Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung in North Africa
‫مؤسسة روزا لوكسمبورغ في شمال افريقيا‬
8 October 2013
The Revolutionary Process in Tunisia
and the Risk of Failure
Maher Hamdi1
The uprising of 17 December 2010 in Tunisia was
the first of a new wave of revolutions. These
revolutions differ from those preceding them in
program, organisation and leadership. None of the
political actors, or observers and specialists for that
matter, had predicted that an outbreak of
revolution would occur with such ease. This could
perhaps justify the various names given to the
event. It is considered an “Arab Uprising” by some,
an “Arab Spring” by others, while still others call it
“The Jasmine Revolution.” This is due to attempts
to mold the narrative of what happened in Tunisia
into the garbs of Euro-centrism, be it liberal or
Marxist. It is this orthodoxy in dealing with events
that would lead to altering the path of the struggle,
twisting it until it takes on other names.
Although a majority of those interested in Tunisian
affairs begin their analyses with Mohamad
Bouazizi’s self-immolation, the eruption and
ensuing toppling of the head of the regime were
the result of the cumulative struggles of
generations starting in the 1970s, going through
the Bread Uprising of 1984, and the mining basin
events of 2008 up to 17 December 2010/14 January
2011.
Anyone who follows this revolutionary process will
notice that the hijacking of the revolution from its
1
Maher Hamdi was born in Menzel Bouzayan in the town of
Sidi Bouzid. He has a degree in Arabic Literature and a Master’s
in Contemporary Civilisation. He is starting a doctoral thesis on
the poor and the marginalised people of Egypt and the social
and political roles they play. He was active as a student both in
high school and at university where he was a member of the
General Union of Tunisian Students (UGET). He is one of the
founders of the Union for Unemployed Graduates (UDC) and
has served as a member of its national leadership from 2006 to
2013.
correct path and the creation of the counterrevolution first appeared with the fleeing of the
ousted president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali– despite
the local and spontaneous nature of the events in
Tunisia, marked by protests rapidly expanding from
Sidi Bouzid, Menzel Bouzayan, Meknessi, Kasserine
and Thala to encompass all towns and regions. The
hijacking began with Mohamad Ghannouchi’s first
interim government and the appointment of
Mustapha Kamal Nabli, an employee of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), as the governor
of the central bank of Tunisia on 17 January 2011.
One of his first tasks was, as he himself announced,
a commitment to repaying Tunisia’s external debt.
The attempts to abort the revolution continued to
clash with the revolutionary youth’s insistence to
hold up their slogans: “Employment is a Right You
Band of Thieves,” and “Work, Freedom, National
Dignity.” These clashes led to the two sit-ins:
Kasbah 1 and 2, which toppled Ghannouchi’s first
and second governments2. Whenever the pace of
2 Mohamad Ghannouchi had occupied the position of Prime
Minister in Tunisia on 17 November 1999 as well as after the
flight of Ben Ali to Saudi Arabia on the 14 January 2011, when he
announced that he will take on the functions and powers of the
president of the republic temporarily, because the president was
unable to perform his duties. This was dictated by Article 56 of
the Tunisian constitution which states that should the president
be unable to fulfil his tasks temporarily he is to delegate the
prime minister all the while remaining in office. Upon perusing
the documents, however, the constitutional council announced
that there was no clear delegation of the prime minister to be
taken into account and that the president had not resigned from
his office. Since his departure had occurred under known
circumstances following the declaration of the state of
emergency, and since he could not commit to his duties, a state
of total disability was reached, based on which it was decided
that Article 57 of the constitution be referred to, and the
vacancy of the office of president was announced. It was as such
announced on 15 January 2011 that the president of the House
of Representatives Mohamed Fouad Mebazaa was to take office
of president of the republic in a temporary manner, until the
early presidential elections would be held within 45 to 60 days as
stated in the constitution.
protests quickened, there followed a rise in
conspiracies, and a unification of the counterrevolutionary forces which came in the form of Beji
Caid Sebsi’s government and a push to replace the
National Council for the Protection of the
Revolution with the High Commission for the
Realisation of Revolutionary Goals (Yadh Ben
Achour’s committee). This is when a two part
operation began: Recycling the old regime on the
one hand, and on the other the political promotion
of the An-Nahda movement—which did not even
participate in the revolution and merely profited
from the Kasbah 2 sit-in.
the political one, and as such puts the ball squarely
in the politicians’ court.3 The Minister of Finance
Ilyess Fakhfakh provides deeper analysis: the
solution lies in an austerity policy of maintaining
salaries at their current level, while removing state
subsidies on many essential products (which will
cause prices to skyrocket and destroy citizens’
purchasing power).
