Yannick Verberckmoes
00903164
Master Program in American Studies
Academic year: 2013-2014
April 21, 1967
Shock Opportunism and the Greek Junta
Supervisor:
Prof. Dr. J. Ken Kennard
In this thesis we will investigate the concept of shock opportunism relating to the Greek
colonels’ regime, that governed Greece from 1967 to 1974. Shock opportunism is defined as
the use of a possibly premeditated collective shock, e.g. a natural disaster, war or coup
d’état, as an opportunity to radically implement neoliberal economic reforms. On the one
hand we will look at why and how this was done and on the other, we will link the case of
Greece to similar examples of authoritarian regimes during the Cold War to come to a better
analysis of this dark period in Greek history.
Although writing a thesis is a very solitary endeavor, its merits can never be accredited to
just one person. I would therefore like to express my gratitude to the following people:
Prof. Dr. J. Ken Kennard: for yelling at me for about thirty minutes one week after the
Easter break and explaining to me in quite straightforward English that my first draft still
needed a lot of work, as this was a testimony to the great care and effort he displayed in
helping me throughout the research and writing process.
Prof. Dr. Victor Gavin: for his useful advice.
Gizem Özbeko ğlu: for her undying support and access to the library of Boğaziçi University
(Istanbul). Both of which were absolutely essential to the completion of this dissertation.
Jannik Held: for introducing me to Naomi Klein’s book The Shock Doctrine over a couple of
beers.
Brigitta Van Der Jeught: for her careful correcting of spelling mistakes.
2
Contents
Introduction........................................................................................................................................6
Chapter One: American Control over Greece in the Larger Cold War Context......................................9
Long-term insurance ..................................................................................................................... 11
Conservative stability .................................................................................................................... 13
Chapter Two: The Threat .................................................................................................................. 16
Center Union and developmentalism ............................................................................................ 17
The army belongs to the nation..................................................................................................... 19
Cyprus........................................................................................................................................... 20
Aspida conspiracy ......................................................................................................................... 21
Chapter Three: The Shock. The Colonels and the CIA......................................................................... 24
The coup ....................................................................................................................................... 27
The American reaction .................................................................................................................. 29
Sensory deprivation ...................................................................................................................... 31
Economic shock therapy ............................................................................................................... 34
The shock wears off ...................................................................................................................... 38
The shock that ended the Colonels’ regime ................................................................................... 39
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 42
Bibliography...................................................................................................................................... 45
3
4
5
Introduction
The aim of this dissertation is to look into why shock opportunism was applied by the Greek
colonels’ regime, that ruled Greece from 1967 to 1974. The term “shock opportunism” is
based on Naomi Klein’s concept of the “shock doctrine”, as explained in Klein’s book under
the same title. Klein’s theory is that neoliberal economic policies are very often applied after
a collective shock such as a natural disaster, a military coup, a war, etc., which Klein
illustrates by means of a host of historic examples. The definition of the shock, in Klein’s
words, is “a gap between fast-moving events and the information that exists to explain
them.” (Klein 2007: 458) This lack of knowledge about what is going on is key to neutralizing
any popular resistance to the implementation of neoliberal economic policies, which
essentially mean: privatization, tax cuts, decreased spending in the public sector and
deregulation. In order to maximally capitalize on the effects of a shock, these policies are
issued within a very small time frame. A process that is known as economic “shock therapy”.
(Klein 2007: 7) One of Klein’s examples is the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Boris
Yeltsin used this shock to carry out significant economic reforms that brought Friedmanism
to Russia and plunged it into a decade of chaos. Yeltsin’s policies had the typical results of
wiping out the middle and lower classes, while a select few made fortunes. As Klein writes,
“By 1998, more than 80 percent of Russian farms had gone bankrupt, and roughly seventy
thousand state factories had closed, creating an epidemic of unemployment. In 1989, before
shock therapy, 2 million people in the Russian Federation were living in poverty, on less than
$4 a day. By the time the shock therapists had administered their ‘bitter medicine’ in the
mid-nineties, 74 million Russians were living below the poverty line, according to the World
Bank.” (Klein 2007: 237-8) When shock therapy is undertaken by authoritarian regimes, they
usually rely on systematic torture to thwart popular resistance. This was, for instance, the
case in Chile under the dictatorship of Pinochet, but as we will see, it was also one of the
main characteristics of the colonels’ Greece.
The problem with Klein’s theory, however, is that she fails to adequately define it. The
closest she comes is to quote Milton Friedman, one of the founding fathers of neoliberalism,
as he observed that “only a crisis –actual or perceived- produces real change. When that
crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I
believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive
and available until the politically impossible becomes the politically inevitable.” (Friedman
1962: 2) Secondly, the use of the word “doctrine” is framed by Klein in a linear historic
narrative that accounts the rise of neoliberalism from the teachings of an obscure Friedrich
Von Hayek to world domination. As Klein writes, “The history of the contemporary free
market – better understood as the rise of corporatism – was written in shocks.” (Klein 2007:
18-9) Given that this is a simplification of a process that is far more complex and haphazardly
in nature, we would prefer the term “shock opportunism”, since an economy can only be
turned neoliberal if conditions allow it. Shock opportunism can thus be defined as the use of
a possibly premeditated collective shock, e.g. a natural disaster, war or coup d’état, as an
opportunity to radically implement neoliberal economic reforms. As Greece was not
6
mentioned as an example of the shock doctrine in Klein’s work, we will show how this case
serves to both demonstrate her point and prove its shortcomings.
When looking at this particular period in time, we need to take into account the larger Cold
War context (i.e. the position of Greece as an American client-state), the regional context
(i.e. the relations of Greece with its neighboring countries, specifically Turkey, and Europe),
and the Greek domestic context (i.e. the political forces operating within Greece). In the first
chapter we will therefore look at the broader Cold War context paired with the Greek
political context in order to comprehend which political forces were operating in Greece.
The story begins with the Greek civil war (1945-1949), which brought about the arrival of the
United States on the shores of Greece so as to help a conservative establishment defeat
communist guerillas. By the term “establishment” is meant: an oligarchy of the Greek
economic elite, Greek conservatives and the monarchy. A second clarification needs to be
made concerning the Greek communist resistance. “Communist” in this case does not signify
that it received support from the Soviet Union. Following the defeat of Greek communism in
1949 due to a lack of resources, the US turned Greece into a stable client state. American
power over Greece was manifested in the US’ control over Greek politics and the army.
Within Greece, the basis for stability was formed by a stifling police state, in which suspected
communists were arrested, detained and tortured. Upon this foundation of coercion rested
a conservative triangle of power, made up of the Palace, the oligarchy and the army, that
kept Greece firmly in the Western camp. The United States furthermore insulated the armed
forces from political control and by financing and training them to a large extent, it made
sure that the loyalty of the Greek army lay as much, if not more, with the United States than
with Greece. On the political scene the right was able to maintain itself by a constant rigging
of elections and its economic policies were such as to cater to the needs of the oligarchy by
granting them monopolies that were protected by law.
As we go into the political instability of 1960s Greece in the second chapter, we will consider
what the perceived threat was that justified a coup. From the early 1950s successive
conservative governments with American support provided, as said, an artificial kind of
stability. But when a new opposition party, the Center Union, gained increasing electoral
support, it was perceived as a threat to both the Greek conservative power structure and the
United States. We will look into how this party became supposedly dangerous and what its
real aims were, especially as regards the economy. As the Center Union prevailed in the
elections of 1963, it sought to end the tight grip of the Greek security forces on public life
and see through its economic program. A crisis over the island of Cyprus, however, put the
government of George Papandreou directly in the sights of the Americans. In the meantime,
George Papandreou’s son, Andreas Papandreou, was accused of having been involved in a
communist conspiracy. The Greek king then removed George Papandreou from power and
two years of political unrest followed. Yet as the elections scheduled for May 28, 1967 were
drawing nearer, the Center Union was slated to win.
In the last chapter we will look at how the junta applied the principles of shock opportunism,
as soon as it came to power on April 21, 1967. While the initial political shock of a military
coup had installed the regime, it was able to sustain itself by way of a reign of terror, which
7
entailed the arrest and incarceration of anyone who resisted. Due to a range of torture
techniques, the junta’s prisoners were then literally and figuratively shocked into
submission. Lastly, the regime turned Greece into a neoliberal haven by means of economic
shock therapy. In this chapter we will take a look at the political and philosophical reasons
for the junta to assume power, but we will also go into the possible complicity of the CIA in
the coup and what their motives could have been, before considering who benefitted from
the regime. We will subsequently analyze the reaction of the United States to the new
regime and find out why the United States supported the junta. The irony of this episode in
Greek history is that while the colonels had been able to seize power by means of a shock, it
was also a shock that removed them: the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Finally, we will briefly
discuss what happened in the wake of the colonels’ rule, as we shed some light on Andreas
Papandreou’s government and its time in office (1981-1989).
8
Chapter One: American Control over Greece
in the Larger Cold War Context
As a civil war had erupted in Greece in 1944 between rightwing conservatives and
communist guerillas, British forces, that had just liberated the country from German
occupation, sided with the conservatives. The reason behind this was an agreement made by
Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin in October of 1944 in Moscow, known as the
“percentages agreement”, which carved up the Balkans into spheres of influence between
the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. “Russia was to have 90 per cent dominance in
Rumania, and 75 per cent in Bulgaria; Britain was to have 90 per cent in Greece; in
Yugoslavia and Hungary, the influence of the two powers would be balanced, each with 50
per cent.” (Nachmani 1990: 496) Britain’s dominance over Greece was furthermore linked to
its imperial interests in the Near and Middle East. With British help, the Greek conservative
establishment quickly succeeded in defeating the communist forces of the Greek People’s
Liberation Army (ELAS) and a peace treaty was signed in Varkiza on February 12, 1945.
However, in March of 1946 another round of fighting broke out between communist
insurgents and the British-backed Greek government. Contrary to expectations, Stalin stuck
to the agreement made with the British and did not send help to the Greek communists. As
Amikam Nachmani writes, “Moscow was prepared to abandon Greece for the sake of
tightening its grip on the rest of the Balkans.” (Nachmani 1990: 496) Nonetheless, the
communist uprising in Greece was believed by the West to be supported by the Soviet Union
and was therefore seen as a direct violation of the percentages agreement. But since the
British found it increasingly harder to carry the economic burden of their war effort in
Greece, they asked the United States for help in 1947. At the time, the United States
adhered to its policy of containment, which essentially entailed two things. “On the one
hand, it involved an acceptance of the West’s inability to intervene effectively in opposition
to the Soviet Union’s policies in the countries garrisoned by Soviet troops. On the other, it
meant that the United States was prepared to block the extension of the Soviet sphere in
Europe by whatever means might seem necessary.” (Clogg and Yannopoulos 1972: 230) As
Greece was in danger of falling to the communists, while the Soviet Union looked for partial
control of Turkey’s Dardanelles, the US took action. President Truman proclaimed his
Truman Doctrine in a message to Congress as “the policy of the United States to support free
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside
pressures.”1 In order to rally support for his demand to send $ 400 million dollars in
immediate aid to Greece and Turkey, the President portrayed the situation as an almost
existential struggle between freedom and tyranny. As Kaplan writes, “The newly acquired
1
Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine, Truman Library Public Papers,
March 12, 1947. Web March 23, 2014. Source:
http://www.Trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=2189&st=&st1=
9
position of leadership of the Free World combined with the global threat of Soviet
communism to offer a Manichean setting of the problem, permitt[ed] the decision for aid to
Greece to be judged as combat between good and evil.” (Kaplan 1993: 7) The logic behind
the Truman doctrine also enveloped a domino theory concerning all of Europe, which to
Truman’s mind, was threatened by an impending spread of communism.
It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so long against
overwhelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse of
free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the
world. Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples
striving to maintain their freedom and independence.”2
Far less ideological terms were used in an assessment of the situation by the Central
Intelligence Group, the direct precursor of the CIA. Given that neighboring Soviet satellite
states did send limited amounts of aid to the communist guerillas, the Central Intelligence
Group, believed that this support actually came from the Soviet Union. However, this was far
removed from the truth. As Stalin told the Yugoslav government in Belgrade, “the Soviet
Union wanted nothing to do with the Greek communists.” (Murtagh 1994: 39) Due to its
misreading of the situation, the Central Intelligence Group feared that if the communists
won in Greece, “(1) The Soviets would gain control of the Aegean and the approaches to the
Dardanelles; (2) their dominance of the Balkans would be complete; and (3) they would
achieve a strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean, thereby outflanking Turkey,
threatening the Suez Canal, and endangering the polities of the Near East.”3
Facing the overwhelming material superiority of the Greek government forces due to
American support, the Greek communists found themselves in dire straits and eventually
surrendered in 1949. As the forces of freedom had won the civil war, one would expect
Greece to finally be free, but, in the words of Nachmani, “[t]he civil war was ended only by
the almost total American colonization of the country.” (Nachmani 1990: 496) The United
States based its control over Greece firstly on a thorough grip on the Greek armed forces,
which were to a significant extent trained and financed by the US. The total US financial aid
that was furnished to Greece from June 1947 to June 1957 amounted to $ 1,491 million, of
which “a mere $ 341 million was spent on non-military projects, such as housing, health and
education, which would have been of direct help to ordinary Greek people.” (Murtagh 1994:
40) To preserve its control over the Greek army, the United States insulated it from Greek
political control and made sure it was loyal to the US first and Greece second. As part of the
American machination to keep the armed forces out of the hands of the Greek government,
the king was placed in charge of them and he thereby enjoyed far more power than he
2
Ibidem.
