Contested Development Working Paper Series
Department of Geography,
King’s College London
_______________________________________________________________
Year 2016 Paper #73
_______________________________________________________________
Risk Root Cause Analysis Paper for PEARL
(Preparing for Extreme And Rare events in
coastaL regions project):
The Case of Rethymno, Crete
Dr. Stavros Mavrogenis
European Centre for Environmental Research and Training
Panteion University of Athens
This project has received funding from the European Union´s Seventh Framework Programme for Research,
Technological Development and Demonstration under Grant Agreement No 603663 for the research project PEARL
(Preparing for Extreme And Rare events in coastal regions). All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced,
stored in a database or retrieval system, or published, in any form or in any way, electronically, mechanically, by print,
photoprint, microfilm or any other means without prior written permission from the publisher.
The deliverable reflects only the author’s views and the European Union is not liable for any use that may be made of
the information contained
Table of contents
1. Background to the Rethymno case study
p.3
2. The foot print of austerity
p.6
Risk
p.7
4. DRM in Greece. Recent developments under the
p.8
3.
Flood
risk
governance
and
Disaster
Management at the national level
Hyogo Framework of Action
5. Input to the RCCA process
p.16
5.1 Physical processes, drivers of hazards and main
p.18
disasters events in the case of Rethymno
5.2
Socio-economic
drivers
of
exposure
and
p.22
vulnerability
5.3 Governance drivers
p.24
6. Perceptions, culture, behavior and the role of
p.27
economic crisis
7. Discussion and Analysis. Input to ABM and FORIN
p.26
Methodology
Reference list
p.46
Appendix A. Methodology and list of interviews
p. 49
2
1. Background to Rethymno case study
Crete is an extremely mountainous island, and its character is defined by a high
mountain range crossing from west to east, formed by three different groups of
mountains: the White Mountains or Lefka Ori (2,452 m), the Idi Range (2,456 m) and
the Dikti Mountains (2,148 m).Crete straddles two climatic zones, the Mediterranean
and the North African, mainly falling within the former. As such, the climate in the
island is primarily temperate. The atmosphere can be quite humid, depending on the
proximity to the sea, while winter is fairly mild. Snowfall is common on the mountains
between November and May, but rare in the low lying areas. While mountain tops
remain snow-capped year long, near the coast snow only stays on the ground for a few
minutes or hours. During the Cretan summer, average temperatures reach the high 20slow 30s Celsius (mid 80s to mid 90sFahrenheit), with maxima touching the upper 30smid 40s (above 110 °F / 43.3 °C). The south coast, including the Mesara Plain and
Asterousia Mountains, falls in the North African climatic zone, and thus enjoys
significantly more sunny days and high temperatures throughout the year.
The Region of Crete is the largest and most populous of the Greek islands, the fifth
largest island in the Mediterranean Sea, and one of the thirteen administrative regions
of Greece. It is located in the southern part of the Aegean Sea separating the Aegean
from the Libyan Sea. Crete is the most populous island in Greece with a population of
more than 620,000 people and population density about 74.5/km2 in comparison to the
national mean which is 87.7 km/2. Approximately 42% live in Crete's main cities and
towns whilst 45% live in rural areas. The economy of the Region of Crete is
predominantly based on agriculture and is one of the few Greek islands that can support
itself independently without a tourism industry. The economy began to change visibly
during the 1970s as tourism gained in importance. While an emphasis remains on
agriculture and stock breeding, due to the climate and terrain of the island, there has
been a drop in manufacturing, and an observable expansion in its service industries
(mainly tourism-related). All three sectors of the Cretan economy (agriculture/farming,
processing-packaging, services), are directly connected and interdependent. The island
has a per capita income much higher than the Greek average, while unemployment is
the same with the national average (25, 6%).
3
According to the forecasts, it is expected that Crete will intensively be affected by the
impacts of climate change, and that until 2050 the annual rainfall will be reduced by
approximately 20-30% together with a huge minimization of the water availability in
the area. The region of Crete is expected to face changes considering the cash flow and
employment rates associated mainly with tourism and agriculture. Every year, more
than 3 million tourists visit the island during summer, but according to forecasts,
tourism in the Mediterranean region will shift from summer and seasonal tourism to
autumn and spring tourism meaning that more flexible and broader employment
contracts need to be prepared. On the other hand, agricultural production that is
associated with tourism necessitates structural changes deriving from the changes
expected in both the supply and demand side of agricultural products. New crops,
resistant in limited water availability and high summer temperatures may be needed
together with new farming techniques and technologies which will safeguard farmers’
income. The delays in the harmonization of environmental legislation with the
European directives, and the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms resulted in the
poor integration of environmental protection in all economic activities.
The coastal zone of Rethymno is exposed throughout the year to strong N and NW
winds (7-8Bf) with great fetches, resulting in the development of great waves. Changes
in wind conditions – probably due to climate change - had resulted in causing storm
events more frequently than in the past. More specifically extreme weather conditions
with strong winds resulted in the creation of storm waves combined sometimes with
flush floods form ephemeral streams. Flooding has always been a serious problem for
Rethymno causing an ongoing threat to its residents, homes, business and public
infrastructure. Rethymno is located in the drainage basin of the north part Rethymno
166 km2 of Vrysinas Mountain making storm water flow through the urban area
inevitable. Therefore, major flood events have been encountered throughout the years,
resulting in serious damages mainly in the Old Town of Rethymno and the east lowlying areas.
Rethymno city's population stands at 55.525 inhabitants 140.12 per sq.meter (Census
2011) which characterize it as the 3rd most populous urban area in Crete. Rethymno
city is the center of commercial, administrative and cultural activities of the
homonymous Regional Unit where most of the human activities are been developed
along the coastline of the harbor area. The area includes the Port of Rethymno, and the
4
adjacent coastal area (a total area of about 4 km2). The Port is located in the Northern
end of Crete, within the homonymous bay.
Map: the city and bay of Rethymno
Adapted from Makropoulos et al. (2015)
5
2. The foot print of austerity
Greece and the troika signed the first Memorandum of Understanding in May 2010
(centred on internal devaluation and a series of taxes and accompanying the first Greek
bailout programme) and the second Memorandum in February 2012 (furthering
austerity and liberalisation measures, accompanied by the second bailout agreement
including the debt-restructuring agreement entailing private-sector involvement)
(Markantonatou 2013). Until the winter of 2009/2010, Greece was running an
unsustainable budget deficit (-15.6% of GDP in 2009), current account balance (-11.1%
of GDP in 2009) and very high public debt (129.7% of GDP in 2009). The combination
of this disappointing economic performance with the aftershocks of the 2008 global
economic crisis brought Greece to the brink of default in early 2010. Greece’s sovereign
debt crisis was prevented by the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF which,
at the request of the Greek government, bailed the country out in May 2010. Since then
a Troika representing the EC, the ECB and the IMF has monitored economic policy in
Greece. Taxes were raised, public spending was cut and public sector wages and
pensions were lowered. A second effort to rescue Greece took place in February 2012,
when international and domestic private creditors oversaw the restructuring of Greek
debt. They suffered losses which helped alleviate the Greek debt. This second rescue
package was also accompanied by further austerity measures, leading to further
decreases in salaries and wages not only in the public but also in the private sector (22% decrease in the minimum monthly salary in the private sector). The results of the
above economic policy measures were mixed. A depression followed the rise in taxes
and the decrease in incomes. In three years (2010 –2012), the economy shrank by a
total 19.5%. Unemployment, which was at 9.5% of the labour force in 2009, soared to
24.3% in 2012. On the other hand, in the same period the Greek economy regained twothirds of the competitiveness it had lost in 2000 – 2009 and the budget deficit fell to
9.4% of GDP at the end of 2011.
