Reference and Vagueness
Author(s): Samuel C. Wheeler III
Source: Synthese, Vol. 30, No. 3/4, On the Logic Semantics of Vagueness (Apr. - May, 1975),
pp. 367-379
Published by: Springer
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SAMUEL
AND
REFERENCE
I.
In Plato's
Theatetus
III
C. WHEELER,
VAGUENESS
INTRODUCTION
are proposed. The 'resem
is determined by the rule, 'X refers to Y
two models
of reference
in which reference
blance' model,
iff nothing distinct from X resembles
Y to a greater degree than X does',
is rejected essentially because it turns out that, since truth and reference
are simultaneously
determined, no error is possible.1 The 'causal' model,
which Plato presents via a wax tablet analogy, says reference to be deter
by the formula 'X refers to Y iff Fis
of X9.2 After a long period in which more
of the resemblance model have dominated,
mined
the appropriate causal source
or less sophisticated
versions
'causal' theories have recently
thanks to Kripke,3 Putnam,4 Donnellan,5
emerged as serious competitors,
and others. The present paper presents another line of attack on resem
blance theories of reference by showing that such theories cannot ade
facts about vagueness. It will be shown that vague
quately accommodate
ness in our concepts is not a problem for causal theories of reference, and
that, once it is seen what the relationship of the causal theory of reference
to 'refers' is, the vagueness of our concept
phically troubling for a causal theorist.
of reference
is not philoso
I call any theory of reference which claims that the reference of a con
the
cept or term is determined
by 'internal' features of the concept,
language-user,
or
a community
of
language-users,
a resemblance
theory.
to such a theory, what a concept or term means is a function of
According
features of the speaker himself or the concept itself. Nothing
beyond, e.g.,
to
or
of
of
the
social
interactions
response
stimulation,
patterns
organism
between a language-user and his fellows, need be consulted in determining
what, if anything, a given term refers to. Features of the concept guarantee
certain features of its referent. The
'nature of things' is excluded either as
or
as
irrelevant to determination
of
posit,
epistemologically
as
A
coherence
theorist
such
Goodman
'the
excludes
the
way
meaning.
world is' as a senseless posit. Most other theorists, holding that determi
a senseless
Synthese 30 (1975) 367-379. All Rights Reserved
Copyright ? 1975 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland
368
SAMUEL
of meaning
is a priori
nature
the
of
things, regard
of meaning.
determination
nation
The
essence
cannot
III
thus can't depend on
things as epistemologically
and
the nature
of
irrelevant
to
of a resemblance
is that determination
theory of meaning
is nothing about the meaning of a term which
is a priori. There
of meaning
C. WHEELER,
be determined
by
by a speaker or a culture.
one
of 'what
would say', are variants of
self-examination
'Stimulus meaning',
and analyses
or less sophistication
of the correspondence
by resemblance of the
idea of Jones to Jones. Thus whatever
can't be determined
from features
more
of the concept about the meaning of the concept can't be determined at all.
In Fregean terms, reference is a function of sense or meaning;
and sense
is something a concept, whether construed as an abstract entity or as an
abstraction
has
i.e.,
from patterns
of individual
or social behavior,
has
in itself,
non-relationally.
I call a causal
theory of reference any theory which construes the refer
a
as
term
of
something determined not by internal features of the
concept, primarily nor by patterns of individual or group behavior, but
rather by external, historical facts about what in the external world is the
source of the occurrence of that term. That is, reference is a real physical
ence
interaction
Whether
minable
about
feature
a term-for-a-person
has taken
interaction
some entity in the world.
is not in general deter
place
of the participants
in isolation. No fact
between
that
by scrutiny of either
the referent of a concept
of
need
and
follow
from
any non-relational
the concept.
II. VAGUENESS
this paper is that if a theorist holds that the predicates
in the logical sense, i.e. that they
language are predicates
ve
ha
and provide true instances of logical truths, he cannot
anextension
The
claim
of
of a natural
hold
raesemblance
theory
of
reference,
given
the phenomenon
of
vagueness.
