Exam Spring 2010, 10 ECTS
The Challenges of
European Enlargement
Implications for the political system of the EU
Henrik Larsen as Jean Monnet Lecturer
Jean Monnet Lectures: The politics of the European Union
Central structures and processes of the EU
Table of contents
1. Introduction .........................................................................................................
1
2. Causes .................................................................................................................
2
3. Functioning .........................................................................................................
4
4. Consequences ...................................................................................................... 6
5. Theoretical discussion ......................................................................................... 9
6. Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 14
7. Literature list .......................................................................................................
15
Introduction
Since its very beginning, the founders of the European Communities had the
dream that their project will become a European-wide block. Thanks to Enlargement, a
Union which started with Six Founding Members expanded to involve 27. Even today,
Enlargement Policy is not by any means finished. It continues to be on the very top of
the EU agenda, in spite of tiredness and the many challenges it poses for the common
identity and the future development of the European Union. Enlargement is vital to
understand both the functioning of the EU and the process of integration. And that is
because European leaders have always been confronted with a widening vs. deepening
dilemma (Avery, 2008: 180).
The topic has generated a mass of academic debate between EU experts
departing from different theoretical approaches. Before the end of Cold War and the
division of Europe, the topic was largely neglected. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier
were one of the first to analyze it from a theoretical perspective as late as 2002 (Bache
& George, 2006: 538) and remain two of the most acknowledged voices within the field
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005) (Sedelmeier, 2005a,b). Sjursen and Smith have
written about the causes of Enlargement Policy (Sjursen & Smith, 2004). Nugent has
edited a complete study of Enlargement as seen from different theoretical approaches
(Nugent: 2004) (Phinnemore, 2004). Bache, George, Avery and Phinnemore have
published some of the most recent studies (Avery, 2008) (Bache, George, 2006)
(Phinnemore, 2010). Most of these authors take the case of Eastern Enlargement.
Finally, Hix and Moravcsik provide the main theoretical tools (Hix, 2005) (Moravcsik,
1993) (Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2005) (Moravcsik, 2006). I refer to all of these authors
and more throughout the paper.
The topic will be investigated from the point of view of the implications that
Enlargement has for the political system of the European Union. In order to answer this
research question, an analysis of Enlargement Policy is made, based on both empirical
and theoretical information, with especial focus on the last Great Enlargement.
Theoretically, the analysis uses a political system approach –mainly represented by
Simon Hix–. This theory (though not the only one) provides a comprehensible
explanation of the practical functioning of the EU as a polity and of all its component
actors. The analysis is structured in three parts. The first one is focused on the causes,
the main driving factors behind Enlargement. It shows which actors within the EU
participate in the policy-making of that area, and who is interested in or benefited from
it. The second part involves the functioning of the policy, and is focused on the
accession negotiations process and how EU actors are engaged on them. In the third
part, the analysis turns to the consequences and challenges that Enlargement poses to
the policy-making procedures and the institutional reforms that have been made to cope
with them. Then follows a theoretical discussion based on the ability of a political
system approach to answer the question of the paper, in contrast to a completely
opposite paradigm: liberal intergovernmentalism. Before concluding, there will be room
for my particular position on the debate, providing the information I have.
Causes
When we talk about European Union Enlargement, we are in fact referring to a
number of policies, as Enlargement comprises many different sectors which are
negotiated separately (Bache & George, 2006: 535). The conditions of the common
market, political representation of new countries, judicial, legal and administrative
matters or involvement in the Common Foreign and Security Policy are only some of
the main examples. Altogether, these issues form the 35 chapters of what is known as
the acquis communitaire, the set of legal norms that are to be compulsory adopted
before joining the EU to avoid a mismatch with existing Member States. Some authors
have even called Enlargement a ‘composite policy’ (Sedelmeier, 2005 a: 402)
(Sedelmeier, 2005 b: 238), while others include it as part of EU Foreign Policy (Sjursen
& Smith, 2004: 126).
What is clear is that, as any other area in the Union, Enlargement has a particular
policy-making system. Many different actors, both institutionalized and noninstitutionalized, participate and defend their interests there. Candidate countries have,
of course, their own interests, although they are shadowed to a large extent by those of
the EU (Sedelmeier, 2005b: 238) and are not the topic of this paper. Among
institutional actors, the European Commission, through the Directorate General for
Enlargement, is the leading voice who pushes for expanding the EU (European
Commission, 2008), even though they know the European Council has the ultimate say,
as both the acceptance of the application and the opening of accession negotiations need
to be approved by unanimity of the Member States. The European Parliament has no
formal powers regarding Enlargement Policy –actually it only approves the Accession
Treaty once it has been ratified by all Member States–. Instead, it uses indirect methods
such as reports, opinions and budgetary control (European Commission, 2007).