Central Intelligence Group, The Greek Situation, February 7, 1947, CIA Research Reports, Reel II (Greece),
00479, Middelburg: Roosevelt Study Center.
3
10
would have in a regular parliamentary democracy. (Papandreou 1970: 97) Within Greece,
the country was ruled by a conservative establishment. “For beyond Parliament and the
government, the all too real centers of power were the Army, the Palace, a small circle of
politicians and civil servants, and a number of bankers, industrialists and shipowners.”
(Tsoucalas 1969: 151) American power was wielded directly through the military mission,
the Embassy and the CIA, which aligned themselves with the Greek oligarchy and the palace.
American interests and those of the Greek establishment were protected by turning Greece
into a thorough police state, based on “the assumption of a continuing struggle against
communism.” (Papandreou 1970: 91) While the Greek communist party was officially
outlawed and 80,000 of its militants exiled after the civil war, people suspected of having
communist sympathies were still arrested and jailed. The legal framework for this was
provided by the emergency legislation of the civil war, which was still intact and had started
to form what Greeks called the “para-constitution”. (Tsoucalas 1969: 148) Prisoners were
detained, tortured and blackmailed in prisons and concentration camps until they signed
written statements denouncing communism.4 Inside the army, a band of officers formed a
secret society known as, the Holy Bond of Greek Officers (IDEA) to ensure that only officers
with the right political convictions were given a shot at making a career. Members vowed to
protect the fatherland from any (especially communist) threat and with a fanatical devotion
to what they perceived as the security of the fatherland, they made sure that the existing
power structures were strictly maintained. Moreover, “IDEA was a natural home for former
Nazi collaborators and immediately after the war the organization began to attract them.
Among the 2,500 mostly middle-rank officers who had joined by the end of the 1940s were
228 former collaborators.” (Murtagh 1994: 58) The most notable of these former
collaborators were George Grivas and George Papadopoulos, who used the networking
opportunities of this society to become very influential figures.5
Long-term insurance
During the Greek civil war the newly created CIA found its way to Greece as a part of the
American effort to fight communism. This was in line with the situation in other European
countries where covert action was undertaken as a compliment to the American aid
furnished under the Marshall Plan, “a necessary complement because without covert action
the Plan would have been less likely to succeed as a result of opposition to American
assistance focused around European communist parties.” (Barnes 1982: 669) The Greek
4
Tsoucalas writes that in 1962 the official number of political prisoners was still 1350. However, he believes
that the real figure must have been a lot higher, as “thousands of persons were detained in concentration
camps in the islands of Agios Efstratios and Yaros until almost the end of the Karamanlis administration
[1963].” (Tsoucalas 1969: 145)
5
According to Charles Foley, Papadopoulos served as a captain in the Security Battalions during the Second
World War, while George Grivas was the leader of the paramilitary X bands. Both organizations were controlled
by the Nazis and actively hunted down resistance fighters. Foley, C., Greek Dictator in CIA’s Pocket, The
Observer, July 1, 1973.
11
office in Athens was established by Tom Karamessines, a veteran of the OSS (Office of
Strategic Services), a World War II forerunner of the CIA. Soon the CIA station in Athens
“numbered more than 100 full-time agents, most of whom were Greek Americans as
Karamessines himself. And Athens became the hub of all CIA activity in the Balkans and the
Middle East, as far as Iran.” (Ganser 2005: 216) The agency played a crucial role in the
development of two organizations, which would be used to subdue any internal opposition:
KYP (the Greek intelligence service) and an elite commando unit, called the Greek Mountain
Raiders. In 1953, the CIA created the Greek Central Intelligence Service (KYP) in its own
image.6 Founded by Tom Karamessines, KYP worked very closely together with the CIA and
much like all of the Greek armed forces, the KYP was essentially financed and controlled by
the US. As Murtagh quotes an ex-CIA agent: “’With coinciding aims and purposes, and of
course our money, it was easy to work with them,’ […] ‘KYP were good at noodling out Greek
communists and those who flirted with the Soviets.’” (Murtagh 1994: 43)7. KYP’s task was to
monitor Bulgarian and Russian radio traffic and to send the tapes back to the United States
where they were decoded by the NSA. On the domestic level, they kept an eye on the Greek
population with great enthusiasm, producing a file on everyone suspected of being a
communist. Hence, according to John Katris, by 1960-1961 there were “over a million and a
half citizens in a country of eight million for whom the government maintained a ‘file’.”
(Katris 1971: 80) Katris also relates that by 1961, the storage of these files had become such
a problem that the CIA supplied KYP and the police with a modern American computerized
system. To show off this brand new piece of American ingenuity, KYP held an official gala, to
which it invited the press. As the official pressed a button on the machine, it delivered a file
of a believed enemy of Greece. “To everyone’s surprise the enemy turned out to be one of
the newspaper reporters present.” (Katris 1971: 80) The Greek Mountain Raiders were to
protect Greece from an internal communist coup or to organize resistance in the event of a
full-scale Soviet invasion. The raiders were therefore trained in guerilla warfare and in the
case of an invasion would relay communications to governments-in-exile and Allied forces
outside of Greece. Their weapons included small arms and mortars hidden in secret arms
caches, that were scattered across the country. Additionally, the CIA invested millions of
dollars in more advanced weaponry, training facilities around Mount Olympus and scuba
diving and parachuting equipment. (Murtagh 1994: 42) The raiders could also teach their
skills to others and in that sense, they could quickly turn into a much larger force if
necessary. As Ganser writes, “the secret army allegedly counted as many as 1,500 officers,
which were in need to recruit immediately another 2,000, to give the Hellenic Raiding Force
6
KYP or Kentriki Ypiresia Pliroforion literally means “Central Intelligence Agency”.
Murtagh does not name any CIA operators he interviewed for his book: “All interviews were conducted on the
basis that sources would not be identified by direct attribution, if they so requested. Several former US
diplomats and Central Intelligence Agency employees who served in Greece in the Sixties and Seventies gave
their account of what happened. I thank them for giving me their time, though they may not thank me for
reaching conclusions I know they do not share.” (Murtagh 1994: viii)
7
12
a nucleus strength of 3,500 elite soldiers.” (Ganser 2005: 217)8 In Greece, the supervision of
the raiders was the task of the so-called paramilitary desk of the CIA. (Agee and Wolf 1978:
154) Together with similar organizations in other NATO countries, the Greek Mountain
Raiders formed NATO’s “stay-behind network”, which was coordinated by the Allied
Coordination Committee located in the NATO headquarters in Brussels. The Greek branch of
the network would function under the name “Operation Sheepskin”. (Murtagh 1994: 41) In
the mind of the CIA, however, this elite force was predominantly “seen as a long-term
‘insurance’ for the interests of the United States in Greece, to be used to assist or to direct
the possible overthrow of an ‘unsympathetic’ Greek government.” (Agee and Wolf 1978:
156)
Conservative stability
Politically, the United States threw their weight behind a series of rightwing governments,
which in turn catered to the needs of both the Americans and the Greek establishment. The
political party that hence carried the favor of the US was the Greek Rally (ES), which in 1955
changed its name to the National Radical Union (ERE) and was from then on led by
Constantine Caramanlis. Both the Greek Rally and the National Radical Union stayed in
power through elaborate manipulation of the electoral system.9 For instance, “[i]n 1956 the
coalition opposed to ERE won more votes than ERE but only obtained 44 per cent of the
seats in Parliament against 56 per cent of the party in power.” (Tsoucalas 1969: 142) The
American intent behind this orientation was to bring political stability to Greece. As Andreas
Papandreou writes, “’Stability’ in the Greek context meant strong government by the
political forces that could be trusted to be amenable to the dictates of the overall US
strategy.” (Papandreou 1970: 89) In practice, this was translated into large military
expenditures, the granting of facilities to US armed forces and strict obedience to the State
Department as regarded Greek foreign policy. According to John Katris, the Greek army
numbered 150,000 men at the end of the civil war, but after Greece’s admission to NATO in
1952, it was forced to increase its size of the armed forces to 200,000. While the United
States helped to cover the expenses by sending $ 100 million in military aid annually, Greece
still needed to spend more than $ 300 million per year to sustain an army of this size. Of
course this was a severe drain on the finances of a poor country with an underdeveloped
economy. (Katris 1971: 154) The right furthermore benefitted the Greek economic oligarchy,
as “[a] combination of generous tax concessions, tolerated tax evasion and a strict wages
discipline, reinforced by liberal police measures, made Greece a haven for profits.”
8
Ganser states an anonymous article in the Austrian political magazine Zoom as his source: (1996), Es Muss
Nicht Immer Gladio Sein. Attentate, Waffenläger, Errinerungslücken, Zoom Nr. 4/5, 78.
9
The US imposed a majority electoral system on Greece in 1952 on order to bring the Greek Rally to power.
“Similarly, it was through able manipulation of electoral systems, elaborated ad hoc before each general
election, that the ‘Greek Rally’ and subsequently the ERE, as it was renamed by Karamanlis, managed to swell
their representation in Parliament and keep themselves in power.” (Tsoucalas 1969: 142)
13
(Papandreou 1970: 92) Economically, Greece remained a largely agricultural country, where
typical agricultural phenomena such as clientelism and dowries were very common.
As the right was essentially the party of the Greek economic oligarchy, it maintained
economic policies that favored the rich at the expense of the poor. Measures such as the
devaluation of the Greek currency proved very beneficial to Greek commerce, but hurt the
ordinary Greeks who saw their savings become worthless. Although Tsoucalas suggests that,
“it is tempting to see the worship of free enterprise as an economic counterpart to dogmatic
anti-Communism” (Tsoucalas 1969: 131), the outlook of the conservatives on the economy
was founded on corruption more than on ideology. Because conservative governments
relied on the oligarchy for support, large-scale tax evasion by wealthy oligarchs was simply
condoned. Stavros Niarchos, for instance, one of Greece’s major shipping magnates at the
time once “drew a few laughs at the tax office when he declared the annual profits of his
shipyard to be 13,000 drachmae ($ 433)!” (Katris 1971: 76)10 What would prove that the
right did not adhere to laissez-faire capitalism, is that the monopolies granted to family
members or friends of rightwing politicians were protected by law. For example, Constantine
Karamanlis, the Greek conservative President, granted a monopoly on razor blades to his
father-in-law and “[a]t the same time, the government placed exorbitant import duties on
razor blades, with the rationalization that this was necessary to encourage the development
of domestic industry.” (Katris 1971: 85) As a consequence of this take on the Greek
economy, unemployment rose and emigration for many was the only way to escape
deprivation. The Right did attempt to be “somewhat Keynesian” (Tsoucalas 1969: 131) in
that “[p]ublic investment expenditure rose from 1.7 billion drachmas in 1952 to 5.8 billion in
1962.” (Tsoucalas 1969: 134) This was needed to provide some employment and to
modernize the country’s infrastructure. As American financial aid decreased, foreign
investment was attracted in its stead. “But though the advantages offered were
extraordinary, the amount of foreign capital actually invested was not significant until 1960.”
(Tsoucalas 1969: 138) On the other hand, the amount of foreign investment in Greece would
soon become very substantial, as by 1964 it “almost equaled the total assets of the
manufacturing sector proper.” (Tsoucalas 1969: 139) However, similar to Karamanlis’ razor
blades deal, foreign investment was not allowed to enter areas where domestic monopolies
were operating. Conversely, to guarantee profits for foreign investors, they were simply
granted their own monopolies. (Rousseas 1967: 182) The era between 1952 and 1963,
characterized by its conservative stability, gradually spurred economic growth and in the
early 1960s growth even increased so much as to provide Greece with an economic
10
Katris also writes that a lot of the American financial aid furnished to Greece for the reconstruction of the
country “poured into the pockets of the Greek oligarchy in the form of bank loans. They were supposed to
develop the land and thereby raise the standard of living of the people. However, a few months after securing
one of these loans the debtor would stop making payments and would declare bankruptcy.” (Katris 1971: 75)
Washington soon learned that this was the price it had to pay to secure the establishment’s loyalty.
14
miracle. 11 But it would be a mistake to ascribe this to the economic policies of the right.
Rather, it came about by emigrant remittances as well as profits from the new-born sectors
of tourism and shipping.12 To the outsider, Greece nevertheless seemed a fast developing
and promising country, with small capsules of vast wealth, as could be found in the mundane
villa areas of Athens. Underneath this mirage of affluence, however, the seeds of unrest
were everywhere, as the lack of national independence, the constant violations of human
rights and the social injustice inherent in this system gradually started to weigh heavily on
the minds of ordinary Greeks.
