www.crimejusticejournal.comIJCJ&SD20176(1):88‐102
ISSN2202–8005
Punishment,DemocracyandTransitionalJusticein
Argentina(1983‐2015)1
DiegoZysmanQuirós
UniversidaddeBuenosAires,Argentina
Abstract
Latin America has neither suffered the majority of mass atrocities in the contemporary
worldnortheworstofthembut,afterasustainedperiodoftransitiontodemocracy,itholds
therecordforthemostdomestictrialsforhumanrightsabuses.Argentinaisanemblematic
caseinLatinAmericaandtheworld.Duetotheearlydevelopmentofitshumanrightstrials,
their social impact and their scale, it has a leading role in what is known as ‘the justice
cascade’. Until recently, leading scholars in sociology of punishment have studied the
penalityof‘ordinarycrimes’throughcausallydeepandglobalnarrativeslargelyfromthe
perspectiveoftheGlobalNorth.Statecrimesandregionalpathsoftransitionaljusticehave
been neglected in their accounts. This paper will question this state of affairs – or
‘parallelism’–throughanexplorationofthepunishmentofboth‘commoncrimes’and‘state
crimes’ in Argentina, thus contributing to the growing body of scholarship on southern
criminology.
Keywords
Punishment;democracy;transitional;justice;state;crime.
Pleasecitethisarticleas:
Zysman Quirós D (2017) Punishment, democracy and transitional justice in Argentina (1983‐
2015). International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 6(1): 88‐102. DOI:
10.5204/ijcjsd.v6i1.378.
ThisworkislicensedunderaCreativeCommonsAttribution4.0Licence.Asan
openaccessjournal,articlesarefreetouse,withproperattribution,ineducationalandothernon‐
commercialsettings.ISSN:2202‐8005
©TheAuthor(s)2017
DiegoZysmanQuirós: Punishment,DemocracyandTransitionalJusticeinArgentina(1983‐2015)
Introduction
Althoughthegrandnarrativesofthesociologyofpunishment(LateModernism,Postmodernism,
Post‐Fordism or Neoliberalism) continue to offer a valuable theoretical framework for social
sciences, they have some limitations. These narratives privilege knowledge produced in the
GlobalNorthoverotherregionsoftheworldandsometimesapplycategoriesoftheGlobalNorth
universally. For this reason, they have recently been problematized in general social theory
(Connell 2007) and postcolonial theory (Cunneen 2011), as well as in feminist criminology
(Carrington2014)andsoutherncriminology(seeCarrington,HoggandSozzo2016).
Atpresent,relativelyfewworksfromwithincriminologyorthesociologyofpunishment–still
mostlycarriedoutinEurope–arestudyingtransitionaljusticeissueswhichtendtoberelegated
to‘newtrends’ineditedcollectionsthatdrawonperspectivesandreadingsinthesedisciplines
(seetheactivitiesoftheEuropeanCriminologyGrouponAtrocityCrimesandTransitionalJustice
(ECACTJ) of the European Society of Criminology;2 also Karstedt 2010; Parmentier 2011;
Savelsberg2010).Thisnoveltyinmainstreamcriminologyismainlyrelatedtotheimpactcaused
intheGlobalNorthbythejudgingofcrimesinRwandaandtheformerYugoslaviaandthecreation
oftheInternationalCriminalCourt(1998)(Cohen1995,1996,2001;Cunneen2011;Morrison
2006; Parmentier 2011; Savelsberg 2010; Stanley 2010). The relevance of these events was
heightenedrecentlywhen,in2009,theStockholmPrizeinCriminologywassurprisinglyawarded
jointlytoAmericanJohnHaganforhisempiricalresearchonthegenocideinDarfurandtothe
ArgentinianRaulZaffaronifortheoreticalworkonmasscrimes(Parmentier2011:423).
Evenso,studiesonthepunishmentofcommoncrimesandcrimesofthestatearerarely,ifever,
combined in a comprehensive approach. Instead, they are treated as separate and unrelated,
assumingdifferent–almostparallel–linesofinquiry,eveninplacessuchasLatinAmericawhere
commoncrimeandtheexperienceofdictatorshipsandbloodyrepressionmakeitdifficultnotto
crosstheselinesofinquiry.
InthispaperIaimtocontributetothegrowingbodyofscholarshiponsoutherncriminology.The
coexistence of state crimes (and their memory) along with common crimes establishes a
framework of meaning in social relations and penal policies that is usually absent in the
explorationsofthecountriesoftheGlobalNorth.Therefore,Iintendtoidentifysomeofthese
featuresinthediscoursesandpracticesofthepenalityofArgentinaandotherLatinAmerican
countries.Furthermore,althoughtherearedeep,detailedstudiesofpenalityandpunitivismin
recentdecadesinArgentina(see,basically,Sozzo2011,2014,2016b),myintentionistofocuson
statecrimesduringthreeimportantperiodsoftransitionaljustice:the1980s,the1990sandthe
2000s.
StatecrimesandtransitionaljusticeinLatinAmerica
Dictatorshipsandtransitionstodemocracy
In recent decades, many Latin American countries have undergone complex transitions to
democracy (the ‘third wave’ according to Huntington 1993) from the repressive military
dictatorshipsthatexistedinthe1960s,1970sand1980s(forexample,in1973,ofthetenLatin
American countries of Hispanic origin, only Colombia and Venezuela had democratic
governments).Statecrimesperpetratedbytheseregimesinvolvedseriousviolationsofhuman
rights,whichwere qualified,asapplicable,as masscrimes,stateterrorismor genocide.(State
violenceinvolvingnationalarmiesandpara‐militarygroupswerealsoafeatureofinternalarmed
conflictsinsomeSouthAmericanandCentralAmericancountries.3)TheexampleofGuatemala,
forinstance,isoneofthefewLatinAmericancasesalmostunanimouslyqualifiedbyobserversas
genocide.Severalcoupstookplacebetween1954and1996anditisestimatedthat,in40years,
more than 200,000 people died or disappeared, and 500,000 others, mostly from indigenous
communities,becamerefugees.Between1982and1983,injust17months,100,000indigenous
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people(mostlymenbut also many women andchildren) were brutally killed in front of their
familiesbystatetroopslookingforguerrilleros(FigueroaIbarraetal.2013).
