VICTORY ENDURING PEACE

FOil
VICTORY
AND
ENDURING
PEACE
*
by .JOSEPII STALIN
PRESIDENT R O OSEVEL T'S message
of greeting to Mikhail Kal in in, Presid ent
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet,
on the occas ion of the twcntv-seventh
anniversary of the foundi ng of the Union
of Soviet Socialist R epublics:
" A t this fateful time, when the Red Army and th e armies
of the United States and other United Nations are fighting
on German soil, we can 1001< forward with even greater
confidence to the early defeat of the Nazi aggressors and
the attainment of our COl/lI11011 goal-a durable and just
peace and a continuancp of close collaboration between all
the United Nation s."
Published by \ V ORKERS LIUR,\RY PUIH,I SIIERS, Ixc ., P.O.
(832 Bro ad way), Ne\~ York 3, N. Y., Dec., ' 9H
~~oo
Box
q8, Sta . D,
PR '''TED IN U.S.A.
FOR VICTORY AND ENDURING PEACE
By JOSEPH V. STALIN
Report of Joseph V. Stalin, Chairman of the State Calli " :ttee of Defense and Supreme Commander-in-Chief ' : the
Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R., at the Meeting of th : .11 oscoto
Soviet of Deputies of the Worhing People, To:c,dhf'l" with
Representatives of Party, Public and Red .-Irm y O i ganizations, ill Honor of the 27th Anniversary of tl.e Great October
Socialist Revolution; November 6, I944.
Comrades!
Today the Soviet people celebrate the 27th Anniversary of
the triumph of the Soviet Revolution in our country. This
is the fourth time that our country is observing the Anniversary of the Soviet Revolution in the midst of the Patriotic
War against the German-fascist invaders.
That does not mean, of course, that the fourth year of the
war does not differ from the preceding three years of the war
in its results. On the contrary, there is a radical difference
between them.
Whereas the preceding two years of the war were years
when the German forces were on the offensive and when they
advanced into the interior of our country-years when the
Red Army was compelled to fight defensive actions-and
whereas the third year of the war was a year of radical change
on our front, when the Red Army launched powerful offensive actions, smashed the Germans in ' a number of decisive
battles, cleared the German troops out of two-thirds of the
Soviet territory and compelled them to pass to the defensive
while the Red Army was still waging war on the German
forces single-handed without substantia l support from the
Allies-the fourth year of the war has bee n a year of decisive
victor ies over the Germa n forces for the Soviet Armies a nd
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th e Armi es of our Allies, a year in whi ch th e Germ an s, now
compelle d to fight o n two fro nt s, found themselves flu ng bac k
to the Germ an fro nt iers.
In th e up shot , th is year ha s en ded in th e ex pu lsio n of the
Gennan forces fro m th e Soviet Un io n. Fran ce, Belgiu m and
cent ral It al y, and th e tra nsfer o f ho stil ities to German ter ri tor y.
Germany in the Vise Between the Two Fronts
The de cisive successes of th e R ed Army thi s year and th e
expulsion of th e Germans from Sovi et territory wer e pr ed etermin ed by th e succession of sha tte ring bl ows whi ch our
troop s deal t th e Germ an for ces beginning as fa r back as last
J anuary and following th en throughout th e year under review.
T he first blow was struc k by o ur tro op s in Ja nuary of thi s
year at Len ingrad and No vgor od wh en th e R ed Army broke
up perm an ent Ger man d efen ses a nd flun g th e ene my back to
th e Balt ics. T h is blo w resul ted in th e li bera tion of the Leningrad Region.
The second hlow was struck in Feb ruary a nd March of thi s
year on th e Bug Ri ver wh en th e R ed Army rou ted th e German for ces a nd flung th em beyond the Dniester. As a result
of thi s blow th e Ukrain e west of th e Dnieper was freed of th e
C cnnan-Iascist invaders.