The
of the
paradox is a version of the sharpest formulation
sen
vagueness creates for a resemblance theorist. The following
following
problem
tences seem each to be true but form an inconsistent
set:
(a) There are five-foot tall men who are not tall men.
inch tall men who are tall men.
(b) There are six-foot-four
REFERENCE AND VAGUENESS
369
(c) If two men differ in height by no more than a twentieth of an inch,
then one is a tall man if and only if the other is a tall man.
(d) For every man taller than five feet tall and shorter than six-foot
four inches tall, there are men shorter and taller than he within a twentieth
of an inch of his height.
For principle (c) to be plausible, the meaning of a predicate, and there
fore its extension, must be a function of internal features of the concept, as
or in terms of patterns of speech-behavior
explicated either mentalistically
acceptance of the resemblance
by the person or the community. Without
theory of reference, it could be supposed that, although we can't tell when
the shift from tall to not-tall occurs, there is still a fact in the matter. But
on an a prioristic,
is a tall man
man
theory of reference, given that whether a
just of his height, and given that the refe
solely of the speech dispositions of the speaker,
resemblance
is a function
rence of a term is a function
no further fact of the matter
is forthcoming.
is completely
any view of concept-acquisition,
vagueness
From
the
of
vocabulary-learning
theory, itwould
standpoint
unsurprising.
to utter a sentence exactly exhausted
be surprising if a disposition
the
a
was
to
of the class of situations where
person
complement
disposed
On
almost
utter the negation of the sentence. This unsurprisingness
doesn't eliminate
the paradox of vagueness, rather it shows there is something screwy about
holding that internal features of concepts determine their reference, since
'we don't know what to
for every concept there are situations in which
a
resemblance
say'. On
theory of reference, every concept is vague, and
it's only a matter of luck if any term has an extension.
We should distinguish
two kinds of cases which may obtain when 'we
do not know what to say', epistemological
and ontological
vagueness
an
as
a
answer
to
is
Cases
there
where
whether
vagueness.
predicate is true
of a case where the speaker 'doesn't know what to say', but this answer
depends on data such that, if it were in, the speaker would know what to
say, are cases of epistemological
vagueness. Epistemological
vagueness,
for the resemblance theorist, is a matter of not having determined whether
the object conforms to the features of the concept sufficiently to fall under
it or not, not having 'total information'
about the case. 'Total informa
a
for
resemblance
of a 'yes' or 'no' answer to the
consists
theorist,
tion',
of
the
of
each
feature
of the concept to a possible
question
application
new case.
'Features'
of a concept
can be taken to be beliefs
the speaker
370
SAMUEL
C. WHEELER,
III
of the concept, compo
has using the concept, criteria for the application
nents of the sense of a term, or whatever else a theorist takes to be what
it is about a concept that makes it apply to the cases to which it does apply.
to
such that total information
is, perhaps in principle, unavailable
the speaker but such that, if it were in, the speaker would know what to
vagueness.
say, are cases of merely epistemological
the conformity or lack of it of the new case to the concept is thus
When
described and it is still not clear whether
there is sufficient
completely
Cases
for concept and object for the concept to apply to the object, then,
to the resemblance
theorist, there is no fact of the matter
according
to the resemblance
whether the concept applies to the new case. According
cases
case
as
is
like
such
'tall
man' which we
such
any
exactly
theory,
match
there is really no fact of the matter, which are
essence of ontological
The
is that there
vague.
vagueness
'ontologically'
an
a
no
is really
fact of the matter whether
predicate is true of
object. Any
choice that is made is arbitrary; no choice one way or the other has any
believe
to be cases where
are correctly convinced,
in 'ontological'
relevant to whether an ontologically
vague
vagueness
predicate applies to such a case can occur. It is ontological
which concerns this paper and which, we argue, requires abandonment
in the logical
either of the view that any English predicates are predicates
or the view that reference is a
sense that they determine an extension,
theoretical
borderline
We
consequences.
that
cases,
nothing
matter
of internal features of concepts.
