Trading Places?: Regionalism in Russia and Ukraine
J. Paul Goode
University of Oklahoma
Email: [email protected]
Paper prepared for the IPSA XXII World Congress of Political Science, Madrid, July
8-12, 2012.
Draft Copy. Please do not cite without author’s consent.
Introduction
In 1991, the politics of withdraw from the USSR took on similar spatial dynamics in Russia and
Ukraine. In both cases, regions emerged in 1989-1991 as key actors that spurred the exit of
these former Soviet republics. Yet despite similar origins, regionalism took on different
trajectories. While Russia decentralized power to an unprecedented extent following
independence, Russia’s regions later receded as political actors with the Kremlin’s campaign to
recentralize power during Vladimir Putin’s presidency. By contrast, Ukraine’s drive for
independence emerged from a regional base but Kyiv moved faster to centralize power,
consolidating the center’s dominant role with the 1996 constitution. Indeed, a number of
Leonid Kuchma’s methods for (re-)establishing control over the regions later would be
emulated by Putin in constructing his “ruling vertical.”
In attempting to account for these divergent outcomes, one confronts a deep division in
existing approaches to understanding regionalist trajectories. The various literatures on
regionalism, separatism, and ethnofederalism are divided roughly into two camps over the
factors that account for regionalist trajectories: those that focus on institutions and particularly
on ethnofederalism 1, and those that emphasize the roles of elites at the central and
1
Ugo M. Amoretti and Nancy Gina Bermeo, eds., Federalism and Territorial Cleavages (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2004), Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design and Destruction of Socialism and the
State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Henry E. Hale, "Divided We Stand: Institutional Sources of
Ethnofederal State Survival and Collapse," World Politics 56, no. 2 (2004), Ian S. Lustick, Dan Miodownik, and Roy J.
Eidelson, "Secessionism in Multicultural States: Does Sharing Power Prevent or Encourage It?," American Political
Science Review 98, no. 2 (2004), Graham Smith, ed., Federalism: The Multiethnic Challenge (New York: Longman,
1995).
1
subnational levels. 2 This division figures prominently in the literature assessing regionalist
trajectories in Eurasia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. 3 Throughout the 1990s and into
the next decade, the discussion of regionalism or subnationalist sovereignty movements was
dominated by institutionalist approaches. These approaches elaborated the various means by
which ethnofederal institutions adopted during the Soviet era served as incubators for the
development of anti-Soviet nationalism while providing the rudimentary attributes of
statehood which would serve as vehicles for secessionist mobilization. 4 In the post-Soviet era,
the preservation of ethnofederal institutions and legacies came to be identified with frozen
conflicts, conflictual center-regional relations, and persistent threats to democracy and
statehood.5 A second significant literature shifted attention from institutions to bargaining,
2
Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, "Divide and Conquer or Divide and Concede: How Do States Respond to
Internally Divided Separatists?," American Political Science Review 105, no. 02 (2011), Henry E. Hale, "The DoubleEdged Sword of Ethnofederalism: Ukraine and the USSR in Comparative Perspective," Comparative Politics 40, no.
3 (2008), Hudson Meadwell, "A Rational Choice Approach to Political Regionalism," Comparative Politics 23, no. 4
(1991), Joseph R. Rudolph, Jr. and Robert J. Thompson, "Ethnoterritorial Movements and the Policy Process:
Accommodating Nationalist Demands in the Developed World," Comparative Politics 17, no. 3 (1985).
3
A third branch of the literature on regionalism focuses on identity construction, somewhat overlapping with the
institutionalist and elite-centric approaches. Vladimir Gel'man and Ted Hopf, eds., Tsentr i Regional'nye
Identichnosti v Rossii (Sankt-Peterburg: Izd-vo Evropeiskogo universiteta v Sankt-Peterburge; Letnii sad, 2003), Elise
Giuliano, Constructing Grievance: Ethnic Nationalism in Russia's Republics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011),
Yoshiko M. Herrera, Imagined Economies: The Sources of Russian Regionalism (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2005).
4
Carol Skalnik Leff, "Democratization and Disintegration in Multinational States: The Breakup of the Communist
Federations," World Politics 51, no. 2 (1999), Philip G. Roeder, "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization," World
Politics 43, no. 2 (1991), Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted
Ethnic Particularism," Slavic Review 53, no. 2 (1994).
5
Svante E. Cornell, "Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective," World
Politics 54, no. 2 (2002), Gail W. Lapidus, "Asymmetrical Federalism and State Breakdown in Russia," Post-Soviet
Affairs 15, no. 1 (1999), Dov Lynch, "Separatist States and Post–Soviet Conflicts," International Affairs 78, no. 4
(2002), Alfred Stepan, "Russian Federalism in Comparative Perspective," Post-Soviet Affairs 16, no. 2 (2000), Daniel
S. Treisman, "Russia's "Ethnic Revival": The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Postcommunist Order,"
World Politics 49, no. 2 (1997).
2
competition, and leadership tactics among central and regional elites, including the tactics of
co-opting, dividing, or otherwise accommodating regionalists. 6
With regard to Russia and Ukraine, however, both institutionalist and elite-oriented
approaches would predict a relatively similar trajectory for regionalism in both countries: given
the centralization of power and the homogenization of regional and national political
institutions, one would expect to see regionalism diminish as regional actors are co-opted by
the center, regionalist organizations are induced to join national politics, and regional goods are
claimed as public goods. Moreover, one might predict the effect to be greater in Ukraine than
in Russia, where centralized power sits uneasily alongside ethnofederal institutions. In fact, one
finds just the opposite: in Russia, regionalism yielded to state centralization under Putin, while
it continued to compete for citizens’ allegiances in offering different visions of national identity
in Ukraine despite the earlier centralization of power in the 1990s. The persistence of
regionalism was vividly displayed during the Orange Revolution, which was interpreted by
observers as a choice between Eastern and Western varieties of national identity, and in
subsequent electoral contests. 7
This puzzling set of outcomes may be explained by differences in regional
territorialization – a dimension of center-regional relations which is often overlooked in both
6
Vladimir Gel'man, "Regime Transition, Uncertainty and Prospects for Democratisation: The Politics of Russia's
Regions in a Comparative Perspective," Europe-Asia Studies 51, no. 6 (1999), Dmitry Gorenburg, "Regional
Separatism in Russia: Ethnic Mobilisation or Power Grab?," Europe-Asia Studies 51, no. 2 (1999), Marie Mendras,
"How Regional Elites Preserve Their Power," Post-Soviet Affairs 15, no. 4 (1999), Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, "When Do
Elites Compete? The Determinants of Political Competition in Russian Regions," Comparative Politics 38, no. 3
(2006), Steven L. Solnick, "Federal Bargaining in Russia," East European Constitutional Review 4, no. 4 (1995),
Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "Central Weakness and Provincial Autonomy: Observations on the Devolution Process in
Russia," Post-Soviet Affairs 15, no. 1 (1999).
7
Taras Kuzio, "Nationalism, Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine: Understanding the Orange Revolution,"
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 43, no. 3 (2010), Ararat L. Osipian and Alexandr L. Osipian, "Why Donbass
Votes for Yanukovych: Confronting the Ukrainian Orange Revolution," Demokratizatsiya 14, no. 4 (2006).
3
institutionalist and elite-oriented approaches to regionalism. 8 In Russia, regionalism was
bounded by existing subnational divisions and sustained by the adoption of mixed ethnic and
administrative principles for federal relations. In other words, regions were understood as
corresponding to existing administrative-territorial units, which provided regionalists with
ready-made political institutions for contesting power during the 1990s. Yet this
correspondence of regionalism to administrative-territorial regions also left regionalists
vulnerable to the homogenization of regional and national political institutions. Regionalism in
Ukraine was less associated with individual administrative units than with broader zones that
mirror historical periods of incorporation into the USSR, as well as variations in linguistic and
ethnic composition. While this form of regionalism was less threatening to Ukraine’s central
state in the 1990s than was the case in Russia, it also proved more resistant to the
centralization of power and institutional homogenization. The fuzzy relationship between
regions and territory in Ukraine permitted the expansion of regionalist claims upon national
identity, whereas the specific association of regions with federal “subjects” limited the
adaptability and appeal of such claims in Russia.
