THE MISSING PERSON IN SCIENCE
Inquiry Starts with “I”
Science seldom proceeds in the straightforward logical manner imagined by outsiders. Instead, its steps forward (and sometimes backward)
are often very human events in which personalities and cultural
traditions play major roles.
A
WORK OF ART REFLECTS THE PER-
how art and science can be partners. We
recognize this most dramatically when
we find beauty in science’s products. Less
well recognized is that art can also be a
part of science’s processes [17]. Richard
Buckminster Fuller described this pithily: “When I’m working on a problem, I
never think about beauty. I think only
how to solve the problem. But when I
REMEDIOS VARO SPAIN 1908–MEXICO 1963. USED BY PERMISSION.
ceptions of its creator. A work
of science reflects the characteristics of nature. A work of
art is a personal expression of the artist. A
work of science must be a shared expression among scientists. An artist creates an
original work and does not want another
artist to reproduce it. A scientist’s work is
–James Watson (1968)
Creación de las aves (Creation of the Birds) by Remedios Varo.
only validated when other scientists reproduce her results. These are useful ways to
distinguish between art and science.
But the whole truth must include
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have finished, if the solution is not beautiful, I know it is wrong.”
I believe that the public discourse
about science has been missing a vital
message that, if understood and promoted, could profoundly improve student,
adult, and societal engagement with
science: Aesthetic and humanistic, as well
as scientific, perspectives can legitimately
influence the choices made in a scientific
inquiry.
Unfortunately, public perceptions of
science too often thwart this message.
Physicist and historian Gerald Holton
has explained that misperceptions of
science can arise because the scientist’s
“private process of creation” is largely
shielded from public view. Only the
“public process of validation” is reported
in professional journals and monographs.
What scientists actually do, their “nascent moment of discovery” and personal
scientific activity – what Holton calls
“private science” – are not. Francois Jacob,
the physiologist and Nobel laureate, captured this difference when he compared
his “night” science of private scientific
activity to the “day” science of formal
public reporting.
The writings of scientists, philosophers, and historians are our partners in
the examination of “private” science –
what scientists say they do, and how and
why they do it. They illuminate how personal and cultural perspectives can influence, and add value to, scientific
investigations [17].
THE PROCESS AND THE PERSON
The cutting edge of science is not about the
completely unknown. It is found where we
understand just enough to ask the right
question or build the right instrument [7].
–David Goodstein
Scientists say that their inquiry starts
with a question, and their first task is to
design an inquiry that makes it soluble.
Questioning, observing, experimenting,
and hypothesis testing are commonly used
to find solutions. None of these processes,
however, is unique to science. If, as Albert
Einstein wrote, “the whole of science is
nothing more than a refinement of everyday thinking,” what refinement is unique
to science? The answer is scientific evidence. The refinement that early scientists
brought to human problem solving is the
evidence to which scientists pay attention.
EVIDENCE. In school, most of us
learned that scientific evidence must be
verifiable. The 20th-century British
philosopher Karl Popper argued that falsifiability is a more appropriate criterion,
since there is always the possibility that
“some new fact or discovery will come
along that does not verify the proposition.” To be scientific, an observation or
proposition must be open to disproof.
If scientific evidence must be falsifiable by others, then the processes of a scientist’s inquiry must be transparent to
others. This is where “public science”
demonstrates its value. If everyone is to
agree on scientific evidence, its identification must be independent of everyone’s
personal characteristics. Scientific evidence must be testable and relevant to
the problem under study. The requirement of falsifiability opens the processes
of scientific inquiry to public scrutiny.
Theology or faith cannot be proven
wrong. A sculpture, a ballet, or a poem is
not falsifiable. Each is subject to likes and
dislikes, to disagreements of taste and style,
to failed technique. The proponents of
creationism say it cannot be proven wrong
because it is a matter of faith. But if it is
not open to disproof, it cannot be science.
One can like or dislike intelligent design.
However, one cannot like or dislike the evidence supporting Mendel’s laws of inherited characteristics – or age estimates from
the carbon dating of ancient trees or bones
– until and unless new evidence arises to
falsify these data.
OBSERVING. Popper wrote that “to
look for a black hat in a black room, you
have to believe that it is there.” His wonderful line reminds us that all scientific
inquiry is based on the assumption that
explanations of natural phenomena are
accessible to human minds and senses.
