Big Sky Debate
Resolved: That the United States should
normalize relations with Cuba.
NFL Public Forum Nationals 2009 Topic: US-Cuban Relations
Public Forum Handbook, NFL Nationals 2009
Table of Contents
METADEBATE ................................................................................................................................................................. 4
STATUS OF US-CUBAN RELATIONS................................................................................................................................................ 4
STATUS OF US-CUBAN RELATIONS: SPECIFIC LAWS ................................................................................................................. 6
TRADE ALREADY EXISTS BETWEEN THE US/CUBA WITHOUT IMPACT..................................................................................... 7
TRAVEL ALREADY EXISTS BETWEEN THE US/CUBA ..................................................................................................................... 8
MONEY EXCHANGE ALREADY EXISTS BETWEEN THE US/CUBA .............................................................................................. 9
PRO .............................................................................................................................................................................. 10
CUBA POSES NO THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES .................................................................................................................... 10
CURRENT POLICY HAS FAILED TO ACHIEVE REGIME CHANGE ............................................................................................... 11
CURRENT POLICY HURTS US BUSINESS ....................................................................................................................................... 14
CURRENT POLICY DRIVES BUSINESS TO COMPETITORS .......................................................................................................... 15
CURRENT POLICY HURTS CUBAN PEOPLE AND NOT CASTRO ............................................................................................... 18
CURRENT POLICY HURTS CUBAN PUBLIC HEALTH ..................................................................................................................... 22
CURRENT POLICY HURTS EDUCATION OF CUBANS ................................................................................................................. 28
CURRENT POLICY HURTS CULTURAL PRESERVATION ............................................................................................................... 30
CURRENT POLICY CONDEMNED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ............................................................................. 31
CURRENT POLICY IS USED AS A PROPAGANDA TOOL BY CASTRO...................................................................................... 35
SHOULD LIFT EMBARGO ................................................................................................................................................................ 36
SHOULD LIFT EMBARGO: WOULD CREATE JOBS ...................................................................................................................... 38
SHOULD LIFT EMBARGO: WOULD INCREASE US AG EXPORTS ............................................................................................. 39
SHOULD LIFT EMBARGO: WOULD INCREASE US ECONOMIC GROWTH ............................................................................ 41
SHOULD LIFT EMBARGO: WOULD HELP THE CUBAN PEOPLE ................................................................................................. 44
SHOULD LIFT EMBARGO: WOULD HEAL US-CUBAN RELATIONS ........................................................................................... 45
SHOULD LIFT EMBARGO: WILL ENCOURAGE LIBERALIZATION .............................................................................................. 46
SHOULD LIFT EMBARGO: WOULD HELP WORLD BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH ............................................................... 47
SHOULD LIFT EMBARGO: WOULD HELP INTERNATIONAL SPORTS ....................................................................................... 48
CONGRESS SUPPORTS LIFTING EMBARGO............................................................................................................................... 49
CUBAN-AMERICANS SUPPORT LIFTING EMBARGO ................................................................................................................. 50
CUBANS SUPPORT LIFTING THE BAN........................................................................................................................................... 51
SHOULD TAKE DRAMATIC ACTION; INCREMENTAL CHANGE ISN’T ENOUGH .................................................................... 52
UNITED STATES IS THE CONTROLLING FACTOR OVER “NORMALIZATION” ........................................................................ 53
CUBA WANTS TO TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES ................................................................................................................ 54
A/T: CASTRO WILL STOP BUSINESS EXPANSION ..................................................................................................................... 55
CON.............................................................................................................................................................................. 56
THE EMBARGO WORKS ................................................................................................................................................................. 56
CUBA VIOLATES HUMAN RIGHTS................................................................................................................................................. 59
CUBA IS A NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT .................................................................................................................................... 60
CUBA REFORMS ARE SMALL OR IMAGINARY ............................................................................................................................ 61
NEW CASTRO BROTHER IS JUST LIKE FIDEL! ............................................................................................................................... 63
US POLICY IS A MORAL TOOL, NOT A POLICY TOOL, AND MUST BE UPHELD .................................................................... 66
LIFTING THE EMBARGO WILL KILL THE FRAGILE DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT IN CUBA ....................................................... 68
LIFTING THE EMBARGO WOULD RUIN 50 YEARS OF PROGRESS ......................................................................................... 69
LIFTING THE EMBARGO WILL NOT BRING REGIME CHANGE................................................................................................. 72
DETERIORATING CUBAN FINANCIAL SOLUTION DEMANDS CONTINUED US POLICY ...................................................... 76
ANY FAILURE OF US POLICY DUE TO US CITIZEN ACTION ...................................................................................................... 78
INFLUX OF FOREIGN CURRENCY KEEPS CUBAN REGIME AFLOAT ........................................................................................ 82
INFLUX OF TOURISM DOLLARS WILL HURT CUBANS ............................................................................................................... 85
US POLICY ENCOURAGES HUMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA .............................................................................................................. 86
US POLICY ENCOURAGES REGIME CHANGE IN CUBA ............................................................................................................ 87
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US ACTION WORTHLESS: CUBA WILL REFUSE TO ACT IN RESPONSE TO “NORMALIZATION” ....................................... 88
NORMALIZING RELATIONS WILL NOT MEAN A BUSINESS BONANZA ................................................................................. 89
NORMALIZING RELATIONS WILL CAUSE CUBAN BRAIN DRAIN ............................................................................................. 97
CUBAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITY SUPPORTS THE EMBARGO ............................................................................................... 98
CUBA IS THE CONTROLLING FACTOR OVER “NORMALIZATION” ......................................................................................... 99
CUBA HAS LITTLE TO OFFER THE UNITED STATES ................................................................................................................... 101
CUBAN GOVERNMENT ACTIONS HURTING THE CUBAN PEOPLE, NOT US POLICY ....................................................... 102
CUBA SHOULD TAKE ACTION: RETURN STOLEN US PROPERTY!.......................................................................................... 104
A/T: CHINA PROVIDES A MODEL .............................................................................................................................................. 105
A/T: EMBARGO HURTS HEALTH CARE ...................................................................................................................................... 106
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METADEBATE
STATUS OF US-CUBAN RELATIONS
SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA DESCRIBED--Nichols '09
[Philip M.; Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics at the University of Pennsylvania; “SYMPOSIUM ARTICLE:
USING SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF ISOMORPHISM TO EVALUATE THE POSSIBILITY OF REGIME CHANGE
THROUGH TRADE SANCTIONS;” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law; Spring 2009; LN]
These sanctions differ from those intended to enforce an internationally-agreed upon rule in at least
two important ways. n63 Such sanctions tend to be unilateral, or imposed by a small group of
nations. n64 Moreover, these sanctions are intended to force a broad change in the behavior of
target countries rather than [*766] compliance with a single rule or regime. n65 The statements of a
U.S. legislator supporting unilateral sanctions of this type illustrate the breadth of changes sought:
The purpose of sanctions is to change behavior. The changes we seek, in partnership with the
Burmese people, are these: concrete, irreversible steps toward reconciliation and democratization
that include the full, unfettered participation of the National League for Democracy and ethnic
minorities; ending attacks on ethnic minorities; and the immediate, unconditional release of all
prisoners of conscience, including Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi. The regime also
needs to know that a sham Constitutional process and token prisoner releases will not be regarded
by anyone as progress toward these goals. n66
The United States' sanctions on Cuba are a paradigmatic example of this type of sanction. n67 The
sanctions explicitly embrace the purpose of effectuating change in Cuba. The Cuban Democracy Act,
the first of the two acts dealing with sanctions on Cuba, flatly states, "It should be the policy of the
United States ... to seek a peaceful transition to democracy and a resumption of economic growth in
Cuba through the careful application of sanctions directed at the Castro government and support
for the Cuban people."
DESPITE LIBERALIZATION OF CUBAN POLITICS, THE UNITED STATES HAS TIGHTENED ITS
CONTROL OF CUBA--Spandoni '04
[Paolo; PdD Candidate at the University of Florida; “SYMPOSIUM: WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC
& SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART I OF II: CUBA TODAY: U.S. Financial Flows in the Cuban Economy;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004; LN]
The collapse of the Soviet Union and its European proxies in the early 1990s inaugurated a very
difficult period for Cuba and an unprecedented economic recession that seriously threatened the
survival of the Castro government. The Cuban authorities were forced to loosen up their centrally
planned economy, establish more developed relations with the capitalist world, and introduce
limited market reforms in areas including trade, foreign investment, and tourism. Given the
emergency situation of the Cuban economy, the end of Cuba's active support of revolutionary forces
in Africa and Latin America, as well as the end of its close ties with the Soviet Union, one could have
expected the beginning of friendlier relations between Washington and Havana. Instead, the United
States tightened the embargo against the island with the enactment of the Torricelli Law in 1992 and
the Helms-Burton Law in 1996. As noted by Jorge Dominguez, "the Cold War had turned colder in
the Caribbean. Cuba was the only country governed by a communist party whose domestic political
regime the United States was still committed by law and policy to replace, albeit by peaceful means."
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DESPITE THE LACK OF NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT, THE EMBARGO IS STRICTER TODAY
THAN IN ANY POINT IN HISTORY--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
For almost half a century, the United States has maintained a comprehensive set of punitive
sanctions against Cuba. Originally, the Cuban embargo developed as sanctions in retaliation for
Fidel Castro's expropriation of $ 1.6 billion to $ 2 billion worth of American property in 1960 to 1961.
After the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the embargo developed
into a means to pressure Cuba into severing ties with the Soviet Union. Decades later, with the
disappearance of the Soviet Union and Cuba's abandonment of support for guerrilla groups in 1991,
the U.S. government has justified the embargo exclusively in terms of promoting democracy and
human rights. For the past 16 years, successive U.S. administrations have argued that the embargo
must continue in order to pressure the Cuban government towards respecting its citizens' human
rights and undertaking democratic reforms. Indeed, long after Cuba has ceased to be a national
[*202] security threat to the United States, the embargo is stricter today than it has been at any point
in its 47-year history.
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STATUS OF US-CUBAN RELATIONS: SPECIFIC LAWS
TSRA DEFINED--Clendinning '08
[Catherine; JD Candidate at the Southern Methodist University School of Law; “The Great North American Trade-Off:
Legislation Shaping Trade Policies Between Cuba and the United States;” Law and Business Review of the Americas;
Winter 2008; LN]
Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000
Shortly before leaving office, President Clinton signed the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export
Enhancement Act (TSRA) of 2000 into law. n52 While the TSRA did not change the ban on imports
from Cuba, it did allow for exceptions of medical and agricultural exports. n53 While the change in
U.S. policy opened up a profitable market for U.S. farmers, the financial restrictions built in to the
TSRA limit transactions to those "financed by payment of cash in advance or through financing by a
third-country financial institution." n54 The U.S. Treasury clarified the financial restrictions in 2005
to allow financing through letters of credit, so long as the bank was in a third country and was
authorized under the provisions. n55
The TSRA has improved trade between Cuba and the United States greatly and even played a role in
the rebuilding of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina hit in 2005. n56 The first shipment of U.S. rice
to Cuba under the TSRA left from the Port of Lake Charles, and between 2001 and 2004, more than
half of the "agricultural commodities sold to Cuba through TRSA" were shipped through the Port of
New Orleans. n57 In 2005, Cuba bought from companies in thirty-eight U.S. states, and as of 2004,
Cuba was the twenty-first "largest market for U.S. agricultural exports," importing about $ 380
million worth of agricultural products from the United States that year.
HELMS-BURTON DESCRIBED--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
The unabashed goal of Helms-Burton was to establish a democratic government in Cuba that did
not include the Castro brothers. n131 Much like the CDA, Title II of the Helms-Burton Act
specifically spelled out the necessary characteristics of a democratic government in Cuba n132 as
well as the forthcoming U.S. policy responses if such a government was formed. n133 Thus, the
definitions of "transitional government" and "democratically elected government" are Title II's key
provisions. The requirements for a transitional government include the legalization of multi-party
political activity, the release of political prisoners, and the dissolution of the Department of State
Security. n134 Once the U.S. president determines and informs [*220] Congress that a transitional
government is in place, he or she shall execute a "plan for assistance." n135 The president is also
authorized to provide some assistance to Cuba in the meantime, such as food, medicine, and other
items that constitute "basic human needs." n136
In addition, a "democratically elected" government must result from free elections, respect civil
liberties, transition "toward a market-oriented" economy, commit to constitutional reforms, and
compensate U.S. citizens whose property was expropriated by the Revolution. n137 Title II
authorizes the president's assistance plan to include a full range of economic assistance upon the
installment of a democratically elected government in Cuba. n138
Finally, Title II details the procedure for suspending or lifting the embargo. n139 Upon determining
that a transitional government is in place, the president may suspend enforcement. n140 The
president shall only proceed to terminate the embargo once he determines that Cuba has a
democratic government. n141 Provisions of the CDA would thus be repealed by operation of law
pursuant to this determination. n142 Congress, however, is entitled to review the suspension of the
embargo and nullify the president's decision by joint resolution.
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TRADE ALREADY EXISTS BETWEEN THE US/CUBA WITHOUT IMPACT
TRADE HAS EXISTED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA FOR FIVE YEARS WITHOUT
IMPACT EITHER WAY--Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
The United States' trade restrictions against Cuba have been a well-known fact of life for Cubans and
Americans alike for over 45 years. Whether known as "the embargo" or "el bloqueo," the prohibition
has had an impact upon various factions in both populations. Though lesser known, there have been
hundreds of millions of dollars of trade between the two countries for over five years as a result of
the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSRA), which authorizes the export of
U.S. agricultural products to Cuba under strict restrictions.
US IS ALREADY EXPORTING FOOD TO CUBA VIA THE TSRA--Ross '04
[James; Professor of Food and Resource Economics at the University of Florida; “The Impact of Potential Changes in U.S.Cuba Relations on Midwest Agribusiness Trade and Investment;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004;
LN]
In 2000, the U.S. Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSRA), n72 was signed into
law. It was not until July 12, 2001, however, that the implementing regulations were published. n73
One of the primary purposes of TSRA was to require the U.S. Government to license commercial
sales of agricultural commodities to purchasers in Cuba. All sales by U.S. companies were to be
authorized only in U.S. dollars on a cash basis--no credit transactions would be permitted. n74
With the changes in U.S. policy regarding food and agricultural exports to Cuba and Cuba's reduced
food supply as a result of tropical storms and other factors, food imports from the United States were
initiated in the new century. Initially, Cuba cast aside offers of U.S. food products, including
donations for disaster assistance. Following Hurricane Michelle in November 2001, however, Cuba's
food reserve was depleted and Cuba turned to the United States for food, especially bulk
commodities, such as wheat, soybeans, and rice. Cuba also imported consumer-oriented products,
especially poultry meat, for distribution through ration stores and to provide institutions with food.
In 2001, the United States exported $ 4.6 million in food to Cuba. In 2002, U.S. food exports to Cuba
increased to $ 140 million, and, as of August 2003, [*771] exports were running about 50% greater
year-to-date than in 2002. See Table 5, infra.
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TRAVEL ALREADY EXISTS BETWEEN THE US/CUBA
DESPITE SANCTIONS, 200,000 AMERICANS VISIT CUBA EACH YEAR--Sarmiento '05
[Ignacio; JD Candidate at Nova Southeastern University; “INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AFFAIRS: TRAVELING TO CUBA?
SORRY, IT'S CLOSED;” Nova Law Review; Winter 2005; LN]
Due to its communist state, the United States government severely restricts travel to the island of
Cuba. n6 The Trading with the Enemy Act n7 prohibits travel to Cuba unless the individual is
licensed. n8 A violation of this restriction involves criminal sanctions, including up to ten years in
prison and civil penalties of up to $ 50,000 per person. n9 Despite the impending possibility of
criminal prosecution, it is estimated that 200,000 Americans successfully visited Cuba in 2003. n10
Americans are able to circumvent the law, which is less than copiously enforced by United States
officials, by first traveling to Canada or Mexico and then flying into Cuba.
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MONEY EXCHANGE ALREADY EXISTS BETWEEN THE US/CUBA
DESPITE SANCTIONS, CURRENCY MAKES IT TO CUBA ANYWAY--Spandoni '04
[Paolo; PdD Candidate at the University of Florida; “SYMPOSIUM: WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC
& SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART I OF II: CUBA TODAY: U.S. Financial Flows in the Cuban Economy;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004; LN]
There has been considerable debate about just how effective U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba
have been in denying hard currency earnings to the Castro government. In light of the available
information, it could be argued that the United States has not only been unable to foster
fundamental political reforms in Cuba, but also has actually contributed to the recovery of the
island's economy from the deep recession of the early 1990s. The purpose of this study is to
demonstrate that, in spite of the tightening of the embargo, the United States has played and
continues to play quite an important role in the Cuban economy. More specifically, significant
amounts of hard currency have been channeled into the Cuban economy through U.S. visitors
(especially Cuban-Americans), remittances sent by Cuban exiles to their families on the island, U.S.
telecommunications payments to Cuba, U.S. food exports (sold in government-owned dollar stores),
and U.S. investors who hold publicly traded shares of major foreign firms engaged in business
activities with the government of Fidel Castro. The study also intends to demonstrate that a
significant share of hard currency reaching Cuba is in violation of U.S. regulations, thus providing
some evidence for the inability of the U.S. government to obtain compliance from its own citizens.
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PRO
CUBA POSES NO THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES
CUBA POSES NO THREAT TO US NATIONAL SECURITY--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
The U.S. embargo against Cuba is not a national security embargo. Cuba poses no threat to U.S.
national security, and the U.S. government does not claim that it does. n431 Unlike the justifications
for the sanctions against [*266] Iraq in the 1990s and those currently in effect against Iran and
North Korean, n432 the U.S. government does not claim that Cuba is developing weapons of mass
destruction or that Cuba poses a danger to American security. n433 For a decade and a half, the
embargo's sole justification has been the promotion of democracy and human rights on the island.
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CURRENT POLICY HAS FAILED TO ACHIEVE REGIME CHANGE
EMBARGO HAS DONE NOTHING TO FURTHER REGIME CHANGE--Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
Since its inception, the embargo has served as the source of great controversy in the United States,
Cuba and the global community. n6 It has been widely criticized for its failure to function as an
impetus for regime change in Cuba and was even noted as a potential factor in Fidel Castro's ability
to retain power for nearly half a century, only then to pass it off to his brother Raul. n7 It can be
argued that the embargo has had the exact opposite effect on the Cuban Government and the Castro
Regime than what the U.S government had intended when initiating the trade restrictions.
US POLICY FOCUS IN CUBA HAS BEEN MISGUIDED--Spandoni '04
[Paolo; PdD Candidate at the University of Florida; “SYMPOSIUM: WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC
& SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART I OF II: CUBA TODAY: U.S. Financial Flows in the Cuban Economy;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004; LN]
In short, unless significant steps are taken in one of the proposed directions, the United States will
have no choice but to wait until Castro passes from the scene by natural causes, and hope his
successor will be less resilient than he, or perhaps more inclined to introduce extensive democratic
reforms. To conclude, consider a recent quote by U.S. President George W. Bush that exemplifies the
great irony of economic sanctions with respect to Cuba. In May 2002, Bush stated: "The sanctions
the United States enforces against the Castro regime are not just a policy tool, but a moral statement.
It is wrong to prop up a regime that routinely stifles all the freedoms that make us human." n126 If
this is the case, then the findings of this paper demonstrate that U.S. policy toward Cuba in the postCold War era has been nothing other than a "wrong" policy.
THE EMBARGO SLOWS THE POLITICAL OPENING OF CUBA--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
The aforementioned 2007 United Nations report on the situation of human rights in Cuba noted
that the U.S. embargo actually retards rather than contributes to a political opening. The embargo
and the recent Helms-Burton legislation has seriously affected the civil and political rights of Cuban
citizens by provoking reactions from Cuban authorities who often respond to foreign interference
with domestic policy by enacting repressive laws. n366 Thus, the embargo is the most powerful
political cover under which [*254] the Cuban government repeatedly justifies its unwillingness to
broaden the scope of individual civil and political liberties on the island.
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NO ACADEMIC CONCLUSION EXISTS ON WHETHER OR NOT EMBARGOES CAN CREATE
REGIME CHANGE--Colmer '04
[Josep M.; Research Professor in Political Science; “CUBA & DEMOCRATIZATION: SHOULD SANCTIONS BE LIFTED?: Who
Could End the Embargo? A Game-Theoretical Perspective;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004;
LN]
Actually, the evidence on the consequences of alternative economic paths for political change
collected in the academic literature is not conclusive, in spite of the accumulated volume of more
than forty years. Essentially, two hypotheses polarize the interpretations of empirical observations.
On the one side, certain students consider that stable political liberty and democracy require some
prerequisites, in particular a certain level of economic development. This old hypothesis has been
submitted to continuous and close scrutiny as successive democratization waves have developed in
the world. In economic terms, democracy is here considered a luxury good - something that people
demand only after having satisfied more basic needs. One of the most recent and influential
formulations, based on the most comprehensive set of empirical data collected, states that certain
levels of economic development (roughly measured by per capita income) are not necessary for
establishing a democratic regime, but they help very much its further duration. This finding is partly
based on long-term analysis, but regarding the last thirty years - when most current democracies
were established - the fact is that very few of the many democratic regimes in underdeveloped
countries with low levels of per capita income have been destabilized.
CUTTING CUBA OFF FROM DEMOCRATIC NATIONS WILL LIMIT ABILITY OF CUBA TO
MIMIC DEMOCRATIC NATIONS--Nichols '09
[Philip M.; Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics at the University of Pennsylvania; “SYMPOSIUM ARTICLE:
USING SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF ISOMORPHISM TO EVALUATE THE POSSIBILITY OF REGIME CHANGE
THROUGH TRADE SANCTIONS;” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law; Spring 2009; LN]
One effect of a comprehensive trade sanction or embargo is that it precludes the repeated
interaction that may lead to mimicry. Cuba, cut off from interaction with democratic nations, could
not easily copy those democratic nations' institutions. On the other hand, Cuba could easily copy the
institutions of those nations who did not comply with the United State's sanctions, and in particular
with the Soviet countries. One vivid example of this is the Cuban legal system, which President Fidel
Castro ordered completely rewritten. n161 The development of a legal system almost always requires
mimicry - the development of a completely novel legal system is a staggering undertaking. n162 The
Cuban legal system, unsurprisingly, is a socialist legal system. n163 Far from forcing Cuba to imitate
the legal systems of democratic countries, the trade sanctions imposed by the United States virtually
guaranteed that Cuba would mimic those of the countries engaged in a cold war with the United
States.
LACK OF INTERACTION WITH SANCTIONING NATIONS HAS PUSHED CUBA TO INTERACT
WITH OTHER HOSTILE TO THE UNITED STATES--Nichols '09
[Philip M.; Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics at the University of Pennsylvania; “SYMPOSIUM ARTICLE:
USING SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF ISOMORPHISM TO EVALUATE THE POSSIBILITY OF REGIME CHANGE
THROUGH TRADE SANCTIONS;” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law; Spring 2009; LN]
On the other hand, lack of interaction with sanctioning nations may actually enhance the perceived
benefit of interaction with non-sanctioning nations, or even lead to dependency on those nations.
n168 Such was the case with Cuba. Cuba became a client state of the Soviet Union, n169 and on
occasion acted in accordance with the Soviet Union's wishes rather than its own. n170 Using the
language of sociologists, exclusion from association with sanctioning states makes the positive
incentives offered by non-sanctioning states more attractive and thus perversely increases the
likelihood of coercive isomorphism with the institutions of those nations.
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SANCTIONS HAVE FAILED IN OVERTHROWING CASTRO--DeMelfi '06
[Christy; JD/MBA Candidate at Hofstra University; “NOTHING BUT THE FACTS: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA;” The Journal of International Business & Law;” Spring 2006; LN]
The original goal discussed was to overthrow Castro. It was hoped that the strain of the sanctions
would anger the population and encourage them to overthrow Castro. Once it was realized that
Castro would not be removed from office, the objective changed to one of retaliation for the
confiscation of U.S. property in Cuba. In total, there was $ 1.8 billion in claims from the U.S. against
Cuba. In 1960, the State Department said that the purpose of the embargo was to "defend the
legitimate economic interests of [U.S] citizens ... [*154] against the aggressive, injurious and
discriminatory policy of Castro's regime." (Kaplowitz, 1998, pg. 4)
As time evolved, the goal was changed to containment, because it was clear Castro would not be
overthrown, and U.S. citizens would not have their property returned. Under this new goal, the
Cuban revolution was meant to be deprived by decreasing money available to the Cuban
government. In theory, it was meant to make sure the communist movement did not gain further
momentum and spread to other countries.
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CURRENT POLICY HURTS US BUSINESS
EMBARGO HAS HURT US BUSINESSES--Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
More recently, the trade sanctions have been harshly criticized for their impact upon various U.S.
economic sectors, specifically the loss of significant earning potential that could result from open
trade relations between the United States and Cuba.
SANCTIONS NATURALLY HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE COUNTRY IMPOSING THEM-DeMelfi '06
[Christy; JD/MBA Candidate at Hofstra University; “NOTHING BUT THE FACTS: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA;” The Journal of International Business & Law;” Spring 2006; LN]
Even though economic sanctions are intended to have negative effects on the economy of the target
country, they also affect the economy of the country or countries imposing them. In addition to
having a general negative [*143] effect on the economy, sanctions can also affect individual
companies and employees. There are many negative consequences of imposing sanctions, such as
lower exports, less foreign investments, fewer jobs in the export sector, and loss of market share in
the global economy.
SANCTIONS MEAN A LOSS IN MARKET SHARE FOR BUSINESSES IN THE IMPOSING
COUNTRY--DeMelfi '06
[Christy; JD/MBA Candidate at Hofstra University; “NOTHING BUT THE FACTS: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA;” The Journal of International Business & Law;” Spring 2006; LN]
Lost market share of businesses in the imposing country can also be a consequence of economic
sanctions. In such a case, because of the lost market share, those companies will sell fewer goods.
This decrease in demand will thus cause jobs to be cut in the economy. It is clear that the negative
consequences of economic sanctions in the imposing country can be quite severe. To put this into
perspective, the Council on Competitiveness found that "eight specific sanctions cost the U.S.
economy $ 6 billion in annual export sales and 120,000 export related jobs." (O'Quinn, 1997, pg. 9)
Even though the U.S. economy is very large, with a GDP over $ 10 trillion, (Work Fact Book 2002) a
loss of that magnitude can not be written off as totally insignificant.
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CURRENT POLICY DRIVES BUSINESS TO COMPETITORS
SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA HAVE HURT AMERICAN BUSINESSES AND DRIVEN TRADE
BUSINESS TO OUR COMPETITORS--Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
Second, domestically, the more significant concern was the impact felt by American farmers and
ranchers. n15 An estimated $ 500 million of agricultural sales were lost annually as a result of
embargoes of Iran, Syria, Sudan and Cuba. n16 The trade sanctions aimed at Cuba, specifically, were
noted as creating a loss of market share to competing agricultural suppliers (e.g. Canada, the
European Union, and Argentina), driving up the prices at which those countries sell their products
as a [*151] result of thin competition, and undermining the United States' reputation as a reliable
supplier to its regular customers.
CHINA STEPPING INTO CUBA TO MEET MARKET DEMANDS--Erikson '04
[Daniel P.; Director of Caribbean Programs at the Inter-America Dialogue; “WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART II OF II: CUBA'S FUTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND
INVESTMENT: The Future of American Business in Cuba: Realities, Risks, and Rewards;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
Cuba has also sought to strengthen relations with China through agreements in the areas of hotel
construction, technological trade, tourism, mining, and industry. n16 In 2001, Chinese premier
Jiang Zemin made an official visit to Havana and opened a $ 400 million credit line to Cuba; shortly
thereafter China leapfrogged Spain to become the leading provider of consumer goods to Cuba, with
over $ 600 million in bilateral trade. n17 China's newfound interest in Cuba cuts across the
spectrum of the island's major industries. The island is the first Latin American country to be
designated an "official tourist destination" by China, with 20,000 Chinese tourists expected in 2004.