This paper utilizes process tracing to compare the development and trajectories of
regionalism in Russia and Ukraine. 9 While the method may be used for the purpose of testing
8
While a large body of literature (focusing particularly on Western Europe) refers to “territorial politics,” this is
actually a misnomer as it is concerned with institutional linkages between centers and peripheries. Michael
Keating, State and Regional Nationalism: Territorial Politics and the European State (New York: Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1988), Mark O. Rousseau and Raphael Zariski, Regionalism and Regional Devolution in Comparative
Perspective (New York: Praeger, 1987), Sidney Tarrow, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Luigi Graziano, eds., Territorial
Politics in Industrial Nations (New York: Praeger, 1978).
9
For discussion of process tracing, see: Andrew Bennett, "Process Tracing: A Bayesian Perspective," in The Oxford
Handbook of Political Methodology, ed. Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David Collier (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2008), Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in
the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004), Peter A. Hall, "Aligning Ontology and Methodology in
4
theory within a single case, it is also warranted as an exploratory mechanism for isolating and
identifying causal mechanisms related to a common phenomenon found within a small number
of cases. The study of regionalism in Russia mostly focuses on federal relations in the 1990s,
particularly involving Russia’s “donor” regions and the secessionist potential of its ethnic
republics. The study of regionalism in Ukraine focuses on identifying the extent and stability of
macro-regional identities and their implications for national elections. Clearly it would be
unproductive to assess these cases in the terms peculiar to the study of each country’s
“regionalism.” Instead, process tracing provides a means to tease out commensurable
observations from both cases and to construct narratives about the path of regionalism in each
country.
For the present study, process-oriented observations are built around the two key
differences that typically obstruct comparisons of regionalism in Russia and Ukraine:
institutions and territory. If few scholarly comparisons have been made between regionalism in
Russia and Ukraine, the most likely reason is the fundamental difference in state structures.
Ukraine opted for a unitary structure in its 1996 Constitution in which governorships are
appointed by the president. By contrast, Russia adapted the structure of the RSFSR to an
admixture of ethno-federal and administrative-territorial divisions. Several former Soviet
autonomous republics (ASSRs) adopted their own republican constitutions and elected
presidents prior to the adoption of the 1993 Constitution. In the vast majority of regions,
governors were appointed until the mid-1990s, then elected for nearly a decade, and finally
appointed once more starting in 2005.
Comparative Politics," in Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed. James Mahoney and Dietrich
Rueschemeyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
5
These institutional differences are buttressed by differences in the size and varieties of
territorial divisions in Russia and Ukraine. Both countries inherited their territorial grid from the
Soviet system with units of varying institutional status. Russia’s ethno-federal system contained
89 federal subjects (21 republics, 49 oblasts, six krais, ten autonomous okrugs, one autonomous
oblast, plus Moscow and St. Petersburg) at independence. 10 Compared to Russia, Ukraine’s
regional structure appeared less complicated in possessing 24 oblasts, one autonomous
republic (Crimea), and two special status cities (Kyiv and Sevastopol).
The paper begins with a brief examination of trajectories of the subnational sovereignty
movements that emerged during 1990-1993 and continues to the more enduring forms of
regionalism to develop in each country. The paper then focuses on the institutional dimension
of regionalism and center-regional dynamics in each country. Despite their manifest differences
in structure, the central responses to regionalism in each country turn out to be broadly similar.
Instead, the critical point of departure appears to be the territorial shape of regionalism. The
comparison suggests that regionalism is easier to contain where regionalist territorial claims
align with regional political institutions. Where regionalism attaches to macro-regional
boundaries, however, it appears more persistent and less vulnerable to the center’s
manipulation of regional political institutions.
“Republicanization” Movements (1990-1993)
10
One result of the centralization of power under Putin was the consolidation of several regions into larger units.
As of this writing Russia consists of 21 republics, 46 oblasts, nine krais, four autonomous okrugs, one autonomous
oblast, and two federal cities.
6
Both Russia and Ukraine experienced a briefly intense period of regionalist and even separatist
mobilization during the final days of the USSR, as well as longer, sustained challenges from
regionalized interests that persisted throughout the 1990s. In the latter sense, regional elites in
both Russia and Ukraine took advantage of the central state’s weakness to press for autonomy
and economic advantage. By and large, these were not secessionist movements though the
central government sometimes perceived them as such. 11
The first wave of spontaneous and innovative regionalism was stimulated by the
examples of the Union republics’ declarations of sovereignty and the opportunity to leverage
Mikhail Gorbachev’s new Union Treaty into an improvement in regional status. In both Ukraine
and Russia, this primarily took the form of “republicanization” movements which followed the
example of the Soviet republics, aiming to promote their status within the new states. This
process continued into the first years of post-Soviet rule as power struggles in each capital
paralyzed central states until connections between center and periphery were re-established.
After Russia declared its sovereignty on June 12, 1990, its autonomous republics (ASSRs)
joined the “parade of sovereignties” in demanding equal status with the Union republics. 12
Yeltsin encouraged this process, famously urging the ASSRs to “take as much independence as
you can swallow.” 13 The Russian Congress of People’s Deputies amended the RSFSR’s
constitution to promote its ASSRs to full constituent republics in December 1990. The next
summer, the Russian Supreme Soviet further promoted four autonomous oblasts to republics. 14
11
Vicki L. Hesli, "Public Support for the Devolution of Power in Ukraine: Regional Patterns," Europe-Asia Studies 47,
no. 1 (1995): 96, Lapidus, "Asymmetrical Federalism."
12
Jeff Kahn, "The Parade of Sovereignties: Establishing the Vocabulary of the New Russian Federalism," Post-Soviet
Affairs 16, no. 1 (2000).
13
TASS, August 7, 1990.
14
Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2002), 207.
7
The process of republicanization was not limited to the autonomies, nor did it end with the
collapse of the USSR. Some of the newly-elected oblast governments threatened to withhold
taxes from collection by the federal treasury. 15 The movement among oblasts and krais gained
momentum as economic protest grew into political demands for increased status. The
proposals during this time included a Pomor Republic centered in Arkhangel’sk, a Central
Russian Republic formed from eleven regions and centered in Orel’, a Leningrad Republic
centered in St. Petersburg, a Neva Republic for St. Petersburg alone, a Southern Urals Republic
formed around Cheliabinsk, a Siberian Republic based in Novosibirsk, an East Siberian Republic
centered in Irkutsk, and a Maritime Republic with its capital in Vladivostok. 16 Four regions
added questions about elevation to republican status to the April 1993 nationwide referendum,
each of which was approved by sizable majorities. 17 Other oblasts sought to promote their
federal status to that of republic, the most notorious instance being the failed attempt by
Eduard Rossel’ to transform Sverdlovsk into an Urals Republic in 1993. 18
Similarly, Ukraine’s declaration of sovereignty on July 16, 1990, stimulated discussions
of creating a Donetsk-Dnipro or Dnipro autonomous region. In August 1990, another such
proposal in Odessa called for “special state status” for the historical area of Novorossiia
15
Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Local Heroes: The Political Economy of Russian Regional Governance (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1997), 81.
16
Vladimir Shlapentokh, Roman Levita, and Mikhail Loiberg, From Submission to Rebellion: The Provinces Versus
the Center in Russia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 109.
17
Gail W. Lapidus and Edward W. Walker, "Nationalism, Regionalism, and Federalism: Center-Periphery Relations
in Post-Communist Russia," in The New Russia: Troubled Transformation, ed. Gail W. Lapidus (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1995), 98.
18
Gerald M. Easter, "Redefining Centre-Regional Relations in the Russian Federation: Sverdlovsk Oblast'," EuropeAsia Studies 49, no. 4 (1997), Milena Gligich-Zolotareva, "Ukrupnenie Sub″Ektov Federatsii: Pro Et Contra,"
Federalizm, no. 1 (2002): 94, Herrera, Imagined Economies: The Sources of Russian Regionalism.
8
(comprised of five Ukrainian oblasts and a portion of the Dniester region of Moldova). 19 The
best known case of regionalism throughout the 1990s was Crimea though it was a particularly
thorny issue in the Donbas regions, as well (see below). Regionalism was also associated with
calls for federalism, starting in Galicia prior to Ukraine’s independence. 20
Other forms of regionalism developed in Western Ukraine. The Society of Carpathian
Ruthenians was formed in Transcarpathia in 1990 to push for the return of the region’s status
of autonomous republic. 21 Motivated in part by Crimea’s example, a referendum was planned
on whether the region should join Ukraine as an autonomous territory. The word
“autonomous” was dropped from the referendum in December 1991 after Kravchuk met with
regional leaders. 22 Movements by the Hungarian minority population in Transcarpathia and the
Romanian and Moldovan minorities in Bukovina further aimed at securing local autonomy.