11
In the period 1960-1973 “gross domestic product grew at an average annual rate of 7.7 percent, but exports
of goods and services grew at the much higher average rate of 12.6 percent.” (Thomadakis 1997: 43)
12
Tsoucalas writes that tourist receipts from 1957 on were growing at a rate of 20 per cent a year. The
remittances of Greek emigrants in 1963 alone amounted to $ 173 million, while shipping accounted for another
$ 170 million in foreign exchange in 1963. (Tsoucalas 1969: 134)
15
Chapter Two: The Threat
The election of 1958, signified a turning point in the course of rightwing electoral
supremacy, as the EDA, the political party of the left, had managed to gain substantial
ground and polled a quarter of the total vote. With its 79 seats in parliament, it would now
take up the role of the primary opposition party.13 These elections had seen the total demise
of the liberals led by Sophocles Venizelos and it became apparent that without radical
reorganization, the voice of the middle ground would disappear from Greek politics. Yet it
took another two and a half years before the Center Union was formed in September of
1961, jointly led by Sophocles Venizelos and George Papandreou. The following year, the son
of George Papandreou, Andreas, returned to Greece. After serving with the US Navy in the
Second World War, he had obtained a Ph.D. in economics from Harvard, and embarked upon
a career in academics. He became a professor at the University of Minnesota and later at the
University of California at Berkeley. (Katris 1971: 200-1) As the elections of 1961 were
coming closer, the Greek para-constitutional system resorted to new ways to make sure that
the right remained in power. The army and secret service (probably with the knowledge of
the CIA) set up a plot that was “christened – without a trace of irony – the Pericles plan,
Pericles being the hero of ancient Greek democracy.” (Murtagh 1994: 56)14 Indeed, the
security forces regarded the elections as a military campaign and left nothing to chance in
re-assuring another victory for the National Radical Union. Citizens were beaten, threatened
or paid in order to convince them of voting for Karamanlis. By mid-October the
Gendarmerie and rightwing para-military forces started to intimidate the people in the
countryside. A few days before the election, the army joined in. “As was disclosed later,
soldiers dressed in civilian clothes were directed to carry out acts of violence at night against
citizens who belonged to the Left or to the Democratic Centre. And as elections were
approaching, this turned into a veritable orgy.” (Papandreou 1970: 105) Moreover, where
voters could not be beaten or blackmailed into voting for the ERE, they were simply made
up. As Murtagh relates, “Fake electoral registers created an extra 200,000 ERE voters in
Athens.” (Murtagh 1994: 59) Despite the violence and fraud, Papandreou’s Center Union still
received 33.7 percent of the votes, with 50.8 percent for the National Radical Union of
Karamanlis and 14.6 percent for the leftist EDA.15 This was a result that both the
establishment and the US could be pleased with, since again “Caramanlis had emerged allpowerful. And [George] Papandreou’s Center Union had picked up 100 seats, to become His
Majesty’s Loyal Opposition, a role the Americans had reserved for it.” (Papandreou 1970:
105)
13
Figures: (Papandreou 1970: 92).
The aforementioned secret society within the armed forces, IDEA, also played a significant role in the
conspiracy. Names of IDEA members involved, included George Papadopoulos, the later leader of the coup. (
Murtagh 1994: 59) As a CIA report two weeks before the elections shows, Laughlin Campbell was able to
predict the outcome with amazing accuracy. As Murtagh writes, “The CIA man was just one per centage [sic]
point out.” (Murtagh 1994: 60)
15
Source for the figures: (Papandreou 1970: 105).
14
16
As a reaction to the fraudulent elections, George Papandreou initiated his anendotos, an
“’unyielding fight’ for new, fair elections.” (Papandreou 1970: 108) By touring the country,
he tried to rally the people behind his cause. When the Center Union held a large open air
gathering in Athens the next year, Greeks flooded the streets to demonstrate their support
for him. According to Andreas Papandreou, “The people came angry and determined, and
George Papandreou emerged as something more than a party leader. He had become the
personification of a cause, the cause of popular sovereignty and democratic rule.”
(Papandreou 1970: 109) Due to a growing rift between the Karamanlis government and the
palace, Karamanlis decided to resign in 1963. The rift had been caused by a dispute, which
“arose from Caramanlis’ efforts to control the Armed Forces, which was a sore point for King
Paul.” (Papandreou 1970: 111)16 However, the US did not regard an electoral triumph for the
Center Union as a possibility. “For the Americans in Greece, Caramanlis had always been a
favourite and they were deeply convinced that the Centre Union could not win a decisive
victory in new elections.” (Papandreou 1970: 112) But on November 3, 1963, the nightmare
of both the establishment and the US came true. “The Centre Union was victorious, receiving
42 per cent of the vote and 137 seats in Parliament. Caramanlis’ National Radical Union had
39 per cent, and 28 seats. Markezinis’ progressive party won the remaining 2 seats.”
(Papandreou 1970: 114) Since George Papandreou refused to form a coalition government
with the right, or to rely on the left for support, he resigned and brought the country to new
elections. His wish for an absolute majority in parliament was granted by the Greek people
on February 16, 1964. “With an unprecedented 52.72 per cent of the votes (against 35.26
per cent for ERE and 11.80 per cent for EDA), it [the Center Union] had an ample majority in
Parliament.” (Tsoucalas 1969: 180)
Center Union and developmentalism
Economically, the Center Union profoundly believed in developmentalism, an economic
theory which had led to success in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil. In general,
developmentalist policies focus on “(1) industrialisation, (2) rapid capital accumulation, (3)
mobilisation of underemployed manpower, and (4) planning and an economically active
state.” (Jameson and Wilber 1992: 6) In her treatment of the success of developmentalism in
the tip of South America, on the other hand, Klein explains the concept in more human
terms.
Developmentalist economists believed that their countries would finally escape the cycle of
poverty only if they pursued an inward-oriented industrialization strategy instead of relying
on the export of natural resources, whose prices had been on a declining path, to Europe and
16
Shortly after resigning, Karamanlis left the country. “His refusal to put up the slightest struggle for his
position and prestige, and his sudden departure from the country under a false name (Mr Triantafyllides), gave
rise to rumours that his life had been threatened.” (Tsoucalas 1969: 178)
17
North America. They advocated regulating or even nationalizing oil, minerals and other key
industries so that a healthy share of the proceeds fed a government-led development
process. (Klein 2007: 55)
It is not a coincidence that Andreas Papandreou studied at Harvard, which together with
Oxford and Yale was the home of developmentalism at the time. (Klein 2007: 55) When
lecturing on the Greek economy in 1967, Andreas Papandreou stated his views in the
following way:
To facilitate economic growth and development in Greece, I believe that the country’s
infrastructure, transportation and communications, credit, and education and health must
belong completely to the public sector. In contrast, agriculture and commerce should be in
the private sector. Finally, industry must be both public and private. Heavy industry should
probably be public while light industry should be private.”17
The danger looming on Greece was that, as the economy was gradually being opened to
foreign investment, local industries would not be able to compete with big foreign
corporations. Moreover, “[i]n most cases foreign capital was treated preferentially and was
granted monopoly rights for the exploitation of the domestic market and the country’s
national resources.” (Rousseas 1967: 182) Overall, the aim was to make Greece stronger
economically and less dependent on foreign money, thereby rendering it more independent
from foreign influence. Andreas Pandreou consequently believed that Greece could only
grow, if it became more autonomous and democratic:
I would like to add that the views I hold on this subject rest upon the basic premise that
economic development in Greece can only be realized when the Greek people control their
own economic and political decisions, or better yet, when the duly elected government in
Greece represents truly the will of the people. Economic subjugation, in contrast, inhibits
growth and development and it conflicts with the goals of national economic and social
development.18
The Center Union’s economic policy can thus be summarized as an effort to make the Greek
economy stronger, to end corruption and social injustice and to make Greece less dependent
on foreign capital. One of the first feats of the Center Union government was therefore an
effort to redistribute income. According to Tsoucalas, “income redistribution was seen as a
tool of effective demand stimulating domestic consumption. And indeed expansion was very
rapid. In 1965, for the first time, the value of industrial output surpassed that of agricultural
production.” (Tsoucalas 1969: 183) Secondly, the party renegotiated the deals between
Greece and the two largest foreign concerns operating on Greek soil (Pechiney and EssoPappas) “and new terms, more advantageous to Greece, were imposed.” (Tsoucalas 1969:
17
18
Quoted in (Rousseas 1967: 176).
Quoted in (Rousseas 1967: 184).
18
183) Lastly, major reforms were made in Greek education, as compulsory schooling was
extended from six to nine years and free meals were provided in all elementary schools. As
Tsoucalas writes, “Of all Papandreou’s reforms, by far the most popular was the chance seen
by the peasants for their children to become ‘civilized human beings’. (Free school meals and
the extension of the leaving age were both abolished by the colonels directly after the 1967
coup).” (Tsoucalas 1969: 184) The story of developmentalism during the Cold War is a tragic
one, given that the CIA started taking out governments that displayed nationalist combined
with socialist tendencies as early as 1953, when a CIA operation codenamed “TP-Ajax”
toppled the Iranian President Mossadagh. According to the New York Times “[t]he prize was
Iran’s oil fields”19, which were at the time controlled by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
(AIOC). Mossadegh intended to nationalize Iran’s oil production and thus became dangerous
to both Britain and the United States. The outcome of the operation saw the replacement of
Mossadegh by General Zahedi and a reaffirmation of the power of the Shah. In South
America, all the showcases of developmentalism – Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Brazil –
were run by U.S.-backed military governments by 1976 and had radically shifted their
economies into free market models. (Klein 2007: 87)
The army belongs to the nation
However, what sent the Center Union directly on a collision course with the traditional
establishment and the United States was not only its economic policies, but also its
commitment to put an end to the rightwing police state as well as Papandreou’s actions in
the Cyprus crisis of 1964. Under the slogan “the army belongs to the nation” (Papandreou
1970: 148), the Papandreou government attempted to thwart the para-constitutional
control of the armed forces and intelligence service by the US and the Palace. Although, the
ministry of defense was given to a loyal friend of the King, Petros Garoufalias - this later
turned out to be a crucial mistake- the Center Union did break down as many elements as it
could of the para-constitutional system. The government thus halted police coercion,
dissolved rightwing extremist bands and released the majority of political prisoners.
According to Tsoucalas, “Within a few months, a climate of freedom had been almost
completely restored.” (Tsoucalas 1969: 183) As the traditional power structure of the right
was now crumbling and the establishment came under threat from a new class alliance
“between large masses of the peasants, the working class, and the radicalized middle and
lower bourgeoisie” (Tsoucalas 1969: 181) that supported the Center Union, the rightwing
National Radical Union denounced the majority party as a “Communist menace” (Tsoucalas
1969: 181). Andreas Papandreou furthermore tried to end the control of the CIA over the
Greek intelligence service, but this endeavor soon proved to be a bridge too far. When
Andreas Papandreou held the office of Minister to the Prime Minister, a post which entailed
19
The New York Times (2000), Secrets of History: The CIA in Iran. Web. July 27, 2014. Source:
http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-chapter2.html
19
the responsibility over the secret services, he discovered that his office was bugged by the
KYP, the Greek counterpart of the CIA. He then replaced the top two KYP men with others
that he could trust and demanded that the eaves-dropping devices be removed
immediately. The new director additionally received the task of protecting Papandreou’s
cabinet from further surveillance. “He came back a while later,” Papandreou writes. “You
know I am very sorry. But it can’t be done.” The man told him apologetically. (Papandreou
1971: 660) Moreover, according to depositions, Andreas Papandreou had obtained from
army officers loyal to him, “the lines of all cabinet members were bugged on orders from
Colonel George Papadopoulos, formerly of KYP (the Greek CIA). Papadopoulos had been
transferred from KYP, but the organization still took its orders from him. After the fall of the
colonels, Greek investigating judges gathered sworn testimony that George Papadopoulos
received a personal stipend from the American CIA agents and that he was the man through
whom they paid stipends to the rest of the KYP employees.” (Deane 1977: 96)
Cyprus
In the heat of the domestic power struggle, an international dispute again erupted between
Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, as both countries laid claims on the island and Turkey
threatened to invade it. Cyprus had gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1960,
whereupon Archbishop Makarios III had assumed the Presidency. The island housed a
majority of Greeks as well as a minority of Turks and violence between the two ethnic
groups was not uncommon. Greece entertained the idea of enosis (Greek: unity) in which
Cyprus would become part of its territory. “Enosis had the advantage of putting Cyprus into
NATO’s ranks, but it had the disadvantage of making Greece [strategically] too important,
especially at the expense of Turkey, a faithful ally that had common frontiers with Russia.
Thus, the Anglo-American ideal for Cyprus lay somewhere between enosis and
independence.” (Papandreou 1970: 131) The US obviously opposed a war between two of its
allies and as tensions between Greece and Turkey rose during the summer of 1964, Dean
Acheson, a former Secretary of State under President Truman, was appointed as a mediator.
To solve the issue, Acheson designed a plan, hence called the “Acheson plan”, which
consisted of four elements: Cyprus would become Greek, with self-governing Turkish
cantons on the island, Turkey would be granted a military base on Cyprus with no limit on
the amount of troops and material to be stationed on that base and lastly, Greece would
hand over the island of Castelorizo to Turkey. (Deane 1977: 113) When President Johnson
invited the Greek ambassador, Alekos Matsas, to the White House, the ambassador
informed the President that Greece could never agree to the Acheson plan, on the grounds
that it was unconstitutional for the Greek parliament to give away a part of the territory.
Johnson, outraged at the ambassador’s words, responded in his typical brawling style:
20
“[F]uck your Parliament and your Constitution. America is an elephant. Cyprus is a flea.