Notably, between 1930 and 1983, Argentina experienced six coups d’état led by military
interventionism (1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966 and 1976‐1983) in between short periods of
weak democratic rule. Not all thecoups usedthe same degree ofviolenceand not allof them
received the same rejection and resistance from political parties and large sectors of the
population.Inaddition,notallofthemweresupportedbycatholicfundamentalismagainstthe
‘leftistsubversionofWesternvalues’inthecontextofthecoldwar,aswasthecaseofthelast
coup.Inthisframework,thebroaduseofviolencetosolvepoliticalconflictsbecamenaturalized.
Itincludedmediacensorship,illegaldetentions,breakingandentering,politicalimprisonment,
militarycontrolsinthestreets,summaryexecutionsdisguisedasconfrontationandtortureofthe
opposition(Bergalli1984;Calveiro2006;FeldandFranco2015;Vezzetti2002).
With areturn to democratic rule in Argentina in1973,state andparastateviolence increased
alongside civil violence. Nevertheless after the coup of 24 March 1976, together with a new
dramatic and systematic increase in the scope and degree of violence, two radical changes
dramaticallymodifiedthestyleofhistoricalrepression:
First, the disappearances demonstrated the development of an obvious
determinationonthepartofthestatetoexterminateitsopponents.Second,they
introducedanewcharacteristictopoliticallymotivatedmurder–itsclandestine
practice.ThesesingularitiessetthecaseofArgentinaapart,evenfromtherestof
the dictatorships that ruled the countries of the region in the 1970s. (Crenzel
2008b:174‐175)
Italsoledtotheappropriationofalmost500childrenandbabieswhodisappearedwiththeir
parents or were born in detention centres and were given to other families to assume false
identitieswhichremainsubjecttodiscoveryeventothepresentday.
The dictatorship toughened the Penal Code with decrees nominated and numbered as ‘Laws’
passedformanycommoncrimes.Inadditiontoestablishingnewcrimes,thedeathpenaltyby
firingsquadwasreinstated(althoughneverapplied)andthepenaltyofabsolutedisqualification
or incapacitation of rights introduced for offenses with ‘subversive’ motivation (Law 21.338).
However,theseverityofthepenalsystemwasduetoauthoritarianandclandestinepractices.
Evidently,officialstatisticsdonotaccountfortheeffectsofthesemechanisms,whichiswhyitis
difficulttomeasurethem(Sozzo2016b:302).Indeed,althoughtherewasapolicestate,common
crime was not the main target of repression. Rather, it was one target among many others,
includingalargenumberofactsofinsubordination(religious,political,sexual,modesofdress,
familyrelationships,musicconsumption,andsoon)thatwereneverlegislatedascriminalbut
weredeemedasanoffensetoCatholicandWesternmoralvalueswhich,itwasthought,hadtobe
rescued(CrenzelandAllier‐Montaño2015;FeldandFranco2015;Vezzetti2002).Thus,leftist
armedgroupsoftenpreferredtobeidentifiedascommoncriminals(andnotpoliticalenemies)
topreventtortureordeath.
Theboundariesbetweenthesystematicstaterepressionandtheprivate,violentandeconomic
crimes of the repressors were blurred. Secret, clandestine and systematic practices of state
repression through military, police and paramilitary forces were complementary but they
sometimes overlapped, which made it easy to sway public opinion into blaming ‘subversive’
groupsforhomicides,robberiesandotherordinarycrimes.Thepopulation’swidespreadfearof
reportingcrimestothepoliceandthecourtsandthecensoringofthemedialedtoanexceptional
levelofviolencemanagementforstateandprivatepurposes.Thus,inadditiontobureaucratic
disappearances,tortureandkillings,thedictatorshipalsotolerated(orpaidtheircollaborators
with) the spoils of war, sexual abuse, vendettas and private businesses, extortion of alleged
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collaborators of subversion and kidnapping motivated by the repressors’ and their allies’
personalinterests(seeCalveiro2006;Vezzetti2002:175‐180).
Inhumanrightsissues,symbolicacts–evensmallones–expresspowerfulmeaningsandhelp
buildtoolsofpoliticalstruggle.Today,theevocationofasymbolicnumber(forexample,number
ofdisappearedpeople)ordate,oralabel(‘subversion’,‘dirtywar’,‘stateterrorism’or‘genocide’)
canconstituteemotionalpoliticalbanners.Whilesupportersofthedictatorshipidentifiedtheuse
offorceasa‘waragainstsubversion’,‘communism’or‘terrorism’,someofitscriticsconsidered
ita‘dirtywar’(averycontroversialconcepteventoday),withtensofthousandsofvictims,among
whichwereunionleaders,workers,priests,humanrightslawyers,scientists,doctorsandleaders
of political parties, their friends, acquaintances and relatives, and others who were deemed
suspicious.Humanrightsgroupsclaimeventothistoday,asanemblemorsymbol,thenumber
of‘30,000disappeared’by‘stateterror’inthecontextofa‘genocide’(Crenzel2008a;Feierstein
2015;Osiel1986,2000:121).4
In general, in Argentina and in those Latin American countries which had experienced
transitionaljustice,policies,debatesandcontrolpracticeswithrespecttocommonorordinary
crimescoexistwiththoserelatedtotruth,memoryandjusticesurroundingserioushumanrights
violations:
… they have been and are still the object of court proceedings, they are part of
publicdiscussionsandpoliticalagendas,theyhavebeenportrayedinawiderange
of cultural productions, and they have been evoked in urban spaces through
archives,parks,monuments,andmemorysites,andbywayofpublicpoliciesthat
seektoensurethatthesepastsareconveyedtofuturegenerations.(Crenzeland
Allier‐Montaño2015:1)
LatinAmericadoesnotaccountfortheworstnorthemajorityofserioushumanrightsviolations
ormassatrocities(comparedwith,forexample,NaziGermanyandRwanda)butithelpedbuilda
modelofindividualcriminalresponsibilityforstatecrimes,whosemainprecedenthadbeenthe
trialsofNurembergandTokyoafterWorldWarII.Argentinaalsoaccountsformorethanathird
ofthetrialsforhumanrightsabusesintheworldandmostofthetransitionaljusticedomestic
trials(Nino1997;Sikkink1996,2011;seealsoSavelsberg2010;TransitionalJusticeDatabase
Project2015).
