Dariusz Aleksandrowicz
Cultural paradigms and postcommunist transformation in Poland
No. 6/99
Frankfurter Institut für
Transformationsstudien
Frankfurt institute for
Transformation Studies
Arbeitsberichte - Discussion Papers
ISSN 1431- 0708
Herausgeber - Editorial Board
Prof. Dr. J.C. Joerden
Prof. Dr. H. Schultz
Prof. Dr. H-J. Wagener
© by the author
Europa-Universität Viadrina
Postfach 1786
D - 15207 Frankfurt (Oder)
Dariusz ALEKSANDROWICZ
Cultural paradigms and post-communist transformation in Poland
Prof. Dr. Dariusz Aleksandrowicz is professor for philosophy, especially philosophical
basics of cultural science analysis at the European University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder)
and a member of the F.I.T. The F.I.T. is supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) as innovation college.
Cultural paradigms and post-communist transformation in Poland
1. Polish cultural traditions
Some of the specific features of the Central European region, specifically of its
cultural tradition and image, result from its peripheral location in Europe. The idea
of a central periphery seems, however, schizophrenic or it at least implies a semantic paradox.
The "Central European periphery" obviously differs from the "proper European
periphery" which refers to such countries as Portugal, Ireland, Scotland, Iceland or
Norway (Aarebrot, 1982; Eisenstadt, 1981; 1987: 65-74; Rokkan and Urwin, 1982).
The peripheral situation of these countries results from their geographic limitation
by the Atlantic. (After the great discoveries, when travels by sea became crucial
economic and political factor, Portugal established itself as a centre of a new area
of development and of influence.) In contrast, the Central European region owes its
specific character to its necessary openness, as a consequence of a lack of any such
natural boundary between "Europe" and the rest of the Eurasian continent. Eastern
Europe was dominated early on by the Mongols and then by the emerging Eurasian
power - the Muscovite Russia; the Balkan countries ended up falling for some
centuries under Turkish rule; and Central Europe remained an area of (cultural,
political or military) influence and competition for both "West" and "East".
The effects of this situation were manifold. It undoubtedly contributed, for instance,
to the specific charm and unique social, as well as political significance of Central
European art and literature. The more general consequence, however, was the almost permanent instability of the region. Up to the present day all the relevant
structures of the Central European region were constantly and dramatically reconstructed. In this century the region has undergone fundamental changes, which have
deeply affected the identity of the countries involved. Every generation of individuals living in Central Europe has experienced clutching transformations at least
twice a the lifetime. The changing spatial and institutional order brought about
radical changes on the venue of values and ideas.
In contrast to the Western part of the continent, with respect to Central Europe, we
can hardly speak of any consequent line of development. Instead there is rather a
temporal and spatial diversity of such lines and strategies, most of them ending in
its own contradictions or in historical catastrophes. The very image of "Central
Europe" as a cultural, political or geographic entity (differing from both the West
and the Russian-dominated Byzantine East) follows from a lack of any clear contours and accordingly, from a lack of any stable identity.
What refers to the region as a whole is also applicable to each of the respective
countries, ethnic groups, and national cultures in question. Instead of a definite
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cultural tradition, we should speak of (sometimes even contradictory) diversity of
cultural traditions. This is especially the case in Poland since throughout the Polish
history all the aforementioned factors of instability were probably more significant
and the changes in development strategies more radical and dramatic than in other
countries of the region.
What I am here referring to are diverse, but interconnected cultural frameworks or
paradigms, which supply evidence for the abstract formula of the "Polish national
culture". These frameworks relate neither to symbols through which the ethnic and
national groups express their cultural identity, nor to the so-called "national character" (Gorer, 1955; Lewandowski, 1995; Mead, 1953). The central issue is rather
of a cognitive nature. It refers to an understanding of the world, which is organised
by some dominant hierarchy of problems, hierarchy of values, collective explanation-models, problem-solving strategies, mythologies etc. At the same time they
determine a sort of communicative space and communicative code, which influence
and limit the social communication within the realm of the "national culture" in
question.