Greece is a flea. If those two fleas keep itching the elephant, they might just get whacked by
the elephant’s trunk, whacked good. […] We pay a lot of good American dollars to the
Greeks, Mr Ambassador. If your Prime Minister gives me talk about Democray, Parliament
and Constitutions, he, his Parliament and his Constitution may not last very long. […] Don’t
forget to tell old Papa what’s his name what I told you. Mind you. Tell him. You hear?”
(Deane 1977: 113-4)
Directly after the conversation, ambassador Matsas, sent every last one of Johnson’s words
in a coded message to Greece. As the coding machine was American, the Americans
intercepted the message and decoded it immediately. A furious LBJ was on the phone within
minutes, scolding Matsas for transferring what was supposed to be a “private conversation”.
(Deane 1977: 114). As the Cyprus war scare progressed, George Papandreou’s position
proved to be uncompromising towards the United States and Turkey. Tensions culminated
on August 7, 1964, when the Turkish air force launched a three day bombing campaign,
which left a number of Greek-Cypriot villages in ruins. (Papandreou 1970: 138-9) Since the
Greek air force was unable to defend Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios purchased Czech groundto-air missiles which were to be delivered by a Greek ship. (Papandreou 1970: 143) Of
course Makarios’ move greatly infuriated the United States. Even though Papandreou did
not want to provoke a war with Turkey, he also understood that NATO could not protect
Greece against a Turkish threat and therefore refused to allow the Greek army to participate
in the military training exercises of August 1964. Moreover, despite strong NATO pressure,
he intended to reduce military expenditure. (Tsoucalas 1969: 187) In the end, an invasion of
Cyprus was only prevented by a letter of President Johnson - himself under pressure from
the Greek American lobby - to the Turkish president, admonishing him “in all candor that the
United States [could] not agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment
for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.”20
Aspida conspiracy
The Cyprus war scare more or less coincided with the ASPIDA (Greek: shield) conspiracy.
Although the conspiracy was largely fabricated by George Papadopoulos, a small group of
Greek officers had in fact created a secret club with the purpose of advancing their careers.
However, according to Philippe Deane, “[i]t has been amply proved, since, that ASPIDA was
no threat to the Greek armed forces. Six captains who felt they had been denied merited
promotions had banded together to petition for redress of their grievance.” (Deane 1977:
97) The ASPIDA conspiracy was made public as a reaction to a demand George Papandreou
had made to an investigation into the Pericles plan that rigged the 1961 elections
20
Johnson words are quoted in: Landau, J. (1974), Johnson’s 1964 Letter to Inönü and Greek Lobbying of the
White House, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, Vol. 14, 45-58. Web, August 4, 2014. Source:
http://www.politics.ankara.edu.tr/dergi/tybook/14/Jacob_M_Landau.pdf
21
(Papandreou 1970: 145). George Grivas, the former collaborator and IDEA member, was the
first to proclaim the existence of ASPIDA in a report sent to Defense Minister Garoufalias
(Papandreou 1970: 151). As Philippe Deane writes, “Andreas Papandreou, the Prime
Minister’s son, was accused of being the leader of ASPIDA. Testimony before the court trying
the junta in August 1975 describes how the damaging rumours were manufactured, how
witnesses were coached to lie and by whom. The names of those involved in this systematic
campaign of calumny were put before the court. George Papadopoulos was the leader of
this operation. He has been found guilty.” (Deane 1977: 98) At the time, however, the king
intended to make a big issue of it. (Papandreou 1970: 155) US army officials, even though
they were aware of the falsity of the accusations, also helped to spread them as much as
they could. (Deane 1977: 99) The official investigation into the ASPIDA case was assigned to
Colonel Laganis, an obedient member of the IDEA organization and therefore a subordinate
of Papadopoulos. (Papandreou 1970: 156) Laganis immediately arrested and interrogated a
number of officers, among whom was Colonel Papaterpos, the deputy director of KYP, who
was appointed by George Papandreou to investigate the Pericles plan. According to Andreas
Papandreou, “his close friendship with my father and me would provide the essential
missing link between the military and the political leadership of the conspiracy.”
(Papandreou 1970: 156) By incriminating Andreas Papandreou and convincing the Greek
public that an allegedly communist faction of army officers was planning a coup, the palace,
the establishment and the US, “could block our [i.e. the Center Union’s] efforts to change
the army leadership – which had become a major public demand following the Pericles
disclosures. [And secondly] […] they could give the King the necessary moral argument for
ousting George Papandreou from the government of the country.” (Papandreou 1970: 157)
King Constantine, who had succeeded king Paul after his death in 1964, deposed the
government of George Papandreou on July 15, 1965. The reason for the ousting had been
the resignation of Defense Minister Garoufalias, a loyal trustee of Constantine. Papandreou
had initially given the mandate to Garoufalias, as a means of appeasing the king, but when it
became apparent that the cooperation of Garoufalias with the Center Union government
was no longer to be expected, George Papandreou let him off and subsequently tried to take
up the ministry himself. This greatly upset king Constantine who in turn demanded the
resignation of Papandreou. By means of a number of apostates (Greek: defectors) from the
Center Union party, the King then tried to form a government of unquestionable loyalty to
him. Apparently the CIA also had a hand in forging this scheme.21 As Andreas Papandrou
writes, “The Palace and the Americans – especially the CIA – had worked hard in the summer
months of 1965 to break up the Centre Union Party. They succeeded eventually in
constructing a bare parliamentary majority for the government of Premier Stephanopoulos
in September 1965.” (Papandreou 1970: 23) At the time it seemed that “[t]he King had won
21
Tsoucalas writes that one of the CIA agents involved was Richard Barnum, who “operated through the EssoPappas concern, whose interests were at stake as the huge contracts signed with the puppet government were
being questioned by the Centre Union.” (Tsoucalas 1969: 206)
22
the first round. Papandreou had been ousted, and Andreas was under indictment for high
treason [in the ASPIDA case].” (Tsoucalas 1969: 191) However, over the next two years more
political mayhem ensued as support for the Center Union was still growing stronger. The
ASPIDA plan backfired, when the Greek public learned that there was hardly any evidence
against the defendants and the plot in the end only served to lay bare the full extent to
which the Greek secret service had tried to control the political scene. “An elaborate system
of tapping ministers’ telephones on behalf of KYP (the Greek CIA) was exposed; a plot
against the life of George Papandreou, which had only failed for accidental reasons, was
brought to light; and two officers revealed that they had been offered large sums of money
to give false evidence, in order to implicate Andreas in a Nasser-style conspiracy [ASPIDA].”
(Tsoucalas 1969: 199) In the Greek parliament, however, George Papandreou, later agreed
to a compromise with the King, initially without the support of his son Andreas. “The main
clause of the agreement was that Papandreou was to support, together with ERE [the
political party of the right], an interim non-political government and was further to refrain
from any attacks against the Palace.” (Tsoucalas 1969: 201) Andreas Papandreou then also
agreed in order to maintain party discipline. As elections approached, it became clear that
the Center Union would again prevail. Moreover, the political upheavals served to invigorate
the figure of Andreas Papandreou, as the other main Center Union deputies had defected to
the King’s puppet government and had even started their own party (FIDIK). But as this new
party could not rely on any popular support, they would surely be wiped away in the
upcoming elections. Secondly, as George Papandreou was approaching the noble age of
eighty, it was believed that he would soon leave the leadership of his party to his son.22
When elections were set for May 28, 1967, the right found itself in complete disarray and
the establishment feared that it would lose its economic and political privileges. According to
Tsoucalas, “[n]ot unreasonably, anxiety gave way to panic. For King, Army and oligarchy, it
was becoming more and more obvious that the continuation of formal democracy would
lead to the collapse of the edifice it had taken the Right so many years to build.” (Tsoucalas
1969: 202)
22
As Phillips Talbot writes in a memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, “At age 80, however, he's lost
biological race to his son Andreas, only other leader of vigor now in party, and a government with Andreas
either as backstage manager or at helm would--as we evaluate thrust of his campaign--transform military high
command into a party-controlled instrument and thus effectively break authority of King and traditional
influentials in this country.” On the foreign policy domain, Talbot compared Andreas to a “Mediterranean
Bhutto”, the Pakistani president who, while maintaining relations with the United States, also reached out to
Russia and China. Talbot furthermore stated that “Russians would not be slow to take advantage.”
271. Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, April 14, 1967, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1964-1968, Vol. XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey (Washington DC: Office of the Historian), Web
August 2, 2014. Source: http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xvi/4764.htm
23
Chapter Three: The Shock. The Colonels and the CIA
According to the literature, there were two groups of plotters: the big and the small junta.
The big junta consisted of the king and his generals, while the small junta was “made up of
Papadopoulos, Makarezos, Pattakos, Roufogalis etc., the colonels and majors who were to
do the dirty work for the generals.” (Deane 1977: 120) In State Department memoranda, the
King’s coup is noted as operation “Lerax 2”, lerax meaning “hawk” in Greek, whereas the
colonels’ coup, the one which was eventually carried out, was called the “Revolutionary
Council”23. The preparations for a coup by the small junta, led by Papadopoulos, seem to
have started as early as 1963, as they blamed king Paul for not doing enough to prevent the
Center Union from coming to power.24 It was an established fact that the United States
would back a dictatorship by the king, if he felt that one was necessary. But although, the
State Department was expecting the king and his generals to make a move, the CIA seemed
to be waiting for the colonels.25 What would strongly indicate that the CIA was at least
aware of the coup is the fact that Papadopoulos and his band were very well connected to
the agency.26 On the other hand, as the CIA never officially admitted any involvement in the
coup, it will remain forever a mystery whether the colonels acted on their own or whether
they acted on the CIA’s orders.27 It has become clear through the personal account of
23
According to the declassified memoranda, the US Embassy was aware of this group as early as 1963.
245. Field Information Report, December 20, 1966, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol. XVI,
Cyprus; Greece; Turkey (Washington DC: Office of the Historian), Web August 2, 2014. Source: http://20012009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xvi/4764.htm
24
Field Information Report 225 from the US Embassy states that, Papadopoulos’ original group of conspirators
blamed “the Palace for the political instability, starting with the fall of former Prime Minister Konstantinos
Karamanlis in 1963.” 225. Field Information Report, March 7, 1966, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1964-1968, Vol. XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey (Washington DC: Office of the Historian), Web August 2, 2014.
Source: http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xvi/4766.htm
25
Field information report 245, however, would suggest that the embassy was aware of the colonels’ plot,
albeit not in detail.
26
Andreas Papandreou writes that most of Papadopoulos’ men were either involved or well connected with
KYP, the Greek intelligence service that worked very closely together with the CIA. According to him, “George
Papadopoulos was the liaison officer between the CIA and the KYP when he was assistant to General Natsinas,
director of KYP under Caramanlis. Nicholas Makarezos was chief of KYP’s information section on the night of
the coup, and Michael Roufogalis, the lieutenant colonel in whose home the group gathered on 20 April to give
the signal for the coup, was director of KYP’s personnel section. […] Brigadiers Pattakos and Alexander
Hadjipetros – the other two men in the small inner circle of the conspiracy – were not connected with KYP; but
Hadjipetros was commandant of NATO’s missile-testing base in Crete, a position that could be held only by
men intimately associated with the US military mission and the CIA.” (Papandreou 1970: 241) According to
Phillippe Deane, Papadopoulos had been on the CIA payroll since 1952 (Deane 1977: 124) and was considered
by an American friend of his, the journalist Marguerite Higgins, as one of “our most prized sources in Greece.”
(Deane 1977: 118)
27
During the trials of the Junta leaders in 1975, after the regime had collapsed, the issue of CIA involvement in
the coup was explicitly left out of the question. However, according to Philippe Deane, “there is sworn
testimony by a member of KYP (the Greek CIA) that some American CIA members, wearing Greek uniforms,
participated in the coup on the of April 21st, 1974 [typo: 1967] to make sure it would be bloodless.” (Deane
1977: 124) Andreas Papandreou furthermore accuses Johson’s Deputy Secreatary of Defense, Cyrus Vance, of
having played a crucial role in ensuring the US did not see the plot as a communist conspiracy. “Cyrus Vance, on
24
Phillipe Deane, who was the king’s Secretary at the time, that Papadopoulos was paid by the
CIA to keep an eye on the king, by handing out stipends to his staff. The stipend for the valet
was allegedly sufficient for him to drive a new Mercedes Benz, although his official wage was
only sixty dollars per month. (Deane 1977: 54) Colonel Joseph Lepczyk, the US army attaché
to the Athens embassy, with whom the King used to play squash was also secretly a CIA spy.
(Murtagh 1994: 99) We would be inclined to believe that the CIA initially had a royal coup in
mind, but then abandoned the plan. There are some reasons why a dictatorship by
Papadopoulos’s faction would have been preferential over one by the king. First, the king
was inexperienced, since he had only mounted the throne in 1964. Secondly, it was unsure
whether king Constantine had enough popular support to legitimize a coup. As Andreas
Papandreou suggests, “The King and the generals would have had no chance to neutralize
the popular reaction, to develop any kind of following. They had become identified with a
corrupt Establishment.” (Papandreou 1970: 245) The main reason, however, seems to have
been that the king’s heart simply was not in it. John Katris writes that the CIA worked
together with Princess Irene and Queen Mother Frederika to persuade the king of the
necessity of leading a military takeover. “In fact they had worked skilfully with CIA
psychologists to break down the reluctance of Constantine to participate fully in it.” (Katris
1971: 42) But from the king’s desperate attempts to maintain parliamentary government
from 1965 to 1967, we can discern the king’s preference for a constitutional government.