As a major consumer of nickel, China has agreed to increase imports of nickel and cobalt. n18 This
is part of a political effort to mend relations that were strained during Cuba's long alliance with the
Soviet Union, but it also reflects China's renewed interest in Latin America and its ideological
sympathies with Cuba. Although a much smaller presence than China, Vietnam is also a trusted
economic partner and supplies the island with more than half of its rice imports.
CHINA INCREASING ITS TRADE RELATIONS WITH CUBA--Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
China is another example of a country that has improved its standing with Cuba and increased trade
relations with Cuba since the [*160] dissolution of the Soviet Union. n78 Through the deferral of
loan payments -which Cuba incurred during the Special Period -- and grants of credit, China has
steadily increased its role in the Cuban trade market in recent years as a result of the countries'
similar political regimes.
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IN ABSENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, OTHER COUNTRIES ARE TAPPING THE CUBAN
MARKETS--Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
Another relevant factor that may dictate the success of any future U.S.-Cuban trade relations is the
state of Cuba's existing partnerships with other foreign countries. Since the Special Period, Cuba has
developed strong ties with a number of international trade partners, including Venezuela, China,
Spain, Canada, Holland, Brazil, Germany, Italy and Mexico. n160 Though the United States has also
played a role in Cuban foreign trade since 2001, solely through TSRA-authorized exports, its share of
this total market has hovered around 5%. n161 This figure may be impressive given the associated
prohibitions and restrictions, but other countries are taking advantage of the Cuban market where
the United States would appear to have a leg up on the competition. Alimport itself, in statements
made to private entities currently trading with Cuba, noted that "[t]he opportunities available in this
neighboring and traditionally friendly country are being tapped by your competition elsewhere in
the world." n162 The potential share of the U.S. role in Cuba's total foreign trade, should trade be
expanded and travel restrictions be eased or repealed, far exceeds its current state.
CUBA AND VENEZUELA HAVE INCREASED THEIR TRADE IN THE EMBARGO ERA--Margulies
'08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
The burgeoning relationship between both Fidel and Raul Castro and Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez, in particular, has been fruitful for the two nations. A recent agreement between them has
resulted in the transfer of low-cost Venezuelan oil exports in exchange for Cuban medical services.
n74 The U.S. government estimates that Venezuelan oil "subsidies" reached more than $ 2 billion in
2006, while also providing upwards of $ 500 million in credit for various projects, including housing
and electricity. n75 As further indication of how this relationship has flourished, in 2004 and 2005
Cuba imported more than double the amount of commodities from Venezuela than they had from
any other nation. n76 In this new political climate, Cuba's continued investment in medical services
and education, even throughout the Special Period, is paying off in large returns, as there is an
increasing demand for such services by Latin American and Caribbean countries.
RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE MEAN THAT CUBA DOES BUSINESS WITH OTHERS LIKE CHINA
OR VENEZUELA--Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
While TSRA has allowed the United States to play a role in the Cuban economy, American interests
have not flourished quite like those of Venezuela and China. Though the United States entered the
Cuban market in 2001 and steadily increased their share for nearly four years, 2005 presented a
stumbling block in that growth. n80 Following the Bush administration's tightening of trade and
travel restrictions, the U.S. share of the Cuban import market decreased from 8% to 6%, while
Venezuela increased their share from 20% to nearly 25%, and China's share increased from 10.5% to
11.8%, surpassing Spain. n81 Today, the U.S. Department of State claims it is the fourth largest
supplier of goods to the Cuban economy, behind only Venezuela, China and Spain. n82 Despite the
fact that it solely provides agricultural commodities to Cuba in the face of increased restrictions, the
United States has clearly made its presence felt amongst other nations competing for a position in
the Cuban market.
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THE ABILITY TO TRADE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES HAS MADE THE EMBARGO FAIL--DeMelfi
'06
[Christy; JD/MBA Candidate at Hofstra University; “NOTHING BUT THE FACTS: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA;” The Journal of International Business & Law;” Spring 2006; LN]
There are various reasons offered as to why the embargo has failed. The basic reason is that the
Cuban government has learned to get around the embargo by trading with other countries. As was
seen, this is often a problem. This was especially true when Cuba turned to trading with the Soviet
Union during much of the embargo's life. Others feel the embargo failed because of the ingenuity of
Fidel Castro. Castro has smartly shifted the blame for Cuban economic problems onto the U.S. Some
also feel the embargo failed because its goals were too difficult. This is particularly true of the goal to
oust Castro. Here the U.S. tried to exercise too much power.
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CURRENT POLICY HURTS CUBAN PEOPLE AND NOT CASTRO
THE EMBARGO WIDELY VIOLATES THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
The Cuban embargo is not a limited set of economic sanctions affecting a few carefully targeted
areas of Cuba's government and society. Instead, it is a comprehensive program that prohibits
virtually all American trade, investment, travel, cultural and human contact with Cuba outside of a
few narrow exceptions. Moreover, throughout the embargo's 47-year history, different U.S.
administrations have worked aggressively to expand the embargo's extraterritorial reach in order to
pressure as many countries as possible to reduce their contacts with Cuba. The embargo's extensive
extraterritorial reach and power as well as its disproportionate nature are magnified by Cuba's
weakness as a small Caribbean island of 11 million people, its peculiar geographical location only 90
miles from the United States, and the U.S.'s own international economic and financial preeminence.
As currently structured, the embargo has comprehensive, widespread, and indiscriminate effects on
the economic, social, and family conditions of the Cuban people that cause it to violate widely
recognized human rights norms as well as the basic obligation of states to ensure that sanctions
imposed for the sake of promoting human rights do not have the opposite effect of harming the
human rights of innocent people.
SANCTIONS HAVE DONE MORE TO HURT THE CUBAN PEOPLE THAN HURT THE CUBAN
LEADERSHIP--Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
In 1999, the House Committee on Agriculture held a hearing to address the detrimental effects that
unilateral U.S. sanctions on trade with Cuba imposed on U.S. agriculture. n10 Two themes ran
through the testimony of Representatives and witnesses from agricultural entities and [*150]
governmental agencies. First, a disservice was being done to the larger Cuban population. n11 There
were concerns that food and medical supplies were being utilized as a tool to achieve foreign policy
goals. The restrictions were seemingly intended to limit any contributions to the success of the
Cuban government and stimulate social upheaval by the Cuban populace against the Castro regime.
n12 This tactic met both strong popular and political opposition for its inhumane nature and failure
to meet its objectives. n13 One representative concluded that the sanctions had a "debilitating
effect, not on the leadership, but on the citizens." n14 The sanctions were ineffective in initiating a
change in the polity of the Cuban state.
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RESTRICTIONS OF REMITTANCES AFFECTED ONLY ORDINARY FAMILIES--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
The fall of the Soviet Union did not relax U.S. policy toward Cuba but instead had the opposite effect.
In 1991, the Soviet Union cut off all remaining subsidies to Cuba, precipitating a descent by the
Cuban economy into a severe depression that would eventually shrink Cuba's GDP by 35%. Believing
that the Castro regime was on its last legs, OFAC reduced the maximum allowable quarterly
remittances from $ 500 to only $ 300. n74 The Soviet Union's fall had provided sanctions advocates
with a new and seemingly powerful argument: whereas support from the Soviets had undermined
the success of the sanctions up to that point, the Soviets' demise meant that sanctions would finally
achieve the desired objective of forcing Castro from power. n75 There is no record as to whether
humanitarian implications were considered in a decision that most drastically affected ordinary
families that depended on remittances for their livelihood.
THE EMBARGO ADVERSELY AFFECTS THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF VAST NUMBERS OF CUBANS-Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
The Cuban embargo's sole purpose, as articulated officially by the U.S. government, is to promote
human rights and democracy on the island. However, because the embargo is comprehensive and
indiscriminate, the [*273] embargo adversely affects the human rights of vast numbers of innocent
Cubans, especially in the areas of economic, social, and cultural rights. The embargo has also failed
since its inception more than four decades ago to contribute to the promotion of human rights on
the island, and it continues to retard any possible political opening by fostering a siege mentality
among Cuban leadership. Moreover, the embargo disregards the clear wishes of the people of Cuba
for closer economic, family and cultural ties to the United States, thereby contradicting its own
ostensibly democratic rationale and further detracting from the limited possibilities currently
available to Cubans to create a more open society.
THE EMBARGO IS NOTHING MORE THAN HARASSMENT OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE--DeMelfi
'06
[Christy; JD/MBA Candidate at Hofstra University; “NOTHING BUT THE FACTS: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA;” The Journal of International Business & Law;” Spring 2006; LN]
Some believe the embargo should be lifted because it causes the Cuban people unnecessary
suffering and deprivation. Others go a step further, and claim the embargo is nothing but
harassment of the Cuban people. Because the U.S. was Cuba's largest trading partner before the
sanction, accounting for over seventy five percent of both Cuban imports and exports, it is believed
that Cubans are cut off from various goods, which only the U.S. could bring to them. This is of great
concern to many because the goods that cause suffering are the U.S.'s medical advancements. Due
to the embargo, medicines that are only made in the U.S. are denied to people who need them in
Cuba.
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ADDITIONAL RESTRICTIONS IN THE 90s MADE THE HUMAN EFFECTS OF THE EMBARGO
DANGEROUSLY EXACERBATED--Campos '04
[Javier; Professor of Anesthesia at the University of Iowa Health Care; “The Impact of the U.S. Embargo on Health Care in
Cuba: A Clinician's Perspective;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
With this piece of legislation, the human effects of the trade embargo were dangerously exacerbated.
First, the CDA imposed a ban on subsidiary trade with Cuba. n9 This ban inhibited Cuba's ability to
import medicines and medical supplies from third-country sources. Second, a provision of the CDA
that addresses licensing guidelines n10 had a serious human impact. The U.S. [*519] Treasury and
Commerce Departments were allowed in principle to license individual sales of medicines and
medical supplies for humanitarian reasons to mitigate the embargo's impact on health care
delivery; however, licensing provisions are so difficult to obtain that this provision discouraged
many U.S. suppliers from applying for the license. Multiple licenses for medicines (including newer
drugs) and medical equipment have been denied based on the principle that these exports to Cuba
would be detrimental to U.S. foreign policy interests.
EMBARGO-RELATED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES ARE FAR REACHING INCLUDING HEALTH,
NUTRITION, EDUCATION AND CULTURE--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
Because the embargo has such far-reaching effects on foreign trade and investment with Cuba, its
effects on human rights are similarly far-reaching, encompassing such areas as public health,
nutrition, education, culture, and even fundamental family rights. In general, economic sanctions
affect education in the sanctioned country by decreasing access to supplies, which ultimately leads
to the deterioration of infrastructure. n264 The Cuban government estimates that the embargo has
cost Cuba an estimated average of $ 2.19 billion a year since 1959, a figure that may be quite
conservative in light of several factors. n265 First, the embargo is unusually comprehensive and
affects every area of Cuba's economic life. Second, it deprives Cuba of the benefits from economies
of scale and geographical advantages associated with the U.S. market. Third, the dollar's role as the
international currency of choice, the preeminent role of U.S. banks in international trade especially
in the western hemisphere, and the embargo's extraterritorial reach combine to [*238] increase
substantially the costs to Cuba of trading with many other countries.
THE US EMBARGO IS ONE OF THE FACTORS HINDERING HUMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
The most recent United Nations report on human rights in Cuba referred to the U.S. embargo as one
of the "factors hindering the realization of human rights in Cuba," and noted that:
The restrictions imposed by the embargo help to deprive Cuba of vital access to medicines, new
scientific and medical technology, food, chemical water treatment and electricity. The disastrous
effects of the embargo in terms of the economic, social and cultural rights of the Cuban people have
been denounced by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations
Children's Fund, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
and the World Health Organization ... . n266
Thus, though the embargo is now promoted as a means of improving human rights, the embargo
has had the opposite effect of harming human rights.
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THE CUBAN EMBARGO HAS A DESTRUCTIVE EFFECT ON INNOCENT POPULATIONS--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
Other international developments have strained the United States' rationale for its punitive
embargo, which is ostensibly to promote human rights in Cuba. Economic sanctions still are a
popular alternative to military action. n429 In recent years, however, researchers have begun to note
the destructive effects of sanctions on innocent populations. n430 Grave criticisms have been
leveled at all types of sanctions but are especially relevant in the context of "human rights"
embargos. Unlike "national security" embargoes in which the sanctioning state's sovereignty is
affected by a military or security threat posed by the other state, human rights embargoes are merely
optional and reflect a desire to pressure the sanctioned state into stricter compliance with human
rights norms. Because of their adverse effects on human rights, economic sanctions, especially
those as comprehensive as the Cuban embargo, can be disproportionate and can undermine the
very legal norms they claim to be promoting.
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CURRENT POLICY HURTS CUBAN PUBLIC HEALTH
THE EMBARGO LIMITS LIFE-SAVING DRUGS FROM BEING SOLD TO CUBA--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
The Cuban government claims that in the ten-month period between June 2004 and April 2005, the
embargo cost Cuba $ 75.7 million in public health damages alone. n286 This cost is a result of the
laborious licensing process that Cuba must comply with in order to purchase medical products
manufactured in the United States or by U.S. subsidiaries. n287 Like the rest of the embargo, the
licensing procedures do not target certain carefully selected products but rather are comprehensive
and indiscriminate. These procedures pose serious problems when considering that U.S. companies
produce approximately 50% of all new patented drugs in the world. n288
In a widely publicized 1997 report, the American Association for World Health ("AAWH") found that
the embargo's arduous licensing provisions actively discouraged medical trade and commerce. n289
AAWH further reported that in some cases U.S. officials provided American firms with misleading or
confusing information. n290 In addition, it reported that several licenses for legitimate medications
and medical equipment were denied as "detrimental to U.S. foreign policy interests." n291 The
AAWH concluded that, as a result of inaccurate or confusing information from U.S. officials, [*242]
one-half of the firms they surveyed incorrectly believed that the embargo prevented all sales of
medications and medical supplies to Cuba.
THE EMBARGO STRONG IMPACTS KIDS WITH CANCER--Campos '04
[Javier; Professor of Anesthesia at the University of Iowa Health Care; “The Impact of the U.S. Embargo on Health Care in
Cuba: A Clinician's Perspective;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
In the 1996 AAWH report, one particular group was identified as having suffered the most: pediatric
patients with different forms of cancer. n23 During an AAWH visit to an oncology ward, it was found
that thirty-five children [*521] with cancer were each vomiting an average of twenty-eight to thirty
times a day because of the lack of anti-nausea drugs. n24 The acquisition cost of these types of
drugs, namely metroclopramide, is forty-five cents per vial in the United States. Unfortunately,
metroclopramide was not available in the pediatric oncology ward in the children's hospital in Cuba.
Limited access to chemotherapy drugs led to the increase in mortality in children with acute
lymphoblastic leukemia. Another problem identified in the AAWH report was the lack of
intravenous site ports required to administer chemotherapy drugs to children with different forms
of cancer. n25 These implantable, intravenous port sites are used instead of multiple punctures in a
child's vein to avoid pain, trauma, or psychological stress. Because of the lack of port sites many
children had to be punctured in their neck veins; compromise to the airway was the cause of death in
some children.
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US EMBARGO HAS DISCOURAGED OTHER COUNTRIES FROM SENDING MEDICAL AID TO
CUBA--Campos '04
[Javier; Professor of Anesthesia at the University of Iowa Health Care; “The Impact of the U.S. Embargo on Health Care in
Cuba: A Clinician's Perspective;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
Since the signing of the CDA, the embargo has prohibited cargo ships from loading or unloading
their products in U.S. ports for 180 days after delivering cargo to Cuba. n11 This tough policy had
discouraged other countries from delivering medical supplies to the island. Some countries have
been willing to take the risk, but have increased their shipping costs between 50% and 400%. The sixmonth docking rule alone is estimated to have increased average shipping costs by about 10%.
Providing humanitarian aid has been a problem, and this has a direct effect on the Cuban people,
even though many charity organizations from the United States and around the world have stepped
in to facilitate their access to medicines, medical supplies, and food. The supplies of humanitarian
aid have not been enough to meet the requirements and needs of every citizen of Cuba.
THE EMBARGO LIMITS CUBAN ACCESS TO HEALTH AND MEDICAL CARE, DIMINISHING
HUMAN RIGHTS--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
An arduous and confusing process that discourages even legal sales of medication and medical
supplies from U.S. companies or subsidiaries harms Cubans' human rights to health and medical
care. The licensing procedures often effectively ensure that vital health products are only available to
Cubans through intermediaries at prohibitive prices that are much higher than in the American
market. n293 The resulting impact of medication shortages in Cuba is well documented. n294 For
example, between 1992 and 1993, medication shortages in Cuba accounted for a 48% increase in
deaths from tuberculosis; a 67% increase in deaths due to infectious and parasitic diseases; and a
77% increase in deaths from influenza and pneumonia.
HELMS-BURTON HAS STRONG IMPACTED HEALTH CARE IN CUBA--Campos '04
[Javier; Professor of Anesthesia at the University of Iowa Health Care; “The Impact of the U.S. Embargo on Health Care in
Cuba: A Clinician's Perspective;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
The Effect of the 1996 Helms-Burton Act on Health Care in Cuba. In 1996, President Clinton signed
the Helms-Burton Act into law in order to tighten sanctions against communist Cuba. n29 The U.S.
Congress passed this bill after the Cuban military shot down two out of three U.S. civilian planes
over the Straits of Florida, killing four members of a Cuban-American exile group. The sponsors of
the bill were Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina) and Representative Dan Burton (R-Indiana).
This new law required an act of Congress to reinforce any part of the U.S. embargo against Cuba,
mandatory denial of visas to individuals who use or profit from confiscated Cuban property, and
allowed Cuban-Americans to sue those who confiscated property in Cuba. n30 Part of the bill that
was passed by the U.S. Congress is described below.
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THE EMBARGO RENDERS THE CUBAN HEALTH SYSTEM WORTHLESS--Campos '04
[Javier; Professor of Anesthesia at the University of Iowa Health Care; “The Impact of the U.S. Embargo on Health Care in
Cuba: A Clinician's Perspective;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
The Cuban health care system has been considered a preeminent model in the developing world. In
fact, the Cuban Constitution makes health care a right of every citizen and makes health care the
responsibility of the Cuban government. Perhaps one of the strengths of the Cuban government is
universal coverage and comprehensive health care provided to its citizens. Unfortunately, the lack of
medicines and limited access to newer medicines makes this system questionable. A doctor might
be able to prescribe a medicine to a Cuban patient, only to find out that the prescribed drug is not
available in any pharmacy. By personal communication I have been informed that a black market for
new medicines exists in Cuba and is a serious problem at the present time.
Medical expenditures in the national budget are estimated to be twenty-six percent of the total gross
budget, a remarkable and unique percentage that has allowed the Cuban health care system to
subsist. In fact, Cuba is known as the "scientific pole," the top of a chain of research centers, and is
considered one of the best in Latin America and Europe. This "scientific pole" is composed of
different buildings, including the National Research Center, the Center for Molecular Immunology,
and the Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology, among others.
EMBARGO HAS SPECIFICALLY IMPACTED CUBA'S EFFORTS TO MODERNIZE HIV/AIDS
TREATMENT--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
More recently, the Cuban government has issued reports in the United Nations General Assembly
documenting the ways in which the U.S. embargo makes the process of obtaining medications and
medical equipment unnecessarily difficult and costly. n296 Two examples include Cuba's
unsuccessful attempts to purchase an anti-viral medication called Tenofovir (Viread) from the U.S.
firm Gilead and Depo-Provera, a contraceptive drug, from another U.S. firm, Pfizer. Because it would
have required an export license from the U.S. government, Gilead was unable to sell Tenofovir, and
Cuba was forced to purchase the medication through third-parties at a significantly higher price.
The Cuban government cited this as an example of the embargo's negative impact on Cuba's efforts
to modernize its HIV/AIDS treatments. n297 In the Depo-Provera example, Cuba reported that,
despite Cuba's attempts to purchase the drug as part of a national program associated with the
United Nations Population Fund, Pfizer claimed it could not sell the product to Cuba without
obtaining a number of licenses, a process which would take several months. n298 Cuba's report to
the United Nations [*243] also chronicled obstacles the country faced in obtaining medical
equipment from U.S. companies and subsidiaries.
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NUMEROUS CATEGORIES OF PUBLIC HEALTH HAVE BEEN IMPACTED BY THE EMBARGO-Campos '04
[Javier; Professor of Anesthesia at the University of Iowa Health Care; “The Impact of the U.S. Embargo on Health Care in
Cuba: A Clinician's Perspective;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
Numerous organizations have studied the implications of the U.S. embargo on the health care in
Cuba. Among these, the American Association for World Health (AAWH), a nonprofit charitable and
educational organization that oversees and informs the American public about major health
challenges that affect people in the United States and abroad, conducted a yearlong investigation in
Cuba in 1996. n13 The AAWH team, composed of nine medical experts, determined in their report
that the U.S. embargo of Cuba has dramatically harmed the overall health and nutrition of many
Cuban citizens. n14 The areas that have been identified as health-related issues concerning the
embargo include malnutrition, water quality, medicines, equipment, and medical information. n15
In the AAWH report, it was determined that malnutrition was a common problem among Cuban
citizens. n16 The limitation on the sale of foodstuffs from other countries has contributed to serious
nutritional deficiencies. n17 For instance, in pregnant women there has been an increase in low
birth weight babies, making them more prone to more diseases. n18 Also, the lack of vitamin B in
the average Cuban's diet has contributed to the development of optical neuropathy, leading to
temporary blindness in an estimated 50,000 adult Cubans. n19 Water quality has also been affected
due to restrictions in the embargo that bar access to water treatment chemicals or spare parts for the
island's water supply system. n20 This has lead to an increase in the incidence of morbidity rates
from water-borne diseases such as typhoid fever, dysentheria, and viral hepatitis, among others.
THE CUBAN EMBARGO LIMITS HEALTH CARE ACCESS, RAISING ETHICAL QUESTIONS--Coll
'07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
A policy of maintaining an arduous and at times insurmountable licensing procedure for trading
health-related products with Cuba harms the health of Cuban citizens. Moreover, the waste of
valuable time and the deprivation of necessary medicine and equipment do not make sense morally
or politically. In a 1995 speech addressing the use of economic sanctions as a political tool, former
United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali explained: "Sanctions, as is generally
recognized, are a blunt instrument. They raise the ethical question of whether suffering inflicted on
vulnerable groups in the target country is a legitimate means of exerting pressure on political
leaders whose behaviour is unlikely to be affected by the plight of their subjects."
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US EMBARGO CREATED A DEVASTATING PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS IN THE 90s--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
Thus, during Cuba's painful period of economic readjustment from 1989 to 1994, the embargo
became a key contributing factor to what was already an extremely difficult situation. Legally and
morally, the United States not only had the opportunity but also the obligation to take Cuba's
deteriorating economic situation into account in the early 1990s as it pondered whether to relax or
tighten the embargo. The U.S. government's actions - to enhance the embargo's comprehensive and
indiscriminate character - had predictably harmful effects on the human rights of innocent people.
The impact on nutrition and public health from Cuba's economic crisis was devastating. Between
1989 and 1993, Cuban imports declined by approximately 50% n270 and resulted in an 18% to 25%
decrease in the availability of protein and calorie sources. n271 The decrease in the availability of
nutrients had a detrimental effect on the health of the population, particularly pregnant women and
young children. n272 Data on pregnancy and birth weights taken during the time period reveals
troubling trends. For example, low birth weights n273 rose 23% from 7.3% in 1989 to 9.0% in 1993.
n274 In addition, [*240] pregnant women who failed to gain adequate weight rose 18% from 7.9% in
1988 to 9.3% in 1993. n275 Furthermore, in 1991, approximately 50% of pregnant women and six-to
12-month old infants were affected by anemia, levels unheard of since the early 1970's. n276 Until
1992, children up to the age of 13 and seniors over the age of 65 were regularly given a daily milk
ration; in 1992 the ration was limited to children six years old and younger. n277 The declining
health indicators thus substantiate the Cuban government's claim that the embargo affects the
"physical and moral integrity of an entire nation, above all its children and its elderly."
EMBARGO HAS LIMITED SOAP SALES TO CUBA, CAUSING A PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
In addition to harms suffered by the population due to a lack of sufficient nutrition, the lack of fats
led to a soap shortage in 1993-1994, n282 and Cubans were forced to make soap out of lye, caustic
soda, and other chemicals. n283 The use of these soap substitutes resulted in an increase in
poisoning and burns and an epidemic of esophageal stenosis in toddlers from inadvertent ingestion
of lye. n284 Due largely to the lack of soap products, epidemics of lice and scabies reached peak
levels in 1994. n285 While reports of these [*241] conditions generated significant controversy
within the United States regarding the embargo's appropriateness, the Clinton administration did
little to loosen the embargo.
THE EMBARGO HAS MADE ACCESS TO NEW DRUGS IN CUBA NEARLY NONEXISTANT-Campos '04
[Javier; Professor of Anesthesia at the University of Iowa Health Care; “The Impact of the U.S. Embargo on Health Care in
Cuba: A Clinician's Perspective;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
The AAWH report also found that access to medicines and medical equipment has been affected by
the U.S. embargo. n21 For example, according to the AAWH, of the more than 1297 medications
available in Cuba in 1991, at the present time Cuban doctors have access to no more than 889 of
these prescription medicines. n22 Many of these medicines are lacking because of limited supplies.
The access to newer drugs is basically nonexistent in Cuba.
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LACK OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES IN CUBA HAS DRAMATICALLY DECREASED ACCESS TO
HEALTH CARE--Campos '04
[Javier; Professor of Anesthesia at the University of Iowa Health Care; “The Impact of the U.S. Embargo on Health Care in
Cuba: A Clinician's Perspective;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
The human toll of the U.S. embargo is seen most dramatically in health care facilities. Surgical cases
have declined from over 800,000 operations performed in 1990 to 500,000 in 1995. This is a direct
indicator of the lack of hospital resources. In addition, there is a shortage of modern anesthetics
because the majority of them are made in the United States. Other affected areas include the cardiac
catheterization rooms. There is a lack of specialized catheters, and in many instances single-use
catheters are used more than once in different patients. This greatly increases the risk of infection or
of the catheter breaking into pieces in the patient's body, increasing the rate of infection or
thrombus formation. Another area greatly affected is operating rooms: air conditioning equipment
is outdated, and spare parts are in short supply or do not exist, increasing the unnecessary risk of
infection during patient care.
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CURRENT POLICY HURTS EDUCATION OF CUBANS
THE EMBARGO HAS A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE CUBAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
Nonetheless, in its report to the United Nations General Assembly in August of 2006, the Cuban
government complained of the U.S. embargo's negative impact on education in several areas. First,
the embargo raises the cost of educational supplies by removing access to products manufactured in
the United States and products containing U.S. components. n307 For example, the report noted
that "instruments indispensable to art schools (violins, pianos, double basses, flutes, ballet pointed
and half-pointed shoes, maillots and leotards) have had to be purchased in third countries, at an
additional cost of 16% or $ 2.5 million." n308 Additionally, "the University of Havana had to pay $
40,000 a year for the bandwidth it required for its Internet service as it was denied access to the subaquatic fiber-optic cable. For service of this nature, universities in any other country in the region
pay $ 600 per [*245] year." n309
THE EMBARGO LIMITS US ORGANIZATIONS HELPING CUBAN SCHOOLS--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
Second, not only does the embargo increase the cost of educational goods, but it also impedes the
ability of private U.S. organizations, churches and charitable foundations to provide assistance to
Cuban schools. For example, U.S. Customs officials detained a caravan headed for Cuba led by the
ecumenical group "Pastors for Peace" in July of 2005. n310 The cargo seized by Customs officials
contained older computers of no potential military value whatsoever, as well as scanners, printers,
calculators, keyboards, and several school buses n311 destined for use by schools in Cuba. n312 The
story of Benjamin Treuhaft, a remarkable New York philanthropist, gives further insight into the
embargo's effects. Since 1995 Treuhaft had been repairing old pianos and sending them to Cuba to
replace aging and damaged pianos in Cuban schools, churches, and concert halls. n313 As of 2007,
Treuhaft had sent 237 pianos to Cuba. n314 However, tighter embargo restrictions imposed by the
Bush administration in 2004 increased pressure on Treuhaft's organization. The Bush
administration revoked the organization's license to tune pianos in Cuba and attempted to shut the
organization down in February of 2004 because it was "not consistent with U.S. foreign policy
towards Cuba." n315 Only in 2006, after considerable outside pressure, did the U.S. government
agree to renew the organization's license.