or reference, every
to any resemblance
theory of meaning
According
even
given total information, we wouldn't
predicate which is such that,
to say, a priori, is ontologically
vague. Since no concept is such
be a clear-cut
that every possible object would, given total information,
case either of it or its negation, except for some very few artificial ones, the
to the view that every concept is mo
theorist is committed
resemblance
know what
vague. It is only a matter of blind fortune that any
to
have an extension. That is, it is the accident that
predicate happens
shade
off by degrees into squirrels that allows both
rabbits
don't
bunny
dally ontologically
'is a bunny rabbit' and 'is a squirrel' to have extensions. The apparent
leads the resemblance
theorist to suppose
ubiquity of vague predicates
is somehow not a real problem, but rather
that the paradox of vagueness
something for which to propose a more
or something
to be removed from our
accurate
logic for the language
stock of problems
by therapy.
REFERENCE AND VAGUENESS
371
III. CONCEPTS AS THEORIES
To begin to see what is wrong with this view, and what's wrong with the
resemblance
theory of meaning, we consider what has been said by such
'Is a person' differs from 'tall man' not only
theorists about personhood.
in being a pure count-noun but also in being a case where it does seem that
or not an entity satisfies the predicate. If there is
between possible persons and possible non-per
we believe about morality,
etc., is in
psychology,
a lot hangs on whether
no objective difference
sons, much
trouble.
of what
In rough outline, borderline cases of persons
such that much of what we believe
organisms
amount
to descriptions
of
to be distinctively
true of
persons is true of them and much that we believe about persons is false of
to resemblance theories of reference, if the speech dispo
them. According
sitions of the community do not determine what is to be said about these
there is no matter of fact about whether these organisms are
organisms,
of the possible organism
persons or not. The counterfactual
description
amounts to 'total information'
about the organism, and if we wouldn't
to resemblance
to say, according
theorists, there would be
to
correct
say.
nothing
Another way to look at extending the predicate
'is a person' to a new
case is to treat such extension on the model of a realist's view of theory
change. Unless we hold that there is a division of some significance
know what
terms of ordinary language and theoretical
terms, the correct
case can be thought of
of a predicate to a new and problematic
on the model of finding that an old theory of a kind of object is false.
data are in about an organism who resembles
When all concept-matching
some
in
persons
respects, there can be an objective answer to
paradigm
between
extension
how theory should adjust in the face of objects which there is some reason
to our current generalizations
to think are counterexamples
about per
sons. In scientific theories, surely, concepts can be mistaken when the
is false and still be concepts of some thing. When
itwas found
some
to it,
lacked
of
the
Newtonian
ascribed
space
theory
properties
can plausibly be viewed as a discovery about space, not the discovery
a concept had no referent. Of course, if we're sufficiently wedded
theory
that
that
to a
theory of reference, we can take the view that no reference
but the implausibility
of this consequence
is
theory-change,
resemblance
survives
that
372
SAMUEL
C. WHEELER,
III
greater than the plausibility of the resemblance
theory of reference which
led to it. There are often correct answers to what in an old theory is what
in a new theory. How the criteria for cross-theoretic
indentity of reference
are to be determined
is discussed in the final section of the paper.
to the extension
this approach
of a predicate,
the content of
a concept amounts
to a theory about its referent. We can regard the
as embodying
'content' of a concept holistically,
the part of a person's
or culture's theory which includes the concept. Roughly,
the content of a
On
is given by the set of beliefs a person has using the term which
that concept. This set gives the broadest notion of content;
expresses
more restricted notions can be proposed as desired. The difficulty with the
resemblance
theory of reference is just that since the concept is supposed
concept
to determine
the reference
internally, the theory the concept embodies
on a resemblance theory, just unprofitable.
is correct, then reference
If this very plausible view about theory-change
will have to be independent of the 'content' of a concept. Reference has to
can't be mistaken,
of whether
the concept
be something a concept can have independently
even a roughly correct theory of what that referent is like.
constitutes
That is, something along the lines of a causal theory of reference must be
correct. What we have argued so far is that a causal theory of reference
can treat many cases which, on a resemblance theory of meaning, must be
If
treated as ontologically
vague, as merely
vague.