By way of analogy to the Hayekian concept of „dispersed knowledge" and „rules of
conduct"1 the culture of a respective society can be thought of as a variety of rules
of thinking and of behaving. These rules are by their very nature external to the
individual and his or her mind. They exist within the process of social interaction.
They form the objective symbolic and cognitive capital that constitutes the substantial background of the respective processes of collective communication. The
inherited symbolic and cognitive capitals change faster than the biological and genetic equipment of humanity. They do not however alter so rapidly as to harmonise
with, and to produce „adequate" answers to, the dramatically changing world that
marks the situation of the transforming societies at the present time. The crucial
issue with traditions is not only that they are products of social interaction but that
they are past products of social interaction which become tools and frames of collective communication. As such, they cannot be voluntarily changed by conscious
attempts of contemporary individuals.
The decisive determinants of the diverse "cultural paradigms" relate to the changing
geopolitical situation, institutional structure and social stratification of the country
throughout the respective period of time. At least four relevant constellations of this
type can be unravelled and distinguished in Polish history from the 10th century
onward: (1) Poland of the "Piast period" - at this time, Poland was more or less an
"average" country within provincial Europe (Samsonowicz, 1995) that defined its
interests and identity through co-operation and/or competition with the Germans
and the Czechs. (2) Poland of the Polish-Lithuanian union - an oversized Eastern1
See for instance, Hayek (1978: Part one; 1982: 11-12). Whereas Hayek writes here precisely of
rules of conduct as elements of traditions and therefore guidance for human actions, my issue in
this paper are specific rules (or patterns) of explanatory and argumentative processes.
D. Aleksandrowicz: Cultural Paradigms and Post-Communist Transformation
3
European empire, which was culturally and economically dominated by agrarian
nobility. It was large in number, usually not very well educated, rather closedminded and conservative. The Polish state was at that time increasingly occupied
with struggles for territorial integrity. One specific factor of the Polish culture of
the respective period was the tendency to mythologize the emerging problems in an
ideology of the "bulwark of Christianity". (3) Poland in the age of partition - the
cultural paradigm was dominated by the efforts of the nobility and of the intelligentsia to gain political and national liberation. (4) The Soviet-controlled "People's
Poland", where the socialist working class held the dominant position in the cultural system.
In order to understand the impact of "national culture" on the transformation process in today's Poland we specifically have to take into account the two last paradigms - the romantic paradigm of the independence movement and the socialist
paradigm.
2. Romantic paradigm
After Poland had lost its independence by the end of the 18th century a "mythologized" approach to the issues of public life became increasingly significant tool of
public communication. The political elites utilised a language, that referred mainly
to values, instead of to a "pragmatic" and "realistic" view of the social life. Since
these elites could hardly establish themselves as (executive and legislative) social
organisers, they developed a "language of politics" that would be hardly useful for
usual programs of social organisation.
The political elites were rather heroic fighters for such ultimate values as "fatherland", "freedom", "justice", "true religion" and so on, while the proper verbal expression of this public practice was literature as well as statements of radical intelligentsia. Both of them brought forth strong romantic and national-messianic elements. Social radicalism that emerged in the public sphere by way of this practice
tended to be moral or value-oriented rather than pragmatic or realistic, since it did
not address the "standard" problems of individual and collective life).
The collective communication on public issues was brought forth within a specific
conceptual framework that was determined by an apocalyptic and messianic mythology of the "Polish nation". According to this mythological framework, there
was some special role Poland was to play in the history of human civilisation and
this role was not to be measured by the "ordinary" criteria of success (like the ability to build a well-organised state or effective economy). The lack of success with
respect to such "partial efforts" was to be recognised as a messianic sacrifice. The
universal meaning of this sacrifice consisted in challenging and calling into question the standards of success accepted in the hitherto existing world. By virtue of
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this sacrifice and due to the subsequent struggle for liberation emerging from it, the
"Poles" were expected to bring into being some ideal model of human society.
One of the crucial points of the romantic paradigm is the idea of an ultimate goal of
the political practice: the "national liberation". Approaching this task would at the
same time bring about the all-round solution of all the "partial problems" of social
life that are confronting "ordinary politics". The second crucial point of the romantic paradigm is the image of the "Polish nation" or the "Polish people" as a monolithic „we-community" of "good people".2 The empirically given diversity of contradicting views and interests represented by the members of the social collective
were to be ignored. Once liberated from the domination of foreign powers, this
community would be able to act as a collective subject and realise its task: to call
into being a good and just society, which would be then a political and social emanation of the primary "goodness" of this collective entity.
The following statements are essential in summing up the cognitive pattern of the
romantic tradition: (1) the source of evil is the oppression of the aforementioned
national community which prevents it from becoming the sovereign subject of
politics; (2) the goal of the national struggle for liberation is to overcome this oppression and to enable the "nation" to autonomously enter the world of politics; (3)
the positive results which this revolutionary change is expected to bring about will
not rely on the nation’s adoption of particular political tools or political procedures
(for instance the democratic practices). Their very meaning is rather to be found in
the mythologized features of this collective subject of political action, which has to
"colonise" the hitherto existing world of politics. According to this idea, it is not
the "Polish nation" which is to become political ("democratic", "liberal", etc.), but it
is politics that is to become "Polish".3
From this idea of the unique value of the Polish nation follows that the efforts of
the latter may be contradicted and spoilt by whatever is to be identified as "antiPolish" or defined as "enemy of Poland". The reverse of the messianic mythology
of the nation are thus cognitive patterns and conceptual tools which can give rise to
radical xenophobia. Moreover, the mythical meaning of the "Polish"4 creates a certain mode of thinking that implies that one can sort out "true" and "untrue" Poles
2
"For to be a Pole on the earth means to live in a divine and noble way!" Przewóska (1923: 14).
"Poland (...) could not flourish (...) amongst the states of law (...). Being not able to live on earth it
goes down to the grave and grows there. But (...) the signs which shine in the Polish history indicate (...) the glorious part of the future (...) which is now darken by monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. All that is a shell which cramps the Polish spirit. (...) The time of the mission of Poland is
approaching (...). Brothers! Let us throw aside the decayed forms of the disappearing world (...) let us animate by the spirit of Poland, which soon will inspire the whole world (...) - for it will be
God himself who through us will pursue his creative work." L. C. (1846: 13-15).
4
"(...) to be a Pole means not only to be born in Poland and to hate the Muscovites and the Germans,
but also to have the Polish spirit in one's own chest and to fulfil it in one's own deed." L. C. (1846:
13). "A Pole who is worthy this name must be a morally clear man and a man of honour."
Przewóska (1923: 71).
3
D. Aleksandrowicz: Cultural Paradigms and Post-Communist Transformation
5
within the really given „Polish nation". The latent xenophobia implied by the messianic myth could prove to be especially irrational and destructive.
This potential of nationalism and xenophobia became apparent after the ultimate
goal of the messianic romanticism - the liberation of Poland - was achieved, and the
traditional patterns of thought were confronted with an entirely new situation. In
contrast to the previous apocalyptic hope, the liberation from the foreign oppression
did not bring about the expected solution for all of the so-called "partial problems"
of social life. The maximalist hopes became thus frustrated and simultaneously the
traditional patterns of the romantic culture were unable to unfold any cognitive
tools which could rationally define the emerging problems or indicate solutions.
Instead, they suggested explanations and practical directives which directly followed the very same logic of the frustrated mode of thought. The conclusion was
therefore that the "true" liberation is still not in reach. The struggle must continue.
The "enemy of Poland" is still at work, even if it now does not manifest itself in an
"external" occupation by foreign powers, but lies rather within the social and political body of the seemingly "liberated" Polish people.
3. Socialist paradigm
It is, of course, a well known fact that the really-existing socialist society has been
politically controlled by a small elite of communist apparatshiks. The working class
- in spite of the claims of official ideology and propaganda - did not play any significant role in this context. However, in a deeper sense, which goes beyond the
issues of the actual political hierarchy and which pertains to the very "substance" of
the society in question, the socialist working class occupied a distinguished, central
position in the social and cultural system of the Soviet-type socialism. The very
social, economic and cultural environment in which the overwhelming majority of
the population had to live, was shaped to correspond with the specific situation of
this social class. It thus confirmed and objectified the particular order of values and
patterns of thought of this class, which became universal standards and background
for the communication process.