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THE EMBARGO LIMITS THE ABILITY OF AMERICAN AND CUBAN EDUCATORS FROM
EXCHANGING IDEAS--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
Third, since 2002, the embargo has also been tightened to restrict the ability of Cuban and American
educators to interact and exchange ideas. In 2006, the Cuban government reported that:
Around 183 Cubans have been denied visas to participate in scientific, academic, sporting and
cultural events in the United States... In many cases, requests for visas have never been responded to,
and, in others, they have been turned down with reference to Section 212, which prohibits the entry
of individuals whose presence in the country could be "detrimental to the interests of the United
States.
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CURRENT POLICY HURTS CULTURAL PRESERVATION
THE EMBARGO HAS HAD AN IMPACT ON CULTURAL PRESERVATION--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
"Without culture, and the relative freedom it implies, society, even when perfect, is but a jungle. This
is why any authentic creation is a gift to the future." n349
The U.S. embargo has had an impact on cultural exchange and preservation. For example, in 2004
the U.S. Treasury Department denied the Hemingway Preservation Foundation's application for a
license to assist in preserving Ernest Hemingway's Cuban home. n350 The home holds invaluable
pieces of joint American and Cuban literary history, including 2,000 letters, 3,000 photographs, and
9,000 annotated books, as well as drafts of some of the novels Hemingway wrote while there,
including For Whom the Bell Tolls, A Moveable Feast, and The Old Man and the Sea. n351 U.S.
officials reportedly did not want to assist in any effort that could bring future tourist dollars to the
Castro government. n352
In May 2005, the Hemingway Preservation Foundation reapplied to the U.S. Treasury Department for
the license, this time jointly with the National [*252] Trust for Historic Preservation. n353 A letter
signed by 60 writers and historians, among them John Irving and Salman Rushdie, compared the
home to the preserved homes of Mark Twain and William Faulkner. n354 After meetings with
members of the U.S. Treasury and State Departments as well as members of Congress, the license
was finally granted but only for the limited purpose of sending a team to give technical advice on the
restoration work. n355 The U.S. government expressly prohibited donations of money, resources,
materials, and even simple carpentry tools, such as saws or hammers, which might be used by the
Cubans to repair the property.
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CURRENT POLICY CONDEMNED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAS CONDEMNED THE EMBARGO--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the GA adopted the first resolution condemning the
U.S. embargo on Cuba. n390 Though it was a dramatic proclamation, it is clear that the 1992
resolution focused on the passage of the Cuban Democracy Act. n391 The preamble expressed
concern about recently approved "laws and regulations whose extraterritorial effects affect the
sovereignty of other States and the legitimate interests of entities or persons under their jurisdiction
... ." n392 The next paragraph refers to the embargo in general but only in order to highlight the
extraterritorial aspects of the CDA. n393 The resolution calls upon "all States to refrain from
promulgating and applying laws ... of the kind referred to in the preamble ... ." n394 The language of
the resolution thus demonstrates that, at least in 1992, the [*259] GA was more concerned with - or
at least more comfortable voting against - the extraterritorial application of the embargo rather than
the embargo itself.
One year later, the GA again formally spoke against the embargo. n395 However, the 1993 resolution
contained significant new language that signaled its disapproval of the entire affair. The 1993
resolution "took note" of that year's Ibero-American Summit "concerning the need to eliminate the
unilateral application of economic and trade measures by one State against another for political
purposes" n396 and essentially signaled substantial agreement with the Summit's position without
adopting it outright. Additionally, by 1993 it had become clear that the Cuban economy was
freefalling, following the end of Soviet subsidies and the disintegration of the socialist bloc that
Cuba had relied on for the bulk of its outside economic relations for more than two decades. The
news coming from Cuba regarding the hardships endured by the Cuban population was grim. The
1993 resolution made reference to the embargo's effect on the Cuban population for the first time.
n397 Overall, the language of the resolution showed a trend toward a wider rejection of unilateral
comprehensive sanctions.
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS CONDEMNED HELMS-BURTON--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
Despite the existence and exercise of the Title III waiver provisions, the international community
universally condemned Helms-Burton and its extraterritorial aspects. n163 The 14-member Rio
Group was among the first international groups to formally criticize Helms-Burton. n164 Shortly
thereafter, the OAS passed a resolution instructing the Inter-American Juridical Committee to
determine the validity of Helms-Burton under international law. n165 In November 1996, the United
Nations, citing the Helms-Burton Act, overwhelmingly passed a nonbinding resolution calling for
the end of the U.S. embargo. n166 Although the United Nations had previously passed similar
resolutions denouncing the embargo, the 1996 version marked the first time that all 15 members of
the European Union voted against it. n167 The European Union also registered its strong opposition
to the law by filing a complaint against the United States with the fledgling World Trade
Organization (WTO). n168 The European Union, Canada, and Mexico also passed "clawback" [*224]
legislation that - in the cases of the European Union and Canada - authorized national corporations
to counter-sue U.S. companies that won damages in U.S. courts under Helms-Burton. n169 By the
close of 1996, leaders from India to Switzerland had expressed strong opposition to the law.
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THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CURRENT EMBARGO LACKS LEGAL COHERENCE--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
The justification for the current U.S. embargo against Cuba lacks legal coherence. The underlying
"absolute sovereignty" doctrine - that states are free to deny the benefits of trade and investment to
any state - requires adherence to the classical international law paradigm in which state sovereignty
is the fundamental norm, and in which there is little room for human rights obligations or any other
kind of "cosmopolitan" concerns beyond the safety and human rights of one's own citizens. n368
Ironically, since 1991, the [*255] embargo's sole touted purpose has been to extend human rights to
the people of Cuba, even if it means disregarding the sovereignty of the existing Cuban government.
However, the "cosmopolitan" paradigm that could justify a human rights embargo against the
policies of another recognized government is very much in conflict with the "absolute sovereignty"
doctrine. Under the classical "absolute sovereignty" paradigm, the United States does not need to
justify its embargo by a purpose of promoting human rights. Under the more contemporary
"cosmopolitan" paradigm, the United States is free to disregard classical notions of state sovereignty
in order to promote human rights in Cuba but must pay close attention to the human rights
consequences of its embargo. Currently, whenever critics of the embargo attack its human rights
basis, the embargo's advocates conveniently abandon the post-1991 paradigm and take refuge in the
old, traditional paradigm, based on notions of absolute state sovereignty.
ALL OF THE UNITED STATES' MAJOR ALLIES OPPOSE THE US EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA-Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
The overwhelming majority of United Nations members, including all of the United States' major
allies, oppose the U.S. embargo against Cuba. As noted earlier in this article, the OAS, the only
regional organization in the hemisphere with the legitimate authority to impose sanctions, ended its
sanctions against Cuba in 1975, and called upon its members - including the United States - to
follow suit. In addition to lacking United Nations and OAS endorsement and being opposed by 183
states in the international community, the embargo has no support from the international human
rights community - not even from a single international NGO working on human rights or
humanitarian issues. The world's two most prominent international human rights NGOs, Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch, are sharply critical of the Cuban government's human
rights policies. Both strongly oppose the embargo as harmful to human rights in Cuba and as
counterproductive to the long-term objective of promoting democracy and human rights on the
island. n424 The Roman Catholic Church, which under Pope John Paul II gained wide credibility for
its stance on behalf of human rights across the globe, has also been highly critical of indiscriminate
sanctions in general and of the Cuban embargo specifically. n425 The embargo's purely unilateral
character is highlighted by the fact that, with the exception of the governments of the United States,
Israel, Palau and the Marshall Islands, there is not a single credible international actor,
governmental or otherwise, [*264] that supports the embargo or has not expressed clear opposition
to it. Finally, even within the United States, the embargo's supporters consist of a narrow minority
located in a small geographic corner of the United States as well as the successive U.S.
administrations and members of Congress that are eager to court their votes and financial backing.
A 2006 Gallup poll indicated that two-thirds of the American people, while disapproving of the
Castro government, would like to reestablish U.S. diplomatic relations with Cuba. n426 Similarly, a
2007 Zogby poll found that a majority of Americans were in favor of improving relations with Cuba
and were against the embargo and its restrictions. n427
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UNIVERSAL DISAPPROVAL OF THE EMBARGO PUTS INTO QUESTION ITS LEGAL
LEGITIMACY--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
Thus, the nearly universal disapproval for the Cuban embargo constitutes a fatal flaw in its
legitimacy. The established consensus is that comprehensive human rights embargoes require
international support in order to be legitimate and free from the taint of partiality and self-interest.
This is also a crucial difference between the Cuban embargo and the earlier sanctions imposed
against South Africa in the 1980s. Unlike the Cuban embargo, the South African sanctions were
limited, supported by many states within the international community across a wide range of
different cultures and economic and political systems, backed by a substantial number of
international actors from the NGO and corporate sectors, and endorsed by leading members of the
South African opposition, such as Bishop Desmond Tutu.
THE DEPTH AND BREADTH OF THE GLOBAL CONSENSUS AGAINST THE EMBARGO PUTS
ITS LEGITIMACY INTO QUESTION--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
As an indiscriminate, comprehensive, unilateral peacetime measure taken by the world's most
powerful nation against a small developing country, the embargo also has come under the strict
legal scrutiny of the international community. Because the embargo is a human rights embargo as
opposed to a national security embargo, it is subject to a higher degree of scrutiny in terms of its
impact on the human rights of the affected population. For the past ten years, overwhelming
majorities at the GA, including all of the United States' closest European, Asian and Latin American
allies, have voted against the embargo. Since 2000, the votes in favor of the United States have been
reduced to four out of 187: the United States itself, Israel, and two Pacific island mini-states that are
heavily dependent on U.S. foreign aid. Even Israel, which ironically maintains full commercial
relations with Cuba and allows its citizens to travel and invest there, has explained its vote not as a
vote in favor of the embargo but as a vote against condemning the actions of its senior ally. The
depth and breadth of the global consensus against the embargo point to serious international
doubts regarding its legal permissibility and its appropriateness as an instrument for the promotion
of human rights. Thus far, however, Washington shows no signs of paying any heed to this
international consensus, just as it ignores what Cubans on the island think of the chief policy
instrument though which the United States seeks to bring democracy and human rights to their
country.
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MUCH OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS AGAINST THE EMBARGO--Colmer '04
[Josep M.; Research Professor in Political Science; “CUBA & DEMOCRATIZATION: SHOULD SANCTIONS BE LIFTED?: Who
Could End the Embargo? A Game-Theoretical Perspective;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004;
LN]
In political terms, the United States also bears the costs of annually being urged to lift the economic
sanctions against Cuba by the United Nations General Assembly and by increasingly broad
majorities since 1992. Similar declarations also are made annually by the Ibero-American Summit
meetings of chief executives, which gather the presidents of all Latin American countries, including
Cuba, the king and the prime minister of Spain, and the prime minister of Portugal. Most U.S.
leaders and politicians, however, seem unimpressed by recommendations of this kind.
UNLESS NATIONS UNIVERSALLY PUT IN THE SANCTIONS, IT WILL PRODUCE THE
OPPOSITE EFFECT--Nichols '09
[Philip M.; Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics at the University of Pennsylvania; “SYMPOSIUM ARTICLE:
USING SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF ISOMORPHISM TO EVALUATE THE POSSIBILITY OF REGIME CHANGE
THROUGH TRADE SANCTIONS;” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law; Spring 2009; LN]
Some types of trade sanctions seek to change the behavior of targeted nations, and in particular seek
to align the behavior of targeted nations with the "acceptable" behavior of the sanctioning nation
and its peers. Behavior is dependent on underlying institutions, such as law. Institutional sociology
offers theoretical explanations as to why entities' institutions will converge. As can be demonstrated
with the United States' embargo of the Republic of Cuba, theories of isomorphism can in fact
explain the outcome of these types of trade sanctions.
Theories of isomorphism can also predict the outcome of trade sanctions. Theories of isomorphism
offer a caution with respect to unilateral trade sanctions. Unless those sanctions are carefully
coordinated with other international actors, each of the theories of normative, mimetic, and even
coercive isomorphism suggest that trade sanctions may actually produce the opposite of the desired
outcome.
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CURRENT POLICY IS USED AS A PROPAGANDA TOOL BY CASTRO
THE US EMBARGO IS USED AS AN EXCUSE FOR FAILURE BY CASTRO--Colmer '04
[Josep M.; Research Professor in Political Science; “CUBA & DEMOCRATIZATION: SHOULD SANCTIONS BE LIFTED?: Who
Could End the Embargo? A Game-Theoretical Perspective;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004;
LN]
The Cuban government derives some benefit from the U.S. embargo, as it can use it as an excuse for
its own failures. Castro's proclamations before assuming power in 1959 emphasized the inefficiency
of a single-crop economy (reportedly focused on sugar exports), as well as the evils of foreign
dependence on investments and tourism (at that time, from the United States). After its shift to
socialism, however, the Cuban economy concentrated on sugar crops - thus consolidating a singlesector economy that facilitates state and bureaucratic control - while becoming again highly
dependent on foreign resources (now from the Soviet Union). Especially since the early 1990s, when
this model of single-crop, state-controlled, foreign-dependent economy openly failed, blaming the
embargo of the United States became a more frequently used rhetorical resource of the Cuban rulers
to exempt themselves from responsibility. Additionally, international opposition to the U.S.
embargo allowed the Cuban rulers to reinforce their claim.
CASTRO HAS USED THE UNITED STATES EMBARGO AS A PROPAGANDA TOOL AGAINST THE
US--DeMelfi '06
[Christy; JD/MBA Candidate at Hofstra University; “NOTHING BUT THE FACTS: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA;” The Journal of International Business & Law;” Spring 2006; LN]
The first goal of overthrowing Castro's regime has failed in practice because of propaganda exposed
by Castro. Castro made the Cuban people feel loyalty to him by blaming the U.S. for the economic
problems the country faced. "Castro blames Cuba's shambles of an economy and endless shortages
on the embargo." (Jacoby, 2002, pg. 2) Although not entirely wrong, Castro's position is not
completely right. It is true that the Cuban people face hardships because of the embargo; however,
Castro does not admit that his economic policies are to blame for most of the hardships. In general,
the U.S. can be partially blamed for the economic problems, but it is too strong to say the hardships
are entirely the U.S.'s fault. Castro was successful in convincing his people of this position because
he is a very charismatic and persuasive person. It is important to note that the command economy of
Cuba failed like all other command economies in the past. In general, command economies fail
because they create chronic shortages, as was evident in the former Soviet Union. Cuba too faces
shortages, especially of food, caused by the command economy, which hinders development.
LIFTING THE EMBARGO WILL DENY CASTRO A PROPAGANDA TOOL--DeMelfi '06
[Christy; JD/MBA Candidate at Hofstra University; “NOTHING BUT THE FACTS: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA;” The Journal of International Business & Law;” Spring 2006; LN]
Other people agree the embargo should be lifted in order for change to occur. Some believe that if
the embargo is lifted, Castro would become more confident and take measures to help his country.
It is argued that this liberalization would have to happen because Castro would not be able to blame
the U.S. for every problem the country faces. In this instance, some believe the embargo simply
strengthens Castro. The embargo makes Castro appear to be a fearless fighter against capitalism,
which bolsters his support. This is further exemplified by anti-Castro Cubans going back and
supporting Castro because they are fearful of the returning exiles coming into power.
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SHOULD LIFT EMBARGO
CUBA NOT LIKELY TO RESPONSE TO MINOR CHANGES; EMBARGO SHOULD BE LIFTED
COMPLETELY--Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
When the TSRA provisions took effect on 25 February 2001, Cuba did not immediately jump at the
opportunity to purchase agricultural commodities from the United States. n25 It took nearly one
year and dire circumstances for the Castro regime to accept the U.S. offer. n26 Following the
disastrous effects of Hurricane Michelle in November 2001 and the subsequent food supply
shortages experienced by the Cuban population, the Cuban government not only continued to reject
the opportunity to import U.S. food products, but more significantly it also turned down the U.S.
offer of disaster assistance. n27 It was not until later - by the end of 2001, when their food reserves
had become fully depleted - that Cuba finally seized the opportunity to purchase bulk agricultural
commodities from the United States. n28 The Cuban government had felt slighted by the fact that
the entire embargo had not been repealed; rather the U.S. government had only opened up a specific
sector with significant restrictions.
THE EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA IS NOT LONGER JUSTIFIABLE CONSIDERING THE
SITUATION TODAY--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
Without doubt, Cuba's confiscation of American properties in 1960-1961 justified some response in
the form of proportionate, limited economic sanctions. Moreover, Cuban actions during the 1960s
and 1970s could reasonably have been interpreted as posing various threats to American national
security, thus serving as legal grounds for further sanctions - as long as the sanctions met the general
principles of proportionality, discrimination, and humanity. But by 2007, with the cumulative
economic costs alone of the embargo to the Cuban economy over a 47-year period conservatively
estimated at $ 60-80 billion, the embargo appears widely disproportionate and no longer justifiable.
This is especially true now that the promotion of democracy and human rights has become the
primary rationale for the embargo, making the unilateral, comprehensive, indiscriminate embargo
even more difficult to justify legally.
SHOULD LIFT THE EMBARGO--Spandoni '04
[Paolo; PdD Candidate at the University of Florida; “SYMPOSIUM: WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC
& SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART I OF II: CUBA TODAY: U.S. Financial Flows in the Cuban Economy;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004; LN]
A second option, which is not necessarily more politically viable, but is certainly less expensive than
the first one, is to promote a rapprochement with Havana and a gradual removal of the major
provisions of the embargo in recognition that economic sanctions have not achieved their main
goals. A policy that respects the rights of Americans to trade with, invest in, and travel to the island
may more effectively serve U.S. interests in post-Soviet Cuba by defending human rights, helping the
Cuban people, and spreading the values of the American society. n125 It would also increase
pressure on the current government in Havana by preventing Fidel Castro from using his traditional
argument that the United States promotes economic deprivation in Cuba and seeks to constrain
Cuban sovereignty.
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US-CUBAN RELATIONS CAN ONLY GET BETTER IF THERE IS A CHANGE--Erikson '04
[Daniel P.; Director of Caribbean Programs at the Inter-America Dialogue; “WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART II OF II: CUBA'S FUTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND
INVESTMENT: The Future of American Business in Cuba: Realities, Risks, and Rewards;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
The first is that U.S.-Cuba economic relations have no where to go but up; it is difficult to conceive of
a scenario where the two countries, so close to each other and with significantly complementary
interests, resources, and skills, would actually reduce their commercial ties due to either U.S. policy
constraints or the vicissitudes of the post-Castro regime. Proof lies in the fact that a sudden trade
relationship has sprung up since November 2001 despite continued Cuban communism, rising
hostilities between the Bush Administration and the Castro government, and the post-September 11
global slowdown. While there may be considerable debate about the ultimate potential of a U.S.Cuba partnership, it is almost certainly more than exists today.
THE EMBARGO IS INCOHERENT IN ITS RATIONALE FOR EXISTENCE--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
Moreover, the embargo can be justified legally only by grounding it in the classic state sovereignty
paradigm according to which states can refuse to trade with any others regardless of the
consequences to the target state's population. This paradigm is completely at odds with the
cosmopolitan paradigm which gives states a legitimate interest in the domestic human rights
conditions of other states. This latter paradigm is the basis under which the United States has
justified its "human rights" embargo against Cuba since 1992. Thus, both philosophically and as a
policy instrument, the embargo is incoherent in its very rationale.
EVEN IF SANCTIONS WORK, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT MUST BE CONSIDERED--DeMelfi '06
[Christy; JD/MBA Candidate at Hofstra University; “NOTHING BUT THE FACTS: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA;” The Journal of International Business & Law;” Spring 2006; LN]
Although opening trade with Cuba may help alleviate some of the United States' economic woes, the
U.S. has refused to lift its 46 year embargo. Why? Policy makers find it politically difficult to lift the
sanctions because of the authoritarian nature of the Cuban government. The economic sanctions
are seen as a way for the U. S. to display its disapproval of communism and uphold the American
ideals of freedom and democracy. Policy makers are concerned that lifting the sanctions may give off
the appearance of weakness in U.S. foreign policy. There is debate, however, over whether the
sanctions actually accomplish their objectives. Even if they do, there is further debate as to whether
the sanctions cause serious harm to the U.S. economy. The costs and benefits of the situation, from
both economic and political perspectives, must be analyzed properly to ensure the correct policy is
being instituted. The current state of the economy thus makes the topic of sanctions against Cuba
an [*138] important issue because the U.S. is in need of measures that will help the economy
recover.
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SHOULD LIFT EMBARGO: WOULD CREATE JOBS
60,000 JOBS WOULD BE CREATED IN THE SOUTH ALONE IF THE EMBARGO WAS LIFTED-Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
The push to limit trade and travel restrictions imposed against Cuba has been spearheaded by a
number of economically depressed states in the U.S. whose agricultural sectors are constantly in
search of export opportunities. n96 Since agricultural trade with Cuba has been permitted under
TSRA, numerous commercial agreements have been signed between Alimport and primarily
Southern and Midwestern states. n97 Those states who see economic potential under the new
policies have advocated greater easing of the trade and travel restrictions. Southern and Midwestern
states have also been the most active in encouraging enhanced trade relations as they stand to
benefit the most. n98 One study estimates that 60,000 new jobs in Southern states would be realized
if uninhibited trade with Cuba resumed. n99 In Alabama alone, the Alabama Department of
Agriculture and Industries reported that since TSRA was passed, sales to Cuba have had a total
impact of $ 300 million on the state economy. n100 Even in the state of Florida, which has
traditionally been home to the strongest opposition to opening up trade relations with Cuba and the
Castro regime, n101 there has been a move to take advantage of the economic opportunities that
would result from agricultural trade relations with Cuba.
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SHOULD LIFT EMBARGO: WOULD INCREASE US AG EXPORTS
EXPANDED AGRICULTURAL TRADE IS WIN-WIN FOR AMERICAN AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCERS--Erikson '04
[Daniel P.; Director of Caribbean Programs at the Inter-America Dialogue; “WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART II OF II: CUBA'S FUTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND
INVESTMENT: The Future of American Business in Cuba: Realities, Risks, and Rewards;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
Expanded agricultural trade is not a win-win for all sectors of the American agricultural community.
The U.S. sugar industry, which is highly protected by quotas and subsidies, has resisted efforts to lift
the embargo. While world sugar prices hover at seven cents per pound, U.S. businesses buy sugar at
twenty-one cents per pound. Only about 15% of U.S. sugar is currently imported. n36 The U.S. citrus
industry has been identified as another vulnerable sector, especially in Florida. While Cuba is a
relatively small producer of oranges and tangerines, accounting for about 1% of total global
production, the island is the third largest producer of grapefruit. Fresh grapefruit and processed
grapefruit respectively represent 5% and 12% of total world exports. To place Cuba's citrus industry
in the context of the United States, the island's production from 1998 to 1999 was larger than the
combined production of Texas and Arizona, which together represent more than a third of
California's output, or 8% of world production. n37 As it currently stands, the burgeoning trade
relationship between the United States and Cuba represents a perfect deal for American suppliers,
who are paid in cash for their goods without facing competition from Cuban producers. However,
the time will eventually come when trade between the United States and Cuba expands beyond
fruits, grains, and livestock to include tourist services and technology.
NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH CUBA COULD MEAN AS MUCH AS $140 MILLION IN GRAIN
SALES A YEAR TO CUBA--Ross '04
[James; Professor of Food and Resource Economics at the University of Florida; “The Impact of Potential Changes in U.S.Cuba Relations on Midwest Agribusiness Trade and Investment;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004;
LN]
The North Dakota State study projects imports that could result if Cuban real per capita GDP
increased by 10%, 30%, and 50%. A 30% increase would return real per capita GDP to late 1980s levels.
Results show imports of [*777] wheat and wheat flour could increase by 27% and 44%, respectively.
If the embargo were lifted and the United States achieved the maximum potential market shares,
U.S. exports to Cuba could be 945,000 metric tons of wheat and 370,000 metric tons of wheat flour.
n92
Estimates from the Texas A&M study place U.S. wheat and wheat flour exports at $ 56 million under
moderate export growth and $ 140 million under high export growth.
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US HAS INCREASINGLY BECOMING AN IMPORTANT TRADE PARTNER TO CUBA--Spandoni
'04
[Paolo; PdD Candidate at the University of Florida; “SYMPOSIUM: WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC
& SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART I OF II: CUBA TODAY: U.S. Financial Flows in the Cuban Economy;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004; LN]
The United States is becoming an increasingly important trading partner for Cuba, ranking first
among the island's sources of imported food in 2002. n90 In 2002, according to the U.S.-Cuba Trade
and Economic Council, the Cuban government bought $ 138.6 million worth of American food
products, including wheat ($ 22.8 million), corn ($ 22.7 million), poultry ($ 21.6 million), and
soybean products ($ 61.6 million). One company alone, Illinois-based Archer Daniels Midland,
reported agricultural exports to Cuba valued at $ 70 million in 2002. n91 Cuba has signed contracts
with eighty-four other U.S.-based firms from twenty-four different U.S. states.
US WOULD BE ABLE TO EXPORT $200 MILLION IN SOYBEANS A YEAR IF CONDITIONS WERE
NORMALIZED--Ross '04
[James; Professor of Food and Resource Economics at the University of Florida; “The Impact of Potential Changes in U.S.Cuba Relations on Midwest Agribusiness Trade and Investment;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004;
LN]
Cuba can expect increased domestic supplies of animal fats (mostly tallow and lard) as its livestock
industry recovers, but Cuba will still remain highly dependent on imports of vegetable oil. China,
Mexico, and Argentina have been the major suppliers of the soybean oil market in Cuba during the
past forty years.
The Texas A&M study estimated U.S. exports of soybeans and soybean products at $ 80 million under
conditions of moderate export growth and $ 179 million under high export growth. Sunflower oil
exports were estimated at $ 4.5 million and $ 10.9 million respectively, under the two conditions of
moderate and high export growth.
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SHOULD LIFT EMBARGO: WOULD INCREASE US ECONOMIC GROWTH
LIFTING THE TRADE EMBARGO WOULD CREATE 10,000 JOBS AND BRING $500 MILLION TO
THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY--Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
Since the passage of TSRA, United States legislators have come under significant and increased
pressures to end the trade embargo and all related trade restrictions. The lessons learned from trade
between the United States and Cuba under TSRA has highlighted the lost economic opportunities
resulting from the embargo and the trading potential that exists between the two countries. One
study estimates that, should the embargo be repealed and the United States pursue investments in
Cuba, agricultural exports could approach nearly $ 517 million of value added annually to the U.S.
economy. n112 The same study calls for an additional 10,656 jobs created in the agricultural sector.
n113 States that would stand to benefit the most from value added and employment are Arkansas,
Iowa, California, Texas and Nebraska.
CUBA IS A NATURAL MARKET AND TRADING PARTNER FOR THE UNITED STATES--Erikson
'04
[Daniel P.; Director of Caribbean Programs at the Inter-America Dialogue; “WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART II OF II: CUBA'S FUTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND
INVESTMENT: The Future of American Business in Cuba: Realities, Risks, and Rewards;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
Indeed, in many ways, Cuba represents a natural market and trading partner for the United States.
As the largest and most populous nation in the Caribbean, Cuba is roughly equivalent in size and
population to Portugal or Hungary (although with a far smaller gross domestic product). Only ninety
miles from Florida at its closest point, Cuba is a near neighbor to the United States, and Havana
boasts one of the largest deep-water ports in Latin America. Moreover, since the early 1990s, the
United States has been pursuing a regional strategy of economic integration, represented initially by
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which binds together the United States,
Canada, and Mexico. Since 2001, the administration of George W. Bush has negotiated bilateral
trade agreements with Chile and the Central American countries and is pursuing a broader Free
Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) that would include all thirty-four democratic countries of
the Western Hemisphere. In this context, closer trade relations with Cuba would fit strategically
within the regional integration efforts witnessed in Latin America. Trade with Cuba would also be
compatible with the commercial relations established with the communist countries of East Asia.
