Honduras
THE MILITARY:
WILLING TO DEAL
BY VICTOR MEZA
Sunday afternoon at Palmerola Air Base, nome to me 1,zuu troops or me Joint IaSK -rorcebravo.
IN
HONDURAS TRAPPED
LATE
a high1979
tideFOUND
of revolution. On one side, the
euphoric and victorious Sandinistas launched an ambitious transformation of the social order; on the other,
the perhaps overconfident Salvadorean guerrillas announced their final offensive. And, powerless to stop
it, Hondurans watched as thousands of defeated
Somocista guardsmen crossed the border, seeking the
protection of the Honduran military.
All these factors would complicate domestic politics
during the 1980s. After 16 years of almost uninterrupted military rule, Honduras was eager for a political
opening. But that was not in the cards, as Washington
was quick to grasp Honduras' strategic potential on the
new Central American chessboard. The country's
geopolitical position is extraordinary. Bordering
Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua, Honduras also
has two coasts, the western on the pivotal Gulf of
Fonseca. Cashing in on traditional Honduran political
14
subservience, Washington proceeded to turn the country into a staging ground for its regional strategy.
This conversion could not, however, be carried out
without brusque changes in the political and military
structures of Honduran society, altering the roles
played by traditional actors: the U.S. Embassy; the
military, the country's most powerful force; and the
civilian government, representing Honduras' political
elite.
While the three claim to co-exist in harmony, in
practice the relationship is rather tumultuous. Each
seeks greater autonomy, while attempting to reduce the
jurisdiction and influence of the other two. This power
struggle has formed the backdrop for Honduran politics
since 1980.
OMMENSURATE WITH THE STRATEGIC
role Washington had assigned Honduras, U.S.
economic and military aid mushroomed. Over 80% of
REPORT ON THE AMERICAS
total support for the decade following 1975 was dispersed after 1980. In the last five years of the 1970s,
military aid amounted to $16.3 million. But in the first
five years of the 1980s, the figure hit $169 million.
Honduras received over $1 billion between 1980 and
1987, 27.8% of it in military subsidies.'
A study by San Francisco's Institute for Food and
Development Policy notes that U.S. aid rose almost
five times from 1980 to 1985-from $57 to $283 million. Even this dramatic increase does not tell the
whole story, for there was fundamental change in the
aid's composition. In 1980 security monies-in the
form of Economic Support Funds and direct military
aid-represented 7% of the total package; by 1985 this
had risen to 76%. Support for development projects
dropped from 80% of total aid in 1980 to 16% in 1985.2
But this massive flow of U.S. support has been repaid
in-kind by Honduran willingness to make territory
available and adjust domestic and foreign policies to
Washington's directives.
Honduran law stipulates that each commander-inchief of the armed forces must serve a fixed term of office, yet from 1980 to 1987 there were four chiefs, precisely the number of U.S. ambassadors during that
period. 3 It is as if each military chief had his corresponding political chief in the person of the U.S. ambassador. Relations were so chummy that some top embassy officials became godparents for officers' children.
FAMILIAR
WITH THE COUNTRY'S PRECIPItous terrain, Washington was surprised when Honduras decided to acquire tanks for its arsenal. But the
Honduran officer negotiating the purchase quickly set
the record straight: "Who told you we wanted tanks to
fight in Honduran territory? We want them to fight in
El Salvador!"4 The strategic reassessment of Honduras
occurred at a time when the Honduran military was still
smarting from the infamous 100-hour "Soccer War"
against El Salvador in July 1969. Honduran officers
were trained throughout the 1970s in a spirit of revenge. Rapidly modernizing and professionalizing, the
Hondurans sought to ensure success in any new confrontation with their adversary.
From 1979 on, the North Americans sought to convince the Hondurans that the situation had changed
substantially. Both scenario and actor were now different. Salvadoreans, the traditional enemies, should now
be seen as important allies in the struggle against communism in Central America. And the Nicaraguans, the
old peaceful neighbors to the south, were now the new
enemies; but not all Nicaraguans, only the Sandinistas.
The others, the anti-Sandinistas, would become allies
in a common cause.
Washington's pressure to end the virtual state of war
prevailing since July 1969 ultimately pushed aside the
Honduran officer corps' own agenda. On October 30,
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1988
1980, Honduran Foreign Minister Col. C6sar Elvir and
his Salvadorean counterpart, Fidel ChAvez Mena
signed a peace treaty in Lima, Peru. Although this
treaty did not definitively solve the border dispute, a
foundation was laid for rapprochement between the
two governments and armies.
Honduran collaboration with El Savador's counterinsurgency war reached its zenith on June 14, 1983,
when 120 U.S. Green Berets landed at Puerto Castilla
on Honduras' northern coast to open a school for Salvadorean soldiers. The Regional Military Training
Center (CREM) would later prove a historic blunder. A
provocation to the Army's nationalist sentiments, the
CREM helped generate a crisis of stability continuing
to this day.