Hungarians in Transcarpathia agitated for the transformation of the Berehove raion into a
Hungarian national district. Bulgarians and Gagauz in Odessa similarly pressed for the creation
of a Bolhrad national district. 23
The republicanization movements in Russia and Ukraine did not prove to be durable. In
Russia, the process halted with the formalization of regional status in the 1992 Federal Treaties.
The resolution of the armed conflict between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet in October 1993
19
Roman Solchanyk, "The Politics of State Building: Centre-Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine," EuropeAsia Studies 46, no. 1 (1994): 59.
20
Gwendolyn Sasse, "The 'New' Ukraine: A State of Regions," in Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union:
Regions in Conflict, ed. James Hughes and Gwendolyn Sasse (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 80.
21
Dominique Arel, "Interpreting 'Nationality' and 'Language' in the 2001 Ukrainian Census," Post-Soviet Affairs 18,
no. 3 (2002): 229-31, Janusz Bugajski, "Ethnic Relations and Regional Problems in Independent Ukraine," in
Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity, ed. Sharon L. Wolchik and Volodymyr Zviglyanich (Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2000), 177. The reference was to the semi-independent Subcarpathian Ruthenia formed from
Czechoslovakia in October 1938.
22
Solchanyk, "The Politics of State Building," 62-3.
23
Bugajski, "Ethnic Relations and Regional Problems," 178, Solchanyk, "The Politics of State Building," 65.
9
was followed by the dissolution of regional parliaments, leaving newly-appointed governors to
steer the drafting of regional charters and to guide the first stages of privatization until the
adoption of Yeltsin’s Constitution in December 1993. 24 In Ukraine, a formal constitution was
not adopted until 1996. Central authority began to be restored following the presidential
election in 1994, continuing with the “Constitutional Treaty” in 1995 that gave Kuchma the
power to appoint the elected speakers of oblast parliaments as the heads of regional
administrations. 25 Moreover, the republicanization movements in Ukraine were more likely to
orient around subregional and cross-regional cleavages as opposed to movements in Russia
focused simply on regional promotion or enlargement. These cleavages may have worked to
“de-activate” regional and ethnopolitical claims based on individual oblasts in Ukraine. 26
Durable Regionalisms in the 1990s
The more persistent forms of regionalism in Russia and Ukraine followed the republicanization
movements, extending through the 1990s and into the next decade. These forms of regionalism
tended to be based upon ethno-territorial claims (Crimea in Ukraine and the ethnic republics in
Russia) or economic claims (the Donbas in Ukraine and the so-called “donor” regions in Russia).
24
Jeffrey W. Hahn, "Democratization and Political Participation in Russia's Regions," in Democratic Changes and
Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 148. New regional assemblies were not elected until the spring of
1994. Darrell Slider, "Elections to Russia's Regional Assemblies," Post-Soviet Affairs 12, no. 3 (1996): 250.
25
Kerstin Zimmer, "Not So Different after All? Centre-Regional Relations: A Ukrainian Comparison," in Politics in
the Russian Regions, ed. Graeme Gill (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 118. To that point, the election of
chairmen for oblast parliaments underscored the center’s weakness, which was helpless to compel regions to stop.
R. F. Turovskii, "Stravnitel'nyi Analiz Tendentsii Regional'nogo Razvitiia Rossii i Ukrainy," Polis, no. 6 (1999): 50.
26
Sasse, "The 'New' Ukraine," 84.
10
These durable forms of regionalism were advanced by regional political machines which
associated regionalism with preserving the distinctiveness of regional political institutions. 27
As the two varieties of regionalism emerged together, the interaction among them
meant that ethnic and economic claims became, at times, difficult to entangle—perhaps best
illustrated by Crimea. As of the 1989 census, Russians made up two-thirds of the region’s
population. For the quarter of the population that was Ukrainian, nearly half (47.4 percent)
reported Russian as their native language, there were no Ukrainian-language schools, and
Ukrainian-language broadcasts were limited. 28 As Sasse (2007) observes, the region’s political
identity came to rest upon “a sense of Crimea’s distinctiveness from the rest of Ukraine and a
recognition of the profound Russian cultural orientation, embodied in the predominant use of
the Russian language.” 29 At the same time, the peninsula’s Communist Party pushed for
autonomy in 1989-1990 to preserve traditional power structures despite developments in
Moscow and Kyiv. 30 The region held a referendum in January 1991 on the “re-establishment” of
the region’s status as an autonomous republic in the USSR in order to participate in the new
Union Treaty (passed with 93.3 percent). 31 Technically speaking, Crimea’s status could only be
re-established as an autonomous republic within the RSFSR (as it had been prior to its transfer
to Ukraine in 1954). Nevertheless, Ukraine’s Supreme Soviet affirmed the region’s status as an
27
On the role of regional political machines, see: Vladimir Gel'man and Sergei Ryzhenkov, "Local Regimes, SubNational Governance and the ‘Power Vertical’ in Contemporary Russia," Europe-Asia Studies 63, no. 3 (2011),
Henry E. Hale, "Explaining Machine Politics in Russia's Regions: Economy, Ethnicity, and Legacy," Post-Soviet Affairs
19, no. 3 (2003), Kimitaka Matsuzato, "All Kuchma's Men: The Reshuffling of Ukrainian Governors and the
Presidential Election of 1999," Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 42, no. 6 (2001).
28
Solchanyk, "The Politics of State Building," 50.
29
Gwendolyn Sasse, The Crimea Question: Identity, Transition, and Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Distributed by
Harvard University Press for the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 2007), 143.
30
Ibid., 132-3, Solchanyk, "The Politics of State Building," 51.
31
Gwendolyn Sasse, "Conflict-Prevention in a Transition State: The Crimean Issue in Post-Soviet Ukraine,"
Nationalism & Ethnic Politics 8, no. 2 (2002): 14.
11
autonomous republic within Ukraine the following month. The Crimean Supreme Soviet
declared the region’s sovereignty in September 1991.
Tensions between Kyiv and Sevastopol rose during the early part of 1992, exacerbated
by suggestions from Moscow that Crimea ought to be returned to Russia. When Ukraine’s
parliament finally passed a law on the region’s status in May 1992, it fell short of Crimea’s
expectations of treatment as an equal partner with Kyiv. The Crimean parliament declared the
region’s independence (subject to a referendum planned for August 1992) while adding a
constitutional amendment stating that Crimea was part of Ukraine on a treaty basis. Kyiv
responded by declaring the act unconstitutional, after which Crimea backed down and
suspended the referendum (though not the actual declaration). This was followed by a
compromise that affirmed Crimea’s status as part of Ukraine while granting Crimeans joint
citizenship and property rights. 32
In March 1994, the leader of the pro-independence Republican Movement of Crimea,
Yuri Meshkov, was elected Crimea’s president. A rift soon developed between Meshkov and the
region’s parliament, allowing Leonid Kuchma an opening to roll back Crimea’s institutional
distinctiveness. In November 1994, the Ukrainian parliament annulled a swath of Crimean
legislation on the grounds that it violated the Constitution. The Crimean presidency and
constitution were abolished in March 1995. The new Ukrainian Constitution provided
significant autonomy for the region and granted its own constitution. 33 This special treatment
of Crimea in fact allowed the central government to further extend its control over the region
32
Hesli, "Public Support for the Devolution of Power in Ukraine: Regional Patterns," 97-9, Solchanyk, "The Politics
of State Building," 51-7.
33
Bugajski, "Ethnic Relations and Regional Problems," 174.