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CUBA REPRESENTS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR DEPRESSED STATES TO STIMULATE THEIR
ECONOMY--Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
The current political and economic climate in the United States would indicate that the time is ripe
for a progressive change in favour of enhancing agricultural trade relations, or even expanding trade
to other sectors, so that the United States could take advantage of this potential market. Prior to the
adoption of TSRA, there was a concerted effort by congressional representatives advocating for the
agricultural exception to [*173] the trade embargo. n149 Economically depressed states recognized
that Cuba, and other countries against which the United States had imposed unilateral trade
sanctions, presented an opportunity to stimulate their economy. n150 Similarly today, a large
number of representatives from states who stand to benefit from additional trade with Cuba have
not only spoken out in favour of easing restrictions prohibiting trade and travel to Cuba, but have
also proposed and co-sponsored relevant legislation in both congressional houses.
CUBA IS A DIAMOND IN THE ROUGH ECONOMICALLY--Erikson '04
[Daniel P.; Director of Caribbean Programs at the Inter-America Dialogue; “WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART II OF II: CUBA'S FUTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND
INVESTMENT: The Future of American Business in Cuba: Realities, Risks, and Rewards;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
Nevertheless, an influential school of thought sees Cuba as a diamond in the rough, with the
capacity to emerge as a "Latin tiger" of substantial interest to U.S. companies. Cuba's population of
11 million represents a market equivalent in size to Ohio, the seventh largest U.S. state. The island's
virgin beaches and rich cultural heritage could quickly catapult it into a prime tourist destination for
American travelers, resulting in massive opportunities for hotel and infrastructure development.
Notwithstanding several areas of direct competition, American and Cuban exports are largely
complementary, with Cuba importing U.S. grain, livestock, and consumer goods while exporting
sugar, tobacco, grapefruit, and nickel. Cuba has built a biotechnology sector that is unique among
developing countries. Perhaps most importantly, Cuba's social services in education and health have
resulted in a highly trained and healthy workforce that could potentially flourish in an
entrepreneurial environment. If Cuba opens to the world, it may thrive.
CUBA COULD PROVIDE A GREAT MARKET FOR THE UNITED STATES IN A WORLD OF
SHRINKING MARKET OPPORTUNITIES--DeMelfi '06
[Christy; JD/MBA Candidate at Hofstra University; “NOTHING BUT THE FACTS: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA;” The Journal of International Business & Law;” Spring 2006; LN]
With the current uncertain state of the United States' economy, any measure to improve the
economy would be welcomed. If the U.S. were to sell more goods, either at home or abroad, the
increase in demand might strengthen the U.S. economy enough to foster a turn around. The
question arises, how to sell more goods. One obvious answer would be for the U.S. economy to enter
into a new market. In this globalized world economy, it may be difficult to find such a market for
U.S. goods or services. By looking no further than 90 miles off the southern coast of Florida, however,
one finds such an untapped economy: Cuba.
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LIFTING THE EMBARGO WOULD DRAMATICALLY INCREASE THE US SHARE OF CUBAN
FOOD IMPORTS--Erikson '04
[Daniel P.; Director of Caribbean Programs at the Inter-America Dialogue; “WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART II OF II: CUBA'S FUTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND
INVESTMENT: The Future of American Business in Cuba: Realities, Risks, and Rewards;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
Between 2001 and 2003, the U.S. share of Cuba's food imports rose from zero to 25%, and the
removal of the U.S. trade embargo could dramatically increase the current level of agricultural
exports to an estimated 60% of the [*700] island's $ 1 billion in annual food imports. n33 In fact,
there has been a range of academic, corporate, and governmental studies of potential U.S.
agricultural exports to Cuba in the absence of sanctions, with estimates ranging from less than $ 0.5
billion to $ 1.2 billion or beyond. n34 The range in measurements reflects different assumptions
about Cuba's economic growth and, more importantly, the potential for increased food demand
resulting from the tourist industry. Nevertheless, a consensus has emerged that Cuba has significant
potential as a market for wheat, wheat flour, rice, corn, poultry and dairy products, and would in
turn supply sugar, citrus, and tobacco products to the U.S. market.
FORTY-THREE STATES HAVE PRODUCTS THAT COULD BE SOLD TO CUBA--Campos '04
[Javier; Professor of Anesthesia at the University of Iowa Health Care; “The Impact of the U.S. Embargo on Health Care in
Cuba: A Clinician's Perspective;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
Another delegation that has made a successful visit to Cuba is the South Carolina trade delegation.
This delegation, led by Lieutenant Governor Andre Bauer, engaged in serious talks on how to get
Cuba to buy South Carolina's agricultural products. In fact, in 2001, "the United States loosened its
forty- [*528] year-old embargo on trading with Cuba to allow shipments of food, agricultural goods,
and medicine to the island nation of eleven million." n45
In all, it has been estimated that thirty-four states produce goods that can be exported to Cuba,
according to John Kavulich, president of the U.S. Cuba Trade and Economic Council. n46 This New
York-based nonprofit group provides research for U.S. businesses wanting to trade with Cuba.
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SHOULD LIFT EMBARGO: WOULD HELP THE CUBAN PEOPLE
LIFTING THE TRAVEL BAN WOULD HELP GET THE FOREIGN CAPITAL REQUIRED TO
INCREASE THE FOOD IMPORTS REQUIRED TO HELP THE CUBAN PEOPLE--Ross '04
[James; Professor of Food and Resource Economics at the University of Florida; “The Impact of Potential Changes in U.S.Cuba Relations on Midwest Agribusiness Trade and Investment;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004;
LN]
Increased numbers of tourists, whether from the United States or elsewhere, would also increase
foreign exchange earnings for the Cuban Government. In the food sector alone, dollar earnings from
food and beverages sold in dollar stores and tourist hotels could help provide foreign exchange
needed to import food. The value of food (including food produced in Cuba and food imported to
Cuba) sold through dollar stores and tourism is estimated at $ 400 million to $ 500 million annually.
Adding a markup of 170% for national food and 240% for imported food sold through dollar stores
and 300% for food sold through tourism, Cuba probably recovers most of the foreign exchange
needed to import food for the growing tourist industry.
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SHOULD LIFT EMBARGO: WOULD HEAL US-CUBAN RELATIONS
THE FIRST STEP OF CREATING FRIENDLY RELATIONS WILL BE TO LIFT THE EMBARGO-Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
In 2002, President Carter became the first U.S. President to travel to Cuba since 1928, as he ventured
upon a mission to mend relations between the neighbouring countries. n117 The former President
expressed the goals he hoped to achieve:
[A] Cuba fully integrated into a democratic hemisphere, participating in a Free Trade Area of the
Americas and with our citizens traveling without restriction to visit each other. I want a massive
student exchange between our universities. I want the people of the United States and Cuba to share
more than a love of baseball and wonderful music. I want us to be friends, and to respect each other.
n118
While this ambitious vision extends far beyond the mere opening of trade relations, President Carter
recognized that the first step involves an act of Congress to lift the embargo, creating an open trade
relationship and permitting unrestricted travel. n119 These words were not only a good will gesture
towards the Cuban government and people, but were a plea to U.S. legislators to take action
regarding existing policy towards Cuba.
US IN THE BEST POSITION TO THAW RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND CUBA BY
NORMALIZING TRADE--Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
While the U.S. government believes it is in a position to alter Cuban policy through the
implementation of trade sanctions and the embargo, the Cuban government believes it is in a
similar position to alter U.S. policy by refusing to purchase U.S. commodities. The likely outcome of
these conflicting views is a political impasse, resulting in the continuation of the status quo, unless
one country chooses to take decisive action toward the situation's resolution. The United States
appears to be in the better position to take that first step toward resolving the standoff by further
relaxing trade restrictions. n159 As evidenced by the tenure of the Castro regime, the U.S.implemented trade restrictions have not been successful in attaining the goal of a democratic
political structure in Cuba. Should the United States take the initiative and relax its existing trade
policy towards Cuba, it is possible [*175] that the Cuban government would view such an act as a
symbol of U.S. recognition of Cuban independence and governance. However, there is no guarantee
the Castro regime would respond accordingly and tensions may continue.
NOW IS THE CRITICAL TIME FOR US-CUBAN RELATIONS--Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
Though contemporary trade relations between the United States and Cuba have only existed since
the adoption of TSRA in 2001, there are many lessons to be learned from these recent experiences
should the U.S. government choose to make a concerted effort to expand its presence in the Cuban
economy beyond severely restricted agricultural trade. In addition, the historical and political
context that lead to the adoption of TSRA may well serve as an indicator of what potential exists for
trade relations to normalize and even flourish between the United States and Cuba. Some analysts
have suggested that we are at a critical juncture in the relations between the two countries.
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SHOULD LIFT EMBARGO: WILL ENCOURAGE LIBERALIZATION
OPENING TRADE WITH CUBA COULD FOSTER POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION ON THE
ISLAND--Colmer '04
[Josep M.; Research Professor in Political Science; “CUBA & DEMOCRATIZATION: SHOULD SANCTIONS BE LIFTED?: Who
Could End the Embargo? A Game-Theoretical Perspective;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004;
LN]
We face certain ineffectiveness of the U.S. embargo against Cuba in spite of supposedly favorable
structural conditions, together with the U.S. government's new reluctance to use this kind of
measure in further conflicts. Indeed, in the United States and elsewhere in the world, public opinion
and political leaders increasingly tend to consider that economic sanctions against Cuba are no
longer justified and should be lifted. It has been argued repeatedly that the embargo harms the
Cuban people while giving the Cuban rulers an excuse for the policy failures of the communist
regime. Some argue that, even for the morally noble goal of bringing about democracy and respect
for human rights in Cuba, economic sanctions can be considered to be a failure, while open trade
and communications, in contrast, could foster political liberalization on the island.
LIFTING THE EMBARGO WILL LEAD TO POLITICAL REFORM AND LIBERALIZATION-DeMelfi '06
[Christy; JD/MBA Candidate at Hofstra University; “NOTHING BUT THE FACTS: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA;” The Journal of International Business & Law;” Spring 2006; LN]
Many feel lifting the embargo would bolster economic reform which would eventually lead to
political reform and liberalization. Some feel that the economic reforms such as joint and private
enterprise and dollarization that has already taken place in Cuba, are a good indication that more
reforms would accompany the lifting of the sanction. These measures are seen as important steps in
the progress toward economic reform that would continue faster if the embargo was lifted.
LIFTING THE EMBARGO WOULD STIMULATE TOURISM, ENCOURAGING CHANGE--DeMelfi
'06
[Christy; JD/MBA Candidate at Hofstra University; “NOTHING BUT THE FACTS: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA;” The Journal of International Business & Law;” Spring 2006; LN]
Other critics of the embargo feel that a free flow of tourism and trade to the U.S. would inspire
change in Cuba. It is believed that lifting the embargo would allow more information into the
country which the public would use to encourage change. The increased pressure on the
government by the people would then ensure change.
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SHOULD LIFT EMBARGO: WOULD HELP WORLD BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH
CUBA COULD PROVIDE A BOOST TO THE INTERNATIONAL BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY-Erikson '04
[Daniel P.; Director of Caribbean Programs at the Inter-America Dialogue; “WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART II OF II: CUBA'S FUTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND
INVESTMENT: The Future of American Business in Cuba: Realities, Risks, and Rewards;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
Cuban medical products are exported to more than forty countries, and the industry employs
approximately 10,000 Cuban scientists. About 1245 people are headquartered at the Center for
Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology outside Havana, the largest and most advanced of the fiftythree biotechnical facilities in Cuba. Cuban officials estimate that of 800 essential medicines, about
80% are developed domestically, while the remaining 20%, consisting mainly of cancer and diabetes
drugs, are imported. n52 Research projects have included recombinant DNA technique and
molecular approaches to vaccines as well as HIV testing kits. The United States granted a license to a
single Cuban product, when pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline persuaded the U.S. government
to exempt the meningitis-B vaccine from U.S. prohibitions on medical trade. Another Cuban cancer
drug has sparked the interest of California-based CancerVax Corp., which is interested in
conducting joint research on cancer vaccines in Havana, and has signed letters of intent with Cuba's
Center for Molecular Biology. n53 Recently, a German company acquired the licensing rights for
innovative new products for neck and breast cancer, and a drug called TheraCIM h-R3 is being
developed for the European market. If this drug receives regulatory approval and becomes a
standard cancer treatment in Europe, potential sales could reach $ 3 billion annually.
THE EMBARGO HAS LIMITED SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION, LIMITING SCIENTIFIC
DISCOVERIES--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
The Chairman of the U.S. Chemistry Association, Charles Casey, criticized the U.S. embargo, stating
that "U.S. measures against the island country, including a prohibition on free travel of Cuban and
American scientists, have hindered the exchange of information and scientific cooperation between
the two countries." n317 In 2005, the U.S. government denied visas to more than 60 Cuban scholars
who had been invited to attend the Latin American Studies Association's annual meeting in Las
Vegas. n318 The academics invited to attend the conference "were to give papers and lectures and
engage in intellectual exchanges ..." n319 Such large-scale denial of visas had been unprecedented
prior to 2004. In fact, the U.S. government had not refused visas to Cuban academics to attend this
conference since the conference's inception in 1979. n320 By way of explanation, the U.S. State
Department stated only that "it is the State Department's view that Cuban officials should not travel
freely in the United States." n321 According to State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher, "all
Cuban academics are government [*247] officials" and "as far as I am aware, none of these
individuals has distinguished himself or herself for free thinking and questioning of anything the
regime has said." n322 Pointing out that Cuba's universities are state-run, Boucher argued that these
"academics are government officials "who wanted to enjoy the hospitality of the United States and
spread the party line.'" n323 However, as one observer wondered, "how Castro suffers from the
grounding of scholars defies explanation."
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SHOULD LIFT EMBARGO: WOULD HELP INTERNATIONAL SPORTS
NORMALIZING CUBAN-US RELATIONS WILL HELP THE INTERNATIONAL SPORTS WORLD-Erikson '04
[Daniel P.; Director of Caribbean Programs at the Inter-America Dialogue; “WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART II OF II: CUBA'S FUTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND
INVESTMENT: The Future of American Business in Cuba: Realities, Risks, and Rewards;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
Cuba has become renowned throughout the world for its prowess at baseball and its unique musical
tradition. In Cuba today, an American who attends a baseball game is likely to be asked, "Are you an
agent?" Although it is hard to quantify the degree to which sports and music can contribute to the
island's economic recovery, there is little question that Cuba has the capacity to make a significant
contribution in these areas. The Castro government banned professional sports soon after the 1959
Revolution, and top Cuban athletes earn about twenty dollars a month in addition to perks such as
luxury housing and transportation. n68 Cuba has long been considered a source of considerable
athletic talent, especially in the realm of baseball. In 1999, the United States and Cuba initiated the
first stage of "baseball diplomacy" with an exhibition game between Cuba's national team and the
Baltimore Orioles, which took place at Camden Yards in Baltimore. n69 In 2000, the United States
delivered a stunning defeat to Cuba, winning the Olympic championship four to zero. n70 The
country remains competitive in a number of international competitions, including boxing, track,
and gymnastics. Cuban high jumper Javier Sotomayor is a two-time Olympic champion and world
record holder, although his reputation was diminished by a positive drug test at the 1999 Pan Am
games, which Cuba disputed.
However, the problem of Cuban athletes defecting while traveling to compete abroad has been a
significant problem for the government, and Castro has denounced the recruitment of baseball
stars as "robbery." Of the estimated sixty Cuban baseball players that defected between 1991 and
2002, only fourteen have entered the Major Leagues in the United States, while the remainder
entered leagues in Central America or Asia or dropped out of the sport entirely. n71 During the same
period, dozens of Olympic athletes have defected and later struggled to find success outside of Cuba.
In December 1997, Cuban baseball star Orlando "El Duque" Hernandez escaped to the [*707]
Bahamas, and eventually signed a $ 6.6 million contract with the New York Yankees - and went on to
win his first World Series in 1998. n72 Other high-profile defections have included Cuba's top
pitcher, Maels Rodriguez, and stolen-base champion Yobal Duenas, who defected in October 2003,
and earlier examples include baseball players who later joined and pitched for the San Francisco
Giants and Boston Red Sox.
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CONGRESS SUPPORTS LIFTING EMBARGO
US HAS ALREADY TAKEN BABY STEPS TOWARDS NORMALIZING TRADE RELATIONS-Erikson '04
[Daniel P.; Director of Caribbean Programs at the Inter-America Dialogue; “WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART II OF II: CUBA'S FUTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND
INVESTMENT: The Future of American Business in Cuba: Realities, Risks, and Rewards;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
In December 2001, several leading U.S. agricultural companies sent a shipment of corn and frozen
chicken to Cuba. This consummated the first direct sale between the two countries since President
John F. Kennedy initiated a trade and investment embargo against the government of Fidel Castro in
the early 1960s. Few people could have guessed that Cuba's near-total commercial estrangement
from the United States, which had survived more than forty years and the administrations of ten
American Presidents, would owe its first small step to a fluke of the weather. Although the U.S.
Congress had passed the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act in the summer of
2000, thereby allowing all-cash food and medical sales to Cuba, the measure was rebuffed by the
Cuban government, which had [*692] vowed not to buy a single grain of rice under the new
legislation. This standoff was cut short in November 2001, when powerful Hurricane Michelle
ripped through Cuba's agricultural sector and created an unexpected political opening. When the
United States offered food aid, Cuba seized the opportunity to reverse its position and began to
purchase U.S. farm goods under the new rules. The resulting boom in agricultural trade - estimated
to reach an annual total of $ 500 million in 2004 - has sparked renewed interest in the wider
American business community about whether and when Cuba will represent a trading and
investment opportunity for U.S. companies.
CONGRESS MOVING CLOSER TO LIBERALIZING TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND CUBA--Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
Within the first three months of 2007 alone, four bills were proposed in the House and one in the
Senate with the express goal of breaking down travel and trade restrictions between the United
States and Cuba. These include: the Cuba Reconciliation Act, n122 the Export Freedom to Cuba Act
of 2007, n123 the Agricultural Export Facilitation Act of 2007, n124 Free Trade with Cuba Act n125
and the Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act of 2007. n126 Though the bills have varying degrees of
support in their respective houses, the sheer volume of these proposals is a strong indication that
there is sentiment in Congress favouring the improvement of trade and travel relations with Cuba.
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CUBAN-AMERICANS SUPPORT LIFTING EMBARGO
CUBAN-AMERICAN LOBBY IS MOVING TOWARDS NORMALIZING RELATIONS--Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
One of the most significant reasons that President Bush and his executive predecessors have taken
little, if any, action to improve relations with Cuba is the political influence of the Cuban-American
population residing in south Florida. n129 Should the sentiment of this support base begin to shift
away from its strong anti-Castro views toward a more cooperative stance, there is reason to believe
the executive would be more responsive to the legislature's proposals. There is reason to believe this
shift is already underway. n130
CUBAN-AMERICAN POPULATION SLOWLY EMBRACING NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH
CUBA--Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
The majority of Cuban-Americans residing in south Florida, primarily those first generation
immigrants who fled Cuba in the first wave after the Revolution, favour the U.S.-Cuban trade
embargo, President George W. Bush's handling of the situation in Cuba, and the additional trade
and travel restrictions imposed by the Bush administration in 2004. n135 An overwhelming majority
of immigrants that [*170] arrived before and during the 1970s still support a continuation of the
embargo and the Bush administration's tighter restrictions. n136 However, the same cannot be said
of second and third generation Cubans or those Cuban-Americans who arrived in south Florida in
the 1980s or later. n137 Though a very slight majority of those Cuban-Americans favour a
continuation of the embargo, the majority oppose the Bush administration's additional restrictions.
n138
These figures are an indication that a transition is occurring in this influential population's political
leanings and policy aims. As the older generation of Cuban-Americans begins to pass, it is likely that
the pendulum will swing. Should the trend continue, the majority sentiment in south Florida will
soon be opposed to the embargo and tight travel and trade restrictions against Cuba. This
fundamental change will be a very strong factor in the future of trade and travel relations between
the United States and Cuba.
CUBAN-AMERICANS SLOWLY ACCEPTING NORMALIZED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND CUBA--Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
Concurrently, the shift that appears to be occurring amongst the influential Cuban-American
population in south Florida n153 regarding attitudes towards relations with Cuba may support a
change in policy. Although this voting block has traditionally opposed the easing of trade
restrictions, the second and third generations of Cuban-Americans favour a step back from the hardline isolationist position. n154 As the shift continues to evolve, this group becomes less likely to
exhibit such strong opposition to any enhanced trade policy, and potentially more likely to favour
such policy. The relative success of TSRA is yet another indicator that it is possible for trade relations
to exist between the United States and Cuba, despite the feelings that a large population of south
Florida residents harbour towards Cuba - and the Castro regime in particular.
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CUBANS SUPPORT LIFTING THE BAN
THE LACK OF SUPPORT FOR THE EMBARGO AMONG THE CUBAN PEOPLE ERODES ITS
LEGITIMACY--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
The embargo's legitimacy is further eroded by the fact that it is opposed by a vast majority of Cubans,
the intended beneficiaries. Officially, the United States government argues that the embargo is in
place for the benefit of the Cuban people as the most effective instrument available to promote an
economic and political opening within Cuban society. One of the more interesting though least
debated moral, political, and legal questions posed by the embargo has to do with what Cubans
living in Cuba think of the embargo. It seems clear that those actually living under the Castro
government would have a well-developed understanding of the policy tools most likely to improve
their situation and that their views should be considered by outsiders intent on assisting them. At
the very least, discussions about how to promote democracy within Cuban society should include
the opinions of those Cubans living on the island. If a key goal of American policy is to foster a
democratic culture in Cuba, then it ought to consult Cubans, the intended beneficiaries of U.S.
policy, on their preferred way of moving toward greater future political and economic freedom.
THE CUBAN PEOPLE ARE OVERWHELMINGLY AGAINST THE EMBARGO--Coll '07
[Alberto; Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute; “HARMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF PROMOTING THEM: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO;” UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs; Fall 2007; LN]
It is possible to draw several tentative conclusions from this survey. An overwhelming majority of
respondents (93%) were against the embargo. Only a small minority (7%) felt that the embargo was
either good or that it did not matter. A larger group (14%) believed that although the embargo has a
negative impact on the lives of ordinary Cubans, is harmful to the country, and should cease, the
embargo's end would not improve their lives significantly because most of Cuba's problems are the
result of its own government's poor economic policies and widespread mismanagement. Among the
majority (76%) who believed that the elimination of the embargo would make an appreciable
difference, opinion was split on how extensive this difference would be. 97% of these respondents
had very high expectations and thought the lifting of the embargo would be "the end of all
shortages" and provide more well-paid jobs. People with high expectations about the end of the
embargo included government sympathizers as well as critics. There was also a small minority (3%)
who strongly believed that the embargo's end would improve Cuba's situation but not as extensively
as most Cubans thought. Their expectations were constrained by a sense that many of Cuba's
economic problems would not be solved simply by ending the embargo. [*271] They did not speak
of government mismanagement or incompetence but of "structural problems" that Cuba faces in
the global economy as a small Caribbean island and that are difficult to tackle, regardless of whether
the economy is socialist or free-market.
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SHOULD TAKE DRAMATIC ACTION; INCREMENTAL CHANGE ISN’T ENOUGH
TSRA MIGHT OPEN TRADE BUT SIGNIFICANT BARRIERS STILL EXIST IN TRADE BETWEEN
THE US AND CUBA--Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
Opening the door to the export of medical and agricultural commodities, while a step forward, was
accompanied by a number of daunting obstacles for those wishing to take advantage of TSRA. The
legislative and administrative requirements have presented a series of burdens and logistical
setbacks for interested U.S. [*153] corporations, which have served as a prohibitive factor for some.
Over the years, it has become exceedingly difficult for firms to take advantage of the legislation and
tap into the potential benefits of trading with the Cuban state.
While the passage of TSRA allowed the export of U.S. agricultural products to Cuba, such sales are
subject to extensive conditions, restrictions and prohibitions, n30 making any commercial
relationship difficult to navigate and flourish. The Department of Treasury's Office of Financial
Asset Control (OFAC) requires any U.S. corporation exporting exempted agricultural products to
Cuba to obtain a license, specifically depending upon the product to be sold. n31 The language in
the TSRA provisions detailing the licensing of agricultural exports has been described as "unclear
and contradictory," generating conflicts over its application.
LIFTING THE TRAVEL BAN IS NOT ENOUGH; MUST COMPLETELY NORMALIZE TO GET
ECONOMIC BENEFITS--Ross '04
[James; Professor of Food and Resource Economics at the University of Florida; “The Impact of Potential Changes in U.S.Cuba Relations on Midwest Agribusiness Trade and Investment;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004;
LN]
Agribusiness investment opportunities under this scenario would be permitted; however, no U.S.
government incentives would be extended to U.S. agribusiness investors. Without incentives
provided by the U.S. government, U.S. investors would have to compete using their own resources
with Canadian and European companies already established in Cuba. Approximately fifty
international economic associations in agribusiness now operate in Cuba in food processing,
production of fresh produce for the tourist trade, and in other agricultural areas. Without a regime
change and implementation of new foreign investment policies and regulations, the established
companies would have an advantage over new investors.
As a result of unilaterally removing economic sanctions on Cuba, it is doubtful there would be
significant increase in U.S. agricultural exports beyond the amount projected for lifting the travel
ban.
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UNITED STATES IS THE CONTROLLING FACTOR OVER “NORMALIZATION”
THE UNITED STATES HAS TOTAL CONTROL OVER “NORMALIZATION”--Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
Cuba has continually claimed that its government is open to any and all trade with the United States,
explicitly placing the burden on the United States to normalize and enhance trade relations between
the two countries. Alimport has issued statements reflecting the desire to normalize the regulatory
business environment and continue to increase the amount of U.S. imports. n83 They have reached
out to U.S. states with strong agricultural interests, as well as to U.S. agricultural firms.
US MUST RECOGNIZE CUBA BEFORE TRADE CAN FLOURISH BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS-Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
However, the situation is not so clean cut when viewed outside of the sheer economic lens and
perspective from which the Cuban Chamber of Commerce may be approaching the situation. The
state of affairs is more complex than a mere economic analysis would indicate. This is evidenced by
statements made by Raul Castro, while sitting as Acting President of Cuba, shortly after assuming
office. n90 In a December 2006 speech commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Cuban
Revolution, Raul stated:
We take this opportunity to once again state that we are willing to resolve at the negotiating table the
longstanding dispute between the United States and Cuba, of course provided they accept, as we
have previously said, our condition as a country that will not tolerate any blemishes on its
independence, and as long as said resolution is based on the principles of equality, reciprocity,
noninterference and mutual respect. In the meantime, after almost half a century, we are willing to
wait patiently until [*162] the moment when common sense prevails in the Washington power
circles. n91
These statements reflect not only the state of economic and trade relations, but also to the social
and political relations between the United States and Cuba; yet another indication that much more
than mere economics is at play when speaking of normalizing trade relations between the two
nations. Political, ideological and historical forces lie at the root of the 50 year standoff between the
United States and Cuba, and trade relations cannot be expected to exist independently of these other
forces. While Alimport and the Cuban Chamber of Commerce may be making significant strides in
developing relationships with U.S. states and agricultural entities, the Castro government has made
it clear that U.S. recognition of their regime is necessary before trade relations can flourish.
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CUBA WANTS TO TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES
CUBA CAN SAVE MILLIONS BY TRADING with the UNITED STATES--Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
The most significant advantage Cuba has in trading with the United States is the savings that can be
achieved on transportation costs, as compared with those costs when trading with European, Asian
[*161] or even South American countries. n85 Cuba annually imports approximately $ 1 billion of
agricultural goods from countries other than the United States, of which transportation costs
constitute nearly thirty-five percent of production costs. n86 It has been estimated that Cuba can
save up to $ 100 million annually on transportation costs alone, should it import primarily U.S.
agricultural products. n87 With those figures in mind, one would imagine that the savings realized
would be enough to motivate Cuba to meet restrictions and regulations required by TSRA and OFAC.