epistemologically
reference is arguably causal rather than internal, then there is no general
as we
argument from not knowing what to say given total information
have defined it, and there not being anything correct to say.
cases of vagueness
become merely
Many
implausibly
'ontological'
on
a
But
causal
what can a causal
vaguenesses
theory.
epistemological
vagueness
vagueness,
theory of real ontological
theorist and the resemblance theorist would want
where
both
the causal
to claim that there is no
fact of the matter, be? Not every ordinary predicate is ontologically
vague,
to say
but surely some are, and a causal theorist must have something
so seem do threaten the claim that predicates have
about cases which
extensions.
Where
certain
matter,
going
we feel that a predicate
is really ontologically
vague, as we are
we
no
are
of
that
choice
'tall
man'
certain
what to say will
that
is,
'Tall' isn't
that no theoretical decision will get anything wrong.
to get its extension
fixed by any advances
in physics
or psychology
REFERENCE AND VAGUENESS
373
as 'is a person' or 'space' might plausibly be. But if this is the case, then
is certainty that no
certainty that nothing we decide to say will matter
this
is
referent
of this term
that
the
theory using
forthcoming,
predicate
isn't the object of a theory at all.
this means
that such predi
To put matters ontologically
backwards,
cates are not projectible,
in the sense that there are no laws which require
If there were laws which required
a
of
like 'tall', then there would be in
predicate
exactly
a
way of deciding borderline cases. If, for instance it were a law
principle
that all basketball
players were tall, there would be relevant possibly
for their statement.
their extensions
the extension
in a borderline
information
case, since there could be a
forthcoming
basketball player of exactly the height of the borderline case.
That is, if there are laws involving a predicate,
then there is possible
data relevant to whether that predicate is true of an entity. Now of course,
there are prima facie true and prima facie projectible
generalizations
using 'tall', for instance
of these generalizations
'all tall men
are over five-foot
a predicate
three', but none
of exactly the extension of
with an extension
roughly
require
is that any predicate
matching most of the clear cases of 'tall man' will be such that the general
ization resulting from replacement of 'tall man' by it will likewise be true.
reason
'tall man'.
The
'Tall man'
isn't a law-bound
predicate at least in part because it doesn't
A predicate can only be law-bound if it has an exten
law-bound guarantees an extension.
have an extension.
sion, and being
I say this is putting things ontologically
backwards
just because the
real reason there aren't any laws about tall men is that 'tall man' doesn't
designate a kind. For there to be a matter of fact about whether a predi
cate correctly applies to a new case, there must be an objective kind in the
nature
of a
the predicate
refers. The projectibility
is a reflection of ontological
fact: Laws are
in terms of natural necessities and divisions in the nature
of things to which
its law-boundness,
predicate,
to be understood
of things, even though, in the order of knowledge,
the nature of things is
on
via the discovery
of laws. Lawlikeness
is our window
approached
reality, not what 'real' actually is or means.
What should a causal theory of reference say about ontologically
vague
then? If there is really no fact of the matter whether an ontolo
predicates,
gically vague predicate applies to a particular case, this can only be be
cause
there is no kind of thing to which
that term refers. The
term has
374
SAMUEL
C. WHEELER,
III
no precise extension because there is no extension determined by a kind
to which it refers. (Kinds, on a plausible view, have 'different extensions
in different possible worlds' or could have more or fewer elements.)