Whatever the political controversy in Tunisia is, the
fact remains that the country is going through a
major crisis. The purchasing power of all citizens
has been seriously affected by staggering price
hikes and the falling value of the Tunisian Dinar,
rendering many citizens unable to keep up with the
demands of daily life. Additionally, these problems
are compounded by the rapidly rising rates of
unemployment throughout the country.
I present this brief historical outline of the major
events to illustrate the current situation and to
show that what is currently happening has been
planned in advance by counter-revolutionary forces
and some leftist political parties. Those have seized
the opportunity to become politically active
because at the time they believed, that the
ultimate priority was to accomplish the democratic
goals; this being the circumstantial convergence
point between them and the liberal forces.
I present here the data found in the 30 June 2013
report of the central bank’s administrative council,
which provides official figures (not the allegations
or fantasies that the opposition is accused of using
to push the government to admit failure):
- Regarding growth, the report states it has been
limited to 2.7 percent vs. 4 percent recorded in
the previous trimester; keeping in mind that the
stated goal for 2013 was 4 percent.
- The decline of both the agricultural and fishing
sectors by 1.6 percent, and the manufacturing
industry by 0.2 percent (related to mining
production).
- Hard currency reserves are at 10 million TND (a
95 day supply as compared to the 119 day
supply held in reserve at the end of 2012).
- The falling exchange rate of the dinar against
the Euro and the Japanese Yen at 1.6 and 1.1
respectively.
- A 1.3 percent decline in foreign investment from
2012 to 2013.
- External debt is at 48 percent of the GDP.
An attempt to restore the old economic system
All economists in Tunisia agree that the economic
situation is spiraling out of control. Although we do
not need experts and specialists to see the features
of a crisis which has reached all social classes and
has grown to cover all sectors, disagreements
about the causes, however, remain.
While some Tunisian opposition parties describe
the economic situation as catastrophic, stating that
the country is at risk of collapse and is perhaps even
incapable of paying salaries during the first few
months of 2014, the governing coalition sees this as
an exaggeration, merely propaganda designed to
reinforce the notion that the government has failed
and needs replacement. The official position
remains the one expressed by Central Bank
governor Chedhli Ayari, who considers the solution
to the economic crisis to be entirely dependent on
I have presented these figures, which in most cases
begin with the word “decline,” to show the
deteriorating
economic
situation.
Should
immediate solutions to this situation not be found,
these same figures could foretell the potential
collapse of the state. While the figures are
frightening, they remain insignificant for the
average citizen, whose concern is limited to price
hikes, the deterioration of purchasing power and
chronic unemployment which has spared no
On 17 January 2011 Mohamed Ghannouchi announced the
formation of a national unity government which brought
together several opposition figures such as Ahmed Najib Chebbi
from the Democratic Progressive Party (currently called Al
Jomhouri) and Ahmed Ibrahim from the Tajdid (renewal) party
(currently called Al Massar party) and he insisted on the
separation of the government from the parties. On 27 February
2011 Mohamed Ghannouchi announced his resignation from the
interim government due to his failure to gain the people’s trust.
3
2
On
the
Central
Bank
report,
please
see:
http://www.africanmanager.com/site_ar/detail_article.php?art_i
d=19595.
Tunisian family.
the end of the 1980s) and the unemployment crisis.
The phenomenon of massive unemployment
among university graduates is a social plague that
has appeared with the policy of national
indebtedness, along with many other scourges
such as the deterioration of purchasing power, the
regression of social services and social security, the
regression of the standard of living, the breakdown
of the educational system, coupled with a rise in
marginalisation, ignorance, and rise in crime rates.
To better understand why we began producing this
kind of unemployment in the second half of the
1990s, I must raise an issue of extreme importance:
The quasi-radical change that happened to the
general logic of the system following the 1984
Bread Uprising. At that time preparations had
already begun to eradicate Bourguiba’s policies
which attempted to reconcile the requirements of
capitalist gains and the demands of a growing
number of hired workers and an expanding internal
market, since they were considered the
preconditions for the continuity of an economic
model based primarily on the domestic market.