3. Flood risk governance and Disaster Risk Management at the national level
Special Secretariat for Water as one of main national authorities is in charge for the
formulation and implementation of all public works (structural or not) related to Water
Resources management and protection, as also for the coordination of all respective
institutions/organizations/services on local and national level. Key responsibilities and
6
activities of SSW are: the incorporation in national legislation of Water and Floods
Framework Directive1; Flood Framework Directive; Wastewater reuse and
management; monitoring and assessment of water quality and quantity; Marine
Strategy Framework Directive; Bathing coasts and Blue Flag operation and finally all
international and transnational Mediterranean water issues. The Secretariat collaborates
closely to the Regional Water Directorates in order to establish national and local
projects in terms of sustainable water resources management.
In 2012 the Greek government completed the identification of potentially High Risk
Flood Areas in the country and updated the Preliminary Flood Risk Assessment. Part
of this process was to update the data for historical floods and the potentially High Risk
Flood areas in all 14 “water districts”. The next steps will be the Flood Risk Plans for
the High Risk Areas that will be produced by the end of 2015. In 2016 the Plans will
be discussed in public consultations. From the interview conducted with the director of
the Water Secretariat (Triantis 30/04/2015) it was mentioned that the consultation
process will be the same with the Water Directive. That means the participation of local
stakeholders from the public sector and the civil society and external consultants. The
tools that will be used are questionnaires, direct contact with local stakeholders via
email or telephone and open seminars at different locations in Crete.
Mr. Kostas Triantis the General Secretary of the SSW when asked about the impact of
austerity measures he claimed
The SSW is not dependent so much on the national budget and
most of the funding originates from the European Union. The
memorandum measures actually enhanced the SSW’s long-term
planning with the introduction of a three years seat for the
General Secretary2.
1
Directive 2007/60/EC, known as the Floods Directive, requires that Member States assess if all water
courses and coast lines are at risk from flooding, to map the potential flooded areas and endangered assets
and humans in order to take adequate and coordinated measures to reduce the risk. The Directive also
reinforces the right of the public to access information and to participate in the planning process. As a
first step a preliminary assessment by 2011 is required in order to identify the river basins and associated
coastal areas at risk of flooding. For all such zones flood risk maps should be prepared by 2013 and
subsequently flood risk management plans focused on prevention, protection and preparedness by 2015.
The Directive applies to inland waters as well as all coastal waters across the whole territory of the EU.
2
Until then the GS used to change every time there was elections or a change in the cabinet.
7
4. DRM in Greece. Recent developments under the Hyogo Framework of Action
Following the commitments that nation states agreed to in Hyogo, Greece undertook
the obligation to set up a National Platform for DRR. After extensive consultations with
departments and agencies were conducted, Greece submitted to the Secretariat of the
UN / ISDR (June 1st 2012) a strategic plan on the Greek National Platform for Disaster
Risk Reduction. The National Platform functions as network of state agencies and other
bodies in order to reduce the risk of natural or technological disasters occurring with
great frequency that can have serious social and economic impact in the country and to
promote the principles of the HFA. With the new institutional framework emphasis was
given in two directions: to disaster risk reduction with the introduction of strategic and
operational civil protection planning, and disaster risk management (DRM) by creating
a new organizational and operational model of civil protection services at central and
decentralized levels. To support these guidelines, civil protection planning was
interlinked with the country's development planning, such as the new National Strategic
Reference Framework 2014-2020.
The main goals of the Platform were the following amongst others:
First of all to increase the citizens' safety, with priority to improving disaster preparation
and response actions, developing warning systems and early warning of the population
by providing clear, understandable and readily usable information, promote training of
civil protection personnel and volunteers. This could be achieved by establishing
alerting procedures, training and education of staff at every level of administration
through constant information, training and education of participants of civil protection
in local decision-making centers at municipal level and the planning and carrying out
civil protection drills. Second, to promote awareness and education of the population
to enhance risk awareness disasters of the population in disaster risk management issues
by constant training and education of the population in the implementation of civil
protection planning especially in the phases of preparedness and response to disasters
through lifelong learning processes. The country's civil protection volunteering system
was supposed to be reorganized in matters that enhance the role of Voluntary
Organizations.
The objective of the Platform is the integration of DRR agenda in the decision-making
process at national and local level, with the participation of the private sector and
8
research institutes. In this way promoting the culture of prevention, which was the great
challenge of Hyogo, in a way that will enhance the ability of Greek society to reduce
human and material losses. In March 2015 the National Progress Report on the
Implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2013-2015 (GSCP, 2015)
describes the progress so far..
In relation to Objective of the HFA on mainstreaming of reducing disasters in
development and other government policies, the report makes reference to the new
enhanced role of Civil Protection Agency which coordinates partnerships between
public and academic organizations so as to integrate DRR policies central and regional
planning. This also relates to integrated flood risk management plans in accordance
with the Floods Directive 60/2007 of the European Commission. Despite the
importance of the establishment of the Platform, the value of dramatically reduced by
the fact that it has not yet normalized its operation, as well as regular meetings do not
take place, while the number of actors involved are very small and includes only
government agencies (National Progress Report on the Implementation of the Hyogo
Framework for Action 2013-2015).
Another outcome is that in Greece despite the economic crisis and other institutional
problems, significant progress has been made in the foundation of institutions and
mechanisms for strengthening DRR. There is already a process of enhancing the role
of civil society, after the amendments of Law. 4249/20153 and a new National Early
Warning System will diminish the fragmentation of existing warning mechanisms. An
important role is expected to play and the new BEYOND program: “Building a Centre
of Excellence for Earth Observation-based monitoring of Natural Disasters”,
implemented by the National Observatory of Athens (NOA). The program areas relate
to various types of natural disasters including geophysical hazards such as earthquakes
and volcanoes, fires, extreme weather and hydrometereological hazards, transportation
Sachara’s dust, apparently thermal urban islands, transmission of air pollutants and
smoke coming from forest fires and industrial accidents, etc., with an emphasis on
monitoring their effects on health, climate change and ecosystems. (NSA, 2015).
However there are important steps that need to be done, notably at the level of
3
Reorganization of the Greek Police, the Fire House and the General Secretariat of Civil Protection,
Ministry of upgrade Services Public Order and Citizen Protection and regulate other matters competence
of the Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection and other provisions.
9
expansion in numbers of the agencies involved in the design and implementation of risk
reduction policy, with special emphasis on particularly vulnerable groups.
Overall we can identify three weaknesses of Greek DRM policies.
The first is that despite the fact of new institutions for DRM (like the National Platform)
and relevant legislations, there is no proper and monitoring and enforcing mechanism
for their implementation. It is clearly an issue of governance and accountability.
The second weakness is that of DRR mainstreaming. Emphasis is still given on postdisaster and reconstruction policies instead of prevention. In addition to this the main
approach still focus on the disaster as an isolated event and less attention is given to the
concept of vulnerability, which has wider social and political dimensions.
The third weakness is the absence of a multi stakeholder approach that takes under
consideration the power relations of social organizations, local communities, civil
society and the private sector. This approach will ensure that all the stakeholders do not
participate only in planning and policy analysis, but they are also responsible of
implementing these policies.