The main interest of the EU is to create a peaceful, politically stable and
economically developed neighborhood from which it can benefit. That explains why the
Union’s strategy is to persuade their border countries to take political and economic
reforms and to consolidate political stability, rule of law, democracy, human rights and
a modern and developed free market economy. It is not by any means in the interest of
the EU to “import” conflicts, like ethic disputes, or to be faced with the responsibility of
dealing with them, as it is not institutionally prepared to do so. That is why protection of
ethnic minorities and settling of border disputes were added as accession criteria at
Copenhagen and Helsinki Council meetings respectively (Sjursen & Smith, 2004: 133).
Candidates have to solve these problems on their own –or with the involvement of
international trial courts– before entering the Union. It is worth mentioning that –seen
from a political system approach– while the Union as a whole is always benefitted from
Enlargement, it is not a necessary precondition that all its individual members are
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005: 14).
In order to achieve their goals, EU institutions can make use of an unstable
combination of both strict accession criteria and solid guarantees of prospect
membership (Sjursen & Smith, 2004). Accession is not an end by itself but a mean to
ensure stability in the region. That was the case of Mediterranean countries –Spain,
Portugal and Greece– during their democratic transition period; of Central and Eastern
European Countries during the post-Cold War period, and of Western Balkans after the
ethnic wars during the 90’. The strategy has been mostly successful, especially if we
consider that, only 10 or 15 years ago, there were many doubts about the democratic
future of some Eastern countries like Slovakia or Bulgaria, and even fears regarding
possibilities for a long-term peace in former Yugoslavia (Sjursen & Smith, 2004: 136).
Just a short remark concerning non-institutional actors: the influence of
interest’s groups is diminished because they are only organized by sectoral associations
and that makes their powers diffused as they cannot oppose or promote the accession of
a particular country, but only try to create the best possible solution to safeguard their
interests once the negotiation process has started (Sedelmeier, 2005b: 238). The two
theories have alternative approaches to the topic. Whereas a liberal intergovernmentalist
would focus on the influence of domestic sectoral interest groups at the accession
negotiations (Sedelmeier: 2005b: 253), a more institutionalist view argues that
Enlargement is a policy of general interest, a “high policy” issue, that is kept aside from
private interests influence and discussed in open consultation and with EU institutions
exercising a primary role (Greenwood, 2007: 2, 22).
Functioning
Enlargement is a long and complex process by which EU institutions decide who
and under what conditions has to become a Member of the Union. In fact, it is a process
without a clear starting and ending points, something that goes continuously and
incrementally (Bache & George, 2006: 559) (Nugent, 2004: 1) (Sedelmeier, 2005a:
426). The different actors within the EU have different interests and have developed
distinct roles during the Enlargement process.
Some authors have found a “classical method of Enlargement” in which existing
Member States express their preferences through the European Council; candidates need
to compulsory adopt the entire acquis communitaire in an incremental way, and
negotiations take place with groups of candidates at a time (Sedelmeier, 2005a: 404).
This is true to some extent, although reality is more complex and each Enlargement
round is unique (Nugent, 2004: 42). Officially, the process starts with the acceptance of
the application by the European Council. Then the Commission makes a report in which
it can recommend the immediate opening of negotiations or whether they have to be
delayed until the applicant meets the general criteria. In the first case, the European
Council then gives the country candidate status and sets a date for the opening of
negotiations (Avery, 2008: 186) (Barnes & Barnes, 2010: 423).
Accession negotiations are a good example of how EU actors interact –and even
compete– with each other to achieve their goals. If, as said before, we look upon
Enlargement as a “composite policy” (Sedelmeier, 2005 a: 402) (Sedelmeier, 2005 b:
238) we reach a first possible classification of EU actors, because in a “composite
policy”, macro and micro-issues are dealt by different policy-makers. In this case, the
macro issue is the goal of accession and the political means to reach it. Micro-issues are
more technical and concern many concrete policy areas (Sedelmeier, 2005a: 402). The
first actors are the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the
Commission technical staff which are in charge of day-to-day negotiations. The macro
policy-makers are the Commission –particularly Enlargement Commissioner– and the
Council of Foreign Ministries, who manage the general agenda. Conflict between the
two levels is possible as the former receive many pressures from sectoral interest groups
whereas the latter can have a more long-term vision of the process (Sedelmeier, 2005a:
411).
