Rethinking the Relationship Between Poverty
and Terrorism
By Jeff Burdette
Journal Article | Jun 9 2014 - 8:44pm
Rethinking the Relationship Between Poverty and Terrorism
Jeff Burdette
U.S. Policymakers have generally accepted as essential and uncontested fact that poverty and terrorism are
directly and causally linked. The current U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy, for instance, explains that alQaeda must be confronted with a “CT strategy embedded within an overall strategy of enhanced U.S.
economic and political engagement with Southeast Asia that fosters peace, prosperity and democracy in
the region.”[i] Yet, a substantial amount of scholarship casts doubt on the purported nexus between
poverty and terrorism, or what is often referred to as the poverty-terrorism hypothesis.
In fact, the truth is more complicated. Poverty does not cause terrorism, but neither is it irrelevant.
Numerous empirical and anecdotal studies demonstrate that there is no direct connection between poverty
and terrorism. However, poverty can still have an important, if indirect, role in contributing to an
individual or group’s predisposition to participate in terrorism. Poverty can help spur radicalization by
reinforcing other sources of disaffection and can also increase opportunities for terrorism by hampering
the ability of governments to effectively employ counterterrorism measures.
Poverty as Causation?
In attempting to elucidate the relationship between poverty and terrorism, scholars have applied multiple
levels of analysis, but have come to the broadly similar conclusion that no direct link exists. At the
individual level, a variety of empirical and anecdotal studies exist. For example, after surveying 250
members of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Nasra Hassan observed that “None of them were
uneducated, desperately poor…two were the sons of millionaires.”[ii] In another study, Alan Krueger and
Jitka Maleckova compared 129 members of Hizballah to a similar age cohort in the Lebanese general
population and found that the Hizballah members had a lower unemployment rate.[iii] Indeed, their
analysis actually suggests an inverse relationship between poverty and terrorism; a thirty point percentage
increase in poverty is correlated with a ten percent reduction in the likelihood of joining Hizballah.
Other studies have set aside the question of poverty’s relationship with radicalization at the level of the
individual and considered instead whether economic disparities among different regions within a country
predispose poorer areas to terrorism. Analyzing terrorism across different states in India, James Piazza
concludes that economic factors are less important than political issues, noting that high levels of terrorist
activity can be found in both wealthy and poor states. On the other hand, he observes that states suffering
from unresolved, long-term political crises have a higher degree of terrorist activity.[iv]
Finally, a number of studies have focused analysis at the national level, evaluating cross-country measures
of poverty and the relative predisposition or resistance to terrorism of poorer and richer countries. In one
of the most widely cited of these studies, Alberto Abadie broadly agrees with Piazza, assessing that
political oppression is positively correlated with terrorism, but that there is no “significant association
between terrorism and economic variables such as income once the effect of other country characteristics
is taken into account.”[v] Taken together, the body of scholarship on poverty and terrorism- encompassing
numerous regions and employing a broad array of methodologies- indicates that regardless of whether the
poverty-terrorism hypothesis is considered at the national, regional, or individual level, there is no
demonstrable empirical link between terrorism and poverty.
If empirical studies largely reject a causal relationship between poverty and terrorism, supporters of the
hypothesis have turned to theory for their most compelling arguments. Indeed, the argument that poverty
breeds desperation and desperation begets terrorism is powerfully and intuitively compelling. But even the
stronger theoretical arguments for the poverty-terrorism hypothesis weaken under stricter scrutiny. For
instance, while it is often accepted prima facie that poverty is at least consistent in theory with a higher
predisposition to participate in terrorism, Krueger and Maletckova point out that Hassan’s interview
subjects emphasize political grievances and argue that not only is eliminating poverty unlikely to allay
these feelings, but higher levels of wealth may actually aggravate them if those who are well off perceive
them more acutely.[vi]
To be sure, many scholars reject the conclusion that poverty and terrorism are unconnected. In support of
this position, they point to a number of studies indicating a direct and substantial link. However, these
studies are undermined by important weaknesses.