A
S THE HONDURAN ARMY BECAME
increasingly docile in North American hands,
new forces committed to the National Security Doctrine * arose within the ranks. Led by Gen. Gustavo
Alvarez Martinez-whose command officially lasted
from January 1982 until March 1984-these officers
pursued real and imagined enemies, attempting to quell
social discontent.5 Battalion 3/16, a special counterinsurgency force which many considered a kind of death
squad, was formed in 1980. Gen. Humberto Regalado,
the current chief of the armed forces, defined it in May
1987 as "a technical and professional squadron that
processes information and whose strategic conception
is to support each of the brigades comprising the
National Army. "6
Yet in an extensive interview with The New York
Times, Florencio Caballero, a former battalion member
now a political refugee in Canada, described a clandestine paramilitary structure for repressing leftists. 7
Caballero, who studied interrogation techniques in
Houston in 1980, said the CIA was extensively involved in training squad members, though he claimed
the North Americans did not advocate or participate in
physical torture.
Even some officers became alarmed about 3/16.
While in Mexico in August 1982, Col. Leonidas Torres
Arias, former intelligence chief of the armed forces,
publicly denounced the activity of these units and held
Alvarez Martinez personally responsible for inspiring
and creating them.i But the denunciations came too late
for scores of Hondurans and foreigners, especially Salvadoreans, who were subjected to the "Argentine
method," disappearing into hidden prisons. With copious aid from the U.S. military and instruction from
Argentines, this new policy of domestic repression was
preventative, selectively applied and clandestine. De*The doctrine of the national security state is associated with the
Brazilian and Argentine military dictatorships, which believed
that by suppressing "internal enemies" they were in fact waging
war against international communism and Soviet subversion.
15
Honduraso
e Amcas
Honduras
IN
"Inousanas or
bomocista guaras crossed mne Doroer.-'
signed to "prevent" the upsurge of a strong revolutionary movement, its targets were those the security forces
considered "potentially subversive." In particular, the
repression aimed to break up support networks that Salvadorean revolutionaries had successfully organized in
Honduras. Further, this policy was framed completely
outside the law, with its own secret prisons and
methods of killing and "disappearing."
Some 130 Hondurans "disappeared" as a result, and
the Honduran government has won the distinction of
being the defendant in the first case brought before the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights of the Organization of American States.' Hondurans gradually submitted to collective fear and paralysis, while the civilian government yielded ground to the impetuous, authoritarian Gen. Alvarez. The impunity with which the
state's repressive forces acted made the population feel
defenseless; many chose the complicity of silence, daring to share fears and opinions only with close friends.
Americas Watch reported in 1982:
The practice of arresting individuals for political
reasons and then refusing to acknowledge their
16
whereabouts and status seems to have become established in Honduras. In case after case, the pattern is the same: persons who are politically active are taken, in full view of eye-witnesses, by
heavily armed men in plain clothes and moving
in unmarked cars. Although they are generally
not in uniform, and do not identify themselves in
any way, these men are able to stalk their victims
in crowded places, and to enter houses and places
of business without ever being intercepted by
regular police forces. After the initial arrest, the
authorities steadfastly deny the prisoner's presence in any detention center. Through the accounts of survivors, it is established that they are
taken to clandestine jails, or at least to facilities
with very restricted access. The relatives file
habeas corpus writs and administrative inquiries,
by and large without success. The prisoner has
become a desaparecido, a missing person."'
FORTIFYING THE MILITARY, WASHington weakened democracy-indeed, rendered it
virtually impossible. According to an unwritten law of
Honduran society, strengthening the military apparatus
almost inevitably brings a proportionate weakening of
civil institutions. Thus, the United States closed the
door to political negotiation and democracy.
But the U.S. scheme was to meet a temporary setback. Gen. Alvarez' growing authoritarianism, his almost total submission to Washington's will and his
Messianic vocation to lead "the war against communism in Central America" bred internal discontent,
and young officers began plotting his overthrow.
This episode serves to illustrate Washington's ignorance about its own ally. Convinced the armed forces
were not anti-American, U.S. diplomats headed by
then Ambassador John D. Negroponte, quickly concluded that neither were they nationalistic. But the officer corps' nationalism is motivated by deep-seated
animosity toward El Salvador. What the military could
never forgive was Alvarez' willingness to train Salvadorean soldiers in Honduras.