American support for a dictatorship, furthermore, was not guaranteed, as Secretary of State
Dean Rusk, warned against “constitutional deviation” on April 3 of 1967, for fear of making a
martyr out of Andreas Papandreou.28 In the end, the king seemed to vest his hopes in a
traditional government led by ERE, although this outcome of the elections was not deemed
probable. 29 According to Andreas Papandreou, the king’s generals, did meet regularly to
discuss a plan for a coup, but strangely the king himself did not participate in these
meetings. Papandreou also believes that the generals ultimately gave up the idea. In his own
words, “the Big Junta was not ready for a coup. It approached the decision many times, but
each time backed away from it.” (Papandreou 1970: 220)
The second question is which elements of the United States government apart from the CIA
were aware of the coup. After the assumption of power by the colonels, Marquis Childs
reported that Walt Rostow, the President’s Special Assistant, had presided over a
committee, known as Committee 303, that contemplated a military takeover in Greece
together with representatives from the US military, State Department and intelligence
the morning of the coup (April 21, 1967) circulated among various governmental offices in Washington, D.C., to
assure officials this coup was ‘ours’, and that concern about it was unnecessary.” (Papandreou 1970: 662)
28
267. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece, April 3, 1967, Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1964-1968, Vol. XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey (Washington DC: Office of the Historian), Web
August 2, 2014. Source: http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xvi/4764.htm
29
271. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, April 14, 1967, Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1964-1968, Vol. XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey (Washington DC: Office of the Historian), Web
August 2, 2014. Source: http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xvi/4764.htm
25
services in February of 1967. Rostow is reported to have closed the meeting with the words:
“I hope you understand gentlemen, that what we have concluded here, or rather have failed
to conclude makes the future course of events in Greece inevitable.”30 But on the date of
publication of Childs’ article, Rostow sent a memorandum to President Johnson, in which he
states that the committee merely assessed a request by Greek Americans to use 200 to
300,000 US dollars “to back candidates who would be anti-Andreas.”31Ambassador Philips
Talbot, is said to have advised against it and when the matter was taken to Secretary of State
Dean Rusk, he too refused. According to Rostow, Rusk “commented that if the dual-national
Greek-Americans are concerned about the prospects and if $200-$300,000 will make the
difference, they should have no trouble raising that sum themselves without involving the
United States Government.” The embassy, according to its declassified memoranda seems to
have been aware of both conspiring groups as early as 1963, but there is very few
information available on what the embassy actually knew and the memoranda do not paint
a clear picture of what was going on. This might also have had something to do with the fact
that the US Embassy and the CIA in Greece were hardly on speaking terms. Hence, when the
coup eventually took place, the embassy had been left in the dark. As Peter Murtagh writes,
Ambassador Talbot “put his own lack of prior knowledge of the plot partly down to the
antipathy that existed between the diplomatic staff and the CIA and a consequent lack of
communication. (Murtagh 1994: 124) The rift between the embassy and the CIA had started
much earlier. Ellis Briggs, who served as US Ambassador to Greece from 1959 to 1962,
testified for a Senate Security Committee during the summer of 1963 and “admitted that
while in Greece he did not have control over the American services [i.e. the CIA].”
(Papandreou 1970: 108) However, a conversation reportedly took place a week after the
colonels assumed power, in which Talbot complained to CIA Station Chief Jack Maury that
the coup was “a rape of democracy”. To which Maury replied, “How can you rape a whore?”
(Agee and Wolf 1978: 154) According to Deane, George Papandreou was well aware of the
plot through his network of koumbaroi32. His Minister of Defense, Garoufalias, who had been
appointed the ministry on the suggestion of the King, was protecting the conspirators from
before the alleged ASPIDA conspiracy was brought out. (Deane 1977: 96) Nevertheless, as
the political quarreling became ever more exacerbated, a dictatorial solution did not seem as
unthinkable as before. However, according to Andreas Papandreou, “few people believed
that a military coup would occur. Greece, after all, was a member of NATO, and Greek
political life was under the direct influence, if not under the full control, of the United States;
and it seemed impossible that the United States should tolerate a dictatorship in Greece.”
(Papandreou 1970: 225) Unfortunately, this belief proved to be not entirely warranted.
30
Childs, M., A Coup in Greece; A Bit of Blackmail, The Washington Post, May 15, 1967.
290. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant to President Johnson, May 15, 1967, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol. XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey (Washington DC: Office of the
Historian), Web August 2, 2014. Source: http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xvi/4763.htm
32
“A koumbaros is someone to whose child you have stood as godfather. The father of the child and the
godfather are one another’s koumbaros.” (Deane 1977: 91) Important men in Greece had many koumbaroi and
used these close relationships to manifest their influence, in a very Godfather-like fashion.
31
26
The coup
The first units to take action on the night of the twentieth of April, were the CIA-trained
Greek Mountain Raiders and given that the raiders were under command of the CIA, this is
another piece of evidence to suggest that the CIA was involved. Around midnight, the
commandos stormed the headquarters of the Greek armed forces, colloquially referred to as
the “Pentagon”. Brigadier General Stylianos Pattakos subsequently led a colon of tanks
through the streets of Athens towards Syntagma square. The entire military takeover was
based on the Prometheus plan, a NATO-designed scheme to take over important
government facilities in case of a communist coup or a Soviet invasion. “In the event of
opposition, Prometheus was unequivocal: “Smash, without hesitation, any probable enemy
resistance.” (Murtagh 1994: 114) Army units arrested over 10.000 people in five hours
(Murtagh 1994: 117). The officer who coordinated the arrests was Colonel Yannis Ladas, the
director of the military police. “’My plan was carried out with mathematical precision,’ he
said in an interview some years later. ‘Within twenty minutes, every politician, every man
and anarchist who was listed could be rounded up.’” (Murtagh 1994: 117) George and
Andreas Papandreou were among the first apprehended. George Papandreou was woken up
by armed men standing at his bedpost. Andreas Papandreou hid himself on the roof of his
house, but surrendered after a soldier held a gun to the head of his 14-year-old son.
(Murtagh 1994: 115) In the early morning the entire country awoke to what would be its
plight for the next seven years.
Shortly after 6 a.m. the radio broadcast a decree, allegedly in the king’s name, proclaiming
the revolution and suspending eleven articles of the constitution. People could now be
arrested on the spot and without warrant, brought before military courts and dealt with.
Homes could be searched with impunity. Meetings and strikes were outlawed, domestic
news subject to censorship. The stock exchange was ordered closed, bank deposits frozen
and foreign stock exchange banned. Borders and ports were sealed and communications
with the outside world cut for ordinary citizens. (Murtagh 1994: 118)
The role the king would play in the first few hours was of vital importance to the success of
the coup. In the organized chaos, that the coup essentially was, he could have given the
army orders to repel the conspiracy. However, no such thing occurred. As Papandreou
accounts, “Papadopoulos’ scheme was based on the Big Lie – that the order to execute Plan
Prometheus had the King’s approval. Indeed both the Air Force and the Navy were quite
prepared to move against the colonels’ junta, but the King discouraged them.” (Papandreou
1970: 246) Moreover, there was an important detail, in which the Prometheus plan differed
from similar NATO plans in other countries, strongly to the colonels’ advantage. “In the case
of Greece, the order for the execution of the plan did not have to be approved by the King or
the cabinet. It was required only that the Chief of the Army General Staff give the green
27
light.” (Papandreou 1970: 243) This function was at the time carried out by General Gregory
Spandidakis, who thus became a crucial figure for the colonels. According to Papandreou,
“They found him in the early morning hours of 21 April playing cards with friends; and they
persuaded him to join them just in time.” (Papandreou 1970: 243) As he confirmed his
approval of the colonels’ actions to disconcerted officers, he gave “the impression that Army
General Staff and the Palace were behind the coup.” (Papandreou 1970: 243) As it turned
out, the king did exactly what the colonels expected of him. After five hours of negotiating,
Constantine swore in the new dictatorship, in order to avoid bloodshed. “After swearing in
the dictatorship, Constantine allowed himself to be photographed with the new cabinet –
the most valuable piece of propaganda he gave the colonels.” (Murtagh 1994: 122)
Constantine eventually did stage a countercoup on December 13, 1967, but his coup was
repelled in less than 24 hours. At three a.m. the following day, the king already found
himself on a plane heading towards Rome with all that was left of his royal court. (Murtagh
1994: 161) His coup failed, because he no longer commanded the loyalty of the army. As
Murtagh relates, “Almost 700 officers, most of whom would have been loyal to him rather
than the government, had been removed from key positions and pensioned off, with junta
loyalists promoted in their place. Others who remained and who initially had little love for
the junta, were dismayed by Constantine’s early acquiescence with the dictatorship.”
(Murtagh 1994: 157) Moreover, the Junta knew about the King’s designs, since all his
telephones were bugged and “by early December, his plans were so well known in Athens
that newspapers were reporting the efforts of Papadopoulos to dissuade him.” (Murtagh
1994: 157) What is remarkable about the coming to power of a dictatorship in Greece is that
the country was essentially taken over by “three colonels and two captains” (Murtagh 1994:
120) The fact that the colonels assumed power in such a sudden yet very well-organized
fashion meant that their success is to be attributed to the shock and confusion that the coup
created. The “Big Lie” (the deception that the king backed the colonels) combined with the
Prometheus instructions to “smash, without hesitation, any probable enemy resistance” can
be seen as an effort to disorient and crush any opposition by means of shock. In fact, this
strategy is reminiscent of what defense analysts now call “Rapid Dominance”. In their book
Shock and Awe, Harlan Ulman and James Wade write, “In crude terms, Rapid Dominance
would seize control of the environment and paralyze or so overload an adversary’s
perceptions and understanding of events so that the enemy would be incapable of
resistance at tactical and strategic levels.” (Ulman and Wade 1996: xxv)
The fact that the colonels had been able to stay under the radar of the general public also
meant that they had the benefit of the doubt when they first came to power. As one eyewitness accounts, “Why would they necessarily be bad?”33 Older people furthermore
seemed to be content with a military dictatorship, as it put an end to the political unrest
33
Quoted in (Katris 1971: 214)
28
which reminded them of the horrors of the civil war. As Xydis writes, “Indeed, they
experienced a sense of relief on learning of the coup of April 21, 1967, and about its
promises of stability and order after the political and social disorders of 1965 to 1967, which
to them appeared to be omens of new civil strife.” (Xydis 1974: 527) This stability was also
essential to the business community, whose cooperation to the regime was of the utmost
importance. The colonels thus “wooed this section of the population by means of anticommunist propaganda and its claim that the new rulers [were] the sole guarantors of law
and order, and thereby of the rights of property and private enterprise.” (Clogg and
Yannopoulos 1972: 77) The junta’s struggle against communism immediately permeated all
aspects of public life and even effected the kind of Greek used in education and state
documents. The colonels favored a form of Greek, called katharevousa, or ‘purifying’, over
the more progressive dimotiki, or ‘popular’. Katharevousa was an artificial variety of Greek,
which intended to preserve as much of the Ancient Greek, as possible, and therefore
differed substantially as to the applied grammar, vocabulary and spelling. Dimotiki, on the
other hand, is the Greek as it is spoken and written today. The language issue might seem
ephemeral, but it is a typical example of the shift towards traditionalism that Greek society
made under the colonels. As an anonymous Greek educator relates:
Since April 1967 katharevousa has in many ways regained its dominant place in Greek life in
general, and in education in particular. As symptomatic of an entire philosophy, the
insistence on katharevousa could be related to a number of measures taken at the same
time: the ban on mini-skirts, beards, and long hair; compulsory church-going by pupils and
teachers; the ceremony of saluting the flag every morning in all schools (a common feature in
many of the United States); and more recently the compulsory carrying of satchels by
children (regardless of the fact that this adds to the parents’ expenses for their children’s
education, which is supposed to be free). (Clogg and Yannopoulos 1972: 132)
In order to take the fight against atheist communism to the metaphysical level, the military
regime made “Greece of the Greek Christians” the official motto of their nation. (Clogg and
Yannopoulos 1972: 45) To the same ends, President Eisenhower had added the words
“Under God” to the American Pledge of Allegiance in 1954.