Austerity measures should not be blamed for these weakness. On the contrary it is the
institutional fragmentation of Greek public administration that functions as a h9ndrance
for most of the commitments that Greece pledge to implement following international
regulations and strategies.
10
5. Input to the Risk Root Cause Analysis process
5.1 Physical processes, drivers of hazards and main disasters events in the case of
Rethymno
This section will show how the contemporary flood risk environment is driven by
historic root causes and drivers across the four domains of physical, governance, socioeconomic and perceptions and values in potentially non-linear ways; grounding this
explanation in the analysis of specific flood events under study which might be
revealing of causal factors; reflecting on how these root causes might also drive risk
accumulation, propagation, cascading, feedback or concatenation.
Multiple stressors have always posed flood threats for the city of Rethymno causing an
ongoing risk to its residents, homes, business and public infrastructure. The flow of
storm water through the city, the large number of streams that cross it and the rapid
transition from the steep slopes at the upstream rural areas to the flat urban zone
imposed significant pressure to flood defenses throughout the years (Makropoulos et
al. pp. 2-3). Major historical floods mainly related to heavy precipitation, exceedance
of river’s and drainage systems’ capacity or inability of flow routing due to lack of
maintenance, recorded on February 29th 1968, February 6th 1984, October 28th 1991
and November 10th 1999 (Archontakis D. 2006; Archontakis D. 2013), but others of
less importance and destructiveness are encountered every year. The 1968 flood was a
tipping point for Mayor at that time Archontakis (and mayor for several terms
afterwards) after a life threatening experience. In his words (05/06/2015)
I was saved at the last minute by a municipality’s employee before
the stream drifts me away. The next moment I realized that I had
to do something about protecting the city from floods.
Until the mid-90s the most repeated flood damage was caused by the Kamaraki’s
stream, which flows through the modern part of downtown Rethymon near the main
city's beach. In 1991 the storm had a duration of four hours, varying intensity and a
total precipitation depth of 135 mm. Neither the exact storm time pattern nor maximum
intensity are known, because that day the rainfall recording gauge was out of order4
4
The author suggested that Oversizing the covered part of the drainage channel is not realistic. Indeed,
the topography of the urbanized area does not permit the construction of closed conduits of sufficient
cross section, and the construction of an open channel is out of the question as it would cut the town in
11
(Ganoulis 1995). The flood events led to adverse human, material, economic and
environmental effects and eventually to the selection of prevention and mitigation
measures e.g. arrangement and diversion of streams and torrents, construction of
circular storm water drainage collectors, internal-primary drainage network and flood
control dams (Ganoulis I. et al. 2000).
The city is very much oriented to the harbour where there is high accumulation of land
values. The Drainage and sewage system used to be coupled – redesign is ongoing –
including new measure upstream. Waves overtop the harbour wall during winter storms
(waves coming for north-west side of the bay) and cause flooding in western part of the
old town. There is Flooding in the area of the harbour authority building in eastern part
of harbour where a drainage outlet leads in the harbour. Here high water pressure from
the open sea and a high amount of water coming through the drainage canal leads to
flooding that penetrates the building. As a result of the extreme waves violent wave
overtopping occurs along the windward breakwaters of the harbour and threatens the
stability of breakwaters as well as the safety of human population. Wave overtopping
also results in flooding of the harbour’s surface area. Further huge quantities of
seawater penetrate from the west (Parking area), and overflow the harbour’s surface
area as well as the wider coastal area causing interruption in loading and unloading
operations, damage to the port facilities and he cargo, traffic problems and damage to
coastal shops and restaurants.
two. Apart from construction restrictions, another important question is the storm sediment load to be
evacuated by this stream to the beach, causing a temporal degradation of the beach and the pollution of
neighbouring sea waters.
12
Photo 1: waves overtop the breakwaters
Photo 2: the entrance of the parking lot
13
Photo 3: waves intrude the old harbor
Note: the photos are snapshots of videos granted to the author from Rethymno’s port
authority (January 2015)
Photo 4: the 1991 flood in Rethymno (Archontakis 2013)
Additionally, the adjacent to the harbor recreational beaches are exposed to erosion
spoiling the coastal site and affecting the tourism’s contribution to local economy. In
the future climate-change and sea-level rise will put additional pressure to Rethymno.
14
It is estimated that sea level will rise from 0.7 to 4 mm/year for the next 100 years.
According to the director of the Port Authority Ms Koutselidaki (11/06/2015):
We have already experienced a significant change of waves that
was about 5 meters in the late 1980s and now is more than 7
meters during winter time.
Adverse effect of the wave energy is also the erosion of the recreational beaches which
highly affects tourism’s contribution to the local economy rousing the interest of the
local authorities for finding efficient solutions. Even though mostly engineering
measures have been implemented, so far, as flood defenses for Rethymno, multiple
forces from the urban and coastal area still result in flood problems as recently
experienced and recorded in the local press/channels/social media.
5.2 Drivers of exposure and vulnerability
The main historic driver for risk accumulation in Rethymno is opposition against flood
risk governance. Discussions with locals that have heard stories from elders confirmed
that in the 1950s the idea of the construction of a new port near Rethymno (2.5
kilometers to the wet) in a physical location safe from the winds was abandoned after
opposition from local interest groups. As one of them said (taxi driver 04/06/2015)
They were owners of warehouses in the old port. A new commercial
harbor outside the old town would increase transport costs and
therefore they stood up against any relevant planning.
Former mayor Archontakis when interviewed claimed that local interest groups other
than warehouse owners this time, were against any initiative for maintaining,
renovating and building infrastructure in the old town. The reason for their stance was
their goal was to demolish the old houses and build apartment blocks following the
main trend of rapid urbanization (e.g. Heraklion). Despite the fact that they founded an
association in order to promote their interests they were not successful. As Archontakis
(05/06/2015) explained
The old town was protected from rapid urbanizations for two reasons.
The first is that even though the 1947 building code did not protect the
old town from rapid urbanization, local residents were not affluent
enough to build apartment blocks in the old town. The second reason is
15
than in 1967 the old town was proclaimed as a historical monument
and in 1978 as a traditional settlement.
These two developments minimized the influence of the landowners association and
protected the old town. Another historic root that should be mentioned is the poor
maintenance of old Venetian pipelines throughout the old town. Ex-mayor Archontakis
and residents from the old town confirmed during the interviews that the old pipelines
underground network was a hazard for public health. As one of them said (household
meeting 04/06/2015)
Back in the 1960s and 1970s no one would dare to stop in the old
town. Bad smells and mosquitoes were all over the place
At this point we have to mention that apart from the 1968 flood that almost cost
Archontakis life, the old town’s bad shape was another powerful motive for him to be
more active in local politics. In his own words (05/06/2015)
I was born and raised in the old town near Kamaraki. I can still
remember the bad smells and huge rats coming out the drainage
pipes. I could also remember that most of the visitors in the old
town would probably end up in the local hospital with diarrhea.
There was a need for something to be done.