12
through the establishment of central institutions and representatives on its territory. 34 Once
Russia formally disavowed any territorial claims to Crimea in 1997, the peninsula’s leadership
was forced to accept permanent accommodation with Kyiv. 35
The role of political machines in advancing regionalism is particularly evident in the
Donbas area (including portions of Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts). The Donbas
is often considered to be distinguished by its large ethnic Russian population though “territorial
and economic components prevail over the ethnic element” as sources of regionalism. 36 The
Donbas is the most industrialized area of Ukraine and early agitation for a federal system was
motivated in part by the complaint that it received less money from the central government
than it contributed, effectively subsidizing other regions—a complaint echoed by “donor”
regions in Russia’s federal system (see below). 37 In October 1991, Donetsk urged the Ukrainian
parliament to consider introducing a German-style federal system. 38 Both the Donetsk and
Luhansk regional parliaments voted for regional autonomy in June 1993. 39
The regionalist movements in Crimea and the Donbas had a number of elements in
common: particularly, the persistence of (unreconstructed) Communist parties as
organizational vehicles, resistance to Ukrainian nationalism (perceived as a Western Ukrainian
project), the pursuit of official recognition of Russian as a state language on par with Ukrainian,
and demands for regional autonomy or federalism. The rise of regionalism in Crimea and the
Donbas regions also reflected differences in the rates of replacement of Soviet-era elites, which
34
Sasse, "The 'New' Ukraine," 93.
Sarah Birch, "Interpreting the Regional Effect in Ukrainian Politics," Europe-Asia Studies 52, no. 6 (2000): 1029.
36
Grigory Nemiria, "Regionalism: An Underestimated Dimension of State-Building," in Ukraine: The Search for a
National Identity, ed. Sharon L. Wolchik and Volodymyr Zviglyanich (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 190.
37
Hesli, "Public Support for the Devolution of Power in Ukraine: Regional Patterns," 94.
38
Solchanyk, "The Politics of State Building," 60.
39
Hesli, "Public Support for the Devolution of Power in Ukraine: Regional Patterns," 94.
35
13
occurred faster in Kyiv and Western Ukraine. Elites from the latter regions achieved an early
integration in central political institutions following Ukraine’s independence. This started to
change once the “red directors” in the Eastern industrial regions organized to protect the fuel
and power sectors from price liberalization, eventually allying with agricultural lobbies from
southern and central regions interested in preserving state credits. 40 The Donbas variety of
regionalism thus shared ethno-linguistic claims and ethno-territorial goals that appealed to
constituencies in multiple regions. It was the fusion of these goals with economic complaints
that made regionalism appealing for regional elites who, in turn, converted it into a means to
shelter regional political machines from central intervention.
The merging of ethno-territorial and economic varieties of regionalism also occurred in
Russia. In the former ASSRs, republican parliaments issued sovereignty declarations, drafted
new constitutions, and elected their own presidents as early as 1991. The republics generally
expected to become full partners with the center—initially in the planned Union Treaty, then
with Moscow as envisioned in the Federal Treaties of March 1992. 41 While the Kremlin viewed
the Federal Treaties as a short-term solution, they still managed to generate discontent among
republics and oblasts, alike. Prominent among the republics, Chechnia (which declared
independence the previous year) and Tatarstan refused to sign the Treaty. Bashkortostan and
Sakha-Iakutiia only signed after receiving budgetary concessions from the center. 42 More
generally, the Treaties acknowledged the republics’ right to all land and natural resources on
40
Nemiria, "Regionalism," 188.
There were three separate Federal Treaties: one for the republics, one for the provinces (oblasts and krais), and
one for the remaining autonomous okrugs.
42
Cameron Ross, Federalism and Democratisation in Russia (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 24.
41
14
their territory. This provision particularly made provincial leaders feel like second class citizens
and stimulated efforts to form inter-regional associations. 43
Already in this early phase, ethno-territorial movements among the republics shifted to
more moderate sets of economic claims. 44 This is particularly striking in the way that
Tatarstan’s referendum on sovereignty in 1992 defined an aggrieved community in terms of
territory and administrative status 45, though this did not prevent it from making ethnoterritorial claims when confronting the federal center. While the 1993 Constitution abolished
the portion of the Federal Treaties which elaborated the powers reserved for the republics, it
maintained the provision for signing bilateral power sharing treaties between the center and
individual regions. Starting in 1994, the republics continued to press for economic concessions
by signing bilateral power sharing treaties with the Kremlin which guaranteed extraconstitutional privileges (such as rights to manage natural resources). 46 With a few notable
exceptions, however, the republics tended to be under-developed with vulnerable populations
that were largely dependent upon the state sector for employment and settled in ethnic
clusters. This set of conditions favored the emergence and consolidation of regional political
machines. 47
43
James Hughes, "Regionalism in Russia: The Rise and Fall of Siberian Agreement," Europe-Asia Studies 46, no. 7
(1994): 1134, Nicholas J. Lynn and Alexei V. Novikov, "Refederalizing Russia: Debates on the Idea of Federalism in
Russia," Publius 27, no. 2 (1997).
44
Dmitry P. Gorenburg, Minority Ethnic Mobilization in the Russian Federation (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2003).
45
Elise Giuliano, "Who Determines the Self in the Politics of Self-Determination? Identity and Preference
Formation in Tartarstan's Nationalist Mobilization," Comparative Politics 32, no. 3 (2000): 311.
46
M.N. Guboglo, ed., Federalizm Vlasti i Vlast' Federalizma (Moscow: IntelTekh, 1997). A handful of powerful
oblasts also took advantage of the bilateral treaty process, though the republics were the principle beneficiaries.
47
Hale, "Explaining Machine Politics in Russia's Regions," 245.
15
Among the provinces (or, as they are sometimes called, the “non-ethnic” regions),
Yeltsin’s appointed governors were constrained to a greater extent than republican leaders in
the drafting of provincial charters (ustavy). 48 As a result, regional political institutions among
the provinces were much less distinctive than those found in the republics that originated with
republican constitutions. However, the governors seized the initiative in the privatization of
state assets on the regional level and a number of regions leveraged their positions to acquire
bilateral treaties similar to those gained by the republics. 49 Among the regions which were net
contributors to the federal budget, or “donor” regions (the number of which varied from 1993
to 1999), regionalist complaints formed about the republics which benefited by exploiting the
center’s fear of ethnic separatism. The donor regions further voiced complaints about
subsidizing failing and economically irresponsible regions.
As the Kremlin sought to enlist the support of Russia’s governors for the 1995-6
electoral cycle, it moved to allow gubernatorial elections in the provinces (republican
presidents were already elected starting in 1991). 50 The transformation of governors from
appointed to elected office provided a direct stimulus for the growth of regionalism. In the
large round of regional elections during 1996-7, about two-thirds of Yeltsin’s appointed
governors lost office. Gubernatorial candidates often linked regional identities with anti-center
platforms, and of course newly elected governors were no longer accountable to the Kremlin. 51
Most governors eschewed identifying with national parties and, in many cases, invented
48
I.A. Umnova, Konstitutsionnye Osnovy Sovremennogo Rossiiskogo Federalizma (Moskva: Delo, 2000), 153-4.
Darrell Slider, "Privatization in Russia's Regions," Post-Soviet Affairs 10, no. 4 (1994). Solnick, "Federal Bargaining
in Russia."
50
Steven L. Solnick, "Gubernatorial Elections in Russia, 1996-1997," Post-Soviet Affairs 14, no. 1 (1998).
51
Aleksandr Shatilov and Vladimir Nechaev, "Regional'nye Vybory: Osobennosti Tekhnologii i Kharakter
Predpochtenii," Svobodnaia Mysl', no. 6 (1997).
49
16
regional parties to serve as vehicles for their election and to place allies in regional
parliaments. 52
The newly-elected governors proved more experienced and politically savvy than their
appointed predecessors, managing to win re-election in 68 percent of gubernatorial contests
over the next large round of elections in 1999-2000. 53 Moreover, the governors became
national political actors in their dual role as senators in the Federation Council with the power
to block federal legislation deemed hostile to regional interests. The new wave of governors
quickly secured control of regional economies or formed alliances with power economic actors
in the regions. They further co-opted the regional representatives and agents of federal
ministries, including even the Presidential Representatives which were supposed to monitor the
governors for the Kremlin. 54
Among the durable regionalisms in Russia, one finds similar to Ukraine that the fusion of
economic complaints with ethno-territorial goals proved useful for republican elites. Unique to
Russia, however, was the opportunity to secure elected governorships which made exploiting
regional identities and anti-center platforms an appealing (and successful) strategy in the mid1990s. In addition, there remained significant distinctions between ethno-territorial and
economic claims associated with regionalism in Russia. In the first place, ethno-territorial claims
were exclusively available to the republics such that they could not be appropriated by, and did
not resonate with, other kinds of regions. Where gubernatorial candidates in Russia’s provinces
cultivated regional identities in their election campaigns, they also crafted regionalist platforms
52
Grigorii V. Golosov, Political Parties in the Regions of Russia: Democracy Unclaimed (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2004), Derek S. Hutcheson, Political Parties in the Russian Regions (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).