The second classification of actors is the classical one between supranational and
intergovernmental institutions. Formally speaking, Enlargement Policy is decided by
intergovernmental actors. Nonetheless, thanks to its extraordinary amount of resources
and extra-official role, the European Commission has become the leading actor in the
process. Academics have defined this situation as a paradox in the EU political system
(Avery, 2008: 183) (Barnes & Barnes, 2010: 425) (Beach, 2005: 231). Accession
negotiations start with a screening by the Commission, in cooperation with the
candidate countries, to assess the efforts needed. Daily negotiations are conducted by
the COREPER and the Council of Foreign Ministers (Barnes & Barnes, 2010: 426),
through which the Member States express their national interests. Existing members can
even sponsor their particular candidates –as we saw in the first stages of Eastern
Enlargement (Nugent, 2004: 42) (Beach, 2005: 217) (Sedelmeier, 2005a: 416)– or can
veto others (Barnes & Barnes, 2010: 425). An immediate consequence is that changes
of government in the most powerful European governments –particularly those of
France and Germany– can push for or restrain accession (Bache & George, 2006). In
fact, the longest and by far the most difficult part of the process is the adoption of a
common position by the European Council in all chapters before actual negotiations
start (Nugent, 2004: 61). It is in that sense that Enlargement Policy is
intergovernmental. In spite that negotiations are officially bilateral between the EU and
each single candidate, reality is more complex, as we have negotiations between 15 –or
now 27– States and the candidates. The Commission monitors the process, sends reports
to the European Council and the European Parliament and manages the more technical
matters (Barnes & Barnes, 2010: 425) (Beach, 2005: 231) (Nugent, 2004: 50). More
often than not, its strong role has helped reaching a maximum common denominator
solution, rather than a minimalistic one, to problematic issues. Without its key
determination, negotiations would have been longer and agreements more unsatisfactory
than with only intergovernmental negotiations (Beach, 2005: 244). Finally, the
Parliament only consents by absolute majority once negotiations are concluded and
before the Accession Treaties are ratified (Nugent, 2004: 55). As a supranational
institution, the Parliament has not succeeded in establishing itself as a strong actor, like
the Commission (Beach, 2005: 244).
There is a final debate concerning democratic accountability. As many other EU
policies,
Enlargement
is
led
by
political
elites
–both
supranational
and
intergovernmental– with no clear debate in the public opinion sphere. Even the
democratically elected institution of the Union, the EP, has no say during the policymaking and implementation process. It has even been discussed whether national
referenda should be organized by the existing Members before enlargements take place
(Nugent, 2004: 62) (Barnes & Barnes, 2010: 433). All this leads us to the more general
debate about the democratic legitimacy of the European Union.
Consequences
An enlarged EU brings many challenges, both for the existing Member States
and for the institutional functioning of the Union. Particularly during the last round of
Enlargement, EU policy-makers were concerned that it could lead to a paralysis of the
policy-making procedure (Barnes & Barnes, 2010: 433) (Sedelmeier, 2005a: 426). We
must bear in mind that there were 12 new members, some of them –like Malta, Cyprus,
Estonia or Slovenia– small countries, with very different political systems from those in
Western Europe. The arguments of this chapter are mainly based on the case of this
fourth Enlargement.
There are many consequences for the EU when it decides to enlarge. First of all,
Enlargement affects the internal balance of power. Some experts say the FrancoGerman axis may lose power with each Enlargement and that new members have a
different idea of Europe that does not include “ever closer union” and may jeopardize
further integration. Others argue that the balance of power will not change at all, mainly
because EU has always worked through non-permanent coalitions of Member States,
which are the key of its success (Nugent, 2004: 10).
Secondly, there are institutional implications, even though some authors tend to
emphasize this problem more than others (Bache & George, 2006: 553)
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005: 3) (Sjursen & Smith, 2004: 126). A Commission
of 27 members may be more inefficient. There are strong movements in favor of
reducing the number of Commissioners below the number of Member States,
particularly if further enlargements take place (Phinnemore, 2004: 129). Nevertheless,
this has the opposition of some small members who do not want to lose a national
Commissioner. The Council is obviously affected in the way that bargains between
Member States are to be more complex and often lead to some kind of side-payments.
