C l i e n t e l i s m and Careerism i n I r i s h Local
G o v e r n m e n t : The Persecution of Civil Servants
Revisited
C.A. C O L L I N S
University of
Liverpool
Abstract: The relationship between elected politicians, local civil servants and the public has been a
standard topic of Irish political science for decades. The usual characterisation of the relationship
between the voter and the politician as being clientelistic is not questioned, but allegations that the
civil servants are also involved in a clientelist network are challenged. Local bureaucrats are recruited
in an apolitical manner and have career paths that render them independent of the classic local pressures.
T
he clientelist m o d e l has dominated the study o f local politics i n Ireland;
it has focused a great deal o f a t t e n t i o n on the nature o f electoral com­
p e t i t i o n . The research o f Carty, Bax, Sacks and others demonstrates that
elected politicians i n Ireland generally make themselves available to individual
electors t o facilitate dealings w i t h the state bureaucracy, particularly at local
government level. I n presenting research evidence and revised models these
authors have extended the view set out i n Chubb's classic article " G o i n g
A b o u t Persecuting Civil Servants" b u t retaining his p r i m a r y focus on elected
politicians (Carty, 1 9 8 1 ; Bax, 1972; Sacks, 1976 and Chubb 1963). This
paper concerns itself w i t h the adequacy o f the clientelist m o d e l i n explaining
the behaviour o f bureaucrats i n Ireland. The model supplies a more satisfac­
t o r y understanding o f the role o f politicans than i t does o f officials. The
paper pays particular a t t e n t i o n t o the effect o f the m e t h o d o f bureaucratic
recruitment and career advancement at a local govenment level i n order t o
demonstrate h o w insulated bureaucrats are f r o m clientelist pressures. The
c o u n t y / c i t y manager's path to the t o p j o b is used to explain the relation­
ship between these senior bureaucrats and clientelist politicians. The t y p i c a l
managerial career w i l l be shown t o involve peer group dominated p r o m o t i o n ,
a stress o n geographic m o b i l i t y , universalism and economic development as
a policy p r i o r i t y . The managers are, however, presented as a particular case
of a more general pattern o f Irish public servant/politician relations.
The most explicit example o f the use of a clientelist m o d e l t o explain
bureaucratic behaviour is f o u n d i n Bax. He claims to demonstrate that l o c a l '
and central politicians have penetrated the process o f bureaucratic appoint­
m e n t at the local level, and used their advantage t o c o n t r o l n o t only jobs b u t
also local policy decisions. B y , i n effect, helping or hindering the careers o f
bureaucrats the more successful politicians ensure that their clients' interests
are protected (Bax, 1972, p . 76). The evidence that Bax advances is far f r o m
conclusive and is vigorously disputed by bureaucrats. Nevertheless, there
are grounds for believing t h a t many Irish people have a l o w o p i n i o n of the
p r o b i t y and n e u t r a l i t y o f public officials. Barrington (1980, p . 187) refers
to some studies w h i c h suggest
. . . that, i n relation t o administrators, this distrust runs very deep
indeed. The extraordinary degree o f recourse i n this c o u n t r y t o public
representatives, and the extent o f their "clinics", suggests that even i n
relation to statutory entitlements, people believe that they w i l l n o t be
treated fairly by public officials. There seems t o be a widespread b u t
w h o l l y u n f o u n d e d belief that most things can b e - " f i x e d " i f only one
gets a w o r d i n the right ear.
Higgins, drawing on research in a different part o f Ireland than Bax, also
uses a clientelist model to explain "the part played . . . b y the local state
executive". He suggests less direct and coercive relations.
C o u n t y Managers c o u l d wreck the operation o f such clientelist practices
. . . W h y do they n o t do so? The answer lies, i n a d d i t i o n to bureaucratic
inertia, i n the quid pro quo of the council meeting. Councillors c o u l d ,
i f they wished, insist on a measure of accountability and i n f o r m a t i o n
that could make life difficult or at least tedious for the Manager. This
does n o t happen. The long-established principle . . . is that members
co-operate w i t h formal nods i n the direction o f accountability b y way
of i n f o r m a t i o n , and the Manager i n t u r n consults and communicates
i n a way that makes a clientelist system possible, that leaves its pro­
cedures intact (Higgins, 1982, p . 124).