But there was more. Alvarez, in his zeal to consolidate power, stepped on the toes of one of the military's
most basic institutions, the Superior Council of the
Armed Forces (COSUFFAA). COSUFFAA, dubbed
"the parliament of the Honduran military," is a sort of
general assembly which meets periodically to discuss
basic problems of the country in general and of the
armed forces in particular. Its decisions normally be-
come official military policy. COSUFFAA meetings
are the stage on which political struggles are played
out, influence and control won and alliances formed
amidst constant plotting. There the power of each
officer is tested on the personal, group and factional
level.
Numbering 52 at the time, Alvarez tried to cut membership to 21, and virtually replace COSUFFAA with
an eight-person Commanders' Junta where he could
REPORT ON THE AMERICAS
play lord and master. The ensuing tension, combined
with the young officers' fear of being dragged by
Alvarez and the North Americans into a war with
Nicaragua, came to a head on the morning of March
31, 1984, when the general was taken prisoner and
packed off to Costa Rica. Days later, a witness offered
this account:
Gen. Alvarez was captured at the San Pedro Sula
Air Base. He was handcuffed and with a pistol
trained on him, they demanded that he sign a prepared letter of resignation. . . . When the general
refused they threw him on the ground, kicking
and hitting him all over his body except for the
face. . . . Gen. Alvarez didn't sign the resignation despite the blows and insults. . . . ""
A
LVAREZ' ABRUPT OUSTER TOOK THE
North Americans by surprise. Their chief-who
they had ceremoniously awarded the "Legion of
Merit" in June 1983-had been most unceremoniously
overthrown. Despite a sophisticated U.S. intelligence
network, a secret plot had incubated, developed and
succeeded in overthrowing "Washington's man in
Honduras." *
Alvarez' fall allowed the armed forces "parliament"
to return to business as usual. Once norms and procedures violated by Alvarez were restored, the COSUFFAA regained its former importance, and the personal
power of the new head of the armed forces was substantially reduced and subordinated to the will of the
council majority. Alvarez' ideological ways, however,
had deeply affected the behavior and attitudes of many
of his colleagues. The new head of the High Command, Col. Efrain Gonzalez, told the press that "It is
important to note that in the armed forces high command there has been no philosophical change. There is
no different ideological or political attitude, but rather
a new military structure to attempt to do things in a
more correct manner. ..
.,12
Significantly, Alvarez' successors did not dismantle
repressive units such as Battalion 3/16, but merely
"froze" them-lowered their semi-public profile,
keeping them hidden and inactive until they might
again become indispensable.
The new team that replaced Alvarez, headed by Gen.
Walter L6pez, almost immediately sought to renegotiate the military alliance with the United States,
to tailor agreements and commitments to Honduran interests. The men felt that greater advantage could be
extracted in exchange for continuing to provide the
*See "Breakdown in Honduras: U.S. Policy in
Trouble," Report on the Americas, Vol.18, no.4 (JulyAugust 1984).
Salvadoreans. the traditional enemies, now imDortant allies in the struaale aaainst communism.
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1988
17
legucigalpa hosts the contra's human rights organization.
Reagan Administration with a regional platform for its
military policy.
One result was the removal of a particularly painful
thorn in the officers' side. In April 1985, the training of
Salvadorean soldiers at the CREM was banned. 3 And
during the celebration of the 21st anniversary of the
First Infantry Battalion, Col. Leonel Riera, one of the
Honduran Armed Forces' three strong men at the time,
reminded his comrades in arms that " . .. the original
causes of the war with El Salvador still persist and
4
could bring about a repetition of that episode.""
Yet the Pentagon gave the Hondurans points for
magnanimity. In a February 1987 memorandum to a
Senate subcommmittee, Gen. Paul Gorman, former
chief of the U.S. Southern Command in Panama, observed:
Honduras has been induced to show extraordinary generosity toward its old enemy, El Salvador, training Salvadorean troops in Honduras
and patrolling its border areas where Salvadorean
insurgents have their sanctuaries. ... .5
Alvarez' fall was a hard blow to U.S. policy in Honduras. It is no accident that after the general's removal
the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa stepped up efforts to
penetrate and control the military structure. According
to Maj. Ricardo Ziniga Morazin, while U.S. diplomats tried to attract and co-opt some young Army officers, they also induced purges-by retirement-of
officers considered less docile. At one point a list was
circulated of 21 officers whom the embassy deemed
18s
"unreliable." One of those was Maj. Zdniga, who
would be retired from the Army in August 1984.'6 But
although the removal of Gen. Alvarez meant a serious
setback to U.S. plans for Honduras-especially with
regard to Nicaragua-the essence of Honduras' political and military collaboration with the Reagan Administration remained unaltered.
During Alvarez' reign the anti-Sandinista contras
operated freely within Honduras and openly maintained offices in the capital. Alvarez' succesors were
more cautious. Distancing themselves from his political style, they suggested that the counterrevolutionaries
keep a low profile and stick to their camps along the
border, avoiding the press as well as the country's
urban centers. Yet the change was only cosmetic. The
Honduran military has remained tolerant of anti-Sandinista activities, finding room for maneuver as an institution as well as opportunities for personal enrichment.
HERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT THE MILitary has come to view the contras as the ultimate
trump card in relations with Washington. The decision
to permit the counterrevolutionaries to deploy freely in
Honduran territory and maintain a network of encampments along the Nicaraguan border is the armed forces'
exclusive responsibility; civilian authorities can do little but reinforce the military strategy with diplomatic
activity.
The government's detached attitude toward the con^"""'"^'
u
KIP'OUKI UN TLE, AIVCIMA-
tras has at times bordered on the absurd. In June 1982,
when Ed6n Pastora was expelled from Costa Rica and
hurriedly sought temporary refuge in Honduras, he appealed directly to Gen. Alvarez, sidestepping civilian
immigration authorities. With Pastora already in Honduras, Foreign Minister Edgardo Paz Barnica said on
June 27 that "Ed6n Pastora is not in Honduras, nor has
he requested entry into this country. ... ,,"7
Paz Barnica did not know that Pastora had already
met twice with Gen. Alvarez and his closest military
advisers. And there has been confusion within the National Congress. On June 25, 1986 Congress President
Carlos Montoya announced that the legislature would
ask the armed forces to explain the contra presence.
Yet that same day Congress deputies defeated such a
motion.'"
In exchange for tolerating the contras, the Honduran
brass continually demand more military aid from
Washington, both quantitatively and qualitatively. One
of their highest aspirations, many Hondurans believe,
is to obtain as much U.S. military support as El Salvador. During his official visit to Washington in June
1983, Gen. Alvarez made it known that the military
needed "at least $400 million over a period no greater
than three years."'"
But the officer corps has found other ways to make
the point. Whenever Washington appears reluctant to
increase aid or satisfy other demands, contra movement within Honduras is restricted. In 1985 at the end
of the presidency of Roberto Suazo Cordova, when the
North Americans dragged their feet in shelling out $67
million from the U.S. Agency for International
Development (AID), a contra plane loaded with
weaponry, medicine and food which had landed at
Tegucigalpa's Toncontin airport was sent back to the
United States. 20
A ND
THERE
HAVE
BEEN
UNDERthe-table negotiations with the Sandinistas. Many
observers of the Central American political scene are
astonished to learn that the Honduran military and the
Sandinistas have gradually built a network of underground contacts. Directly or through intermediaries,
these contacts have on several occasions served to defuse tensions, averting war between the two countries
and facilitating personal communication which on any
public or official level would seem virtually impossible.
It all began on October 18, 1984 when Halima Sirker
L6pez arrived in Tegucigalpa.' Trusted by Daniel and
Humberto Ortega, she came with a message from "my
brother Daniel, future president of Nicaragua" for
Gen. Walter L6pez and other Honduran military men.
Gen. L6pez authorized his chief of military intelligence, Col. H6ctor Aplicano, to hear out the Sandinista emissary. And on January 27, 1986, while Honduras' newly elected head of state, Jos6 Azcona Hoyo,
JANUARY/FEBRUARY
1988
was receiving the presidential sash, two high-ranking
Honduran Army officers met with Nicaraguan military
officials on Honduras' southern border; details of these
talks remain secret. 22
On the night of March 17, 1986, when Sandinista
troops crossed the border in hot pursuit of the contras,
Honduran soldiers were conspicuously absent. A contingent of 500 Hondurans showed up a week later in
U.S. helicopters laden with C-rations provided by the
Pentagon. Reports leaked to the press some time later
confirmed that the Honduran military had previously
talked to the Nicaraguans about the operation, and set
up a means of communication. It was even asserted
that the Hondurans agreed to the Sandinista incursion
on the condition that they would not advance beyond a
certain point and would use neither heavy artillery nor
helicopters within Honduras.
Finally, in late 1986-with the mediation of
Panamanian Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega-the Sandinistas sought another communication channel to the
Honduran military. Conversations were held in
Panama City in October and November 1986, and it
appeared the Sandinistas would have a green light to
pursue the contras into Honduran territory without reprisal. However, on the night of December 4 a mysterious incident occurred: a Sandinista contingent attacked
an observation post, killing two Honduran soldiers. In
one of the most dangerous incidents between the two
countries, the Honduran Air Force retaliated, bombing
two Nicaraguan villages, Wiwilf and Murra, on December 7.
T
HE CONTRAS ARE ALSO A SOURCE OF
juicy commissions for officers and civilians.
