The semantics/pragmatics interface from a linguistic perspective: a ďŝƌĚ͛ƐĞLJĞǀŝĞǁ Ilse Depraetere, UMR 8163 STL I. Outline -­‐ Domains of application: an overview -­‐ ǮŠ‡‘–‡š–ǯƒ†ǮWhat is Saidǯ: an overview -­‐ Generalized conversational implicatures (GCI) at the semantics/pragmatics interface: an example (and) -­‐ Empirical observations that pragmatic theory is supposed to explain: some examples II. Domains of application Anglo-­‐American vs. Continental view (Mey 2001) Ǯ‹‰—‹•–‹…’”ƒ‰ƒ–‹…•ǥ…ƒ„‡•ƒ‹†–‘
characterize a new way of looking at things linguistic rather than marking off clear „‘—†ƒ”‹‡•–‘‘–Š‡”†‹•…‹’Ž‹‡•Ǥǯȋƒ„‡”Žƒ†
and Mey (1977: 5) in Mey (2001: 9)) Ǯ–Š‡ „‘”†‡”™ƒ”•ǯȋ‘”ʹͲͲ͸Ȍ Ǯ„‘”†‡”•‹”‹•Š‡•ǯȋ”‹‡ŽʹͲͳͲȌ Handbook of Pragmatics (HOPS), Mouton de Gruyter (http://www.degruyter.com/view/serial/40489) This new landmark series of nine self-­contained handbooks provides a comprehensive and up-­
to-­date overview of the entire field of pragmatics. It is based on a wide conception of pragmatics as the study of intentional human interaction in social and cultural contexts. The series reflects, appraises and structures a field that is exceptionally vast, unusually heterogeneous and still rapidly expanding. In-­depth articles by leading experts from around the world discuss the foundations, major theories and most recent developments of pragmatics including philosophical, cognitive, socio-­cultural, contrastive and diachronic perspectives. -­‐ it will view pragmatics from both theoretical and applied perspectives; -­‐ it will be internationally oriented meeting the needs of the international pragmatic community;
-­‐ it will be interdisciplinary including pragmatically relevant entries from adjacent fields such as philosophy, anthropology and sociology, neuroscience and psychology, semantics, grammar and text and discourse analysis; Bublitz, W. and N. R. Norrick (eds.) 2011. Vol 1. Foundations of pragmatics. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Sbisà, M. and K. Turner (eds.) 2013. Vol 2. Pragmatics of speech actions. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Schmid, H.-­‐J. (ed.) 2012. Vol 4. Cognitive pragmatics. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Locher, M. and S. L. Graham. (eds.) 2010. Vol 6. Interpersonal pragmatics. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. The semantics/pragmatics interface from a linguistic perspective: ƒ„‹”†ǯ•‡›‡˜‹‡™ 1 Trosborg, A. (ed.) 2010. Vol 7. Pragmatics across languages and cultures. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Jucker, A. H. and I. Taavitsaien. (eds). 2010. Vol 8. Historical pragmatics. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Herring, S., D. Stien and T. Virtanen. (eds). 2013. Vol 9. Pragmatics of computer-­mediated Communication. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Schneider, K. P. and A. Barron. (eds.) 2014. Pragmatics of discourse. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. International Pragmatics Association, http://ipra.ua.ac.be/ Journals Intercultural Pragmatics http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/iprg International Review of pragmatics http://www.brill.com/international-­‐review-­‐pragmatics Journal of Pragmatics http://www.journals.elsevier.com/journal-­‐of-­‐pragmatics/ Journal of Historical Pragmatics http://benjamins.com/#catalog/journals/jhp/main Lódz Papers in Pragmatics http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/lpp Pragmatics. Ipra Papers in Pragmatics http://ipra.ua.ac.be/main.aspx?c=*HOME&n=1267 Pragmatics and Cognition http://benjamins.com/#catalog/journals/pc/main Revue de Sémantique et Pragmatique http://www.univ-­‐orleans.fr/RSP/presentation.htm Semantics and Pragmatics http://semprag.org/index Ilse Depraetere, UMR 8163 STL, 16-­‐1-­‐2013 2 III. ͚dŚĞŽŶƚĞdžƚ͛ĂŶĚ͚tŚĂƚŝƐ^ĂŝĚ͛͗ĂŶŽǀĞƌǀŝĞǁ Grice (1975): what is said what is implicated context for -­‐ conventional implicatures reference assignment -­‐ generalized conversational implicatures & disambiguation -­‐ particularized conversational implicatures Carston (1988, 2002, 2009) Hypothesis -­‐ ǮThe (tacit) assumption of most pragmaticists then is that there is a small gap between sentence sense and explicature, but that it is entirely filled by disambiguation and ”‡ˆ‡”‡…‡ƒ••‹‰‡–ǤŠ›•Š‘—Ž†–Š‹•„‡•‘ǫǯȋͳͻͺͺǣͳ͸ͲȌ -­‐ pragmatic processing makes a far greater combination to determining proposition that is (minimally) truth-­‐evaluable, the explicature -­‐ generalized conversational implicatures are part of what is said (arguments, cf. section IV) Processes involved: -­‐ saturation (linguistic variable, (1) and (2)) -­‐ free enrichment ((3) to (6), constrained by the principle of Relevance) Examples: (1) Paracetamol is better. (than what?) (Carston 2009: 16) (2) ‡ǯ•too young. (for what?) (3) –ǯ•‰‘‹‰–‘–ƒ‡–‹‡ˆ‘”–Š‡•‡™‘—†•–‘Š‡ƒŽǤȏconsiderable time] (Carston 2009: 17) (4) –ǯ••‘™‹‰Ǥȏin location x] (5) Boris is a manǤȋƒ””‘™‹‰ǣǮ–Š‡‹†‡ƒŽƒǯȌ (6) This policy will bankrupt –Š‡ˆƒ”‡”•ǤȋŽ‘‘•‡—•‡‘ˆǮ„ƒ”—’–ǯȌ Bach (1994, 2007) Hypothesis: -­‐ what is said + what is implicated + impliciture (Ǯwhat is implicit in the ‡š’Ž‹…‹–ǯ) Processes involved: -­‐ expansion (pragmatic underdetermination, minimal proposition, (7) and (8)) -­‐ completion (semantic underdetermination, no proposition, (9) and (10)) Examples: (7) Everyone [in my family] went to the wedding. (8) I will be there [at the agreed time]. (2007: 30) (9) Danielle just finished a novel. (doing what: reading, writing, editing, typing, eating?) (2007: 31) (10) That statue is short. (relative to what?) The semantics/pragmatics interface from a linguistic perspective: ƒ„‹”†ǯ•‡›‡˜‹‡™ 3 Recanati (2001, 2010) Hypothesis Truth-­‐conditional pragmatics: what is said = intuitive truth-­‐conditional content ˆǤ˜ƒ‹Žƒ„‹Ž‹–›’”‹…‹’Ž‡ǣǮ†‡…‹†‹‰™Š‡–Š‡”ƒ’”ƒ‰ƒ–‹…ƒŽŽ›†‡–‡”‹‡†ƒ•’‡…–‘ˆ—––‡”ƒ…‡