53
Ross, Federalism and Democratisation in Russia, 105.
54
Irina Busygina, "Predstavitelei Prezidenta: Problemy Stanovleniia i Perspektivy Razvitiia Instituta," Svobodnaia
Mysl', no. 4 (1996), Eugene Huskey, Presidential Power in Russia (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1999).
17
that lined up with regional borders. This led to the development of region-specific parties and a
focus on region-specific claims in such a way that inter-regional associations and macroregional identities never acquired political significance. More importantly, this meant that
regionalist agendas could not be converted into nationalist projects as was the case with
Donbas regionalism (or Western Ukrainian nationalism, for that matter).
In addition, Russia’s republics and provinces differed in terms of the institutionalization
of regionalism. The republics drafted constitutions much earlier than the provinces and even
prior to the adoption of Russia’s Constitution. As a result, republican political institutions were
both distinctive and relatively insulated from central intervention. Republican presidents also
were elected much earlier, meaning that there was a great deal more continuity with Soviet-era
nomenklatura within the republics than in other regions. Among the provinces, charters were
regulated to a much greater degree than republican constitutions, making provincial political
institutions easier for the Kremlin to monitor and manipulate. Where charismatic governors
discovered or exploited regionalism to gain elected office, the durability of regionalism would
depend upon their ongoing commitment to the cause. One also found a faster rate of
replacement among regional elites in the provinces where electoral opportunities and regional
political machines emerged later than in the republics.
Regionalism and State Centralization
The preceding sections illustrate the extent to which the rise of regionalism in both Russia and
Ukraine was driven by regional political machines and occurred within the context of weak
18
central states. In both countries, the new governments settled for preserving Soviet-era
regional institutions and boundaries while attempting to reconstruct state power. The
somewhat predictable result in both cases was that central states were buffeted by regionalist
assaults on central state authority. Ukraine’s and Russia’s central states re-asserted their
authority over the regions, but they did so at different times and with significantly different
degrees of success. In Ukraine, centralization began almost immediately following Kuchma’s
election in 1994, yet regionalism remains a prominent feature of national politics to this day.
Russia moved to centralize power in the Kremlin only after 2000, but it proved more effective in
taming regionalism than its neighbor.
At independence, Ukraine still operated under a Soviet-era Constitution in which the
regions were governed by oblast soviets (councils) which, in turn, were subordinated to the
national parliament. Leonid Kravchuk attempted to increase presidential control over the
regions in March 1992 with the creation of presidential representatives (somewhat similar to
Boris Yeltsin’s institutional creation) in each region. These were intended to act as regional
executives and would be subordinate to the president.
Discontent with the central government spread among the regions as Kravchuk’s
government failed to implement market reforms while the president and parliament competed
for influence among regional administrations, as was the case in Russia. Existing culturalhistorical differences among Ukraine’s regions were magnified and widened by competing
regional interests in the industrial and agricultural sectors of the economy. Moreover, the
steeper decline in living standards relative to Russia made the latter appear increasingly
19
attractive for Ukrainians whose loyalties to the central state remained in question. 55 Bowing to
pressure from the Eastern oblasts in 1993, Kravchuk granted them autonomy by presidential
decree. The following year, parliament abolished the presidential representatives while
transforming the elected heads of oblast soviets into regional executives (or governors).
The weakness of the central state was compounded by the lack of other unifying
national institutions. The adoption of a mixed ballot system for the 1994 parliamentary
elections produced a proliferation of parties rather than consolidating the party system. The
result was the well-known polarization of voting in the April 1994 parliamentary elections
between Western and Eastern Ukraine. The vote for nationalist parties was regionally confined
to Galicia, Western Ukraine, and Kyiv. The Communist Party (along with the Socialist Party and
Peasants’ Party) received the bulk of its support from Crimea and the Donbas. These regions
further held referenda on the adoption of Russian as a state language and participation in the
CIS (in the Donbas), adopting a federal system for Ukraine, and joint Ukrainian-Russian
citizenship (in Crimea). 56 This pattern continued with the presidential election in June 1994.
Former Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma not only promised improved ties with Russia and the
CIS, but also represented the powerful “red directors.” 57 Kuchma defeated Kravchuk in the
second round owing largely to the support of voters in Ukraine’s Eastern and East-Central
regions.
55
Bugajski, "Ethnic Relations and Regional Problems," 167.
Birch, "Interpreting the Regional Effect in Ukrainian Politics," 1029, Hesli, "Public Support for the Devolution of
Power in Ukraine: Regional Patterns," 94, Sven Holdar, "Torn between East and West: The Regional Factor in
Ukrainian Politics," Post-Soviet Geography 36, no. 2 (1995): 125-8.
57
Andrew Wilson, Ukraine's Orange Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 38.
56
20
Kuchma’s election in 1994 permitted an influx of Easterners in central government. 58
This reversed the previous phase when Western interests dominated central government in
1991-2, though arguably this reversal weakened the president’s control over both Western and
Eastern regions (upon whom Kuchma came to depend). Following his election, Kuchma moved
to subordinate the elected chairmen of oblast soviets by decree in August 1994. The next
month he created a Council of Regions as an advisory body. This brought together the chairmen
of oblast Soviets (and the city Soviets of Kyiv and Sevastopol), making them subordinate to the
president while bypassing the parliament. 59 He next claimed the power to veto any regional law
found to violate the Constitution or other laws in October 1994. Kuchma’s early moves thus
anticipated the centralizing measures later taken by Vladimir Putin in Russia, though without
the revival of the institution of presidential representatives. The adoption of the “Law on
Power” in June 1995 gave Kuchma the ability to appoint the heads of regional and local
administrations. The 1996 Constitution moved even further in strengthening presidential
control by formally establishing Ukraine as a unitary state and separating the heads of oblast
administrations from oblast councils: they became governors, part of a chain of executive
power connecting the president to the regional and village levels. 60
The appointed governorships provided a novel source of patronage and Kuchma already
promised certain governorships to political parties in exchange for their support of the draft
Constitution. 61 Wilson (2005) describes Kuchma’s rise as a balancing act among three
58
Taras Kuzio, Ukraine: State and Nation Building (New York: Routledge, 1998), 74.
Bugajski, "Ethnic Relations and Regional Problems," 169.
60
Andrew Konitzer-Smirnov, "Serving Different Masters: Regional Executives and Accountability in Ukraine and
Russia," Europe-Asia Studies 57, no. 1 (2005): 7.
61
Matsuzato, "All Kuchma's Men," 425.
59
21
competing clans based in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Kyiv. 62 In the absence of unifying
national institutions (particularly a strong party system), he came to rely upon his appointed
governors to mobilize voters. Initially, he exercised restraint given the recent electoral mandate
of oblast council chairmen though the number of replacements increased with the approaching
election season. In the 1998 elections, Matsuzato (2001) argues that Kuchma exploited the
rivalry between Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk in order to weaken potential opposition while
simultaneously using Transcarpathians’ distaste for “Galician chauvinism” to drive a wedge
among Western regions. 63 His re-election in 1999 was a function of his cultivation of regional
caciques and his use of gubernatorial appointments to sustain the governors’ loyalty alongside
a sense of vulnerability to manipulation by the center. The center’s reliance upon appointed
governors to mobilize votes, in turn, required an expansion of regional executives’ powers and
the transfer of lucrative state assets to the control of regional elites. 64 This also paralleled
Russia’s experience following the elimination of gubernatorial elections in Russia (see below).
The 1998-1999 elections differed from previous elections in that they were dominated
by Ukraine’s economy rather than its identity. Ukraine’s central regions (as well as the
ideological center) proved critical for the elections and competition for these regions’ support
became an enduring feature of subsequent campaigns. 65 Aside from this one election cycle,
62
Wilson, Ukraine's Orange Revolution, 38-42.
Matsuzato, "All Kuchma's Men," 420.
64
Konitzer-Smirnov, "Serving Different Masters," 7.
65
Paul D'Anieri, Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power, Politics, and Institutional Design (New York: M.E. Sharpe,
2007). Peter R. Craumer and James I. Clem, "Ukraine's Emerging Electoral Geography: A Regional Analysis of the
1998 Parliamentary Elections," Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 40, no. 1 (1999). Ralph S. Clem and Peter R.