When investigating the fate of the infamous $27 million in "humanitarian" contra aid, the U.S. General
Accounting Office discovered that between October
1985 and February 1986 the contras' local suppliers
had received $5.4 million in return for goods and services actually or supposedly delivered to the anti-Sandinistas.2"
Business flourished, soon arousing the ambitions of
certain top brass interested in a piece of the pie. On the
morning of August 8, 1986, a company of Los Cobras
anti-riot police stormed the residence of Congressman
Rodolfo Zelaya, owner of the Hermano Pedro Supermarket, chief contra purveyor and civilian beneficiary
of contra-destined dollars. The point of the exercise
was to intimidate Zelaya into abandoning the milliondollar business to military men. Zelaya sold out, and
sought refuge in Miami.
The Zelaya case illustrates the form sometimes taken
by internal Army squabbles. Spurred by the possibility
of taking over the lucrative contra business, some officers took the opportunity to upstage colleagues who
were Zelaya's business partners and protectors. Thus
some commanders killed two birds with one stone19
Honduras
broadening their influence within the armed forces
while gaining entrance to the flourishing million-dollar
contra trade.
This particular incident led to a purge within the
armed forces. Two casualties were Cols. Thomas Said
Speer and H6ctor Aplicano, respectively chief of the
Tank Corps and ex-chief of intelligence, both closely
linked to contra operations and to Zelaya.
But certain politicians have also benefitted from the
anti-Sandinista funds. During congressional debate on
June 25, 1986, Rep. Michael Barnes (D.-Md.) said
that $75,000 was apparently paid to the wife of the
Honduran officer known to be the contras' chief
Tegucigalpa contact, while $40,000 landed in the
dinista groups. Many Honduran officers understand the
grave risk of that presence and are concerned about the
prospect of Nicaragua's war ending in defeat for the
contras, who would likely remain in Honduras.
Yet these dissident officers also understand that the
high level of dependency on U.S. military aid allows
the Honduran Army little leverage. Unable to expel the
contras, they reason their best bet is to use them for
their own benefit-institutional as well as personal.
Professional scorn for the contras runs high. "I
don't believe in a military victory by the contras," military chief Humberto Regalado said last May. 26 The
armed forces consider the rebels a mercenary army, unable to defeat the Sandinistas militarily. And they
blame the contras' Somocista leadership for having
lost power in the first place.
When the contras, fleeing Sandinista attacks, hastily
retreat to their bases across the border, the Honduran
military is openly contemptuous. On the night of May
30, 1987, this contempt led the Hondurans to prevent
the contras from crossing the border. The armed
forces' greatest concern is to avoid a large-scale confrontation with Nicaragua. They know, however, that
free contra deployment from Honduran territory is a
permanent provocation, and could ignite war at any
moment. Four main reasons for the Honduran military
to avoid war with its neighbor stand out:
First, the officers know well that this war is not
theirs, so why get mixed up in it? Second, they understand that it is a difficult war, perhaps impossible to
win. The armed forces are not about to risk an adventure that could end in extravagant defeat, their second
in less than twenty years. They know that defeat on the
battlefield would immediately be followed by complete
loss of their waning prestige, and the consequent
weakening of their enormous influence in Honduran
society.
Third-and this is very important-they know that
in the unlikely case of a victory over the Sandinistas,
the victors would not be the Honduran military, but the
contras and North Americans. And finally, they can
easily deduce that if the contras do win, a large part of
the aid Honduras now gets from Washington would be
diverted to Nicaragua to reconstruct the economy and
strengthen the newly installed contra government.
Thus, they conclude, a war against Nicaragua would
be so peculiar that the Hondurans would lose even if
they win. This reasoning has led the military to a policy
which many describe as "cynical pragmatism"maintaining the latent threat of war without letting it
become reality. This dangerous equilibrium allows
them to extract the maximum benefits in U.S.
economic and military aid without crossing the demarcation between potential war and real war.
Palmerola: The U.s. presence is not in question.
pockets of well-known local politicians.24
The corruption fostered by the contra money has
joined the graft that for years has characterized the
Honduran political scene. In a chronology published in
September 1985, the Honduras Documentation Center
identified more than 100 recent cases of corruption in
the Suazo C6rdova Administration inaugurated in
1982.25 Like the mythical Hydra, corruption has slowly
invaded every available space in public administration.
Bribery, buying and selling influence, fraud and simple
robbery of public funds have become an indispensable
lubricant without which state machinery does not turn.
OF
COURSE NOT ALL OF THE MILITARY
benefit from the contra business. And not all of
the military agree with the presence of armed anti-San-
N APRIL 6, 1987, RICHARD ARMITAGE,
assistant secretary of defense for international se--
20
---------
REPORT ON THE AMERICAS
I
C
"Constant joint military maneuvers allow for an endless and sizeable flow of U.S. troops through Honduras."
curity affairs, speaking before a Senate subcommittee,
defined the U.S. military presence in Honduras as "appropriate and temporary, although of an indefinite nature," conditional upon the moment when, in his own
words, "the Sandinistas cease to be a threat to the true
democracies of the region." 27
The permanent nature of the U.S. military presence
in Honduran territory has been a topic of great debate,
above all in the U.S. Congress. In Honduras, on the
other hand, very few have doubted its permanence.