The third bIOI\" was struck in April and M ay of this year
in th e area .of the Crimea wh en th e German troops wer e flun g
into th e Black Sea. As th e result of this blow, th e Crimea and
Odessa wer e deli vered from Germ an oppression .
The fourth bl ow was stru ck in June of this year in th e ar ea
of Kar eli a, wh en th e R ed Arm y ro u ted the Finnish for ces,
lib erat ed Vyborg and Petrozavod sk and flun g th e Finns back
into th e in ter ior of Finland. This blow resulted in th e lib erat ion of the grea ter part of the Ka relo :Finnish So viet R epu blic.
Th e fifth bl ow was stru ck at th e Germans in Juue and Jul y
of this year wh en th e R ed Arm y utterl y routed th e German
forces at Vit cbsk , Bobruisk and Mogil ev: this blow culminated
in th e encircl ement of 30 German divisions at Minsk. As a
result of thi s blow, our for ces: (a) lib er at ed th e whol e of th e
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Byeloru ssian Soviet Rep ubli c, (b) ga ined th e Vistula and li bera ted a conside rable part of Poland, our all y, (c) ga ined th e
Ni em en an d liber at ed th e greater part of th e Lithu ani an Soviet R ep u bli c, an d (d) forced th e Ni cm cn and ap proached
the frontiers of Germany.
T h e sixt h blow was struck in July and Augu st of this year
in th e area o f th e \Vestern Ukrain e wh en th e R ed Ar my
ro ute d th e Ger ma n for ces at Lvov and flun g th em beyon d th e
Sa n and the Vistul a. As a result of th is bl ow: (a) th e \\'estern
U krai ne was libera ted , a nd (b) our tro ops forced the Vistu la
a nd set up a stro ng bridgeh ead beyond it, west o f Sandomi r.
Th e sevent h blow was struc k in Au gu st of thi s yea r in th e
Kishin cv and j assy are a wh en ou r tro ops utterl y routed th e
German and Rumani an for ces. It cu lm ina ted in the encirclement of 22 German di visions at Kish inev, thi s number
not incl uding Ruman ian div isions. As a re sult o f this bl ow:
(a) th e Mold avian Sovi et R epublic was liberated, (b) Ger man y's Rum anian all y was put out of ac tion and d eclared
war on German y and Hungary, (c) Germany's Bul garian all y
was put ou t of ac tio n and lik ewis e declared war on German y,
(d) th e road was ope ned for our tr oop s to Hungar y, German y's last a lly in Europe; and (e) th e opportunity arose to
reach ou t a helping hand to Yugoslavia, our a lly, aga inst th e
G erman in vaders.
The eigh th blow was struc k in Septem ber and O ctoher of
this year in th e Baltics, wh en th e R ed Ar my ro uted the German for ces at Tallinn and R iga and d rove the m from the
lIalti cs. As a result of thi s hlow : (a) th e Esto n ia n Sovi et R epublic was lib erated, (b) th e grea ter part of th e Latvian Soviet R epubli c was libera ted : (c) Germany's Finnish a llv was
p ill o u t of ac tion a nd declared war on Germ an y, and (d) over
30 German d ivisions found th em selv es cut off fro m Prussi a
a nd gr ipped in pin cer s betw een Tukums and Libava wh ere
th ey are now bein g hammer ed to a finish by our troops.
In O ctober o f this year th e ninth blow was laun ch ed hy our
IrOO PS betw een th e Tisza and th e Danube in th e ar ea of
Hungary: its purpose is to put Hungar y out of th e war and
tu rn her aga inst Germany. As a resu lt of this blow whi ch h as
not yet been consu m ma ted: (a) our for ces rend er ed direct as-
5
sista ucc to our all y, Yu go slav ia , in drivi ng o u t the G ermans
and liberati ng Belgrade, and (b) our forces received the op portu nity to cross the Carpathians and reach out a he lping
hand to our ally, the Czechos lova k R ep ubli c, part of whose
ter ritory has a lrea dy been freed of th e Ge rman invaders.