IV. CAUSALITY
AND REALITY
of not referring to a kind more fully
should explain the consequences
case
to
of
for
the
'is a person'. On a causal theory of
by returning
example
on
was
the referential theory to determine
the
reference, what
supposed
referent of a concept is regarded as a theory about the referent of the
We
In general, when a theory is
concept, which theory may well be mistaken.
a bad one, one of two things can happen. (1) It can turn out that the
referent of the concept is very different from the theory embodied
in the
concept, that the theory is a mistaken
theory about something real. (2) It
can turn out that the concept has no referent at all, that the theory was
a theory of nothing.
every object of a theory is preserved when theory changes. Among
to borderline cases of persons is the conclusion
the possible adjustments
that there are no persons, that 'is a person' doesn't designate a kind, so
Not
that being a person is not the essence of any object, i.e., doesn't determine
of anything.
the identity or extinction conditions
It suffices to have this
result if there turn out to be no laws about all and only the persons in the
new theory which organizes our responses to the stimulations which the
to there being
'is a person' organized. This amounts
theory containing
no predicate of the new theory which is true of all and only the persons,
a theory
so that the new theory does not quantify over persons. When
a
the
abandons
when
putative kind,
change
predicate supposedly desig
amounts
base, the abandonment
nating that kind has a rich observational
to drawing the conclusion
that the putative kind can't be defined in the
new theory. In the case of persons, this wouldn't be to deny that the set of
collections of atoms which now for all speakers would elicit the response
subsets of the set of such
'person' exist, but just to say that appropriate
objects don't jointly form a portion of a law-category, a kind. The set of
to the intersection of the stimulus meanings
'clear cases' corresponds
of 'is a person' for all speakers and thus wouldn't
'give the extension' of
the term except by some miracle. We can call this set the 'stimulus exten
on this result,
sion' of the term. From the point of view of real distinction,
375
REFERENCE AND VAGUENESS
since appropriate parts of its stimulus extension have nothing in
doesn't designate a kind. 'Person' would turn out to be a non
'person',
common,
to non
should be treated analogously
general term, which
names.
covers
in
above
the
whatever
discussion,
referring
'Appropriate',
some verbal behavior with a term and an
relation must exist between
referring
existent
in order
for that term to refer to that existent.
For
terms
like
the essence our theory
substance-determiners,
is the essence of a property instance.
would deny that it determines
it is for an 'observational'
What
putative kind not to exist is for that
not
to
of
the
be
real
kind
system of kinds. What the laws of a
part
putative
'tall man'
which
are not
to that theory, and
theory are determine what the kinds are according
what the kinds are determine what objects there are. If an old kind turns
to be a kind, its objects don't exist, even though the stimulus
situations which were paradigms for eliciting the term are still there.
We should be explicit about why we say that, if 'person' doesn't desig
out not
a kind, then persons don't exist and the term 'person' designates
nothing. A causal theory of reference holds that some sort of appropriate
ly restricted causal relation holds between an object and a term when that
nate
term refers to that object.
that the presence of what
In the case of general
it is that the general
terms, we would suppose
terms describes about an
object is what causes in the appropriate way our term. But this means
is really a cause of phenomena
in the world.
that what the term designates
are
at least the
On almost every attempt to understand
laws
causality,
as
causal
either
of
expression
directly giving account of
relationships,
or
as
them
In general, if A causes B9
being behind the causal relation.
there are some descriptions A' and B' o? A and of B such that A' only if B'
is an instance of a physical
law. This, as we would put it, states things
but
nevertheless
shows that lawlikeness, pro
backwards,
ontologically
jectibility,
requires
and causality
causal objects.
go together. A causal theory of reference thus
General
entities which can be referred to are
real kinds and properties, objects which can be causes. Un
or natural predicates refer to nothing real because their
artificial
projectible
referents
are, by definition, not items which can cause phenom
imaginary
ena, whether utterances or not, by entering into lawlike relations. To be real
projectible,
is to be able to enter into causal
enter causal relations. The causal
rejecting the ontological
sets can
relations, and only law-bound
to
of
is
reference
committed
thus
theory
liberalism which
congeals
the pattern of responses
376
SAMUEL
C. WHEELER,
III
of any possible culture into a perfectly acceptable
candidate for reality.
It might be objected at this point that there could be kinds which were
only weakly tied to laws. Such a view would claim that there are mutually
irreducible
perhaps
'law-governed' kinds and some
kinds. Thus every science or
system of kinds. There is not a
systems of kinds, the so-called
or 'psychological'
'sociological'
system of suppositions
generates
single 'real' system of kinds.
its own
if there are causal relations between
events involving physical, law
kinds, then
governed objects and events involving objects of non-physical
a
must
in
'Mental
there
be
Davidson's
Events',6
argument
by
description
of both events such that they fall under a law. Thus, if there are multiple
But,
but causally related systems of kinds, there must be objects
are elements of at least two unconnected
kinds from two mutually
un-law-related
which
systems of kinds.