Despite his use of the clientelist model, Higgins suggests that politicians
"rarely objectively influence a decision. They create the illusion o f assistance
however" (ibid., p. 12). K o m i t o w r i t i n g about planning decisions i n D u b l i n
describes the vulnerability o f councillors to the pressures o f electoral survival.
I n his study politicians clearly influence decisions. The councillor is depen­
dent o n his clients rather than the c o m m u n i t y i n general.
. . . the p o l i t i c i a n benefits b y listening t o the individual, w h o w i l l
remember the favour and w h o w i l l be i n a position to r e t u r n i t later,
and n o t the group, w h i c h m i g h t well forget (or n o t f i n d o u t about) the
politician's actions. I n the light o f this, he w i l l inevitably tend t o l o o k
after the interests o f the few, and neglect the interests of the many
( K o m i t o , 1983a, p . 298).
Officials do n o t disturb the relationship between clients and politicians
according t o K o m i t o because " . . . lack o f public knowledge suits officials
as m u c h as councillors (ibid., p . 299). Elsewhere, K o m i t o fits bureaucrats
more squarely i n t o the clientelist m o d e l .
Brokerage politics provides positive benefits for civil servants. Politicians
become useful protectors; although administrators are vulnerable to
politicians, they are also protected f r o m the p u b l i c . Citizens' displeasure
can o n l y harm civil servants i f i t translates i n t o politicians' displeasure
( K o m i t o , 1983b, p. 14).
Carty, whose p r i m a r y focus is the party system, concludes that " . . . clientelist
a u t h o r i t y patterns thrive i n Irish politics because they are congruent w i t h
the norms and traditions that permeate the society." He sees civil servants as
f i x i n g "the tone and substance o f . . . public p o l i c y . . . reinforcing the
isolation o f most politicians from the policy-making and governing p r o ­
cesses" (Carty, 1 9 8 1 , p p . 141-142). Thus i t can be seen t h a t various writers
have highlighted links between the bureaucrats and the clientelist system,
t h o u g h most agree o n the partisan neutrality o f public officials.
To date the explanations offered for Irish clientelism have drawn atten­
t i o n to the perceptions o f peasant societies, the high level o f partisanship
amongst the electorate, high party discipline i n the legislature and the
supposed dominance o f rural values i n urban areas. A great deal o f attention
has been given to modernisation theory, "the periphery dominated centre"
and, above all, transactionalism. I n a d d i t i o n , some theorists have explored
the usefulness o f the "capitalist underdevelopment" arguments (O'Connell,
1982) and the corporatist m o d e l (Chubb, 1982). V e r y l i t t l e research, how­
ever, has been conducted o n the interests or workings o f the bureaucracy
itself. Politicians are shown t o be busy b u t very l i t t l e is k n o w n about the
volume and content o f the bureaucracy's business. More i m p o r t a n t l y the
p o l i c y concerns o f even the most senior public officials are n o t k n o w n .
Public p o l i c y i n Ireland is implemented b y career bureaucrats w h o ,
together w i t h a small sub-set o f politicians (mostly i n the Cabinet) are also
responsible for its f o r m u l a t i o n . The Irish bureaucracy, while open t o criticisms
about its receptiveness t o fresh ideas, is, i n Barrington's words, " l o y a l ,
diligent, intelligent, austere and honest (1980, p . 31). Nowhere is the nature
of the Irish public service more aptly demonstrated than i n relation t o the
recruitment o f the key local bureaucrat, the c i t y / c o u n t y manager. His con­
t r o l o f local government administration is a crucial element i n the politicians'
brokerage n e t w o r k s , yet his position depends only very indirectly on p o l i ­
ticians. I n c o m m o n w i t h the central government civil servant, the Irish
c i t y / c o u n t y manager operates a policy-making system effectively removed
f r o m the clientelist activities o f the majority o f politicians.
I t is i m p o r t a n t for the argument developed i n this article to disaggregate
the n o t i o n o f p o l i c y .
Politicians are political entrepreneurs: they operate w i t h i n institutionally
defined systems — electoral markets — e x p l o i t i n g the opportunities
they f i n d , creating new ones wherever possible. I n the Irish case the
p r o p o r t i o n a l electoral system based o n the single transferable vote
rewards those politicians best able to integrate and e x p l o i t the forces
of partisanship and transactionalism (Garvin, 1977, p . 184).