Inthissense,IconsidertheexaminationoftheArgentinecasemaycontributetounderstandthe
dynamics of penality in other Latin American countries, without forgetting that: ‘… local
specificities that underpin the relationship between democratisation and punishment, [are]
embedded … in national histories, political traditions, economic trajectories, institutional
arrangements,andsocialandculturaldynamics…’(CheliotisandSozzo2016:264).
CommonandstatecrimeandpunishmentinArgentina
ArgentinaisemblematicinrelationtotheexperienceoftransitionaljusticeinLatinAmericaand
the world, and the developments and debates arising from it (Centro de Estudios Legales y
Sociales(CentreforLegalandSocialStudies,orCELS)2013:128;Osiel2000;Sikkink1996,2011;
Teitel2003).Duetoitsearlydevelopment,itsimpactandthescopeofitsjuridicaldebates,human
rightstrials,convictionsandsentences,ithashadaleadingroleintheglobaltrendknownas‘the
justice cascade’ (Sikkink 1996, 2011; Crenzel 2015: 81). In her influential book, The Justice
Cascade.HowHumanRightsProsecutionsAreChangingWorldPolitics(2011),politicalscientist
scholar,KatrynSikkink,analysesthecaseofArgentinainaseparatechapter,titled‘…frompariah
statetoglobalprotagonist’.Shesuggeststhat,intheearly1980s,afteranon‐negotiatedtransition
following the defeat of the Malvinas/Falklands war, Argentina helped the development of
accountabilitymechanismssuchastruthcommissions(toprecedetrials,nottoreplacethemas
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South Africa post‐apartheid did in the 1990s) and also to establish high‐level human rights
prosecutionsconcerningthedisappeared(‘desaparecidos’).Althoughearliermilitarytrialshad
beenheldinGreece(1975)andPortugal(1979),thisunprecedenteddecisioninLatinAmerica
wasinternationallycomparedwiththeimpactoftheTokyoandNurembergtrials.Argentinais
nowalsothecountrywiththelongestrecordofprosecutinghumanrightsabusesthatoccurred
beforethetransition(Sikkink2011).
ThreedistinctmomentsmaybeidentifiedinthehistoryoftrialsinArgentina.Iexaminethem
concurrentlywithchangesinordinarycrimeandpunishment.
Theoriginofthestatecrimeprosecutions
The first occurrences began in late 1983. Argentina was the sole country in the region not
governedbymilitarydictatorshipsthatcontinuedtoruleinBolivia,Brazil,Chile,Paraguayand
Uruguay.Democracyhadbeenrestoredand,fivedaysafterRaúlAlfonsínfromtheUniónCívica
Radical party was sworn in as president (1983‐1989), he established a truth commission, the
CONADEP(NationalCommissionofDisappearedPeople)toinvestigatedisappearancesofpeople
and other human rights abuses by the military dictatorship. Personalities from culture,
journalism, law, religion, congressional politics and science were convened to form the
commission. Some human rights activists and groups seeking a bicameral congressional
commissiondeclinedfordifferentreasonstoparticipateinCONADEPalthoughanexceptionwas
thePermanentAssemblyfor HumanRightsorAPDH,which voluntarilyprovidedinformation,
testimoniesandmaterialtotheinquiry.Thenon‐participantsincludedMadresdelaPlazadeMayo
and Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo; Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS); Servicio de Paz y
Justicia (SERPAJ, or Service for Peace and Justice); Familiares de Detenidos y Desparecidos por
RazonesPolíticasoMovimientoEcuménicoporlosDerechosHumanos(EcumenicalMovementfor
HumanRights).Theseorganizationshadadualpositionsincemostofthemcooperatedactively
withtheCONADEPbutpubliclycontinuedtocallfortheestablishmentofabicameralcommission
(Crenzel2008a,2008b,2015).
Foroverninemonths,commissionofficialsandvolunteerstravelledthecountryandcreatedlocal
delegationsinthesearchformissingpeopleandevidenceofstatecrimesandtheirperpetrators,
thedestructionofevidence,andtheexistenceofaclandestinesystematicnetworkofdetention
andtorturecenters.Afterinitialdisbeliefandfear,theworkofthesecommissionofficialsand
volunteers generated thousands of new testimonials from other victims, morgue and hospital
professionals,police,themilitary,communityleaders,religiousleadersandotherleaderswith
first‐handknowledgeandexperiencesoftheclandestinetortureanddetentioncenters(centros
clandestinosdedetención)thatoperatedthroughoutthecountryundermilitaryrule,inCórdoba,
Mendoza,SantaFeandBuenosAires.ThatwasthecaseofthenotoriousEscueladeMecánicade
laArmada(NavalSchoolofMechanicsorESMA),inacentrallocationinthecityofBuenosAires,
wherepoliticaldetaineesweretorturedandinterrogatedbeforebeingkilled. Theworkofthe
CONADEPhelpedprovethatthesecentreshadbeenpartofanentiresystemofstateterrorism
(Crenzel2008a:63,2008b:179‐181,2015;Carrington2014:87‐88).