The American reaction
Washington’s initial reaction to the coup was extremely hesitant. The State Department did
not want to get ahead of the facts and decided to wait. “It was to be a full week before Rusk
made any public statement about the coup and then only to say that Washington was
waiting for some ‘concrete evidence’ of an early return to democracy.” (Murtagh 1994: 125)
Despite warnings by President Johnson and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, who
stated that American aid would be suspended, if parliamentary government was not
restored, the US government started a tenure of “looking on the bright side” (Clogg and
29
Yannopoulos 1972: 241-2) and not allowing civil rights to get in the way of strategic
interests. In the end, Washington’s ambivalence towards the Greek junta resulted in an arms
embargo, which appears to have been largely a sham. As Maurice Goldbloom writes:
The result of the conflicting pressures within the United States government was a suspension
of shipments of heavy weapons but a continuation (and in many categories an actual
increase) in all other forms of aid. The weapons cut off were those which would have been
useful primarily against a foreign foe; those which continued to flow were the ones most
important for domestic repression. This policy must be judged in the light of the fact that a
decision had been reached before the coup to phase out military aid to Greece, or at least to
reduce it sharply, over the four-year period 1967-70. (Clogg and Yannopoulos 1972: 242,
original italics)34
When in June of 1967, the Six-Day War broke out between Israel and its Arab neighbors,
relations between the US and the junta quickly became more cordial. The strategic
importance of Greece was once more highlighted, due to its proximity to Israel and the
colonels’ willingness to let the US use Greek air force bases. (Murtagh 1994: 155) Moreover,
“[b]ecause of the growing Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean during the 1960s and
the USSR’s political and military moves in the Middle East – in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq – and
because of the closing of Wheelus air base and other United States and British facilities in
Libya after the overthrow of the monarchy in that country in 1969, the United States
military facilities in Greece became more important than ever before to the Western
position in the eastern Mediterranean.” (Xydis 1974: 524) As the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968 had already caused a temporary suspension of the arms embargo on
Greece, the arms shipments to Greece were resumed as soon as the embargo ended on
September 22, 1970. (Xydis 1974: 522) Because of the junta’s pro-US and pro-NATO stand,
the US military was one of its greatest supporters and the colonels obliged their American
overlords in 1971 by starting negotiations to give the US Sixth Fleet home port facilities in
the Athens area. “This meant that the US navy, under a contract signed with the junta,
would have all the docking, service and staff accommodation facilities in Greece necessary to
sustain the operations of the fleet.” (Murtagh 1994: 154) If the agreement were carried out,
Athens would have become “the American Navy’s largest home port in Europe”. (Murtagh
1994: 155) In one of Murtagh’s interviews with a former American naval officer, the attitude
of the US military towards the junta is made painfully clear:
’Once the junta took over, from a military point of view we were more secure in Greece,’ […]
‘In the 1970s we didn’t think about the morality of doing business with the junta at all.
President Carter was ahead of his time. To look back in hindsight and say ‘Gosh, isn’t this
34
The continuation of American aid to Greece was also motivated as a way “to keep open the channels of
communication between the two governments.” (Xydis 1974: 522) Turkey restored relations with the junta
early on, given the necessity “to continue negotiations over Cyprus.” (Clogg and Yannopoulos 1972: 243)
30
terrible’, OK, but we weren’t ready to spill that much blood for human rights.’ (Murtagh
1994: 231)
Sensory deprivation
The use of shock was not only instrumental to the colonels’ assumption of power, it was also
quintessential to the way they sustained their regime: by arresting and torturing everyone
suspected of being against them. This practice started from the first minute of the coup, as
10,000 people were arrested on the night of April 20th, 1967. The torture methods applied in
Greece seem to be the same as the ones that have been used by other authoritarian regimes
that received support from the CIA. As Naomi Klein describes the history of the CIA’s
enhanced interrogation techniques from early experiments at McGill University, to
waterboarding in Guantanamo, a distinct set of actions all recur, that were described in the
CIA’s 1963 torture bible: the Kubark Counterintelligence Interrogation manual.35
Wherever the Kubark method has been taught, certain clear patterns – all designed to
induce, deepen and sustain shock – have emerged: prisoners are captured in the most jarring
and disorienting way possible, late at night or in early morning raids, as the manual
instructs36. They are immediately hooded or blindfolded, stripped and beaten, then subjected
to some form of sensory deprivation. And from Guatemala to Honduras, Vietnam to Iran, the
Philippines to Chile, the use of electroshocks is ubiquitous. (Klein 2007: 41)
It should not surprise that these techniques were also used by the agents of the KYP, since,
as has been said before, this agency was to a large extent trained and financed by the CIA.
Moreover, the kind of torture methods, used to subdue the Greek population, fit perfectly in
the aforementioned patterns. These torture methods are the grim legacy of experiments
conducted at McGill University’s Allan Memorial Institute in Montreal, under the supervision
of Dr. Ewen Cameron. In his attempts to heal psychiatric patients, Cameron tried to cure
traumas by erasing the memory and rebuilding the personalities of trauma victims. As Klein
states, “His ambition was not to mend or repair his patients but to re-create them using a
method he invented called ‘psychic driving’37.” (Klein 2007: 31) Although he did succeed in
35
Kubark Counterintelligence Interrogation was obtained by the Baltimore Sun after a Freedom of Information
Act in 1997. “Kubark” is simply a cryptonym for the CIA.
36
According to the manual the timing of the arrest is the first step to a successful interrogation: “What we aim
to do is to ensure that the manner of arrest achieves, if possible, surprise, and the maximum amount of mental
discomfort in order to catch the suspect off balance and to deprive him of the initiative.” The Central
Intelligence Agency, Kubark Counterintelligence Interrogation, The National Security Archive, p. 85. Web,
August 4, 2014. Source: http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB122/
Early morning or late night raids are preferential, given that a person’s psychological resistance is then at its
lowest.
37
Psychic driving “consisted of Cameron playing his patients tape-recorded messages such as ‘You are a good
mother and wife and people enjoy your company.’ As a behaviorist, he believed that if he could get his patients
to absorb the messages on the tape, they would start behaving differently.” (Klein 2007: 32)
31
regressing patients into a state where they became infantile, the rebuilding of the mind
unfortunately proved impossible. In the mid-1950s, the CIA became interested in Cameron’s
research as it was investigating special interrogation techniques. Inspired by alleged
brainwashing of American POWs in the Korean war, a program was set up “to find new ways
to break prisoners suspected of being Communists and double agents.” (Klein 2007: 33) and
in 1953 the program received the name MKUltra. Remarkably, Dr. Sydney Gottlieb, the
director of MKUltra, who became the overall director of the CIA’s Technical Services
Division38 in the 1960s, has reportedly visited Greece on multiple occasions. (Agee and Wolf
1978: 150) Whether he actually advised the junta on torture methods, is of course unclear.
But it was not unusual for American agents to assist local torturers in other parts of the
world. As Klein writes, “Testimony from Central American torture survivors in the seventies
and eighties is littered with references to mysterious English speaking men walking in and
out of cells, proposing questions or offering tips.” (Klein 2007: 42)
The findings of MKUltra were processed into the aforementioned Kubark Counterintelligence
Interrogation, which has some distinct features so that its use can be discerned in the
torture methods of the colonels’ regime. Whoever was captured was treated as a
communist agent, who had to be broken down. The interrogations would stop when the
interrogated person signed documents that denounced communism and gave the
interrogator names of others –communists or not- who would subsequently be arrested.
One method described in the manual particularly gives it its hall mark: sensory deprivation.
Sensory deprivation is applied to break through the mental defenses of the detainee by
attacking his or her sense of identity. This is done by distorting a person’s awareness of time
and space. Hence, interrogatees are preferably held in isolation and in complete darkness so
that the day cannot be distinguished from the night, meals come at different times, and no
contact with other prisoners is allowed. As the manual says, “The point is that man’s sense
of identity depends on a continuity in his surroundings, habits, appearance, actions, relations
with others, etc. Detention permits the interrogator to cut through these links and throw the
interrogatee back upon his own unaided resources.”39 The manual furthermore illustrates
that the use of shock to bereave a population of any capability to resist is very similar to the
way successful sensory deprivation is conducted. As a shock in Klein’s shock doctrine is
defined as “a gap between fast-moving events and the information that exists to explain
them” (Klein 2007: 458), the purpose of the CIA’s interrogation techniques is to do the same
on the individual level.
38
“The Technical Services Division officers provided specialized back-up for CIA operations. TSD assistance to
other branches of the CIA included electronic monitoring devices, various gadgets for surveillance, special
weapons for clandestine operations, drugs for use in such operations, forged documents and other similar
material. Most of the TSD officers had experience in radio and electronics; a few were engineers.” (Agee and
Wolf 1978: 149)
39
The Central Intelligence Agency, The Kubark Counterintelligence Interrogation, p. 86.
32
When this aim is achieved, resistance is seriously impaired. There is an interval - which may
be extremely brief – of suspended animation, a kind of psychological shock or paralysis. It is
caused by a traumatic or sub-traumatic experience which explodes, as it were, the world that
is familiar to the subject as well as his image of himself within that world. Experienced
interrogators recognize this effect when it appears and know that at this moment the source
is far more open to suggestion, far likelier to comply, than he was just before he experienced
the shock. 40
The method of sensory deprivation can be seen in the eye-witness accounts of Greek torture
victims. In Greece, prisoners were usually held in isolation, if they had not broken down in
the initial rounds of interrogation. Contrary to what was to be expected, they did maintain
their sense of time. According to the account of Helen K.41, incorporated in Katris’ book
Eyewitness in Greece, she was held in isolation from December 12 to 26 at the infamous
headquarters of the General Security in Athens’ Bouboulina street. (Katris 1971: 237) The
highest-ranking officer at the facility was Vassilis Lambrou. Helen K. writes that Lambrou
“studied in the United States in the school of Psychological Warfare.” (Katris 1971: 234)42
The same Vassilis Lambrou reportedly intimidated his prisoners by stating “We are the
government, you are nothing. The government isn’t alone. Behind the government are the
Americans. […] The whole world is in two parts, […] the Russians and the Americans. We are
the Americans. Be grateful we’ve only tortured you a little. In Russia, they’d kill you.”
(Murtagh 1994: 6) What betrays a strong connection between the American secret services
and the Greek KYP was not only the applied methods, as much as the fact that most of KYP’s
torture equipment had been furnished to Greece as American aid. As John Katris writes,
“bicycles, jeeps, patrol wagons, iron wreaths used to squeeze skulls, wire whips, truth
serums, even blankets used to carry bodies all bore the mark ‘made in U.S.A.’ or ‘U.S.’”
(Katris 1971: 226) The aim of the tortures was not necessarily to gain information. Since
prisoners were released simply by giving other people’s names, a chain of prosecution and
violence was set in motion to keep the Greek population firmly under control. According to
an unnamed junta colonel quoted by Katris, inquisition and brutality was “a matter of
survival of the Revolution.” (Katris1971: 226) The governments of Norway, Sweden,
Denmark and the Netherlands reacted against the junta’s violations of human rights by
approaching Council of Europe’s Commission of Human Rights in September 1967. In their
40
The Central Intelligence Agency, The Kubark Counterintelligence Interrogation, p. 65-6.
Helen K. is a pseudonym Katris gave to an eyewitness in order to protect her identity. (Katris 1971: 213)
42
Psychological warfare was taught at two different schools in the United States: the Counterinsurgency School
in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the School of the Americas in Fort Benning, Georgia. The latter was
responsible for training the torturers of South America’s authoritarian regimes, which terrorized civilian
populations throughout the continent. (Klein 2007: 454) Colonel Papadopoulos was also an expert on enhanced
interrogation, given his past with the Security Battalions during the Second World War. In 1965, as Philippe
Deane relates, Papadopoulos was furthermore entrusted by king Constantine with the position of head of the
psychological warfare bureau at the Greek general staff. (Deane 1977: 119) Charles Foley writes that
Papadopoulos also received training in interrogation techniques by the CIA. Because of his affiliation with the
agency, old hands of the US military mission in Greece reportedly called him “the first CIA agent to become
Premier of a European country.” Foley, C., Greek Dictator in CIA’s Pocket, The Observer, July 1, 1973.
41
33
defense, the Junta claimed that Greece was under extraordinary conditions, given the
alleged threat posed by internal communism. (Clogg and Yannopoulos 1972: 35) As
overwhelming evidence had been gathered of the regime’s torture practices, Greece
withdrew from the Council of Europe in 1969 facing certain expulsion. (Murtagh 1994: 203)
Economic shock therapy
On the economic front of their relentless battle against communism, the Junta implemented
Friedmanite economic shock therapy to completely overhaul the Greek economy. The
philosophical underpinning of neoliberalism was of course that it entailed the economic
expression of freedom, hence the title of Friedman’s 1962 masterpiece Capitalism and
Freedom. According to Naomi Klein, the irony of Friedman’s theory is that “this
fundamentalist form of capitalism has consistently been midwifed by the most brutal forms
of coercion, inflicted on the collective body politic as well as on countless individual bodies.”
(Klein 2007: 18-9) In other words, free market capitalism has often been adhered to by the
most repressive of governments. The man in charge of the Junta’s operation towards
economic freedom was Finance Minister, Adamantios Androutsopoulos, who claimed to be a
professor of economics and alleged to have taught at the University of Chicago. However,
none of this was actually true. Androutsopoulos did spend nine years in Chicago, but failed
to get a degree from the prestigious university that was also home to Friedman.43 Philippe
Deane furthermore relates that Androutsopoulos had come to Greece after the Second
World War and had been working for the CIA ever since. What is more, he “often boasted of
this fact.” (Deane 1977: 134) Although Androutsopoulos never obtained a degree in
economics from the University of Chicago, he did seem to understand Friedman’s
neoliberalism, as can clearly be seen in the policies issued by the Junta. In general, the
junta’s outlook on the economy resulted in increased defense expenditures, cuts in the
public sector and a fiscal system that aimed to attract foreign investment by means of low
taxes. The colonels likewise attempted to privatize the public sector by granting contracts to
foreign firms to carry out tasks that traditionally belonged to the government. The American
corporation, Litton Benelux, for instance, signed a contract in May 1967 to provide for the
administration, coordination and the conducting of negotiations of projects with foreign
investors in the Western Peloponnese and Crete. According to John Pesmazoglu, this deal
was worth $ 840 million. (Clogg and Yannopoulos 1972: 98) The main attraction for foreign
firms was a hugely advantageous taxation system. As Peter Murtagh accounts:
Within four months of taking office, the tax system was altered to attract foreign investment.