For bureaucrats, particularly managers, policy is n o t a series o f transactions.
Rather i t is development planning, infrastructural development, housing
targets and the like. There are few rewards for the politician i n competing
w i t h the manager for c o n t r o l over most areas o f policy. N o r do the public
p u t pressure o n councillors to fight o n a broad p o l i c y f r o n t . Pressure group
activity at a local government level is very l i m i t e d , particularly outside
D u b l i n . The councillor's interests are i n the specifics o f policy implemen­
t a t i o n and his time perspective is necessarily short. The politicians are
circumscribed by a t t e n t i o n to the local and particular while the official is
p r i m a r i l y attentive t o the general.
The Irish public service has experienced an unusually high level o f stress
i n recent years. A n embargo o n n e w appointments and an erosion o f its
remuneration i n relation t o other groups has been augmented by a barrage o f
criticism f r o m ministers and academics.
As the Irish Civil Service grew . . . i n the 1960's and 1970's i t became
less rather than more flexible . . . administrative rigidity is n o w damag­
ing decision m a k i n g . . . [ w h i c h is] paralysed by institutional sclerosis
(Lee, 1985).
Morale i n the civil service was so l o w and the level o f criticism so high that
i n May 1984 the Department o f the Public Service launched an advertising
campaign t o improve the bureaucracy's image. I n the case o f local, authorities
the fiscal problems o f the central government, plus the abolition o f indepen­
dent local t a x a t i o n , p u t city and c o u n t y managers i n the front line i n the
battle to collect charges for local services. The managers have, however, been
spared direct criticism as to their professional competence; n o t so senior civil
servants. Central to this negative comment has been the assertion that seniority
rather than competence was the m a i n factor i n a civil service career. As Lee
puts i t , the
slow process o f advancement tended t o leave u l t i m a t e l y as survivors
men o f considerable natural a b i l i t y , extensive procedural experience,
ingrained caution, narrowness o f perspective and considerably m u t e d
a m b i t i o n to get things done. The civil service i n general developed
strong, narrow, negative minds.
F u r t h e r , some politicians have questioned the " n e u t r a l i t y " o f their civil
servants. As a former Secretary o f the Department o f Finance observed,
Too o f t e n the impression is given that i t is necessary for Ministers to
appoint outside advisers because they cannot " r e l y " o n the l o y a l t y o f
the civil service. . . . Sometimes accusations o f inefficiency are coupled
w i t h doubts regarding the l o y a l t y o f the civil service as grounds for the
appointments o f advisers (Murray, 1982, p . 58).
Such developments are n o t peculiar to Ireland; the n o t i o n o f the neutral
bureaucrat is being challenged i n many countries where i t once seemed
axiomatic. As a British academic recently p u t i t ,
This n o t i o n seems t o be a w o r m i n the centre o f the rose. . . . The model
that is set up is o f a profession that is n o t so m u c h neutral as amoral.
A n d w h y that should be t h o u g h t a desirable t h i n g I have never under­
stood (Ridley, 1985).
Public servants are increasingly recognised as p o l i t i c a l actors whose attitudes
to public p o l i c y reflect their o w n social, educational and w o r k experiences.
I f " a d m i n i s t r a t i o n " were a purely technical function o f government then
there w o u l d be no reason to note the backgrounds, sex or age o f bureau­
crats. I n c o m m o n w i t h other " p u b l i c servants" i n all countries, however,
Irish local government officers do effectively contribute to the making o f
p o l i c y . The more senior they are the more significant those p o l i c y areas are
l i k e l y t o be. Thus m u c h academic a t t e n t i o n i n many countries has been
concentrated u p o n the social backgrounds o f bureaucrats t o help explain the
values they bring t o the policy process. I t is n o t sufficient, however, to
k n o w the characteristics o f entrants to the public service. I t is i m p o r t a n t ,
also t o examine the process o f advancement. I n Irish local government, the
manager is clearly the pre-eminent bureaucrat so his career is an i m p o r t a n t
aspect o f p o l i c y studies.