The final report with the complete record, titled Nunca Más, was presented one year later, in
1984, to the president on paper and microfilm in a public ceremony. It comprised more than
50,000pages.Apaperbackversionwaspublishedfortheinformationofthegeneralpublicand
becameabestseller.(By2007NuncaMashadsoldmorethanhalfamillioncopiesandhadbeen
translated into English, Hebrew, Italian, German and Portuguese.) The evidence collected by
CONADEPwastheprosecution’skeyresourceinthetrialsthatledtotheconvictionofthemilitary
juntas.Todate,allthetrialsforthecrimesofthedictatorshiphavebeenbasedonthereportof
theCONADEPandtherearenumerousproposalstocreateastyleofCONADEPforinvestigating
corruptionorinternationalterrorism.Inaddition,‘NuncaMás’isstillthemainmottoinhuman
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rights discourse and has been a key symbol subsequently replicated in a large number of
internationaltruthcommissionreports.5
Asaresult,in1985nineformermembersofthemilitaryjuntasweresuccessfullyprosecutedin
ahighfederalcivilcourtinBuenosAires(thetrialsoftheJuntas)andfiveothers(ex‐generals
Videla, Massera, Agosti, Viola and Lambruschini) were convicted and sentenced according to
criminallaw(andnotthemilitarycode)toprisonforcrimesofaggravatedmurder,kidnapping
and multiple cases of torture. This led to investigations of a large number of people in other
courts.
The legality and legitimacy of the criminal justice system to protect ordinary citizens was
establishedbasedontheruleoflaw.Aliberalcriminalorientationwasmaintained,inwhichthe
humanrightsoftheaccusedandtheconvictedwerereestablishedwhiletortureofimprisoned
peoplewaspunishedseverely(Sozzo2014:13).Criminalclassicismoftheeighteenthcentury
anditslegalsafeguardswererediscoveredinAnglo‐Saxoncountriesthroughthe‘justicemodel’
and the due process revolution of 1970s. In terms of processes and prison conditions, these
guarantees were opposed to the practices of authoritarianism, which were always willing to
consider valid any means for crime control. They should be applied by impartial courts
administeringprospectiveandstrictlawsequallytoordinarycrimesandstatecrimes.Forthis
reason,preventionofexcessivestateviolenceofanykindwascentralsoasnottorelapseinto
authoritarianism.
Therefore,theNationalSupremeCourtwasfounded,withtheaimofestablishingdemocraticrule
through a liberal tendency towards privacy, freedom of speech, search and seizure, arrests,
interrogationsanddrugpossession.Thisapproach,inspiredbytheroleoftheliberalUSSupreme
Court(the‘WarrenCourt’)ofthe1960s,wasabsolutelynovelinlocallegalhistory.Thisenabled
the condemnation of the usual practices of hard repression of the dictatorship through due
process, while legitimizing the performance of a liberal criminal justice system to protect
citizenshipindemocracy.
Therewerenoinitiativesclearlyorientedtowardsanincreaseintheextensionorseverityofthe
penalsystemand,infact,therewereseveralinitiativestodecreaseit.Thus,internationaltreaties
onhumanrightswereratified;theseincludedtheAmericanConventiononHumanRights(Law
23.054),theInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRightsandtheInternationalCovenant
onEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights(Law23.313),andtheConventionagainstTortureand
OtherCruel,InhumanorDegradingTreatmentorPunishment(Law23.338)(Gargarella2010:
29).Further,rulesofthePenalCodeaboutrecidivismandmulti‐recidivism,suspendedsentences
andotherstigmatizingmeasuresweremodifiedinfavorofconvicts.Law23.070alsoestablished
abeneficialcomputationforcommonandpoliticalprisoners,sentencedoronremand,whowere
inprisonintheperiodbetween24March1976and10December1983(Sozzo2011:8).
Althoughcriticismofliberaldemocraciesfortoleranceorsoftnessindealingwithcommoncrime
existedinArgentinaandthroughoutLatinAmerica(BeckettandGodoy2008)andelsewhere,this
does not always lead to unchanged punitiveness. While state crimes of the dictatorship –
investigated,prosecutedandconvictedforviolationsofthepenalcode–wereinthespotlight,
commoncrimes,especiallyso‐calledstreetcrimes,werenotamainconcern.Themediadidnot
focus on them (except the most sensationalist press, which also sought to sell images of ‘the
horror show’ of the dictatorship); they were not prominent among other problems in public
opinionnorweretheythefocusofthepoliticalcampaignsof1985and1987(Sozzo2014:6).All
ofthishappenedinthecontextofaconsiderableincreaseintheregistryofcrimesinthoseyears
(Kessler2010:72).AsSozzo(2011:6)pointsout:
…between1983and1989,therateofcrimeandtherateofintentionalhomicides
recordedbypoliceinstitutionsincreasedby73%and85%,respectively.Insome
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jurisdictionsthisgrowthwasevenhigher.IntheCityofBuenosAirestherateof
propertycrime–whichgrewby65%inthecountry–increasedby120%,andby
139% in the Province of Buenos Aires. In this province the rate of intentional
homicideincreasedby137%,andby140%intheProvinceofSantaFeduringthe
sameperiod.