meaning is part of what is said, that is, in making a decision concerning what is said, we should always try to preserve our pre-­‐–Š‡‘”‡–‹…‹–—‹–‹‘•‘–Š‡ƒ––‡”Ǥǯȋ‡…ƒƒ–‹ͳͻͻ͵ǣ
248) Processes involved -­‐ primary pragmatic processes and secondary pragmatic processes -­‐ saturation o linguistically controlled pragmatic process (2010: 4) o indexicals and free variables in logical form o bottom-­‐up, signal-­‐driven -­‐ modulation o pragmatically controlled pragmatic process o Ǯ‡ƒ‹‰m of an expression is mapped to a distinct meaning g(mȌǡ™Š‡”‡Ǯgǯ‹•ƒ
’”ƒ‰ƒ–‹…ˆ—…–‹‘ǯȋʹͲͳͲǣͶʹȌ o metonymy, metaphor, free enrichment o top-­‐down, context-­‐driven Borg (2012) Ǯǯ‰‘‹‰–‘ƒ”‰—‡–Šƒ–‹–‹•’‘••‹„Ž‡–‘”‡…‘˜‡”–Š‡’”‘’‘•‹–‹‘Ž‹–‡”ƒŽŽ›‡š’”‡••‡†„›ƒ™‡ŽŽ-­‐
formed declarative sentence (its semantic content) simply on the basis of knowledge of the lexical entries for the expressions involved and an understanding of the syntactic construction of that sentence, plus, for sentences which contain genuinely context-­‐sensitive elements, a merely ‹‹ƒŽ…‘…‡’–‹‘‘ˆ–Š‡…‘–‡š–™‹–Š‹™Š‹…Š–Š‡•‡–‡…‡™ƒ•’”‘†—…‡†ǤǯȋʹͲͳʹǣͳȌ (i)
Semantic content for well-­‐formed declarative sentences is truth-­‐evaluable content. (ii)
Semantic content for a sentence is fully determined by its syntactic structure and lexical content: the meaning of a sentence is exhausted by the meaning of its parts and their mode of composition. (iii)
There are only a limited number of context-­‐sensitive expressions in natural language. (iv)
Recovery of semantic content is possible without access to current speaker ‹–‡–‹‘•ȋ…”—†‡Ž›ǡ‰”ƒ•’‘ˆ•‡ƒ–‹……‘–‡–‹˜‘Ž˜‡•Ǯ™‘”†”‡ƒ†‹‰ǯƒ†‘–
Ǯ‹†”‡ƒ†‹‰ǯȌȋʹͲͳʹǣ 4Ȃ5) Ǯf we dissolve the syntactic walls on what counts as semantic content we will be left with no way to reconstruct any walls at all. That is to say, we will lose all distinction between literal meaning and speech act content.ǯȋʹͲͳʹǣͳ͸Ȍ Carston Bach Recanati Borg Top-­‐down pragmatic effects on the proposition ξ X ξ X literally expressed (semantic content) Semantic content is speech act content ξ X ξ X Do lexico-­‐syntactic features alone sometimes ξ ξ ξ ξ give rise to propositions? Do lexico-­‐syntactic features alone always give X X ξ ξ rise to propositions? Fig. 1. (based on Borg 2012: 72) Ilse Depraetere, UMR 8163 STL, 16-­‐1-­‐2013 4 Grice Carston elements of meaning that are communicated when a sentence is uttered code reference assignment & disambiguation what is said code Bach explicature Recanati what is said conventional meaning reference assignment & disambiguation linguistically mandated enrichment = saturation free enrichment conventional implicatures GCI Particularized