Rapid urbanization of Rethymno in the last three decades is another driver for flood
risk. It is evident that the population rise from 14.500 in the 1970s to more than 40.000
today. The rise in the population until the mid-90s was not organized and did not take
under consideration long-term projections about natural hazards or other environmental
and socioeconomic pressures. The rapid growth of population was concentrated on the
coast in Rethymno or at the surrounding areas near the city. The reason for that is the
expansion of tourism ant the economies of scales that were created. Since the 1960s
decentralization of responsibility to local authorities in Greece did not mean more
funding. However things changed with EU funding in mid-1990s. Mayor Arcontakis
claimed that
In 1996 I visited France in order to learn from their experiences
in flood risk management. Seven months later the infrastructure
constructions were initiated with EU funding of course.
16
The ex prefect of Rethymno agreed to the abovementioned claim. In his own words
(Pappadakis 08/06/2015):
We have always wanted to protect the old town and the city of
Rethymno from disasters. But the problem was lack of money
(parades in local dialect).
Another major issue was lack of awareness as new population moved into Rethymno.
Most of them were originated from mountainous areas and carried local knowledge for
preventing from other types of disasters mainly forest fires and landslides, not urban
flooding or storm surges. In addition to that floods in Rethymno did not occur very
often and locals in many cases developed the feeling that were safe. As a consequence
they did not develop their economy to be resilient to this kind of shocks that most of
the times lead to loss and damage of assets.
5.3 Disaster Risk Reduction and Preparedness in Rethymno:
Disaster Risk Reduction policies are planned and implemented by the regional branch
of the General Secretariat for Civil Protection in Heraklion and the local branch of
Rethymno. Their main task is post-disaster intervention and early warning for other
types of disasters mostly forest fires that are the main threat in Crete. The headquarters
in Heraklion are understaffed as consequence of the austerity measures and therefore
have limited capacity to implement long-term strategic planning as the Director Mr.
Tzanokostakis claimed (02/06/2015)
Lack of staff is our major concern. For the last six months I trained a
team of well-educated young professionals in GIS and when their
voucher expired there was no option of rehiring them5
In Rethymno the civil protection office is understaffed as well. It has only one employee
who is also in charge. He mostly collaborates with the fire department that is the major
agent in post-disaster actions. There is a local volunteer group for civil protection but
5
Voucher is an EU funded programme for young professionals that covers their wages for a certain
period of time as another way to reduce unemployment levels.
17
is not supported by local authorities6. One of the interviewees (interviewee #1)
commented on that
Party politics are the main reason for the lack of support to the team of
volunteers. There is also conflict of interests with the local Red Cross
branch because they are officially registered and well-trained and the
volunteers are not.
The local Red Cross office is very active and its volunteers well trained for all kinds of
disasters and emergencies. The Red Cross/Samaritans is the oldest civil society
organization in Greece with main field of interest disasters response. Thus, it has
accumulated experience from past events and more importantly has developed a
national network with local branches across the country. Therefore the Red Cross
Societies have access to funds and human resources and are not dependent on local
authorities. The long tradition attracts people that would like to volunteer in their free
time. Furthermore, the local Red Cross branch is a stakeholder that participates in all
meetings about disasters preparedness and reduction. However that does not mean that
its viewpoints are always taken into account and transformed into policy actions. For
example as the Mr. Kalfoutzos (08/06/2015) said
Most of the times that I participate in meetings with other government
officials they do not take into account my warnings. For example in the
meetings about the Impact Assessment Report in case of break of the
Potamoi Dam, I asked for more focus on the prepardenss and raise
awareness of the local population. In the end there was only one event
organized and nothing more.
6
Unfortynately I was not given the opportunity to interview the leader of the volunteer group no matter
how many times I tried to get in touch with him.
18
Photo: the Potamoi Dam near Rethymno
When asked about the new legal framework and the Platform Mr. Kalfoutzos
(08/06/2015) said
The legal framework that was voted in 2010 (Kapodistrias reform)
transferred all the responsibilities from the local authorities (due to the
abolishment of the prefects) to the fire brigade. Therefore there is no
chance for pre-disaster planning because the prefects were more
organized in terms of preparing for local disasters of all types whereas
the fire department is rational that focus on forest fires.
Another concern in Rethymno is the lack of communication of evacuation routes after
a disaster. The only exception is the evacuation plan in case of an earthquake. However
relevant maps were distributed only once to local residents and according to the head
of the Red Cross (Kalfoutzos 08/06/2015)
The meeting points are located in non-suitable places. These are
schools that are in vulnerable positions in case of landslides. We are
19
asking people to leave their homes and gather at places that have more
chances to get injured or worse
Map of the old city: the red dots mark the evacuation spots after an earthquake. At the
bottom end the pen circle is a hill that after an earthquake might cause landslides.
6. Perceptions, culture, behavior and the role of economic crisis
In Rethymno social fragmentation, tradition of clientelism and party politics and lack
of enforcement of legislations are the three basic elements to be blamed for the absence
of a vibrant civil society and lack of awareness for disasters and environmental
protection among other social issues. Almost anyone asked during the fieldtrip about
the root causes of Rethymno main problems agreed to this. A few of them worth
mentioning
Local politicians all they care about is their personal assets. No
one can trust them anymore. Taxi driver (04/06/2015)
Rethymno would be much more different today if we did not have
their party politics to divide us (restaurant owner 04/06/2015)
20
I am sick of their corruption and that is the reason I never asked
for EU funding to renovate my hotel7. I took a bank loan instead
(hotel owner 07/06/2015)
The list could go on a lot. The thing that is evident is that due to the fact that local
population is heavily dependent on the state and local authorities for decades, this
provokes distrust to the state and changes the power dynamics at the local level. People
prefer or choose to form their social capital on the basis of kinship and common origin.
However this is a vicious cycle because at the end of the day strong in terms of power
and wealth kins can easily support or elect theirs MPs or mayors.
At the society's level financial crisis didn't change much. Eroding social capital is still
an issue although a few local NGOs were created focused on solidarity actions. The
leader one of them named Sympolis confirmed the new trend. In his own words
(Papadosifos 09/06/2015)
We are a group of young people with strong will to change things
in our town. Most of our activities focus on solidarity and aid to
families that are hit from the economic crisis. We see that more
and more people start to form new social networks and support
the most vulnerable. However their numbers do not allow us to
say that there is a vibrant civil society in Rethymno.
Photos 4 and 5 are evident of the ignorance local residents have about the infrastructure
in the old town. They cover the drain grates with plastic in order to cover smells and
prevent insects to come out of the drain pipes. Archontakis (05/06/2015) said that this
is caused because in some houses the owners in order not to pay drainage bills connect
them with the rainwater pipes causing the aforementioned problem. However
Prinarakis from the local public utilities company (09/05/2015) denied this accusation
and said that they do not charge extra the old town’s residents.
Another major issue raised by the participants in the 1st Stakeholder Workshop in
Rethymno is that many house owners and constructors drop debris or remains in
streams after finishing their construction works or even neglect to take appropriate
7
Applications for EU’s funding for the tourism sector had to be made via local authorities.
21
measures, therefore, material or even machinery are swept away in case a heavy
precipitation takes place during the construction works.
Photo 4: covered drain grate in the old town (Stavros Mavrogenis)
22
Photo 5: covered drain grate in the old town (Stavros Mavrogenis)
Another example of how the economic crisis has complicated flood risk management,
tourism revenues and public perception about risk is the construction of the new
boardwalk (photo 5). Shop owners are afraid that their shops of the beach at serious risk
from possible flooding in the near future. They say in the past faced difficult situations
and fear that due to the height difference between the tile edge and the bottom surface,
the rainwater would descend into their stores. The main reason for their concerns
however is that tourists will prefer to move from the other side of the road next to the
beach and that would probably mean fewer clients. Flood risk here is being used as a
scapegoat from local interest groups.