Public service r e c r u i t m e n t i n Ireland is conducted o n the m e r i t principle,
the central tenet o f w h i c h is that persons selected for posts have the requisite
skill and knowledge. This principle was established under British rule and n o t
challenged subsequently.
The passing o f the State services i n t o the c o n t r o l o f a native Govern­
ment, however revolutionary i t may have been as a step i n the political
development o f the n a t i o n entails, broadly speaking, no immediate
disturbance o f any fundamental k i n d i n the daily w o r k o f the average
civil servant. Under changed masters the same main tasks o f adminis­
t r a t i o n continue to be performed b y the same staffs o n the same general
lines o f organization and procedure (Brennan Report, 1936, para. 8).
After Independence the new government t o o k a series o f measures to re­
assert central a u t h o r i t y i n areas o f local government including recruitment. A
central recruitment agency, the Local A p p o i n t m e n t s Commission ( L A C ) , i n
effect, removes any local discretion i n the hiring and firing o f officials. The
L A C was a major departure f r o m British practice whereby each local a u t h o r i t y
was responsible for its o w n staff. Irish local government officers do n o t
depend o n councillors for appointment or p r o m o t i o n . There is no p o i n t i n
the career o f an official at w h i c h politicians are required to give their views.
A t the most j u n i o r level appointments are made f r o m a locally recruited
panel on the basis o f the leaving certificate examination points system,
subject to medical and school references and a brief interview w i t h a senior
officer. Above staff officer grades the system is similar to civil sendee recruit­
m e n t w i t h commissioners w h o are
expected to take their decisions on the basis o f the law and the facts,
and they are n o t expected to — and indeed do n o t — bend t o represen­
tations f r o m p u b l i c representatives, including ministers (Barrington,
1980, p . 3 4 ) .
The mechanics o f the system were established i n the 1920s and have changed
o n l y i n relatively m i n o r ways since.
. . . the Civil Service Commissioners have perfected i n the course o f years
a regular procedure by means o f selection boards. This procedure has
n o w come t o be o f great importance and has enabled a great number o f
posts t o be filled i n a satisfactory manner w h i c h i n former times were
filled b y the exercise o f patronage. . . . The details o f this system or
procedure appear to have been carefully elaborated and they have been
enforced w i t h a strictness which has c o n t r i b u t e d towards establishing
general confidence i n the selection boards (Brennan Report, 1936, para.
93).
Senior local government appointments are made using the same means
administered b y the L A C . The L A C goes further than most o f its foreign
counterparts i n that i t does n o t send the local a u t h o r i t y w i t h a vacancy a
short-list b u t recommends only one. The local politicians, therefore, have
no influence over the selection o f senior local bureaucrats. The centralised
a u t h o r i t y o f the L A C was a direct response o n the part o f the immediate
post-Independence regime to the localism, partiality and susceptibility t o
influence o f local elected representatives. I t continues to insulate the system
of local appointments from the elements o f incivisme, parochialism, antiintellectualism and sectarianism i n Irish p o l i t i c a l culture. Early Irish govern­
ments, especially the first Fianna Fail administration, were naturally more
concerned about the p o l i t i c a l implications o f public service r e c r u i t m e n t than
has subsequently been the case. Nevertheless, even i n 1932, Fianna Fail's
direct political interference i n the L A C was confined to changing the commisioners:
What is almost surprising is the apparently relative absence o f favouritism
and c o r r u p t i o n o n a large scale, given the poverty and culture o f the
society; w h a t is o d d i n Ireland is t h a t the majority o f civil service posts
are filled b y m e r i t recruitment, b y impersonal, i f perhaps imperfect,
processes o f examination and interview (Garvin, 1 9 8 1 , p . 199).
Today the appointments commissions are an autonomous j o i n t bureaucracy
insulated even f r o m direct ministerial c o n t r o l .