The existence of the socialist working class was in a unique sense connected with
the socialist state. The socialist state (and not, for instance, the economic process)
called it into being. The state, not the market or the entrepreneur, expected the
working class to perform efforts and duties according to criteria dictated by the
state. In return the state provided employment security as well as economic and
social security for the employee and his or her family. Although the level of the
latter was very low, according to Western standards, it was almost equal for the
members of the society. Moreover, the socialist state exercised control over desired
goods and privileges. Obtaining access to them was the most significant way of
improving one's position within the socialist society. The state was also the appropriate instance to which the working class reported its satisfaction or its discontent
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with the existing situation. By doing so the workers rationally expected to persuade
the socialist state to solve the problems the working people were faced with. This
specific dependence of the socialist working class became the essential factor
which determined both the existence and the mode of thinking of all other groups
(for instance, members of the so-called "free professions", private farmers or private entrepreneurs) in the socialist society.
The institutional framework of the really-existing socialism, which decisively
shaped the mode of living and work of the people, contributed to the elaboration of
the specific consciousness of the socialist working class. At the same time it provided the corresponding cognitive and communicative patterns with a some factual
evidence, by the virtue of which they could appear as universal standards of culture.5 The remuneration as well as the social status of a socialist worker had little to
do with his or her individual performance. These factors were also completely disconnected from the economic effectiveness of the enterprise he or she were employed in, and from the actual demand for the goods that were produced in it. The
main issue war rather the politically defined "relevance" of the plant in question.
The role of the worker was to perform the prescribed duties "for the state" and "for
his or her plant", or even to simply be present and disposable at the place of work.
Although this specific relation to the socialist state was not necessarily due to any
ideological commitment to "socialism" or "communism", this "dependence-" or
"subordination-syndrome" was a decisive point in this context. In addition, a
worker - especially if he or she worked in a big (since "bigness" was significantly
correlated with political relevancy), though usually economically deficient, steel
plant or coal mine - could earn more than a lawyer, medical doctor or university
professor. In addition, all those who tried to play the economic game working on
their own account and at their own risk were confronted with political and administrative obstacles as well as with ideological hostility, which furthered the distrust
and resentments of the average "state dependent" members of the society. Therefore, the objective hierarchy of values placed such qualities as individual initiative,
responsibility and even individual skill close to the lowest level.
Finally, it was the system-conforming environment which evoked some behavioural
patterns of the people, influencing at the same time the collective picture of the
world. In addition to the evident factors of economic backwardness, political oppression and relative poverty, this environment consisted in a specific formation of
the human space according to the mode of living of the socialist working class: The
socialist plants were usually oversized and sometimes voluntarily put into the
structurally underdeveloped landscape - a visible dominant, which determined the
existence of the people in a way widely exceeding the issues of their professional
5
To be sure, it was not only the spontaneous social process but at the same time the cultural policy
of the socialist state that contributed to this standardisation and universalisation of the cognitive
and evaluative patterns of the working class. For more on this cf. Aleksandrowicz (1982).
D. Aleksandrowicz: Cultural Paradigms and Post-Communist Transformation
7
activity. The huge settlements were usually located close to the plant and were quite
primitively constructed with the pre-cast panels. At the rather gloomy plant-owned
"vacation hostels" the staff of the plant could spend its holidays, escaping both the
plant and the settlement for a couple of weeks. As far as this environment influenced the psycho-social constitution of the people involved, the result was hardly
any sort of "collectivism" as commonly propagated by socialist ideologists, but
rather a specific mixture of anti-individualism and anarchism with a sharp opposition of "one's own" and of "public" affairs.