Consistent with this premise, the Cuban Chamber of Commerce has indicated that if the United
States wishes to open a dialogue with Cuba, opening trade lines between the two countries, then
Cuba would be interested. n88 The cheaper transportation costs as a result of the geographical
proximity would be a very strong factor influencing Cuban trade relations with the United States over
other international trade partners.
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A/T: CASTRO WILL STOP BUSINESS EXPANSION
US ACTION TO LIFT THE EMBARGO WILL RESULT IN ATTRACTIVE OPPORTUNITIES FOR US
BUSINESS EVEN IF CASTRO DISAPPROVES--Erikson '04
[Daniel P.; Director of Caribbean Programs at the Inter-America Dialogue; “WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART II OF II: CUBA'S FUTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND
INVESTMENT: The Future of American Business in Cuba: Realities, Risks, and Rewards;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
Cuba's economic future will hinge on many different factors, but there are a range of trends at work
that suggest that the Cuban economy is likely to open significantly over the next decade. This
prediction can be based in part on the fact that Cuba's economic relations have become increasingly
internationalized since the early 1990s, including a limited opening to foreign direct investment and
the cultivation of a much wider array of trading partners. While some of the initial reforms were
partially reversed during the mid-1990s (such as laws allowing small-scale entrepreneurial activity),
the overall trend has been towards cautious incorporation of market mechanisms in some sectors,
and greater outreach towards the American business sector. Thus, even if Fidel Castro remains at
the helm and the political system remains closed, a significant shift in U.S. policy, such as removing
the trade and investment embargo, could result in attractive, though limited opportunities for U.S.
companies in several fields.
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CON
THE EMBARGO WORKS
ALTHOUGH THE OVERALL GOAL HAS NOT BEEN ACHIEVED, THE EMBARGO HAS BEEN
SUCCESSFUL IN SMALLER FOREIGN POLICY GOALS--Colmer '04
[Josep M.; Research Professor in Political Science; “CUBA & DEMOCRATIZATION: SHOULD SANCTIONS BE LIFTED?: Who
Could End the Embargo? A Game-Theoretical Perspective;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004;
LN]
In spite of these apparently favorable conditions, the major goal of the U.S. embargo against the
Cuban regime, destabilizing the government in the expectation of an internal uprising, has not been
achieved thus far. Other goals, such as the elimination of the national security threat created by the
establishment of a communist regime with nuclear weapons only a few miles from U.S. territory,
were achieved de facto very early, by the end of 1962, as discussed above. The goal of containing the
export of the Cuban revolution and stopping the expansion of communism in Latin America, to the
extent that it has been successful, may have been helped by the U.S. embargo and threat of further
sanctions - but probably has not depended on it but rather on the dissolution of the Soviet Union
and the failures of Cuban military adventures abroad.
THE EMBARGO HAS COST CUBA BILLIONS AND BILLIONS OF DOLLARS--Colmer '04
[Josep M.; Research Professor in Political Science; “CUBA & DEMOCRATIZATION: SHOULD SANCTIONS BE LIFTED?: Who
Could End the Embargo? A Game-Theoretical Perspective;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004;
LN]
Nevertheless, it is possible to collect the following estimates of the U.S. embargo costs on Cuba from
several sources. From 1961 to 1989, one study estimates Cuba's total costs at about $ 49 billion. The
U.S. International Trade Commission has estimated that U.S.-Cuba bilateral trade and investment
flow, in the absence of U.S. sanctions from 1960 to 1996, would [*175] have been between $ 26
billion and $ 48 billion. n23 Sources closely related to the Cuban government estimated that the U.S.
blockade had cost Cuba, in both lost trade and extra costs in importing products from other
countries, about $ 38 billion to $ 40 billion from 1960 to 1995. However, in 1998, the Cuban
government estimated that costs including the absence of trade with the U.S., reduced tourism,
differential costs from importing goods from more distant countries, frozen bank accounts, and
emigration of skilled workers amounted to about $ 67 billion. In 1999, the Cuban government
announced the filing of a lawsuit against the U.S. government to recover the damages caused by the
forty-year blockade for $ 100 billion. This amount, nevertheless, also was increased soon after. On
the official site of the Cuban government against the blockade, published in 2001, direct and
indirect losses were estimated at more than $ 121 billion (although only $ 67 billion were detailed in
measurable variables, and from these only $ 30 billion were attributed to failed exports and services).
OVERALL, THE EMBARGO HAS BEEN A SUCCESS EVEN IF SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES VARY IN
SUCCESS--DeMelfi '06
[Christy; JD/MBA Candidate at Hofstra University; “NOTHING BUT THE FACTS: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA;” The Journal of International Business & Law;” Spring 2006; LN]
In a very general sense, applying only the definition of an embargo, the embargo against Cuba has
been implemented successfully. Because the embargo has prevented nearly all direct and indirect
commercial relations between those subject to U.S. jurisdiction and Cuba or its nationals, in theory,
the embargo has been successful. When you look at specific goals, however, the successfulness has
varied.
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THE SANCTIONS WERE LARGELY SUCCESSFUL IN CONTAINING COMMUNISM--DeMelfi '06
[Christy; JD/MBA Candidate at Hofstra University; “NOTHING BUT THE FACTS: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA;” The Journal of International Business & Law;” Spring 2006; LN]
The goal of containment was partially successful. According to Donna Kaplowitz in Anatomy of a
Failed Embargo, (1998) this objective failed because the goal was "nebulous, changing, and difficult
to obtain." (Kaplowitz, 1998, pg. 6) The main reason this goal was so hard to achieve is because
Cubans turned to another source to finance their revolutions. This other source was the Soviet
Union, which provided a great deal of aid to Cuba during most of the embargo's life. The embargo
did not prevent Cuba from exercising its influence in other parts of the world, particularly in other
South American countries, and Africa. Remember, Cuba's involvement in other Latin American
countries is what sparked the O.A.S. sanction in the 1960's. Cuba also supported revolutions in such
African countries as Ethiopia and Angola. The goal was partially successful, however, because
communism did not spread around the globe.
THE UNITED STATES SHOULD DEMAND THAT WESTERN ALLIES STOP CODDLING CUBA-Sweeney '94
[John P.; Foreign Policy Fellow; “Why the Cuban Trade Embargo Should Be Maintained;” Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder #1010; 10 November 1994; http://www.heritage.org/research/tradeandeconomicfreedom/bg1010.cfm; downloaded 12 May
2009]
Demand that U.S. allies in the Western Hemisphere, including Mexico and Canada, stop coddling
Castro and start calling for real change. Link future free trade agreements between the United States
and Latin American/Caribbean nations to redoubled efforts by these countries to persuade Castro to
liberalize Cuba's economy and political system. Prepare for the possibility that Castro's collapse
could unleash a lengthy period of social and political unrest, and perhaps even civil war, in Cuba.
Reinforce the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo in anticipation of attack by pro-Castro forces.
SANCTIONS CAN WORK TO CREATE SPECIFIC POLICY GOALS--Drezner '06
[Daniel W.; Economist; “Drezner on Weisberg on sanctions;” DanielDrezner.com; 3 August 2006;
http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/002832.html; downloaded 12 May 2009]
Sanctions with more specifically tailored demands can work against authoritarian regimes. The
1979 financial sanctions against Iran did play an important role in the release of the hostages. The
U.S. and U.N. sanctions against Libya led that country to surrender suspects in several airline
bombings -- and probably played a supporting role in Libya's decision to renounce its WMD
program. So, if the sanctioning country can be precise in what it wants, and is willing to settle for
less than regime change, sanctions have the potential to work. The flaw in America's sanctions
policy is not their use, but the tendency to overestimate the concessions sanctions can generate.
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THE EMBARGO HAS WORKED DESPITE THE OUTWARD PERCEPTION THAT IT DID NOT-Gutierrez '07
[Carlos M.; Former US Secretary of Commerce; Commission for Assistance to Free Cuba; “Cuba at the Crossroads;” The
Heritage Lecture #1048; 24 October 2007; http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/hl1048.cfm; downloaded 12 May 2009]
When the subject of Cuba comes up, one quesnism are a tactic to remain in power, but the real
ideology is a fervent anti-Americanism. So, the first goal has been to keep resources out of his
hands.gle thing that Castro has believed in all of his adult life. It is almost as though Marxism and
Commution that I'm always asked is, "The embargo has been in place for about 47 years: Has it
worked?" And my answer to that is yes, the embargo has worked. One of the things that history never
does for us is tell us what did not happen. We only know what has taken place. What we don't know
is what could have happened. The embargo has denied Castro resources, and that's what the
embargo was intended to do. For many of you who have read Cuban history, many of you who are
well-versed in Cuban history--especially Cuban history since the coming to power of Fidel Castro-you will know that his regime's number one philosophy, their true ideology is anti-Americanism.
THE EMBARGO HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL BY STOPPING WHAT WOULD HAVE HAPPENED
HAD CASTRO HAD RESOURCES--Gutierrez '07
[Carlos M.; Former US Secretary of Commerce; Commission for Assistance to Free Cuba; “Cuba at the Crossroads;” The
Heritage Lecture #1048; 24 October 2007; http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/hl1048.cfm; downloaded 12 May 2009]
When I say history doesn't record what doesn't happen, and doesn't give us credit for what doesn't
happen, imagine what the last 48 years would have been like if Castro had had resources. If Castro
would have had real monetary resources, imagine the things that could have happened over the last
48 years. They haven't. And that is why I say, yes, the embargo has been a success, and President
Bush is determined to keep the policy in place and to continue to take initiatives to hasten the
Cuban people's day of freedom.
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CUBA VIOLATES HUMAN RIGHTS
POLITICAL PRISONERS ARE INHUMANLY TREATED IN CUBA--Sarmiento '05
[Ignacio; JD Candidate at Nova Southeastern University; “INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AFFAIRS: TRAVELING TO CUBA?
SORRY, IT'S CLOSED;” Nova Law Review; Winter 2005; LN]
Political prisoners are generally treated the worst of all prisoners. n220 They have unsanitary
facilities, are not provided with blankets, and are afforded no legal protection. n221 Additionally,
medical care is refused to political prisoners on a regular basis. n222 For example, Jorge Antunez, a
thirty-three year old male, was incarcerated for eighteen years as a political prisoner. n223 While in
jail, Antunez was beaten unconscious by prison guards. n224 When his sister questioned the
beating, she was told that prison officials were authorized to beat inmates at their discretion. n225
At the time of the beating, Antunez was suffering kidney failure and hypoglycemia, and was denied
medication. n226 Another example of a human rights violation was the Cuban government's attack
on a tugboat carrying more than forty people (twenty were children) during which all of the
passengers were killed for attempting to flee the island.
CUBA CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN POOR HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES--Roberts and Walser '08
[James and Ray; Policy Analysts; “Cuba's Phony Transition: Fidel Resigns, Raul Reigns;” Heritage Foundation; WebMemo;
19 February 2008; downloaded 12 May 2009]
The human rights situation has not improved since March 2003, when the government cracked
down on the peaceful opposition and arrested 75 human rights activists, journalists, and opposition
figures, sentencing many of them to prison terms ranging from six to 28 years. The U.S. Department
of State writes the following in its 2006 "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices":
The government's human rights record remained poor, and the government continued to commit
numerous, serious abuses. The government denied citizens the right to change their government.
There were at least 283 political prisoners and detainees at year's end. Thousands of citizens served
sentences for "dangerousness," in the absence of any criminal activity.
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CUBA IS A NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT
CUBA IS STILL A NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT TO THE WORLD--Roberts '07
[James; Research Fellow; “Cuba at the Crossroads: The Threat to U.S. National Security;” Heritage Foundation WebMemo;
18 October 2007; http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/wm1669.cfm; downloaded 12 May 2009]
The next event will feature a discussion of the many ways that Castro's Cuba threatens U.S. national
security. A number of security issues stand out:
* Cuba is aggressively spreading anti-Americanism throughout Latin America and is deeply
involved in backing and advising the increasingly totalitarian and virulently anti-U.S. regime of
Venezuelan dictator-President Hugo Chávez.[1]
* Since Raul Castro took the reins as acting head of state in 2006, Cuban intelligence services have
intensified their targeting of the U.S. Since 9/11, however, U.S. intelligence agencies have reduced
the priority assigned to Cuba.[2]
* Cuba's Directorate of Intelligence (DI) is among the top six intelligence services in the world.
Thirty-five of its intelligence officers or agents have been identified operating in the U.S. and
neutralized between 1996 and 2003.[3] This is strong evidence of DI's aggressiveness and hostility
toward the U.S.
* Cuba traffics in intelligence. U.S. intelligence secrets collected by Cuba have been sold to or
bartered with Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and other enemies of the United States. China is
known to have had intelligence personnel posted to the Cuban Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) site at
Bejucal since 2001, and Russia continues to receive Cuban SIGINT information. Additionally, many
Cuban intelligence agents and security police are advising Hugo Chávez in Venezuela.[4]
* Cuban intelligence has successfully compromised every major U.S. military operation since the
1983 invasion of Grenada and has provided America's enemies with forewarning of impending U.S.
operations.[5]
* Beijing is busy working to improve Cuban signals intelligence and electronic warfare facilities,
which had languished after the fall of the Soviet Union, integrating them into China's own global
satellite network. Mary O'Grady of the Wall Street Journal has noted that this means the Chinese
army, at a cyber-warfare complex 20 miles south of Havana, can now monitor phone conversations
and Internet transmissions in America.
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CUBA REFORMS ARE SMALL OR IMAGINARY
CUBAN REFORMS HAVE BEEN HOLLOW--DeMelfi '06
[Christy; JD/MBA Candidate at Hofstra University; “NOTHING BUT THE FACTS: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA;” The Journal of International Business & Law;” Spring 2006; LN]
Another reform is the emergence of private enterprises. This is also hollow because the businesses
are extremely regulated. These businesses are not allowed to have brokers or to hire employees. They
are also required to sell [*162] any food they produce to the government so that a free market does
not prevail. Dollarization is also an empty step taken by the Cuban government. Normal citizens are
not allowed to have dollars, unless they work in Cuba's tourism industry. This scarcity of the dollar
created a powerful black market in Cuba. In order to combat some of this illegal market, Castro
forced some people with dollars to convert back to the peso. Obviously then, the dollar is not free to
circulate throughout the country.
CUBA HAS TAKEN NO STEPS TOWARDS POLITICAL REFORM--Sarmiento '05
[Ignacio; JD Candidate at Nova Southeastern University; “INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AFFAIRS: TRAVELING TO CUBA?
SORRY, IT'S CLOSED;” Nova Law Review; Winter 2005; LN]
Additionally, unlike China, Cuba has not taken any steps towards reform. n232 For example, in Cuba
there is neither private property, nor any persons available to do business with except for the
government itself. Clearly, this policy is attributable to Castro's control over all aspects of life in
Cuba. n233 Under Castro's government, it is illegal for anyone to do business except for the
government. n234 This means that even if the United States allowed businesses to establish
themselves in Cuba, the business owners would not be able to independently run the business or
hire employees. n235 The Cuban government would control the company and assign the workers
they feel should be employed by the company. n236 For example, the largest foreign investor in
Cuba is Sheritt International of Canada ("Sheritt"). n237 Sheritt operates a mine in Cuba that
employs about 1500 individuals and pays Castro about $ 10,000 a year per worker. n238 Castro, in
turn, pays the workers eighteen [*310] dollars a month and retains the difference for himself. n239
This is the type of money that the United States needs to prevent the Cuban government from
acquiring. One way of accomplishing this goal is through the embargo and, more specifically,
through travel restrictions that prevent the flow of American dollars into Cuba.
ANY PERCEIVED REFORMS FROM OPENING UP THE US-CUBAN POLICY IS A FACADE-DeMelfi '06
[Christy; JD/MBA Candidate at Hofstra University; “NOTHING BUT THE FACTS: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA;” The Journal of International Business & Law;” Spring 2006; LN]
Those in favor of the embargo believe that such claims are unrealistic. Even though it appears that
several reforms have been made in Cuba, they are a facade. These beliefs are false because of strict
limitations on the reforms. One of these reforms is the allowance of joint enterprises with foreign
investors. This may seem good on the surface, but upon closer inspection one sees that Cuban
citizens are not allowed to establish their own businesses or join in with foreigners on investments.
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PROMISES OF MARKET REFORMS IN CUBA HAVE BEEN HOLLOW HOPE--Sweeney '94
[John P.; Foreign Policy Fellow; “Why the Cuban Trade Embargo Should Be Maintained;” Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder #1010; 10 November 1994; http://www.heritage.org/research/tradeandeconomicfreedom/bg1010.cfm; downloaded 12 May
2009]
None of the alleged "market reforms" undertaken to date in Cuba are true free-market initiatives.
Free enterprise remains highly restricted. Foreign investors doing business in Cuba today deal
mainly with Castro's regime. Cuban partners in joint ventures and mixed companies are approved
by Castro as "safe." Moreover, unlike China, Cuba has barely started to open up its economy, and
what little has been done to date has been permitted with great official reluctance and with the
objective of assuring the communist government's political survival. China's economic
transformation has been under way since 1978, when important agricultural reforms were
introduced, including the right of peasant farmers to grow the crops they wished and retain some of
their profit. Moreover, the government of China has encouraged the marketization of the country's
coastal provinces, and since 1992 the Chinese constitution has incorporated the concept of the
"socialist market economy." Although China remains a communist nation where political freedoms
are sharply restricted, the ruling regime has permitted vigorous development of the private sector,
thus laying the seeds for its eventual demise and potential replacement by a politically pluralist,
more open society.
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NEW CASTRO BROTHER IS JUST LIKE FIDEL!
NEW CASTRO BROTHER WON'T LIBERALIZE CUBA--Clendinning '08
[Catherine; JD Candidate at the Southern Methodist University School of Law; “The Great North American Trade-Off:
Legislation Shaping Trade Policies Between Cuba and the United States;” Law and Business Review of the Americas;
Winter 2008; LN]
Almost as soon as the excitement about a post-Castro Cuba began, it was quelled. n66 "Photos of a
recuperating Fidel Castro" coupled with [*146] news from the Nonaligned Movement summit of
Raul Castro's anti-American sentiments quieted press reports of the new Cuba on the horizon. n67
Reports also began to surface reminding the world that no matter what happens to Fidel Castro, the
current U.S. legislation toward Cuba will not easily allow for overnight changes.
RAUL CASTRO WILL KEEP THE POLICIES OF FIDEL--Gutierrez '07
[Carlos M.; Former US Secretary of Commerce; Commission for Assistance to Free Cuba; “Cuba at the Crossroads;” The
Heritage Lecture #1048; 24 October 2007; http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/hl1048.cfm; downloaded 12 May 2009]
I think that the key question is below Fidel and Raul. We don't think any change will come from
Fidel and Raul; we do not have these hopes, and I think it would be a bit naïve to think that Raul is-after 48 or 49 years of being the Defense Minister in a Communist regime--all of the sudden going to
be enlightened to change. There are people--Carlos Laje, Felipe Perachoque--I don't think anyone
really knows what they think because they have to say what they have to say to stay in power. And
people inside the military, people inside the government who see and travel, they see what they're
missing; they see what people in Cuba are going through. They understand, I hope, what they lack
and what they could have and the shortages and what people have to go through for this so-called
ideology.
DESPITE REPORTS OF MODEST REFORMS, ALL SIGNS IN CUBA POINT TO THE STATUS QUO
WITH RAUL IN CHARGE--Roberts and Walser '08
[James and Ray; Policy Analysts; “Cuba's Phony Transition: Fidel Resigns, Raul Reigns;” Heritage
Foundation; WebMemo; 19 February 2008; downloaded 12 May 2009]
Fidel Castro's resignation announcement comes as little surprise to those following events in Cuba.
The transition has been underway since July 31, 2006, when Fidel announced a "temporary transfer"
of power and yielded day-to-day control of the government to his brother, Raul Castro. That Brother
Raul's coronation was announced furtively, in the middle of the night, and online in a country where
practically no one but the Communist nomenclatura has access to the Internet is a good indicator of
a phony transition that lacks legitimacy.
Although minor economic reforms are possible, all signs point to a continuation of the status quo in
Cuba. The United States should keep existing policies in place until Cuba makes real progress on
political reforms and human rights issues.
RAUL'S REFORMS HAVE BEEN MODEST--Walser '08
[Ray; Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America; “Cuba Solidarity Day 2008: Remembering Our Totalitarian Neighbor;”
Heritage Foundation WebMemo; 20 May 2008; downloaded 12 May 2009]
The transition from Fidel to Raul occurred with few signs of instability and turmoil. Since February
24, 2008, Raul Castro has launched modest economic changes. Cubans can now aspire, although
few can afford, to own cell phones, DVD players, and computers (without access to the Internet). A
few hated restrictions, such as the ban on patronizing tourist hotels, have been lifted. Small farmers
and the self-employed will have more latitude to operate and more productive workers may receive
higher wages.
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NO FUTURE IS CERTAIN IN CUBA, THE CASTRO BROTHERS COULD BE REPLACED BY A
SIMILAR HARDLINE REGIME--Johnson '06
[Stephen; Latin America Policy Analyst; “Springtime for Cuba?;” Heritage Foundation Commentary; 2 August 2006;
http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed080206a.cfm; downloaded 12 May 2009]
Cuban Americans in Miami, as well as democrats around the world, hope the incident may hasten a
change in power on the island prison. However, it’s probably too soon to break out the bubbly. Fidel
has already proven himself a survivor in his old age — having overcome periods of incoherence and
broken bones when he fell into metal folding chairs. Plus his brother could be just as nasty.
What’s certain about Cuba’s future is that it’s hard to predict. The demise of one or both Castros
could lead to a power struggle among senior leaders, a collegial junta of generals ready to sustain
control over Cuba’s major income-generating enterprises (such as tourism), or a loss of control over
the masses.
RAUL IS EVERY BIT AS VIOLENT AS FIDEL--Johnson '06
[Stephen; Latin America Policy Analyst; “Springtime for Cuba?;” Heritage Foundation Commentary; 2 August 2006;
http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed080206a.cfm; downloaded 12 May 2009]
In case of death, Raúl, the 79-year-old dictator’s younger brother by four years, is the designated
successor. He is reportedly melancholy, uncharismatic, and in questionable health himself.
Moreover, he is believed to admire China’s slow transition toward capitalism, leading some analysts
to think he might be a malleable, temporary figure.
Yet, Raúl has always been Fidel’s dour enforcer, arranging for killings and imprisonments. He is the
architect of the current Cuban Communist party and organs of civilian government. As long as Fidel
is living, he is unlikely to make any changes. And even if Fidel goes to eternal justice soon, Raúl may
be expected to extend the regime’s iron rule for some time with support from the Cuban
Revolutionary Armed Forces.
RAUL HAS MAINTAIN CUBA'S POOR HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD--Walser '08
[Ray; Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America; “Cuba Solidarity Day 2008: Remembering Our Totalitarian Neighbor;”
Heritage Foundation WebMemo; 20 May 2008; downloaded 12 May 2009]
Sadly, as May 21 reminds us, the political climate in Cuba remains stagnant and stifling. Raul Castro
commands a legion of security agents believed to exceed 20,000, skilled in surveillance, infiltration,
and the use of agents provocateurs. Gatherings of more than three are prohibited; individuals are
subject to arrest and imprisonment for "dangerousness." Anyone expressing inconformity with
official views becomes fair game for a visit by a mob and "acts of repudiation."
An estimated 240 political prisoners languish under the most deplorable conditions that include
solitary confinement, and often beatings. Among the prisoners are many whose offenses were to
demand respect for universal human rights or to call for freedom of ideas and press.
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RAUL IS NOT AN AGENT OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION THAT THE POST-CASTRO FORCES
CALLED FOR--Roberts and Walser '08
[James and Ray; Policy Analysts; “Cuba's Phony Transition: Fidel Resigns, Raul Reigns;” Heritage Foundation; WebMemo;
19 February 2008; downloaded 12 May 2009]
Raul Castro is not the agent of democratic transition hoped for by forward-looking Cubans. Fidel's
younger brother, now 76 years old, has lived in the shadows of his flamboyant, domineering elder
brother. Yet Raul has wielded immense political and institutional power since the Cuban Revolution
took power in 1959. Raul has commanded the Cuban Armed Forces since 1959 and the security
(intelligence) services since 1989, and he has shared in Fidel's leadership of the Communist Party,
Cuba's only legal party. Cuba's 50,000-plus armed forces remain at the center of its command
economy. Serving or former military officers direct an estimated 60 percent of Cuba's business and
industry. The Ministry of Interior is still a world-class intelligence service and has become adept at
confronting any form of dissent. There is no indication that Raul intends to dismantle any of these
support structures.
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US POLICY IS A MORAL TOOL, NOT A POLICY TOOL, AND MUST BE UPHELD
SANCTIONS AREN'T JUST A POLICY TOOL, THEY ARE A MORAL STATEMENT THAT SHOULD
BE UPHELD--Sarmiento '05
[Ignacio; JD Candidate at Nova Southeastern University; “INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AFFAIRS: TRAVELING TO CUBA?
SORRY, IT'S CLOSED;” Nova Law Review; Winter 2005; LN]
On October 10, 2003, President George W. Bush "announced the establishment of The Commission
for Assistance to a Free Cuba ("the Commission")." n137 The Commission's primary function is to
assist Cuba in the transition from a communist country to a free and democratic society. n138 The
Commission provided a report to the President on May 1, 2004, proposing a number of changes to
the current United States policy towards Cuba. n139 Following the Commission's suggestions, the
President implemented the new policy considerations, effective June 30, 2004. n140 Since the outset
of his presidency, President Bush has vigorously upheld restrictions on Cuba, while preserving the
rights of Cuban citizens. n141 In a speech given on Cuba's Independence Day, President Bush
stated:
The sanctions the United States enforces against the Castro regime are not just a policy tool, but a
moral statement. It is wrong to prop up a regime that routinely stifles all the freedoms that make us
human. The United States stands opposed to such tyranny [*301] and will oppose any attempt to
weaken sanctions against the Castro regime until it respects the basic human rights of its citizens,
frees political prisoners, holds democratic free elections, and allows free speech.
THE EMBARGO SETS A CLEAR RULE THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT TOLERATE
THOSE THAT SUPPORT TERRORIST ACTIONS--Colmer '04
[Josep M.; Research Professor in Political Science; “CUBA & DEMOCRATIZATION: SHOULD SANCTIONS BE LIFTED?: Who
Could End the Embargo? A Game-Theoretical Perspective;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004;
LN]
As discussed above, the most important benefit of the embargo policy to the United States is the
opportunity to use it as a deterrent to new revolutionary initiatives and as leverage for intervening in
future Cuban events. In the past, the Cuban regime supported every single guerrilla, insurrectionary
movement, or terrorist group in Latin America (with the only exception being the Shining Path in
Peru). A report from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency released in May 1998 stated that Cuba does
not pose "a significant military threat to the United States and to other countries in the region" any
longer. n19 But, it is also a fact that Castro continues to view violent action and terrorism as
legitimate revolutionary tactics and protects terrorist group members (for instance, from the Basque
Country and Colombia), which is why the U.S. State Department keeps Cuba on the list of states
supporting terrorism. The U.S. embargo also sets an example, deterring would-be revolutionary
leaders in other countries from engaging in initiatives leading to the confiscation of American
properties or other forms of hostility. Regarding the future, U.S. leaders can expect to use the
embargo as an exchange tool for liberalization, democratization, and compensation decisions on
the Cuban side, as discussed above.
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THE UNITED STATES SHOULD STAND FIRM ON ITS DEMANDS THAT CUBA LIBERALIZE
BEFORE THE US DROPS THE EMBARGO--Sweeney '94
[John P.; Foreign Policy Fellow; “Why the Cuban Trade Embargo Should Be Maintained;” Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder #1010; 10 November 1994; http://www.heritage.org/research/tradeandeconomicfreedom/bg1010.cfm; downloaded 12 May
2009]
Although the United States today stands virtually alone in its insistence on maintaining the
embargo, it must stand firm. Thus far, the Clinton Administration has resisted pressure to lift the
embargo. To hasten the transition to a post-Castro Cuba, the Administration should: Maintain the
embargo until irreversible economic and political reforms leading to democratic capitalism take
place.