And the Parliament has an increased number of Members (MEPs) that need a previous
socialization process to their political groups and the functioning methods of the
institution.
The third challenge is about policies. The interests of new members, though not
generalizable at all, are nonetheless different to those of old members. Common
Agricultural Policy, Structural and Cohesion Funds are the most disputed issues because
East European countries all have large and unproductive agricultural sectors and low
level of income compared to the EU average (Bache & George, 2006: 553). This
situation may create tensions about resource allocation and budgetary matters (Barnes &
Barnes, 2010: 434).
The last challenge might not be so obvious but is still important to understand
the whole idea of the EU political system. It is the idea of Europeanization, as defined
by Börzel (2005: 52). Europeanization takes place differently among Member States
(Börzel, 2005: 50), and it seems logical that the new members are Europeanized in a
different way than the rest are.
How have EU policy-makers adapted to all these challenges? Ten years ago,
German Foreign Minister Fischer said in his famous speech at Humbold University:
“Enlargement will render imperative a fundamental reform of the European institutions.
Just what would a European Council with thirty heads of State and government be like?
[...] How can one prevent the EU from becoming utterly intransparent? [...] Question
upon question, but there is a very simple answer: the transition from a union of States to
full parliamentarisation as a European Federation, [...] based on a constituent Treaty.”
(Fischer, 2000) The discourse shows how Enlargement was always a concern for EU
policy-makers because of its implications for the functioning of the EU; and there was
always a need for Treaty reforms that could cope with such pressures. Faced with the
dilemma of deepening vs. widening –or integration vs. enlargement–, policy-makers
tried to finish further Treaties just before new accessions (Nugent, 2004: 63). The
Intergovernmental Conferences that adopted the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties in 1997
and 2001 basically made changes on the most institutional matters such as the number
of Commissioners and MEPs and the extension of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV)
(Sedelmeir, 2005a: 417). The difficulty to reach unanimity made them think in the idea
of a more “flexible integration” and so the Treaties also promoted “enhanced
cooperation” among a group of the most integrationist members. This differentiation, in
somewhat like a two-level EU, is not an obstacle for European integration. On the
contrary, having a group of pioneers can be positive for the whole development of the
Union (Nugent, 2004: 268). Other strategies, such as the Open Method of Coordination,
can increase efficiency in an expanded EU (Phinnemore, 2004: 129). Finally, the
economic issues were solved by a progressive concession of structural and agricultural
funds and transition periods in some aspects of the single market (Nugent, 2004: 10).
Soon raised some voices –particularly among the more integrationist academics–
arguing that these reforms were insufficient and further changes were needed in order to
avoid the Union to collapse in the near future (Nugent, 2004: 66) (Phinnemore, 2010:
39, 43); while the less integrationists advocated the well-functioning of the EU postEnlargement (Avery, 2008: 198). The third and final attempt to create an appropriate
legal context for an enlarged EU came with the Constitutional Treaty and, after its
failure and the subsequent crisis, with the Lisbon Treaty. It is only six months since it
came into force; and it is still too early to say if the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty are
the most appropriate for a Union of 27 members or if further Treaty reforms or a revival
of the Constitutional debate are needed.
There are other challenges that an enlarged EU must confront, for instance the
consequences for the external relations and EU weigh in the world stage, and the
problem of European identity and the idea of Europe (Nugent, 2004: 10). In spite of the
importance of these questions, they lie beyond the reach and the aims of this paper.
By now we have seen how the main factor to explain Enlargement Policy, in
spite of the fact that this policy is intergovernmental in principle, is the decisive role of
the Commission; and how interest groups have a low influence in defining the longterm goals. We have seen that Enlargement takes place in a context of a “classical
method” but in a delicate and complex distribution of functions between EU
institutions. And we have seen how Enlargement has political and institutional
consequences, as well as for the policies and the process of Europeanization; and how
EU policy-makers have tried to solve these challenges through many reforms.
By looking at the previous analysis, we can reach an answer to the initial
research question which I started the paper with. The conclusion of the former ideas is
that Enlargement creates a circular process within the EU political system by which EU
institutions promote a process (Enlargement) which in turn creates demands for further
political and institutional changes to adapt to the new situation. These are the basic
implications that Enlargement has for the political system of the EU.
