Publics Meet Market Democracy in Central and East Europe, 1991-1993
Mary E. McIntosh; Martha Abele Mac Iver; Daniel G. Abele; Dina Smeltz
Slavic Review, Vol. 53, No. 2. (Summer, 1994), pp. 483-512.
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seeks to compare the relative explanatory power of these two perspectives in shaping public preferences toward the market and democracy
in central and east Europe. Many scholars have argued that self-interest-the maximization of one's personal material well-being-is a primary determinant of political attitudes. According to that perspective,
those who feel they will be "losers" in the new political and economic
order in central and east Europe are more likely to oppose the move
to market democracy than those who feel they will be "winners." By
contrast, the "symbolic politics" perspective argues that political socialization largely drives public attitudes toward policy. Thus, this
model suggests that policy preferences toward the market and democracy are triggered by generally enduring attitudes about such "symbolic" issues as the relationship between the individual and the state,
the importance of freedom versus equality and the value of new versus
traditional ways. The policy implications of these two perspectives are
quite different. If self-interest is the primary factor motivating the publics' policy preferences, then stable democracy is best addressed by
ensuring that as many people as possible believe they will be "winners"
in the new system. Yet, if the symbolic politics explanation has greater
explanatory power in the public's policy preferences, these governments face the perhaps more daunting task of dealing with the legacy
of the political socialization of the communist period and slowly changing political attitudes.
The historical record, as many have observed, suggests that "modern democracy is a product of the capitalist process." w h i l e the exact
nature of the causal linkage between democracy and market forces is
open to debate, many scholars assert that the market has historically
preceded the development of modern democratic i n s t i t ~ t i o n s Rose's
.~
typology of political systems (popularly elected versus unrepresentative) by economic systems (market versus non-market) illustrates that
current history offers n o notable examples of non-market economic
systems with popularly elected political systems (figure l)."wo
types
of political regimes are distinguished, a representative system that is
"accountable to a mass electorate through free elections" and an au-
Political Science Review 74 (1980): 670-83; Benjamin L. Page, "Elections a n d Social
Choice: T h e State of the Evidence," American Journal ofPolitica1 Science 21 (1977): 63968; Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Economics and Elections: The ibfajor Western Democracies (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988).
3. Joseph Alois Schumpeter, Cafiitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: H a r p e r
a n d Bros., 1942).
4. Peter Berger, "The Uncertain T r i u m p h of Democratic Capitalism," Journal of
Democracy 3 (1993): 7-16; Claus Offe, "Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic
Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe," Social Research 58 (1991):
864-902; Carlos Waisman, "Capitalism, the Market a n d Democracy," in Reexamining
Democracy: Essays in Honor ofSeymour ibfartin Lifiset, eds. Gary Marks a n d Larry Jay Diam o n d (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1992).
5. Richard Rose, "Escaping from Absolute Dissatisfaction: A Trial-and-ErrorModel
of Change in Eastern Europe," Journal of Theoretical Politics 4 (1992): 371-93.
Market Democracy in Central and East Europe
485
Figure 1
Alternative Political Economies
Political
Economic
Market
Popularly elected
Unrepresentative
Market
derllocracy
Market
authoritarian
Non-market
democracy
Non-market
authoritarian
thoritarian regime which is not responsive to the mass public and is
ruled by a select elite. Of course, there are different variants of each
of these "ideal" types. Likewise, there are a number of variants of
economic systems based on market principles and non-market systems.
While virtually all economies contain mixed elements, individual economies can be classified as either predominantly market or non-market
based. According to Rose, market democracy is characterized by those
advanced industrial nations in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development and a few less industrially developed nations. Included in this category are countries such as Sweden, which
has developed an extensive welfare state, but bases its production on
capitalist principles and private property. Many countries in the world
are market authoritarian regimes: the market prevails but free competitive elections do not. The non-market democracy, according to Rose, is
"difficult to find anywhere." Finally, the fourth logical construct, the
non-market authoritarian type, depicts the political economy of the socialist states. This typology suggests that the free market has historically
been a necessary, but not sufficient condition, for the development of
democratic institutions. Nondemocratic forms of government may have
free market economies (the "market authoritarian" system) but democratic forms of government have only existed in countries with market economies (the "non-market democracy" is an empty cell in the
typology).
How may this historical sequencing be explained? Tocqueville and
others%ontend that the market is conducive to the development of
democracy because it provides the "social space within which individuals, groups and entire institutional complexes can develop independent of state control."' The market creates the opportunity for civil
society-the kaleidoscope of organizations and groups that mediate
6. Alexis d e Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 2 (New York: Vintage, 1945);
Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited," Presidential
Address, American Sociological Association, Miami, Florida, 1993; Larry Diamond,
"Three Paradoxes of Democracy," in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, eds. Larry
Diamond a n d Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
7. Berger, "The Uncertain T r i u m p h of Democratic Capitalism," 7-16.
486
Slavic Review
between the state and the individual-to develop. Historically, capitalism produces a middle class that seeks to protect its rights and will
challenge the state when its interests are at risk.8 It is the consequences
of the market, not the intent or reason for establishing the market,
that promote the formation of democratic organizing principles. Thus,
the market itself is not essential to the development of democracy but
the societal structures it promotes are essential.
Given the past sequencing of economic and political events, we
might have expected the "non-market authoritarian" countries of central and east Europe to have gradually developed free market economies within the confines of an authoritarian political system (such as
the east Asian newly industrializing countries). The social structures
created by the market might then have become the foundation for the
development of democratic institutions. T o a limited degree, the first
part of this sequence was occurring before 1989 in some of the countries in the region, most notably Hungary. But for the most part, central and east Europe stands as a case where the desire for political
freedoms, not the free market, sparked the revolutions of 1989. Given
the sequencing of democratic and then market reform, a key question
is whether these fragile democracies can survive as they confront the
overwhelming challenge of constructing market economies.
Relying on the Latin American experience, Przeworski explores the
question of whether major economic reforms can be enacted under
democratic conditions, or whether either economic reforms or democracy must be sacrificed.' He first asserts that for democracy to
consolidate, it must "evoke self-interested, spontaneous compliance
from all the major political forces." He then argues that this compliance only occurs when democracy is "fair and effectiven-conditions
under which economic transition from a command economy cannot
easily be accomplished. The social costs of economic transition are
high-unemployment,
inflation, inequalities and general uncertainty-and the public and major political forces find it hard to accept
these costs. "Losers" in the simultaneous processes of marketization
and democratization comply to the rules of democracy because democracy offers oppositional political forces the chance to advance the
"losers"' interests in the future. Thus, the opposition has an opportunity to turn today's loss into tomorrow's win under a democratic
system of government. The recent "comebacks" of the leftist parties in
Hungary, Poland and Lithuania stand as examples of how the economically disenfranchised used democratic tools to advance their agenda
in politics.
8. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comfiarative Analysis of France,
Russia, and China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Lipset, "The Social
Requisites of Democracy Revisited"; Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and
Dewzocracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press,
1966).
9. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforwzs in
Eastern Eurofie and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
Market Democracy in Central and East Europe
487
Can the historical relationship between democracy and capitalism
suggest hypotheses about the relationship between support for these
two systems at the individual level? While we acknowledge the potential risks of an ecological fallacy, it seems reasonable to expect that if
market structures (and presumable market values) have historically laid
the foundation for the successful consolidation of democracy, then
those who favor a free market economy should be more likely than
others to embrace liberal democratic principles. We would expect that
many of the underlying attributes that predispose one to accept market
principles would also foster support for democratic principles.