Admit no more Cuban refugees into the U.S. beyond the 20,000 per year agreed to during
negotiations in September. The 32,000 Cuban refugees now at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo
and in Panama should gradually be processed for admission to the United States.
THE UNITED STATES SHOULD MAINTAIN ITS STANCE AGAINST CUBA UNTIL THERE IS
POSITIVE MOVEMENT ON POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM ISSUES--Roberts and
Walser '08
[James and Ray; Policy Analysts; “Cuba's Phony Transition: Fidel Resigns, Raul Reigns;” Heritage Foundation; WebMemo;
19 February 2008; downloaded 12 May 2009]
It is certainly premature to speak of significant change in the relationship between the United States
and Cuba. On February 19, President Bush called for a transition centered on free and fair elections.
The Administration has reiterated its commitment to a policy enunciated in October 2007.[10]
In a speech made last year, Raul indicated that he was disposed toward improved relations with the
United States. Now in a position to call the shots, he can perhaps adopt a less confrontational
stance. If he wishes to send a strong signal of change, Raul should release prisoners of conscience
who were jailed in 2003, free the media, and grant access both to the Internet and to the outside
media.
Neither Members of Congress nor the American people should push to alter existing legislation or
restrictions on trade or travel with Cuba absent signs of positive change on the political and human
rights fronts. Raul fully understands the nature of the U.S.-Cuba dynamic and is smart enough to
find ways to work with the U.S. if he so desires. The transition ball still remains firmly in the Cuban
court.
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LIFTING THE EMBARGO WILL KILL THE FRAGILE DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT IN
CUBA
LIFTING THE EMBARGO WOULD KILL REFORM MOVEMENTS IN CUBA--Johnson '00
[Stephen; Latin America Policy Analyst; “Beyond the Gonzalez Case: How to Bring Freedom to Cuba;” Heritage Foundation
Executive Memorandum; 24 February 2000; downloaded 12 May 2009]
Lifting the embargo would be a serious mistake because it would focus relations even more on
Castro and devastate those in Cuba who seek reform. It would signal that quick sales are more
important to America than freedom while giving the regime additional resources to suppress
opposition, control expression, and block the development of institutions that would serve as a basis
for civil society.
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LIFTING THE EMBARGO WOULD RUIN 50 YEARS OF PROGRESS
US CAN STILL ACHIEVE ITS POLICY GOALS IN CUBA USING THE EMBARGO--Sarmiento '05
[Ignacio; JD Candidate at Nova Southeastern University; “INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AFFAIRS: TRAVELING TO CUBA?
SORRY, IT'S CLOSED;” Nova Law Review; Winter 2005; LN]
What the United States is asking of Cuba in order to allow travel and lift the embargo as a whole is
extremely feasible and can be achieved through pressure from the United States and other countries.
n211 These prerequisites include liberating all political prisoners, allowing other political parties to
form, and allowing free democratic elections. n212 These are the same types of conditions that
influenced democratic change over the last four decades in Portugal, Chile, and the Dominican
Republic -- just to name a few. n213 In contrast, [*308] where there has been no external pressure
and trade has been allowed, there has been no change to communist regimes.
THE US SHOULD ONLY LIFT THE EMBARGO IS THERE IS A POLITICAL OPENING IN CUBA-Colmer '04
[Josep M.; Research Professor in Political Science; “CUBA & DEMOCRATIZATION: SHOULD SANCTIONS BE LIFTED?: Who
Could End the Embargo? A Game-Theoretical Perspective;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004;
LN]
In a hypothetical future scenario in which the Cuban government - perhaps after Fidel Castro's
death - launches a political opening, it would be in the U.S. government's interest to respond
positively by lifting the embargo. In foreseeable circumstances, the Cuban move might be the result
of strategic calculations, especially dependent on the new difficulties of maintaining public order
and preventing social unrest, rather than of Cuban rulers' formal democratic commitment. In that
case, it would be in the U.S. interest to lift the embargo only conditionally, in the aim of preventing a
further move by the Cuban government back to political closeness and restrictions.
TURNING BACK EMBARGO NOW WOULD RUIN PROGRESS MADE OVER THE LAST 45 YEARS-Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
Since the latter part of the 1990s, beginning with the lobby for the passage of TSRA, various states
and industries have placed increasing pressure upon the U.S. government to ease trade and travel
restrictions and end the embargo. TSRA is seen as the necessary first step in the longer journey
towards the total breakdown of the embargo and a changed political stance with respect to Cuba and
the Castro regime. n92 However, while a segment of the U.S. public is in favor of lifting the embargo
and the associated restrictions, there are also those who believe "the embargo is finally working and
to lift it now would only add strength to the Castro regime and betray the faith of those Cubans who
have supported U.S. policy since the revolution." n93 The pro-embargo contingency is in favor of
retaining the hard-line U.S. policy toward Cuba and believes TSRA is the unfortunate catering of the
U.S. government to special interests that directly benefit from the expanding trade. n94 Those same
interests would see an end to the embargo while the Castro regime remains in power as the worst
possible outcome. They believe catering to [*163] foreign and domestic powers opposing the
embargo would equate to a complete failure of the policy pursued over the last 45 years.
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THE US SHOULD MAINTAIN OR STRENGTHEN THE EMBARGO AND WAIT FOR CUBA TO
TAKE ACTION--Colmer '04
[Josep M.; Research Professor in Political Science; “CUBA & DEMOCRATIZATION: SHOULD SANCTIONS BE LIFTED?: Who
Could End the Embargo? A Game-Theoretical Perspective;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004;
LN]
An opportunity for a policy to promote economic and political reforms able to trigger the end of the
embargo lies on the side of the Cuban government, in spite of its claims to the contrary. In order to
induce this move on the Cuban side, the U.S. strategy should be maintaining or even strengthening
the embargo. This may be paradoxical due to the fact that, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
which protected and subsidized Cuba, the Cuban dictatorship is now weaker than a few decades ago
and, therefore, less threatening to the United States. Precisely because of this weakness, U.S.
decision-makers may expect the embargo to be more effective in the present and foreseeable future
than it was in the past.
THE ONLY WAY TO HASTEN THE COLLAPSE OF CASTRO'S REGIME IS TO MAINTAIN THE
EMBARGO UNTIL CONDITIONS CHANGE IN CUBA--Sweeney '94
[John P.; Foreign Policy Fellow; “Why the Cuban Trade Embargo Should Be Maintained;” Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder #1010; 10 November 1994; http://www.heritage.org/research/tradeandeconomicfreedom/bg1010.cfm; downloaded 12 May
2009]
Thus far, the Clinton Administration has been steadfast in refusing to discuss the economic
embargo. It is correct in doing so. To hasten the collapse of the Castro regime and communism in
Cuba, the Administration should also:
Maintain the embargo until irreversible economic and political reforms leading to democratic
capitalism are in place. Tightening the economic screws may lead to more disturbances and riots, as
well as increased repression as Castro struggles to remain in power. However, the embargo remains
the only effective instrument available to the U.S. government in trying to force the economic and
democratic concessions it has been demanding of Castro for over three decades. Maintaining the
embargo will help to end the Castro regime more quickly.
THE UNITED STATES MUST LEAVE THE EMBARGO ALONE UNTIL IT MEETS ITS
OBJECTIVES--Sweeney '94
[John P.; Foreign Policy Fellow; “Why the Cuban Trade Embargo Should Be Maintained;” Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder #1010; 10 November 1994; http://www.heritage.org/research/tradeandeconomicfreedom/bg1010.cfm; downloaded 12 May
2009]
The United States must not abandon the Cuban people by relaxing or lifting the trade embargo
against the communist regime. Instead, the U.S. government must reject all pressures to ease the
embargo until all of the objectives for which it was imposed are achieved. Anything less would
constitute an unacceptable breach of faith with the Cuban people, who today are among the very few
people left in the world who still suffer the brutality of a communist dictatorship.
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THE UNITED STATES SHOULD MAINTAIN ITS ROLE IN CHALLENGING CUBA AND WAITING
OUT THE REGIME--Johnson '02
[Stephen; Latin America Policy Analyst; “Time For Consensus On Cuba;” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder; 30 August
2002; http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/BG1579.cfm; downloaded 12 May 2009]
For now, U.S. policy should be focused on constraining Castro's mischief, prodding further
concessions to market economics, and penetrating the regime's blockade on human rights and free
choice. In the future, it should provide transition leaders with concrete incentives to reform Cuba's
predatory, parasitic government.
However the Administration and Congress work out the details of U.S. policy toward Cuba, patience
will be crucial to eventual success. When Castro is gone, change may still come in fits and starts. A
recent survey among dissidents concluded that not everyone in the Communist Party (or even in the
government) likes the regime, but fear of repression, loss of entitlements, and a sense of futility still
keep many from challenging the current order. Some worry that a transition may bring high
unemployment, the loss of education and health benefits, and expulsions from their homes.
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LIFTING THE EMBARGO WILL NOT BRING REGIME CHANGE
CUBANS WILL HAVE THE FINAL SAY IN CUBA'S FUTURE LEADERSHIP, NOT THE UNITED
STATES--Clendinning '08
[Catherine; JD Candidate at the Southern Methodist University School of Law; “The Great North American Trade-Off:
Legislation Shaping Trade Policies Between Cuba and the United States;” Law and Business Review of the Americas;
Winter 2008; LN]
Of course not everyone agrees with Senator Nelson's plan. Many policy makers want to be careful not
to be "too quick to acknowledge a transition government" in Cuba. n80 Yet others suggest a much
more aggressive stance toward bringing Castro down at this time, citing concerns about terrorism
and what could happen if Cuba fell into the wrong hands. n81 Despite the range of opinions policy
makers have on how to move forward, it seems that recent events foreshadowing a post-Castro Cuba
may act as "a wake up call to policy makers to expand the interests that are being represented in USCuba policy, and move towards a more constructive engagement with what hopefully will be a
transition on the island." n82 Ultimately, one thing seems clear: "at the end of the day, it's up to
Cubans to determine how this transition will take place and what Cuba's national future will be."
THE CASTRO REGIME IS STRONG; LIFTING THE EMBARGO WILL INSPIRE CONFIDENCE-DeMelfi '06
[Christy; JD/MBA Candidate at Hofstra University; “NOTHING BUT THE FACTS: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA;” The Journal of International Business & Law;” Spring 2006; LN]
As it is seen in any interview with Castro, he is already a confident leader. Lifting the embargo would
not increase his confidence further. Even if it did happen, there is no reason to believe he would
suddenly open up to democracy and liberalization.
THE WORST CASE SCENARIO IS THE UNITED STATES LIFTING THE EMBARGO WHILE CUBA
MAINTAINS ITS DICTATORSHIP--Colmer '04
[Josep M.; Research Professor in Political Science; “CUBA & DEMOCRATIZATION: SHOULD SANCTIONS BE LIFTED?: Who
Could End the Embargo? A Game-Theoretical Perspective;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004;
LN]
According to the same reasoning, the worst possible outcome for the United States would be the
unilateral lifting of the embargo without any change in Cuba's policy - what we call free tradedictatorship. This outcome, which could result from domestic and foreign pressures on the U.S.
government against the embargo, would imply a complete defeat of the strategy pursued for forty
years. Later on in the paper, I also will discuss the prospects for this unilateral lifting to promote or
help a process of liberalization and democratization in Cuba. Regarding the other two intermediate
preferences, which imply the maintenance of the embargo, the option linked to democratization
and opening in Cuba appears as potentially more satisfactory for the United States. The present state
of affairs since the 1960s, which we call embargo-dictatorship, would be the third preference of the
U.S. government - not a very satisfactory result. This preference-ordering could, of course, be altered
for future U.S. rulers, especially taking into account that the "actor" we are dealing with is, in fact, a
complex interaction of a Presidency, a two-chamber Congress, diverse territorial interests, farmers,
humanitarian lobbies, and party factionalization, as will be discussed below.
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LIFTING THE EMBARGO WITHOUT LIBERALIZING ACTION IN CUBA WOULD BE A WIN FOR
CASTRO--Colmer '04
[Josep M.; Research Professor in Political Science; “CUBA & DEMOCRATIZATION: SHOULD SANCTIONS BE LIFTED?: Who
Could End the Embargo? A Game-Theoretical Perspective;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004;
LN]
For Castro's Cuba, the best possible outcome would be what we call free trade-dictatorship; that is,
the possibility of receiving the economic benefits from foreign trade, investments, and massive
tourism while maintaining the dictatorship and state control of the economy. This is the worst
possible outcome for the United States. Actually, this is what the Cuban government has attempted
since the early 1990s with non-U.S. partners, including Canada, Spain, and other EU countries. By
dealing directly with foreign companies trading or investing in Cuba, the government may expect to
keep Cuban people away from deleterious influences while obtaining resources to maintain rulers'
control and keep living standards sufficiently high to prevent social unrest and revolts. In other
words, Castro's ideal in the present circumstances would be to promote, including with the United
States, the kind of relations already established with a few democratic, capitalist countries. In his
own words:
The embargo is causing us terrible damage today when the socialist bloc no longer exists and we
have lost 70 percent of our trade and imports ... The suffering hurts all of us, but we won't exchange
the independence of this nation for a plate of beans ... Under no concept can lifting the embargo be
conditioned to issues that affect our independence. The Cuban [*178] position is a worthy one: Lift
the embargo without any conditions.
WITHOUT LIBERALIZATION STEPS ON THE PART OF CASTRO, LIFTING THE EMBARGO
WOULD ONLINE INCREASE THE OPPRESSION OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE--Sweeney '94
[John P.; Foreign Policy Fellow; “Why the Cuban Trade Embargo Should Be Maintained;” Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder #1010; 10 November 1994; http://www.heritage.org/research/tradeandeconomicfreedom/bg1010.cfm; downloaded 12 May
2009]
Without these steps, lifting the embargo would only assure Castro's continuing repression of the
Cuban people. Those who advocate doing so are violating their own professed commitment to
hemispheric democracy and the individual's right to self-determination. Castro is a ruthless,
charismatic dictator and is a potential danger to all democratic, freedom-loving nations. He is an
anachronism, but a dangerous one. The embargo, however, is not an anachronism; it is a legitimate
instrument for achieving the goal of a free and democratic Cuba.
MUST WAIT FOR LIBERAL GOVERNMENT TO COME TO POWER IN CUBA BEFORE
CHANGING POLICY--Gutierrez '07
[Carlos M.; Former US Secretary of Commerce; Commission for Assistance to Free Cuba; “Cuba at the Crossroads;” The
Heritage Lecture #1048; 24 October 2007; http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/hl1048.cfm; downloaded 12 May 2009]
I think we have to wait until there is change, and there will be change soon, and we'll see what kind
of leaders surface. But I believe, like you, that there are people there who want to change. They can't
be as open about it as we'd like them to be. And one of the opportunities is to identify those people,
because they're there, and we'd like to help them.
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TRYING TO BUY REFORMS WITH TRADE HAS NEVER WORKED TO CREATE LIBERAL
REFORMS IN CUBA--Johnson '02
[Stephen; Latin America Policy Analyst; “Time For Consensus On Cuba;” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder; 30 August
2002; http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/BG1579.cfm; downloaded 12 May 2009]
Those who favor trading with Castro as a way to reap profits and effect change in Cuba should
consider evidence that dealing with him on his terms provides uncertain rewards and has never
resulted in reform. Rather than work at cross purposes, the White House and Congress should
collaborate to identify America's interests and then fill in the details of an improved U.S.-Cuba policy
that would
* Deny support to a hostile regime by conditioning normal relations on an end to threats against
the United States and its allies and on democratic reforms, and by maintaining "cash and carry"
policies for sales of U.S. goods until the regime permits independent businesses and enacts marketbased reforms;
* Promote economic opportunity for America and Cuba by easing travel restrictions and
permitting U.S.-Cuban joint ventures when Castro's regime guarantees internationally accepted
labor rights, by establishing credits for independent Cuban businesses, and by developing a set of
principles for incorporating Cuba into normal trade relations once it permits a market economy;
and
* Encourage Cuban democrats by enhancing U.S. contact with ordinary Cubans, by improving
efforts to support Cuban dissidents and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and by improving
U.S. efforts to provide information on democratic governance and entrepreneurship to citizens on
the island.
THE US SHOULD CONDITION LIFTING THE EMBARGO ON FREE ELECTIONS--Johnson '00
[Stephen; Latin America Policy Analyst; “Beyond the Gonzalez Case: How to Bring Freedom to Cuba;” Heritage Foundation
Executive Memorandum; 24 February 2000; downloaded 12 May 2009]
Under current Cuban law, trade is only possible with the Cuban government. Rather than provide
resources to the regime, Washington should withhold full trade relations until Castro allows free
elections, opens markets, releases political prisoners, and restores civil liberties. In the meantime,
the Administration should streamline licensing procedures for donations, simplify paperwork for
approved classes of travelers, and find avenues to support nascent autonomous sectors of civil
society in Cuba, such as small entrepreneurs.
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IT IS A MISTAKE TO ASSUME THAT CUBA IS WAITING FOR THE UNITED STATES TO LIFT
SANCTIONS TO LIBERALIZE ITS GOVERNMENT--Azel '08
[Jose; “Cuba: Snuff Out the Embargo;” Gov Central; 3 March 2008; http://www.govcentral.com/news/articles/1535-cuba-snuff-out-theembargo-pro-versus-con-debate; downloaded 12 May 2009]
The effectiveness of using economic sanctions for political influence is an often debated aspect of
U.S. foreign policy. The practice, however, is not new or particularly American. Pericles’ decree
banning the Megarians from the Athenian market and ports helped incite the Great Peloponnesian
War in 431 B.C.
In the case of Cuba in 2008, after nearly five decades of economic sanctions, the debate continues.
Critics of the U.S. embargo note that economic sanctions have failed to change the nature of the
Cuban government and have allowed the country to use the embargo for propaganda purposes.
Abandoning U.S. trade restrictions, they argue, would expose Cuba to the “American way of life” and
help foment social pressures for economic reforms and political liberalization.
Regrettably, this outlook stems from a U.S.-centric vantage point extrapolated to the Cuban
government. Embargo opponents make the flawed assumption that the current Cuban government
is earnestly interested in close relations with its northern neighbor—and willing to jeopardize its
total control and 50-year legacy of opposition to Yankee imperialism in exchange for an
improvement in the economic well-being of Cubans. Raul Castro’s recent speech to Cuba’s National
Assembly should put an end to that notion.
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DETERIORATING CUBAN FINANCIAL SOLUTION DEMANDS CONTINUED US
POLICY
THE EMBARGO IS AS IMPORTANT NOW AS IT HAS EVER BEEN DUE TO THE CUBAN
FINANCIAL SITUATION--Sarmiento '05
[Ignacio; JD Candidate at Nova Southeastern University; “INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AFFAIRS: TRAVELING TO CUBA?
SORRY, IT'S CLOSED;” Nova Law Review; Winter 2005; LN]
The embargo against Cuba has been in place for more than forty years, and now, more than ever, the
United States must continue its enforcement. One of the primary reasons travel restrictions have
become stricter is to further curtail the entry of American dollars into the Cuban economy under
Castro. It now appears that the Castro regime is out of money mostly due to the collapse of the Soviet
Union, which resulted in the end of generous funding to the communist government. n209
Moreover, Cuba currently owes Russia over twenty billion dollars.
RECENT POLITICAL EVENTS HAVE MADE THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS MORE EFFECTIVE-DeMelfi '06
[Christy; JD/MBA Candidate at Hofstra University; “NOTHING BUT THE FACTS: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA;” The Journal of International Business & Law;” Spring 2006; LN]
In general, sanctions against Cuba are a tricky matter. The sanctions were originally imposed
unilaterally; however, they were not very effective. Several other democratic nations later joined in
the imposition of sanctions; however, Cuba was able to find a trade partner - the Soviet Union - to fill
the trade void. In the last few decades though, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba has lost its
main trading partner. Thus the economic effects are more prominent in recent history than ever
before. This has forced Castro to make some changes in policy such as dollarization. Dollarization
occurred in Cuba when the dollar was legalized as a currency. Although on the surface it appears that
changes have indeed been made, upon closer inspection one can see the changes are merely a
facade. The dollar is not available to all people, rather only the elite use this denomination of
currency.
ECONOMIC DOWNTURN ON THE ISLAND OF CUBA JUSTIFIED THE USE OF INCREASED
SANCTIONS OVER THE LAST DECADE--Spandoni '04
[Paolo; PdD Candidate at the University of Florida; “SYMPOSIUM: WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC
& SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART I OF II: CUBA TODAY: U.S. Financial Flows in the Cuban Economy;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004; LN]
Although one of the reasons for additional sanctions was to stimulate democratic reforms in Cuba,
the whole point of U.S. policy was to exert economic pressure on the Castro government (and
eventually hasten its demise) by stemming the flow of hard currency to the Caribbean island. A
spokesman for the U.S. Treasury Department recently admitted that sanctions against Cuba were
mainly intended to "deprive the Castro regime of the financial wherewithal to continue to oppress
its people." n2 In addition, the United States tried to capitalize on Cuba's economic dilemma and
frustrated economic adjustment. It is important to note that, "up to 1989, the embargo placed
conditions on the 15 percent of Cuba's international trade which fell outside the socialist market;
after 1991, the embargo had a restrictive influence on more than 90 percent of that trade." n3 Under
these circumstances, it appears obvious that U.S. policymakers had an unparalleled opportunity
finally to get the most out of economic sanctions that had failed for thirty years to overthrow the rule
of Fidel Castro.
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FACTORS EXIST TO MAKE THE EMBARGO A SUCCESS--Colmer '04
[Josep M.; Research Professor in Political Science; “CUBA & DEMOCRATIZATION: SHOULD SANCTIONS BE LIFTED?: Who
Could End the Embargo? A Game-Theoretical Perspective;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004;
LN]
According to the academic state of the art, the U. S. embargo against Cuba meets several favorable
conditions for success. Success is defined as the sender country achieving its foreign policy goals
regarding the target country, such as inducing it to change some of its policies or overthrowing the
regime. In this approach, favorable structural conditions for success include very different relative
sizes of the sender and the target countries, intense previous relations between the two countries,
high costs to the target country, low sender costs, and the length or duration of the sanctions.
THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION HAS MADE THE SANCTIONS MORE EFFECTIVE-DeMelfi '06
[Christy; JD/MBA Candidate at Hofstra University; “NOTHING BUT THE FACTS: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA;” The Journal of International Business & Law;” Spring 2006; LN]
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the effects of the sanction have been apparent in Cuba. Since
the early 1990's, Cuba has faced hard financial times. The country has faced a vicious cycle of
economic hardships caused by limited capital inflows, and reduced exports which led to lower
domestic production. In fact Cuba is now considered one of the least developed countries in the
Western Hemisphere with a GDP per capita at only $ 1560. This is a huge [*160] decrease in the
standard of living considering that Cuba was one of the most developed countries in the 1950's.
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ANY FAILURE OF US POLICY DUE TO US CITIZEN ACTION
US CITIZEN ACTION HAS RENDERED THE EMBARGO MUCH LESS USEFUL AS A POLICY
TOOL--Spandoni '04
[Paolo; PdD Candidate at the University of Florida; “SYMPOSIUM: WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC
& SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART I OF II: CUBA TODAY: U.S. Financial Flows in the Cuban Economy;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004; LN]
The importance of this work resides in its attempt to enrich the general debate on the role and
usefulness of economic sanctions and shed light upon a specific aspect that has been generally
neglected by scholars of international relations and by the literature on the Cuban embargo. While
many scholars tend to evaluate the utility of sanctions by analyzing the behavior of the target
government, this study focuses on the citizens of the coercer state. Far [*83] from downplaying the
importance of economic adjustments devised by the target country to cope with sanctions, the
contention of this paper is that U.S. citizens' economic activities (both legal and illegal) have
mitigated the impact of the Cuban embargo and undermined its main goal. The study begins with
an analysis of international tourism in Cuba and the presence of U.S. visitors on the island. It
continues with an examination of the importance for the Cuban economy of remittances sent from
Cuban exiles and payments to the Cuban government by U.S.-based companies for
telecommunications services. Finally, it provides a brief review of recent developments in U.S. food
sales to Cuba and U.S. investments in foreign companies that operate in the Cuban market. The
conclusion summarizes the main findings of the research and offers some suggestions for a more
effective U.S. policy toward the government of Fidel Castro.
DESPITE THE EMBARGO, REGULAR AMOUNTS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL FLOWS TO CUBA-Spandoni '04
[Paolo; PdD Candidate at the University of Florida; “SYMPOSIUM: WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC
& SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART I OF II: CUBA TODAY: U.S. Financial Flows in the Cuban Economy;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004; LN]
From the analysis presented in this paper, we can fairly argue that, in spite of the tightening of the
embargo, the United States has contributed in a significant way to the recovery of the Cuban
economy following the deep recession of the early 1990s. While intended to stimulate democratic
reforms and exercise pressure for regime change in Cuba by stemming the flow of hard currency to
the island, U.S. economic sanctions have achieved neither of these goals. Admittedly, the role of the
United States in the Cuban economy would have been much more important in the absence of
sanctions. However, even with restrictions in place, significant amounts of hard currency have been
channeled into Cuba through direct and indirect means of travel, remittances, telecommunications
payments, food sales, and secondary investments. Washington's policy toward Havana ended up
throwing a lifeline to the same government it was supposed to undermine.
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SEVERAL CUBAN AMERICANS REGULARLY SEND MONEY TO CUBA ABOVE THE LEGAL
LIMIT--Spandoni '04
[Paolo; PdD Candidate at the University of Florida; “SYMPOSIUM: WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC
& SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART I OF II: CUBA TODAY: U.S. Financial Flows in the Cuban Economy;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004; LN]
There is some evidence that money transfers from the United States oftentimes violate the limit of $
1200 per year on remittances to Cuba. Whereas more than 50% of Cuban respondents in the
November 2001 IADB survey said they send less than $ 100 per transaction, interviews with mules say
that, on average, they carry more than $ 200 per individual package. n59 [*100] Given that most of
the mules travel twice a month using different routes, it is likely that transactions with these
entrepreneurs frequently exceed the $ 1200 annual cap on remittances for U.S. citizens. As further
proof, Cuban sources indicate that the number of U.S. citizens of Cuban descent sending money
back home might be as high as 520,000. n60 If we divide the author's estimates of remittances (to be
more precise, we can deduct 10% because not all remittances come from the United States) by the
estimated number of Cuban Americans who regularly send money to their families, we can see that
money transfers to Cuba from the United States were on average $ 1817 per person in 2001, $ 1955 in
2002, and $ 2042 in 2003. Confirming these results, some experts have argued that Cuban Americans
currently send an annual average of $ 2000 per person to Cuba using non-traditional channels such
as mules or other entrusted agents.
CURRENCY FROM CUBAN AMERICANS HAS BEEN THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR
IN REACTIVATING THE CUBAN ECONOMY--Spandoni '04
[Paolo; PdD Candidate at the University of Florida; “SYMPOSIUM: WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC
& SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART I OF II: CUBA TODAY: U.S. Financial Flows in the Cuban Economy;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004; LN]
As a result of the deep economic recession that threatened Cuba's survival in the early 1990s, the
Castro government decriminalized both the possession and the use of hard currency (especially U.S.
dollars) in August 1993. In addition, the government legalized dollar-denominated remittances
under its 1994 monetary reform program. Since then, family remittances, mainly sent from Cuban
Americans, have become an important source of supplemental income for many Cubans. Even more
important for the purpose of this study, these practices have significantly boosted the domestic
dollar market in Cuba. As observed by Ana Julia Jatar-Hausmann, the legalization of the use of
foreign currency encouraged more family remittances, and the high prices at government-owned
dollar stores acted as a hidden sales tax on remittances, effectively allowing the Cuban authorities to
obtain access to that money. n30 In light of this development, several scholars contend that money
sent from abroad has been the single most important factor in reactivating the Cuban economy in
the second half of the 1990s.