Theoretical discussion
The whole previous analysis is constructed following the assumption that the EU
is a complete political system and it can be studied on this basis. At this point, it is
necessary to review and discuss the pros and cons of using this kind of theoretical
grounds on the studying of the challenges of Enlargement for the policy-making of the
EU. Political system approaches are based on the following four basic assumptions
developed by Simon Hix and based on the classical definition of a political system of
Gabriel Almond and David Easton. The EU has a set of permanent and interrelated
institutions that create collective norms. European citizens and groups of citizens
influence these decisions. The decisions have an impact on the redistribution of
resources and values within the system. And the outputs of the system create new
demands in a continuous cycle (Hix, 2005: 2).
Studying the EU as a political system has many implications for the results of
the analysis. It means that it can be approached using the classical political science tools
as any other democratic system (Hix, 2005: 1). In our case, Enlargement Policy needs to
be integrated into this system, taking into account all the actors, institutions and
processes that take part in it. It cannot be studied separately, but as a part of a more
complex environment.
The research of this paper has been structured in three parts, to answer three
initial sub-questions. Which are the main factors to explain EU Enlargement Policy?
How does Enlargement Policy take place within the EU political system? And which
consequences does it have for the EU policy-making? As we have seen, the answer to
the first question is to be found in the roles and interaction of the collective institutions
along with demands posed by other actors. For Hix, Member States are not the only
actors to raise demands to the system since, for instance, civil society is also involved in
form of political parties, interest groups and, obviously, direct elections. This is the core
concept that differentiates the EU from international organizations and allows Hix to
argue that it is a political system by itself (Hix, 2005: 3). So the decision to enlarge or
not has the origins in multiple –and often contradictory– interests of myriad of actors,
both institutionalized and not. It is not possible to focus only in one kind of actors –for
instance, only supranational authorities or the Member States, as it is often done– in
order to have a proper explanation. Only the amalgamation of all of them can give us an
idea of the situation.
The second sub-question is particularly relevant to Hix’s point that relations
between the institutions are normalized and standardized. This is particularly true to
understand the process of accessing negotiations, which has been the focus of the
second part of the analysis. Negotiations take place in a highly institutionalized way,
with every actor –whether one takes the classification of Sedelmeier between macro and
micro-level policy-makers (Sedelmeier, 2005a,b) or the more conventional one between
supranational and intergovernmental actors– executing its limited tasks. Even though, in
his classification, Hix recognizes that foreign policies in general are intergovernmental,
with the Council having the initiative and the Commission and Parliament given a more
passive role (Hix, 2005: 8).
The last sub-question, about the consequences of Enlargement, turns to the
hypothesis that outputs from the political system have a large impact on the
redistribution of resources and values. From this departing point, the theory explains the
implications for institutions and policies (resources) and for the balance of power and
Europeanization process (values).
Notwithstanding, political system approaches also left many questions unsolved.
For instance, they do not enter the debate of democratic legitimacy since, for them, the
EU is a pluralistic society in which citizens already have multiple channels to
participate. Most important, they do not provide a comprehensible explanation to the
question: Why the Union decides to expand? Moreover, its focus on the European
structures rather than processes may create some theoretical limits. This is why the
arguments of liberal intergovernmentalism may provide a complementary explanation.
Liberal intergovernmentalism is, in turn, constructed of three theses: a rational
view
of
the
State,
liberal
theory
of
national
preference
formation
and
intergovernmentalist theory of interstate negotiations (Moravcsik, 1993: 480) (Cini,
2010: 96). Andrew Moravcsik is the first and main proponent of the theory, which
indeed represents a challenge to political system approaches. For him, every European
process is a two-level game where at the first stage domestic groups create preferences,
and then the State (in this case, each Member State) articulates them (Moravcsik, 1993:
481).
Applied to the study of Enlargement Policy, liberal intergovernmentalism argues
that States are clearly in a more privileged position to define this policy than any
supranational actor, not least because they have the right to veto accession of new
members at any stage of the process. The causes of Enlargement are not to be found in a
decisive role of the Commission against low motivation –and even against the interest–
of Member States, in a context of diffused civil society involvement, as seen in part one.
Quite the contrary: “European governments [...] calculated the expected economic and
geopolitical consequences of Enlargement for their domestic societies and acted
accordingly.” (Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2005: 198) Rationality of the State is a number
one precondition. But some have responded with the opposite argument, based on the
more or less extended idea that accession negotiations are primarily conducted by
transnational bureaucrats while national actors are left apart (Sedelmeier, 2005: 240).
In the previous analysis we also found how the Commission has a key role in
pushing for further Enlargement in comparison with intergovernmental institutions.