conversational implicatures GCI Particularized conversational implicatures what is implicated conventional implicatures implicature reference assignment & disambiguation completion expansion impliciture conventional implicatures GCI what is said impliciture what is said primary pragmatic processes Particularized conversational implicatures what is implicated what is implicated secondary pragmatic processes Figure 2. Contextual information, what is said and what is implicated The semantics/pragmatics interface from a linguistic perspective: ƒ„‹”†ǯ•‡›‡˜‹‡™ 5 IV. Generalized Conversational Implicatures at the semantics/pragmatics interface: an example (and) (based on Ariel 2008) ǮŠ‡…‘•‡•—•‹–Š‡ˆ‹‡Ž†‹•–Šƒ–and has a minimal semantic meaning, supplemented by a ˜ƒ”‹‡–›‘ˆ’”ƒ‰ƒ–‹…‹–‡”’”‡–ƒ–‹‘•Ǥǯȋ”‹‡ŽʹͲͲͺǣ͹͹Ȍ Generalized Conversational Implicature (ƒš‹‘ˆƒ‡”ǣǮ‡‘”†‡”Ž›ǯ) (11) Alina: we were gonna take it [the broken radio] out and send it back to the factory. (Ariel 2008: 72, in order to) (12) a. The bus lines in Ramle have been privatized Ȃ and the residents of the Arab neighborhoods have to walk. (Ariel 2008: 72, and as a result) b. ?? the residents of the Arab neighborhoods have to walk Ȃ and the bus lines have been privatized. (Ariel 2008: 73) (13) Š‡™ƒ•‘…‡‹™‹–ŠŠ‡”‹†•ƒ†‘…‡™‹–Š‘—–„—–…ƒǯ–”‡‡„‡”™Š‹…Š…ƒ‡ˆ‹”•–Ǥ
(Ariel 2008: 75, cancellation) (14) a. ™‡–‘˜‡”–‘‹ŽŽǯ•and we checked the proofs. (Huddleston and Pullum et al 2002: 1300, and then) b. ™‡–‘˜‡”–‘‹ŽŽǯ•Ǥ‡…Š‡…‡† the proofs. (15) Relations between Okon and Beinisch grew tense [the Nili Cohen episode]. Shortly ƒˆ–‡”™ƒ”†•ǡ‘Ž‡ˆ––Š‡’‘•‹–‹‘‘ˆ”‡‰‹•–”ƒ”ǥ‹•…‘ˆ‹†ƒ–••ƒ›–Š‡”‡‹•‘…ƒ—•ƒŽ
connection between the Nili Cohen episode and his leaving. (Ariel 2008: 76, cancellation) (16) a. Ken: So I eat the local food and get deadly ill. (Ariel 2008: 72, as a result) b. Ken: So I eat the local food. I get deadly ill. (Ariel 2008: 76, as a result) ǮŽ–Š‘—‰Š–Š‹•ƒ”‰—‡–‹•‘ˆ–‡—•‡†„›ƒƒŽ›•–•ȋǥȌǡ‘‹–•‘™ǡ‹–‹•‘–a very convincing argument. Many lexical codes exist for interpretations that could be pragmatically inferred. Thus, one would not want to say that as a result has no causal semantic meaning just because adding it to ȋǥȌȏͳ͸„], for example, is redundant. Carston (2002: 250Ȃ͸ͲȌ”‹‰Š–Ž›•—‰‰‡•–•™‡•Š‘—Ž†„‡…ƒ”‡ˆ—Ž‹Š‘™™‡—•‡–Š‹•…”‹–‡”‹‘ǡ–Š‡Ǥǯ
(Ariel 2008: 76) Against the implicature analysis: and-­‐related inferences can (sometimes) affect the truth conditions of the proposition they are based on. Part of the explicature. Cf. 1. Operator-­‐scope embedding tests (Cohen 1971, Carston 2002, Recanati 1989, 2001) Ǯˆ™‡•‡‡ that some logical operator has an effect on the inferred interpretation, the inference must have contributed to the truth conditions of the proposition. The rationale behind this test is that logical operators have scope only on explicitly stated materials. If so, when we see a differential patterning of some inferences, such that some of them fall under the scope of logical operators but others do not, we have a basis for distinguishing between the two. Explicated inferences are those which fall under the scope of logical opera–‘”•ǡ„‡…ƒ—•‡–Š‡›Šƒ˜‡ƒ‘”‡†‹”‡…–‹–‡”ƒ…–‹‘ƒŽ’”‡•‡…‡Ǥ’Ž‹…ƒ–—”‡•†‘‘–Ǥǯ