This was the model of the capitalist state that
balanced its social and economic duties, being both
the largest investor and consumer at the same
time. In other words, given the inability of the
private sector to provide the needed quantity and
quality of employment which suited the
developments of the Tunisian education system, it
was natural that the state took over these roles in
earnest. This contributed to the improvement of
social indicators: the level of professional
competence increased, improving economic output
and increasing its productivity, thereby benefitting
private capital.
The debilitating crisis in which the country finds
itself, is not only the result of current conditions,
but may also find its roots in the 1980s and in the
overall economic and social decisions of the postrevolutionary governments which have been
perpetuating the same policies of the regimes of
Habib Bourguiba and Ben Ali (policies which led to
the Uprising of 17 December 2010 - January 14th
2011)4. Although the examples to illustrate this are
numerous, perhaps the clearest for Tunisian
citizens are the questions of debt and
unemployment.
There is a close link between debt as a cornerstone
of the new capitalist liberal policy in Tunisia (since
4
Habib Bourguiba was born in the Trabelsiya neighbourhood of
the coastal town of Monastir to a middle class family. He
received his secondary education at the Sadiki School then
Carnot High School in Tunis, after which he travelled to Paris in
1942, receiving his Baccalaureate. He studied at the school of
law and political science from which he received a BA in 1927
and then returned to Tunisia to practice law. He joined the Free
Destour Party in 1933 and quit it the same year to create the
Neo Destour Party in Ksar Hellal on 2 March 1934 accompanied
by Mahmoud Materi, Taher Sfar and Bahri Guiga. On 20 March
1956 complete independence was proclaimed and Bourguiba
formed the first post-independence government. On 13 August
1956 the new Personal Status Code was passed which is
considered one of Bourguiba’s most important achievements as
it contained revolutionary provisions such as the abolishing of
polygamy and expanding women's access to divorce through
courts. He showed extreme ferocity when facing his rivals,
particularly the political ones, even if they were his fellow
combatants. He exploited his founding of the first state and his
monopoly over it to eradicate the Zaitouna Islamic Institution
which was a supporter to his sworn enemy Saleh ben Youssef.
The latter had the support of Middle Eastern and the nationalist
forces, particularly Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser. Bourguiba
would chase the ‘Youssefites’, killing and arresting many of
them, only suspending the case upon the assassination of their
exiled leader in Germany. He also used a 1962 attempted coup
against him to freeze the activities of the Communist Party, halt
all the independent and opposition-oriented newspapers, and
eliminate basic freedoms and set in place the one-party system.
In all of this he sought the assistance of the Tunisian General
Labour Union (UGTT), which had allied itself with the Destour
party to the extent where it accepted the party’s intervention in
its affairs as well as the imposed guardianship on the union itself
and its leadership. With the adoption of socialism in the sixties,
civil society became absent, and the country became dominated
by the one-party management, that dominated freedom of
thought, media and organization.
Zine el Abidine Ben Ali was born on 3 September 1936. He was
the second president of Tunisia following its independence from
France in 1956 after Habib Bourguiba. He was appointed as
Prime Minister in October 1987 and a month later he claimed
presidency in November 1987 in a bloodless coup where he
announced that President Bourguiba was no longer able to
serve as president. He was re-elected with majority votes in all
the following presidential elections, the last of which took place
on 25 October 2009. He was ousted on 14 January 2011
following a popular uprising. His rule was the most oppressive,
marginalising and impoverishing one that Tunisians have
known.
The transformation of the regime, as such,
ultimately aimed to realise maximum profit without
taking into account the employment and income
issues or the restructuring of the domestic
economy in order to guarantee its ultimate goal of
differentiating between the companies that
produced for the domestic market and those that
produced for an external one. At first, foreign
companies were basically classified in the second
category and are still producing two thirds of
Tunisian exports today. In a second phase,
however, and especially thanks to privatisation and
liberalisation of domestic markets, foreign
companies became active in the domestic markets
as well. This is how the local economy was
liberalised and no longer needed domestic
consumption to guarantee the production of
3
“surplus value”, i.e. selling production in order to
make profit.5 This was materialising in external
markets which made it possible for the economy to
continue to flourish while at the same time the
social crisis was worsening with the increase of
unemployment and poverty, which explains the
paradox of 2010: an economy with a high growth
rate, and a revolution triggered by unemployment
and poverty.