Companies with headquarters outside Greece were granted freedom from all Greek company
43
Nicodemus, C., Greek Prime Minister Falsified Academic Career, The Montreal Gazette, Feb. 15, 1974. Web
July 12, 2014. Source:
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1946&dat=19740215&id=SpouAAAAIBAJ&sjid=mKEFAAAAIBAJ&pg=
3783,3524137
34
taxation and their staff members in Greece absolved of the obligation to pay income tax. The
state would not require account book audits for foreign companies and there were to be no
foreign exchange controls on registered mail. Two-year renewable work permits were
introduced and staff with foreign companies were allowed duty-free importation of cars,
furniture and personal belongings. Thus the new tax regime allowed foreigners to operate
totally tax free in Greece and export all their profits without any examination by the Greek
government. (Murtagh 1994: 135)
American companies such as Ford, National Cash Registers, Union Carbide and Trans World
Airlines were quick to take advantage of the new opportunities (Murtagh 1994: 135) and by
1969 foreign companies operating in Greece amounted to a total of 217. (Katris 1971: 253)
Greek shipping magnates such as Stavros Niarchos and Aristotle Onassis equally benefitted.
However, the suspension of constitutional rights also caused a downfall in tourist receipts
that is estimated at a loss of $ 200 million in the period 1967-71. (Clogg and Yannopoulos
1972: 100) Greece’s isolation following the withdrawal from the Council of Europe in 1969
furthermore meant that its dependence on foreign investment became ever more
desperate, as another $ 200 million in capital resources expected from the European
Economic Community were not made available. (Clogg and Yannopoulos 1972: 76) But the
income these deals with foreign investors actually generated for Greece, was far less than
what the Junta had anticipated and was even lower than in the years 1963-66. (Clogg and
Yannopoulos 1972: 97) Due to the almost subordinate position of the Greek government
towards big companies, “[c]hanges in prices, rates or other costs to the advantage of the
private contracting partner could not be assessed or invoked for adjustment to the benefit
of the country, while variations in conditions to the disadvantage of the contracting partner
were bound to lead to disputes, delays and finally to the breakdown of the relationship.”
(Clogg and Yannopoulos 1972: 99) The overall result of the Greek regime’s economic policies
was an increase in balance deficits, lower growth and unemployment leading to emigration.
By the end of 1973, inflation in Greece had reached 30 percent.44
The junta’s reforms greatly benefitted the Greek economic oligarchy and Greek Americans
with business interests in Greece. As has already been mentioned, prior to the colonels’
coup, wealthy Greek Americans were lobbying with Walt Rostow to tip the balance of the
elections in favor of the right using American money. Indeed some Greek Americans had a
lot to gain if the Center Union did not come to power. Tom Pappas, for instance, who openly
declared to be a member of the CIA45, had bribed Queen Frederika in the early 1960s and
was subsequently granted permission to build an Exxon concern in the area of Thessaloniki,
despite severe opposition from the Center Union and the leftist EDA. “As a result of his deal
with the government, Pappas obtained monopoly rights over the manufacture of 29
44
Inflation.eu, Inflation Greece 1973. Web July 13, 2014. Source: http://www.inflation.eu/inflationrates/greece/historic-inflation/cpi-inflation-greece-1973.aspx.
45
According to John Katris, Pappas said this in an interview with the Greek newspaper Apogevmatini, published
on July 28, 1968. (Katris 1971: 46).
35
products and according to contemporary analysts critical of the deal, stood to exercise
control over 54 per cent of Greece’s exports.” (Murtagh 1994: 50) When the Papandreou
government came to power in 1963, the contract was revised before being terminated by
the Greek Supreme Court in 1966. (Katris 1972: 46) But with the installation of the junta, one
of his employees, Pavlos Totomis, became Minister of Public Order and “[t]he contracts of
Esso were revised in Pappas’ favour soon afterwards.” (Tsoucalas 1969: 206) Pappas’ brother
at the time ran the Boston Pappas Foundation, that according to Tsoucalas, “was a conduit
for CIA money destined for Greece.” (Tsoucalas 1969: 206) Not only did Tom Pappas wield a
lot of influence in Greece, he also had some powerful friends in the United States. As
Murtagh relates: “Pappas was a long-standing friend of the Republican Party. He had been
one of President Eisenhower’s senior and most successful fundraisers and his relationship
with Nixon went back to the late 1940s. Pappas has been credited in some quarters with
having persuaded the Nixon camp to bring [Spiro] Agnew onto the presidential ticket.”
(Murtagh 1994: 204) Because of these close ties between Pappas and Nixon, Ambassador
Philips Talbot reportedly resigned his post in January 1969. (Murtagh 1994: 205) Elias
Demetracopoulos, a Greek journalist living in exile in the United States since 1967, was the
first to shed light on Pappas’ donations to the Nixon campaign. As Murtagh writes,
“Demetracopoulos alleged that between July and October 1968 three separate payments
totalling $549, 000 were made to the Nixon-Agnew campaign in one-thousand-dollar-bill
transfers from a Pappas account in the National Bank of Greece.” (Murtagh 1994: 204) Given
the connection between Pappas and the CIA, Murtagh believes that this could have actually
been CIA money, laundered through Pappas. (Murtagh 1994: 204) It is therefore not
surprising that Spiro Agnew, Nixon’s Greek American Vice-President, zestfully proclaimed his
support for the junta. According to Star News, Agnew stated that the junta was “seriously
living up to their obligations” and had “promised free elections.” Agnew’s praise
immediately headlined in the junta-controlled press. The free elections, however, were
never held.46 More importantly, this could also help to explain why Nixon was in favor of
resuming American aid to Greece. As Xydis writes, “In August 1971, the U.S. House of
Representatives passed a $ 3.4 billion foreign aid authorization bill, but voted against further
aid to Greece unless the President found that ‘overriding’ national security requirements
justified waiving the ban. President Nixon decided that they did.” (Xydis 1972: 522) Officially,
the reestablishment of aid to Greece was also legitimized as a way of giving the United
States leverage with the colonels to push for a return to democracy, although the regime’s
alliance to NATO and the strategic position of Greece were considered as even more
“overriding”. (Murtagh 1994: 201-2) The explanation Nixon gave was that “Without aid to
Greece, we would have no viable policy to save Israel.”47 From the Greek perspective,
46
Evans, R. and Novak, R., Did Agnew Sell Out to the Greek Junta?, in Star News, July 18, 1975. Web April 18,
2014. Source:
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1454&dat=19750718&id=YMMsAAAAIBAJ&sjid=3QkEAAAAIBAJ&pg
=3076,3575047
47
Quoted in Foley, C., Greek Dictator in CIA’s Pocket, The Observer, July 1, 1973.
36
American help was very welcome, given the dire consequences of the economic isolation
from Europe. Agnew’s office as Vice President ended even before the Watergate scandal
occurred, when he was forced to resign in 1973, facing bribery charges. (Murtagh 1994: 2045) Pappas’ name also appeared in the Watergate tapes, in which he was referred to as “the
Greek bearing gifts”. (Murtagh 1994: 205) When Nixon needed money to finance his legal
defense in the Watergate cover-up, Tom Pappas made a gift of $50,000 to John Mitchell,
Nixon’s attorney general. (Murtagh 1994: 205)
The example of Tom Pappas illustrates the behind the scenes power of certain Greek
Americans and would again suggest that the CIA was very much involved in the overthrow of
constitutional government in Greece. This country was but one case in a host of CIA plots
that took out politicians and political parties with a developmentalist agenda, a fate which in
this particular story befell Andreas Papandreou and the Center Union. Because of his
economic beliefs, Andreas Papandreou was smeared as a Communist48 and his implication in
the fabricated ASPIDA conspiracy served only to highlight his alleged ideological convictions.
We have already discussed the example of the CIA coup in Iran, which deposed President
Mossadegh, since he was considered a threat to American economic interests. Exactly the
same happened a year later in Guatemala, where a CIA plot was carried out to establish an
anti-communist government “that would return expropriated land to the United Fruit
Company.”49 (Streeter 1999: 386) Other examples are Brazil (1962), Indonesia (1965) and
Argentina (1976), just to name a few.50 We will now focus on the regime of Pinochet in Chile
to show some of the distinct similarities it had with the Greece of the colonels. As Salvador
Allende’s Popular Unity party running on a developmentalist political agenda won the 1970
elections “promising to put into government hands large sectors of the economy that were
being run by foreign and local corporations” (Klein 2007: 59), his program was bound to
jeopardize American business interests. Hence, President Nixon gave CIA director Richard
Helms the order to “make the economy scream”51. The companies with the most to lose
from Allende’s coming to power were American mining companies with holdings in Chile and
the International Telephone and Telegraph Company, which according to Klein “owned 70
percent of Chile’s soon-to-be-nationalized telephone company.” (Klein 2007: 64) Moreover,
according to Philippe Agee, Southern Capital, which was the CIA’s largest proprietary, i.e. a
corporation owned and operated by the CIA, “owned some ITT stock.” (Agee and Wolf 1978:
129) But despite three years of economic warfare, Allende was still in power by 1973. A coup
was therefore staged by general Pinochet, who installed himself by means of full-on military
48
Childs, M., A Coup in Greece; A Bit of Blackmail, The Washington Post, May 15, 1967.
Other US directives for the new Guatemalan government were to “lift trade barriers, eliminate restrictions
on foreign investment, supply inexpensive raw materials, realign Guatemala’s foreign policy positions with
those of the United States in the Organization of American States and the United Nations, and welcome US
military training and assistance.” (Streeter 1999: 386)
50
A more exhaustive list of CIA interventions since the Second World War can be found in Blum, W. (2004),
Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II, see bibliography.
51
Quoted in (Klein 2007: 64)
49
37
shock and awe. Allende was killed when jets bombed the presidential palace and just like in
Greece, “the shock of the coup prepared the ground for economic shock therapy; the shock
of the torture chamber terrorized anyone thinking of standing in the way of the economic
shocks.” (Klein 2007: 71) The Chilean economy was turned into a Friedmanite paradise, by
graduate students of the University of Chicago, who upon their return to South America
were called “los Chicago boys”. (Klein 2007: 62) By 1982, Chile’s economy had crashed, its
debt was beyond control and employment stood at 30 percent.
The shock wears off
As time went by the resistance movements became more consolidated and better
organized. Andreas Papandreou, released from the junta’s claws in 1968, went on to
become a very influential spokesperson for a return to democracy in Greece. The most
significant challenges to the colonels’ regime’s rule occurred in 1973. In May of that year
mutinous naval officers, attempted a plot against the dictatorship. Unfortunately, on the day
the officers were supposed to take the fleet to sea, access to the Scaramanga naval base was
blocked by the regime.52 Only, the Velos, was able to stay out of the hands of the junta, as it
was already at sea. The ship declared for the uprising, but the crew found themselves
standing alone. Commander Nikolaos Pappas then sailed the Velos to Italy, where he
requested political asylum for himself and his men. In the context of a rapidly deteriorating
economic situation and given the fact that the regime’s popular support was ebbing away,
especially as younger people – generally against the regime- were reaching voting age and
older people, who were grateful for the political stability of the dictatorship, saw their
numbers decline, (Xydis 1974: 531) the junta proclaimed significant political reforms, to be
supported by a plebiscite. The aim of the plebiscite, however, was also to officially install
Papadopoulos as the President of Greece. According to the Junta’s results, 72 per cent of the
people voted in favor. (Murtagh 1994: 238) Given that Papadopoulos was confident about
his authority, he announced further reforms such as the formation of a civilian government,
free and fair elections, the immediate end of martial law in the Athens region and the
establishment of the Constitutional Court, which would facilitate the creation of political
parties. Even more surprisingly, he proclaimed an amnesty for all political crimes committed
inside Greece since April 21, 1967 and granted a pardon to Alexander Panagoulis, who had
tried to assassinate him in August 1968. (Xydis 1974: 531-2) Conversely, as President, he
would “retain absolute authority in matters of public order, defence and foreign affairs, the
ministers of which Papadopoulos would appoint himself, and in other matters of
government, his writ would run superior to that of the prime minister.” (Murtagh 1994: 238)
As a reaction, students of the University of Athens occupied the campus buildings and
52
Murtagh suggests that the junta knew something was afoot and therefore took pre-emptive action. The plot,
he believes, might have been betrayed by retired CIA agent Joseph Lepczyck, the King’s former squash partner,
who maintained contacts both with the naval officers and the regime. (Murtagh 1994: 236-7)
38
demanded the ouster of Papadopoulos by means of radio broadcasts. The regime responded
with ruthless military force, as soldiers fired 24,000 rounds at the unarmed students to end
the protest. Miraculously, only 23 students were killed. (Murtagh 1994: 242) The
Polytechneio (Greek: polytechnic faculty) of Athens University has since become an icon in
Greek history. Due to the promised mollification by Papadopoulos of the martial law, a
counter-coup was undertaken within the junta on November 25, 1973 and a new leader
emerged in the person of Brigadier General Dimitrios Ioannidis. He was one of
Papadopoulos’ originals who opposed the restoration of civilian government and were
spiteful of his assumption of the presidency, by which he had sidelined them. According to a
classified memorandum by Tom Boyatt, head of the State Department’s Cyprus Desk, the
CIA station in Athens “was unable to control its enthusiasm for Ioannides”53 and when
Ioannides wanted to deal with the American government, he bypassed Ambassador Tasca
and the official diplomatic channels. Instead, “he dealt direct with the CIA.” (Murtagh 1994:
243) As his Prime Minister, Ioannidis appointed Adamantios Androutsopoulos, the CIA agent
and self-proclaimed economics professor who had radically changed the outlook of the
Greek economy.