We measure the relationship of support for democratic and market
principles by constructing a two-by-two typology of public support for
democratic principles and market economy. This approach is similar
to Rose's typology of regimes, though we distinguish between high and
low support for the free market and democratic principles rather than
support for a command economy and authoritarianism. We would
expect individuals, like states, to be clustered in cells of enthusiasm
for both democracy and the market (reform enthusiasts) or skepticism
of both (reform skeptics) (figure 2).1° We assume that the larger the
proportion of reform enthusiasts to reform skeptics, the greater the probability of successful consolidation of democracy. While numerical size
matters, the level of political involvement and influence of each group
also figures into this calculation. If the reform enthusiasts are more politically motivated and thus more likely than others to become involved
in the political process, reform-minded politicians will have a good
chance to further the consolidation of democracy despite the reluctance of reform skeptics.
But the other diagonal in Rose's typology (non-representative market systems and representative command systems) is more problematic
to translate to the individual level. States can have market economies
without being democratic but historically there have not been democracies without a market economy. Can we thus infer that individuals
can support a market economy without supporting democracy, but not
vice versa? Given the initial sequencing of reforms in most of central
and east Europe (basic democratic institutions such as competitive elections occurring before market reforms) and the higher social costs of
market reforms than democratic reforms, it is more likely that this
relationship would be reversed to some extent at the individual level.
10. O f course there are different types of capitalism a n d democracy. O u r discussion is based o n support of basic principles that would arguably undergird most types
of capitalism o r democracy. See Terry Karl a n d Phillippe Schmitter, "Modes of T r a n sition in Latin America, Southern a n d Eastern Europe," International Social Science
Journal 128 (March 1991), for further discussion of the different types of capitalism
and democracy. T h e distinction between liberal democratic a n d free market e n t h u siasts and skeptics is obviously more nuanced than represented in o u r heuristic typology. We choose the terms "enthusiasts" a n d "skeptics" to emphasize that these are
new ideas a n d that it is unlikely they have crystallized into solid support o r opposition
in the short time since 1989.
488
Slavic Review
Figure 2 Typology of Support for Democratic and Market Principles Liberal Den~ocracy
Enthusiasts
Free Market:
Enthusiasts
Skeptics
Skeptics
Reform enthusiasts
Democratic
skeptics1
market enthusiasts
Democratic enthusiasts1
market skeptics
Reform skeptics
We would expect a significant number of central and east Europeans
to embrace democratic principles but not market ones. We suspect
that these democratic enthusiasts/market skeptics oppose market reforms
either because they oppose the principles of the free market (greater
economic inequality and high levels of private ownership of business
are two of the contested principles) or are skeptical of whether the
market can deliver greater prosperity or security than the previous
system. In those countries where significant market reforms preceded
democratic reforms (e.g. Hungary), however, we would expect a pattern
closer to that found at the aggregate level-a higher number of democratic skeptics/market enthusiasts. These likely are people who are profiting in the new economic system but are not faring as well in the new
political system. We suspect they are people who are politically disadvantaged under the new governments or who find "democracy" too
unstructured and disorderly. Yet if market principles (such as competition) underlie the liberal democratic process, theoretically we
would expect many of these individuals to eventually embrace democratic precepts.
To examine the public's attitude toward these fundamental political and economic changes, we turn to two distinct literatures-"selfinterest" and "symbolic politics." According to the instrumental perspective, "self-interest" primarily drives people's political attitudes,
policy preferences and voting choices. Publics adopt political attitudes
or policy perspectives that offer the maximum utility or benefit at
minimal costs." Individuals evaluate their past, current and future
circumstances, and calculate what serves their best interests. If current
practices have benefited them (e.g. they have a thriving small business)
or if they believe their future prospects will be brighter (e.g. believe
they or their children will profit from a market economy), they are
likely to support the current policy. By contrast, the symbolic politics
perspective asserts that people "acquire stable affective preferences"
11. Page, "Elections a n d Social Choice: T h e State of the Evidence," 639-68.
Market Democracy in Central and East Europe
489
through the socialization process, "with little calculation of the future
costs and benefits of these attitudes." In other words, attitudes toward
new policy issues are formed more on the basis of enduring political
and social values than according to personal interest or gain. We apply
these two perspectives below to the question of political and economic
policy preferences in central and east ~ u r o p e . ' "
As Sears, Hensler and Speer argue, the concept of "self-interest" is
potentially so broad as to be m e a n i n g l e ~ s . Thus,
'~
we follow their lead
and define self-interest in relatively short-term calculations which figure directly on a person's material well-being. The inability of the
former communist governments in central and east Europe to offer
their citizens economic improvement contributed greatly to both the
public's and elite's demands for radical political and economic change.
While political freedom was the rallying cry of the revolutions of 1989,
people also expected their economic situations to improve. Yet survey
data show that most central and east Europeans believe that their current economic situations are worse, not better, than they were under
c o m m u n i ~ r n .The
' ~ current economic reforms have greatly diminished
many people's standards of living and replaced their relatively "secure
and certain" economic lives with a much higher degree of uncertainty
and insecurity, at least in the short term. Numerous scholars have
shown that political evaluations are influenced by economic condispeaking, research on the relationship between politt i o n ~ .Broadly
'~
ical preferences and economic factors has focused on "pocketbook"
considerations, a person's assessment of hislher personal economic
well-being and what Lewis-Beck termed "sociotropic" assessments, an
individual's general evaluation of the country's overall economic situation. The evidence from western industrial societies suggests that
sociotropic assessments are better predictors of political attitudes than
'*
12. Sears, Lau, Tyler a n d Allen, "Self-Interest versus Symbolic Politics in Policy
Attitudes a n d Presidential Voting," 670-83.
13. We posit a nonreciprocal model which is ordered based o n the generally held
view that directionality flows from general attitudes to more specific ones. We acknowledge that many of the linkages between these attitudinal measures might be
more accurately represented in a reciprocal model, but this is beyond the scope of
this paper.
14. Sears, Hensler a n d Speer, "Whites' Opposition to 'Busing': Self-Interest o r
Symbolic Politics?" 369-84.
15. Mary E. McIntosh a n d Martha Abele Mac Iver, "Coping with Freedom a n d
Uncertainty: Public Opinion in Hungary, Poland, a n d Czechoslovakia, 1989-92," International Journal of Public Opinion Research 4 (1992): 375-91.
16. Lewis-Beck, Economics and Elections: The 1Vlajor Western Democracies; Donald R.
Kinder a n d D. Roderick Kiewiet, "Economic Discontent a n d Political Behavior: T h e
Role of Personal Grievances a n d Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional
Voting," Awzerican Journal ofPolitica1 Sczence 23 (1979): 495-517; Morris P. Fiorina, "Short
and Long-term Effects of Economic Conditions a n d Individual Voting Decisions,"
Social Science Working Paper 244, California Institute of Technology (December 1978);
Raymond M. Duch, "Tolerating Economic Reform: Popular S u p p o r t for Transition to
a Free Market in the Former Soviet Union," American Political Science Reuiew 87 (1993):
590-606.
490
Slavic Review
"pocketbook" indicators." Nevertheless, we investigate both of these
economic assessments, given the unique circumstances of the transitions in central and east Europe.