TherewasoneexceptionIbelieveisnoteworthy:afewcasesofkidnappingsandmurderswith
the complicity of members or former members of the armed forces, the police or intelligence
servicesattracteddeeppublicconcernandmediaattentionbecauseofthemenacetodemocracy
theyimplied(Kessler2009:73‐75,2010:117;Sozzo2011).Thesecasesweredescribedinofficial
statementsascasesof‘unemployed–repressive–labor’(afterthedictatorship).Thus,inthis
period,thegreatestfearsofcrimewereassociatedwiththelegacyoftheauthoritarianpast.There
wasnoattempttoanswerthefearsofcrimewithpunitiveness(whichreferred,precisely,tothe
authoritarianpast)butratherwithafurtherdeepeningofdemocraticinstitutions.
InArgentina,asinmanyLatinAmericancountrieswheretherearenoofficialdata,thisperiod
presentsseriousdifficultiesintermsofrebuildingdatarelatingtoimprisonment(Sozzo2014:1,
2016a:305).However,thedataofthefederalprisonservice(whichcomputesdatanationwide,
includingfederalprisonsthroughoutthecountryandprisonsinthecityofBuenosAires)andof
the provincial prison services of the province of Buenos Aires and the province of Santa Fe
(between1983and1989thecityofBuenosAires,andtheprovincesmentionedwerethethree
mostimportantdemographicdistricts)maybeusedasindicators.Thus,between1983and1984
therewasasharpdeclineof51percentinthenumberofinmatesinthefederalprisonservice,
42percentintheprisonserviceoftheprovinceofSantaFeanda27percentintheProvinceof
BuenosAires.ThenumberintheFederalprisonservicein1984wasthelowestsince1965.After
1984,however,annualgrowthescalated.Federalprisonersincreased11.6percentonaverage,
with a large increase of 28 per cent between 1987 and 1988. In 1988 the number of federal
prisonerswasjust15percent,lowerthanattheendofthemilitarydictatorship.Intheprovince
ofBuenosAiresandtheprovinceofSantaFe,thegrowthinthenumberofprisonerswashigher;
in1989itreachedthesamenumberofinmatesasattheendofthedictatorship(respectively,66
per 100,000 and 41 per 100,000) (Sozzo 2014: 18, 2016: 305). This situation changed
dramatically after governmental pardons, particularly in the mid‐1990s, when both fear of
commoncrimeandtheindicatorsofpunitivenessgrewsharply.
Limitsandpardons
ThethreatofmultipleprosecutionsintheAlfonsíngovernmentandjudicialdecisionsresultedin
armeduprisingsagainstthegovernmentaswellasadeeppublicandstatefearofanewcoup
d'etat.Inthatcontext,in1986and1987hierarchicalcondemnationswereprioritizedandtwo
laws were passed: one set a deadline in the presentation of new charges (‘Punto Final’, Law
23.492);andanotherlimitedthelegalresponsibilityofsoldierswhoactedundersuperiororders
(‘Obediencia Debida’, Law 23.521) except in cases of appropriation of minors. This highly
controversial decision, which led to the closure of most of these criminal proceedings, was
followedbyadecisionofthenextpresident–fromtheopposingPeronistparty–thatseemedto
implythecompleteendoftrialsandpunishments.
In1990,PresidentMenem(1989‐1995‐1999)launchedtherhetoricofsocialreconciliationand
– as chief of the executive branch – pardoned the convicted Junta members and hundreds of
military, state officials and some high ranking members of leftist groups that were facing
prosecution. The Argentine human rights movement and the families of victims, nevertheless,
continuedtopressforaccountabilityinlocalandinternationalforums.Duringthe1990s,there
were no criminal prosecutions, but ‘Truth trials’ were held in some federal courts to gather
information about the facts and responsibilities, although there was no prospect of criminal
conviction. Relatives and victims also filed complaints with courts in other countries. They
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obtainedarrestwarrantsandextraditions.In2001,theInter‐AmericanCommissiononHuman
Rights – whose decisions must be followed by its members – ruled against the impunity of
amnestylawsandpardonsincrimes‘againsthumanity’(ruling‘BarriosAltos’).
Thedisruptionofcriminalprosecutionandstateneglectoftheseriouscrimescommittedbythe
dictatorshipcanbeassociatedwiththeemergenceofnewinsecuritieswhicharechanneledinthe
concernforcommoncrimepromptedbyapopulism‘fromabove’duringadecadethatwasthe
quintessence of neoliberalism in Argentina (privatizations, de‐industrialization and
unemployment).
Duringthe1990s,therewasasignificantgrowthinthenumberofcriminallawsproducedand,
contrary to what had happened during Alfonsín’s government, it is possible to identify laws
clearly oriented towards increasing the severity and extension of the penal system, but also
certain laws oriented towards the opposite (Sozzo 2011, 2016). Many laws implied the
criminalization of new behaviors or the increase in punishments for already criminalized
behaviors.However,mostofthemhadamarginalimpactontheoperationofthepenalsystem,
beingmoresymbolicthansubstantiveinnature.
Itisclearthatcommoncrimesbecame,onceagain,thecenterofattentionofstatereaction.Drug
offenses, in the context of the American ‘war on drugs’, increased in importance and this was
reflected in crime statistics after the mid‐1990s. In addition, President Menem repeatedly
suggestedthepossibilityofreformingcriminallaw(andabandoninginternationalagreements)
toimposethedeathpenaltyfortraffickingoffenses,aproposalwhichhadnotexistedevenduring
thedictatorship.Althoughthisdidnothappen,anewdruglawthatincriminatedmorebehaviours
andwasmoreseverewasenacted(Law23.737).Inaddition,theNationalSupremeCourtupheld
more conservative positions on issues including legal guarantees and challenged the liberal
positioninrelationtodrugsforpersonalconsumption(‘Montalvo’ruling).