A major theme i n the academic discussion o f recruitment is the question
of equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y and representativeness. There has been m u c h
debate about whether bureaucracy should m i r r o r the characteristics o f the
p o p u l a t i o n i t administers. Some scholars have advocated the establishment
of a bureaucracy similar i n social and economic characteristics to the people
w i t h w h o m they w i l l be w o r k i n g . The arguments are that narrow recruitment
f r o m any social stratum w i l l tend to create undesirable bias, and, that bureau­
cratic personnel policy should be used to alter the social and economic
structure o f the society. I n Ireland the only recent debate o n representative­
ness has concerned w o m e n . Since J u l y 1977, recruitment on a sex basis has
been illegal. Public service grades formerly confined t o men or w o m e n were
opened to b o t h sexes. I r o n i c a l l y , as far as the public service is concerned the
result has been that men have taken more posts previously confined to
w o m e n (Meehan, 1983, p . 5). I n local government the highest post a w o m a n
has held has been a c i t y / c o u n t y librarian; i n the civil service o n l y 2.5 per
cent o f posts at principal level or above are held b y w o m e n . I t is too early to
assess the impact o f the ending o f formal sex discrimination o n senior posts
though the signs are n o t entirely favourable. Religion has n o t been a significant
element i n p u b l i c service recruitment since Independence despite the DunbarHarrison controversy o f 1 9 3 1 .
Having a m e r i t appointment system, w i t h no onerous modifications to
ensure p o l i t i c a l acceptability or representativeness, narrows the debate o n
public service recruitment to the specifics o f qualifications and training. I n
recent years there has been some criticism that public service entry pro­
cedures and training have insulated Irish bureaucrats f r o m developments i n
private organisations. A t a central government level, the "British-style"
career structure gives l i t t l e incentive for movement between the public and
private sectors. Recent government attempts to encourage lateral movement
have been largely unsuccessful. For senior local government posts, criteria
for senior appointments have been narrowed i n a way that probably deters
outsiders f r o m applying. There is a strong strand o f thought i n b o t h the Irish
civil and local government services to the effect that their values and norms
are distinct f r o m those o f private industry.
. . . i n the rather underdeveloped economy o f the post-independence
p e r i o d . . . there was so l i t t l e rivalry f r o m the private sector and because
u n d e r e m p l o y m e n t was chronic, the public service seems also to have
been able to recruit a large group o f highly able men. Because o f its
p o l i t i c a l indispensability, the civil service was able to retain its corporate
integrity and i d e n t i t y . . . . The result o f this situation was the creation
of an i n f o r m a l system o f demarcation o f areas i n w h i c h merit recruit­
m e n t was to operate from areas where patronage considerations were
to be paramount; an "executive r e d o u b t " , independent o f the party
machine, survived and even prospered, relying on its o w n indispensability
and o n its o w n very considerable sense o f corporate responsibility and
self-interest (Garvin, 1977, p. 206).
The local a u t h o r i t y service does n o t w h o l l y share i n the self-assurance o f
the civil service. I t does n o t have the p r o t e c t i o n o f a n o n y m i t y , the doctrine
of ministerial responsibility or the centrality o f the larger bureaucracy. The
public service as a whole has undergone an i m p o r t a n t change, however, i n
that i t no longer holds the same attraction for able j o b seekers. A public
service post is less often the first choice o f bright school leavers. There has
been an expansion i n the availability o f w h i t e collar e m p l o y m e n t and a
change i n public attitudes about state e m p l o y m e n t . I n a d d i t i o n , the public
service has come t o reinforce its o w n self image i n the pattern o f p r o m o t i o n s
w h i c h has led to an ambivalence cibout its o w n comparative w o r t h . This is
well illustrated i n the case o f c o u n t y managers.
The 18 c o u n t y managers w h o first t o o k up office as a result o f the 1940
A c t , w h i c h setup the managerial system n a t i o n a l l y , were m o s t l y local govern­
ment personnel already. Only five, however, had come through the ranks,
i.e., entered the local service as clerical officers. The remaining 13 had entered
local government at relatively high levels after other careers. I t is clear that
these earliest managers were f r o m a relatively wide background f r o m w i t h i n
the lower and clerical professions. The educational background o f the early
appointees was also broad. O f the first 18 managers, four had finished their
education at a national school, while five had gained a third-level education.
Except for t w o civil servants w h o entered the local service as managers, all
the others previously held posts w i t h i n the scope o f L A C a p p o i n t m e n t .
Clearly, the early L A C selection boards t o o k a flexible approach t o the
suitability o f candidates.