Photo 5: the new boardwalk
23
7. Discussion and Analysis. Input to ABM and FORIN Methodology
Primary actors are the government agencies that develop and implement policy
decisions on flood risk governance. The EU should be also included in the group of
primary actors due to the fact that it regulates funding and provides most of the
guidelines and legislations for the member states. At the local level primary actors are
the local authorities (region of Crete, municipality, port fund) that also implement
policy actions. Secondary actors originate from the civil society. The have the power to
influence at a certain degree the policy actions (i.e. the Red Cross Society)
The following table summarizes the actors that have direct and indirect influence to
flood risk governance in Rethymno:
24
Actors
Influence
Behavior/attribute
European Union
Direct
Legislation (i.e. Floods Directive), funding, policy recommendations.
However the member states are responsible for the implementation
Ministry
of
Environment
the indirect
Legislation (renewable resourxes, coastal zone management, water
resources management, environmental impacts assessment)
and
Energy
Ministry of Finance
Indirect
the EU funding was delayed due to the inability of the Greek state to
contribute (each EU – funded project has 25% co-funding from the Greek
state)
Ministry of Interior
Indirect
The 2010 reform for local authorities (Kapodistrias) aimed at the
enhancement of regional governance and weakened local authorities in
terms of power, human resources and responsibilities
Special Secretariat for Direct
The SSW is in charge of the implementation of the Floods Directive. It
Water
should be noted that
General Secretariat for Direct
The CSCP is in charge of DRR and DRM at the national level
Civil Protection
direct
Region of Crete
It receives most of the EU funding and has the human resources and
technical capacity to develop and implement long-term policies. However
in the case of DRM, the civil protection office is understaffed and flood
risk governance not a priority.
Municipality
of Direct
Funding, civil protection office, urban planning. The municipality is the
most important local authority and has the potential to ccordianate different
Rethymno
actors for flood risk governance
Civil protection office in Direct
It used to be the perfect’s civil protection office (abolished by the 2010
Rethymno
Kapodistrias reform) and now coordiantes civil protection in the region of
Rewthymno (not the city). It collaborates with the fire brigade and the
municipality of Rethymno
Direct
Fire brigade
The fire brigade after the 2010 reform is in charge of civil protection.
However its main expertise is in forest fires and not DRM
Red
Cross/Good Indirect
Samaritans local branch
They are considered a local stakeholder. They have the capacity to respond
rapidly after any kind of disaster. They have established long-term
cooperation with local authorities and local population supports their cause.
26
Port Direct
Municipal
Authority
Trust
of
Rethymno
The Municipal Port Authority Trust of Rethymno continues its historic
course which started in Rethymno in 1914. The aforementioned department
actively contributes to the development of this region of Crete and carries
the great responsibility of administering the only entrance gate to
Rethymno’ s prefecture to date, as well as maintaining the facilities of all
its ports and fishing resorts. The Municipal Port Authority Trust of
Rethymno provides public utility services and contributes to the
commercial, passenger, tourist and fishing traffic and generally to the
smooth operation of the ports in its authority.
Municipal Water Supply Direct
The Municipal Water Supply and Sewerage Company SA of Rethymno has
and Sewerage Company
the responsibility of water and sewerage services of the Regional Unit of
SA
Rethymno as well as the storm water network and the flood prevention
works. The aforementioned department was established in 1981 whereas it
actually started its function in 1985. Their goal is that all residents are able
to enjoy water in sufficient quality and quantity, to provide treatment and
disposal facilities of sewerage throughout the Regional Unit and to
contribute towards the general protection of the environment.
27
indirect
Development
organization
of
The Organization is supervised by the Hellenic Ministry of Development
and Competitiveness and acts throughout the area of Crete. Particularly for
Crete
Rethymno case study, the Development organization of Crete SA is
S.A.
responsible for the supervision, maintenance and management of the
Potamoi Dam which is constructed in the main watershed in Rethymno and
interrupts the flow of Platania River (the only river in Rethymno with base
flow).
Synpolis NGO
Indirect
Youth NGO that organizes charity fundraising events and focus on
solidarity actions for marginalized social groups
Former
Archontakis
mayor Indirect
His term lasted 27 years and he also served as a president of the Municipal
Water Supply and Sewerage Company of Rethymno for the periods 19791982, 1995-1998, 1999-2002 and 2002-2006. During his term, important
infrastructure projects were carried out related to water supply and
sewerage networks, as well as flood prevention works. Even though he is
now retired, he provides an ecsellent source of information for past floods
events and for the post-disaster response strategies
28
and Indirect
Shopkeepers
They provide the main source of income for the Municipal Port Authority
restaurant owners at the
Fund and are heavily dependent on tourism. They interact with the
boardwalk
Municipality, the Port authority and due to their proximity to the sea are
high vulnerable to storm surges and urban floods. However their behavior
is not always too consistent to this. For example in the case of the new
boardwalk they used floods as a scapegoat for their reactions. Their main
concern was the fact that tourists would prefer to walk on the boardwalk
instead of their shops/restaurants.
University
(Rethymno)
of
Crete Indirect
There is no actual interaction with the city of Rethymno although several
thousands of students live in there.
29
Adapted from Gourgoura et al. (2015)
The sociogram provides an interesting illustration of the interactions of the factors
mentioned in the table. At the national level the institutional fragmentation is clear. The
GCSP and SSW do not interact at all. The SSW is responsible for the incorporation of
the Floods Directive and the GCSP for DRM. Although long-term planning (SSW’s
role) and the DRM cycle (pre-disaster preparedness and post-disaster response) should
be integrated into one and single policy, in Greece at the national level this is not the
case. In terms of funding the SSW is not affected by the austerity measures as other
government bodies. The main reason for this is that it is not dependent from the national
budget for its main activities except for the payments of its employees. On the contrary
these payments come from the EU financial sources that are not affected from national
budget cuts.
At the same level we should also add the ministries of Interior and Finance. They both
have indirect role to flood risk governance but they are important actors as well. The
ministry of Finance is the government body that decides and implements the austerity
measures. The ministry of Interior is responsible for regional and local governance and
in 2010 implemented the “Kapodistrias reform” which abolished the 2nd degree of local
governance (prefects) in favor of the Regions. Both ministries’ policies as we have seen
in the case of Rethymno influence a lot flood risk governance. First, the ministry of
Finance the last few months is to be blamed for the delays in the EU-funded projects at
the local level. Every EU-funded project in Greece has a 25% levy of national
participation. The vast majority of infrastructure constructions at the local level cannot
be completed unless there is the 25% national participation or the EU decides in favor
of full funding. At the time being 50% of local municipalities in Greece cannot
complete EU projects worth almost 1 billion euros.
In July 2011, the Greek government reached an agreement with the Commission to
reduce the national funds required for the execution of the program. According to the
agreement, EU funds will cover 85% of public funds and only 15% will be national
public funds. Greece currently enjoys preferential treatment given its very specific
circumstances. Greek programmes financed with the EU funds under 2007-2013
programming period receive a higher proportion of EU financing – and hence Greece
is required to co-finance less – than many other countries (COM(2015) 400 final). This
comes via a 10% "top up" of EU co-financing until mid-2016 – in many cases this
means that the EU pays for 95% of the total investment cost under the 2007-2013
financing period (as opposed to the maximum of 85% otherwise applicable).