4. "Alienation of politics" and political communication in the socialist culture
The five decades of nazi occupation and then of communist rule, which was the
consequence of Soviet military domination in Eastern and Central Europe, have
contributed to the romantic "alienation" of the world of politics and public life from
issues which emerged in the light of the experience of the members of the population. The process of political decision-making and the special kind of "political
game" which went on within the communist power elite took place behind quite
hermetically closed doors and was thus unknown and mysterious for the politically
passive "people" who were ruled by the few communist activists. Moreover, the
language used in the world of politics in order to communicate to the people what
allegedly happened behind the closed doors, and to establish the legitimacy of the
political elite, consisted of highly esoteric "newspeak". Its definitions of political
ends, allies and enemies referred to entities and relations which were elements of
some mythical reality constructed within the context of Marxist philosophy. Referring not to empirically given but to some "higher" or "future" reality, this newspeak
required for its proper understanding some special communicative skills which
were hardly present outside of the numerically limited groups of scholars and professional ideologists. Finally, in the orthodox communist system "public opinion"
did not play any serious role in the context of the political life. The collective and
individual members of the society had no opportunity to publicly express or to discuss their opinions on political issues, since there was no freedom of speech or independent media channels open to voice such a freedom. There was also no reliable
research of the "public opinion"(except for the reports of the clandestine police)
through which the feelings and attitudes of the "people" could be made known to
the political elites.
There were, nonetheless, some specific means of practical contact between the
"people" and the political world. (1) The people entered into the world of politics as
actors participating in a special ritual. By way of the so-called "elections", mass
demonstrations on state holidays, street riots, or strikes they became momentary
participants in the world of politics, expressing their support or condemnation of
the political elites. (2) The members of the political elite occasionally entered the
practical, everyday life of the people. The usual expression of this was the occa-
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sional appearance of a "good-fellow"-politician who came from inside the closed
political dimension to visit workers in their production plants, peasants on their
fields, or inhabitants in their towns or villages. He spoke the "normal" language of
the people and was able to deal with their everyday problems, such as supply shortages, holes in the road or bad public transportation. He also usually used his influence to solve them.
There were also situations in the life of the socialist society, when the official language of political communication between the elites and the "people" lost much of
its esotery and became closer to the communicative patterns of the everyday communication. One specific context was the crisis situation in which the elites had to
explain their failure to reach the ideologically prescribed ends. The elites spoke in
terms of subjective faults such as greed, selfishness or disloyalty of some individual
members of the power elite. The latter were used as scapegoats to provide a simple
and plausible explanation for the failure.
5. Cognitive patterns in the evolution of anticommunist emancipation movements
Two different currents, each opposed to the policy of the ruling elites gradually
emerged within decades of communist rule in Poland. The first was the popular
movement of workers who protested by means of strikes and street riots against the
concrete defects of their everyday life. They were frustrated with low wages, high
prices or the arrogance of public administration. The communist elites dealt with
these workers by way of repressive measures and/or tentative changes in the socalled "social and economic policy" and style of the official propaganda (combined
with the aforementioned "scapegoat" strategy). The second type of opposition consisted in the activities of the anti-Communist or revisionist intelligentsia who contested the system by confronting the actual state of affairs with ideals such as national independence, individual freedom or genuine socialism.
The gradual evolution of the system surfaced considerable changes in the late
1970s. It consisted in a reduction of the political role played by the ideological patterns of the official discourse and legitimacy, which were substituted by more
"pragmatic" ones. The power elite argued increasingly in terms of consumeroriented economic success (by emphasising, for example, the growing number of
consumer goods being produced) and of legal norms. Significant were the efforts of
the communist elites to establish a legal framework so that the ideologically legitimate elements of the political system - especially, the role of the communist party
or the special relations to the USSR - could find a "legal" justification. In this new
argumentative context the ideas derived from the communist myth lost much of
their relevance.
D. Aleksandrowicz: Cultural Paradigms and Post-Communist Transformation
9
The consequences of these changes were both far-reaching and manifold:
(1) They contributed to the emergence of a new type of opposing intelligentsia. The
strategy and image of the latter was different from the old-type anti-Communists
who radically questioned communism, confronting it with the tradition of the sovereign pre-war Poland (now represented by the Polish government in exile) and of
the revisionists who contested the communist system from within the communist
myth-making (Aleksandrowicz, 1992). This new opposing elite criticised the existing reality by developing alternative programs of institutional reforms and in
terms of legality. Its main task was to examine whether the institutions and officials
of the communist state obey the legal norms laid down for them by their own legislative. Another task was to propose as well as to practise several forms of independent public activity (which could claim to be "legal" from the same point of
view). The partners of this new opposition in other countries of the communist bloc
joined in human-rights movements, which developed as a result of the Helsinkiprocess.