We hypothesize that those who evaluate their own or their country's current economic situations as good are likely to support the
current policies. Conversely, it follows that frustration with the existing
economic situation will generate support for changing the current policies.'' Likewise, those who have experienced an improvement relative
to their own or the country's past economic situations (retrospective)
or expect their own or the country's situations to improve in the future
(prospective), are likely to support the current political and economic
course. Given that objective economic conditions have improved for
only a relatively small percentage of people, we would not expect current or retrospective economic assessments to generate strong support
for democratic or market policies. Instead, we would expect prospective economic assessments to be more strongly linked to attitudes about
these reforms. Following Bruszt and Simonl%nd P r z e w ~ r s k i , we
~ ~ 'hypothesize that central and east Europeans who are optimistic about
the future will be more likely than others to support democratic and
market policies. These individuals will support the new system even if
they are currently "losers" if they think they (or members of their
family) will eventually be "winners" in the system. The direction of the
relationships between the current and retrospective indicators and
market and democratic principles may even be the opposite of what
we would expect, given the economic affairs in the region. Moreover,
the relatively limited predictive power of self-interest on such a wide
array of policy issues as congressional elections,*l school desegregat i ~ n energy
, ~ ~ policy,29 market reform in the former Soviet Union2*
17. Lewis-Beck, Econon~icsand Elections: The Major Western Democracies.
18. O u r hypotheses a r e the reverse of those of Duch because o u r data were collected later in the reform process. Using 1990 data, Duch hypothesized that the more
negative one's view of the economic system (before reforms started), the higher one's
support for a free market. Since the reference point in o u r surveys was the economic
system after free market reforms had begun, o;r expectations are reversed.
19. Laszlo Bruszt a n d Janos Simon, "The Great Transformation in Hungary a n d
Eastern Europe: Theoretical Approaches a n d Public Opinion about Capitalism a n d
Democracy" (unpublished manuscript, 1992).
20. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market.
21. Fiorina, "Short a n d Long-term Effects of Economic Conditions a n d Individual
Voting Decisions"; Kinder a n d Kiewiet, "Economic Discontent a n d Political Behavior:
T h e Role of Personal Grievances a n d Collective Economic Judgements in Congressional Voting."
22. David 0 . Sears a n d Donald R. Kinder, "Racial Tensions a n d Voting in Los
Angeles," in Los Angeles: Viability and Prospects for metropolitan Leadership, ed. Werner Z .
Hirsch (New York: Praeger, 1971).
23. David 0. Sears, 'Tom R. Tyler, Jack Citrin a n d Donald R. Kinder, "Political
System S u p p o r t a n d Public Response to the Energy Crisis," American Journal of Political
Science 22 (1978): 56-82.
24. Duch, "Tolerating Economic Reform: Popular S u p p o r t for Transition to a
Free Market in the Former Soviet Union," 590-606.
Market Democracy in Central and East Europe
49 1
and law enforcementL5suggests that the contribution of self-interest
on the formation of these political attitudes may be rather modest.
The symbolic politics perspective views attitude formation in a very
different manner than the self-interest p e r s p e c t i v e . ' ~ r o a d l y stated,
this perspective argues that political socialization plays a larger role
in defining policy preferences than does self-interest. Through the political socialization process individuals acquire predispositions which
influence their political attitudes by evoking emotional responses to
"symbols" associated with early political socialization. This perspective
contends that it is largely immaterial whether the policy issue has a
direct bearing on the individual's well-being. Even when a new policy
issue does not evoke a particular response, proponents of this perspective contend that people respond in a manner that maximizes
cognitive consistency.
The general predispositions of political ideology,27equalitarianismz8 and individualism2%re some of the most important in the fornation of policy preferences. We assume that the policy issues of "market economy" and "liberal democracy" are likely linked to such
underlying predispositions as a person's belief about: 1) the relationship between the individual and the state; 2) the value of equality
versus freedom; 3) the merit of new versus traditional ways of structuring societal relations; 4) one's openness to other cultures and outside influences; and 5 ) whether people can be trusted. We discuss each
of these in more detail below.
The relationship between ideological orientation and political and
economic attitudes is well established. In particular, the role of the
state in society has long structured political debate in western industrialized countries and is at the heart of the transition in central and
east Europe. As some have argued, democratic development and market formation in central and east Europe depend on greater individual
responsibility and less state contr01.~'
While the terms left and right (or liberal and conservative) are
25. Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Monitoring the Quality of the Criminal Justice Systems,"
in The Human Meaning of Social Change, eds. Angus Campbell a n d Philip E. Converse
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972).
26. Jack Citrin, Beth Reingold and Donald P. Green, "American Identity and the
Politics of Ethnic Change," Journal of Politics 52 (1990): 1124-54; Sears a n d Kinder,
"Racial Tensions and Voting in Los Angeles"; Sears, Lau, Tyler and Allen, Jr., "SelfInterest versus Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting."
27. David 0. Sears and Jack Citrin, Tax Revolt: Somethingfor Nothing in California,
enl. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).
28. M. Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values: A Theory of Organization and Change
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1968).
29. S. Feldman, "Economic Individualism a n d American Public Opinion," American Political Quarterly 11 (1983) 3-29; S. Lukes, Individualism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973).
30. Ada Finifter and Ellen Mickiewicz, "Redefining the Political System of the
USSR: Mass Support for Political Change," American Political Science Review 86 (1992):
857-74; Ralf Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: In a Letter Intended to
Have Been Sent to a Gentleman in Warsaw (New York: Times Books, 1990).
492
Slavic Review
bandied about in central and east Europe, we have not found them to
hold a shared meaning for publics in-the region. Consequently, we
believe a measure of "preferred society" is a more useful indicator of
an underlying liberal-conservative c o n t i n ~ u m . Our
~ ' expectation is that
those who prefer an "individual opportunities society" will be more
likely to support liberal democratic and market policies than those
who prefer a "state guarantees society." Closely connected to preference for state guarantees is the ideal of egalitarianism, a central political tenet under socialism. Unlike the western tenet of "equality of
opportunity," equality under socialism referred to economic equality
(i.e., relatively low income differentials), which some assert curtailed
individual initiative. Of course, historically the redistribution of resources has become fundamental to liberal democracy but not to nearly
the same degree as in socialist systems. Many scholars3' have contended
that political socialization during the communist period was relatively
successful in fostering the value of egalitarianism among a portion of
the population, in part because these regimes ensured a minimal standard of living and a basic level of security for most. We expect those
who favor economic equality over political freedom to be less likely
than others to support liberal democratic and market policies.""
Following Rose and Haerpfer and others," we expect that those
who are predisposed to change will be more inclined to support democratic principles and market reform since both require new ways of
thinking and acting. As has often been observed," democracy and the
free market are based on certainty in process but uncertainty in outcomes. Most of the old ways of doing things, both politically and eco31. McIntosh a n d Mac Iver, "Coping with Freedom a n d Uncertainty: Public O p i n ion in Hungary, Poland, a n d Czechoslovakia, 1989-92," 375-91.
32. David Mason, "Attitudes Towards the Market and the State in Post-Communist Europe," paper presented a t the annual meeting of the American Association for
the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Phoenix, Arizona, 1992; James P. MacGregor,
"Value Structures in a Developed Socialist System: T h e Case of Czechoslovakia," Comparative Politics 23 (1991): 181-99; Peter M. E. Volten, "Introduction a n d Assessment,"
in Bound to Change: Consolidating Democracy in East Central Europe, ed. Peter M . E. Vol ten
(New York: Institute f o r East-West Studies, 1992).
33. This research, as well as that of others, have noted that central a n d east
Europeans welcome some differentiation in income. Yet the key question is not whether
people accept the idea of differential rewards for different skill levels a n d quality of
performance, but whether economic equality is more important than political freedom.
34. Richard Rose a n d Christian Haerpfer, "New Democracies Between State a n d
Market: A Baseline Report o n Public Opinion," Center for the Study of Public Policy,
University of Strathclyde, no. 204, 1992; Bruszt a n d Simon, "The Great Transformation
in Hungary a n d Eastern Europe: Theoretical Approaches a n d Public O p i n i o n about
Capitalism a n d Democracy"; Dennis Chong, Herbert McClosky a n d John Zaller, "Patterns of Support for Democratic a n d Capitalist Values in the United States," British
Journal of Sociology 13 (1983): 401-40.
35. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Valerie Bunce, "Rising Above the Past:
T h e Struggle for Liberal Democracy in Eastern Europe," World Policy Journal 7 (Summer
1990): 395-430.
Market Democracy i n Central and East Europe
493
nomically, will not work in a market democracy: while initiative and
adaptability were required in communist societies (the second economies in these countries are good examples of the initiative and adaptability of the people), they were not highly valued in the "official"
political culture of these societies. The successful transition to market
democracy requires that people be adaptive and open to change, and
may rest even more on the ability of publics to take initiative than
does the functioning of established market d e m o c r a c i e s . " ~ e l a t e dto
acceptance of change and new ideas is an openness to other cultures
and outside influences. Dalton and Weil emphasize the importance of
outside influences in shaping democratic orientation^."^ Specifically,
Weil has argued that the demonstration effect of the west has played
a major role in shaping central and east European attitudes toward
adoption of market democracy. Those who feel threatened by other
countries or by "outsiders" within their own country are probably
more likely than others to cling to the old political and economic
system. Moreover, given that many economists contend that the successful transition from a command to market economy depends upon
participation in the global economy and foreign investment in particular, we expect that those who are open to western influence will be
more inclined than others to endorse both democratic principles and
market reform.
Interpersonal trust is viewed as central to the building of a society
in which democracy can flourish. Those who lack trust are less likely
to cooperate with others (politically or economically) and are more
likely to be alienated from society." As Gibson, Duch and Tedin have
pointed out, interpersonal trust plays an integral role in the formation
of political coalitions in the former socialist states."" If political culture
theorists are correct that interpersonal trust is central to the building
36. Rose and Haerpfer, "New Democracies Between State a n d Market: A Baseline
Report o n Public Opinion."
37. Russel Dalton, " C o n ~ ~ n u n i s at sn d Democrats: Attitudes Toward Democracy in
the Two Germanies," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political
Science Association, Washington, DC, 199 1.
38. D o n n a Bahry a n d Brian D. Silver, "Soviet Citizen Participation o n the Eve of
Democratization," American Political Science Review 84 (1990): 821-47; Arthur Miller,
"In Search of Regime Legitimacy," in Public Opinion and Regime Change: The New Politics
of Post-Soviet Societies, eds. Arthur H . Miller, William M. Reisinger a n d Vicki L. Hesli
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1993); Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1989); Gabriel A. Almond a n d Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture:
Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1963); Edward C. Banfield with the assistance of Laura Fasano Banfield, The Moral
Basis o f a Backward Society (New York: Free Press, 1958); Ronald Inglehart, "'The Renaissance of Political Culture," American Political Science Review 82 (1982): 1203-30; David
S. Mason, Revolz~tionin East-Central Europe: The Rise and Fall of Communism and the Cold
War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).
39. James Gibson, Raymond Duch a n d Kent Tedin, "Democratic Values a n d the
Transformation of the Soviet Union," The Journal ofpolitics 54 (1992): 329-71.
Slavic Review
of democracy, we would expect trust to be related to support for liberal
democratic principles and perhaps also to support for market reform.
A number of social characteristics have also been shown to be
related to attitudes toward both the market and liberal democracy.
Based on results from western ~ u r o p e , ~and
' eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union,41 we expect support of both the market and
liberal democracy to increase with level of education. Although some
have argued that the educational system under communism likely acted
as a transmitter of pre-1989 value^,^' others have found that education
makes individuals more critical of regime value~.~"e expect that the
process of exploring new ideas and acquiring skills and knowledge
would make one more receptive to democratic and market precepts.
Furthermore, as modernization theory would predict, we expect urban
residents to be more likely than rural ones to support these reforms.
Chong, McClosky and Zaller along with many others note that exposure to different political and economic ideas is likely to be greater in
urban rather than rural areas, and that the limited communication in
rural areas might impede learning the "new political and economic
norms."44 Given that the young theoretically comprise a "nontraditional" element in society4%nd potentially will benefit more from the
reforms than others, we hypothesize that younger people will be more
likely than older ones to express support for democratic and market
reforms. Other recent studies show that young people in eastern Europe are more likely than older ones to espouse democratic principles4"
40. Ibid.
41. James Gibson, "Political and Economic Markets: Connecting Attitudes toward
Political Democracy and a Market Economy within the Mass Culture of the USSR,"
paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Washington, DC, 1993; Duch, "Tolerating Economic Reform: Popular Support for
Transition to a Free Market in the Former Soviet Union," 590-606.
42. Frederick D. Weil, "The Variable Effects of Education on Liberal Attitudes:
A Comparative-Historical Analysis of Anti-Semitism Using Public Opinion Survey
Data," American Sociological Review 50 (August 1985): 458-74; Dalton, "Communists and
Democrats: Attitudes Toward Democracy in the Two Cermanies."
43. Jeffrey W. Hahn, "Continuity a n d Change in Russian Political Culture," British
Journal of Political Science 21 (1991): 393-421; Brian Silver, "Political Beliefs of the Soviet
Citizen: Sources of Support for Regime Norms," in Politics, Worlt and Daily Life in the
USSR: A Survey of Former Soviet Citizens, ed. James R. Millar (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1987); Donna Bahry, "Society 'Transformed? Rethinking the Social
Roots of Perestroika," Slavic Review 52 (Fall 1993): 512-54; Mary E. McIntosh, Martha
Abele Mac Iver, Daniel C. Abele a n d David Nolle, "Minority Rights a n d Majority Rule:
Ethnic Tolerance in Romania and Bulgaria," forthcoming in Social Forces.
44. Dennis Chong, Herbert McClosky a n d John Zaller, "Patterns of Support for
Democratic a n d Capitalist Values in the United States," British Journal of Sociology 1 3
(1983): 401-40.
45. Ada Finifter a n d Ellen Mickiewicz, "Redefining the Political System of the
USSR: Mass Support for Political Change," American Political Science Review 86 (1992):
857-74.
46. H a h n , "Continuity a n d Change in Russian Political Culture," 393-421; Richard Dobson, "Communism's Legacy a n d Russian Youth," unpublished manuscript;
ibfarket Democracy in Central and East Europe
49 5
and market reform.47 Consistent with the findings of others,48we expect men to be more likely than women to support democratic and
market reforms. This probably reflects women's greater concern for
the economic and social welfare of their families in a system where
the state n o longer assumes the responsibility that it did in the past.
Social class in its various meanings has repeatedly been found to be
related to political and economic attitudes. Yet Bruszt and Simon warn
that the fluidity of the social system makes class a less reliable predictor
in the rapidly changing socio-political environment of central and east
Europe than it might be in more stable s ~ c i e t i e s . Although
~"
numerous
scholars argue that the development of a middle class is central to the
development of capitalism, we concur with Bruszt and Simon that it
is probably too early for class to be a reliable predictor in central and
east Europe. Thus, we d o not expect to find a consistent relationship
between self-identified social class and support for either liberal democratic or market reform.
Before we explore how these indicators of self-interest and symbolic politics shape market and democratic preferences, we examine
the publics' support for three principles of liberal democracy. We then
turn to the publics' attitude toward the free market. We conclude this
section of the paper with an examination of the relationship between
support for these liberal democratic principles and support for the
market. These analyses are based on USIA-commissioned nationwide
probability surveys conducted between early 1991 and early 1993 in
Hungary, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. (See appendix for a full description of these surveys.)
Based primarily on Dahl's conception of polyarchy, we focus on
three principles of liberal democracy-representative government, civil
liberties and rule of law. Specifically, we asked respondents how important a multiparty system of government, freedom to criticize the
government and a system ofjustice that treats everyone equally are for
a "society to be called a democracy." While these items do not directly
measure support for liberal democratic principles, analysis shows that
Finifter a n d Mickiewicz, "Redefining the Political System of the USSR: Mass S u p p o r t
for Political Change," 857-74.