One need only survey the military installations housing
U.S. troops, especially the central base at Palmerola,
where the 1,200 soldiers of Joint Task Force Bravo are
permanently stationed. Furthermore, constant joint
military maneuvers allow for an endless and sizeable
flow of U.S. troops through Honduras. Between October 1981 and August 1987, 58 joint military operations were conducted, from large-scale maneuvers like
Ahuas Tara I, II and III, to simple medical training
exercises in rural areas.
All this has had considerable repercussions on Honduran society, which no doubt will continue. And the
U.S. military presence may yet provoke nationalistic
officers into demanding substantial change in the
politico-military alliance with Washington. The same
forces who oppose war with Nicaragua and reject the
permanent contra presence, are demanding a new Honduran foreign policy, a policy based on effective neuJANUARY/FEBRUARY 1988
trality and non-interference in the domestic affairs of
neighboring countries. These tendencies are not yet
strong enough to prevail or change the course of
events. But it is increasingly clear that their numbers
are growing.
Young officers who participated in the March 1984
overthrow of Gen. Gustavo Alvarez now control the
main channels of power within the Army, exercising
the day-to-day command of the most important battalions. They are the Lieutenant Colonels of the 6th Promotion, including Alvaro Romero, Mario Amaya,
Ren6 Fonseca, Ram6n Rosa and Reynaldo Andino. Almost all were junior officers during the 1969 Soccer
War and directly confronted the Salvadorean Army on
the battlefield, a deeply formative experience. This
group controls almost half of the Superior Council of
the Armed Forces; in alliance with other promotions,
chiefly the 8th and 10th, they constitute a majority
within the COSUFFAA.
In an institution as unique as the Honduran Armythe "only parliamentary Army," as some analysts call
it-the rise of new promotions and displacement of the
old can have extraordinary importance. To a great extent, however, the short-term future will depend on
Washington's ability to co-opt young Honduran officers and neutralize their nationalist impulses. And also,
of course, on the region's peace process in the months
ahead. U
21
Honduras
vate foreign obligations, yet no one has been indicted.
CONADI's debtors are prominent among the country's
private and public sector elites. Washington frequently
cites the CONADI fiasco in justifying AID's aggressive push to sell off public enterprises. The logic is
strange, since CONADI was, if anything, an elite private sector subsidy boondoggle. Moreover, it appears
CONADI firms will be sold back to the same cast of
characters who caused the scandal, with losses the government estimated at $300 million."
The Administration proposes to revolutionize Honduras' outdated "crony capitalism." The vehicle for
this top-down transformation is a private sector/foreign
investment model based largely on non-traditional exports. This, the Reagan team hopes, will vindicate its
claim that the free market offers a sure path to Third
World development.
Gilberto
Goldstein,
a
prominent
Honduran
businessman of CONADI fame.47
The difficulty with development based on non-traditional exports is that, as two analysts of Latin American debt observed, "capturing export markets requires
time and sustained promotional effort, even after a
country's products have become more competitive
through devaluation." 4 8 Experience with such exports
in Honduras is woefully lacking, especially in the marketing and distribution so crucial to success. 49 Despite
AID gimmicks like President Azcona's declaration of
1987 as the "Year of Export," the non-traditional export program has failed. Indeed, the first six months of
1987 registered a decline over 1986.50 Non-traditional
exports accounted for only 21% of Honduran exports in
1985 down from 27% in 1980."
MOST
EAGAN'S ECONOMIC POLICIES FOR HONduras are beset with contradictions. First, the attempt to revitalize the economy through private investment (both foreign and domestic) will not work in a climate of declining investor confidence. Honduras was
classified a "high-risk" for investors by Frost and Sullivan in 1986 and ranked 19 out of 24 countries in credit rating and debt capability, according to 75 international banks surveyed by Institutional Investor."2
Second, AID's private sector approach clashes head
on with huge government deficits largely caused by
U.S.-fostered militarization. Honduras' is increasingly
a war economy, in which a free market system is decreasingly viable. Lastly, Tegucigalpa has come to rely
on ever greater levels of U.S. assistance to finance its
budget and generally "bail out" the economy.
Reagan's rhetoric about free enterprise does not jibe
with the reality of large-scale foreign aid. Honduras is
becoming an international welfare case. And as one
AID dissident told me, "When AID steps in and runs
things, becoming a shadow government, it hardly
works to build Honduran institutional abilities. Yet that
is the supposed goal of AID in Honduras, to help create
a modern functioning state and economy."