Lastly, at the end of O ctober of this year, a blow was dea lt
the German forces in nort h Finland when the German troops
were knocked out of the ar ea of Pech enga and our troops pursuing th e Germans ent ered th e territory of Norwa y, our ally .
I shall not give figures of th e losses in killed and prisoners
which th e enemy sustained in these op erations, of the number of guns, tanks, aircraft, shells and machine gu ns captured
by our troops, and so forth . You ar e probably acqua inted
with these figur es from the communiques of the Soviet I nformation Bureau.
Su ch are the principal operations carried out by th e Red
Army during th e past year, op erations which hav e led to the
exp u lsion of th e German forces from ou r country.
As a result of th ese operations as many as 120 divi sions of
th e Germans and their allies have been routed and put out of
action. I n p la ce of the 257 divisions that faced our front last
year, of which 207 were German, we no w have facing our
front , after all the "total" and "super-total" mob ilizatio ns,
on ly 204 Germa n and H un garian divisions . the Germa n d ivisions numberi ng no mor e than 180.
It has to be admitted that in this war Hitler German y with
her fascist army has proved to b e a more powerful, crafty
and experienced, ad versary th an German y and her army were
in an y war of th e past. It should be added that in this war
th e Germans succe eded in exploiting the productive forces of
practically th e who le of Europe and the qute considerable ar mies of their vassal sta tes.
An d if in spite of these favorabl e cond itions for the prosecut ion of the war Germa ny never theless find s h erself on the
brink of im m inen t destruction, th e explanatio n is that her
chief adve rsary, th e Soviet U nion , has surpassed H itler Germa ny in stre ngth.
W hat mu st be rega rded as a ne w factor in the war against
H itler Germany this past year is th at this year the Red Arm y
6
has not been operating against the German forces siugle-,
handed as was the case in previous years, but together with
the forces of our Allies.
The Teheran Conference was not held for nothing. The
decision of the Teheran Conference on a join t blow at Germany from the west, east and sout h began 10 be carried ou r
with amazing precision. Simultaneously with the summer operations of the Red Army on the Soviet-German front, the Allied forces launched the invasion of France and organized
powerful offensive operations which compelled Hitler Germany to wage war on two fronts.
The troops and nayy of our Allies accomplished a mass
landing operation on the coast of France that has no parallel
in history for scope and organization, and overcame the Gerrrian fortifications with consummate skil l. Thus Germany
found herself gripped in a vise between two fronts.
As was to be expected , the enemy failed to withstand the
joint blows of th e R ed .\ rmy and the Alli ed forces. The enemy's
resistance was broken and his troops were knocked out of
cerural Italy, France, Belgium and the Soviet U nio n in a short
space of time. He was flung back to the German frontier.
T here can be no doubt that without the opening of the second front in Europe. which holds as many as 75 German
divisions, our troops wou ld not have bee n able to break the
resista nce of the German forces and knock them out of th e
Soviet Union in such a short time.
The G reat Exploit of th e Soviet Peo ple in t he Pat riotic War
Bu t it is eq ua lly ind ub itab le th at wit hout the powe rful
offensive operations of the R ed Army in the summer of this
year, which held as many as 200 German divisions, the forces
of our Allies could not have coped so qu ickly with the Germa n for ces and knoc ked th em out of cen tra l it aly, Fra nce and
Belgiu m. T he thi ng is to keep Germa ny gr ipped in th is vise
between the two fronts. That is th e key to vic tory .
If the R ed Army was able to acq u it itself successfu lly of its
d u ty to its cou ntry and to drive the Germans from Soviet soil,
it was becau se of the unreser ved su ppo rt received in th e rear
fro m our who le coun try. from all the peo ples of o ur coun try.
7
Everything for the front! has been the watc hword this past
year in the selfless effort of all Soviet pcoplc-c-workcrs, peasants and int ell igent sia, as well as in the d irect ing act ivit ics of
our Covcrmncnt and Part y bodies.