(2) Both the opposition and the ruling elites argued increasingly within the same
universe of communication. The hitherto impassable borderline between the partycontrolled language of the communist myth and the language of the "class enemy"
ceased to play any significant role. Thus, the opportunity for a political dialogue
opened and with it came a platform for argumentative competition.
(3) Owing to the "realistic" and "pragmatic" background of its communicative and
programmatic patterns, the new opposing elites succeeded in establishing contact
with the leaders of the opposition in the production plants and amongst the peasantry. They were also able to politically influence many of these popular leaders.
Finally, the two originally divided currents of the opposition became united. The
workers aiming at the increased standard of living now understood their goals to be
results of a more substantial task: reconstruction or replacement of the existing
system, according to the idea of democratisation and liberalisation of the political,
economic and cultural life of society. Through popular support, the opposing intelligentsia gained a powerful political instrument which could be used in the political
game. This process found its fruition in the "Solidarity"-movement of the 1980s.
6. Logic of the popular emancipation movement and the political culture of
democracy
The heyday of this process, which resulted from the evolution of both the elites of
the opposition and of the communist elites, were the "round-table" talks which began in early 1989. During these talks the leaders of the communist party and state,
as well as the leaders of intellectual and popular opposition, discussed the common
issue of a peaceful transformation of the political and economic system. Owing to
its alliance with the workers movement, the programmatic opposition became a real
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political factor, which could have been regarded by the communists as a serious
playmate.
Irrespective of the historical significance of this philosophy of peaceful transition
from the one-party communist system to democracy, it would be misleading to interpret this compromise as a final result or, to speak in a more speculative fashion,
an "ultimate meaning" of the previously mentioned evolutionary process. To understand the more far-reaching consequences of the evolution and co-operation of the
"popular" and the "intellectual" emancipation movement, we must look at the corresponding events not only in the light of political history but also in the light of
historically changing "cultural frameworks" of political practice. From this point of
view, the above described evolution of the emancipation movement contributed in
effect to the emergence of two diametrically opposed patterns of thought and behaviour: of the rational political culture on the one hand and romantic populism on
the other. The greater part of the former opposition and of communist elites as well
as many of the most successful and open-minded workers' leaders gradually advanced in the "rational" political game with respect to competing projects of institutional reform. For the workers, the experience of the anti-Communist emancipation movement meant the adoption of crucial patterns of the romantic messianism
which they learned during the heroic period of mass strikes, organisational efforts
and conspiracy. This part of the Polish cultural tradition, originally represented by
the nobility and then by the radical intelligentsia, had thus finally found its expression in the mode of thought and collective behaviour of the post-Communist
working class. At the same time, it blended together with significant aspects of the
"socialist paradigm" of the national culture.
The popular movement developed within the production plants. Its visions of the
world of politics and public life were determined by the respective practical experiences. From this point of view, what really matters are issues of the working population’s standard of life. The workers supported the program of structural transformation offered by the "programmatic" opposition, assuming that the structural
changes in the political system would provide a set of necessary conditions to bring
the ends hoped and strived for by the people. The "liberation from communism"
these changes would surface was to be interpreted as an apocalyptic event which
would enable the oppressed value-positive community ("Polish nation", "working
people") to enter the world of politics, to "colonise" it and to act as a collective
problem-solving subject, seizing the role played hitherto by the socialist state.
In contrast, the real task for the "programmatic" opposition was to construct the
institutional framework of the society, to establish a competitive system of pluralistic democracy and market economy which would enable individuals and interest
groups to strive for their desired goals.