Yet the worst danger is not that Reaganomics might
fail, but that it might, however improbable, succeed.
Rapid private sector-led growth would surely create
new elites, deepen inequality in this desperately poor
society and lead to more repression and instability.
Honduran exceptionalism, if it ever existed, would disappear forever. U
STRIKING ABOUT AID'S PLAN IS
that it simply amounts to more of the same.
Honduras already has one of Latin America's most
open, export-dependent, private enterprise economies.
How, then, can greater openness and privatization
make it better? How can the state be the fundamental
obstacle to progress when, at least until recently, it
played an almost neglible role in economic matters?
Similarly, the idea that development presupposes
more U.S. investment is undercut by its already overwhelming presence in Honduras. Nowhere else in Central America is U.S. business more prominent and important. 45 North Americans have long dominated agribusiness, with the partial exceptions of coffee and
cattle.
Furthermore, the AID privatization plan continues to
depend on government help in the form of tax breaks,
subsidies, low-cost loans, training and other forms of
assistance. Apparently the irony of a private sector
capitalist revolution led by a large government bureaucracy in the form of AID has not been recognized.
The Reagan revolution in Honduras will likely prove
a sham. "New" entrepreneurs will not emerge; the
same old faces will back "new" enterprises. An AIDinspired non-traditional export project recently announced with much fanfare is one example. This multimillion dollar endeavor uses advanced Israeli drip irrigation to produce melons for export. 46 But harvesting-by poorly paid, unskilled women-remains labor-intensive. The project is run by sugar plantation owner
References
The Military: Willing to Deal
1. See U.S. Agency for International Development, Congressional Presentations, various years (Washington, D.C.). In-
cluded in the total are the $59.75 million approved as additional
aid by the U.S. Congress in late June 1987. Note that in official
U.S. reports military aid totals are notoriously understated, so
that Economic Support Funds (ESF) are listed as "economic
38
38
R
aid." A large part of ESF goes to finance the state's growing deficit, which increases yearly due partly to the high costs of
militarizing the country.
2. Phillip Berryman and Medea Benjamin, Help or Hindr-
ance? United States EconomicAid in CentralAmerica (San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1987) p. 16.
3. Until 1985 the constitutional term of the head of the armed
forces was five years, one year more than that of the President of
the Republic. But in October 1985 the National Congress amREPORT ON THE AMERICAS
REPORT ON THE AMERICAS
mended the constitution to provide for a three-year term. The military chiefs were as follows from 1980: Gen. Policarpo Paz Garcia (1975-1982), Gen. Gustavo Alvarez (1982-1984), Gen. Walter L6pez (1984-1986), Gen. Humberto Regalado (1986-). Over
the same period the following U.S. Ambassadors were posted to
Tegucigalpa: Jack Binns (1980-1981), John Negroponte (19811985), John Ferch (1985-1986), Everett Briggs (1986-).
4. Author's interview with Maj. Ricardo Zuiniga, May 1984.
5. Paradoxically, Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, the armed
forces' youngest and most professional chief in their short history, did not receive his military education in Honduras. He
studied at the Military College of Argentina from 1958-1962,
where junta leader Jorge Rafael Videla was among his most admired instructors.
6. Diario de la Tribuna (Tegucigalpa), May 4, 1987.
7. New York Times, May 2, 1987; See also Human Rights in
Honduras: Central America's Sideshow (New York: Americas
Watch, May 1987) pp.126-143.
8. Excelsior (Mexico City), September 1, 1982.
9. In April 1986 the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights filed three cases against Honduras in the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights. The cases seek to hold the government
responsible for the 1981 and 1982 disappearances of four persons, two Hondurans and two Costa Ricans. The case is still
pending, and the first ruling is expected in mid-January.
10. Human Rights in Honduras: Signs of "The Argentine
Method" (New York: Americas Watch, December 1982) p.5-6.
11. La Prensa (Tegucigalpa), April 6, 1984.
12. DiarioLa Tribuna, October 13, 1984.
13. The proportion of Salvadorean soldiers trained at the
Regional Military Training Center (CREM) was three Salvadoreans for each Honduran.
14. El Heraldo (Tegucigalpa), July 22, 1985.
15. Testimony of Paul Gorman before the Military Construction Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee,
April 6, 1987, Washington, D.C.
16. Author's interview with Maj. Ricardo Zdiniga, May 1984.
Zdniga was mysteriously murdered in September 1985, some fear
in response to testimony he gave to U.S. congressional contacts
about death-squad activity.
See Christian Science Monitor,
November 19, 1985.
17. La Tribuna (Tegucigalpa), June 27, 1982.
18. Tiempo (Tegucigalpa), June 26, 1986.
19. La Tribuna, June 11, 1983.
20. Traveling in the plane were Mario Calero, brother of
Adolfo Calero, chief of the contra Nicaraguan Democratic Force
(FDN), and two NBC television journalists. The Honduran military privately used this argument as a pretext to reject the shipment and return the plane to the United States, its country of origin.