In our case this means that even there is access to EU funding for local authorities this
does not mean that the project will be completed in the desired time framework. The
31
ministry of Interior has also changed the power dynamics by transferring the
responsibilities of prefects to regions. What really happened is that regions now
prioritize the importance of infrastructure projects and allocate the EU funds
accordingly. In the meantime in the Regional Unit of Rethymno that replaced the
prefect, there is a Civil Protection Department that has no clear responsibilities. Most
of its main duties were transferred to the fire department and there is also Civil
Protection Department in Municipality of Rethymno. The point is that pre-existed
institutional fragmentation and austerity measures in the recent years have been the
main hindrance for flood risk governance at the national level. The institutional
fragmentation at the local level was evident at the 1st Stakeholder Workshop organized
in Rethymno. The representative from the Regional Unit claimed that
“This is Municipality’s authority and we are not involved at all and we
shouldn’t.”
Whereas the representative from the Port Authority
“Hydraulic works are Municipal Water Company’s task we are not
involved at all”
This lack of communication is evident and largely admitted by government official.
The representative of the Regional Unit commented on that
“As long as 2 services or organisations need to collaborate everything
is perfect. When we come to larger groups of 3 or 4 then nothing moves
due to lack of central monitoring. The questions which always rises in
this cases is “who is in charge?”
The incorporation of the Floods Directive has been significantly delayed. The Directive
might have been released in 2007 but in Greece the process of integration began in 2012
and the regional impacts assessment will be developed by the end of 2015. This means
that there is no actual implementation of the Directive in Greece and local authorities
are not aware of it and the next steps they have to follow in order to adapt their
administrations to it.
At the local level our findings agree to the graph that shows flow of information among
the different institutions. The Municipality of Rethymno is at the center and has the
main coordinating and leading role. In the past it was the only agent that was actually
32
accountable for flood governance. We could acknowledge two distinct periods of time:
the first since the 1968 flood until 1997 and the next since 1998 until 2008.
Table: evolution of flood risk in Rethymno across time-scales
Period
Characteristics
1968 – 1997
-
lack
of
infrastructure
and
mechanisms to cope with the risk
-
major
urban
floods
(1968,
1984.1991)
-
rapid urbanization and increase in
tourists arrivals
-
poor funds from national budget and
lack
of
fundraising
from
EU
financial sources
1998-2008
-
last major urban flood (1999)
-
large
scale
anti-flood
infrastructure constructions in the
old town
-
more efficient fundraising from
EU financial sources
2009 until today
-
Austerity measures affect local
DRR planning
-
Infrastructure more oriented to
small-scale constructions
-
- emergence of a civil society
-
Retreat of party politics
The first period is characterized by frequent urban floods that its impacts cause loss and
damage of properties and other assets due to lack of infrastructure and mechanisms to
cope with the risk. The tipping point that opened a window of opportunity was the EU
funds in mid-90s that opened a window of opportunity for Rethymno to reduce its
33
vulnerability by large-scale hard engineering measures. The leadership of Archontakis
was a crucial element in terms of fundraising and successfully completing the
infrastructure. However this period is far from being characterized as an example of
successful flood risk governance. Hard engineering infrastructure measures were not
accompanied by raising awareness campaigns for local population about floods and the
sustainable use of the new infrastructure. In his own words (05/06/2015)
I feel sorry that many of my fellow citizens do not respect this
infrastructure. They take it for granted and have already forgotten the
state of the city before this. It is really sad when I see them empty their
cook oil for example in the sewerage system.
Except for raising awareness there was no stakeholders’ engagement. The only thing
that mobilized local population for the last three decades was party politics. In
Rethymno there was a strong collision of the socialist party of PASOK which ruled the
country for one decade (1993-2004) and the ex-mayor who belonged to the
conservative party. The outcome was that his contribution was not recognized as he
wished for and at the same time a certain number of people in Rethymno believe that
this infrastructure was extremely expensive, not needed and are suspicious for
corruption. From the discussion I had in a local household (07/06/2015)
The only reason for this large-scale infrastructure projects is that they
are corrupted and they want to take advantage of their positions in
order to start constructions that are not actually needed
The year of 2008 marks the beginning of the world crisis that stroke Greece two years
later. The impacts at the national level have been thoroughly analyzed. In Rethymno
the qualitative change is that funding for large-scale infrastructure is no more available.
Local institutions are well aware of that. As Mr. Prinarakis from Municipal Water
Supply and Sewerage Company said (09/06/2015)
We are now applying for small-scale but nevertheless efficient
infrastructure projects. For example we abandoned a water refinery
that was planned for Rethymno and replaces with smaller refineries in
different locations that could actually enhance more efficiently the
town’s water supply. The same also strategy is being followed for floods
34
infrastructure due to the fact that most engineering works have been
completed the last few years.
With this opinion agrees the Mayor of Rethymno who participated in the 1st Stakeholder
Workshop organized in Rethymno on 1-2 October 2015.
Perhaps, there are no many engineering works left for Rethymno case
study to be implemented for flood defence, but there are still many more
actions that we should proceed with such as utilising and maintaining
the existing infrastructure
Although the financial crisis has significantly reduces the availability of funds,
Rethymno is in better position compared to other coastal cities in Greece due to the
existence of this infrastructure.
At the society level the last few years an important change was observed. Party politics
are not anymore in the core of public sphere and local population is more eager to
participate in actions and campaigns organized by NGOS. This certainly does not mean
that Rethymno obtained a vibrant civil society but at least people care more about social
issues than party politics. From the interviews conducted with Kalfoutzos (Red Cross)
and Papadosisfos (NGO Synpolis) it came out as a result that locals are less apathetic
than they used to. During the Stakeholder Workshop the majority of the participants
agreed that the authorities should not seek for more hard engineering measures (with
the exception of minor engineering infrastructure in the port) but for operational
measures and raise awareness strategies for general public.
Tourism still continues to be the priority as expected in terms of income and pressure
to local authorities for various decisions affecting the coastal zone8. Across different
time scales, a part of local society in Rethymno that were mobilized by economic
interests were a at a certain degree one of the historic roots of today’s vulnerability. In
the 1950s it was the owners of the warehouses in the old port, in the 1960s the landlords
of the old town and today the restaurant owners and shopkeepers in the old town as
well. The generate income for the Port Authority Fund which in turn is the manager of
8
At the national level there is the Specific Framework Spatial Plan of Coastal Areas and Islands has been
developed. According to Law 3983/2011 "National Strategy for the protection and management of the
marine environment the Directive 2008/56 of the European Communities on the Marine Strategy
Directive was incorporated into national legislation aiming for a high environmental status of the marine
environment by the year 2020. However the coastal zone in Greece is considered a commodity and local
municipalities are allowed to have revenues from its exploitation.
35
the town’s coastal zone. It is rational that this interaction creates a relationship of
overdependence based on economic interest, ending up in flood risk. The example of
the new parking lot is exactly the outcome of what we describe. Tourism entrepreneurs
demand for more parking space for tourists and the port authority fund responds by
planning and constructing the parking lot in the most vulnerable location in the old port.
The result is that sea storm surges are a new reality for Rethymno which infrastructure
from the 90s was planned to mitigate urban floods.