Craumer, "Shades of Orange: The Electoral Geography of Ukraine’s 2004 Presidential Elections," Eurasian
Geography and Economics 46, no. 5 (2005). Ralph S. Clem and Peter R. Craumer, "Orange, Blue and White, and
Blonde: The Electoral Geography of Ukraine's 2006 and 2007 Rada Elections," Eurasian Geography and Economics
49, no. 2 (2008).
63
22
however, voting in every national contest has split the country broadly into East and West.
Regional differences continue to influence voting in national elections in relatively stable
patterns observed since the Orange Revolution.66
Against the persistence of regionalism in Ukrainian politics, one might argue that the
regionalization of popular support for Ukraine’s political parties and candidates does not
translate into the regionalization of policy. D’Anieri (2007) demonstrates, parties elected from
the same region (or macro-region) did not vote together in Ukraine’s parliament prior to the
Orange Revolution. 67 Immediately following the Orange Revolution, nearly two-thirds of new
cabinet ministers were drawn from central regions while just four each were drawn from
Eastern and Western regions. 68 Indeed, some have argued that 2004 was the last time that
voters in Eastern regions were mobilized by appeals for regional autonomy. 69 Yet the party list
for the Party of Regions in 2007 was dominated by actors from the Donbas, with Donetsk oblast
clearly leading all others. While a great many candidates listed their place of residence as Kyiv
(including Yanukovych), they were unquestionably connected with Eastern regions. By contrast,
the Yulia Tymoshenko and Our Ukraine blocs lacked clear regional profiles in their party lists. 70
Nevertheless, the media continued to depict Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovych as
Western and Eastern candidates in the 2010 presidential election.71 And soon after the 2010
66
On the merging of regionalism and nationalism in the Orange Revolution, see: Kuzio, "Nationalism, Identity and
Civil Society in Ukraine: Understanding the Orange Revolution."
67
D'Anieri, Understanding Ukrainian Politics, 113.
68
Dominique Arel, "Orange Ukraine Chooses the West, but without the East," in Aspects of the Orange Revolution
Iii, ed. Ingmar Bredies, Andreas Umland, and Valentin Yakushik, Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society
(Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2007), 42.
69
Gwendolyn Sasse, "The Role of Regionalism," Journal of Democracy 21, no. 3 (2010): 104-5.
70
Party lists for the 2007 parliamentary election are located at: http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2007/w6p001 (last
accessed January 6, 2012).
71
Sasse, "The Role of Regionalism," 101.
23
elections, Yanukovych provided clear indication of the ongoing importance attributed to the
regional dimension of Ukraine’s politics by sacking eleven governors appointed by his
predecessor. 72
Like Ukraine, Russia initially confronted the problem of central state weakness. After
encouraging the ASSRs to mobilize in his struggle with Gorbachev, Yeltsin found that he had to
preserve the asymmetrical federal structure of the RSFSR.73 Though the 1993 Constitution
declared that all regions (“subjects”) were equal, it preserved ethno-federal elements that
protected the republics’ status. Hence, ethno-federal institutions facilitated its persistence of
regionalism, but they also ensured that regionalism would not be converted into nationalist
projects.
Yeltsin instituted a system of presidential representatives though they were intended to
serve as the Kremlin’s eyes and ears rather than function as regional executives. 74 Yeltsin also
was willing to wheel and deal, offering extra-constitutional bargains (including economic
autonomy) to mollify regionalist oblasts and republics. At the same time, this strategy of
bilateral bargaining helped to prevent anti-center regional coalitions from forming throughout
the 1990s. 75 He continued to give away power in order to keep power through the conversion
of governors from appointed to elected positions. After securing re-election in 1996, Yeltsin
attempted to roll back regionalism, first by reinvigorating the institution of Presidential
72
Interfax-Ukraine, March 18, 2010.
Jeffrey Kahn, Federalism, Democratization, and the Rule of Law in Russia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002),
Lynn and Novikov, "Refederalizing Russia: Debates on the Idea of Federalism in Russia."
74
Busygina, "Predstavitelei Prezidenta.", Huskey, Presidential Power in Russia, 192-5.
75
Solnick, "Federal Bargaining in Russia.", Steven L. Solnick, "Is the Center Too Weak or Too Strong in the Russian
Federation?," in Building the Russian State: Institutional Crisis and the Quest for Democratic Governance, ed.
Valerie Sperling (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), Stoner-Weiss, "Central Weakness and Provincial Autonomy:
Observations on the Devolution Process in Russia.", Daniel S. Treisman, After the Deluge: Regional Crises and
Political Consolidation in Russia (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999).
73
24
Representatives in 1997 and then with legislation requiring regions to bring their constitutions
and charters into conformity with the federal Constitution in 1999. Neither of these measures
had a significant effect. Yeltsin’s tactics of divide and conquer broke down by the end of the
decade as influential governors linked with opposition in the Fatherland-All Russia movement
to challenge the party of power in the 1999 parliamentary elections and the 2000 presidential
election.
After the success of Unity in turning back the regionalist threat and Vladimir Putin’s
election in March 2000, the Kremlin pursued the re-centralization of power with renewed
determination. In May 2000, Putin announced the creation of seven Federal Districts to oversee
Russia’s regions which would be led by reformed Presidential Representatives and their army of
Federal Inspectors. 76 The Federal Districts became the staging ground for rolling back legal
inconsistencies in regional charters and constitutions, and for intervening in gubernatorial
elections to ensure the election of the Kremlin’s favored candidates. Perhaps their most
important effect, however, was to disrupt the governors’ influence over federal agents and
officials in the regions and re-subordinate them to the federal center. 77 The Federal Districts
created a “cadres quake,” establishing a means to co-opt regional officials into the Presidential
Administration and re-insert them into regional politics. 78 Putin also weakened the governors
by removing them from the Federation Council in 2001-2 and pushing for the adoption of
76
James Alexander, "Federal Reforms in Russia: Putin's Challenge to the Republics," Demokratizatsiya 12, no. 2
(2004), Matthew Hyde, "Putin's Federal Reforms and Their Implications for Presidential Power in Russia," EuropeAsia Studies 53, no. 5 (2001), Peter Reddaway and Robert W. Orttung, eds., The Dynamics of Russian Politics:
Putin's Reform of Federal-Regional Relations, Volume I (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).
77
Archie Brown, "Vladimir Putin and the Reaffirmation of Central State Power," Post-Soviet Affairs 17, no. 1 (2001).
78
Natal'ia Zubarevich, Nikolai Petrov, and Aleksei Titkov, "Federal'nye Okruga - 2000," in Regiony Rossii v 1999 G.:
Ezhegodnoe Prilozhenie K "Politicheskomu Al'manakhu Rossii", ed. N. Petrov (Moscow: Moskovskii Tsentr Karnegi,
2001).
25
legislation to allow the president to sack elected governors and dissolve regional parliaments.
The new Law on Parties (2001) further eliminated regional parties and compelled regional
parliaments to be elected, at least in part, by party list. 79
A further set of reforms aimed at diminishing the basis for economic complaints among
regionalists. The revised Tax Code in 2002 effectively eliminated the category of “donor”
regions by substantially reducing the share of taxes retained by regional administrations and
increasing the amount to be transferred to federal coffers. In 2003, the Kozak Commission
focused on eliminating the bilateral treaties, which henceforth would require confirmation by
regional parliaments and the State Duma. It also worked to eliminate gray areas in the
Constitution regarding jointly held powers between the center and the regions, though the
practical effect was to allocate the most lucrative of those powers to the federal center. The
Kremlin also encouraged the autonomous okrugs to merge with neighboring oblasts or krais in
the interest of increasing regional economic performance, starting with the referendum on
merging Perm oblast with Komi-Permiak autonomous okrug in 2003. 80
The culmination of Putin’s assault on regionalism was the elimination of gubernatorial
elections, announced immediately following the Beslan crisis in September 2004. 81 The relative
ease with which this was accomplished betrays the thin institutional foundations of
regionalism, particularly among the provinces where elected governors opted to forego noisy
and expensive elections in exchange for gaining access to the resources and authority of the
Presidential Administration. By contrast, the republican parliaments dragged out the process of
79
Kenneth Wilson, "Party-System Development under Putin," Post-Soviet Affairs 22, no. 4 (2006).