However, the bombings in Buenos Aires of the Israeli Embassy in 1992 and the Argentine‐
IsraeliteMutualAssociation(AMIA)communitycenterin1994–withtheallegedcomplicityof
membersofstateandpoliceforces–resultedinalargenumberofdeadandwoundedcivilian
victims.Asaresultnew,strongdemandsformechanismsofaccountabilityandjusticeagainst
impunityandpowercrimeswereboostedandvictimsocialmovementsre‐emergedtogetherwith
theirdemandsfortruthandjusticewithregardstothecrimesofthedictatorship.‘Insecurity’and
crimefearsinArgentinabecameespeciallywidespreadafterthemid‐1990s(Kessler2009,2010:
115‐138).
Inrelationtoofficiallyregisteredcrimes:
…crimerateinthecountrygrewconstantlybetween1995and2002(88%).This
increase was similar in Buenos Aires city (87%) but extremely higher in the
BuenosAiresProvince(169%).Intentionalhomicidesgrewmoremoderatelyin
thisperiodinthecountry(28%)buttoagreaterdegreeinBuenosAiresProvince
(75%),comparedtoa14%increaseinBuenosAirescity.(Sozzo2016b:309)
ContrarytothedynamicofAlfonsín’sgovernment,indicatorsofpunitivenessgrew:
Thefederalprisonpopulationincreased52%between1989and1995,reachinga
level 28%higher thanat theend of the military dictatorship. The incarceration
rateinBuenosAiresProvincegrew14%‐reachingarate15%higherthanin1983‐
and in Santa Fe Province it increased 7% ‐reaching the same level as in 1983‐.
Meanwhile,therateofsentencesinthecountrygrew14%,althoughit wasstill
18%lowerthanattheendofthemilitarydictatorship.(Sozzo2016b:307)
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Thistrenddeepenedlateron:
Argentinianratewentfrom71/100,000in1996to123/100,000in2002,a73%
increase in six years. A similar growth was observed in Buenos Aires Province
(78%)and,toalowerdegree,infederalprisonpopulation(41%).(Sozzo2016b:
311)
Restartingtheprosecutionofstatecrimes
Sincethecandidacyof Alfonsínin1983,theprosecutionofcrimesofthedictatorshiphadnot
been a political campaign promise; however, twenty years later, during Nestor Kirchner’s
administration (2003‐2007), Congress enacted Law 25.779, which declared the invalidity of
‘PuntoFinal’(Law23.492)and‘ObedienciaDebida’(Law23.521).In2005,theNationalSupreme
CourtupheldLaw25.779(‘Simon’ruling)and,in2007,itdeclaredthepardonsinrelationtothe
militaryunconstitutional(‘Riveros’ruling).Thus,statecrimesofthepastwereconsidered‘crimes
against humanity’ and laws protecting or limiting the prosecution of military personnel and
accompliceswereconsideredunconstitutional.Thisdidnotextendtopoliticalcrimescommitted
byarmedleftistorganizations.Aftermorethanadecadeoflethargy,theKirchneradministration
calledfora newfoundationofthestruggleforhumanrights andaquestioningofall previous
governments (including their own political party). A strong policy of memory, justice and
punishmentwithrespecttostatecrimesofthedictatorialpastwasinstalledontheagendaand
supported;itwassubstantiallymaintainedbyKirchner’swife,whosucceededhimaspresident
(Cristina Fernández de Kirchner 2007‐2011‐2015). Human rights organizations and victims’
movementsstronglysupportedthesepolicies,andmanyofthemreceivedsymbolicandmaterial
recognitionfromthegovernment(tothepointofbecoming–verycontroversially–keyplayers
inpolitics)asneverbefore.
This decision revived intense public debates about the dictatorial past and their civilian
accomplices. It also triggered a polarization on the recent history and around the silence and
crimesofthosewhohadparticipatedinleftistarmedorganizationspriortothedictatorship.
Insum,from2003totheendof2015,atotalof2,821people(military,policeandcivilians)were
indicted in hundreds of federal investigations involving multiple participants, promoted in
severalcourtsthroughoutthecountry.Manyofthesehadbeeninitiallyinvestigatedinthe1980s
untilamnestylawsandpardonstookeffect.Thecurrenttrendistogroupfederalinvestigations
aroundclandestinedetentioncentresorcommonplans(liketheNavalSchoolofMechanicsor
ESMA,‘AutomotoresOrletti’,‘Vesuvio’orthejointlydevelopedplanwithdictatorshipsofChileand
Uruguay:‘PlanCondor’,andothers).
Alargenumberoftheaccusedarestillunderinvestigation;somediedofnaturalcausesandafew
absconded. Strictly speaking, during the years 2006‐2015, 662 of those defendants were
convicted on trial6 and 60 were acquitted. Thirty eight per cent were sentenced to life
imprisonment(‘prisión’or‘reclusión’)withthepotentialforparole;31.5percentweresentenced
to3‐15yearsinprison(ordinaryprisonsforseriouscrimes,notmilitaryprisons);27percent
weresentencedto16‐25years;3percenttonomorethanthreeyears;and,fortheremainder
(0.5percent),arangeofothersentences.Nearlyonethirdoftheconvictionswereforoffensesof
illegal deprivation of liberty; a slightly smaller proportion for torture or murder; and the
remainderforappropriationofchildren,sexualviolenceorothercrimes(CELS2015;Ministerio
PúblicoFiscaldelaNación(MPF)2015).
Intheelectioncampaignof2003,NestorKirchner,thefuturepresident,linkedinsecurity asa
social problem resulting from the crisis, and unemployment and poverty as generated by the
neoliberalreformsofthe1990s;healsocriticizedeconomiccrimeandpromotedprosecutionof
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crimesofthepowerful(Sozzo2016a:193‐94,2016b:311).Theseviewswerecontrarytothose
oftheotherleadingcandidate,theformerpresidentMenem.
