of small-town
mayors.
Novel result: Split-ticket voting is more likely in small
municipalities than in large ones.
Intuition: governor cares less about party affiliation of mayors in small
municipalities ⇒
politicians’ incentives are less correlated ⇒
voters adopt less correlated joint performance evaluation rules ⇒
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
BR Functions Dynamics TS in Small Municipalities
Ticket Splitting in Small Municipalities
Region consists of n municipalities.
Each municipality is pivotal in regional elections with
probability proportional to its population share.
Governor G cares less about party affiliation of small-town
mayors.
Novel result: Split-ticket voting is more likely in small
municipalities than in large ones.
Intuition: governor cares less about party affiliation of mayors in small
municipalities ⇒
politicians’ incentives are less correlated ⇒
voters adopt less correlated joint performance evaluation rules ⇒
this increases the probability of ticket splitting.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Summary and Results
Political Agency model of Split-Ticket Voting:
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Summary and Results
Political Agency model of Split-Ticket Voting:
Politicians’ incentives are correlated ⇒ voters use joint
performance evaluation to reward politicians.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Summary and Results
Political Agency model of Split-Ticket Voting:
Politicians’ incentives are correlated ⇒ voters use joint
performance evaluation to reward politicians.
Reelections of politicians from the same party are positively
correlated.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Summary and Results
Political Agency model of Split-Ticket Voting:
Politicians’ incentives are correlated ⇒ voters use joint
performance evaluation to reward politicians.
Reelections of politicians from the same party are positively
correlated.
Reelections of politicians from different parties are negatively
correlated.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Summary and Results
Dynamics of Ticket Splitting:
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Summary and Results
Dynamics of Ticket Splitting:
Ticket Splitting is less likely than voting for candidates from
same party.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Summary and Results
Dynamics of Ticket Splitting:
Ticket Splitting is less likely than voting for candidates from
same party.
If politicians prefer incumbents, voters tend to split tickets if in
the previous period they also split tickets.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Summary and Results
Dynamics of Ticket Splitting:
Ticket Splitting is less likely than voting for candidates from
same party.
If politicians prefer incumbents, voters tend to split tickets if in
the previous period they also split tickets.
If politicians prefer newcomers, voters tend to split tickets if in
the previous period they didn’t split tickets.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach
Introduction Model Equilibrium Results
Summary and Results
Dynamics of Ticket Splitting:
Ticket Splitting is less likely than voting for candidates from
same party.
If politicians prefer incumbents, voters tend to split tickets if in
the previous period they also split tickets.
If politicians prefer newcomers, voters tend to split tickets if in
the previous period they didn’t split tickets.
Ticket Splitting is more likely in small municipalities than in
large ones.
Galina Zudenkova
Split-Ticket Voting: An Implicit Incentive Approach