J. Paul Goode, "The Push for Regional Enlargement in Putin's Russia," Post-Soviet Affairs 20, no. 3 (2004).
81
J. Paul Goode, "The Puzzle of Putin's Gubernatorial Appointments," Europe-Asia Studies 59, no. 3 (2007).
80
26
revising their constitutions. 82 They further resisted the notion of regional enlargement, and
republican presidents tended to be re-appointed rather than replaced. Rather, what republican
executives gained by supporting the move to a system of presidential appointments was the
ability to exploit the Kremlin’s centralizing rhetoric to preserve and further expand their
authority within the republics. While the conversion of regional executives into presidential
appointees effectively rendered the Presidential Representatives superfluous, the Kremlin
gained the ability to hold governors accountable for performance in national elections.
When compared to the persistence of regionalism in Ukraine, its swift demise in Russia
is striking. As discussed above, regionalism arose within individual regions in Russia’s federal
structure and gained in momentum with the introduction of direct gubernatorial elections.
Unlike Ukraine, national elections did not take on fundamentally regional contours except to
the extent that the Kremlin required regional leaders to mobilize voters. Yeltsin relied upon
governors to mobilize voters in his bid for re-election in 1996, but the Duma election in
December 1999 was the only national election in which regionalist governors sought to position
themselves to gain control over the central government. After Putin came to power, the task of
taming the regions became a straight-forward matter of co-opting regional governors and
homogenizing regional political institutions.
82
Elena A. Chebankova, "The Limitations of Central Authority in the Regions and the Implications for the Evolution
of Russia's Federal System," Europe-Asia Studies 57, no. 7 (2005).
27
Territorial Frames and Regionalism
Contrary to early predictions that regionalism in Ukraine would force it closer to Russia’s
federal model of center-regional relations, 83 one arguably observes the reverse: Putin’s
centralizing reforms and the decline of regionalism in Russia appear to follow the example set
by Kuchma in Ukraine. Moreover, regionalism remains a persistent and significant feature of
Ukraine’s politics while it subsided in Russia following its peak at the end of the 1990s. This
difference is all the more striking when one considers that Russia’s federal system provides a
firmer institutional basis than Ukraine’s unitary state structure for regionalists to maintain
power locally and to pursue central political agendas.
Given the broad correspondence between varieties and political organization of durable
regionalisms in both countries and the common centralizing means to weaken or undo their
institutional foundations despite fundamentally different state structures, both institutionalist
and elite-oriented varieties of explanation appear insufficient to account for the persistence of
regionalism in Ukrainian politics and its decline in Russia. However, a critical difference which
emerges from the discussion of process appears to be the territorial framework within which
regions “matter.”
In post-Soviet Russia, regions and regional identities territorialized along the lines of
existing administrative-territorial boundaries: first among the former ASSRs, then among the
provinces with the introduction of gubernatorial elections. While most Russians identify to
some extent with a macro-regional orientation (i.e., the Urals, the Volga, Western or Eastern
83
Turovskii, "Stravnitel'nyi Analiz Tendentsii Regional'nogo Razvitiia Rossii i Ukrainy."
28
Siberia), these orientations are not claimed by any major national parties, nor do they present
competing national visions. Hence, even though Russia’s federal system possesses a more
varied network of territorial divisions, the links between regions and political institutions are
much simpler than in Ukraine.
This association of regions with Russia’s federal “subjects” (sub”ekty) proved a doubleedged sword for both the center and the regions. On the one hand, it facilitated regionalist
mobilization against the central state early on—particularly among the ethnic republics—and
provided the resources and authority to promote regional interests and block central
intervention in regional politics during the 1990s. However, this also meant that Russia’s
regionalisms were territorially-bound and did not resonate with elites or citizens in neighboring
regions. For instance, attempts to induce regional leaders to cross regional boundaries in the
form of the eight inter-regional assocations, such as Siberian Accord (Siberskoe soglashenie)
foundered owing to internal conflicts and suspicions among ambitious governors. Instead, the
inter-regional associations remained forums for economic cooperation and lobbying in which
membership did not entail political commitments. 84 In other words, the appeal of regionalism
was confined to individual regions and could not be converted into broader macro-regional or
nationalist projects.
If regionalism in Russia was bound to individual administrative-territorial units, the
relationship between regionalism and territory is much more complicated in Ukraine. While
there is little doubt that regions “matter” in Ukrainian politics, there is much debate over the
84
Hughes, "Regionalism in Russia: The Rise and Fall of Siberian Agreement.", Vladimir Klimanov, "Regional'noe
Sotrudnichestvo," in Regiony Rossii v 1999 G.: Ezhegodnoe Prilozhenie K "Politicheskomu Al'manakhu Rossii", ed. N.
Petrov (Moscow: Moskovskii Tsentr Karnegi, 2001).
29
kinds of regions in play. In contrast to the Russian case where regionalism is synonymous with
individual federal units, regionalism in Ukraine tends to encompass more than one oblast. 85 The
dominant trope for understanding regionalism in Ukraine relates to the cultural division
between Eastern and Western halves. The East-West division maps onto a series of binary
opposites: Eastern Ukraine is more industrialized and russified, with a greater proportion of
ethnic Russians and Russophone Ukrainians. Western Ukraine is more agrarian and has a
greater number of ethnic Ukrainians. The regions of Eastern Ukraine tend to lean towards
Russia and the former Soviet states, while regions in Western Ukraine tend to lean towards
Eastern Europe. 86
This is an attractive narrative that appears to correspond with the outcomes of the most
significant national elections in post-Soviet Ukraine. The Eastern/Western division appeared
particularly salient during the crucial parliamentary and presidential elections of 1994 and
during the Orange Revolution in 2004. Yet at times the differences between Eastern and
Western regions appear to be overstated. In the December 1991 referendum on independence,
the highest “Yes” vote was found in the West though even in the Eastern regions more than 86
percent voted in favor of independence. 87 In general, surveys indicated that Eastern Ukrainians
were no less committed to the Ukrainian state and its territorial integrity than Western
Ukrainians though they desired closer ties with Russia whereas Westerners were more likely to
85
To facilitate comparison, I refer to these as “macro-regions” while continuing to use “region” as synonymous
with oblasts and other primary subnational units. Logically, one should also refer to “macro-regionalism” in
Ukraine rather than regionalism, though this unnecessarily confuses the matter by introducing a neologism.
86
Stephen Shulman, "Asymmetrical International Integration and Ukrainian National Disunity," Political Geography
18, no. 8 (1999).
87
By contrast, a bare majority (54.2 percent) in Crimea voted for independence while just over 42 percent voted
against. Holdar, "Torn between East and West," 119-20, Sasse, The Crimea Question, 141-2.
30
view Russia as a threat. 88 Nevertheless, distinct differences in regional political preferences
appear to follow a loose division of the country between East and West. Particularly during the
mid-1990s, Eastern regions favored greater regional autonomy and a federal model of
government while Western regions favored a strong central authority and a unitary form of
government.89
While the division between Eastern and Western Ukraine seems to have a firm grip on
the public imagination and the media, there are a number of difficulties with dividing Ukraine
into two macro-regions. Sometimes the Dnipro river is used to define the boundary between
East and West (left bank and right bank, respectively), though often scholars use the
Westernmost and Easternmost regions (especially Lviv and Donetsk) to illustrate generally
opposed cultural-political tendencies. 90 Moreover, the East/West distinction does not always
consistently map onto politically active linguistic and economic differences, such that important
differences among Eastern or Western regions (and within-region differences) are minimized in
analysis. 91 Finally, the use of census data and surveys to associate ethnicity and language with
territory tends to present social identities as categorical and exclusive, whereas people possess
multiple, layered identities that are sometimes even contradictory. 92 For example, most
88
William Zimmerman, "Is Ukraine a Political Community?," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31, no. 1
(1998).
89
Hesli, "Public Support for the Devolution of Power in Ukraine: Regional Patterns."
90
Ian Bremmer, "The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine," Europe-Asia Studies 46, no. 2 (1994), Peter
Rodgers, "Understanding Regionalism and the Politics of Identity in Ukraine's Eastern Borderlands," Nationalities
Papers 34, no. 2 (2006), Shulman, "Asymmetrical International Integration and Ukrainian National Disunity," 914-5,
Zimmerman, "Is Ukraine a Political Community?."
91
John O'Loughlin, "The Regional Factor in Contemporary Ukrainian Politics: Scale, Place, Space, or Bogus Effect?,"
Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 42, no. 1 (2001).