The pas t year has been marked by fresh successes in industry, agriculture and transport, by furt her prog ress in our war
economy. \ Vith the war in its fourth year our factories are
prod uc ing several times more tanks, aircraft, guns, mortars and
ammunit ion tha n in its ope ning phase.
In the rehab ilita tio n of agr icul ture th e most difficult period
has been passed. \ Vith th e fertil e fields of the non and the
Kuban res tored to our co u uirv and the Ukra ine liberated, our
far mi ng is rccovcring rapi dl y 'from its grave losses.
T he Soviet railways have stood a strain that the transport
of other countries wo u ld hardly be ab le to bear.
All this indi ca tes tha t the economic foundation of the
Soviet State proved to possess infinitely greater vitality than
the eco nomy of the enemy states. The socialist system born of
the O ctob er R evolu tion has len t our people and our Ar my
great and in vin cib le streng th. Despi te the heavy burden of th is
war , despit e th e temporary occupat io n by the Germans of very
large and eco no m icall y import ant part s of th e cou ntry, th e
Soviet Stat e did not red uce th e su p p ly of arms a mi an nn un ition for th e front as the war proceed ed , but in creased it from
year to yea r. Today th e Red Arm y has not less bu t mo re tank s,
g uns and a ircraft than th e Germ an army. As for th e quality
o f our war mat eri al , it is far su pe r ior to the ene my arma me nts
in that respect.
Just as th e R ed Army achi eved military victory o ver th e fascist forces in its lon g and ard uo us single- h ande d str ugg le, so th e
workers in th e Soviet rear won eco no mic victory over th e ene my
in th eir lone fight against Hitler Germ an y and her associates.
The Sovi et peopl e have deni ed th emselve s man y necessities,
h ave consciously incurred serious material privations, in order
to give more for the front. The unparalleled hardships of th e
pr esent war have not broken but further tempered th e iron
will and fearless spirit of the Soviet people. Our people hav e
rightfully won the fame of a heroic nation. Our working class
is giving all its str ength to the caus e of victory, constantly im-
8
proving th e technology of production, in creasing th e ca pacity
of industrial enter p r ises, building new factori es and mills. Th e
working" class of the Sovi et Union has a great labor exp loit to
its cred it in th e present war.
Our illl elli gentsia are striking out boldl y in th e field of tech nic al a nd cultural innovation, successfull y promoting modern
science and di spl aying the creative spirit in applying its
ac h ieve me nts to th e produ ction of muniti ons for th e Red
Army. By th eir creative work th e Soviet int elligentsia have
mad e an invaluabl e co n tr ibu tio n to th e e ne my's defeat.
An army ca n no t fight and win with out mode r n arma ments.
But neit h er ca n it fight and win without br ead, without provisions. Th anks to the soli citude of the collect ive farm peas a n try, th e R ed Arm y ex pe r ien ces no sh o rt age of food in thi s
fou rth yea r of war, Th e m en and women of th e coll ective
farms are supplying the workers a nd intelligentsia wi th foodSluffs and industry with raw mat erials, making it possibl e for
factori es and mills producing arms and eq u ipme nt for th e
front to fu nc tion n or m all y. Actively a nd with a clear sense of
duty to the co untry o ur collective farm peasantry are helping
t he Red Army to achieve victory O\'e.r the enemy.
The match less la bor exploits of the Soviet women and of
o ur sple ndid yon th will go d own fore ver in h isto ry; fo r i t is
they that have bo rne the br unt o f the work in the factories
a nd mi lls and on the co llccrivc and State farms. For the sake
o f th ei r co u n try's h on or an d i nde pe nde nce Sov iet wo men,
you ths a nd gi rls are di spl ayi ng true va lo r a nd h eroi sm o n the
labo r front. They ha ve shown themselves wort hy of their
fath ers an d so ns, husb ands a nd broth ers, wh o are d efend in g
th eir h om el and aga ins t th e C cn nan -Iascist fiends,
Th e labor explo its of th e Sov iet peop le in the rea r, li ke the
immorta l d eed s of val or of ou r sold iers at th e front , are
ro o ted in th eir fervent and lif e·giving spirit of Sovi et patri otism . The st re ng th o f So viet p a tri o tism lies in th e fact th a t it is
based n ot on rac ia l or n at ion ali sti c prejudices, but o n the p eopl e's profound d evotion and lo yalty to th eir Sovi et homel and,
o n th e fr at ern al p artn er ship of th e working p eople of all the
na tion al iti es in o u r land .