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REMITTANCES FROM ABROAD IS THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IN BRINGING IN MONEY
TO THE CUBAN ECONOMY--Spandoni '04
[Paolo; PdD Candidate at the University of Florida; “SYMPOSIUM: WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC
& SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART I OF II: CUBA TODAY: U.S. Financial Flows in the Cuban Economy;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004; LN]
Pedro Monreal, an academic from the island, argues that in recent years Cuba has become
increasingly dependent on remittances and donations from abroad. He specifies that, in strict
terms, the Cuban economy cannot be qualified as an economy that depends fundamentally on
remittances because other important activities such as tourism and mining have emerged.
Nevertheless, he concludes that the importance of money sent from abroad is beyond question. In
fact, in net terms, remittances are the biggest source of foreign exchange for the country, more than
tourism and sugar. n31 Many of those who analyze data on revenues from tourism (about $ 2 billion
in 2003) [*91] believe that the tourism industry is the main generator of hard currency for the Cuban
economy. However, it must be noted that these are gross figures. In net terms, revenues are
significantly lower. In March 2001, Carlos Lage estimated the cost per dollar of gross income from
tourist activities at $ 0.76. n32 This indicator is very high and refers only to the direct cost in dollars,
not the indirect cost incurred by the state in the tourist sector. Also consider that domestically
produced goods for tourism have an imported (indirect) component in dollars, which implies that
the cost per dollar of gross income would be even higher. Direct and indirect costs per dollar have
been estimated by some economists at more than $ 0.80, which would mean for the country a net
result of just $ 0.20 for every dollar of gross income from tourist activities. n33 Such an estimate has
been recently confirmed by Cuban Vice Minister of Tourism Marta Maiz. In May 2003, in an
interview for the Cuban magazine Bohemia, she said that in 2002 "income from tourism was $ 52.2
million less than in 2001, with a cost of USD 80 cents for every dollar captured by the country."
INCREASE IN FOOD SALES PUTS HARD AMERICAN CURRENCY INTO CUBA--Spandoni '04
[Paolo; PdD Candidate at the University of Florida; “SYMPOSIUM: WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC
& SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART I OF II: CUBA TODAY: U.S. Financial Flows in the Cuban Economy;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004; LN]
How do U.S. food sales generate hard currency revenues for the Cuban government? This is quite
simple. Although the majority of U.S. commodities exported to Cuba go into ration stores, about 5%
end up in local dollar shops. n99 Just as an example, it is reported that the variety of products
exported to Cuba by Indiana-based Marsh Supermarket and sold at government-owned dollar retail
stores continues to rise. Since October 2002, Marsh brand cereals, gelatin desserts, instant pudding,
pie filling, and hot cocoa mix have been available in Cuba, with additional items reaching the local
hard currency market since January 2003. n100 As stated previously, the price mark-up for imported
food in government-owned dollar stores is about 240%. Therefore, the 5% of U.S. food sales ($ 700
million, including fees, between December 2001 and April 2004), worth approximately $ 35 million,
that reached Cuba's dollar stores would sell for about $ 84 million, thus generating as much as $ 49
million in hard currency revenues for the government of Fidel Castro. Given that Castro has
promised to increase food imports from the United States, a growing amount of foreign exchange
revenues (once generated by products imported from other countries) will continue to be generated
by U.S. trade activities with Cuba. In the first four months of 2004, American food sales to the island
were $ 172 million, up by an astonishing 155% over the same period in 2003. n101 This year,
according to Cuban authorities, purchases from the United States could represent more than 30% of
Cuba's food imports from all countries.
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THE FLOW OF CAPITAL FROM THE CUBAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITY HAS BEEN CRITICAL
TO KEEPING CUBA AFLOAT--Spandoni '04
[Paolo; PdD Candidate at the University of Florida; “SYMPOSIUM: WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC
& SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART I OF II: CUBA TODAY: U.S. Financial Flows in the Cuban Economy;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004; LN]
Even more importantly, formal and informal activities by the Cuban-American community, the most
vocal group in the United States in favor of the embargo, have been a major factor in keeping afloat
the economy of the Caribbean island. For instance, of approximately 200,000 U.S. citizens who
[*116] traveled to Cuba in 2002, with or without their government's approval (they were the largest
group of visitors after Canadians), more than 60% were Cuban Americans. In addition, remittances
to the island sent from U.S. citizens of Cuban descent, mostly through informal mechanisms, have
been, in net terms, Cuba's most important source of foreign exchange. As argued by Susan Eckstein,
"the remittance economy reflects a society that is transnationally grounded, able, willing, and
wanting to operate according to its own networks and norms, in defiance both of U.S. and Cuban
official regulations that interfere."
THE ONLY WAY TO MAKE THE EMBARGO EFFECTIVE WOULD BE TO STOP THE FLOW OF
CAPITAL FROM CUBAN-AMERICANS TO CUBA, A VERY POLITICALLY UNPOPULAR MOVE-Spandoni '04
[Paolo; PdD Candidate at the University of Florida; “SYMPOSIUM: WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC
& SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART I OF II: CUBA TODAY: U.S. Financial Flows in the Cuban Economy;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004; LN]
In light of this situation, two possible options are available to U.S. decision-makers for a more
successful policy toward Cuba. The first option is to strengthen current restrictions on travel and
remittances by significantly reducing the number of U.S. citizens authorized to visit the island and
the amount of money that Cuban Americans can legally send to their families. In order to be
effective, these measures should increase the level of scrutiny for potential violations on travel and
money transfers, as well as hold citizens of Cuban descent to the same standards as any other
American. While such a policy may be unpopular and quite expensive to implement, it makes no
sense to make exceptions for a specific group of U.S. citizens that channels more hard currency into
Cuba than any other group.
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INFLUX OF FOREIGN CURRENCY KEEPS CUBAN REGIME AFLOAT
THE INFLUX OF AMERICAN DOLLARS KEEPS THE CUBAN REGIME AFLOAT AND MUST STOP
IMMEDIATELY--Sarmiento '05
[Ignacio; JD Candidate at Nova Southeastern University; “INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AFFAIRS: TRAVELING TO CUBA?
SORRY, IT'S CLOSED;” Nova Law Review; Winter 2005; LN]
Looking back, the past forty-four years of the embargo have cost the Castro government more than
seventy-two billion dollars. n240 However, it is estimated that one billion dollars annually is
contributed to communist Cuba via travel to the island or Americans sending money to their family
members. n241 This constant influx of American dollars is what currently drives the Cuban
government and consequentially, is precisely what must stop.
RESOURCES ONLY BENEFIT CASTRO, NOT THE PEOPLE OF CUBA--Gutierrez '07
[Carlos M.; Former US Secretary of Commerce; Commission for Assistance to Free Cuba; “Cuba at the Crossroads;” The
Heritage Lecture #1048; 24 October 2007; http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/hl1048.cfm; downloaded 12 May 2009]
Think about it: Anything that can hurt the U.S. That has been their policy for over 48 years, and that
has been more important than putting a focus on the plight of the people in Cuba. So when there
have been resources, Cubans have not benefited; only Castro, the Cuban military, and foreign Communist guerrillas have benefited.
ECONOMIC COLLAPSE INCREASES SOCIAL UNREST IN CUBA--Sweeney '94
[John P.; Foreign Policy Fellow; “Why the Cuban Trade Embargo Should Be Maintained;” Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder #1010; 10 November 1994; http://www.heritage.org/research/tradeandeconomicfreedom/bg1010.cfm; downloaded 12 May
2009]
Cuba's economic collapse has accelerated in 1994, and social unrest has increased dramatically. On
July 13, at least 30 Cubans trying to flee the island on a hijacked tugboat drowned at sea when four
Cuban government ships swept the decks of the fleeing tugboat with high-pressure water hoses and
rammed the aged wooden vessel until it broke up and sank. Of the 72 people believed to be aboard,
only half survived. Over a ten-day period between the last week of July and the first week of August,
three passenger ferries were hijacked in Havana harbor by Cubans desperate to flee their country.
On August 5, thousands of Cubans rioted in the Old Waterfront district of Havana, throwing rocks at
police and trashing dollar-only stores after the police dispersed a crowd drawn to the harbor by
rumors that boats were waiting to carry them to freedom in the United States. At one point,
hundreds of Cubans tried to board Chinese and Canadian freighters in the port. The rioting, which
lasted over four hours and involved up to 15,000 people, was the worst Cuba has experienced in more
than three decades.
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IF THE UNITED STATES WERE TO LIFT THE EMBARGO, CUBA WOULD RESPOND BY
CREATING METHODS TO CAPITALIZE ON THE NEW TRADE WEALTH--Drezner '06
[Daniel W.; Economist; “Drezner on Weisberg on sanctions;” DanielDrezner.com; 3 August 2006;
http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/002832.html; downloaded 12 May 2009]
The constructive engagement approach rests on an odd assumption -- that the leaders of a rogue
state are somehow unaware that they will become trapped in a web of economic interdependence.
The truth is that applying constructive engagement against rogue states as a means to induce
economic and political change tends not to work either. Put crudely, if a regime wants to stay in
power at all costs, all of the economic openness in the world is not going to make much difference,
because the government that wants to stay in power will simply apply strict controls over trade with
the outside world. If the United States were to unilaterally and unconditionally lift all barriers to
exchange with Cuba, the government in Havana would immediately erect a maze of regulations
designed to limit Cuban trade with the United States (and to funnel such trade towards politically
reliable cronies).
GIVING CUBA RESOURCES ONLY GIVES CASTRO THE POWER TO OPPRESS HIS OWN
PEOPLE AND THREATEN OTHERS--Gutierrez '07
[Carlos M.; Former US Secretary of Commerce; Commission for Assistance to Free Cuba; “Cuba at the Crossroads;” The
Heritage Lecture #1048; 24 October 2007; http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/hl1048.cfm; downloaded 12 May 2009]
Think about those times when Castro has had resources. In 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis,
there were missiles stationed on the island. History has confirmed--and it has been written from
members of the Communist Party in the then-Soviet Union and Cuba as well as to Castro himself-that he wanted desperately to keep those missiles. And it wasn't enough that in exchange for giving
up those missiles, he got a guarantee that the U.S. would not invade Cuba. He wanted those missiles,
and at one point he was willing and ready to do whatever had to be done--even use those missiles.
That was 1962. Think about the money he put in Angola, the resources he put into Africa (and I'm
talking about military resources, not humanitarian resources). In Salvador, Nicaragua, Grenada, and
throughout the world, he funded guerrilla movements.
So when he has had resources, those resources have not gone to benefit the Cuban people. The
Cuban people are still standing in line waiting for food, and that food doesn't even last for the
month that the ration card is for. That has not changed in 48 years. When he has had resources, it
usually has been used to somehow threaten Cuba's neighbors and fund guerrilla movements-anything that can hurt the U.S.
EVEN IF OUR POLICY HAS ACHIEVED MODEST GAINS, CHANGING THE EMBARGO WILL
ONLY HELP PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO--Johnson '02
[Stephen; Latin America Policy Analyst; “Time For Consensus On Cuba;” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder; 30 August
2002; http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/BG1579.cfm; downloaded 12 May 2009]
Critics of U.S. policy say that America's trade embargo and political hostility have failed to change
Castro's behavior and argue that warmer relations would be more likely to encourage political and
economic reforms. While it is true that Washington's cold-shoulder strategy has produced only
modest results, the approach of pursuing normal relations with Cuba--exercised by most of the rest
of the world for the past 43 years--has merely helped preserve the status quo.
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LIFTING THE EMBARGO WILL GUARANTEE THE CONTINENCE OF THE CASTRO REGIME-Azel '08
[Jose; “Cuba: Snuff Out the Embargo;” Gov Central; 3 March 2008; http://www.govcentral.com/news/articles/1535-cuba-snuff-out-theembargo-pro-versus-con-debate; downloaded 12 May 2009]
There are many negative unintended consequences to unilaterally lifting the embargo without
meaningful changes in Cuba’s political and economic model. Most important of all, it would ensure
the continuation of the current totalitarian regime by strengthening state enterprises that would be
the main beneficiaries of currency inflows into business owned by the Cuban government.
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INFLUX OF TOURISM DOLLARS WILL HURT CUBANS
CUBA USES INTERNATIONAL TOURIST DOLLARS TO KEEP THEIR WORKERS OPPRESSED-Erikson '04
[Daniel P.; Director of Caribbean Programs at the Inter-America Dialogue; “WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART II OF II: CUBA'S FUTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND
INVESTMENT: The Future of American Business in Cuba: Realities, Risks, and Rewards;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
The recent development of Cuba's tourist industry has not been without controversy. Some foreign
companies have balked at Cuba's two-tier wage system, which requires international investors to pay
the Cuban government in dollars for staff who then receive payment in Cuban pesos of far lesser
value. International resorts frequently ban Cuban citizens from using the rooms or services, even if
they have sufficient U.S. dollars to pay for the accommodations. Critics have denounced this practice
as a form of "tourist apartheid." n43 Finally, Cuba's state-owned tourist sector has come under
internal scrutiny for possible corruption, stemming in part from its importance as a source of hard
currency revenues. Most recently, in December 2003, a potential scandal in Cuba's largest state-run
tourism company came to light, when Cubanacan President Juan Jose Vega was [*702] removed
from office amid an investigation into the company's finances. n44 Although the Cuban government
later denied that allegations of corruption were involved, the removal indicates the political
sensitivity of this sector of the Cuban economy.
TRADE AND TOURISM WILL NOT ENCOURAGE CHANGE IN CUBA--DeMelfi '06
[Christy; JD/MBA Candidate at Hofstra University; “NOTHING BUT THE FACTS: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA;” The Journal of International Business & Law;” Spring 2006; LN]
It is also false to believe that full tourism and trade will raise expectations and encourage change in
Cuba. People in Cuba already have high expectations. They hear from their exiled relatives and hope
for a better life. They are not affected by the embargo in this regard. One cannot believe tourism will
be the magic cure to inspire change. It must be remembered that tourists from the rest of the world
go to Cuba and that has not sparked change. The main reason for this is that most Cubans have
nothing to do with the tourism industry. This fact would not change as long as Castro is in office no
matter if American tourists are on the island.
US TOURISM WON'T BRING DEMOCRACY TO CUBA--Azel '08
[Jose; “Cuba: Snuff Out the Embargo;” Gov Central; 3 March 2008; http://www.govcentral.com/news/articles/1535-cuba-snuff-out-theembargo-pro-versus-con-debate; downloaded 12 May 2009]
Moreover, U.S. tourism will not bring democracy to Cuba. For years, hundreds of thousands of
tourists from Canada, Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere have visited the island. Cuba is no more
democratic today. On what mystical grounds do opponents of the embargo offer that American
tourists will do the trick?
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US POLICY ENCOURAGES HUMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA
CONTINUED RESTRICTIONS HELP ENCOURAGE HUMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA--Sarmiento '05
[Ignacio; JD Candidate at Nova Southeastern University; “INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AFFAIRS: TRAVELING TO CUBA?
SORRY, IT'S CLOSED;” Nova Law Review; Winter 2005; LN]
In upholding restrictions, the United States will also be taking a step toward preserving human
rights. In Cuba, individuals are incarcerated for expressing their thoughts on a regular basis. n215
The Castro government does not disclose figures relating to how many individuals are currently in
jail as political prisoners, n216 but the figure is estimated to be between 2000 and 5000 prisoners.
n217 The political prisoners can be left in jail anywhere from a couple of days to over thirty years.
n218 Since the judicial system is controlled by the communist party and the right to legal
representation is not guaranteed, political prisoners are commonly detained for years without being
charged or much less tried.
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US POLICY ENCOURAGES REGIME CHANGE IN CUBA
STRICT SANCTIONS WILL EVENTUALLY CHOKE OFF THE CUBAN REGIME FORCING IT TO
REFORM--Sarmiento '05
[Ignacio; JD Candidate at Nova Southeastern University; “INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AFFAIRS: TRAVELING TO CUBA?
SORRY, IT'S CLOSED;” Nova Law Review; Winter 2005; LN]
If the United States preserves the current sanctions against Cuba, it will be more difficult for Castro's
successors to mimic the same form of government. n244 Because of lack of money, his successors
will have no choice but to comply with United States' mandate, thereby, freeing political prisoners,
allowing opposing political activity, permitting free press, encouraging the formation of labor
unions, and most importantly, permitting democratic elections. n245 If the United States backs out
now, oppression and a communist dictatorship for the Cuban people will be effervescent in decades
to come even after Fidel Castro is long gone.
THE RATIONAL ACTION TO BRING LIBERALIZATION TO CUBA WOULD BE TO MAINTAIN OR
STRENGTHEN THE EMBARGO--Colmer '04
[Josep M.; Research Professor in Political Science; “CUBA & DEMOCRATIZATION: SHOULD SANCTIONS BE LIFTED?: Who
Could End the Embargo? A Game-Theoretical Perspective;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004;
LN]
For Cuban rulers to undertake a significant initiative of liberalizing reforms, the likelihood that
economic difficulties helped by the U.S. embargo may provoke social unrest and political
destabilization should be higher than the rather high risks of a political opening. As long as the
Cuban rulers keep valuing the advantages of open trade and massive foreign investment much less
than the maintenance of the dictatorship, as seems to be the case, and as long as the embargoinduced economic difficulties do not provoke an imminent social uprising, no unilateral move from
the Cuban side should be expected. Under these conditions, the rational strategy on the U.S. side
should be to maintain or even strengthen the embargo and parallel pressures on the present Cuban
government, while also promising substantial economic help and other side-payments in the future
for a democratic and open Cuba.
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US ACTION WORTHLESS: CUBA WILL REFUSE TO ACT IN RESPONSE TO
“NORMALIZATION”
US EFFORTS TO NORMALIZE MIGHT NOT BE MET WITH SIMILAR ACTIONS BY THE
CUBANS--Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
Should all the requisite factors fall into place on the U.S. side in order to ease or lift the existing trade
restrictions against the export of agricultural commodities - or even allow other forms of trade there is no guarantee that Cuba will seize the opportunity to enter into such an enhanced
relationship with the United States. As evidenced by its initial rejection of the U.S. offer to export
agricultural goods in 2001, immediately following the adoption of TSRA, n155 Cuba may be less
willing [*174] to accept such an offer than an economic analysis would indicate. For Cuba, U.S.
commodities - whether agricultural or of another nature - may be significantly cheaper than those
offered by other trade partners, as a result of the proximity between the two countries and the related
transportation costs. n156 The Cuban government, however, whether under the leadership of Fidel
or Raul, has very strong ideals and convictions when it comes to relations with the United States.
These may impede the expansion of any such trade.
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NORMALIZING RELATIONS WILL NOT MEAN A BUSINESS BONANZA
POLITICAL FACTORS PREVENT NORMALIZATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
CUBA--Erikson '04
[Daniel P.; Director of Caribbean Programs at the Inter-America Dialogue; “WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART II OF II: CUBA'S FUTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND
INVESTMENT: The Future of American Business in Cuba: Realities, Risks, and Rewards;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
Of course, this future has not yet arrived. The tense relationship between the United States and Cuba
has its roots in Cold War politics in Latin America, the repressive and undemocratic rule of Fidel
Castro, and a diminishing but still influential Cuban-American lobby in South Florida that opposes
any steps towards normalization. This political dimension plays a crucial role in maintaining the
U.S. embargo, and the key groups that oppose lifting the sanctions may seek to impose new
impediments on trade with Cuba even if the U.S. Congress voted to repeal the embargo. The Bush
Administration has taken a strong stance against fostering economic relations in Cuba while Fidel
Castro remains in power, a position supported by an influential minority of U.S. legislators. Even so,
a slim majority in both houses of Congress favors lifting the travel ban, and significant changes in
U.S. policy are being proposed.
FOCUS ON RADICAL ECONOMIC IDEAS WILL HAMPER BUSINESS GROWTH IN CUBA-Erikson '04
[Daniel P.; Director of Caribbean Programs at the Inter-America Dialogue; “WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART II OF II: CUBA'S FUTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND
INVESTMENT: The Future of American Business in Cuba: Realities, Risks, and Rewards;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
Moreover, there is significant political uncertainty regarding the future direction of U.S. policy and
the nature of the eventual post-Castro regime. Cuba is almost certain to suffer a number of political
shocks over the next decade, including the lifting of the U.S. travel ban, possible removal of U.S.
trade and investment restrictions, growing tension between the socialist government and
independent civil society forces on the island, and the heightened possibility that Fidel Castro's rule
will come to its natural end. Regardless of whether Cuba embraces market socialism or free-market
democracy, either type of post-Castro government would face significant (though distinct)
challenges that could hamper the perceived economic potential of the island. Yet Cuba has been
forced to move beyond the days when it was a Soviet satellite state run according to Marxist
orthodoxy - and its leaders are learning to grapple with free market forces.
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ECONOMIC FACTORS WILL DISCOURAGE US TRADE WITH CUBA WITHOUT THE EMBARGO-Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
While Cuba has been outspoken about the mutual benefits of enhanced trade relations with the
United States, n163 it might not be willing to sacrifice the relationships developed with trade
partners that have stepped up since the dissolution of the Soviet presence in Cuba. In particular,
trade relations with Venezuela, Bolivia and China, because of their similar political ideals, n164 will
likely flourish in years to come, making it increasingly difficult for the United States to occupy any
share of the market those countries currently possess. Additionally, countries that are willing to
enter into trade agreements with Cuba on the basis of credit, as well as those prepared to defer preexisting loan payments, will [*176] have a greater opportunity to play an increased role in Cuban
foreign trade. n165 Though Cuba does not have any outstanding loans with the United States, the
"payment of cash in advance" requirement of TSRA n166 and the subsequent OFAC clarifications of
this terminology n167 render the United States a less attractive trade partner than countries offering
transactions on the basis of credit. Even if the U.S. Congress can pass legislation easing these
restrictions, Cuba's poor credit rating n168 might discourage U.S. corporations and banking
institutions from entering into such agreements.
CUBA'S OUTSTANDING INTERNATIONAL DEBT WILL PREVENT ECONOMIC EXPANSION
POST-EMBARGO--Erikson '04
[Daniel P.; Director of Caribbean Programs at the Inter-America Dialogue; “WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART II OF II: CUBA'S FUTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND
INVESTMENT: The Future of American Business in Cuba: Realities, Risks, and Rewards;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
Cuba is one of the worst debtor countries in the world, and has been in default of much of its foreign
debt for nearly a decade. In 2002, the Cuban Central Bank reported total hard currency debt of $ 12.2
billion, with $ 10.9 billion mainly owed to Paris Club creditors, and a balance due to Japan,
Argentina, and a half dozen other countries. In addition to this recognized amount, Russia also
claims that Cuba owes $ 20 billion to the former Soviet Union, and Cuba additionally has
commercial arrears of $ 1 billion with foreign companies. n104 Cuba withdrew from the
International Monetary Fund [*715] and World Bank in 1964 in good standing and has no arrears
with those organizations, nor with the Inter-American Development Bank, which it never joined.
Nonetheless, Cuba's outstanding foreign debt is significant, and resolving these claims may be
costly and arduous. The resolution of Cuba's hidden debt crisis is a crucial economic issue facing
the country.
CUBA IS A RISKY PLACE TO DO BUSINESS--Johnson '02
[Stephen; Latin America Policy Analyst; “Time For Consensus On Cuba;” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder; 30 August
2002; http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/BG1579.cfm; downloaded 12 May 2009]
For foreign investors, Cuba can be a risky place to do business. Ranking near the bottom of The
Heritage Foundation's 2002 Index of Economic Freedom,29 it lacks rule of law to protect contracts,
an independent judiciary tohear accusations and mediate disputes, and basic property rights.
Moreover, the regime chooses its foreign partners and requires them to acquiesce to its denial of
workers' rights--which is in violation of no fewer than five United Nations International Labor
Organization conventions.
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LIFTING SANCTIONS WILL HAVE LITTLE IMPACT ON THE IMPORTS OF AMERICAN GOOD
TO CUBA--Ross '04
[James; Professor of Food and Resource Economics at the University of Florida; “The Impact of Potential Changes in U.S.Cuba Relations on Midwest Agribusiness Trade and Investment;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004;
LN]
In the second scenario, unilaterally removing U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba and not providing
incentives for U.S. agribusiness trade and investment would have little impact on U.S. food and
agricultural exports beyond the anticipated effect of lifting the travel ban. If removing U.S. economic
sanctions on Cuba resulted in increased opportunities for Cuba to receive international credit and
for the Cuban economy to grow, then a more significant impact could result. There is little evidence
to indicate, however, that Cuba would have increased access to credit or sustained economic growth
as a result of removing U.S. economic sanctions unilaterally on Cuba.
FOREIGN INVESTMENT WILL NOT BE AS GREAT AS PEOPLE EXPECT WITHOUT AN
EMBARGO--DeMelfi '06
[Christy; JD/MBA Candidate at Hofstra University; “NOTHING BUT THE FACTS: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA;” The Journal of International Business & Law;” Spring 2006; LN]
Those is favor of the sanction feel the reality here is that foreign investment is not as great as
everyone expected. One must also consider the fact that the Cuban economy is small. Even if opened
to U.S. investments there would not be a great amount, therefore, the U.S. businesses are not
missing out on much.
A MOVEMENT TOWARDS DEMOCRACY WOULD ACTUALLY HURT CUBA'S ECONOMIC
POSSIBILITIES--Erikson '04
[Daniel P.; Director of Caribbean Programs at the Inter-America Dialogue; “WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART II OF II: CUBA'S FUTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND
INVESTMENT: The Future of American Business in Cuba: Realities, Risks, and Rewards;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
Most importantly, Cuba's future economic performance is highly dependent on the nature of the
Cuban regime. If continued communist leadership adopts a market socialist model, then the
possibility of Cuba emerging as a "Latin tiger" with economic success approaching a smaller version
of China or Vietnam is indeed possible. However, this would come at the cost of continuing to
restrict emigration from the island and the known constraints on political and economic liberties.
If, however, Cuba rapidly transitions towards greater political freedom and democracy - even if
public enterprises remain the norm - then the island will likely see substantial talent flight and
develop an economic profile similar to the rest of the Caribbean. Tourism, remittances, and some
agricultural and mineral exports would drive the economy, while human capital-intensive sectors
like [*717] biotechnology, education, the health professions, and the arts would be severely
weakened by international competition for these skills. Revival of export-oriented manufacturing is
also likely as Cuba gains some of this market, which is currently dominated by Mexico and,
increasingly, Central America.
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LIFTING SANCTIONS WON'T BRING A PANACEA OF POSITIVE ECONOMIC IMPACTS--DeMelfi
'06
[Christy; JD/MBA Candidate at Hofstra University; “NOTHING BUT THE FACTS: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA;” The Journal of International Business & Law;” Spring 2006; LN]
It is tempting to believe that the easy way to solve the problem of the negative consequences would
be to lift the sanctions. The solution, however, is not always that simple. Even after sanctions have
been lifted there may be continuing negative effects. In order to regain lost market share in the
target country, U.S. companies may be forced to transfer technology, cut prices, or make unusual
concessions. Another long term consequence may be strained international relationships. These
relationships may be harmed between the sender and the target country as well as between other
countries not directly involved. Sometimes after sanctions have been lifted, the target country
remains hostile toward the sender country. Relationships with potential trade partners can also be
affected by sanctions. Here, the threat of sanctions being imposed causes unnecessary fear in these
nations, harms those relationships.