One popular and intriguing argument employed by supporters of the poverty-terrorism hypothesis has
focused on biases introduced by the recruitment regimes employed by terrorist organizations. According
to this argument, organizations favor recruits of higher socioeconomic status first, because they’re likely
to be better skilled and more educated, and second because by voluntarily abandoning material comforts
otherwise available to them they have demonstrated a high level of commitment to the cause.[vii]
Consequently, even if the pool of potential terrorists is predominantly poor, the selection process obscures
this fact by disproportionately choosing among the few wealthy recruits while largely ignoring the many
poor options. However, if this argument is correct we should expect a positive correlation between
poverty and support for terrorism; even if impoverished individuals are less likely to be accepted by a
terrorist organization, they should still be more likely to support it. On the contrary, one study examining
this question found that Palestinian support for armed attacks against Israeli targets actually fell among the
unemployed.[viii]
Another flaw in studies supportive of the poverty-terrorism hypothesis is an emphasis on economic factors
where political or other issues may be equally salient. Pinar Derin-Gure has challenged the findings of
Krueger and others by drawing a distinction between separatist terrorism and other types of domestic
terrorism under the hypothesis that impoverished separatist regions may be especially prone to terrorism.
He considers the economic conditions of a variety of separatist regions that have seen heightened rates of
terrorism and confirms his hypothesis, concluding that “separatist terrorists tend to originate from poorer
areas.”[ix] Yet, while isolating separatist terrorism from other forms of domestic political violence offers
an intriguing new perspective, it fails to consider that separatist regions typically experience
socioeconomic deprivation alongside a multitude of other grievances, including political repression and
racial or ethnic discrimination. To establish that economic factors are causal, they need to be isolated from
these other plausible grievances.
Poverty as a Contributory Factor?
Ultimately, the many studies assessing terrorism and poverty demonstrate that socioeconomic deprivation
does not have a direct, causal relationship with terrorism. However, this does not mean that poverty is
irrelevant. Indeed, by contributing to radicalization and expanding opportunities for political violence,
poverty still bears on terrorism in three important, if indirect, ways.
First, even if absolute levels of poverty are unimportant, socioeconomic deprivation relative to the
expectations of a group or individual can be a significant grievance. As Neal Smelser notes numerous
studies have demonstrated that “strains could not be identified solely as objective conditions, such as
absolute level of poverty, but always had to be assessed relative to some kind of expectation.”[x]
According to Smelser, this principle of relative deprivation is “a universal feature of disaffection.”[xi] It’s
important to distinguish the concept of relative deprivation from the claim that poverty directly fuels
terrorism because it is the perception of inequality, rather than poverty itself, that fuels alienation. As
Smelser argues, awareness of this socioeconomic disparity serves to “make other, remaining foci of
exclusion more visible and aggravating.”[xii] Lending support to this theory, a report prepared by the
Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI) finds that “it seems clear that large socio-economic
inequalities are more conflict generating if…they are reinforced by other grievances of a more political
nature, such as ethnic discrimination.”[xiii] Notably, the economic factors by themselves are less
important than their role in substantiating and reinforcing existing grievances.
Beyond its theoretical appeal, the principle of relative deprivation has empirical support. For example,
Piazza has studied the relationship between economic discrimination against minority groups and
terrorism. He concludes that “minority economic discrimination is a significant predictor of domestic
terrorist events in countries and that absence of and remediation of minority economic discrimination are
significant negative predictors of domestic terrorism.”[xiv] Again, he emphasizes the importance of
socioeconomic deprivation as just one component of a confluence of mutually reinforcing grievances.
“Minority economic discrimination – which usually involves some combination of employment
discrimination, unequal access to government health, educational or social services, and lack of economic
opportunities available to the rest of society – is a catalyst for the development of minority group
grievances.”[xv]
Second, economic deprivation can also indirectly foster radicalization by producing and emphasizing
status dissonance. As Matthew Venhaus argues, unrealized expectations of success often drive
radicalization by compelling young men with limited opportunities to seek status through participation in
terrorism.[xvi] Unemployment is often a particularly potent trigger for feelings of status dissatisfaction.
For example, Muhsin Hassan interviewed 15 former al-Shabaab members and concluded “although
personal poverty is not a reason for joining violent extremism, the cases of these youth show that the
effects of poverty, such as idleness and low self-esteem cannot be ignored in this discussion. The fact that
many Somali youth are unemployed and rely on relatives for sustenance…dampens their self-worth such
that when an opportunity to fend for oneself arises, they are quick to take advantage.”[xvii]
Finally, poverty can contribute to terrorism by increasing opportunities for violent political action.