Sov iet p atri otism bl ends h armoniousl y th e nation al tradi-
9
lions of the peoples and the common vital interests of a ll the
working peoples of th e Soviet Union. Far from dividing th em ,
Soviet patriotism welds all th e n ati ons and peopl es of our
country into a sing le 'fra tern al famil y. This sho u ld be regarded
as the founda tion of th e invi olable and eve r stro nger fri end sh ip among the peoples of th e Soviet U n io n.
At the same tim e th e peoples of th e U.S .S.R. respect th e
rights and indep enden ce of th e nations of for eign cou nt ries
and h ave always show n the mse lves willing to liv e in peace and
friendship with th eir neighbor sta tes. This sho u ld be regarded
as th e foundati on of th e contac ts gro wing and ga in ing stre ngt h
betwe en our Stat e and th e fr eedom-loving n at ions . The reason
Soviet m en and wom en hate th e Germ an in vad er s is n ot th a t
th ey ar e of differ ent n ationality, bu t th at t hev h ave brou ght
unt old calamity and su ffering on our people and on all freedom -loving nations. It is a n old saying of our peopl e th at th e
wolf is not beaten for bein g gray but fo r devo ur ing shee p .
The German fascists chose th e mi santh ropi c rac e th eor y for
th eir ideological weapon in th e ex pec ta tion th at by preaching
bestial nationalism th ey would produce th e moral a nd political conditions for th e German inv ad er s' domination over th e
subjugat ed nations. Actuall y, however, th e policy of ra cial
hatred pu rsued by th e Hitlerites has proved a source of weak ness for the German-fascist sta te intern ally and of it s isolation
internationally.
The ideology and policy of racial hatred have been a facto r
in the disintegration of Hitler's brigand bloc. It can not be regarded as an accide n t th at not only the subjugated peoples of
France and Yugoslavia, Poland and Czechoslovakia, Greece
and Belgium, D enmark, Norway and th e Netherlands hav e
risen against the German imperialists, but also Hitler's form er
vassals-the Italians and Rumanians, Finns and Bulgarian s.
By th eir savag e policy th e Hitler clique hav e set all th e nations
of th e world against Germany, and the so-called "chosen
German race" has become the obj ect of universal hatred.
It is not only military defeat that the Hitlerires have sustained in this war, but moral and political def eat as well. Th e
ideology of equality of all races and nations which h as tak en
firm root in our country, the ideology of friendship among
10
the peoples, has emerged completely victorious over the H itler ire ideology o f bcst ial na ti on ali sm a nd racial h atred .
Today when the Pa triotic \\'ar is d rawing to its victorious.
concl usio n, the historic role of th e Soviet people is revealed
in its full grca tncss. It is u uivcrsa ll y acknow lcdge d now thaI
by their selfless strugg le the Sov iet people have saved the
civiliz a tion of E urope fro m th e fascist va nd als. Tha t is thegreat service re ndered by the Soviet people to the h isto ry of
mank ind.
The Con solidation and Extension of the Anti-G erman Coalition
Front. The Question of Peace and Secur ity
T he past year has ' been a year of tr iumph fo r th e common
cause of the ant i-German coalition, for the sake of which the"
peoples of th e Soviet Un ion, Great Brita in an d the U ni ted
States h ave join ed in a figh ting all iance. It has been a year of
consolidation of the unity of the three ma in powers and of
coord ination of their act ions aga inst H itler G erman y.