In this view, though, the reality of kinds is weakened. The essence of a
of when an object remains in existence while
real kind is determination
as
to
when an object ceases to exists. What kinds deter
altering
opposed
irreducible
mine, among other things, are unique durations for objects in the world.
A thing lasts as long as it retains all its essential features. If this is what
kinds do, then no object can belong to two un-law-connected
kinds. If
the duration of the object, then unless the kinds are
so
law-connected
that their determinations
agree, the object could have
different durations. But such 'Theory-relative objects' thus generated aren't
sufficient to constitute the person-independent
objects a realistic view of the
each kind determines
requires. If kinds are real, their objects have unique durations.
If there are no persons, all positive ascriptions of 'is a person' are false
and their negations true. If such predications
specify objects by reference
world
to non-existent
Russell's
or assign to objects non-existent
features, then by
true.
such sentences will be false and their negations
kinds
analysis,
If we understand
'is a hobgoblin'
analysis of 'John is a hobgoblin'
\Ex){Ey)(Jx &Hy&
to designate
is
a kind of anything,
then the
=
(z)(Jz <- z x) &
(z)(Hz
by a kind
bears to that kind. The sentence is false, just as 'John is a person' is false
if 'is a person' similarly doesn't designate a kind.
where V
is the relation
an item whose
<-?z =
y) & x e y)99
essence
is determined
REFERENCE AND VAGUENESS
377
If it turns out that there are persons, our term 'is a person' does desig
nate a kind, even though the essence which that kind determines may be
vastly different from our concept, and may have little to do with our
It could very
and reidentification
of persons.
criteria for identification
well be, for instance, that fetuses are persons but quadruple amputees are
that such suppositions
violate
not, even though knock-down
arguments
conceptual truths are available.
In the case of a genuinely ontologically
such as we
vague predicate
suppose 'tall man' to be our confidence that there is no fact of the matter
amounts
doesn't
are not a kind, that this predicate
of
reference, since it doesn't think of a
theory
as given by its internal features, must take concepts to
to confidence
refer. The
that tall men
causal
concept's extension
to
refer, to be proper names of entities, kinds which could correspond
different sets. In the case of 'tall man' we are sure that it has no referent
when we are sure that whether
an object is in the extension of its referent
of fact. In using 'tall man' while acknowledging
its 'onto
a
we
are
in myth.
knowingly acquiescing
logical vagueness',
to the paradox,
The solution the causal theory of reference proposes
is not a matter
then, is to say that premise (b) is false.
"tall man" refers, there is no extension
are no tall men. If concepts are theories,
Since
there is no kind
to which
determined
by that kind. There
there is nothing wrong with con
tinuing pretenses that the archaic theory of the Tall, the Short, the Hot
and the Cold are true. We can communicate
by means of these myths,
we
can
as
about
understand
talk
Santa
but they're literally
Claus,
just
false.
In the case of 'tallman' we're convinced
in a borderline case, that there's no kind
that there's no fact of the matter
to which
it refers, and that the
theory the concept embodies is a theory of nothing. In the case of person,
there is a fact of the matter or not, whether
we're not so sure whether
there is a kind of thing which
fact happens as our knowledge
'person' denotes. A lot depends on what in
of the kinds there are increases. If it turns
out that 'person' does refer to a kind, there are persons. This kind may
have a vastly different essence than our concept supposes. If it doesn't so
turn out, then there aren't any. In both the case of 'person' and of 'tall
incorrect
man', we can be sure that our present concepts are mistaken,
and inaccurate theories, since they don't even give straight answers to
what's what in their own terms.