When i n 1926 the Government i n t r o d u c e d the Local A u t h o r i t i e s (Officers
and Employees) B i l l , L i m e r i c k C o u n t y Council passed a resolution express­
ing alarm at the onset o f a new bureaucracy. The passing o f the b i l l w o u l d
lead t o a local government service dominated b y Dubliners, w h o c o u l d study
while resident at home. The sons and daughters o f farmers, labourers and
others f r o m the provinces w o u l d be unable t o get appointments i n the service
of their o w n counties. The L i m e r i c k councillors need n o t have w o r r i e d . By
1940 local government was disproportionately manned b y provincials. Most
of the 16 first managers o n w h o m data are available came f r o m counties
far from D u b l i n . I n this respect managerial r e c r u i t m e n t has n o t changed;
relatively few c o u n t y managers are f r o m D u b l i n .
The majority o f public servants i n post-independence Ireland had trans­
ferred directly f r o m the British administration. A t a central government
level, the w o r k i n g practices and career structures o f civil servants are largely
explained b y this smooth transfer. Local government owes less t o the British
because the system was less developed at the t i m e o f independence. The
nationalist campaign had been most disruptive at the municipal level and
standards o f administrative practice had n o t been established as f i r m l y as i n
the civil service. While civil servants l o o k e d to the British pattern i n recruit­
m e n t and advancement, there was no such c o n t i n u i t y i n local government.
The commissioners and the few pre-1942 city managers established the
pattern o f unequivocal leadership b y a single administrator whose background
did n o t reflect the claims t o p r i m a c y o f any academic discipline or profession.
Further, i n the early years, an apprenticeship i n local government was n o t
t h o u g h t necessary. The first managers included a teacher, a journalist, a
grocer and several other non-bureaucrats.
Since 1942, there has been a gradual decrease i n the "openness" o f com­
p e t i t i o n for managerial vacancies. Certain experiences, largely confined t o
administration w i t h i n local government, have been identified as central to
management. Managers have generally spent all their w o r k i n g lives i n local
government during w h i c h t i m e they have acquired accounting and adminis­
trative qualification, through part-time study. By 1983, 84 per cent o f
managers had come up t h r o u g h the administrative ranks. Interview boards,
dominated b y bureaucrats and excluding elected politicians, have clearly
expressed a preference for candidates w i t h substantial local government
backgrounds. I t is n o t unfair to suggest t h a t the manager o n any interview
board for the t o p local government j o b w i l l f i n d his judgement given par­
ticular weight. A m o n g the administrative experience most highly valued
b y managers is that o f t o w n clerk. This post affords a broad range o f adminis­
trative duties, clear personal responsibilities and exposure t o the public,
press and politicians. By 1980 almost a half o f managers had previously been
t o w n clerks.
The Irish local and civil services draw from the same social classes and
there is no clear difference in class terms between the lower and upper
ranks o f either. The barriers to entry i n t o the public service reflect social
position only as mediated through educational achievement. There is no
t r a d i t i o n , as i n Britain for example, o f social exclusivity i n the higher public
service. I n practice, the traditional pattern o f non-graduate entry and the
importance attached to the Irish language has m i l i t a t e d against the upper
socio-economic stratum, w h i c h was disproportionately Protestant and against
those Catholics w h o attended prestigious boading schools at w h i c h Irish was
n o t taught. The bureaucracy does, however, reflect
. . . fairly accurately the system o f social stratification i n the c o u n t r y .
. . . L i k e most immediately post-revolutionary societies, Ireland was left
i n the 1920s and 1930s w i t h something o f a class vacuum. Independence
marked the end o f the dominance o f the Anglo-Irish "establishment"
and this group had no immediate successor. The higher bureaucracy
gradually ceased to be the preserve o f an elite w i t h most senior officials
coming f r o m the lower-middle class. . . . T o p civil service jobs are n o t
only open to people recruited at the secondary school level, b u t are
largely filled b y them (Pyne, 1974, p . 26).
As w i t h senior civil servants, the managers predominantly entered public
service directly f r o m secondary school. A substantial m i n o r i t y o f 1983
incumbents attended schools r u n b y the Christian Brothers. Other managers
attended a variety o f diocesan and religious order secondary schools. The
Christian Brothers' schooling has n o t resulted, however, i n "old-school t i e "
t r a d i t i o n i n the public service. Other networks may well have an indirect
bearing o n local government appointments b u t these are generally associated
w i t h w o r k experience. I t is possible to detect, for example, a pattern i n the
former authorities o f current incumbents. Clearly i t is an asset t o have been
associated w i t h a highly regarded administration or project.