The Teheran Conference decision on joi nt ac tions against
Germany and the br illiant realiza tion of that decision arc
one of th e str ik ing ind icatio ns of the co nsolidat io n of the antiH itlcrit e coa li tion front. There are few instances in history of
plans for lar ge-scale mi litary operations undertaken in [o m t
ac tions aga inst a common enemy being c-ur icd out so Fully
and with such precision as the plan for a joiru blow against
Germa ny d rawn u p at the Tehera n Co nference. T here ca n be
no dou bt th a t wit hou t unity of opinion and coord inatio n of
ac tions between the three great powers, the Teheran decis ion
cou ld no t have been p u t into effect so fully an d with suc h
precisio n. Nor, on the other h an d , ca n there be any do ubt that
the successful rea lization of the T eh eran dec isio n was bo u nd
to serve for th e conso lida tion of the U ni ted Na tio ns fro nt .
An equa lly striking indicat ion of the soli dity of th e front
of the Un ited Na tions is to be seen in th e d ecisions of th e'
Dumbart on O aks Confere nce o n post-war secur ity. There is
ta lk of d ifferen ces between the th ree powers on certain security
probl ems. Differen ces d o ex ist, of course, an d th ey will arise
on a number o f o ther issues as well. Differen ces of opi nion are'
ro be fou nd even among peopl e in one and th e same pany..
11
Th ey a re all th e mor e bound to occur between represent ati ves
of diff er en t states a nd diff erent parties,
Th e surp rising th ing' is not that diff er en ces ex ist, but th at
th er e are so few of th em and th at as a rul e in pr acti cally every
case th ey ar e resolv ed in a spir it of unity a nd coord ina tio n
a mong the three grea t pow er s.
" 'h at ma tt er s is not th a t th er e are diff er en ces, but th at th ese
diff eren ces d o not transgr ess th e bounds of wh a t the inter ests
of unity of th e three great pow er s allow, and th at in th e lon g
run th ey are resolved in accorda nce with th e interests of th at
unity. It is known that more ser io us diff eren ces ex isted between us over th e op ening of th e seco nd front. It is al so known,
however, tha t in th e end these di ffer en ces were resolved in a
sp ir it of com p le te accord .
Th e same thing may be said of the diff er en ces at th e Dum barton Oaks Confer en ce. \Vhat is char act eri sti c about this con ference is not th at cert ain diff er en ces wer e re vea led th er e, but
that nin e-tenths of th e security problems wer e dispatched a t
this confren ce in a spirit of complete unanimity. That is wh y
1 think th at th e Dumbarton Oaks Confer en ce decisions a re to
be regarded as a striking indication of the solid ity of th e front
of the anti-German coalition.
The r ecent talks in Mo scow with Mr. Churchill, th e head
of the British Gov ernment, and Mr. Ed en , th e British Foreign
Secr et ar y, are to be viewed as an eve n more str iking indication
of th e consolidation of th e Unit ed N ations front, h eld as th ese
talk s wer e in an a tmosphe re of fri endship a nd a spirit of
perf ect un animity. All throu gh th e war th e Hitlerir es hav e
been mak in g frantic efforts to caus e di sunion among th e
United Nations and set th em at logg erheads , to stir up suspici on a nd unfriendly feeling a mo ng th em , to weaken th eir
war effor t b y mutual mi strust a nd if pos sibl e by confli ct between the m as well.
Ambitions lik e the se on th e part of th e Hitl er politi cians ar e
easy e noug h to understand. Ther e is no grea ter d an ger for
th em than the unity of th e Unit ed Na tion s in th e struggl e
against Hi tler imperialism, and th ey could achie ve no gr eat er
military-politi cal success than by div iding th e Allied pow er s
in th eir fight aga inst th e common foe.