Despite what happened in Tunisia on 14 January
2011, an event crowned with the ousting of a
dictator; global capitalism is the true financial and
political authority in Tunisia, and with that the
destiny of the Tunisian people is still in the hands of
neo-colonialist powers. This explains why the post14 January governments strive to ensure the
satisfaction of foreign parties by marginalizing
revolutionary demands that are devoted to social
and economic change at the expense of the
interests of the Tunisian people. The aid which
these governments have been receiving from
abroad is proof of the imperialist forces’ panic from
the revolutionary path that has brought down one
of their local agents (Ben Ali). This resulted in a
need to fix the crack and search for new agents to
protect their neo-colonial system in Tunisia.
The presentation of the economic situation preand post- 14 January aims first to show that there
exists only one political system, pursuing one
economic and social goal, namely to further the
interests of foreign investors and ensure the
protection of the shameful agreements with
capitalist allies. The structural adjustment policies
that were adopted in 1986 – near the end of
Bourguiba’s rule – were maintained and applied
during the presidency of the ousted dictator Ben
Ali, and are still effective today, during the Troika’s
reign, with a willingness to apply its second phase
in the form of adopting austerity measures. As for
the partnership initiative with the European Union
which was launched with Ben Ali in 2008, it is now
turning into a Privileged Partnership agreement
under An-Nahda’s rule6.
5
6
The stupor of imperialist forces regarding the
events in Tunisia (and in the Arab region) did not
last for long. Aside from their direct support of the
governments of Ghannouchi and, later on that of
Sebsi’s, they dedicated a part of the G8 Deauville
summit on 26-27 April 2011 to set a plan to lay siege
to the Arab revolutions, particularly in Tunisia and
Egypt. The Deauville summit was the first
international summit to tackle the wave of popular
revolutions in the Arab world under the title of “The
Arab Spring Summit” with the presence of Beji Caid
Sebsi. It later came to be known as the “Deauville
Partnership” to support the transition of the North
African and the Middle East countries into free
democratic societies by searching for channels of
support for the new governments in Tunisia, Egypt,
and Libya; and by pushing the summit’s member
states to provide billions in aid to the transitional
governments and turn the debts into future
investments.
The Incentives Investment Code by law 93-120 promulgated on
27 December 1993 offers many incentives and financial, tax and
exemption privileges as well as investment grants and State
support. The latter will ensure the contribution of institutions in
the legal system for social security and contribute by bearing
the expenses resulting from infrastructure work and the costs of
vocational training in accordance with the following objectives:
- Export;
- Regional development;
- Agricultural development;
- The advancement of technology and research for
development;
- New investors and small and medium sized enterprises;
- Supporting investments.
The Privileged partnership Agreement was signed on 19
November 2012 in Brussels, within the framework of the 9th
meeting of the Tunisia-EU partnership council which aims to
integrate European and Tunisian economies in the EuroMediterranean area under the pretext that it is an honorary
status conferred by the EU on Tunisia for the success of the
democratic transition and its activation. The agreement,
however, pushes Tunisia further down as it drowns in liberal
reforms serving the European counterparts, which can only
destroy the Tunisian economy that cannot compete with the
European goods whether in Tunisian markets or in EuroMediterranean ones. It was introduced through the Jasmine
Plan under Beji Caid Sebsi’s government (a social and economic
plan which cost 125 billion Dinars, almost two thirds of which
were borrowed by Beji Caid Sebsi from the African
Development Bank, the World Bank and the EU, which only
aggravated the debt issue that Tunisia suffers from. Tunisia
thus risks losing its national decision making independence and
its economic sovereignty).