A significant number o f today's managers w h o were i n j u n i o r positions i n
the late 1960s became involved in planning. Some w o r k e d closely w i t h
planning consultants, others serviced the Regional Development Organisations,
the statutory co-ordinating bodies. The development responsibilities o f
local authorities represent an i m p o r t a n t area o f initiative and a u t o n o m y for
managers. A majority o f managers spend a large p r o p o r t i o n o f their t i m e o n
economic development. The doctrine o f ultra vires is a restriction b u t i n this
function more than most, managers take a liberal view o f their powers and
responsibilities under the legislation. Managers l o o k for their standing brief
to the m a x i m issued by Sean Lemass i n 1963 that local authorities should
become "development corporations". The Local Government (Planning and
Development) A c t , 1963 gave local authorities new powers for the provision
and management o f industrial sites, buildings and services. As "development
corporations", they were responsible for the development o f their areas and
the provision o f the necessary infrastructure. The central requirement o f the
A c t was the preparation o f development plans t o be reviewed every 5 years.
The preparation o f plans forces managers to make a comprehensive assessment
of their areas and gives them a far different o u t l o o k f r o m their councillors.
A n i m p o r t a n t difference between the upper echelons o f the civil service
and the managers is the almost universal need for aspirants t o the t o p local
government posts t o be geographically m o b i l e . Once a person has accepted a
post i n the civil service, he is u n l i k e l y t o have to live outside D u b l i n , especi­
ally w h e n i n the higher grades. By contrast, advancement i n local government
usually necessitates a change o f a u t h o r i t y . Outside D u b l i n , only one i n c u m ­
bent manager has served the same a u t h o r i t y t h r o u g h o u t his career. A m o n g
the current managers, including those w h o entered the service at a senior
level, an average o f 4 separate changes o f a u t h o r i t y have been made o n the
way t o their first managerial post. Aspirant managers have t o be prepared t o
move t o any part o f the c o u n t r y .
1
The emphasis o n m o b i l i t y t h r o u g h o u t the administrators' careers, together
w i t h their acknowledged "professional" skills, distances the manager f r o m
b o t h his councillors and the majority o f local residents. Particularly i n the
provinces the manager is an i m p o r t a n t local figure b u t , while he may attend
many local events he may feel reluctant t o participate i n local society.
Several authors i n other countries, n o t a b l y Britain and France, have n o t e d
the emergence o f a new middle-class w i t h o u t strong attachment to the area
i n w h i c h they live. Often these people are identified as moving upwards
socially, such as Gouldner's "spiralists", or as having distinctly non-local
values, such as Merton's (1957, pp. 387-420) "cosmopolitans". Birch, i n
his study o f an English provincial t o w n , n o t e d
. . . the majority o f the managers, scientists, lawyers, clergymen, sur­
geons, and senior public officials i n a t o w n are likely t o be immigrants
rather than natives (Birch, 1959, p . 37).
I t is unclear whether i n Ireland, outside D u b l i n and Cork, a similar picture
1. In the provicincial counties, this has happened only once before. Mr T . Brophy, a former manager,
spent all his career in Tipperary North Riding.
w o u l d emerge. The level o f professional white-collar e m p l o y m e n t i n the
provinces is still l o w . I t has, however, increased as the state sector has
expanded and as m u l t i - n a t i o n a l or nation-wide enterprises have replaced
locally-based firms, such as family businesses. Over a t h i r d o f office workers
reside outside their native counties (Geary and Hughes, 1970). Whatever
the size o f this " n o n - l o c a l " elite group, the managers are clearly part o f i t ,
as are their senior colleagues i n the public service. The importance o f this
non-localist o u t l o o k in relation to the manager/councillor relationship is
that i t underlines their different perceptions o f policy priorities. For managers,
the persistence o f geographic m o b i l i t y as a feature o f their careers extends
i n t o middle age. The manager is effectively part o f a national local service;
he does n o t come f r o m the locality he serves.
