Margaret E. Winters
Cognitive Grammar and Kurylowicz`s
Laws of Analogy
Series A: General & Theoretical Papers
ISSN 1435-6473
Essen: LAUD 1988 (2nd ed. with divergent page numbering 2012)
Paper No. 226
Universität Duisburg-Essen
Margaret E. Winters
Southern Illinois University (USA)
Cognitive Grammar and Kurylowicz`s
Law of Analogy
Copyright by the author
1988 (2nd ed. with divergent page numbering 2012)
Series A
General and Theoretical
Paper No. 226
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ii
Margaret E. Winters
Cognitive Grammar and Kurylowicz`s Laws of Analogy
1.
Introduction
1.1.
It is safe to say that Kurylowicz`s "La nature des process dits analogiques" (19661) has
incited more controversial questions than it has settled on the nature and functioning of
analogy.2 Often cited and analyzed in introductions to historical linguistics and elsewhere, it
begins with remarks about the relationship between basic and derived forms (158 – 161),
followed by the famous (not to say notorious) six "laws" of analogy (162 – 174), each
discussed and illustrated by a wide range of examples from various Indo-European
languages. Of the six "laws", five are grammar-internal, having to do, in very general terms,
with the direction of analogical extension, while the sixth is a statement of the relationship
between language and society, between, roughly, langue and parole in the creation of new
forms.
1.2.
Several problems arise from this article, even if one accepts, as I do, the validity of this
study of the nature of analogic processes and is not questioning the data used to illustrate
the principles. The first problem is the exact nature of Kurylowcz`s use of loi "law", which
seems at first to give a rather nineteenth-century feeling to his analysis. It is interesting,
however, to note that while Kurylowicz, indeed, does use the word loi, he prefers formule or
simply designates each of the six items by a Roman numeral without providing any other
designation for them. In his conclusion he specifies that he is proposing directions of
possible analogical change, but that the social factor decides if and to what extent analogy
takes place. His well-known image of run-off mechanisms for rain-water (sewers, drains,
etc) and their use when and only when it rains (174) seems to clarify further the nature of
his "laws".
1
2
All citations will be from the article as reprinted in Hamp et al. 1966. It was originally published 1945 –
1949 Acta Linguistica 5: 121 – 138.
Geoffrey Nathan has discussed and criticized many versions of this paper, for which I am grateful. At
the conference at Lille where this paper was presented orally, I benefited from discussion with Joan
Bybee, Paulo de Carvalho, Peter van Reenen and Lene Schøsler. I appreciate their taking the time to
give me their reactions and suggestions. They are not responsible, of course, for weaknesses and errors
here.
1
A second problem is that of the interpretation of these laws3 and of the article as a
whole. Arlotto (1974) and Hock (1986), among others, devote pages to explicating them,
analyzing both what is meant by a "basic" and "derived" form and how these interact
according to the directionality principles that constitute the laws. I will return below to a
discussion of some of the interpretation.
Lastly, once the laws are clear, at least to the satisfaction of any analyst at a given
moment, there is the question of the validity of Kurylowicz`s principles. Are they true? All
of the time? Some of the time? How do they compare to other attempts to provide a
typology for analogy, especially Manczak`s (1958)?
Implied in all of this discussion are wider questions about the subject: what is the
nature of analogy? Is there truly a division between the purely structural aspects of language
and this aspect, always recognized as psychological? In the present paper I will consider in
some detail two of Kurylowcz`s laws and discuss some of their implications for the study of
language evolution. I shall do so within the framework of Cognitive Grammar, which,
because of its stance on the close relationship between language function and human
cognition in general, is particular well suited to such a study.
The next section of the paper, therefore, is a brief overview of Cognitive Grammar and
its applicability to the study of analogy and analogical change. The following section will
return specifically to Kurylowcz`s second and fourth laws and consider them in light of
Cognitive Grammar. I shall end with some further questions which arise from this
discussion.