Smelser points out that radicalization alone is insufficient for the incidence of terrorism. Instead, this
radicalization must occur in the context of what he terms the “opportunity structure.”[xviii] If opportunity
can be restricted, terrorism can be deterred. But there is a significant disparity between the capacity of
poor and wealthy countries to respond to terrorism. While the governments of rich countries will have
sufficient financial resources to train, pay, and equip a strong police and army, poor countries will
generally be beset by ill-equipped and poorly trained security forces. Worse still, the security forces in
poorer countries are more likely to be corrupt and often attempt to mask any shortcomings in training or
equipment with exceptional levels of brutality, meaning that their response may not be merely ineffective,
but outright counterproductive. Finally, economic discrimination against minority populations can also
exert an important influence on the opportunity structure. As Piazza points out, aggrieved minority
populations will likely be less willing to cooperate with the government on security operations.[xix]
Implications
The question of whether or not poverty causes terrorism is complex and refuses to lend itself to a
categorical yes or no answer. On one hand, a review of the literature suggests that poverty is not a direct
and immediate cause of terrorism. At the same time, it can have an important, albeit indirect, role in
producing political violence. Most importantly, it can promote radicalization by reinforcing other sources
of disaffection or facilitate terrorism by weakening state capacity and offering greater opportunity for
violent political expression.
Policymakers should bear these lessons in mind when designing counterterrorism strategies. Broad
poverty reduction programs, while admirable in their own right, are unlikely to be an effective
counterterror tool. On the other hand, more targeted assistance- including measures aimed at reducing
discrimination against minority groups, promoting positive paths to self-esteem for potential terrorist
recruits, or bolstering indigenous counterterrorism security forces –may have a more significant impact.
Such narrowly tailored aid programs connected to specific objectives should replace broad poverty
reduction measures in future counterterrorism strategies.
End Notes
[i] “National Strategy for Counterterrorism,” Office of the President of the United States (June 2011), 16.
[ii] Nasra Hassan, “An Arsenal of Believers,” The New Yorker, November 19, 2011,
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2001/11/19/011119fa_FACT1?currentPage=all.
[iii] Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty, Political Violence, and Terrorism: Is
There a Causal Connection?” National Bureau of Economic Research (July 2002), 9.
[iv] James A. Piazza, “Economic Development, Poorly Managed Political Conflict and Terrorism,”
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 32, No. 5 (May 2009), 416.
[v] Alberto Abadie, “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,” The American Economic
Review, Vol. 96, No. 2 (May 2006), 57.
[vi] Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty, Political Violence, and Terrorism: Is
There a Causal Connection?” National Bureau of Economic Research (July 2002), 9.
[vii] James A. Piazza, “Poverty, minority economic discrimination, and domestic terrorism,” Journal of
Peace Research, Vol. 48 (March 2011), 340.
[viii] Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty, Political Violence, and Terrorism: Is
There a Causal Connection?” National Bureau of Economic Research (July 2002), 16.
[ix] Pinar Derin-Güre, “Does Terrorism Have Economic Roots?” Boston University (May 15, 2009), 6.
[x] Neal Smelser, The Faces of Terrorism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 15.
[xi] Ibid.
[xii] Ibid, 16.
[xiii] Brynjar Lia and Katja Skolberg, “Causes of Terrorism: An Expanded and Updated Review of the
Literature,” Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 27.
[xiv] James A. Piazza, “Poverty, minority economic discrimination, and domestic terrorism,” Journal of
Peace Research, Vol. 48 (March 2011), 349.
[xv] Ibid, 341.
[xvi] Matthew Venhaus, “Why Youth Join al-Qaeda,” US Institute of Peace Special Report (2010), 9.
[xvii] Muhsin Hassan, “Understanding Drivers of Violent Extremism: The Case of al-Shabab and Somali
Youth,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 5, Iss. 8 (August 2012), 18.
[xviii] Neal Smelser, The Faces of Terrorism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 29.
[xix] James A. Piazza, “Poverty, minority economic discrimination, and domestic terrorism,” Journal of
Peace Research, Vol. 48 (March 2011), 341.
About the Author
Jeff Burdette
Jeff Burdette is a Masters Candidate in the Security Studies Program in
Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service. His research interests include terrorism
and security issues in the Middle East and North Africa. He can be found on
Twitter at @BurdetteJeff.
Available online at : http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/rethinking-the-relationship-betweenpoverty-and-terrorism
Links:
{1} http://smallwarsjournal.com/author/jeff-burdette
{2} http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2001/11/19/011119fa_FACT1?currentPage=all
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