Building a national, democratic and social system
necessitates a cut with the current hegemonic
exploitative system, as well as enabling Tunisians
to determine their own fate and participate in the
reorganisation of their economy upon their social,
cultural and environmental priorities, based on the
available material and human resources. To give
the revolution the opportunity to fulfil its goals and
truly accomplish a social change culminating in the
transfer of authority from a decomposing
conservative class to a young progressive one, the
following should be undertaken promptly to face
the current economic and social situation:
Suspension of external debt payment until it is
audited, following which a popular decision must
4
be made with regards to its cancellation;
Cancelling both value added tax exemption on
supply and tax exemption on profits for foreign
companies;
Reforming the fiscal system through an
imposition of taxes on major fortunes and
progressive taxation;
Fighting corruption and addressing the
smuggling and laundering of capital;
Repealing shameful agreements with foreign
bodies (the privileged partnership with the EU
and the new structural adjustments), in addition
to revising the investment code, auditing all the
privatisation operations which have taken place
since 1987 and taking other appropriate
measures
such
as
expropriation
and
nationalisation.
new phase culminated in the declaration of the end
of revolutionary legitimacy, replaced with the
incipience of a new legitimacy, that of electoral
legitimacy. Within this framework the function of
this elected assembly changed from setting
foundations, to passing legislation, to the assembly
submitting its decisions to the dialectic of majority
and minority. From this emerged a government
based on election results.
This was anticipated because the elections for the
Constituent Assembly happened in a vertical and
centralised manner, for the success of which
several internal and external factors were
mobilised. The starting point was the overthrowing
of the National Council for the Protection of the
Revolution and its replacement by the High
Commission for the Realization of Revolutionary
Goals and Democratic Transition (Yadh Ben
Achour’s
Commission).
This
new
“High
Commission” prepared the electoral law that only
served those who had political funding and
accepted the possibility of sharing the
revolutionary cake with those arriving from
overseas, and those who are most capable of
buying forgiveness and obedience from foreign
actors. This mission was assigned to the High
Independent Authority for Elections presided over
by Kamal Jandoubi. Jandoubi was the president of
the Euro-Mediterranean network for human rights
which is closely tied to the European Union. In
addition to all of this came the shuttle trips the
leader of the Nahdha movement made to several
European cities concluding with a visit to the White
House where oil company hawks welcomed him on
the condition that he would act as the guardian
angel of US and EU interests in post-revolutionary
Tunisia.
Finally, it must be noted that both the foreign and
local bourgeoisie are the only beneficiaries of the
current regime and that they therefore bear the full
responsibility for the social crisis resulting from the
political dictatorial authority, or what is otherwise
called a system of corruption and tyranny. This
leads to the conclusion that the revolution is a
“political revolution” at its core; its mission is the
realisation of what is called a “democratic
transition,” i.e. a reform of the political system
which will in turn - as they claim - improve the
economy and all the related social indicators. In
other words the economic crisis is not the result of
the failure of the capitalist system but rather the
result of corruption and political tyranny, which
have prevented the economic wheel from turning
around and which has hindered liberal capitalist
structural reforms.
The people at the political parties’ auction
Several attempts to circumvent the masses popular
demands which are portrayed in the revolutionary
youth’s first slogans preceded the 23 October
elections. Every technique available was used to
abort the economic and social demands of the
Tunisian people.
Since the flight of the dictator, the revolutionary
process in Tunisia has been marked by several
stops. Each indicated that counter-revolutionary
forces were attempting to delay or block the path
until suitable conditions for the reestablishment of
the old order, albeit under a different name, were
available.
In addition to the electoral law and political money
which served some parties at the detriment of
others, there was an exploitation of publicity, many
actions alien to Tunisian culture were used to
manipulate public attention, focusing the people on
minor issues and distracting Tunisians from
essential ones. For example the film “Persepolis”
that was shown on the TV channel Nesma raised
The elections for the National Constituent
Assembly on 23 October 2011 represented a
completion of the circumvention of the revolution
by the appropriation of the state apparatus. With
the rise of the An-Nahdha movement to power and
the forging of its alliances, a new phase began. This
5
the issues of infidelity and atheism between people
of one nation. It was considered offensive to Islam
and Muslims, and was used in the electoral
campaigns of An-Nahdha. Many people voted for
the latter not on the basis of its political and
economic platform but rather on the basis of piety
and faith. These practices continued under the rule
of An-Nahdha. Whenever the social protest
movements escalated, some transient case would
appear to block the revolutionary path.
apparatus of the UGTT has committed itself to
pacification and mediation, often claiming no ties
to sit-ins and demonstrations, which they describe
as chaotic. Meanwhile the liberal democratic
powers are committed to constitutional legitimacy
and what the ballot boxes have led to; all the while
wanting to benefit from the struggles of the youth
and those who refuse An-Nahdha’s reign. These
parties seem to follow the Arab proverb, “Rain
where you will, for what you grow will be mine,” an
idea expressed implicitly by Beji Caid Sebsi several
times.