47. Duch, "Tolerating Economic Reform: Popular S u p p o r t for 'Transition to a
Free Market in the Former Soviet Union," 590-606; Mason, "Attitudes Towards the
Market a n d the State in Post-Communist Europe"; Barbar-a Heyns a n d Aleksandr-a
Jasinska-Kania, "Values, Politics a n d the Ideologies of Reform: Poland in Transition,"
in Research on Democracy and Society: A Research Annual, ed. Frederick Weil (Greenwich:
JAI Press, 1993).
48. Ellen Carnaghan and D o n n a Bahry, "Political Attitudes and the Gender G a p
in the USSR," Comparative Politics (July 1990): 379-99; Kent M. Jennings, Continuities in
Political Action: A Longitudinal Study of Political Orientations in Three Western Democracies
(Berlin: W . d e Gruyter, 1990).
49. Bruszt a n d Simon, "The Great Transformation in Hungary and Eastern ELIrope: Theoretical Approaches a n d Public O p i n i o n about Capitalism a n d Democracy."
Slavic Review
those who think these principles are essential to a democracy clearly
hold views consistent with liberal democratic theory.") ~ h u we
s believe
it is fair to assume that those who think these items are essential for
democracy also support these liberal democratic principles. Of course,
democracy entails more than these three political principles," but these
represent basic aspects that most would agree are essential to the functioning of a democracy."2 Moreover, these are familiar principles that
central and east Europeans can evaluate with some confidence.
These questions were first asked in most countries" in fall 1991 or
early 1992 and have been repeated once or twice since then except in
Romania. While opinion has shifted slightly in these countries, n o
overall significant differences were noted when these questions were
repeated. This suggests that, despite the rapid speed of political change,
publics' views about the importance of these characteristics are rather
stable. In Table 1 we see that solid majorities believe that equal justice,
political opposition and freedom to criticize the government are important or essential to a democracy. Of these attributes, however, a
system of equal justice is the only one that majorities in all these coun50. Measuring support for liberal democracy is a matter of some debate. Rose
and Mishler have challenged the "idealistic" approach of measuring the extent to
which citizens embrace norms considered fundamental to democratic government,
arguing instead for a "realist" approach that ascertains support for the current regime.
Using such a measure, they find majorities o r near majorities of democratic supporters
throughout eastern Europe. McIntosh a n d Mac Iver find similar majorities preferring
the current political systenl over the previous communist one. Measures of support
for ideal norms such as a multiparty system, political dissent a n d freedoin of the press
show nearly as sizable majorities embracing democratic principles.
Much as we h o p e the optimism voiced by these researchers about the prospects
for democracy in central a n d eastern Europe is warranted, the historical precedent of
democratic reversals noted by Huntington a n d others suggests to us that a more rigorous test of support for democratic principles rnay be in order. Respondents may
prefer the current democratic regime a n d voice agreement with abstract democratic
principles, but not consider those norms as essential for their political system. Therefore, based primarily o n Dahl's conception of liberal democracy, we seek to measure
the extent to which respondents regard the norms of competitive elections, freedom
to criticize the government a n d equality u n d e r the law as essential for a democracy.
While some may argue that this does not directly measure support for these norms,
we would counter that it is indeed a more rigorous test of support. O u r analysis
indicates that individuals who regard o n e of these principles as essential generally
meet the Rose and Mishler test of a democrat (prefer the current democratic regime
over the former communist one), while n o t all who support the new system regard
these norms as essential. It is not the case that individuals view these principles as
essential for a democracy but then don't theinselves support them. While o u r measure
inay underestimate democratic support ainong publics in the region, we would argue
that this more cautious measure is a t least as appropriate, if n o t more so, than others.
51. See Gibson, Duch a n d Tedin, "Democratic Values a n d the Transformation of
the Soviet Union," 329-71, for extensive discussion.
52. David Held, Models of Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987);
Georg Sorensen, Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).
53. Romania is a n exception. T h e question was asked in fall 1991 but the wording
was changed, thus comparisons a r e impossible to make.
497
Market Democracy in Central and East Europe
Table 1
Support for Democratic Principles
Question: People associate democracy with diverse meanings such as those o n this
card. For each o f these, please tell m e whether you think it is essential,
important but n o t essential, n o t very important or n o t at all important for
a society t o b e called a democracy.
Hungary
1192
---
-
-
12192
Romania
Poland
9/91
5192
2193
5193
Bulgaria
9191
3193
-
A system of justice that treats
everyone equally
Essential
Important but not essential
Not very Important
Not at all important
At least two stl-ong political
parties competing in
elections
Essential
Important but not essential
Not very Important
Not at all important
Freedom to criticize the
government
Essential
Important but not essential
Not very Important
Not at all important
tries deem essential for a society to be called a democracy. By contrast,
half or fewer except in Bulgaria say "freedom to criticize the government" or "at least two political parties competing in elections" are
essential. T o create a scale of support for democratic principles, we
summed these three democratic item responses54for each respondent
(a multiparty system of government, freedom to criticize the government and a system of justice that treats everyone equally) after factor
analysis revealed one significant factor.55
The transition from a command to a market economy buffets these
publics with equal, or perhaps greater, challenges and confusion than
does the transition from a nondemocratic to democratic system of
government. For the public the costs of economic reform are "frontend loaded" since the pain of economic reform (price increases, unemployment and general uncertainty) is experienced before the benefits of reforms." The path that each of these countries has chosen to
54. T h e following analyses are based o n the November 1992 data i n Hungary and
the early 1993 data i n the other countries.
55. T h e factor loadings for b o t h the liberal democracy and market e c o n o m y indicators for all four countries are presented i n Table 5 .
56. Richard Rose and William Mishler, "Reacting t o Regime Change i n Eastern
Europe: Polarization or Leaders and Laggards?" Center for the Study o f Public Policy,
University o f Strathclyde, n o . 210, 1993.
Slavic Review
Table 2 Views on Creation of Free Market Economy Question:
D o you personally feel that the creation of a free market economy, that
is, o n e largely free from state control, is right o r wrong for (survey country)?
Poles
5192
2193
Right
Wrong
Don't know
48 %
34
18
100%
48 %
37
15
100%
Romanians
10191
4192
9192
5193
35%
48
36%
39
37 %
46
44 %
45
11
100%
Right
Wrong
Don't know
2
25
3
100%
100%
100%
Hungarians
12192
Right
Wrong
Don't know
62 %
19
18
99 %
Bulgarians
4192
3193
Right
Wrong
Don't know
51 %
23
25
53%
26
22
100%
100%
reform their economies varies considerably (from Poland's shock therapy to Romania's more halting approach). It would appear that n o
matter what the approach, the costs of market reform are more painful
and concrete than those of political reform. Thus, as already noted,
we would expect fewer people to embrace market than political reforms.
When asked if they think the "creation of a free market economy,
that is, one largely free of state control" is right or wrong for their
country's future, more central and east Europeans say it is right than
wrong, except in Romania. As Table 2 shows, support for the free
market is slightly higher in Hungary, followed by Bulgaria and Poland,
while Romanians are evenly divided. The finding that Hungarians were
more likely than others in 1992 to voice support for the creation of a
free market likely corresponds with its longer history of market practices (starting with the New Economic Mechanism in 1968).
Market Democracy in Central and East Europe
Table 3
Views on Privatization
Question: T h e r e is much talk about privatization of business in (survey country).
Some people feel that the majority of businesses should be privately owned.
Others think that only some businesses should be privately owned and
that the government should continue to r u n the majority of businesses.
Which of the two alternatives is closest to your own views?