Modern scholars now declare that the idea
that science proceeds through collecting
observations without prejudice is false.
As a former professor of mine, Philipp
Frank, explained, without a theory, a question, and a context we do not even know
what to observe. He quoted Auguste
Comte, writing in 1858: “Chance observations usually do not lend themselves
to any generalization.” Contemporary
philosophers agree [8]. In a scientific
inquiry, it is the inquirer’s input that
makes human sense of the observation.
EXPERIMENTING. Experimenting can
be described as “a form of thinking as
bacteria grew. Barbara McClintock discovered wandering genes by noticing
“unexpected segregants exhibiting bizarre
phenotypes” in her maize seedlings.
Margaret Mead wisely emphasized the
“position of the experimenter” as the
“point of reference from which we define
a field of observation.”
In science, “the achievements of one
generation represent something won
from Nature, which remains as definite
“ Aesthetic and humanistic perspectives can
influence the choices made in a scientific
inquiry.”
well as a practical expression of thought”
[11]. The contributions of those with
“genius in their fingertips” are too often
neglected. Nobel laureate Joshua Lederberg once told me that the high-school
subjects most useful to his later work
were shop and technical drawing. He
could learn the “school” science by himself, but not the skills needed to design
and build experiments.
To separate tiny quantities of radium
from huge, 20-kg batches of pitchblende,
Marie Curie learned that she needed
brawn as well as brain to do her work. To
attract and retain more students in science, the brawn versus brain dichotomy
long separating academic from technical
skills needs reevaluation [16].
In teaching, I often quote the following, for which I cannot now find the
source: “Science is an interrogation of
nature, but nature can respond only in
the way the question is asked.” Doesn’t
this say it all?
Experimental design, technical skill,
and a critical spirit are all needed to coax
new information and new data out of
nature. Nature can only answer questions
that are asked or provide observations for
experiments designed to reveal them.
Luckily for science, there are astute
observers who pay attention when something unexpected appears. Fleming discovered penicillin by noticing that the
mold contaminating his culture of Staphylococcus bacteria had left a halo where no
gain and definite progress: an experiment
properly carried out remains for all time”
[1]. Great experiments, like those of
Meselson and Stahl described in the
March/April Update, are a scientist’s sculpture, symphony, and choreography.
HYPOTHESIS TESTING. In business
and politics, in architecture and economics, dreaming up hypotheses and figuring
out how to test them can be the most
fun, and the most creative, part of problem solving. Some years ago, at a Rockefeller University meeting honoring Andrei
Sakharov for peace work, I heard Popper
say, “When scientists fight, their hypotheses die in their stead.” He recognized scientific hypotheses as scientists’ personal
creations and possessions.
Hypotheses are educated guesses
about what the answer might be. They
can be useful throughout an inquiry and
tested in many different ways. Different
hypotheses can be posited and tested to
address new questions as they arise. If the
test validates the guess, the hypothesis
becomes a conclusion. If it does not, then
the scientist makes the critical decision
whether to give up a favorite conviction
or go “back to the drawing board.”
During my years in cancer research,
while scanning cancer cells with the newly
powerful electron microscope, I once saw
slices of hexagonally packed particles
in cells that my colleague, Charlotte
Friend (later president of the New York
Academy of Sciences), had given me
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for technical experiments. This chance
observation could not, of course, yield
any conclusions until she and I put
our prior knowledge and experience
together to ask two questions: Are they
viruses and, if so, have they any relation
to cancer?
Hypothesizing yes answers to these
questions, we designed experiments to
test them. Finding supporting evidence,
we reported that we had discovered
REMEDIOS VARO SPAIN 1908–MEXICO 1963. USED BY PERMISSION.
conditioned as any other branch of human
endeavor – so much so that the question,
“what is the purpose and meaning of science,” receives quite different answers at
different times and from different sorts of
people.
Human judgment, taste, and style are
actively involved throughout a scientific
inquiry. Different scientists may sense differently, question differently, and hypothesize differently. Those who love order
best will find order,
and those intrigued by
ambiguity will find
it. Michael Polanyi
has described “personal
knowledge” as the
ingredient of scientific
inquiry that fuses the
personal and objective.