Despite statements to the contrary by the new
rulers, their promises of democracy, public and
individual freedoms, development and the
completion of the civil state have not been realised.
In fact, their practices have triggered a new wave of
popular movements and workers’ strikes in several
areas of the country. As usual, the response to
these protests was security-based and made use of
a big stick policy. The youth of Menzel Bouzayan
and its unionists were judged unfairly. There were
random arrests in the village of Omran, then
birdshot attacks in Siliana. A wave of arrests was
witnessed by the cities of Kef and Jendouba. Many
towns were compensated for a lack of development
or economic growth with tear gas and trials. Things
went further still, reaching the level of political
assassinations. On 6 February 2013 leftist leader
Chokri Belaid was eliminated in a message to all,
that this was the first assassination but not the last
one. A second assassination of Mohamed Brahmi
followed on 25 July 2013, making “good” on that
promise. One event followed another in the
Chaambi Mountains where eight military elite unit
soldiers were killed and their bodies mutilated.
The most surprising position, however, is that of
the leftist powers, particularly that of the radical
left which emerged from the movements of the
sixties and the seventies and survived the
repression of Bourguiba and the Novemberian
Tyranny (in reference to the coup of 7 November
1987)7. Although the left had joined the early
struggle against Bourguiba, and against Ben Ali
after him, and despite the role it played in the
acceleration of the fall of the dictatorship, its role
after 14 January has been meagre. It did not raise
the issue of authority and began to experience a
kind of schizophrenia between its discourse and
stated goals, and its actual activities in the struggle.
Instead of guiding the popular movements and
joining the rising revolutionary youth forces in the
continuation of the revolutionary process, the
“historical leadership” of the left leaned towards
the forces for reform and contributed to the
restructuring of the bourgeois state. It must be
noted that some of these parties had participated
in Ben Achour’s putschist commission. Even
attempts to work in fronts ended in failure, neither
the first 14 January Front succeeded in closing
ranks and claiming victory for the people’s causes,
nor did the Popular Front present a political, social
or economic plan that could serve as an alternative
to the bipolarization between religious and
bourgeois liberalism. The weakness of the policies
of the Popular Front is seen in its response to the
political assassinations of two of its most
prominent leaders, Chokri Belaid and Mohamed
Brahmi. Despite the massive funeral of Belaid, the
martyr, which over one million and a half people
attended, the leadership did not leverage the
popular anger to amend the revolutionary process.
Even the initiative announced by Hamma
Hammami, the official spokesperson of the Popular
Noticeably, these incidences of violence and terror
usually occur when the government is suffering
from a political crisis. Whenever the revolutionary
and the electoral legitimacies collide, the pace of
violence escalates. Those who believe in
revolutionary legitimacy now see that the electoral
legitimacy – to which An-Nahdha holds dear – has
fallen and became void in the revolutionary path.
With the escalation of protests, a third party
interferes, one which played the role of the fireman
in the face of popular movements using consensual
legitimacy. The representative of this kind of
consensus is the group of democratic parties and
the civil society headed by the Workers’ Union
(UGTT), which is the major social power in the
country and the custodian of the January 14/17
movements which toppled the head of regime. The
7
6
A bloodless coup organised by Ben Ali while he was Prime
Minister and which resulted in the ousting of Borguiba for claims
that his health situation made him unfit to rule.
Front, on the evening of Brahmi’s assassination was
used by the other political powers, especially Nidaa
Tunis.
can only happen if authority passes from the worn
out hands of conservatism to the progressive hands
of youth. Due to the historical crisis of
revolutionary labour leadership in Tunisia, the
country is going through a long-term revolutionary
process rather than a revolution. The labour
leadership has suffered several defeats, worse still;
it failed during the mid-eighties of the previous
century to respond adequately to the crisis of the
Bourguiba regime, which gave the imperialist
powers an opportunity to impose their own
solutions.