12
It is well kn own , however, how futil e th e effor ts o f th e fascist pol iti cians to disrupt th e allian ce of th e grea t pow ers have
p roved , T ha t mean s th at th e all ia nce betw een th e U.S.S.R .,
Great Brita in a nd the Un ite d Stat es is fo u nde d not on casual ,
short-lived conside ra tio ns bu t on vit al and lastin g int erests.
There need be no d ou bt th at having stoo d th e stra in of oye r
three years of war and bein g scaled with th e blood of n ati ons
ri sen in d efens e of th eir lib erty a nd honor, th e fighting allia nce of the de mocra tic p owers will all th e more certa in ly sta nd
the stra in of th e con clud ing p ha se of th e war.
H owever, th e past year h as been not on ly a yea r o f th e
conso lida tion of th e ant i-Cerrnan front of th e Allied pow ers,
bu t also a yea r of its ex te nsio n. It ca n no t be regarded as an
accid ent tha t aft er Ital y, oth er allies of Germany-Fin la nd,
Ru mania a nd Bul gari a-hav e also been p ut out of th e war .
A point to be made is th at th ese sta tes h ave not on ly withdrawn from th e war but have brok en with German y and
d eclared war on h er , thus joining th e front of the United
Nations. That is cer ta in ly a n exte nsio n of th e Un ited N ati ons
front agai nst Hitl er German y.
\\'i thout doubt German y's last ally in Eu rope, Hungar y,
will also be put out of ac tion in th e near est future. This will
mean th e complete isolation of Hitler Germany in Europe and
th e in evitability of her co lla pse.
The Uni ted N ations face th e victorious con clus ion of th e
war agai nst Hit ler Germ an y. T h e war ag ains t German y will
be won by th e United Nati ons - of th at th ere ca n no lon ger be
an y doubt today.
I
To win th e war against German y is to accomp lish a gre at
hi stori cal task. But winning th e war is not in itself synon ymous
with insuring for th e n ation s lastin g p eace and guara nteed
securi ty in th e future. The thing is not on ly to win th e war
but also to render new aggression and n ew war impossibl e, if
no t for ever then at least for a lon g time to com e.
After her d efeat Germany will of course be dis armed both
in th e eco nom ic and th e m ilitary-poli ti cal sense . It would
how ever be naive to think tha t she will not attempt to restore
h er mi ght and launch n ew agg ression. It is com mon kn owl edge that th e German ch iefta ins ar e already now preparing
13
for a new war. H istory revea ls th at a sho rt peri od of time, some
or 30 year s, is eno ugh for Germany to recove r from d efea t
and reestablish her might.
'Vhat means are there to preclude fresh aggression on Germany's part, and if war should star t nevertheless, to nip it in
th e bud a nd g ive it no opportunity to develop into a big war?
The qu estion is the more in place since history sho ws that
aggressive nations, as th e nations that a ttack, ar e usually better
pr epared for a new war th an peace -loving ,nations wh ich, having no interest in a new war, ar e usuall y behind with th eir
pr eparations for it. It is a fact that in th e present war the
aggressive nations had an inv asion army all read y even before
the wa r broke out; while th e peace-loving nations did not have
even a full y ad equat e army to cover the mobilizat ion .
One can no t regard as an accid ent su ch distasteful facts as
th e Pearl Harbor "incident," th e loss of the Philippines and
other Pacific islands, th e loss of Hongkong and Sing apore.
wh en Japan as th e agg less ive nation proved to be bet ter prepa red for war th an G reat Bri ta in and th e Un ited States of
Ame rica, whi ch p ur sued a poli cy of peace. Nor can on e regard
as a n accide nt such a dist asteful fact as th e loss of th e Ukraine,
Byelorussia and th e Baltics in th e very first year of th e war,
wh en Germany as the aggr essive nation proved bett er pr epared
for war than th e peac e-loving Soviet Union.