36
Table of root causes
Category
of Pathway
root causes
Drivers
Temporal
Manifestation for Rethymno
expression
Physical
Historic
Long-term dynamics of physical processes. Geographic location of town: extremely
vulnerable to winds and storm surges from the sea, and in a drainage basin (and
of
therefore vulnerable to three streams overflowing during winter and carry large
hazard
quantities of sediment)
Contemporary
Combination of physical processes with more pressure from extreme rainfall patterns
due to climate-change
Socioeconomic
future
Climate-change and sea-level rise
historic
Rapid urbanization in the last three decades in a disorganized fashion. Lack of drainage
capacity and poor maintenance.
Contemporary
future
Governance
Historic
Rapid urbanization in the last three decades in a disorganized fashion. Lack of drainage
capacity and poor maintenance.
Drivers
of Physical
Contemporary
n/a
future
n/a
Historic
Absence of infrastructure to prevent floods
exposure
Since the 1960s decentralization of responsibility to local authorities in Greece did not
mean more funding. However things changed with EU funding in mid-1990s.
Contemporary
Maintenance of existing infrastructure
Lack of awareness by local population concerning
Socioeconomic
future
Austerity measures might stall new infrastructure plans
Historic
Rapid urbanization, local economic interest groups influence siting of port in
vulnerable area.
Governance
Contemporary
Lack of efficient maintainance of the infrastructure
future
Austerity measures might stall new infrastructure plans
Historic
Planning and land-use decisions not suitable for preventing loss and damage from
natural hazards. Therefore, there was absence of integrating risk management and
housing policy
38
The construction of infrastructure usually followed the rapid urbanization in Rethymno.
Most of policy decisions focus on economic growth, tourist development and certainly
not civil protection, non-structural measures for disaster preparedness and vulnerability
reduction.
Transfer of power to Fire Dept inhibits preventative measures
Contemporary
Lack of human resources due to the austerity measures, institutional fragmentation and
bureaucracy
EU finance does not filter down to local level
Weakness of national-level frameworks where no monitoring or enforcement for
implementation, lack of emphasis on preparedness and vulnerability and lack of multistakeholder engagement
future
Challenges posed from the emergence of civil society organizations and their
contribution to flood risk management – but mostly focused on solidarity vs a vs
financial crisis
Opportunity for flood risk management if there is a viable strategy by local authorities
and NGOs to raise awareness
39
Drivers
of Physical
Historic
Inadequate urban planning, location of harbor
Contemporary
Poor maintenance of infrastructure due to austerity measures and lack of human
vulnerability
resources
future
Socioeconomic
Historic
Lack of awareness as new population moved into Rethymno. Most of them were
originated from mountainous areas and carried local knowledge for preventing from
other types of disasters mainly forest fires and landslides, not urban flooding or storm
surges. In addition to that floods in Rethymnon did not occur very often and locals in
many cases developed the feeling that were safe. As a consequence their economy was
not resilient to this kind of shocks leading to loss and damage of assets.
Contemporary
As above. Lack of awareness also includes restaurant owners/residents in the old town
that do not maintain properly the infrastructure and do proper waste disposal etc.
future
Governance
Historic
Since the 1960s decentralization of responsibility to local authorities in Greece did not
mean more funding. However things changed with EU funding in mid-1990s.
Transfer of power to Fire Dept inhibits preventative measures
40
Contemporary
The construction of infrastructure usually followed the rapid urbanization in Rethymno.
Most of policy decisions focus on economic growth, tourist development and certainly
not civil protection, non-structural measures for disaster preparedness and vulnerability
reduction.
EU finance does not filter down to local level
Weakness of national-level frameworks where no monitoring or enforcement for
implementation, lack of emphasis on preparedness and vulnerability and lack of multistakeholder engagement
Clientelism and party politics inhibit state-civil society engagements at the local level
future
Different levels of local governance disorientate from the accomplishment of integrated
disaster risk management. The institutional fragmentation will probably persist with the
economic crisis and lack of political will to reform the existing policy context.
41
From the analysis hitherto, it is acknowledged as a conclusion that economic interests
pose the major threat for flood risk in the case of Rethymno across scales (both time
and social actors). However there is a window of opportunity for social transformation
where transformation is seen as the process of re-aligning the structures to ensure a
resilient and sustainable future in a given context. An explanation for this view point is
the change at the level of society that for the first time in modern history are eager to
overcome political rivalries that are to be blamed for the erosion of the social capital
and phenomena as clientelism and corruption. Troika and austerity measures
paradoxically are the catalysts for the renegotiation of the social contract in Rethymno
which in turn could empower local stakeholders to change power relation in their favor
and participate more actively. On the other hand institution fragmentation in
governance process at the national and the absence of long-term planning that leads
eventually in lack of implementation at the national level are the main hindrances for
flood risk governance. The Europeanization process even though in the case of the
incorporation of the Floods Directive (despite the fact that was significantly delayed)
and the National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction provide the tools for the
enhancement of flood risk governance. The challenge for the FORIN methodology is
to take advantage on the window of opportunity that is open for the renegotiation of
social contract by explaining to local authorities and local actors the benefits of a
holistic approach of flood risk governance far from hard engineering measures.
During the 1st Stakeholder Workshop the participants concluded in three major points
relevant to the institutional ABM design:
The city of Rethymno has already implemented flood defences, and as it was reported
by the stakeholders, it is more important to implement operational measures, that will
educate stakeholders regarding how to protect themselves and the city of Rethymno
from flood, rather than to construct new structural measures.
The economic crisis has led the city of Rethymno to try and use as much as possible
the existing capital, both in terms of workforce and infrastructure. The stakeholders
pinpointed that in major flooding events the city of Rethymno has requested the help
from construction companies in order to increase the fleet of tractors used to clean up
the streets.
Finally, the unavailability of funds is so wide that the design and development of any
new structural measures seem irrelevant. The institutional Agent Based Model will
focus more on simulating the maintenance of existing structures, the cooperation of the
authorities with the stakeholders and the behavior of the commercial sector, and less on
the simulation of making decisions regarding the implementation of different flood
protection measures.
43
Reference list
Blätgen, T. & Ntua, P.G., 2014. Setting up the PEARL Learning and Action Alliances
LAAs.
Botetzagias, I. (2011) “Green Politics in Greece at the time of Fiscal Crisis”,
Sustainable Politics and the Crisis of the Peripheries: Ireland and Greece
Advances in Ecopolitics, Volume 8, 161–179
COM(2015) 400 final Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
committee of the Regions “a new start for jobs and growth in Greece”
Davies, A. R., & Mullin, S. J. (2011). Greening the economy: interrogating
sustainability innovations beyond the mainstream. Journal of Economic
Geography, 11(5), 793-816.
Feindt, P. H., & Cowell, R. (2010). The recession, environmental policy and ecological
modernization–what's new about the green new deal?. International Planning
Studies, 15(3), 191-211.
Gourgoura P.,Blätgen T., Lykou A.,Birkmann J., Makropoulos C.,(2015), Learning
and Action Alliances: A tool for flood risk governance in coastal areas. The case
of Rethymno, Crete. 14th International Conference on Environmental Science
and Technology (CEST2015), Rhodes, Greece, 3-5 September 2015
GSCP, 2015. National progress report on the implementation of the Hyogo Framework
for Action (2013-2015), Athens.
Kousis, M. (2004) ‘Economic opportunities and threats in contentious environmental
politics: a view from the European south’, Theory and Society, vol. 33, no. 3-4,
pp. 393–415.