Nidaa Tunis8 benefited the most when the
“Immunization of the Revolution” bill, one which
was going to include Beji Caid Sebsi and which was
going to be passed in the Constituent Assembly in
order to prevent old regime figures from taking
part in politics and the next political elections, was
defeated. They also benefited from the popular
street movements as it became possible for some
previously rejected ex-regime figures to take part in
marches and to speak from platforms.
This does not mean that the process is dead and
buried. The battle is ongoing and there are signs of
victory at the horizon. However, this depends on
the rise of a progressive class that would be capable
to assemble an overwhelming majority of the
masses and thus would be able to take over
authority. No matter how complicated or perhaps
blurred the political situation in Tunisia seems, the
signs of détente and resolutions to the crisis are not
far off. This has started with the attack on the
bipolarisation between the modernist right-wing
and the religious right-wing through popular and
youth resistance projects. There is now a
movement towards linking the following strategic
democratic tasks: addressing violence and
terrorism, ensuring total equality between women
and men, guaranteeing freedom of the media,
judicial independence and the impartiality of
administration, with a class oriented economic and
social content. This is done through a rehabilitation
of the public sector to adjust the modes of regional
and local imbalance, the nationalization of banks,
the self-governance of seized companies, debt
cancellation, a guarantee of a return to citizenship
and life for the unemployed and free health care
and education. This does not imply, however, the
availability of the conditions for success in the near
future; what has happened in Tunisia is a long-term
revolutionary process which may need more than a
decade to be safely achieved.
the following strategic democratic tasks:
addressing violence and terrorism, ensuring total
equality between women and men, guaranteeing
freedom of the media, judicial independence and
the impartiality of administration, with a class
oriented economic and social content. This is done
through a rehabilitation of the public sector to
adjust the modes of regional and local imbalance,
the nationalization of banks, the self-governance of
seized companies, debt cancellation, a guarantee
of a return to citizenship and life for the
The floundering of the Popular Front, which many
have bet on as a popular revolutionary alternative,
is the result of several factors, such as what some
consider right-wing orientations of its political
policies, especially following its inclusion in the
Salvation Front with some bourgeois powers9. The
most important factor in the front’s difficulties is
the absence of revolutionary labour leaders in its
composition like what has been witnessed by the
classical revolutions of the previous century. By
revolutionary labour leaders I mean organised
revolutionary vanguards having an informed
revolutionary platform, united with the masses
who adopt its platform and whose trust it gains
facing the imperialist powers, their local allies and
their exploitative class system. This is mainly why
political analysts consider the 17 December - 14
January uprising spontaneous; its spontaneity lies
in the absence of leadership and a revolutionary
programme.
Conclusion
The revolutionary track in Tunisia as in all social
revolutions aims to change the social order which
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9
Nidaa Tunis is the second strongest organised political force in
Tunisia following An-Nahda. It is a secular party that has been
formed following 2011 elections by the former Prime Minister
Beji Caid Sebsi. The party includes liberals, Destourians, former
members of the ousted Ben Ali’s Constitutional Democratic
Rally (CDR), and some leftists.
The Salvation Front is a coalition of a group of democratic
parties as well as some civil society organisations and
associations that was born on the evening of the day of the
assassination of the martyr Mohamad Brahmi on 25 July 2013.
The front agreed on some tasks, primarily is the dissolution of
the National Constituent Assembly, toppling the government
and forming a non-partisan salvation government. Of the front
constituency is the Union for Tunisia coalition, led by the Nidaa
Tunis party, and some of the parties of the Popular Front.
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unemployed and free health care and education.
This does not imply, however, the availability of the
conditions for success in the near future; what has
happened in Tunisia is a long-term revolutionary
process which may need more than a decade to be
safely achieved.
The Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung is an independent institute
for political education, affiliated with the German Left. Our
office in Tunis works with organisations and individuals in
North Africa with regards to socio-economic development
without oppression and foreign domination. In this respect,
analyzing the effects of European politics with regards to
North Africa is a focus. Another one is dialogue between
societal groups working on social justice in North Africa and
Germany/Europe for fostering sovereign, democratic
development for all.
In this respect, we irregularly publish short analyses and
opinions about relevant issues. These don’t necessarily
represent positions of the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, but
should be viewed as input into local, regional or
international debates.
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung
North Africa Regional Office
23 Avenue Jughurta,
Tunis 1082, Tunisia.
[email protected]
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