2.
Cognitive Grammar
Cognitive Grammar is a theory of language processing and production, based on the notion
that in order to understand linguistic function, it is essential to integrate it with general
cognitive functioning. It is a meaning-based theory, positing the fundamental nature of
semantics (taken in the widest sense to include much of pragmatics too) as underlying all if
linguistic function. Involved in processing language (and hence meaning) are the same
activities that we use as human beings to interact in a wide number of circumstances with
the world: comparison, assignment of saliency, entrenchment of certain routines (Langacker
1987) and categorization of the environment, both mental and physical (Lakoff 1987).
2.1.
In ways similar to those in which we categorize colors, shapes, faces, music, we also
categorize linguistically significant sounds, morphemes and words, phrases, constructions,
sentences. They form what Lakoff (1987: 91ff) calls radial categories, arranged around
3
Although it is reasonably clear by Kurylowicz`s use of the word loi that he did not mean it in the
Neogrammarian sense, he did use it and I will therefore continue what has been a convention among
commentators to use the word "law" without further explanation.
2
prototypical members of the given semantic category or set. Extended from the prototypical
or central member are others which share some features of the prototype, but differ in regard
to others. These less prototypical members of the category or set can be understood as
belonging to the set via these lines or extension back to the center, but may or may not be
directly related to each other. A cup of butter (which often refers to two 4-ounce sticks and
has no container involved at all) is only related to a trophy (also called a cup) by a
consideration of the ways in which the central notion of "cup" has been extended quite far
from the prototype in several different directions not necessarily related at all to each other
(see Winters forthcoming for further discussion). It is important to note that no two items in
a radial category share all the same features: some are added, eliminated, substituted for in
each instance in relationship to the center.
Important for categorization is the assignment of saliency to certain features
(Langacker 1987: 39 – 40). Not all features of any given item (linguistic or non-linguistic)
are of equal importance, and those which are considered more important are those which
will guide the assignment of any item to a category. Not only is the choice of category to
which anything is assigned determined by the choice of features used to categorize it, but
also the place in the category (central, extended somewhat from the center, peripheral)
comes from how the human mind views the various features.
Obviously each human being does have the fresh task of assigning saliency anew to
every item he or she encounters at every minute. Much of the categorization of the universe
we consciously or unconsciously know is conventional, based on history and social norms.
It is, therefore, to a large extent language or even dialect specific, on a continuum of degrees
of what Langacker (1987: 59 – 60) calls entrenchment or conventionalization.
2.2.
Diachronic change is often, consequently, change in categorization. As I have said
elsewhere (Winters 1987), there are two ways in which set membership can change: either
an item (again, sound, morpheme, construction, etc.) can change from one set to another (as
happens when an indicative trigger becomes the trigger of the subjunctive) or its place
within the set in relationship to other items can change (as when Latin passum becomes the
unmarked negation particle in modern French [Winters forthcoming]).
A refinement to this notion of diachronic must be added here: this kind of movement
across categories or within categories is at least part of the time a result of changes in
assignment of saliency to a given item or to a given feature of some item. With changes in
saliency come changes in how subsequent items are scanned, compared, and assigned to
categories. To use a trivial, non-linguistic example, our way of looking at people and
grouping them changes if we are concerned with height (and thus assign saliency to that
feature) instead of being concerned with eye color.
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2.3.
Analogical change can be characterized more precisely, therefore, as a subset of linguistic
change, different in the kind of item being changed, perhaps, but not in the fundamental
mechanism of change. When analogical change takes place, as is well known, morphemes
and words become more like each other, or more like some basis of comparison, following
lines of development which are morphological and not phonological; that is, these changes
do not, most of the time, involve the normal course of sound change. What is happening,
instead, is that they are being perceived, through one or more features, as being like other,
better entrenches items, and undergo modification of some other feature or features to make
them even more like the basis of comparison.