The shock that ended the Colonels’ regime
Ioannidis repelled the promised reforms of George Papadopoulos. However, the greatest
threat to his regime proved to be external, rather than internal. Tensions between Greece
and Turkey over Cyprus had again mounted, while Ioannidis harbored a profound hatred
towards the Cypriot President, Archbishop Makarios. To rid himself of Makarios, Ioannidis
organized a coup on Cyprus and installed Nicos Samson as a puppet president.54 Turkey in
turn reacted with a double invasion to protect the Turkish speaking minority of the island.
Badly organized resistance by the Greek army collapsed within a couple of days, as well as
the junta itself. As Deane relates, “[T]hey [the colonels’ dictatorship] got frightened and gave
up power, because the Cyprus crisis had forced them to mobilise the army and they could
not control the thousands of armed reservists as they had controlled an unarmed
population.” (Deane 1977: 136) Due to an impending war with Turkey following the Cyprus
tragedy, the junta surrendered its power to a civilian government on July 23, 1974.
Constantine Karamanlis, who up to that point was still living in Paris, unexpectedly became
53
Quoted in (Murtagh 1994: 243).
It is again unclear whether the CIA was in some way involved in this coup. Officially the US State Department
advised strongly against it. But Kissinger, according to an article by Theodore Kouloumbis, believes that a CIA
agent could have given Ioannidis the green light and a tacit reassurance that Turkey would not intervene.
Couloumbis as well as Alexis Papachelas reckon that this agent was Gust Avrakotos. Kouloumbis, T., Η σχέση
Χένρι Κίσινγκερ και Δημήτρη Ιωαννίδη (The relationship between Henry Kissinger and Dimitris Ioannidis),
Kathimerini, August 22, 2010. Web July 20, 2014. Source:
http://www.kathimerini.gr/402554/article/epikairothta/politikh/h-sxesh-xenri-kisingker-kai-dhmhtrh-iwannidh
Papachelas, A., Ο Γκαστ Αβρακότος σε παιχνίδια εξουσίας (Gust Avrakotos in the middle of power games),
Kathimerini. January 20, 2008. Web July 22, 2014.
Source:http://www.kathimerini.gr/310761/article/epikairothta/ellada/o-gkast-avrakotos-se-paixnidia-e3oysias
54
39
the new Prime Minister of a government of national unity. In December of 1974, Greece
held a new referendum on the monarchy, which abolished the Greek royal court. At the time
Greece was permeated by “a virulent wave of anti-Americanism, encompassing Greeks of
virtually all political shades.” (Pidham 1991: 113) This led to the withdrawal of Greece from
NATO during the years 1974 to 1980 and a reorientation towards the European Community,
of which it became a full member in 1981. In December of 1975, the new CIA station chief in
Athens, Richard Welch was assassinated by a terrorist organization called November 17,
named after the date of the Polytechneio revolt. Welch had been identified due to the
publication of Philip Agee’s book Inside the Company, which revealed the names of certain
agents. (Murtagh 1994: 259-60) The colonels were finally brought to book during a 21-day
trial, that ended on the 23 of August 1975.55 On that day, George Papadopoulos, Stylianos
Pattakos and Nikolaos Makarezos, were sentenced to death. A verdict which was later
commuted by the Karamanlis government to life imprisonment.
Andreas Papandreou’s PASOK, created in 1974, would go on to win the elections of 1981
running on the slogan of allaghi (Greek: change). “Allaghi meant a number of things to
Papandreou: change in economic affairs, change in social affairs, change in foreign affairs.”
(Willsford 1995: 365) Economically, the PASOK government tried to implement a fairer tax
system and to expand the public sector. But this move, intended to end the corruption of the
ruling classes, backfired when the age-old practice simply changed hands. As John
Tomkinson writes:
Far from welcoming social justice and developing a healthy civil society, the traditional
attitudes of selfishness, croneyism and irresponsibility of the traditional ruling and privileged
classes was adopted by the newly enfranchised middle and working classes, on the principle
'It's our turn now.' This resulted in a large inefficient civil service bloated by a new generation
of political appointees from the other side of the political spectrum, who adopted the same
old practices of making croney appointments, and demanding bribes and rousfeti.56
In general, Papandreou’s economic policies failed because wealthy Greeks escaped taxes by
moving their capital abroad and refused to invest in their home country as a reaction to
Papandreou’s new approach on the economy. This resulted in increased budget deficits and
higher inflation. (Wilsford 1995: 366) On the social front, Papandreou was more successful,
as his changes allowed Greece to transform into a modern secular country. Papandreou
decriminalized adultery and ended the old custom of the dowry. Another significant move
was that he allowed political exiles that had fought with the communist ELAS in the civil war,
55
As Time magazine reported, “One question left unanswered by both trials was whether the American CIA
actively supported seven-year Papadopoulos regime, as is widely believed in Greece. Deyannis [the President of
the Court] forbade almost all discussion of the question by insisting that the court was interested solely in
finding out what happened on the day of the coup.” Greece: Answering to History, Time, Sept. 1, 1975.
56
Rousfeti is Greek for “bribe”. Tomkinson, J., Athens in the European Union I: The Return of Democracy. Web
July 20, 2014. Source: http://www.anagnosis.gr/index.php?pageID=474&la=eng
40
to return to Greece, which meant that the healing process of this horrible tragedy could
finally start. In the field of foreign policy, Papandreou’s tone gradually shifted from
vehemently nationalistic to more moderate positions. Although Greece had just re-entered
NATO the previous year, Papandreou in 1981 promised to “withdraw from NATO, kick out
US bases from Greek soil, and hold a referendum on membership of the EEC”57. However,
none of this actually occurred.58 In 1989 Papandreou’s government “collapsed in a welter of
scandal and allegations of corruption.” (Murtagh 1994: 266) Andreas Papandreou himself
was tried by the Greek High Court, but acquitted by a 7-6 vote. The fact that Papandreou laid
the foundation of an oversized public sector, while not ending the traditional practices of
bribery and other forms of corruption, played a large role in the collapse of the Greek
economy following the worldwide crisis of 2008.59
57
Ibidem.
In fact, in 1983 (and in 1990) new agreements were signed for US bases in Greece. (Pidham 1991: 118)
59
BBC News, Eurozone Crisis Explained, November 27, 2012. Web August 4, 2014. Source:
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-13798000
58
41
Conclusion
The use of Naomi Klein’s shock doctrine, termed better as shock opportunism, as a method
of addressing the complex history of the Greek junta, allows for a better understanding of all
the different factors that brought about the rise to power of this regime. Shock opportunism
here came down to a premeditated political shock (a military dictatorship) that sustained
itself by means of torture (shocks on the individual level) and similarly washed over the
Greek economy with economic shock therapy. The threat that provoked the colonels’ coup
in Greece, as in so many other countries, was posed by a politician with a developmentalist
economic agenda. The rhetoric, that formed the basis of American foreign policy, namely
that America always fought on the side of freedom and against tyranny, led to a systemic
demonization of politicians who favored more autonomy, or more economic equality. As
Naomi Klein writes, “In the sixties and seventies, the favored tactic for dealing with the
inconvenient popularity of developmentalism and democratic socialism was to try to equate
them with Stalinism, deliberately blurring the clear differences between the worldviews.”
(Klein 2007: 451) In Greece, this representation of a world in two distinct blocks, led to the
demonization of Andreas Papandreou as a dangerous communist. Subsequently this fight
against communism as an internal peril formed the pretext for the colonels’ assumption of
power and their ideological struggle completely permeated Greek society, as its presence
was felt in everything from the katharevousa version of Greek, to the ban on miniskirts and
the identity construction, epitomized by the new national motto “Greece of the Christian
Greeks”. The effect of this shock opportunism, however, was entirely negative. As the
tortures caused relentless suffering, the Greek economy by the end of the junta’s rule was
almost completely destroyed. Unsurprisingly, this also brought about a wave of antiAmericanism in Greece, exemplified by its withdrawal from NATO in 1974.
The similarities between what happened in Greece and the tragic events in the countries of
the Southern Cone (Chile, Argentina and Uruguay), where military dictatorships brutally
wiped out developmentalism, are so striking that it is tempting to look at Greece as if it were
a South American country. This comparison could also serve to prove the complicity of the
CIA in the colonels’ coup. For in all these countries, a vehemently rightwing government was
forcefully established against the will of the people. These regimes furthermore maintained
themselves on a basis of systematic torture and overhauled the economy on a new creed of
free market capitalism. The ideological underpinning of this form of capitalism was that it
was the economic expression of freedom. The irony, according to Klein, is that “while
Friedman’s economic model is capable of being partially imposed under democracy,
authoritarian conditions are required for the implementation of its true vision.” (Klein 2007:
11) The real reason behind the dogmatic adherence of these authoritarian regimes to free
market capitalism, is far likelier to be found in the connection between the CIA and big
corporations. In this thesis, the example of Tom Pappas has amply shown how influential
certain businessmen were, as Pappas had direct links with both the Republican party and the
CIA. And it were people like Pappas who had the most to lose if a developmentalist
politician, in this case Andreas Papandreou, came to power. In Chile, the economic beliefs of
42
Salvador Allende went against the interests of ITT and American mining companies. As a
reaction to Allende’s rise to power, President Nixon famously ordered the CIA to “make the
economy scream.” (Klein 2007:64) When Pinochet took control, the Chilean economy was
reconstructed on Friedman’s teachings, transferred to Chile by the Chicago boys. In 1978,
Philippe Agee, a defected CIA agent turned whistleblower, wrote that the common goal in all
these undertakings was “the furthering of U.S. hegemony so that American multinational
companies [could] intensify their exploitation of the natural resources and labor of foreign
lands.” (Agee and Wolf 1978: 19) And neither was this tactic limited to South America. One
of the earliest examples was Iran, where a coup deposed Mossadegh in 1953. Iran thus
started a pattern of CIA interventions in countries, “where strong nationalist movements
have insisted on some form of socialism to ensure national control of economic resources.”
(Agee and Wolf 1978: 21) So what we have here is a worldwide phenomenon, which
deserves careful consideration when studying the history of the Cold War. This linkage
between the Greek dictatorship and similar CIA-installed regimes is the biggest contribution
of this thesis, since none of the consulted scholarship on the Greek junta treats the case of
Greece in a global perspective.
However, the case of Greece also shows the soft spots in Klein’s theory. Although it is
certainly true that a lot of collective shocks have paved the way for neoliberal economic
reforms, a great deal of shocks did not have this result. As Naomi Klein describes the growth
of Friedmanism from the Social Science building of the University of Chicago to a world
dominating religion in a linear way, she foregoes the cases where shocks had a very different
impact. What we have addressed in this thesis are three shocks: the Greek civil war, the
colonels coup and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Only the second of these three can be
categorized as a shock in terms of Naomi Klein’s shock doctrine. Since the example of Greece
shows that the so-called shock doctrine can only be applied when conditions allow it, we
believe that it is indeed more appropriate to use the term “shock opportunism”. A second
lesson as regards the shock doctrine, is that some historical elements in the build-up of a
society are so entrenched that they are virtually shock resistant. Corruption and favoritism,
have run through this dissertation as a red line, from the conservative governments of the
1950s to the Greece of Papandreou’s PASOK. This seems to be the real Greek tragedy, that
despite the great efforts made to render Greece a more independent and prosperous
country, this dream went down with the scandals of the Papandreou government, as its
leading members were under accusations of fraud in 1989. Perhaps, as a polemicist, writing
with a distinctly socialist banner, the failure of Papandreou in Greece, would explain why
Klein does not treat the Greek case in her book. Another explanation might be that Greece is
often simply overlooked.
This is of course very unfortunate, given that Greece can teach us a lot about the Cold War,
as it was is the only European country where differences in ideology were fought out on the
battlefield. Moreover, it was the only European country, upon which the CIA imposed its
model economic model of free market capitalism. In the end, the relationship between
Greece and its overlord, the United States, proves how some countries in the so-called “free
world” were not allowed to be free, but slavishly had to follow American dictates. The
essential message to be found in this thesis is hence one in basic Realpolitik. Ideology in that
43
sense was more of a means to an end, but what it essentially came down to was raw power.
Greece was not permitted to have more self-determination, because American interests
were at stake. As the colonels took control, the ideology of freedom was used to safeguard
these interests and to keep Greece firmly on the American side. When writing this
dissertation, some words of the ancient historian Thucydides therefore sprung to mind.
Thucydides wrote about the Peloponnesian war, which divided Greece into two power blocs:
Athens and Sparta. When the Melians expressed their wish for, what we would call in Cold
War terminology, non-alignment, the Athenians disagreed and decided that Melos was to be
in their camp. Before invading the island of Melos and slaughtering its male population, the
freedom and democracy loving Athenians professed, “Of the gods we believe, and of men
we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can. And it is not
as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it when made: we found it existing
before us, and shall leave it to exist for ever after us; all we do is to make use of it, knowing
that you and everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we
do.” (Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, V, 105, 2)
44
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