This argument would not be supported by liberal intergovernmentalists, who argue that
the Commission can only intervene in the way it does not contradict the fundamental
national interests of Member States, to which it is the agent. As documents from the
Commission are not legally-binding, actual accession negotiations lay ultimately in the
hands of the States who try to maximize their interests during the bargaining. The final
agreement with the candidates would always be the most efficient one, because it takes
all their preferences into account.
The functioning of Enlargement Policy is quite simple and results from applying
the theory of interstate bargaining to the case. Ideally, each existing Member State has a
clearly defined set of preferences and tries to obtain the maximum benefits from
negotiations with other States, providing its relative negotiating power (Moravcsik,
1993: 498)
Liberal intergovernmentalism is more optimistic in relation to the challenges that
Enlargement poses for the well-functioning of the EU policy-making system. For them,
these issues have been exaggerated and there are no major changes post-accession
(Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2005: 207). In fact, institutional reforms to cope with these
alleged misfits can be counterproductive, as in the case of the project for a European
Constitution. According to Moravcsik, its failure was predictable from the very
beginning because it was an unnecessary effort to give a constitutional appearance to a
system which was already constitutionalized (Moravcsik, 2006: 220). By contrast, a
tendency toward more differentiation and enhanced cooperation would be totally
positive (Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2005: 208).
In conclusion, liberal intergovernmentalism provides a coherent explanation
only to the first sub-question of the paper, i.e. the main factors that explain Enlargement
Policy. Their theory of State rationality and cost-benefit calculations is a logical starting
point to understand the interests behind Enlargement; for instance, why the EU is more
interested in the accession of some countries than others. Nonetheless, it generally fails
to explain both the functioning and the consequences of Enlargement –in fact it denies
the existence of any important consequence– because it lacks a system in which to
locate them, as it mainly focuses on individual and rational actors (the States) and
ignores the presence of autonomous supranational institutions with self-determined
interests (Cini, 2010: 100).
There is no theory that can provide thoroughly answers to the questions set by
this paper. Each one has its point of view and is, by definition, incomplete. Nonetheless,
reached this point I think I have enough arguments to state that political system
approaches provide one of the most complete explanations of Enlargement Policy, at
least from the angle taken by this paper, namely the implications of Enlargement for the
political system of the EU. This is not to say that the theory is perfect. It has many
drawbacks and lacks –not least its failure to answer the basic question: Why?– but in
general, it fits the aims of the research. As stated before, Hix focuses more on the
structures of the EU and less on its dynamics, and this can create some inconsistencies.
Liberal intergovernmentalism can be used as a complement to political system
approaches. Particularly in its most obscure points like the driving factors and interests
behind Enlargement Policy. Although, as a whole, this theory gives only a partial vision
to the topic and is mostly incomplete. As argued by its critics (Cini, 2010), its focus on
the State as the solely relevant actor in every European process is not realistic. European
supranational institutions have independent interests and provide a degree of complexity
to the system. Again, this is not to say that Moravcsik’s theses are false. They are a
good starting point and can perfectly help understand the behavior of individual States
in negotiation processes. Notwithstanding, to ground the analysis solely on these
premises would probably have provided incomplete results.
Conclusion
Enlargement Policy represents many challenges for the EU. First of all, it is the
expression of many different interests which, within the EU, are represented by the
Member States and by all EU institutions. It is a challenge for its managing, which
needs to integrate all the actors of the political system with a separation of tasks. And
finally, it is a challenge for its political and institutional consequences as well as for the
policies and the process of Europeanization. These consequences may require the
deepening of institutional reforms, but it is early to say if the present Treaty of Lisbon
will be sufficient for dealing with the challenges that Enlargement represents for the
EU.
Just a few words about the prospects of Enlargement Policy related to the more
general debate about the Future of Europe. Every time there is an accession round,
surges the debate about the identity of Europe: What is and what is not Europe? At the
present moment, three countries such different as Croatia, Iceland and Turkey are on the
focus of EU Enlargement Policy. There are also indications that Western Balkan
countries will be the next, and that negotiations with them will be even more difficult
than those with Eastern countries (Barnes & Barnes, 2010: 425). The final frontiers of
the European Union remain unknown and, although there are many reasons for them to
remain unknown, this creates a feeling of instability among civil society. The causes
that explain why the EU promotes this insecurity in such an important matter as
Enlargement Policy, although already introduced by Graham Avery (Avery, 2008: 195),
could be the starting point of further research on the topic.
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