Poles
519 1
919 1
1192
5192
2193
--
45 %
49
35%
59
40 %
50
41 %
51
Romanians
12/90
4192
9192
5/93
Mostly private
Mostly state
Don't know
42 %
54
4
100%
31 %
59
10
100%
36%
56
9
101%
36%
57
Hungarians
1192
12/92
Mostly private
Mostly state
Don't know
41 %
48
42 %
51 %
Mostly private
Mostly state
Don't know
Mostly private
Mostly state
Don't know
2
38 %
58
7
100%
2
99 %
100%
24%
59
22 %
55
17
23
100%
100%
22 %
64
16
101%
While economists dispute the degree and speed with which the
economy should be marketized, most agree that privatization and foreign investment are critical to the development of a free market. Besides increasing efficiency of east European businesses, privatization
will reduce governments' deficits by curbing subsidies to unprofitable
firms. Privatization of the state "dinosaurs" has been approached with
varying combinations of mass privatization, foreign investment and
sales to small entrepreneurs. Hungary has relied more heavily on foreign investment, while Romania has adopted, but has yet to implement
fully, the successful Czech model of mass privatization to "create a
nation of shareholders."
Tables 3 and 4 reveal that publics are not as enthusiastic as economists about these economic reforms. On the specific issue of priva-
Slavic Review
Table 4 Views on Foreign Investment Question: There are different opinions about foreign investment. Some people think
that foreign investment is necessary a n d will have a positive influence o n
the development of the (survey country's) economy. Others say that foreign investment will not help a lot a n d we will become dependent o n
foreigners. Which view is closer to your own?
Poles
11190
519 1
919 1
1/92
5/92
2/93
37 %
44
19
100%
57 %
34
9
100%
45 %
40
15
100%
44 %
37
18
99 %
47 %
40
12
99%
51 %
38
10
99 %
Romanians
10191
4192
9/92
5193
Positive
Negative
Don't know
63 %
22
15
100%
51 %
27
22
100%
49 %
28
52 %
30
18
100%
Hungarians
719 1
1/92
12192
Positive
Negative
Don't know
43 %
43
14
100%
49 %
40
11
100%
58 %
27
14
99 %
41 %
30
29
100%
43 %
33
24
100%
Positive
Negative
Don't know
Positive
Negative
Don't know
44 %
33
22
99 % 23
100%
tization, a larger percentage in all four countries prefers that the majority of businesses remain state owned than favors majority private
ownership. This suggests that many who support a free market economy in principle as the "right thing" for their country want more
government intervention and control than is typical of a laissez-faire
model of capitalism. As has been detailed elsewhere,'? central and east
Europeans are clearly more inclined toward the greater state supports
and social equality of a west European-style social democracy than to
the more individualist and socially stratified American-style capitalism.
57. Mary E. McIntosh and Martha Abele Mac Iver, "Transition to What: Publics
Confront Change in Central a n d East Europe," East European Studies Program Occasional
Paper Series, Woodrow Wilson Center, 1993.
Market Democracy in Central and East Europe
50 1
More central and east Europeans support than oppose foreign investment, agreeing that it "is necessary and will have a positive influence
on the development of the economy." Foreign investment is not only
key to the privatization schemes in many of these countries but is also
part of a broader effort to integrate these economies into the international market. After factor analysis revealed one significant market
factor, we summed the three market item responses for each respondent (support for the creation of a free market, foreign investment and
privatization) to create a scale of support for market prinicples (see
discussion below for more details).
While these findings offer insights about the level of support for
liberal democratic principles and a free market economy, we are also
interested in the relationship between these two measures. Do attitudes
toward liberal democratic principles and a free market economy constitute a single reformist dimension o r separate dimensions? We hypothesized that attitudes toward liberal democracy and a free market
are two distinct but related factors of an overall reformist dimension.
The factor analysis of the measures of commitment to liberal democratic principles (competitive elections, freedom to criticize the government, system of justice that treats all equally) and the measures of
support for a market economy (whether free market is rightlwrong,
privatization, foreign investment) reported in Table 5 indicates that
this is indeed the case. In each of the four countries, support for liberal
democratic principles constitutes a separate dimension from support
for a free market economy. As expected, however, these separate factors are moderately related." The data provide further evidence of the
mutually reinforcing relationship between support for democratic
principles and a free market found by Duch and Gibson among Soviet
citizens." Our data cannot answer the question of whether democratic
principles or free market principles "came first" in the public mind,
but it would appear that from the public perspective the move toward
the market and democratic institutions is an interrelated process. Since
one of our key interests is how preferences for both the market and
democracy are shaped, we examine this question next with the expectation that many of the same factors influence attitudes toward both
of these reforms.
We employ multivariate analysis (ordinary least squares regression
analysis) to uncover the relative importance of the "self-interest" and
"symbolic politics" variables in explaining support for democratic
principles and the free market. In Table 6 we see that the "self-interest"
variables tend to account for less of the variance in the model than
58. T h e correlations between market a n d democracy measures are: Hungary
r=.21; Bulgaria r=.35; Poland r=.13; Romania r = . 3 9 .
59. Duch, "Tolerating Economic Reform: Popular S u p p o r t for Transition to a
Free Market in the Former Soviet Union," 590-606; Gibson, "Political and Econolllic
Markets: Connecting Attitudes toward Political Democracy and a Market Economy
within the Mass Culture of the USSR."
Slavic Review
Table 5 Factor Loadings for Liberal Democratic Principles and Market Economy Rotated Factor Matrix:
(Oblimin Rotation)
Factor 1
Democratic Principles
Factor 2
Market Economy
H
P
B
R
H
P
B
R
Competitive elections
Equal justice
Freedom to criticize govt.
.75
.77
.77
.68
.SO
.77
.74
.80
.77
.73
.74
.78
.23
.ll
.13
.26
.08
.07
.33
.20
.21
.37
.30
.19
Free market right
Privatization
Foreign Investment
.16
.21
.06
.15
.17
.07
.39
.16
.23
.20
.29
.37
.69
.72
.75
.68
.76
.78
.74
.76
.78
.76
.80
.71
the "symbolic politics" variables (a notable exception is support for
democratic principles in Bulgaria). Moreover, when the symbolic politics variables are entered into the model first they account for substantially more of the variance than the self-interest variable^.^' This
suggests that, at least at this stage of the transition in central and east
Europe, these values and attitudes are as, or more, significant in determining attitudes toward political policies than the calculation of
private self-interest.
Looking more closely at the self-interest variables, we find support
for our hypothesis that the prospective indicators would be the strongest predictors of both support for the market and democratic policies.
Those who are more optimistic about their personal financial situation
over the next five years or express optimism in general (tomorrow's
"winners") tend to be more supportive of democratic principles and
a free market than those who are more pessimistic. T o a lesser degree,
we find support for our hypothesis that current and retrospective economic measures would be weak predictors of support for the market
or democratic reform, and that the economic dislocation and turmoil
might produce unexpected findings. For example, those who are positive about their current income (today's "winners") in Poland are more
likely to support democratic principles, while the inverse relationship
is found in Bulgaria (those who are negative about their current income are more likely to support democratic principles). Likewise, although assessments of the current economic situation in both Bulgaria
and Poland produce the expected relationship with the market, we
60. T h e R' when the symbolic politics variables are entered first into the equation
are: Hungary, democracy .02, market .16; Poland, democracy .06, market .20; Ro-mania,
democracy .16; market .40; a n d Bulgaria, democracy .09, market .37.
Market Democracy in Central and East Europe
503
find the opposite to be the case with democratic principles in Romania.
These differences are probably due to the different stages of both market and democratic transitions in each of these countries. What is clear
is that those who are optimistic about their future well-being are more
likely than others to support the move to a market democracy.