CORRUPTION IS WIDESPREAD IN CUBA WHICH WOULD HAMPER ANY TRADE BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA--Erikson '04
[Daniel P.; Director of Caribbean Programs at the Inter-America Dialogue; “WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART II OF II: CUBA'S FUTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND
INVESTMENT: The Future of American Business in Cuba: Realities, Risks, and Rewards;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
The level of corruption in Cuba remains worrisome. The Cuban government admits that corruption
exists, and the government has become more active in rooting out wrongdoing in state-owned
enterprises, including the formation of an agency to oversee auditing and control in 2001. In its 2003
survey, the corruption watchdog group Transparency International gave Cuba a score of 4.6 out of a
possible 10, ranking forty-third out of 133 countries worldwide - in the middle of the pack for
developing countries. n98 Other reports suggest that corruption in Cuba is far more widespread, and
the country has had its share of scandals in recent years. Further, the economic transition in Russia
and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s demonstrated how elites were able to take advantage of fluid
institutional norms to drain state resources, divert foreign investment, and soak up development
lending and international aid. For example, after channeling billions of dollars into the former
Soviet Union between 1992 and 1998, the World Bank's own evaluations department rated the
lending to be "unsatisfactory" due to immense government corruption during the privatization
process. Similar, though less visible, woes continue to plague the socialist countries of East Asia,
such as China and Vietnam. Worse still is the possibility that Cuba's regulatory environment for
guiding trade and investment might become unhinged at the same moment that multinational
companies, multilateral lenders, and bilateral development agencies like USAID are funneling
massive amounts of resources into the country. If corrupt practices become prevalent in Cuba's
future business environment, this will weigh heavily on the island's prospects.
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CUBA'S TRADING PARTNERS REPORT SIGNIFICANT BARRIERS TO TRADE; REPORTS OF
TRADE BONANZA ARE INFLATED EXPECTATIONS--Erikson '04
[Daniel P.; Director of Caribbean Programs at the Inter-America Dialogue; “WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART II OF II: CUBA'S FUTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND
INVESTMENT: The Future of American Business in Cuba: Realities, Risks, and Rewards;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
But does Cuba really represent a desirable opportunity for American business? Market analysts are
deeply divided as to whether Cuba is a land of risks or rewards. On the one hand, Cuba remains a
rigid communist state with a centrally controlled economic structure, a workforce with uncertain
habits, low per capita income, and high levels of external debt. Canadian and European investors in
Cuba cite numerous difficulties related to red tape, arbitrary treatment by Cuban regulators,
interference in hiring decisions, and questionable labor practices. There is ample evidence that
Cuba is not an easy place for foreign companies to invest, a fact that is no doubt exacerbated by the
controversial 1996 Helms-Burton Act, which allows U.S. citizens to sue foreign nationals for
business dealings with expropriated properties in Cuba. As a result, it seems that much of Cuba's
appeal for U.S. companies stems from its status as the "forbidden fruit" of Latin America and the
Caribbean. If the U.S. embargo were lifted, the reality would be unlikely to measure up to inflated
expectations.
A VARIETY OF FACTORS WILL LIKELY SLOW US-CUBAN TRADE RELATIONSHIPS IN
ABSENCE OF AN EMBARGO--Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
Assessing these factors holistically, the U.S. and Cuban political environments and the existing state
of Cuban trade relations with other foreign entities make it appear quite difficult for the United
States to improve its standing in the Cuban foreign trade market. There are not only economic
factors, but strong political, ideological and historical factors that will dictate how any such
relationship will develop. We have seen this dance played out through the evolution of agricultural
exports to Cuba, authorized by TSRA. The experience over the last six years during which this trade
has been operating, and the years leading up to the adoption of TSRA, serve as a strong indicator of
the potential that exists for a U.S.-Cuban trade relationship to flourish. However, it has also provided
a snapshot of the associated difficulties given the ideological differences between the two countries,
the historical tension [*177] and the complex political climate under which any future relationship
would exist.
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IF THE CASTRO REGIME FLOUNDERS, IT WOULD HAMPER THE DEVELOPMENT OF
PRODUCTIVE US-CUBAN TRADE RELATIONS--Erikson '04
[Daniel P.; Director of Caribbean Programs at the Inter-America Dialogue; “WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART II OF II: CUBA'S FUTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND
INVESTMENT: The Future of American Business in Cuba: Realities, Risks, and Rewards;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
At the beginning of 2005, the Cuban government remains politically strong and has proven itself
capable of achieving modest economic growth in an adverse international environment. In addition,
Fidel Castro has outlined a succession plan whereby power will pass to his brother Raul Castro, the
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, in the event the elder Castro dies or becomes
incapacitated. Assuming this succession occurs without hindrance, the choice between maintaining
the communist state, adopting some form of market socialism, or embracing greater economic
reform will lie in the hands of Raul Castro, the military, and Cuba's civilian leadership. Nonetheless,
the possibility of civil unrest or a dramatic deterioration in state institutions remains evident. This
could emerge in the shape of serious divisions among the ruling elite, splits in the military, U.S.
efforts to pressure for removal of the post-Castro communist regime, or the advent of popular
leadership capable of mobilizing citizens against the government. The emergence of a highly volatile
political environment, with a policy framework in flux, could severely hamper the development of
productive U.S.-Cuba trade relations.
EVEN IF THE EMBARGO IS LIFTED, POOR LABOR PRACTICES AND OTHER ABUSES WILL
PREVENT US TRADE WITH CUBA--Erikson '04
[Daniel P.; Director of Caribbean Programs at the Inter-America Dialogue; “WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART II OF II: CUBA'S FUTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND
INVESTMENT: The Future of American Business in Cuba: Realities, Risks, and Rewards;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
Even if the U.S. sanctions are lifted in quick succession by a future U.S. administration, Cuba will
remain a highly politicized battleground for American companies seeking to invest there. The
country's poor labor practices and restrictive investment framework may provoke U.S. policymakers
to engage in further regulation, or even assess penalties against American businesses that engage in
certain practices. Large multinational companies may well decide that the Cuban market is not
promising enough to brave a series of legal and political woes. On the other hand, however, certain
companies engaged in tourism and other high-potential industries may view Cuba as a "can't miss"
opportunity. However, after nearly fifty years of clumsy and shortsighted U.S. policy towards Cuba,
even the formal end of the embargo will not be able to prevent American policymakers from
meddling in the commercial relationship between the two countries.
PROSPECTS FOR US BUSINESS IN CUBA IS UNCERTAIN AS LONG AS CUBA MAINTAINS ITS
CURRENT MODEL--Johnson '02
[Stephen; Latin America Policy Analyst; “Time For Consensus On Cuba;” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder; 30 August
2002; http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/BG1579.cfm; downloaded 12 May 2009]
Prospects for U.S. businesses are uncertain as long as the regime retains its failed economic model.
Although the U.S. International Trade Commission has estimated that lifting sanctions could result
in exports to Cuba of between $650 million and $1.2 billion per year, actual results could be
significantly lower due to the regime's continuing dependence on historically supportive creditors,
perennial debt problems that limit purchasing power, and ethical questions about bartering with a
regime that essentially exploits slave labor.35 Even if projections were realized, abolishing Cuba
trade sanctions would boost U.S. exports to Latin America by only 0.7 percent.36 In contrast, a
reformed, market-oriented Cuba would have far greater potential for increased, more reliable trade.
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LEGAL LIABILITY CREATED BY THE HELMS-BURTON ACT WILL HAMPER TRADE BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA--Erikson '04
[Daniel P.; Director of Caribbean Programs at the Inter-America Dialogue; “WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART II OF II: CUBA'S FUTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND
INVESTMENT: The Future of American Business in Cuba: Realities, Risks, and Rewards;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
Following the 1959 Cuban revolution and subsequent nationalization of property, the Castro
government settled all of its property claims with the exception of those filed by U.S. companies and
Cuban citizens who had fled overseas. Between 1959 and 1960, the Cuban government expropriated
U.S. property worth an estimated $ 1.8 billion at the time of seizure. n99 Fleeing Cuban exiles also
suffered property losses in the billions. n100 This unsettled dispute over property is the foundation
of the most controversial titles in the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, which allows U.S. citizens who were
formerly Cuban nationals to sue foreign companies with investments in Cuba for "trafficking in
expropriated property." n101 The Clinton and Bush Administrations have consistently granted sixmonth waivers to prevent the law from coming into effect, but it remains on the books nonetheless.
Further, in 1999, Ricardo Alarcon, President of Cuba's National Assembly, announced his
government's intention to sue the U.S. government for $ 100 billion in damages for the economic
suffering resulting from forty years of sanctions. n102 Earlier that year, the government filed a claim
in Cuban courts asking for $ 181 billion in damages for the deaths and physical harm of thousands
of people through acts ranging from the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion to the bombing of Havana hotels
in 1997. n103 Many U.S. companies will want to invest in Cuba before full legal resolutions of these
claims, but such efforts may be subject to liability that could cause significant financial and legal
headaches down the road.
CURRENT COSTS TO US EXPORTS IS LESS THAN 0.5% OF THE TOTAL US EXPORTS--Colmer
'04
[Josep M.; Research Professor in Political Science; “CUBA & DEMOCRATIZATION: SHOULD SANCTIONS BE LIFTED?: Who
Could End the Embargo? A Game-Theoretical Perspective;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004;
LN]
The United States also bears some costs from the embargo, first of all in the form of missing export
opportunities. Separate evaluations published in 2002 estimate missed U.S. food and agricultural
exports to Cuba as worth about $ 1.25 billion per year. n20 By comparison, note that in 1992, when
U.S. subsidiaries were prevented from trading with Cuba, their activity amounted to $ 0.7 million,
while Canada, the largest trading partner of Cuba, exports to the island more than $ 0.5 million. In
global terms, the costs of the embargo to the sender country's economy therefore can be estimated
to amount to less than 0.5% of total U.S. exports.
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THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT LOSE OUT TO OTHER COUNTRIES WHEN THE CASTRO
REGIME BREAKS--Sweeney '94
[John P.; Foreign Policy Fellow; “Why the Cuban Trade Embargo Should Be Maintained;” Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder #1010; 10 November 1994; http://www.heritage.org/research/tradeandeconomicfreedom/bg1010.cfm; downloaded 12 May
2009]
Many of those wishing to see the embargo lifted also argue that American businesses will lose out to
competition from other countries whose governments do not restrict trade and investment in Cuba.
But this argument is weak. Before the communist revolution, the United States was Cuba's largest
trading partner: nearly 80 percent of Cuba's two-way volume of trade involved the U.S. Regardless of
when the embargo is lifted, the United States will quickly regain its prominent role in the Cuban
economy. Moreover, the Cuban- American community, totaling over 1.8 million people, will be an
important source of investment capital and management experience.
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NORMALIZING RELATIONS WILL CAUSE CUBAN BRAIN DRAIN
MASS MIGRATION OF PROFESSIONALS WOULD CRIPLE CUBA IF RESTRICTIONS WERE
LIFTED--Erikson '04
[Daniel P.; Director of Caribbean Programs at the Inter-America Dialogue; “WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART II OF II: CUBA'S FUTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND
INVESTMENT: The Future of American Business in Cuba: Realities, Risks, and Rewards;” Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
Cuba's superior human capital is regarded as one of the most promising elements of the island's
economic future. Through sustained investments, free education, and sophisticated community
health practices, Cuba's health and education indices are better than much of the developing world.
Underemployment of highly educated professionals is one of the major challenges facing Cuba's
labor market, where taxi drivers and bellhops can earn far more in U.S. dollar tips than surgeons or
university professors can make with their peso salaries. The Cuban government tightly monitors the
ability of Cubans to travel abroad, and this is especially true for talented individuals who present a
high risk for flight. Numerous defections by athletes, dancers, artists, and to a lesser degree, doctors
and scientists, have been a source of concern and embarrassment for the Cuban government. In
some cases, the defections prevent Cuba's participation in international venues. However, if Cuba
were to reduce significantly the barriers to exit, the possibility of heightened or even mass migration
could significantly deplete the intellectual and human capital that represents the island's most
promising asset.
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CUBAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITY SUPPORTS THE EMBARGO
THE EMBARGO IS SUPPORTED BY THE CUBAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITY--Colmer '04
[Josep M.; Research Professor in Political Science; “CUBA & DEMOCRATIZATION: SHOULD SANCTIONS BE LIFTED?: Who
Could End the Embargo? A Game-Theoretical Perspective;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Spring 2004;
LN]
Also, U.S. political leaders can expect benefits from maintaining the embargo policy against Cuba in
the form of political, financial, and electoral support from the Cuban-American community. Cuban
exiles in the United States were, of course, the biggest losers in the settlement between the U.S.,
Cuban, and Soviet governments, established in the mid-1960s, which granted Castro's dictatorship a
broad margin of survival. Although the goal of directly overthrowing the Cuban regime has been
alien to U.S. policy since then, as [*173] previously discussed, pressures exerted through the
prohibition of trade and investment, together with special radio and TV broadcasts to the island and
support to external and internal opposition, can feed Cuban-Americans' expectations of
destabilizing the regime.
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CUBA IS THE CONTROLLING FACTOR OVER “NORMALIZATION”
CUBA HAS ERECTED BARRIERS TO NORMALIZED US-CUBAN RELATIONS--Clendinning '08
[Catherine; JD Candidate at the Southern Methodist University School of Law; “The Great North American Trade-Off:
Legislation Shaping Trade Policies Between Cuba and the United States;” Law and Business Review of the Americas;
Winter 2008; LN]
In addition to the tough U.S. criteria, recent Cuban laws present additional hurdles to change in
U.S.-Cuba relations. For example, in 1999, Cuba passed the Proteccion de la Independencia
Nacional y la Economia de Cuba (Law for the Protection of National Independence and Economy of
Cuba), also called "Law 88." n73 This law bans assisting the United States in any way, such as in
"ownership, distribution, or reproduction" of U.S. government materials, and imposes prison
sentences for "collaborating with radio ... stations" thought to be helping the United States n74
(such as Radio Marti, the U.S.-funded station broadcasted to Cuba from Miami). n75 Most recently,
Cuba passed a constitutional amendment in 2002 "declaring Cuba's socialist system 'untouchable.'"
UNITED STATES ACTION IS WORTHLESS WITHOUT ACTION FROM CUBA TO LIBERALIZE
THEIR MARKETS AND GOVERNMENT--Sweeney '94
[John P.; Foreign Policy Fellow; “Why the Cuban Trade Embargo Should Be Maintained;” Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder #1010; 10 November 1994; http://www.heritage.org/research/tradeandeconomicfreedom/bg1010.cfm; downloaded 12 May
2009]
Castro's recent comments and actions make it clear how fruitless it would be for the United States to
make concessions now. Even without access to U.S. markets and investments, there are many steps
Castro could take to improve economic and political conditions within his country, but he refuses to
do so. These include:
• Adopting free-market policies that include a reform of Cuba's constitution and passage of
laws to abolish all legal prohibition of private enterprise and property ownership.
• Holding democratic elections in the context of a politically pluralist society in which the
Communist Party is compelled to compete with democratic organizations and political
parties.
• Freeing all political prisoners currently in Cuban jails.
• Disbanding the Interior Ministry's security police and the Committees for the Defense of the
Revolution, which function as thought-control police and as spies in every neighborhood in
Cuba.
• Eliminating the Marxist political indoctrination, which is a central feature of Cuba's
education system.
• Restoring all confiscated assets and properties to their rightful owners, or agreeing to pay
appropriate compensation for what the regime has stolen from them.
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CUBA UNWILLING TO MAKE ANY CHANGES IN EXCHANGE FOR LIFTING THE EMBARGO-Sweeney '94
[John P.; Foreign Policy Fellow; “Why the Cuban Trade Embargo Should Be Maintained;” Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder #1010; 10 November 1994; http://www.heritage.org/research/tradeandeconomicfreedom/bg1010.cfm; downloaded 12 May
2009]
Castro's Determination to Retain Power. Nevertheless, Castro flatly rules out any possibility of
compromise and reconciliation. In a lengthy interview published September 25, 1994, by the
Venezuelan daily El Nacional, Castro repeated his oft-expressed demand that the U.S. lift the
embargo unilaterally without demanding any concessions in return. Alternating between defiance
and self-pity, Castro said:
The U.S. plan is to starve Cuba into submission, but even if [the U.S.] were to hurl an atomic bomb at
Cuba, nothing would change. There is no solution but to end the embargo.... If [Cuba] had
Venezuela's oil and other economic resources, we wouldn't even have developed tourism.... Lifting
the embargo is fundamental.... The embargo is causing us terrible damage today when the socialist
bloc no longer exists and we have lost 70 percent of our trade and imports.... What country in the
world would have resisted the five years that Cuba has resisted?... The suffering hurts all of us, but
we won't exchange the independence of this nation for a plate of beans.... [U]nder no concept can
lifting the embargo be conditioned to issues that affect our independence. The Cuban position is a
worthy one: Lift the embargo without any conditions. It's the only honorable course.
FOR US POLICY TO WORK, WE MUST ASSUME THAT THE CASTROS WON'T RETURN ANY
FAVORS--Johnson '02
[Stephen; Latin America Policy Analyst; “Time For Consensus On Cuba;” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder; 30 August
2002; http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/BG1579.cfm; downloaded 12 May 2009]
While U.S. policies cannot turn Cuba into an instant democracy, they can at least promote its
construction one brick at a time. But to be effective, they should not be based on the anticipation
that Fidel Castro will return any favors. Rather, policy initiatives should support U.S. interests in
promoting a stable democratic neighborhood, promote the long-term development of market-based
economic prosperity that will benefit both Cuba and the United States, and cultivate a lasting
friendship with the Cuban people--not with the old bully who, for the moment, holds them prisoner.
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CUBA HAS LITTLE TO OFFER THE UNITED STATES
CUBA HAS LITTLE TO OFFER THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE OF ITS OVER RELIANCE ON
HEALTH CARE SERVICES--Margulies '08
[Michael; Attorney; “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATESCUBA RELATIONS;” Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law; 2008; LN]
Finally, Cuba's long-term development of human capital, through its investment in education and
health care services, places the country in a position to give priority to partners willing to enter into
trade agreements exchanging goods for services. Venezuela has eagerly taken advantage of such
exchange, exporting oil and other commodities to Cuba in return for medical personnel. n169 As a
result, Venezuela occupies nearly a quarter of Cuba's foreign trade market; this stronghold on the
Cuban market will not likely be displaced by other trade competitors or the United States, even if the
embargo is lifted. The fact that the United States does not have as pressing a need for Cuban health
care services or education, one of Cuba's major new export prospects, n170 as other potential Cuban
trade partners may restrict the ability for the U.S. share of Cuban foreign trade to dramatically
increase.
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CUBAN GOVERNMENT ACTIONS HURTING THE CUBAN PEOPLE, NOT US POLICY
CUBAN GOVERNMENT RULES CONCERNING RESOURCES HAVE LEAD PROFESSIONALS TO
ABANDON THEIR JOBS IN FAVOR OF PROSTITUTION--Sarmiento '05
[Ignacio; JD Candidate at Nova Southeastern University; “INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AFFAIRS: TRAVELING TO CUBA?
SORRY, IT'S CLOSED;” Nova Law Review; Winter 2005; LN]
The Castro government continuously assures the people of Cuba they will have a share in the
country's national goods. n31 Despite these promises, Cubans are strictly banned from all tourist
areas, including the beautiful beaches and hotels. n32 For example, shopping in luxury stores and
eating in fine restaurants is reserved only for foreigners. n33 Castro does so to prevent Cuban
citizens from gaining access to valuable foreign currency. n34 These restrictions are forcing Cubans
to resort to desperate measures in an effort to [*291] gain access to United States dollars on the
island. n35 Highly educated males and females are abandoning their traditional jobs, opting for
other extreme career paths. n36 For example, males are beginning to drive cabs and females have
resorted to prostitution (now at an all time high) just to make ends meet.
CUBA CONTINUES TO RESTRICT ACCESS TO FOOD, EDUCATION, HEALTH CARE AND
WORK--Sarmiento '05
[Ignacio; JD Candidate at Nova Southeastern University; “INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AFFAIRS: TRAVELING TO CUBA?
SORRY, IT'S CLOSED;” Nova Law Review; Winter 2005; LN]
Castro continues to restrict access to food, education, health care, and work. n242 "This permits
Castro to stifle any and all dissent. Any Cuban daring to say the wrong thing, by Castro's standards,
loses his or her job. Anyone refusing to spy on a neighbor is denied a university education. Anyone
daring to organize an opposition group goes to jail." n243 The American government is trying to
prevent these exact actions by restricting travel to Cuba and by not allowing American dollars to
further help fuel the fire of the communist government. Travel restrictions are by no means going to
shut down Castro's government, but it will significantly contribute to the overall effort and is more
than a step in the right direction.
ANY SUFFERING OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE IS A DIRECT RESULT OF CASTRO'S ACTIONS-DeMelfi '06
[Christy; JD/MBA Candidate at Hofstra University; “NOTHING BUT THE FACTS: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA;” The Journal of International Business & Law;” Spring 2006; LN]
Others believe this viewpoint is false. In reality, the suffering of the Cuban people is caused by
Castro's inability to admit that communism has failed. One must realize the suffering of the Cuban
people is not caused completely by the U.S.; instead the Cuban government is the culprit. In
addition, it is false to believe the embargo encourages suffering, because the U.S. does allow trade
for food and medicine so that the people of Cuba are not deprived. The U.S. is not the cruel heartless
country that Castro portrays.
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CUBA IS FULLY AT BLAME FOR WHATEVER DOOM FACES ITS PEOPLE, NOT UNITED STATE
POLICY--Sweeney '94
[John P.; Foreign Policy Fellow; “Why the Cuban Trade Embargo Should Be Maintained;” Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder #1010; 10 November 1994; http://www.heritage.org/research/tradeandeconomicfreedom/bg1010.cfm; downloaded 12 May
2009]
Fidel Castro blames the U.S. trade embargo for the collapse of the Cuban economy. The truth,
however, is that Cuba's economic destruction was caused by the regime's ruinous economic policies.
Specifically, Castro's command economy, based on a 1976 constitution and laws which prohibit
private enterprise and ownership of property, completely destroyed the free market in Cuba,
hindering economic growth and prosperity.
RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITS ON THE CUBAN PEOPLE ARE ALL DUE TO CASTRO'S REGIME,
NOT THE UNITED STATES--Gutierrez '07
[Carlos M.; Former US Secretary of Commerce; Commission for Assistance to Free Cuba; “Cuba at the Crossroads;” The
Heritage Lecture #1048; 24 October 2007; http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/hl1048.cfm; downloaded 12 May 2009]
It is clear that the restrictions imposed on the Cuban people have nothing to do with the U.S.
embargo and nothing to do with our policies. It has everything to do with Castro's desire and the
regime's desire to stay in power. They may use the U.S. as an excuse for everything they do. "Why do
we need such a strong military, and why do we need to spy on our people? Well, because the U.S. is
going to attack us one day." That's not true. "Why is it that people don't have enough to eat? It's not
because Communism doesn't work, it's because of the U.S. embargo." So all of that just confuses
people; the reality is this is a regime that has done everything and anything to stay in power.
CASTRO IS TO BLAME FOR THE HARDSHIP OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE, NOT UNITED STATES
SANCTIONS--Johnson '02
[Stephen; Latin America Policy Analyst; “Time For Consensus On Cuba;” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder; 30 August
2002; http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/BG1579.cfm; downloaded 12 May 2009]
Critics of U.S. policy toward Cuba have come to repeat Castro's frequent claim that U.S. sanctions
have hurt relations and imposed hardship on the Cuban people. In fact, Castro's own blockades are
to blame for Cuba's isolation and poor domestic living conditions.
THE EMBARGO IS NOT THE CAUSE OF CUBA'S ECONOMIC DISASTER; CASTRO'S REGIME IS-Azel '08
[Jose; “Cuba: Snuff Out the Embargo;” Gov Central; 3 March 2008; http://www.govcentral.com/news/articles/1535-cuba-snuff-out-theembargo-pro-versus-con-debate; downloaded 12 May 2009]
The embargo is not the cause of the catastrophic state of Cuba’s economy. Mismanagement and the
fact that “command economy” models don’t work lie at the root of Cuba’s economic misery. Despite
the existence of the embargo, the U.S. is Cuba’s sixth-largest trading partner and biggest food
supplier.
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CUBA SHOULD TAKE ACTION: RETURN STOLEN US PROPERTY!
CUBA CAN START NORMALIZING BY RETURNING ALL STOLEN PROPERTY TO AMERICANS-Sarmiento '05
[Ignacio; JD Candidate at Nova Southeastern University; “INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AFFAIRS: TRAVELING TO CUBA?
SORRY, IT'S CLOSED;” Nova Law Review; Winter 2005; LN]
Because section 2370(a)(2) makes returning property taken from United States citizens a condition
precedent to receiving a "benefit," any attempt to [*292] ease the restrictions against Cuba would
have to essentially repeal this law, unless, of course, the Cuban government chooses to return all
property. n42 Further, there is no statutory language indicating specific time restrictions on the
expiration of the embargo or guidance on when, or how, it may end. n43 Although the current
President could always terminate the embargo by exercising his foreign powers, the regulations
would still exist in the texts.
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A/T: CHINA PROVIDES A MODEL
CHINA ISN'T A MODEL FOR ECONOMICS LIBERALIZING POLITICS; CHINA IS STILL A
BRUTAL REGIME--Sarmiento '05
[Ignacio; JD Candidate at Nova Southeastern University; “INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AFFAIRS: TRAVELING TO CUBA?
SORRY, IT'S CLOSED;” Nova Law Review; Winter 2005; LN]
Recently, individuals opposing the restrictions on Cuba have compared such restrictions to the
situation in China where private investment is being made; thus the question arises, why China and
not Cuba? n228 The answer is simple; the situation in Cuba is completely different from that in
China. Although it appears that investing in China is helping create a flourishing democracy, in
reality it is not. n229 For example, the Chinese government is still trying to control all activity in its
country. n230 Currently, the Chinese government has placed stringent controls on the use of the
internet and has declared that "party cells" will be imposed on all private organizations doing
business in China.
CUBA IS UNLIKE TO SEE ANY BENEFIT FROM “CHINA-LIKE” OPENING OF MARKETS-Roberts and Walser '08
[James and Ray; Policy Analysts; “Cuba's Phony Transition: Fidel Resigns, Raul Reigns;” Heritage Foundation; WebMemo;
19 February 2008; downloaded 12 May 2009]
The economy is not likely to respond quickly or robustly to any minor "China-like" opening that Raul
may attempt. He may begin to tinker with the economic system, presenting limited reforms in the
agricultural area and some modest private market opportunities, but the command economy will
remain firmly in place. That is bad news for the Cuban people. Production in Cuba has long been
inefficient, and the economy cannot provide even basic goods and services. Corruption is rampant,
and more than 40 percent of the economy is in the informal sector.
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A/T: EMBARGO HURTS HEALTH CARE
DESPITE THE EMBARGO, THE CUBAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM COVERS CUBANS
UNIVERSALLY AND IS A MODEL FOR THE DEVELOPING WORLD--Campos '04
[Javier; Professor of Anesthesia at the University of Iowa Health Care; “The Impact of the U.S. Embargo on Health Care in
Cuba: A Clinician's Perspective;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
Although the U.S. embargo has greatly affected the health care system in Cuba, Cuba's health care
system is considered the preeminent model in the developing world. In contrast to the U.S. health
care system, the Cuban Constitution makes health care a right of every citizen and the responsibility
of the government. n27 This system is based on universal coverage and comprehensive care, at no
cost to Cuban citizens. Over the years, the Cuban Government has placed a top priority on public
health expenditures in the national budget and has allocated considerable human resources to
public health strategies, which have earned praise from the World Health [*523] Organization,
UNICEF, and others. In contrast, in the United States there are forty-one million Americans who do
not have health coverage or insurance, and among these forty-one million are eleven million
children. This is plainly unacceptable by the standards of today's health care.
CUBAN HEALTH CARE IS CLOSER TO THE WESTERN WORLD THAN THE DEVELOPING
WORLD--Campos '04
[Javier; Professor of Anesthesia at the University of Iowa Health Care; “The Impact of the U.S. Embargo on Health Care in
Cuba: A Clinician's Perspective;” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems; Fall 2004; LN]
In the last census, done in the late 1990s, Cuba's health statistics were more closely aligned with
those of the Western European nations and North America than of developing countries. The ratio
of physicians to inhabitants in Cuba is 1 to 195, and ninety-five percent of the Cuban population is
attended by family physicians. The infant mortality rate in Cuba is an exemplary model for Latin
American countries. In 1996, UNICEF reported that Cuba's infant mortality was down to 7.9 per 1000
live births, in sharp contrast to Latin American countries where the infant mortality rate is roughly
38 per 1000 live births.
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