In their autobiographies, scientists tell us
that they participate
personally, even passionately, in their acts
of understanding. In
school, we learned that
scientists must be objective, but we cannot help
notice how our colleagues’ personal characteristics influence
their work. Scientific
reports reveal again
and again that combining the perspectives
of different scientists
entices more secrets
from nature. Should
Fenómeno de ingravidez (Phenomenon of Weightlessness) by Remedios Varo.
not students be taught
“virus-like” particles in some mouse can- early how and why their personal characcer cells. Continuing to study the strain teristics matter to science – and that
of mice from which the observed cells science benefits from different people
had come, Friend identified them as asking and answering questions in their
own ways?
mouse leukemic viruses.
WHAT KIND OF SCIENCE TO DO? His
WHO DOES SCIENCE AND
extensive historical studies led Holton to
HOW THEY DO IT
develop categories for the types of science
The notion that personal perspectives are
scientists choose to do. (I am extremely
embedded in scientific inquiry is not grateful to Professor Holton for suggestnew. In 1934, Albert Einstein wrote: ing that I use this information from his
Science as something existing and complete
unpublished work.) Some choose to chalis the most objective thing known to man.
lenge a prevailing scientific model or
But science in the making, as an end to be
exemplar, to reach principle-oriented
conclusions, or to focus on a synthesis of
pursued, is as subjective and psychologically
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previously unconnected theories and
findings. Some look for areas of basic scientific ignorance in the realm of social or
national interest, or want to emphasize
the applicability of already known science and engineering to technical and
social problems.
Holton also noted how some reject
“androcentric” or “western” science and
technology and seek alternatives to it.
And some are most interested in the
potential for wide dissemination, recognition, and reward subsequent to the
publication of scientific findings.
HOW TO DO SCIENCE? Scientists can
differ dramatically in how they work. Do
they choose to work alone or in groups,
in a laboratory, under the ocean, in caves
or in spaceships, or at home with a computer? Those choosing fieldwork, whether
in the Antarctic or the Amazon, tell of
their particular taste for nature and of its
emotional and physical, as well as intellectual, challenges [6].
Choices may be constrained by what a
mentor, a professor, or other superior
advises. Today, they are increasingly constrained by available resources. In a
review of the personnel and productivity
of five German chemistry laboratories
from 1870 to 1930, the chemist Joseph
Fruton discovered a powerful finding
about the impact of scientific styles [5]:
The scientific productivity of the laboratories led by scientists with broad views of
their field, and great interest in encouraging their junior associates, was significantly greater than the output of laboratories
with autocratic, dictatorial leaders who
treated students as disciples rather than as
independent scientists.
B E L I E F S A B O U T S C I E N C E . Political
and economic power influence what science gets done by allocating resources for
research and for technological applications. It is important for nonscientists to
recognize that not all scientists view science’s potential power the same way.
At a memorable 1978 conference on
“The Limits of Scientific Inquiry” [2], 15
natural and social scientists were unable
to agree on the topic. Nobel laureate and
university president David Baltimore
argued that scientific knowledge is
humanity’s highest purpose, and thus
there should be no attempts to limit or
direct the search for knowledge. Sissela
Bok articulated an alternative perspec-
as first and foremost a process of personal inquiry, usable by and transparent
to all?
“ Nature can respond only in the way the
question is asked.”
tive: There are even higher values than
the acquisition of knowledge, and thus
science should join with other forms of
knowledge in supporting such values.
The beliefs expressed reflected each scientist’s presumption about science.
Half a century earlier, Popper, too,
addressed the presumptions of science,
suggesting that the practice of science
could be encompassed by three doctrines:
1. The scientist aims at finding a true theory or description of the world which shall
also be an explanation of the observable facts.
2. The scientist can succeed in finally
establishing the truth of such theories
beyond all reasonable doubt.
3. The best, the truly scientific theories,
describe the “essences” or the “essential
natures” of things – the realities which lie
behind appearances.
Those who believe that science can
answer questions not just about phenomena, but also about the “essence” of things
(doctrine 3) will value science’s mode of
inquiry above all others and believe
human reason can solve all problems.