21. Halima Sirker served as Nicaraguan Consul in Houston,
Texas; a member of the Nicaraguan United Nations delegation;
and later as ambassador to India. Sirker later retired from the
diplomatic corps and lives in the United States.
22. See Victor Meza, "Una historia para John Le Carre,"
Tiempo (Tegucigalpa), April 25, 1986.
23. "La Contra: un buen negocio," Boletin Informativo No.
61, May 1986, p. 14 (Tegucigalpa: Centro de Documentaci6n de
Honduras, CEDOH).
24. "Quienes fueron?" Boletin Informativo No. 66, October
1986, p 3. (Tegucigalpa: CEDOH); Congressional Record, June
26, 1986.
25. La corrupci6n en Honduras 1982-85, CronologiaNo. 3
(Tegucigalpa: CEDOH, September 1985).
26. La Tribuna, May 4, 1987.
27. Testimony of Richard Armitage before Military ConstrueJANUARY/FEBRUARY 1988
tion Subcommittee of U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee,
April 6, 1987, Washington, D.C.
Campesinos: Between Carrot and Stick
1. Honduras is unique in Central America in that, as late as
1974, up to one-third of its land was still public-either national
or ejidal (community owned). Charles D. Brockett, "Public Policy, Peasants, and Rural Development in Honduras," Journal of
Latin American Studies, Vol.19, p. 79.
2. J. Mark Ruhl, "The Honduran Agrarian Reform Under
Suazo Cord6va, 1982-85; An Assessment," Inter-American
Economic Affairs, Vol. 39, no. 2 (Autumn 1985), p.65, quoting
statistics from CEPAL (Comisi6n Econ6mica Para America
Latina).
3. The ceilings ranged from 100 to 2000 hectares, with most
of the country falling in the 250-500 hectare category. Ley de
Reforma Agraria: Reglamentos y Otras Disposiciones
(Tegucigalpa: Instituto Nacional Agrario, 1978), p. 22.
4. One hectare equals 2.47 acres.
5. In 1963, when FENACH leaders were imprisoned and their
offices destroyed, founder Lorenzo Zelaya and a group of followers fled to the mountains to form a guerrilla front. The front was
crushed by the Army in 1965.
6. Everyone I interviewed at AID insisted on anonymity.
7. Marcial Euceda has since formed a new group called Peasant Organization for Honduran National Agriculture (OCANH),
which operates in the department of Santa Barbara.
8. INA claims it pays almost $250,000 a year for the salaries
of peasant activists. In 1987 FECORAH reportedly received
$50,000; ANACH $105,000; and the UNC $90,000.
9. El Tiempo (San Pedro Sula), June 29, 1987.
10. La Prensa (Tegucigalpa), May 6, 1987.
11. El Tiempo, July 9, 1987. World Bank, World Development Report 1987 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
12. Mario Ponce, "Honduras: Agricultural Policy and Perspectives," Honduras Confronts its Future (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1986), p. 133.
13. FY 1988 Congressional Presentation, Annex 111, Latin
America and the Caribbean(Washington, DC: Agency for International Development, 1987), p. 134.
14. Andlisis y propuestas sobre las seis recomendaciones en
materia agrariaformuladas por la misidn presidencial agricola
de los Estados Unidos de America a Honduras, (Tegucigalpa: Instituto Nacional Agrario, no date).
15. Boletin Informativo, No. 30 (September 1987). This total
represents roughly 16% of the rural population (although the subsequent abandonment of the land by many families probably reduces it to about 10%), and some 11% of the land.
16. Ilja Luciak, "National Unity and Popular Hegemony: the
Dialectics of Sandinista Agrarian Reform Policies, 1979-1986,"
Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol.19, p. 113.
17. Instituto Hondurefio de Desarrollo Rural, 84 meses de reforma agrariadel gobierno de lasfuerzas armadas de Honduras
(Tegucigalpa: IHDER, 1980), pp. 258-259.
18. Andlisis y propuestas.
19. Brockett, "Public Policy," p. 82.
20. Andlisis y propuestas.
21. Peter Peek, Agrarian Structure and Rural Poverty: The
Case of Honduras (Geneva: InternationalLabour Organisation,
1984), p. 17.
22. Andlisis y propuestas.
23. Andlisis y propuestas.
24. Brockett, "Public Policy," p. 76.
25. Ponce, "Honduras: Agricultural Policy," p. 146.
26. World Bank, 1987.
27. La Tribuna (Tegucigalpa), December 16, 1986.
28. In These Times, March 18-24, 1987, p. 9.
39