Between2006‐07and2015therewereseverallegalinitiativesandmoderatespeechesinrelation
to common crime and no initiatives to increase criminal severity as in the 1990s, with the
exceptionof new incriminations for humantrafficking (Law 26.364 and 26.842);, andmurder
aggravatedby‘femicide’andsexual‘hatecrimes’(Law26.791),theimpactofwhichhasnotyet
becomeclear.ThiscontrastedparticularlywithrhetoricandinitiativesbytheGovernorofthe
Province of Buenos Aires, who belonged to the same political alliance and was promoted by
FernándezdeKirchnertopresidentialcandidatein2015.Inaddition,theNationalSupremeCourt
added more prestigious and less conservative members, supported the prosecution of state
crimes,andslowly returnedtotheliberalcriminal road ofthe mid‐1980sforcommoncrimes
(even in terms of prison overcrowding: rule ‘Verbitsky’, 2005; and possession of drugs for
consumption:rule‘Arriola’,2009).
However, between 2004 and 2005 an event characterized as the best example of punitive
populism‘frombelow’inthatdecadeledtoanescalationofpenalreforms,undoubtedlyaimedat
greaterpunitivityforordinarycrimes.Inowfocusonthisevent.
OnMarch24,2004,theanniversaryofmilitarycoupof1976,PresidentKirchnerremovedthe
picture of Videla, the first president of the dictatorship (who was under house arrest at that
moment),fromthegalleryofthenationalmilitarycollege.Thismovewasidentifiedbymanyasa
symbolofanewerainhumanrightspolicy.Thatsameday,itbecamepublicknowledgethatAxel
Blumberg had been found killed the previous day. He was a young upper‐middle class boy, a
victim of a kidnapping organized by a criminal gang with no connection to politics. This case,
which became a catalyst for discussions on security and politics, was extensively debated. In
Argentina,kidnappingfollowedbydeath,aswesawbefore,islinkednotonlytofearsofpolitical
violencebythestatebutalso,duringthe1970s,tofearsof‘popular’punishmentorillegalways
of funding leftist groups and, during the transition to democracy in the 1980s, to fears about
persistentauthoritarianstructuresofcrime(Kessler2009,2010;Sozzo2011,2016b).
The‘Axel’Foundation,createdbyAxelBlumberg’sfather,heldseveraldemonstrations(initially
verycrowded)inpursuitofsecurityandjusticeandinfavorofmoralandlegislativereform.He
alsocollected5millionsignaturesinapetitiontobepresentedtotheexecutiveandlegislative
authoritiesofthenationalgovernmentandtheProvinceofBuenosAiresurgingpassageofalarge
numberofcriminallaws,proceduralandlegalreformsoftheprisonsystem,andadministrative
controls pursuing, undoubtedly, more severity (Calzado and Van den Dooren 2009; Schillagi
2006;Sozzo2011,2016b).
Inafewmonthsduring2004,inthecontextoftheaforementionedBlumbergcrusade,morethan
ten legal reforms to the Criminal Code and the national prison law increased penalties or
restrictions. In October 2004, penitentiary law was also reformed in order to rule out the
possibilityofenjoyingtemporaryrelease,ordiscontinuousprisonandassistedlibertyincasesof
aggravatedmurder.Thiswasextendedtoothercases(CalzadoandVandenDooren2009;Sozzo
2016b).
The relationshipof the Kirchner administrationtoBlumberg’s crusade was ambiguous.In the
first year, before the great social support of Blumberg’s claims, their relationship was close
(Blumbergevenhadpersonalmeetingswiththepresidentinthehouseofgovernment).These
meetings helped him gain support for the legal reforms to the Criminal Code mentioned
previously. In 2005, long after human rights organizations had questioned the fact that the
protests had turned to the political right and criticized the government, Blumberg and the
governmentbroketies.ThelastpublicdemonstrationwasinAugust2006.Afewweeksbefore,a
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federalcourtofBuenosAirescityhaddecidedthefirstconvictionforcrimesofthedictatorship
after2003.
The upward trend in the national incarceration rate reached 144 per 100,000 inhabitants in
2005:
In Buenos Aires Province, the increase was even higher (28%). Federal prison
population grew less (9%). Sentence rates increased significantly by 29%.
Moreover, the severity of sentences intensified: suspended sentences were
reduced – from 42% in 2002 to 35% in 2005 – and longer custodial sentences
imposed–in2002,72%oftheseconvictionswereforlessthanthreeyearsand
decreasedto66%in2005.(Sozzo2016b:313)
However, between 2005 and 2007, there was a slight decrease in the prison population, both
nationallyandintheProvinceofBuenosAires.Itthenbegantoincreasemoderately–inrelative
terms–until2015:
Incarcerationratedecreased8%from2005to2007,reaching133/100,000,and
sodidfederalprisonpopulationby6%andintheBuenosAiresProvinceby8%.
Thisreductionisalsoobservedinsentencerates:10%lowerin2007thanin2005.
(Sozzo2016b:314)
In this context, imprisonment rates increased moderately. Between 2007 and
2013 the incarceration rate grew 14%, reaching 152/100,000 nationwide. In
BuenosAiresProvince,itincreasedby13%reaching176/100,000.Federalprison
population grew by 9%. Sentence rates remained stable, but the amount of
suspended sentences decreased (from 38% to 32%) and so did short custodial
sentences(from66%to61%).(Sozzo2016b:316)
Conclusions
Thecriminologyandsociologyofpunishmentofcommoncrimesandstudiesonpunishmentof
state crimes have usually taken different paths, even in Latin America where it is extremely
difficultnottocrossthelinesthatdividethem.Ingeneral,inArgentinaandtransitionaljustice
countries,experienceswithrespecttocommonorordinarycrimescoexistwiththoserelatedto
thetruth,memoryandjusticesurroundingserioushumanrightsviolations.