92
On the politics surrounding the identification of language preferences in Ukraine’s census, see: Arel,
"Interpreting 'Nationality' and 'Language' in the 2001 Ukrainian Census."
31
Ukrainians have some ability to speak or understand both Russian and Ukrainian and many
speak a combination of both known as surzhyk.
The fuzziness of macro-regional boundaries produced a lively scholarly debate over the
appropriate varieties of regions (or macro-regions) that are active in Ukrainian politics. In
testing the implications of working with different numbers of regions, Barrington and Herron
(2004) discover that language (Russophone or Ukrainophone) appears to be a statistically
significant factor in determining regime support when the country is divided into two or eight
macro-regions, but not with a four-region model. Similarly, religious differences appear
significant with a two-region model but not with four- and eight-region models. 93 Barrington
and Faranda (2009) further find that, using an eight-region model, a north/south division might
be just as useful as the traditional East/West division for identifying distinct regional cultures
though they note significant blurring around the edges of their macro-regions. 94
An alternative approach is offered by Birch (2000), who divides Ukraine into five macroregions that correspond with their historical incorporation into Soviet Ukraine: former
Habsburg regions (including Galicia and Bukovina) which were split among Poland,
Czechoslovakia and Romania following the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, then
annexed by the USSR in 1944; Western Volhynia, which long was part of Poland before it was
taken over by Imperial Russia in the eighteenth century, then again under Polish rule during the
interwar years before its incorporation into the USSR in 1944; Right Bank regions, which were
part of Poland until acquired by Russia in 1793, and incorporated into Ukraine with the creation
93
Lowell W. Barrington and Erik S. Herron, "One Ukraine or Many? Regionalism in Ukraine and Its Political
Consequences," Nationalities Papers 32, no. 1 (2004): 66.
94
Lowell Barrington and Regina Faranda, "Reexamining Region, Ethnicity, and Language in Ukraine," Post-Soviet
Affairs 25, no. 3 (2009): 249. The one region where cultural markers unambiguously line up with juridical borders is
Crimea, which they treat separately from the other seven macro-regions.
32
of the USSR in 1922; Left Bank regions, which had the longest history of Russian rule and were a
major center for industrialization and Russian immigration during the Soviet era; and former
Ottoman lands, which experienced rapid frontier-style development during the nineteenth
century after incorporation in Tsarist Russia. 95
In this scheme, the “regional effect” on politics during the 1990s varies significantly by
macro-region. The macro-regions that were last to be incorporated into the USSR gravitate
towards rightist, nationalist parties. In the regions that were part of the USSR from its creation,
economics matters more than history, benefiting leftist parties. Birch also notes, however, that
historical and economic cleavages do not line up neatly. Barrington (2002) adopts a similar
schema for dividing Ukraine into eight macro-regions that correspond to significant historical
and demographic factors. His 1998 survey of all oblasts reveals that these macro-regions exert a
stronger effect on support for the government and regime than either ethnicity or language.96
Katchanovski (2006) similarly finds that regional political cleavages continue to reflect culturalhistorical differences emerging from their varied experiences prior to the Second World War. 97
Hence, there is some evidence that cultural boundaries are defined in terms of macroregions drawn in accordance with historical cleavages defined by their period of incorporation
into Soviet Ukraine. There may be some flexibility in the definition of cultural boundaries,
however, as suggested by the move to a system of appointed governors and the steady
95
Birch, "Interpreting the Regional Effect in Ukrainian Politics."
Lowell W. Barrington, "Examining Rival Theories of Demographic Influences on Political Support: The Power of
Regional, Ethnic, and Linguistic Divisions in Ukraine," European Journal of Political Research 41, no. 4 (2002).
97
Ivan Katchanovski, "Regional Poltical Divisions in Ukraine in 1991-2006," Nationalities Papers 34, no. 5 (2006):
528.
96
33
increase in gubernatorial replacements under Kuchma.98 Where cultural boundaries seem most
porous is in those regions where elite career paths were most cosmopolitan during the Soviet
era. Industrial and administrative elites from Eastern regions (Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and
Kharkov), Crimea, and Kyiv were deeply integrated with the Soviet nomenklatura and it was
common for their careers to advance them to Moscow. 99 By contrast, the career paths of elites
in Western regions tended to be regionally confined. In this light, it is not surprising that calls
for federalism emerged as an opposition strategy in Galicia prior to Ukraine’s independence, or
that they were less likely to view relations with Russia in positive light following independence.
Similarly, elites in the Donbas regions found it less difficult to reconcile their commitment to
Ukraine’s territorial integrity with their calls for federalism or regional autonomy immediately
after independence, along with their preference for closer ties with Russia.
In line with this interpretation, Arel (2006) argues that Eastern Ukrainian identity is a biethnic and bilingual rather than opposed to Ukrainian national identity. Likewise, Eastern
Ukrainian regionalism seeks political inclusion rather than secession. In the context of Ukraine’s
politics after the Orange Revolution, the durability of support for the Party of Regions reflects
the macro-regional structure of ethnic, linguistic, and historical identities preserved since
independence. Whereas the Orangists suspected the Regionals of playing the secessionist card,
in fact they sought to protect themselves from exclusion. More to the point, the exclusion of a
single party from power would mean the exclusion of an entire territory.100 This last point in
particular helps to explain why the macro-regional shape of regionalism persists or, to put it
98
Though it is also the case that Kuchma tended to draw his gubernatorial appointments from within regions, likely
as a practical means to ensure that regional political machines continued to function.
99
Sasse, The Crimea Question, 130, Sasse, "The 'New' Ukraine," 86.
100
Dominique Arel, "La Face Cachée De La Révolution Orange: L'ukraine En Négation Face À Son Problème
Régional," Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest 37, no. 4 (2006).
34
differently, why supporters of the Party of Regions outside of Donetsk seemingly vote for the
hegemony of one oblast.
Conclusion
The territorial limits of regionalism in Russia made it increasingly vulnerable to central
intervention once the Kremlin acquired the will to intervene in regional politics. If the territorial
limits of regionalism provided opportunities for mobilization and institutionalization in terms of
the adoption of regional constitutions and charters and the election of governors on antiKremlin platforms, the account of Putin’s centralization of power demonstrates that they also
provided the center with concrete levers to combat regionalism. In this sense, it is worth
recalling that Putin’s centralization of power was justified not just in terms of restoring the
“ruling vertical,” but also in creating uniform legal and information spaces throughout the
country. 101
Of course, it is not certain that this will remain the case. The homogenization of regional
political institutions and the decline of provincial regionalism in Russia have accompanied
increased nationalist sentiment in recent years. The more that Russia becomes a federation in
name only, the more one suspects that Russians are likely to view regional divisions as
ephemeral and regional political institutions as interchangeable. In essence, the centralization
of power under Putin bears the potential to facilitate the emergence of nationalist projects
101
Following mass protests of the December 2011 elections to the State Duma, the Kremlin introduced legislation
to restore direct gubernatorial elections. While an analysis of this move would go beyond the confines of this
article, it is unlikely that it would stimulate a revival of regionalism in Russia – at the very least, not without
additional reforms to permit greater variation in the design of regional political institutions and the participation of
political parties formed on the regional or inter-regional levels.
35
which activate along ethno-territorial lines defined by the “non-ethnic” regions (or rather,
ethnically Russian regions lacking republican status). Yet even if this comes to pass, this form of
nationalism would elide regional differences rather than seek to conquer or colonize the central
government on their behalf.
The political implications of the macro-regional shape of regionalism go some way to
explain the persistence of regionalism in Ukraine and, ipso facto, the speed of its decline in
Russia. In the contest for control of the central state, regional actors seek to convert macroregional claims into national projects. In effect, the lack of institutional alternatives for the
realization of regionalist claims channels those claims into the contest for the state. Such
platforms are most effective in the course of nationwide elections when the state is
convincingly at stake.
Outside of national elections, divisions among regions (and further divisions among
macro-regions) are easily exploited by the center to keep would-be regionalists divided and
uncoordinated. The homogenization of regional political institutions and the ability to replace
regional governors by appointment makes it possible for the center to intervene in regional
politics and head off challenges at the oblast level. However, this ability to influence regional
politics remains disconnected from macro-regional identities: they may not be institutionalized
as administrative-territorial divisions, but neither are they vulnerable to administrative
manipulation. Rather, the persistence of regionalism on a macro-regional scale makes all
politics appear to be national in form but regional in content.
36
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