It would be naive to explain th ese facts by th e person al
qu alities of the Japanese a nd the Germans, th eir superiorit y
over th e British. th e Am eri can s and th e Russians, th eir foresight and so on . The reason her e is not personal qualities bu t
the fact that th e aggressiv e nations inter ested in a new war ,
being nations that prepare for war over a long tim e and accumulat e forc es for it , ar e usually-and are bound to bebetter pr epared for war than peace-loving nations whi ch hav e
no inter est in a new war. That is natural and und erstandabl e.
If you like . this is a law of hi story which it would be d an gerous
to ignore.
It is 1I0t to be denied accordingly that in d ays to com e th e
peace-loving nations may once more find themselves caught off
their guard by aggression. unless of course they work out special measures right now which can avert it.
~o
14
\\'cll, what means are there to preclude fresh aggression on
Germany's part, and if war should start nevertheless, to nip it in
the bud and give it no opportunity to develop into a big war?
There is only one means to this end, in addition to the
complete disarmament of thc aggressive nations: that is, to
establish a special organization made up of representatives of
thc peace-loving nations to uphold peacc and safeguard security; to put the necessary minimum of armed forces required
for the averting of aggression at the disposal of the directing
body of this organization, and to obligate this organization to
employ these armed forccs without delay if it becomes necessary to avert or stop aggression and punish the culprits.
This must not be a repetition of the ill-starred League of
Nations which had neither the right nor the means to avert
aggression. It will be a new, special, full y authorized world
organization having at its command everything necessary to
uphold pcacc and avert new aggrcssion.
Can we cxpect the actions of this world organization to be
sufficiently cffective? They will be effective if th e great powers
which have borne thc brunt of the war against Hitler Germany
continuc to act in a spirit of unanimit y and accord. They will
not be effective if this essential condition is violated.
Comrades, the Soviet people and the Red Army are performing successfully the tasks that have confronted them in the
course of the Patriotic \Var. The Red Army has done its patriotic duty with credit and has freed our country of the enemy.
Now and for all time our land is clear of the Hitlerite pollution. For the Red Army there now remains its last final mission: together with the Armies of our Allies to consummate
the defeat of the German-fascist army, to finish off the fascist
beast in his own den and hoist the nal-( of victory over Berlin.
There is reason to expect that this task will be performed by
the Red Army in the none too distant future.
Long live our victorious Red Armyl
Long live our glorious Navyl
Long live the mighty Soviet peoplel
Long live our great homeland I
Death to the German-fascist invaders!
First Printing, 160,000
TEHERAN
OUR PATH IN WAR A ND PEACE
By EARL BROWDER
Americans of all cla sses and political a ffiliatio ns w ill find
in Earl Browder's brilliantly illuminating book on the new
problems, ta sks and perspectives confronting our nation and
the world as a re sult of the historic Teheran Ag r eem ent, a
penetrating guide to the future. As the newly-elected presiden t of the Commu nist Po litical Associati on points Gu t :
" The Teher a n concord furnishes the platform upon which
ca n and m us t be gathered all forward-looki ng men and
women of all classes and political ideo logies, subordin ating
all other considerations to the single purpose of we lding a
firm an d effective majority of the people and directing the
n ation and the world alo ng t he Te her an path."
His new work is a cont in uation and compa nion-volume to
Victory----<lnd After . But wh ile in h is former book t he au t hor
dev oted only one sho r t chapter to th e probl em s "After"
victory has been won, hi s l at est bo ok is practically e ntirely
occupied with the va st, world-enveloping tasks of post-war
reconstruction wh ich press ever more ur gently for attention,
and which will be trem endously influenced by the outcome
of the 1944 presidential elections .
Am ong the chapters a re "The Guarantee of Teheran" ;
"R econstructlon of Europe "; "Characte ristics of Capi talism" ;
"Elem en ts of an Economic Program"; "The 1944 Electi ons" ;
"The Changes in Communist Organization ," and "What
Marxism Contributes to Amer ica."
Cloth $1.50, Paper $.35
o
WORKERS LIBRARY PUBLISHERS
P. O. Box 148, St at ion 0 (832 Broadway) , New York 3, N. Y.