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Revisit the ‘One­China Policy’ ­ WSJ
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COMMENTARY
Revisit the ‘One-China Policy’
A closer U.S. military relationship with Taiwan would help counter Beijing’s belligerence.
Chinese J­15 jet fighters on an aircraft carrier in the South China Sea, Jan. 2. PHOTO: REUTERS
By JOHN BOLTON
Jan. 16, 2017 7:07 p.m. ET
The People’s Republic of China sent its aircraft carrier, Liaoning, through the Strait of
Taiwan early this month, at least in part responding to Taiwanese President Tsai Ingwen’s phone conversation congratulating President-elect Donald Trump.
That’s Beijing’s style: Make an unacceptable long-distance phone call, and an aircraft
carrier shows up in your backyard. It is akin to proclaiming the South China Sea a
Chinese province and constructing islands in international waters to house military
bases; to declaring a provocative Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea;
and to seizing Singaporean military equipment recently transiting Hong Kong for
annual military exercises on Taiwan.
It is high time to revisit the “one-China policy” and decide what America thinks it
means, 45 years after the Shanghai Communiqué. Mr. Trump has said the policy is
negotiable. Negotiation should not mean Washington gives and Beijing takes. We need
strategically coherent priorities reflecting not 1972 but 2017, encompassing more than
trade and monetary policy, and specifically including Taiwan. Let’s see how an
increasingly belligerent China responds.
Constantly chanting “one-China policy” is a favorite Beijing negotiating tactic: Pick a
benign-sounding slogan; persuade foreign interlocutors to accept it; and then redefine it
to Beijing’s satisfaction, dragging the unwary foreigners along for the ride. To Beijing,
“one China” means the PRC is the sole legitimate “China,” as sloganized in “the three
no’s”: no Taiwanese independence; no two Chinas; no one China, one Taiwan. For too
long, America has unthinkingly succumbed to this wordplay.
Even in the Shanghai Communiqué, however, Washington merely “acknowledges” that
“all Chinese” believe “there is but one China,” of which Taiwan is part. Taiwanese public
opinion surveys for decades have shown fewer and fewer citizens describing themselves
as “Chinese.” Who allowed them to change their minds? Washington has always said
reunification had to come peacefully and by mutual agreement. Mutual agreement
hasn’t come in 67 years, and won’t in any foreseeable future, especially given China’s
increasingly brutal reinterpretation of another slogan—“one country, two systems” in
Hong Kong.
Beijing and its acolytes expected that Taiwan would simply collapse. It hasn’t. Chiang
Kai-shek’s 1949 retreat was not a temporary respite before final surrender. Neither the
Shanghai Communiqué nor Jimmy Carter’s 1978 derecognition of the Republic of China
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1/17/2017
Revisit the ‘One­China Policy’ ­ WSJ
persuaded Taiwan to go gentle into that good night—especially after Congress enacted
the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.
Eventually Taiwan even became a democracy, with the 1996 popular election of Lee
Teng-hui, the peaceful, democratic transfer of power to the opposition party in 2000,
and further peaceful transfers in 2008 and 2016. So inconsiderate of those free-thinking
Taiwanese.
What should the United States do now? In addition to a diplomatic ladder of escalation,
we can take concrete steps helpful to U.S. interests. Here is one prompted by China’s
recent impoundment of Singapore’s military equipment. Spoiler alert: Beijing will not
approve.
America could enhance its East Asia military posture by increasing U.S. military sales to
Taiwan and by again stationing military personnel and assets there, probably
negotiating favorable financial terms. We need not approximate Douglas MacArthur’s
image of Taiwan as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier,” or renegotiate a mutual defense
treaty. Basing rights and related activity do not imply a full defense alliance. Our
activities would not be dissimilar to Singapore’s, although they could be more extensive.
The Taiwan Relations Act is expansive enough to encompass such a relationship, so new
legislative authority is unnecessary.
Some may object that a U.S. military presence would violate the Shanghai Communiqué,
but the language of the Taiwan Relations Act should take precedence. Circumstances in
the region are fundamentally different from 1972, as Beijing would be the first to
proclaim. Nearby Asian governments would cite the enormous increase in Chinese
military power and belligerence. Most important, effectively permanent changes in the
Taiwan-China relationship have occurred, making much of the communiqué obsolete.
The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus—things thus standing—justifies taking a different
perspective than in 1972.
Taiwan’s geographic location is closer to East Asia’s mainland and the South China Sea
than either Okinawa or Guam, giving U.S. forces greater flexibility for rapid deployment
throughout the region should the need arise. Washington might also help ease tensions
with Tokyo by redeploying at least some U.S. forces from Okinawa, a festering problem
in the U.S.-Japan relationship. And the current leadership of the Philippines offers little
chance of increasing military and other cooperation there in the foreseeable future.
Guaranteeing freedom of the seas, deterring military adventurism, and preventing
unilateral territorial annexations are core American interests in East and Southeast
Asia. Today, as opposed to 1972, a closer military relationship with Taiwan would be a
significant step toward achieving these objectives. If China disagrees, by all means let’s
talk.
Mr. Bolton is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and author of
“Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad”
(Simon & Schuster, 2007).
Copyright ©2017 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved
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