Edward Teller and Jonas Salk expressed
this view. Those who believe that science’s power is limited to explaining natural phenomena (doctrines 1 and 2)
support equal opportunity for all modes
of human inquiry and exhibit collaborative rather than autocratic scientific styles.
Albert Einstein, Rachel Carson, and most
modern scientists whose writings I have
cited fit well into this category.
WHO DOES SCIENCE MATTERS There is
ample evidence that most students and
adults turn away from science when they
perceive it as inaccessible, abstruse, mathematical, impersonal, divorced from the
arts and humanities – and only for
“brainy” males. Would they not be more
attracted, and would not teaching be
more effective, if science was understood
Scientists, teachers, and professors are
well known to get satisfaction from
belonging to an “elite” group who can
“do science.” This is, too often, conveyed
to students. I well remember my pride as
a young woman, wearing my white lab
coat and carrying my special slide rule
(yes, before computers and now found
only on eBay). But can we not retain
pride in our skills and successes, and still
open scientific inquiry to all? Should not
understanding the difference between
scientific and nonscientific evidence be
central to scientific literacy? And would
not societal problem solving be improved
if problem solvers from the arts, humanities, industry, and government collaboratively combined their different kinds of
evidence in addressing complex societal
problems?
Students need to know that one size
does not fit all scientists. They need to
know that science needs and welcomes
inquirers with different personal and cultural interests, styles, and experiences, all
united through shared rigorous, objective
criteria for scientific evidence. They need
to know that different approaches, but
shared evidence, can entice more “secrets”
from nature. Both science and society
need scientists and leaders whose perspectives reflect the diverse needs and
interests of the taxpayers supporting and
applying their work. It follows that the
scientific value added by the participation and leadership of women – as well
as members of other groups now underrepresented in science – is essential to an
open and democratic society.
–Cecily Cannan Selby
Cecily Cannan Selby is an affiliated scholar of the Steinhardt School of Education at
New York University and a fellow of the
New York Academy of Sciences. Her profes-
REFERENCES
1. Andrade, E. N. 1952. Classics in Science: A
Course of Selected Reading by Authorities. International University Society, Nottingham, U.K.
2. Daedalus. 1978. The Limits of Scientific
Inquiry (spring).
3. Einstein, A. 1950. Out of My Later Years.
Philosophical Library, New York, p. 256.
4. Einstein, A. 1934. The World as I See It.
Covici, Friede, New York, p. 290.
5. Fruton, J. F. 1990. Contrasts in Scientific Style:
Research Groups in the Chemical and Biochemical
Sciences. Memoirs series, vol. 191, J. Stewart.,
Ed. American Philosophical Library, Philadelphia, p. 473.
6. Gladfelter, E. 2002. Agassiz’s Legacy: Scientists’
Reflections on the Value of Field Experience. Oxford
University Press, New York, p. 437.
7. Goodstein, D. 2001. New York Times Book
Review.
8. Hempel, C. 1966. Philosophy of Natural
Science. Foundations of Philosophy series, E. &
M. Beardsley, Eds. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle
River, NJ.
9. Holton, G. 1978, The Scientific Imagination:
Case Studies. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, U.K, p. 382.
10. Jacob, F. 2001. Of Flies, Mice and Men.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
11. Medawar, P. 1979. Advice to a Young
Scientist. Harper & Row, New York.
12. Polanyi, M. 1958. Personal Knowledge:
Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. University of
Chicago Press, Chicago.
13. Popper, K. 1964. Conjectures and Refutations:
The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Routledge
& Kegan Paul, London.
14. Popper, K. 1983. Realism and the Aim of
Science, Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD.
15. Root-Bernstein, R. 1988. Setting the Stage
for Discovery: Breakthroughs Depend on More
than Luck, The Sciences (May/June) 26-34.
16. Selby, C. C. 1993. Technology: From Myths
to Realities, Phi Delta Kappan (May): 684-689.
17. Selby, C. C. 2006. Journal of College Science
Teaching (July/August).
sional career has spanned more than five
decades, including positions as a research
biophysicist at MIT, Sloan Kettering, and
Weill-Cornell Medical College. As an educator, she has been founding dean of the
North Carolina School of Science and Mathematics and chair of the department of
mathematics, statistics, and science education at New York University. She is also the
founding chair of the Council of the New
York Hall of Science.
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