Koutalakis, C. (2011) ‘Environmental policy in Greece reloaded: plurality,
participation and the sirens of neo-centralism’, Sustainable Politics and the Crisis
44
in
Ireland and
Greece, vol.
8, pp. 181–200, available online at
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/books.htm?issn¼2041-806x&volume ¼ 8
Koutalakis, C. (2011). Environmental policy in Greece reloaded: plurality, participation
and the sirens of neo-centralism. Sustainable Politics and the Crisis in Ireland and
Greece, 8, 181-200.
Lekakis, J. and M. Kousis (2013) “Economic Crisis, Troika and the Environment in
Greece”
South
European
Society
and
Politics,
May,
10.1080/13608746.2013.799731
Leonard, L., & Botetzagias, I. (Eds.). (2011). Sustainable politics and the crisis of the
peripheries: Ireland and Greece (Vol. 8). Emerald Group Publishing.
Makropoulos C., Tsoukala V., Belibbasakis K., Lykou A., Chondros M., Gourgoura P.,
Nikolopoulos D. (2015) Managing flood risk in coastal cities through an
integrated modelling framework supporting stakeholders’ involvement: the case
of Rethymno, Crete (abstract submitted and accepted). Paper presented at the 36th
IAHR World Congrees 2015, Hague,Netherlands, 28 June -3 July 2015
Markantonatou, M. (2013) ‘Diagnosis, treatment, and effects of the crisis in Greece: a
“special case” or a “test case”?’, MPIfG Discussion Paper, no. 13/3, available
online at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70247
Tsaltas, G. & Rodotheatos, G. (2011) ‘Greece and the EU: promoting sustainable
development. Easy to plan hard to achieve’, Sustainable Politics and the
Economic Crisis of the Peripheries, vol. 8, pp. 141–159, available online at
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/books.htm?issn¼2041-806x&volume ¼ 8
Tsaltas, G., & Rodotheatos, G. (2011). Greece and the EU: Promoting the idea of
sustainable development. Easy to plan, hard to achieve. Liam Leonard, Iosif
Botetzagias (ed.) Sustainable Politics and the Crisis of the Peripheries: Ireland
and Greece (Advances in Ecopolitics, 8, 141-159.
WWF-GR. (2012) [8th Annual Report, Commitments for implementation—
Environmental Legislation in Greece. Environmental Legislation Watch],
Athens, available online at: http://www.wwf.gr/en/images/pdfs/Environmentallegislation-report2012.pdf
45
Yiannakourou, G. (2011) ‘Urban planning and siting of RE projects: forces,
weaknesses, opportunities and prospects’, Hellenic Foundation for European and
Foreign Policy, available online at: www.diavouleusi.eliamep.gr
Ministry of Finance. (2012) ‘Ordinances of editorial improvements, correcting faults
and omissions of Law 4093/2012 and Law 4046/2012, addressing urgent issues’,
Hellenic Republic, FEK 229/A/19-11-2012
Botetzagias, I. (2011) “Green Politics in Greece at the time of Fiscal Crisis”, ustainable
Politicsand the Crisis of the Peripheries: Ireland and Greece Advances in
Ecopolitics, Volume 8, 161–179
WWF-GR (2011) 7th Annual Report, Commitments for Implementation: The
Environmental Law in Greece (in Greek) http://www.wwf.gr/images/pdfs/wwfnomoreport2011.pdf
WWF-GR et al (2012) ‘Justice for Acheloos’ Press Release, www.wwf.gr 11
September.
WWF-GR (2012) Commitments for implementation – Environmental Legislation in
Greece. Summary Annual Review, by Nantsou, T., Chasiotis, G., Christ
46
Appendix A
Methodology and list of interviews
Before the fieldtrip, a desktop-based literature review was conducted for Rethymno
case study. The theoretical research was based on peer-reviewed articles, studies,
publications, and projects reports released by research foundations and other
institutions with relevant experience and other relevant information from the internet.
The fieldtrip took place in June and last for 11 days. The fieldwork contributed to the
triangulation of the theoretical data by observing, talking and interviewing members of
civil society involved in relevant projects. Furthermore, interviews were also conducted
with key officers who participate in the decision making process, representing their
community and national interests.
a semi-structured interview questionnaire was developed, listing about a dozen openended questions in order to guide the discussions with different stakeholders. The
interviews were recorded, with the consent of the interviewees.
The interviews were conducted in accordance with KCL ethics panel, so that full and
informed consent was provided, so that no dependent relationship existed between the
interviewer and interviewees, and so that no sensitive information was collected. The
interviewees had the opportunity to withdraw their data from the project at any time up
until it was transcribed for use in the final report. All the interviewees are anonymous.
However, specific data from the interviewees was collected—age, gender, role from
individuals and, from the NGOs, approximate size, mandate and location.
Semi – constructed personal interviews were conducted due to the major strengths they
have in relation with other qualitative methods of research. In general semi –
constructed interviews are part of the qualitative methods of research that have been
really useful for the practitioners in the field of human geography (Cloke et al. 2004).
Their intrinsic value was firstly acknowledged by the scholars from the field of feminist
and cultural geography in order to diversify their methodological tools from the
dominant paradigm of quantitative human geography (Crang 2002, McDowell 1992).
Their main strength is that they give the opportunity to the researcher to be more
47
flexible and more active during the conversation. Additionally, interviewees are more
eligible to express their opinions and deeper thoughts in comparison with other
quantitative methods such as filling in some typical questionnaires. On the other hand
the basic limitation of this qualitative method is that its results cannot be generalizable
to the wider public. The sample is not statistically chosen but on the contrary
interviewees are selected on the basis of their experiences, professions and value of
their opinions (Cameron 2000). As far as our method of collection is concerned both
categories of interviewees were recruited by “snowballing” technique. The interviews
took place in Athens, Heraclion and Rethymno. In Athens the interviews were
conducted in the Ministry of the Environment, Energy and Climate Change. In
Heraclion in the Departments of the Region of Crete. Finally in Rethymno in different
locations. The choice of the interview’s place or otherwise its positionality is of
significant importance for the researcher. Elwood and Martin (2000, p. 649)
successfully put it “the interview site itself produces “micro-geographies” of spatial
relations and meaning, where multiple scales of social relations intersect in the research
interview”.
Name
Profession
Date of interview
Kostas Triantis
General secretary of Water 30/04/2015
Resources Secretariat
M. Kritsotakis
Director
of
Water 02/06/2015
Resources department in
Region of Crete
G. Alexakis
Consultant
G. Tzanokostakis
Director
Of
Civil 02/06/2015
Protection Agency in
Region of Crete
Anonymous
Taxi driver
04/06
Anonymous
Restaurant owner
04/06/2015
02/06/2015
Y. Markantes (interviewee High school teacher
#1)
N. Votsoglou
05/06/2015
Civil Protection office in 05/06/2015
Rethymno
48
D. Archontakis
Ex mayor
05/06/2015
Anonymous
Hotel owner
07/06/2015
Anonymous
Household
07/06/2015
K. Kalfountzos
Red cross Rethymno
08/06/2015
Pappadakis
Ex prefect
08/06/2015
D.Prinarakis
Director DEYAR
09/06/2015
G. Papadosifos
NGO Synpolis
09/06/2015
A.Nikolopoulou
NGO Archelon
10/06/2015
E.Koutsaledaki
Directoρ of Port Fund
11/06/2015
49