To use an often-cited example, the German plural form Baüme did not always have the
fronted diphthong. Speakers of German, comparing the morpheme of "plural" in this word
to the morpheme of "plural" in others assigned over time a more salient position within the
category of PLURAL to the feature of fronting on well-entrenched and frequently used
forms. That feature was then perceived as part of the nature of pluralization in words where
it was not organically present. In this particular case I would say that the form Baüme did
not change category when it added the umlaut, but moved closer within the morphological
set of PLURAL to what had become the more prototypical form for German nouns. In other
cases the analogy does cause a full set change; to use an example I have also used
elsewhere, the comparatively recent use of the subjunctive with French après que "after",
which is generally recognized as being a consequence of its close (polarized) semantic
relationship with avant que "before", constitutes a full category change for après que, a
former trigger of the indicative, and places it near the periphery of its new semantic set of
subjunctive triggers (Winters 1987: 612).
3.
Kurylowicz`s Laws of Analogy
3.1.
Kurylowicz`s second law states that:
Les actions dites ‘analogiques’ suivent la direction: forms de foundation 
forms fondées, dont le rapport découle de leurs sphères d`emploi.
As Hock points out (1986: 213), this law should be divided into two section, one on the
direction of change (from the fondation or basic form to the fondée or derived form) and one
on the meaning of sphère d`emploi or sphere of usage.
The direction of change, of course, is simply a restatement of the basic proportion of
analogy, from a form which serves as base of comparison to the form which changes to
become more like it. Within Cognitive Grammar it can be seen that the base form has the
property of being better entrenched than the form which changes, and also has features
which are perceived as more salient. The change, therefore, is a change in feature or features
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to those which share the saliency. The notion of entrenchment is itself a radial category and
can involve various ideas frequency. Most obvious for morphology is, probably, type
frequency: there are, for example, simply more regular verbs (weak in Germanic, those
belonging to the –ARE class in Romance) in comparison to which others regularize. But
there is also token frequency. The French first person plural verb ending, -ons is generally
believed to have spread from the present tense form somes of the highly irregular verb être
"to be" in early French. Here, then, a single instance, but one of exceptionally high token
frequency, was the cause of an analogical change throughout the rest of the Old French
verbal system.4
Sphere of usage can be reinterpreted as the assignment of category, and place within
category, to any form. Based on work considering a variety of languages (see, for example,
Manczak 1958, Bybee 1985) a prototypical verb form, for example, is usually cited as
present, indicative, active, third person and singular. A noun is singular, masculine in
gender systems, and, in case languages, in the nominative.5
This form of the noun serves as citation form in dictionaries and, often, when the word
is used in isolation. It is also the subject of an active verb, a position of salience in a
prototypical sentence (see, for example, van Oosten 1986), and, in many languages, the
form of direct address. Diachronically it serves as the base for analogical change involving a
model outside the paradigm (Latin fourth declension nouns usually merge with the second
declension in large part because of the identity of nominative singular –us forms), but not,
interestingly, for change within a single paradigm. Here the sphere of usage factor has to be
balanced against sheer frequency of forms: in Latin nouns whose nominative singular form
had one fewer syllable than any other form, when the number of syllables was made equal
within the paradigm, the majority of nominative singular (the significantly different form)
changed in the direction of the rest of the paradigm. Examples include:
1.
4
5
Classical Latin
Nom. sg.
Full
mormortleo
leonflofloraestaaestat-
Late Latin
New. Nom. sg.
mort"death"
leon"lion"
flor"flower"
aestat"summer"
Hock (1986: 215) suggests productivity as a measure of the basicness of a given form, but I believe he
has fallen into a circular trap: is the form productive because it is basic or basic because it is productive?
These grammatical categories are, of course, based on Indo-European. Both Kurylowicz`s work and
mine are within this family, and the analysis in this paper reflects this bias. The work should be
extended eventually to a much wider number of diverse languages.