(Ariel 2008: 80) (17) conditional a. If I eat the local food and I get deathly ill, I should stop going to Mexico. (Ariel 2008: 80) b. If I eat the local food and as a result I get deathly ill, I should stop going to Mexico. c. ?? If I get deathly ill and eat the local food, I should stop going to Mexico. Ilse Depraetere, UMR 8163 STL, 16-­‐1-­‐2013 6 (18) scope of negation I read somewhere, –Šƒ–‹–ǯ•not that, she fell and broke her hip but, she broke her hip and fell. (Ariel 2008: 80) (19) disjunction Either he left her and she took to the bottle or she took to the bottle and he left her. (Carston 2002: 227) (20) comparative –ǯ•„‡––‡”–‘†‘›‘—”Šƒ†‰‡–ƒŒ‘„–Šƒ–‘‰‡–ƒŒ‘„ƒ††‘›‘—”ŠǤȋƒ”•–‘ʹͲͲʹǣ
227) Cf. 2. ‹’Ž‡•‡–‡…‡•‡šŠ‹„‹–•ƒ‡Ǯ‹–”—•‹‘ǯ (21) a. Well, I guess if they call him Randy and Š‡ƒ•™‡”•ǡŠ‡ǯ•ƒ†›Ǥ b. Someone called him Randy and he answered. c. Conclus‹‘ǣ‡ǯ•ƒ†›Ǥȋ”‹‡ŽʹͲͲͺǣͺͳ) (22) Woman filing a complaint (I) and a policeman (He) (Ariel 2008: 82) I. He broke the door open with a kick. Started to act madly. To yell. He. (reads) My husband (his name) came into the house and „”‘‡‘’‡–Š‡†‘‘”ǥ I. Excuse me, I correct his writing. He first of all broke the door open and then he came ‹ǥ He. ƒ†ƒǡ†‘ǯ–‹–‡””—’–‡ƒ††‘ǯ––‡ƒ…Š ‡Š‘™–‘ˆ‹ŽŽ‘—–ƒ…‘’Žƒ‹–ǥ I. ”›–‘—†‡”•–ƒ†ǡ‹”Ǥ–ǯ•‹’‘••‹„Ž‡–Šƒ–Š‡ˆ‹”•–‘ˆƒŽŽ…ƒ‡‹ƒ†–Š‡„”‘‡–Š‡
door open. He. –ǯ•‘–‹’‘”–ƒ–ǤŠƒ–ǯ•Š‘™›‘—ˆ‹ŽŽ‘—–ƒ…‘’Žƒ‹–Ǥ I. But ‹–ǯ•‘––”—‡ǡƒ†™‘ǯ–•‹‰–Š‹•…‘’Žƒ‹–—Ž‡••ǥ Cf. 3. Lie tests ǮErteschik-­‐Shir ƒ†ƒ’’‹ǯ•ȋͳͻ͹ͻȌDz‹‡‡•–dz, which identifies foregrounded information (Dominant is their term), can help us see that the relation between the conjunctions is indeed a potential foregrounded ‡••ƒ‰‡‹–Š‡•‡…ƒ•‡•ǤŠ‡‹†‡ƒ„‡Š‹†–Š‡Dz‹‡‡•–dz‹•
–Šƒ––Š‡ƒ††”‡••‡‡ǯ•”‡•’‘•‡‘•–ƒ–—”ƒŽŽ›”‡Žƒ–‡•–‘–Š‡ˆ‘”egrounded, rather than to –Š‡„ƒ…‰”‘—†‡†ƒ–‡”‹ƒŽ‘ˆ–Š‡•’‡ƒ‡”ǯ•—––‡”ƒ…‡. ȋǥȌ’’Ž›‹‰–Š‡Dz‹‡‡•–dzŠ‡”‡
shows that either conjunct, but, crucially, also the connection between the conjuncts can be targeted by the test.ǯȋ”‹‡ŽʹͲͲͺǣͺͲȌ (23) Ken: (H) So I eat the local food, and get deathly ill ‘ƒ‡ǣŠƒ–ǯ•‘––”—‡Ǥ a. You †‘ǯ–‡ƒ––Š‡Ž‘…ƒŽˆ‘‘†Ǥ „Ǥ‘—†‘ǯ–‰‡–†‡ƒ–ŠŽ›‹ŽŽǤ …ǤŠ‡ˆ‘‘†ǯ•‰‘–‘–Š‹‰–‘†‘™‹–Š›‘—”‹ŽŽ‡••Ǥ Cf. 4. Functional independence principle (cf. Carston 1988, Carston 2002: 189Ȃ90) (12) Lenore: What put you off travelling down there? Ken: Well, I eat the local food, and get deathly ill. (Ariel 2008: 82) Implicature: Ken is not planning to travel to Mexico. The semantics/pragmatics interface from a linguistic perspective: ƒ„‹”†ǯ•‡›‡˜‹‡™ 7 ”‡‹•‡ǣǮ‡ƒ––Š‡Ž‘…ƒŽˆ‘‘†ƒ†ƒ•ƒ”‡•—Ž–‰‡–†‡ƒ–ŠŽ›‹ŽŽǤǯ Ǯ‘–‡˜‡”›’‘–‡–‹ƒŽ–”—–Š-­‐compatible inference is necessarily intended „›–Š‡•’‡ƒ‡”Ǥǯ (Ariel 2008: 87) (13) a. ALINA So Cathy calls me up, and •Š‡™ƒ–•‘ƒ–Šƒǯ•’Š-­‐ .. address. b. ALINA ‘ƒ–Š›™ƒ–•‘ƒ–Šƒǯ•ƒ††”‡••and she calls me up. (14) a. We watched the Akaba conference, we hoped for the best [hopes for peace], and yesterday they knocked on our door [officer who tells them their son has been killed by Palestinians]. b. We watched the Akaba conference, we hoped for the best, and then, yesterday they knocked on our door. GCI are cancellable (in most cases > implicatures) vs. GCI contribute to truth-­‐conditional content (> explicature) V. Empirical observations: some examples 5.1. Modal meaning (may and can): contextual enrichment? (24) a. He may be disappointed. (epistemic possibility) b. Female species may grow up to 35cm long. (non-­‐epistemic possibility) c. You may come in. (permission) (25) a. she can play the violin. (ability) b. You can get through. Road works are over. (possibility) c. Can I leave now? (permission) Salkie (2012): Can is •‡ƒ–‹…ƒŽŽ›‹…‘’Ž‡–‡ȋǮ•‡ƒ–‹…—†‡”†‡–‡”‹ƒ–‹‘ǯȋƒ…ŠͳͻͻͶȌȌ ; may is pragmatically ‹…‘’Ž‡–‡ȋǮ•‡–‡…‡‘-­‐Ž‹–‡”ƒŽ‹–›ǯȋƒ…ŠͳͻͻͶȌȌ Saturation? Free enrichment? Completion? ability opportunity permission general situation situation possibility (GSP) permissibility scope narrow narrow narrow wide wide source internal External external external external potential -­‐ potential -­‐ potential + potential -­‐ potential barrier + potential barrier barrier barrier barrier barrier Table 1: taxonomy of root possibility in Depraetere and Reed (2011) 5.2. Š‡Ǯ”‡•—Ž–ƒ–‹˜‡’‡”ˆ‡…–ǯ: cancellability of implicatures How many perfects? (26) Have you ever been to Venice? (experiential) (27) I have heard this before. (indefinite) (28) I have been working here for too long. (continuative) etc. Ilse Depraetere, UMR 8163 STL, 16-­‐1-­‐2013 8 Ǯ‡•—Ž–ƒ–‹˜‡’‡”ˆ‡…–ǯ (29) ǯ˜‡Šƒ†ƒ•Š‘™‡”Ǥȋ‡•—Ž–ǣǯ…Ž‡ƒȂ You need to clean up the bathroom Ȃ You can take a shower now Ȃ ǯ ready to go Ȃ ǯ‘–ˆ‡‡Ž‹‰ depressed anymore, etc.) Semantics of perfect (aspectual or temporal): resultativeness Or is resultativeness an implicature? Ǯ„‡Ž‹‡˜‡–Šƒ–‘‡…ƒ–ƒŽ‘ˆ”‡•—Ž–•™‹–Š‹–Š‡”‡ƒŽ‘ˆ‡š’‡”‹‡…‡ǡ‡‘”›ǡ‘”ˆ‡‡Ž‹‰ǤŠƒ–‹•ǡ
the experiencer has been affected internally by some past situation and hence bears the result of –Šƒ–…Šƒ‰‡Ǥǯȋ”‹–‘ͳͻͺͺǣ10Ȃ1) Smith (1981), Michaelis (1994), Depraetere (1998): (a) result state (= conventional implicature) (b) actual results (depend on situation type) (30) ȗǫǫ‡Šƒ•†‹‡†ǡ„—–Š‡‹•ǯ–†‡ƒ†Ǥ (31) *?? I have opened the †‘‘”ǡ„—–‹–‹•ǯ–‘’‡Ǥ Šƒ˜‡‘’‡‡†–Š‡†‘‘”ǡ„—–‹–ǯ••–‹ŽŽŠ‘–‹Š‡”‡Ǥ (32) Šƒ˜‡—Ž‘…‡†–Š‡†‘‘”ǡ„—–™‡•–‹ŽŽ…ƒǯ–‰‡–‹Ǥ (33) —•ƒŠƒ•…Ž‹„‡†–Š‡ƒ––‡”Š‘”ǡ„—–•Š‡ǯ•ƒ–Š‘‡‘™Ǥȋ‡š’‡”‹‡–‹ƒŽ”‡ƒ†‹‰Ȍ 5.3. Conventionalisation of implicatures (34) ‘——•–‰‘ǤȋŽ†‰Ž‹•ŠǮ‘–ƒǯα›‘—ƒ”‡ƒŽŽ‘™‡†–‘‰‘ǯȌ pragmatic strengthening: permission implicates expectation, Ǯ™ƒ–›‘—–‘‰‘ǡ›‘—Šƒ˜‡