378
SAMUEL
C. WHEELER,
III
V. CRITERIA FOR CROSS THEORETIC REFERENCE
theory, as we have said, the question of concept reference is
terms.
of theoretical
reduced to the question of cross-theoretic
meaning
does theory change preserve objects of an old theory and when
When
does it, in replacing atom-for-Democritus
with atom-for-Wheeler,
aban
On a causal
don old objects and kinds and denote new objects with homonyms?
are the conditions for a theory to refer to a kind?
What
the above question has been approached via the resemblance
Typically
and has led to the rather extreme views of Feyerabend
of
reference
theory
and others. The question of what the conditions of reference are has been
by some of Kripke's arguments against the resemblance
a causal theory should say about conditions for reference is
does so because
'refers', if it refers to a real phenomenon,
further obscured
theory. What
the following:
relation to the phenomenon.
the appropriate
reference
What
it is that is causally responsible for our
really is is whatever phenomenon
term 'refers'. There is no more reason to suppose that essential properties
it bears
than there is to suppose
by a priori methods
are.
to
of
the causal theory of
According
gold
properties
essence
of
not
reference
be
should
the
reference,
supposed to be accessible
If
the theory is correct, of course, we know something
by reflection alone.
of reference are determinable
that essential
about
the vague generalities Kripke and others have
to
theory of reference itself, it is unreasonable
to supply a detailed account of the essence of reference.
reference, namely
supplied. By the causal
expect desk work
argument forms somewhat obscure this. Kripke argues from
to the resemblance theory that a causal theory is correct.
counterexamples
What he seems to be doing is showing that the content of our concept of
Kripke's
constitutes a causal theory of reference, since the intuitive pro
of
this concept gives an extension to 'refers' which differs from the
jection
extension projected by the resemblance
theory of reference. The idea
our
appears to be that further analysis of this kind will, by unpacking
reference
genuine concept of reference, give us a detailed account of the conditions
for reference. But if our intuitive concept of reference is a theory of what
'refers' refers to, such a priori unpacking can only give us a theory which,
by the causal theory of reference
pick out its referent descriptively.
work for 'refers' either.
itself, cannot reasonably be expected
A priori analysis can't be expected
to
to
REFERENCE AND VAGUENESS
379
Kripke's arguments are best interpreted as just reductions of the resem
blance theory. The resemblance
theory, on its own account, must bill
itself as an accurate rendering of our concept of reference. What reference
is is what coincides most closely with our concept. Kripke has shown if
is correct as applies
to 'refers', then the theory is
that
is, is that the resemblance
show,
arguments
Kripke's
is
don't provide data
of
reference
His
incoherent.
theory
counter-examples
for a revised a prioristic account of reference.
the resemblance
mistaken.
theory
What
So, whether a theory imbedded in a concept has a referent or not isn't
something we should reasonably be expected to have an a priori theory of.
theory of reference, then, since a concept is just a theory of
to have any
its referent, if any, and can only empirically be determined
referent at all, there is nothing puzzling about ontological
vagueness
about non-referring
beyond puzzlements
singular terms. If we are right in
thinking that no borderline for 'tall man' ismore than arbitrary, the con
On a causal
'tall man'
cept is referent-less. There's no real kind in the world which
is underdetermined
denotes. Not every predicate whose extension
by its
can
content need be in this situation, since concepts
incorrect
constitute
theories of their referents.
University
of Connecticut
NOTES
i Theatetus
2 Theatetus
187E5-188C2,190B-190E.
190E ff.
3
and G. Harman
and Necessity',
inD. Davidson
Kripke,
(eds.), Seman
Saul, 'Naming
tics of Natural
D. Reidel, Dordrecht,
1972, pp. 253-355.
Language,
4
70 (1973), 699
and Reference',
The Journal
Putnam,
Hilary,
of Philosophy
'Meaning
711.
5
The Philosophical
83 (1974),
3-32.
Review
of Nothing',
Keith,
Donnellan,
'Speaking
6
in L. Foster and J.W. Swanson
'Mental Events',
Davidson,
Donald,
(eds.), Experience
and Theory,
University
of Massachusetts
Press,
1970, pp. 79-101.