D. Aleksandrowicz: Cultural Paradigms and Post-Communist Transformation
11
The breakdown of the communist institutions and their replacement by democratic
ones did not yet produce an increased standard of living, since the new democratic
elites still dealt with institutional, framework-oriented issues and not with the
problems which the members of the working population considered "truly" relevant. Moreover, the new situation of the emergence of the competitive society required skills necessary for individual or collective success, that were fundamentally
different from those which were useful in the socialist society. Finally, because the
process of economic transformation leads to the breakdown of many plants and
branches of industry (those which were once successful within the old society and
its rules of the game) the original hopes and expectations of the working people
become frustrated. However, these expectations, regardless of how irrational they
may seem from a "pragmatic" or "realistic" point of view, are logical consequences
of the well-trained cultural patterns. With the help of these cultural patterns, a great
part of the working population tries to explain and to evaluate, as well as to practically orient itself in the dramatically changing world. The critical efforts of the
workers, who have learned and tested their problem-solving strategies through the
heroic experience of the emancipation movement, are now directed against the institutions of the democratic state, against the democratic rules of the game6 and
against the members of the new political elite, who are considered to be personally
responsible for the frustrating social, political and economic order.7
What the "people" expected the new (that is, coming from "our", and not the enemy's ranks) political elites to do, was to make the public life and the world of
politics conform to views, problems and values that were emerging from the everyday practice of the "man of the street". Because of this expectation, the people
failed to recognise the multiplicity of such "men" as well as the contradictory relations between them and their respective hierarchies of values. The ideal was thus, a
sort of universalization of the "good fellow" politician image offered sporadically
by the communists. Since the new elites did not deal with the issues of the „people"
but rather with structural problems that the „people" did not understand nor discern
relevant, and since these elites were unwilling to play the role of the "good-fellow"
politician, the "people" considered the political life to be a new ritual with little
reference to reality and its language to be a new "newspeak". The elites, according
to that popular view, adopted the whole ritual (including elections and parliamentary debates) to hide their "real" task - which was to gain economic profit at the
costs of the deluded people. The alleged „betrayal" of the elites could be made
plausible within the conceptual framework of the national mythology. They have
betrayed the "people" and the "Polish nation", since they represent either the communists or the capitalists, especially foreign capitalists, or simply the "enemies of
6
"I do not need any voters in order to make a strike. For a strike it is enough to have the staff of a
production plant." Press conference of the "Solidarity"-leader M. Jankowski, quoted in: "Gazeta
Wyborcza", 7-8.08.93.
7
"They sit, do nothing and speak about everything, but not about us". Common-people's opinion
about parliament, quoted in: "Gazeta Wyborcza", 31.05.93.
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Poland" - most often, Jews.8 Both left-wing and right-wing opponents of the open
society offer these popular anarchist views the respective tools to politically oppose
the institutional reality of the emerging democracy.9
Those who adopted such views were formed to comprehend the social world, identify the problems and collectively come to grips with them, by way of cognitive
patterns which were "legitimated" over the last 200 years of the national history and
"directly verified" during the recent emancipation struggle. It is thus, not simply the
case that workers or peasants organising riots against the "Jewish parliament" used
to "believe in democracy" and then they politically and ideologically became followers of nationalism or fascism. In fact, a great part of the process happens on a
level which is "deeper" or "more substantial" - and by the same token "less manifest", more "hidden" or "softer" (closer to the "social software") - than the purely
political or ideological level. These individuals are not simply "enemies of democracy" and thus supporters of some competing political ideology. It is rather a problem of how the democratic state and the democratic procedures "appear" to the
"people" according to well-established and socially relevant patterns of thought and
communication.
The problems which face the democratic institutions in the post-communist Polish
society cannot be resolved by means of political competition and argumentation
alone. The essential issue is the organic and piecemeal growth of what may be
called the "culture of democracy". To approach to this task means, however, to
8
"The Parliament, the government and the president Lech Walesa do not act according to the Polish
interest, for they are enemies of Poland". From a "Solidarity"-leaflet, quoted in: "Gazeta Wyborcza", 22-23.05.93. "Why do you call politicians and people from the public life which you don't
like Jews?" "Is it a shame to be a Jew? I am proud to be a Pole". "But you call your opponents
Jews in order to offend them." "You are wondering about our attacks, but somebody is responsible
for all this evil. In the communist time there was one single leading force and there is the same
situation today." Authorised interview with the "Solidarity"-leader Z. Wrzodak in: "Gazeta Wyborcza", 25.05.93. "In Poland we face a paradoxical situation, for it is the Jewish minority who is ruling a civilised and numbering nearly 40 millions of people country." From a leaflet of the "Disappointed and Frustrated Poles" (Warsaw, 13.09.90). According to an opinion poll carried out in
spring 93 only 7,1% of the „Solidarity"-members (numbering at that time about 2.000.000) agreed
that Poland is ruled by the Polish people. More popular was the view that the country is ruled by
the foreign capital (37,2%), by Americans (17,8%), by Jews (17%), by domestic capitalists
(10,3%) or by communist agents (8,3%). Cf. L. Maleszka, Druga Solidarnosc Trzeciej Rzeczypospolitej /The Second Solidarity of the Third Republic/, in: „Gazeta Wyborcza", 31.08.-1.09.96.