•‘‡‘„Ž‹‰ƒ–‹‘–‘‰‘ǯ > Grice's (1975) lower-­‐bounding second Principle of Quantity: Ǯ‘‘–ƒ‡›‘—”
…‘–”‹„—–‹‘‘”‡‹ˆ‘”ƒ–‹˜‡–Šƒ‹•”‡“—‹”‡†Ǥǯ > Horn's (1984) R-­‐’”‹…‹’Ž‡ǣǮƒ‡›‘—”…‘–”‹„—–‹‘‡…‡••ƒ”›Ǣ•ƒ›‘‘”‡–Šƒ›‘—
—•–ǯ > ‡˜‹•‘̵•ȋͳͻͺ͵Ȍ”‹…‹’Ž‡‘ˆˆ‘”ƒ–‹˜‡‡••ǣǮ‡ƒ†ƒ•—…Š‹–‘ƒ—––‡”ƒ…‡ƒ•‹•
consist‡–™‹–Š™Šƒ–›‘—‘™ƒ„‘—––Š‡™‘”Ž†ǯ (Traugott 1989) 5.4. Be able to, have the ability to and (counter)factuality: R-­‐principle vs. Q-­‐principle (35) He was able to solve the problem. R-­‐implicates factuality: and he did (36) John had the ability to solve the problem. Q-­‐implicates counterfactuality (??): „—–Š‡†‹†ǯ– (Ziegeler 2001, 2003) VI. References Ariel, M. 2008. Pragmatics and grammar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ariel, M. 2010. Defining pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bach, K. 1994. Semantic slack. In Tsohatzidis, S.L. (ed.) Foundations of speech act theory: philosophical and linguistic perspectives. London: Routledge. 268Ȃ91. The semantics/pragmatics interface from a linguistic perspective: ƒ„‹”†ǯ•‡›‡˜‹‡™ 9 Bach, K. 2007. Regressions in pragmatics (and semantics). In Burton-­‐Roberts, N. (ed.) Pragmatics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 24Ȃ44. Borg, E. 2012. Pursuing meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press Brinton, L. 1988. The development of English aspectual systems: aspectualizers and post-­verbal particles. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Carston, R. 1988. Implicature, explicature and truth-­‐theoretic semantics. In Kempson, R. (ed.) Mental representations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 155Ȃ81. Carston, R. 2002. Thoughts and utterances. The pragmatics of explicit communication. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Carston, R. 2009. The explicit/implicit distinction in pragmatics and the limits of explicit communication. International Review of Pragmatics 1.1: 35Ȃ62. Cohen, J. 1971Ǥ‘‡”‡ƒ”•‘
”‹…‡ǯ•˜‹‡™ƒ„‘—––Š‡Ž‘‰‹…ƒl particles of natural language In: Bar-­‐Hillel, Y. (ed.) Pragmatics of natural language. Dordrecht: Reidel. 50Ȃ68. Depraetere, I. 1998. On the resultative character of present perfect sentences, Journal of Pragmatics 29: 597Ȃ613. Depraetere, I and S. Reed. 2011. Towards a more explicit taxonomy of root possibility in English, English Language and Linguistics 15.1: 1Ȃ29. Erteschik-­‐Shir, N. and S. Lappin. 1979. Dominance and functions explanation of island phenomena, Theoretical Linguistics 6: 41Ȃ85. Grice, H.P. 1975. Logic and conversation. In Cole, P. and J. Morgan (eds.) Syntax and semantics. Vol 3. New York, NY: Academic Press. 41Ȃ58. Haberland, H. and J. Mey. 1977. Editorial: Linguistics and pragmatics, Journal of Pragmatics 1: 1Ȃ
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