Turning to symbolic attitudes, we find support for our hypotheses
that political ideology (measured as preferred society) and acceptance
of change are significant predictors of support for both the market and
democracy, with two exceptions. None of the symbolic attitudes is a
predictor of support for democratic principles in Hungary and acceptance of change is not a significant predictor of market principles
in Poland. The symbolic attitude variables are notably stronger predictors of support for the market than for democratic principles. Reasons for this finding may be that our market scale is more concrete
than our democratic measure and that respondents are more divided
in their opinion about the market. These two factors probably account
for the stronger correlation between the symbolic politics measures
and market principles than between the symbolic politics measures
and the democratic principles. With the exception of interpersonal
trust, in at least three out of the four countries these symbolic attitudes
are significant predictors of support for the market. Those who welcome change and new ideas are open to western influence in their
country, favor freedom over equality and support an individual opportunities society are more likely than others to support the market.
As we hypothesized, in general the better educated, urban, male
and younger central and east Europeans are more likely than others
to support both democratic and market principles. Table 6 clearly
shows that education is by far the strongest and most consistent predictor of support for both liberal democratic principles and a free
market economy. Except in Romania, gender and urbanity are moderate predictors of these principles. When other social characteristics
(especially education) are controlled, age and social class are relatively
weak predictors of support for the market and democracy. Only in
Bulgaria and Romania are the young and the self-defined middle and
upper classes more likely than others to support one or both of these
reforms after other factors are controlled. Although these cross-sectional data cannot address lifecycle versus generational theories, we
suspect that one reason the well educated (who also tend to be younger),
males and urban dwellers are the strongest supporters of the market
and democratic principles is that they are in the best position to profit
from these systemic changes.
In sum, Table 6 reveals that the strongest predictors of support for
both liberal democratic and market principles are: preferred society,
acceptance of change and new ideas, openness to western influence,
general future assessment, education, urbanity and gender. Those who
prefer an individual opportunities society, accept new ideas and
change, are open to western influence, voice general optimism about
the future, are well educated, urban and male are more likely than
Table 6 Standardized Regression Coefficients between Self-Interest, Symbolic Political Attitudes, Social Characteristics and Support for Democratic and Market Principles Hungary
Democracy
Market
Self-Interest
Five year economic assessment
General future assessment
Next year economic assessment
Current:
Country evaluation
Subjective income
Rrtrospectiue:
Past economic
Self-Interest R2
Symbolic Attitudrr
Preferred society"
Acceptance of change
Openness to western culture
Equality1'
Interpersonal trust
Symbolic R2
Social Characteristics
Education
Gender'
'Town size
Age
Social class
Total R2
Unless indicated all coding is from low to high.
"Coded as 1 =state guarantees, "individual
opportunities
hCoded as 1=equality, 2=freedom
'Coded as I =male, P=female
" ~ o asked.
t
* p < .05; * * p < . O l
Poland
1)emocracy
Romania
Market
Democracy
Market
Bulgaria
50 5
Market Democracy in Central and East Europe
Figure 3
Distribution of Opinion on Liberal Democracy and Market Reforms
POLAND
Liberal Democracy
Free Market
Enthusiasts
Skeptics
Enthusiasts
Skeptics
29 %
31 %
16%
24%
HUNGARY
Liberal Democracy
Free Market
Enthusiasts
Skeptics
BULGARIA
Liberal Democracy
Free Market
Enthusiasts
Skeptics
Enthusiasts
Skeptics
32 %
36%
6%
26%
Enthusiasts
Skeptics
27 %
17%
26%
30 %
ROMANIA
Liberal Democracy
Free Market
Enthusiasts
Skeptics
Enthusiasts
Skeptics
29%
22 %
13%
36 %
others to support liberal democratic principles and a free market economy. We have looked at the relationship between these two measures
of reform and the predictors of both measures, but we still have not
addressed the critical question of the degree of public support for both
reforms and the implications for the transitions to market democracy.
While it is clearly important to examine the predictors of each of these
measures separately, the interwoven nature of the reform process also
dictates that we examine their joint effects. T o address these questions,
we return to the typology presented at the beginning of this paper.
Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of reform enthusiasts (who support both), reform skeptics (who are wary of both), democratic enthusiastslmarket skeptics and democratic skepticslmarket enthusiasts in
each country. In each country roughly as many people support both
liberal democratic and market principles as are inclined to be skeptical
of both. Specifically, between a fourth and a third in each country
support liberal democratic principles and market reform while a similar percentage are more skeptical of both these principles. The rest
have divided views, with democratic enthusiastslmarket skeptics outnumbering democratic skepticslmarket enthusiasts significantly in each
of the countries but Hungary.
As we hypothesized, Figure 3 shows that free market enthusiasts
(except in Hungary) are substantially more likely to support liberal
democratic principles than to be wary of them. By contrast, skeptics
of the free market are somewhat more divided in their views of liberal
democratic principles and are not necessarily concentrated in the democratic skeptic cell (especially in Poland and Bulgaria). While there is
some relationship between support for the free market and support
for democracy, there are a large proportion of people with mixed
Slavic Review
views. As we hypothesized, those with mixed views tend to be enthusiastic about democracy but skeptical of the market (except in Hungary).
What do these data tell us about each of these four groups? (See
graphs, page 508 and page 509.) Looking first at those who support
both liberal democracy and market reforms we see that although reform
enthusiasts constitute only a minority in each of these countries, they
comprise a much larger proportion of the population that is younger,
better educated, male and politically interested. Clearly this bodes well
for the future of market democracy in these countries, but whether
members of this group will be able to carry their compatriots with
them to a successful completion of the reform process remains to be
seen. The greatest threat to a successful transition to market democracy
comes from the minority in each country who remain skeptical of both
democratic and market reforms. While members of this group may be
inclined to strike or demonstrate to disrupt the reform process, they
are otherwise generally less politically active, older, female, less well
educated and less well mobilized than the reform-oriented sector of
society. Thus, while equal in size to the reform enthusiasts, their "voice"
is potentially much softer and less influential.
What about those members of the public who tend to support a
market economy but are skeptical about liberal democracy? We have
argued that if a free market is necessary for the consolidation of democracy, then those members of society who contribute to the building
of a market economy are supporting democracy indirectly-whatever
their own beliefs about how essential competitive elections and freedom to criticize the government may be. This group is relatively small
in each country except Hungary, where it forms about a quarter of the
population. Hungarians may be more supportive of a free market because the country began experimenting with a limited free market
much earlier (under Kadar), so the principles of the market are presumably much better known than in Bulgaria, Romania and Poland.
While it is theoretically possible that such a group would advocate nondemocratic means to push through market reforms, it is more likely
that their support for the market will be beneficial to democracy. The
generally larger group of individuals who are enthusiastic about liberal
democracy but skeptical about market reforms are apparently reluctant to give u p the economic "security" they enjoyed under communism. The transition to a free market economy means that many may
lose theirjobs and the benefits that they assumed were universal rights.
Those who are enthusiastic about democracy but skeptical of the market, like those who are skeptical of both democratic and market reforms, are likely to exert pressure on their governments to ease the
pain of market reforms and retain some socialist dimensions to the
economy. If governments in the region had the resources to provide
the kind of welfare state that these publics appear to be advocating,
such pressure would not necessarily be detrimental to democratic consolidation. But in order to provide the kind of social safety net that
Market Democracy in Central and East Europe
507
publics want, the economies of central and east Europe must first generate enough wealth to redistribute-and this will require that publics
accept the economic costs (inflation, unemployment, greater disparity
between rich and poor, greater uncertainty) in the interim. Whether
this group's commitment to democracy will override its objections to
the market reform process, should those come into severe conflict,
remains to be seen.