I n 1 9 7 1 , McKinsey n o t e d t h a t :
2
While currently i t is theoretically possible for engineers to become
County Managers, they have had difficulty i n convincing the Local
A p p o i n t m e n t s Commission that they have the required administrative
experience. This has c o n t r i b u t e d to the current very real feeling o f
grievance and injustice among engineering staff (McKinsey, 1 9 7 1 , p . 3 7 ) .
Since that t i m e , seven engineers have been appointed t o manager and assis­
tant manager posts. Nevertheless, several observers have reasoned that,
given the high technical content o f local services, the salary differentials, the
contraction i n private sector opportunities during a recession and the example
of the current engineering-qualified incumbents — more engineers w o u l d be
expected i n management posts. Irish engineers do i n fact deal w i t h politicians
directly b o t h in their offices and while visiting sites. They are, however,
reticent about such contacts. Further, some managers discourage direct
engineer/councillor contact, preferring members to use the administrative
channel. O n the w h o l e , engineers i n private are cynical and disparaging about
politicians and their reticence about management may reflect this o u t l o o k .
I n a d d i t i o n , there is a reluctance t o leave "the profession". The overall
t r e n d that emerges f r o m this review o f the career patterns o f managers is
o f an occupation characterised b y a narrowing field o f appointment. The
"concession" made t o engineers is highly qualified and asks the aspirant
technologist to identify closely w i t h the established group. The "generalist"
administrator is increasingly "specialist" in his self-image.
CONCLUSIONS
A paradox arises f r o m the observations above i n the light o f the dominant
2. The average age of managers in 1982 was 5 1; the average age on entry to the local service was 21.
clientelist m o d e l o f Irish politics. The public service, particularly at local
government level, is manned b y career bureaucrats notable for their peri­
patetic b u t n a r r o w administrative careers, social m o b i l i t y and partisan
n e u t r a l i t y . This contrasts w i t h the evidence o f constant wheeler-dealing b y
politicians emeshed i n particularistic networks o f transactions involving
frequent interventions w i t h the bureaucracy. B o t h managers and councillors
have p o l i c y and administrative interests b u t i n largely non-competitive areas.
The divergence o f interests between official and p o l i t i c i a n arises f r o m differing
perspectives established b y b o t h consideration o f time-scale and socialisation.
The stability o f their relationship is reinforced b y the temporal fragmen­
t a t i o n o f the f o r m a l policy-making process, and b y the non-competing
resources over w h i c h the manager and his councillors seek command.
The effect o f the managers' career pattern is t o make h i m very m u c h a
professional administrator w i t h loyalties t o the local government service
generally rather than t o any one locality. The Irish p o l i t i c i a n , o n the other
hand, is t i e d b y the localist demands o f his clientele. The ideological simi­
larities o f the Irish parties, their lack o f a social base and their strict discipline
precludes the establishment o f an independent bloc o f support based o n a
distinctive p o l i c y stance. The administrator, on the other hand, is secure i n
his tenure b u t ambitious. A n i m p o r t a n t c r i t e r i o n o f success is peer group
approval. I f he keeps his council members content (i.e., supplied w i t h
sufficient occasions o f apparent power) and makes a c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the
development o f his area, he w i l l be judged a "success". Such a judgement,
however, is n o t dependent o n the short-term perspective forced o n politicians
i n a clientelist system. The manager w i l l set as his target the completion of,
for example, a housing project, factory complex or social amenity. Such
achievements take time and the benefits are diffuse. Thus, the major p o l i c y
interests o f the manager and his council are l i k e l y t o be divergent. More
specifically, " p o l i c y " for the politician is a very different phenomenon than
i t is for the bureaucrat.
As long as the manager is neutral i n the rivalry between his councillors,
they w i l l n o r m a l l y be content t o leave h i m t o formulate p o l i c y i n the m e d i u m
and long t e r m . His priorities are u n l i k e l y to be seriously compromised b y
marginal adjustments i n the light o f representations o n behalf o f individuals.
I f his policies were threatened he w o u l d refuse to allow exceptions confident
i n the knowledge that his consistent refusal w i l l n o t penalise individual
politicians. While Higgins is right t o suggest that managers facilitate coun­
cillors for the sake o f an easy life, there is n o t h i n g i n the career interests o f
public officials that make t h e m susceptible t o clientelist pressures.
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