9
The other important point which we have to refer to in this context is the conflict between the program of the democratic reform and the efforts of some forces in the Polish Catholic Church or in
related institutions to promote what since the victory of the counterreformation in Poland is being
called "the catholic state of the Polish nation": "Dear officials of the state administration! You cannot allow to cut us off from the roots we came from. (...) You cannot allow this great Polish oaktree to be watered with the poison of the misconceived freedom, European ideas and godless democracy". Address of the Prior of the Paulinite's Monastery at Claramontana (in the name of the
Pope and of the General of the Paulinite's Order) to the participants of the pilgrimage of the officials of Polish public administration to Claramontana at May 15th 1993, quoted in: "Niedziela",
30.05.93.
D. Aleksandrowicz: Cultural Paradigms and Post-Communist Transformation
13
challenge some crucial patterns of the national cultural tradition and wellestablished models of national identity.
7. Are the „people" still the same?
Since the begin of the transformation process in the early 1990s, dramatic changes
have occurred in the political life of the Polish society. Wide support for moderate,
reformist liberals vanished quickly, soon after the reformist concepts were put into
practice. Instead, ideas and political groups promoting some sort of radical antiCommunist revolution and appealing to values such as „nation" and „catholic tradition" have gained remarkable popularity. Finally, following the path of Lithuania,
the popular sympathy has moved to the former communists, who argued in terms of
anti-clericalism and of appreciating the achievements of the socialist past. The former president who embodied the legend of the „Solidarity" movement, and who
was directly supported by the church, lost the election. The winner was his postcommunist rival whose appeal resulted from a movement away from both the tradition of anti-communism and of Catholicism.
Yet, the „real" change in the attitudes of the masses has been much more moderate
than it appears to be. The aforementioned process took mainly place on the surface
of the social life and was due to the altering popular sympathy. This sympathy has
had a political colour and thus remarkable political consequence. For the majority
of people, it was a means of symbolic identification of expectations which remained substantially the same since the strike movement of the late 1970s: higher
wages and well supplied marketplaces, accompanied by high level of social security
and easy access to education and to health care, lack of greater social differences, of
poverty, of unemployment and of criminality. Since all these demands are hard to
satisfy in any of the existing societies and especially in an underdeveloped and
transforming one, the post-communists, too, failed in meeting them. Therefore, in
1997 there were national-populist, church-backed politicians, who have regained
much of the popular support.
The dramatic but not substantial moves from the left to the right (whatever these
abused words in contemporary Poland mean) will probably occupy the public scene
until the „critical mass" of some less visible processes will be reached. The first of
these processes will be the gradual change in the mental equipment of the „people".
Continuing their hopeless trial-and-error-efforts, they will become increasingly
clever, which means - ready to rethink their very behavioural strategy and picture of
the world. The second process will be the vanishing social significance of the
„people" in the traditional meaning of the word (and parallel to it, of the
„intelligentsia" of the East-European fashion). Due to the changing economic
structure of the society, the peasants and industrial workers will diminish in number
and will lose their former position. The opposite process will be the growth of the
14
F.I.T. Discussion Paper 6/99
„middle class", without which the competitive „open society" would remain an
unstable institutional shell and wishful thinking.
D. Aleksandrowicz: Cultural Paradigms and Post-Communist Transformation
15
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Aleksandrowicz, Dariusz, 1982: Kultura industrialna - Analiza socjologiczna
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Przewóska, Maria Cz., 1923: Polska i jej twierdze bytu. Sklad zasad narodowej
samowiedzy twórczej /Poland and the Fortress of its Being. The Principles of the
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