What can these data tell us about the fate of societies that are
attempting to make the transition to both a free market and liberal
democracy simultaneously? While these reforms are distinct in the public mind, they are more related than at odds with each other. People
who support one tend to support the other as well, though a notable
percentage of these publics hold mixed views." Although the consensus over democracy and capitalism is clearly greater in the United
States than it is among publics in central and east Europe, even in the
United States debates routinely rage over some democratic and market
p r i n ~ i p l e s . "It~ may even prove helpful that publics are not polarized
between support for or opposition to both reforms. Given that most
central and east Europeans support one of these two principles, these
mixed views might serve to moderate debates over the reform process
and avoid extremist politics.
The data clearly show that both "symbolic politics" and "self-interest" play a role in predicting support for liberal democratic and market
principles. Those who are best prepared (social psychologically and
demographically) to "win" in the new system or who are already "winning" (economically or politically) tend to support both liberal democratic principles and a free market. The question becomes, how do
governments create an environment where many feel they will eventually be winners? The answer suggests that governments in central
and east Europe are caught in somewhat of a double bind. To be
"responsive" to public demands requires governments to implement
more gradual, less painful economic reforms than the "shock therapy"
many economists advocate as the best approach. But the more gradual
approach may only prolong the pain of the economic transition. Governments pursuing such a course may be perceived as making too little
progress in moving toward the prosperity that publics associate with
both western economies and "democracy." Moreover, the finding that
symbolic attitudes are generally .stronger predictors than the self-interest measures of support for market and democratic reforms suggests
that an upswing in the economy may only partially ease the way to a
stable market democracy in these countries. If responses to these re61. Mixed views o n democracy a n d capitalism are not necessarily an indication
of lack of constraint o r consistency in attitudes. Unlike Finifter a n d Mickiewicz (1992),
who early in the transition process concluded that Soviet publics displayed little consistency in their attitudes toward change, o u r data show a moderately high degree of
consistency.
62. Chong, McClosky a n d Zaller, "Patterns of S u p p o r t for Democratic a n d Capitalist Values in the United States," 401-40.
Slavic Review
forms are driven more from deeply held predispositions, the public's
skepticism of the market especially and of democracy to a lesser extent
is unlikely to change quickly. Given that attitude change is a slow
process, it is likely to take decades before solid majorities support both
liberal democratic and market principles.
The simultaneous transitions to democracy and a free market thus
pose an unprecedented challenge for publics and policymakers alike.
If the dislocations caused by market reforms become too harsh, the
"losers" might turn to democratic mechanisms to derail the reform
process. But if market reforms become stalled because of public opposition, governments may be blamed for failing to produce the economic prosperity desired by publics. In either case, the new institutions
of democracy potentially become the means to disrupt the reform process. Thus, it becomes critical in this high-wire act for governments to
balance the public's demand for economic prosperity and social welfare together with the economic realities regarding the costs of these
public desires. As a growing number of recent elections in the region
illustrate (Lithuania, Poland and Hungary), this is an extremely difficult act to perform.
APPENDIX
Sample Design and iMethodology. USIA-commissioned surveys in central a n d east Europe
were based o n nationwide stratified probability sarnples of adults (aged 18 and older).
Individual respondents were selected from voting lists in Bulgaria. In Poland the
sample was constructed from a census list of housing units (individuals selected by
Kish grid). In Hungary a n d Romania a r a n d o m route method was used (with selection
of respondent by Kish grid). Response rates are moderately high (average in the mid70% range). T h e US research team worked closely with the country teams to design
the sampling plan a n d train interviewers. T h e questionnaires were translated by the
country teams and reviewed by the US team. All interviews were face-to-face (not selfcompleted), fully structured interviews.
Date of survey
Number of
respondents
Contractor
Bulgaria
October 1991
April 1992
March 1993
CSD'
CSD
CSD
Hungary
July 1991
January 1992
December 1992
Gallup Hungary
Median
Median
Poland
May 1991
September 1991
January 1992
May 1992
February 1993
Central Europe Market
Central Europe Market
Demoskop
Demoskop
Demoskop
Romania
October 1991
April 1992
September 1992
May 1993
SOCIOBIT
SOCIOBIT
SOCIOBIT
SOCIOBIT
'Center for the Study of Democracy
Market Democracy in Central and East Europe
51 1
Nineteen times o u t of 20, results from samples of 1,000 will differ by n o more than
about 4 percentage points in either direction from what would be f o u n d if it were
possible to interview every adult in the country. For a sample of 1,500 to 2,000, the
sampling error is about 3 % . T h e potential margin of sampling e r r o r is larger for
smaller groups. In addition to sampling error, the practical difficulties of conducting
a survey of public opinion may introduce other sources of e r r o r into the results.
Measures of Independent Variables
Scale construction. All scales were constructed by coding "don't knows" in the middle
category a n d summing the responses from each measure (after factor analysis demonstrated that the measures constituted a single dimension). Don't know rates ranged
from roughly 5 to 15 percent.
Symbolic Politics Indicators
Preferred Society:
Some people say individuals should take more responsibility for providingfor themselves. Others
say the state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for. Others have
views somewhere i n between. How would you place your views on this scale? (4 pt. scale)
What is more important for government to do, i n your opinion: to make certain that there are
opportunities for people to get ahead on their own or to guarantee that people's basic needs are
met?
Equality:
Which of these two statements comes closest to your own opinion: a) Ijind that both freedom and equality are important. But i f I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom more important, that is, that everyone can live i n freedom and develop .without hinderance b) Certainly freedom and equality are important. But i f I were to choose one or the other, I would consider equality more important, that is, that nobody is needy and that social class dzfferences are not so strong Acceptance of change a n d new ideas:
Now I would like to ask you about your viezus on various issues. Some people are zuilling to take
big risks i n a n attempt to gain big rewards. Others would rather play it safe and not risk losing
what they have. Others have views somewhere i n between. How would you place your views on
this scale? Show card. (4 pt. scale)
Some people say when changes occur i n their lives, they worry about the dzficulties they may cause.
Others say when changes occur i n their lives, they welcome the possibility that something new is
begznning. Others llave views somewhere i n between. How would you place your views on this
scale? Show card. (4 pt. scale)
Some people say ideas that have stood the test of time are generally best. Others say new ideas are
generally better than old ones. Others have views somewhere i n between. How would you place
your views on this scale? Show card. (4 pt. scale)
Interpersonal Trust:
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful i n dealing with people? Now I'm going to read you some statements that describe how people often feel. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with each of these statements. Most people can be trusted.
Slavic Review
Openness to outside world:
Now I'm going to read you some statements that describe how people often feel. Please tell me
whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with each of
these statements.
The influence of American culture is a threat to our own culture.
The United States has too much injluence over our country's affairs.
Self-Interest Indicators
Current Economic Situation:
How would you describe the current economic situation i n (Suruey Country)? Would you say the economic situation is very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad? How would you evaluate your current jnancial situation? Is it very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? Retrospective Economic Situation:
And turning to your householdj'inancial situation, cornpared to 12 months ago, do you think
that thejnancial situation ofyour household has improved a lot, improved a little, remained the
same, declined a little, declined a lot
Prospective Economic Situation:
A year from now, do you expect that thejnancial situation ofyour household will have iw~proved a lot, improved a little, remained the same, declined a little or declined a lot. Five years from now, do you expect that thejnancial situation of your household will have improved a lot, improved a little, remained the same, declined a little, or declined a lot? General Future assessment:
Now I'm going to read you some statements that describe how people often feel. Please tell me
whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with each of
these statements.
A young person of today can expect much of the future.
Any person with ability and willingness to work hard has a good chance to get ahead.