InthispaperIaimedtocontributetothescholarshiponsoutherncriminology(Carrington,Hogg
and Sozzo 2015) by means of exploring changes in crimes and punishment of state crimes
committedduringthelastmilitarydictatorshipinArgentina(1976‐1983)jointlywithchangesin
thepunishmentofcommoncrimesina–lessusual–comprehensiveapproach.
It is uncertain whether the experience of the authoritarian past will lead to a subsequent
punitivityinthedemocraticcriminaljusticesystem,orwhetheritwillpreventarecurrenceof
authoritarianrule(CheliotisandSozzo2016:265).However,itappearsthatthecultivationand
maintenanceofthecollectivememoryofstatecrimesofthedictatorshipinArgentinamakesit
verydifficulttopromoteclaimsofopenpunitivenesstowardordinarycriminality(Sozzo2011).
It was stressed that the increased tolerance of common crimes of the powerless was possible
during the governments of Alfonsín and Kirchner (after 2005) and that matched low rates of
imprisonmentor,atleast,moremoderateones(Sozzo2016b).Thisseemstocorrelatewiththe
policyofprosecutingcrimesofthedictatorship.Moreover,punitivitytowardscommoncrimesin
themid‐1990scouldberelatedtotheinterruptionoftrials.
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Criminalizingtherepressivepracticesofthedictatorshipasserioushumanrightsviolationsand
legalcrimes,accordingtothecivil(notmilitary)PenalCodeandcourtsforfederalcrimes,hadthe
symbolicandsubstantivepurposeofdenyingstateviolenceasalegitimateweaponofpolitical
struggle.Thissituationcontinuestodayintheidentificationofthesecrimesas‘crimesagainst
humanity’.Duringthirtyyearsofdemocraticrule,thefearofamilitarycoupdidnotmaterialize
butneitherdidviolentretaliationagainsttherepressorsorwavesoflynchingmotivatedbyother
commoncrimes,asexperiencedinotherLatinAmericanregions(Godoy2004).
This article exemplifies a fruitful line of research on punishment in Latin America and other
countrieswithexperiencesoftransitionaljustice,andalsoinotherpartsoftheglobalwherethese
processeshavenottakenplace,asitallowsthemtotesthowfartheirgeneralassumptionsabout
punishmentareapplicablebeyondtheirborders.Southerncriminologyshouldnotonlychallenge
thelimitsoftheclaimsofthegrandnarrativesoftheglobalNorthbutalsoprovideelementsto
broadenthescopeofunderstandingoftheirspecificproblems.
Correspondence: Diego Zysman Quirós, Facultad de Derecho, Universidad de Buenos Aires,
BuenosAires,Argentina;VisitingFellow,SchoolofJustice,FacultyofLaw,QueenslandUniversity
ofTechnology,2GeorgeStreet,BrisbaneQLD4000,Australia.
Email:[email protected]
1ThispaperispartofaresearchprojectatUniversidaddeBuenosAires,FacultaddeDerechoDCT1440(2014‐16)and
UBACyT 20020150200141BA (2016‐17) ‘Castigo y Democracia: Teoría y práctica penal en Argentina y América
Latina’.
2 European Criminology Group on Atrocity Crimes and Transitional Justice (ECACTJ) of the European Society of
Criminology at http://www.esc‐eurocrim.org/index.php/activities/working‐groups/53‐atrocity‐crimes‐and‐
transitional‐justice
3Thetransitiontodemocracybeganindifferentyears:Ecuador(1980),Bolivia(1982),Honduras(1982)Argentina
(1983),ElSalvador(1984),Uruguay(1984);Brazil(1985),Guatemala(1986),Haiti(1991),Paraguay(1989),Chile
(1990),Panama(1990),Peru(1980,2000).
4TheCONADEP,inninemonthsofoperation,systematicallydocumentedatleast8,961disappearances.Thisnumber
increased later with new reports. Human rights groupshave claimed, since the mid‐1970s, ‘30.000 disappeared’.
Discussions on this issue are not innocent and, even now, they are the subject of intense divisive political and
historicaltension.Recently,humanrightsleadersexpressedindignationregardingcommentsofcurrentPresident
Macrionthenumberofpeoplewhohaddisappearedduringthedictatorshipandtheuseoftheconceptof‘dirtywar’.
Macriansweredinaninterview:‘Idon’tknow.It’sadebatethatIdon’twanttoenterinto.Ifitwas9,000or30,000
…’.Theconceptof‘dirtywar’,widelyusedinternationallysince1980s,orotherusesoftheterm‘war’or‘civilwar’to
characterizetheviolenceduringdictatorship,isquestionedbypoliticalandhumanrightsorganizationsandscholars
whoproperlyprefertoidentifyitasstateterrorandnottospeakoftwosideswithequalresponsibilityforviolence
inacivilwar.
5ArquidiócesisdeSanPaulo:BrasilNuncaMás(1985);SERPAJUruguay,NuncaMás(1989);ComitédeIglesiapara
Ayudas de Emergencia, Paraguay Nunca Más (1990); Proyecto Interdiocesano de Recuperación de la Memoria
Histórica,Guatemala:‘NuncaMás’(1996);ProyectoNuncaMás;Colombia‘NuncaMás’:crímenesdelesahumanidad
(2000),andothercommissionreports(Crenzel2008:193).
6 Despite the criminological importance, a significant number of judgments are not firm in legal terms, since the
convictedhavetherighttoappealtotheNationalSupremeCourt.
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