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There are, naturally, some counterexamples:
2.
saguihere-
sanguinehered-
sanguihere-
"blood"
"heir"
In verbs, there is some question about the basicness for analogical change of the third
person among the various categories which are cited. It is true, as Hock (1986: 220) points
out, that there are reasons based on frequency to perceive that forms as basic. But citation
forms of verbs tend to be the bare root (as often in English) or the infinitive (as in the
Romance languages) or even more or less random (as in Latin as evidenced by dialogue in
plays). In other cases clusters of forms seem to be involved rather than any one single base.
Old French, as a result of the Latin stress system, had many verbs which, simply within the
present tense system, had a diphthong on the singular forms and the third person plural, and
a simple vowel for the first and second plural as well as the infinitive:
3.
Infinitive: amer "to love"
aim
amons
aimes
amez
aime
aiment
The modern verb has generalized the diphthongized form, which includes as part of the base
the third person singular. There are, however, many verb which also became regular, but
modeled on the infinitive, and the firt and second plural forms:
4.
Infinitive: lever "to raise"
lief
levons
lieves
levez
lieve
lievent
The assignment of saliency and therefore the condition of being basic is hierarchical, I
believe, with certain features being salient, not automatically in an absolute sense, but if
other features are not present. To return to example 1 and 2, nominative singular is the
central member of the set of forms of a given paradigm, but only when some other features
isn`t valued more highly, in this case the number of different forms having the same syllabic
and stress pattern. In other cases as exemplified by 3 and 4, it is difficult to talk of saliency
of one person in contrast to all the others, but only of tendancies toward saliency and
basicness of sets of persons.
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3.2.
Kurylowcz`s fourth law states that:
Quand à la suite d`une transformation morphologique une forme subit la
différenciation, la forme nouvelle correspond à sa fonction primaire (de
fondation), la forme ancienne est reserve pour la fonction secondaire (fondée).
It is a statement of what happens when doublets arise through analogical change: the nonchanged form is used for secondary functions, while the analogically created form takes on
the primary meaning of the word. The primary function of the form is again the central or
prototypical meaning within a category, and the law can be restated to reflect what occurs
when there is a shift in category organization so that a new prototype replaces an older one.
The older form does not disappear, but becomes part of the radial set extending out from the
new prototype. In this case, the fact that any form is made up of a series of features helps
explain how the new prototype arises. In these cases we find two different features
coinciding: one of the central meaning of the morpheme and one of the high frequency (and
therefore high saliency) morphological marking. To use one of the most often cited
examples, brethren becomes specialized to church-related use alongside brothers because
the –s (regular plural) morpheme reinforces the centrality of the more usual meaning of
brother.
Kiparsky (1974) cites numerous counterexamples to this law (of the type louses
"unpleasant people", Maple Leafs "members of the hockey team of "hat name", badder
"tougher"), and argues that Kurylowicz`s statement should be reversed, that in the majority
of cases, all other things being equal, the analogically derived form will have a secondary
meaning. Hock (2986: 226 – 227) defends Kurylowicz, on the grounds that the semantic
differentiation (of lice and louses, for example) predates the analogical morphological
change, and that these examples are therefore irrelevant to the interpretation of the law. The
two meanings coexisted within the radial category of meaning, therefore, before
morphological differentiation became part of the language. It still leaves us with the
question, however, of why in the time-honored examples, regularity of morphological
marking coincides with basic meaning, while it is the derived meaning in the examples
proposed by Kiparsky which exhibits morphological regularity. This may be a genuine
example of polarity in language, with competition between saliency (here in the case of
non-prototypicality) and reinforcement of two kinds of prototypicality a suggested above.
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4.
Summary and Conclusions
4.1.
What I have attempted to illustrate in this paper is that the theory of Cognitive Grammar can
shed some light on the nature of analogical change and on the interpretation of
Kurylowicz`s laws of analogical processes. It is necessary to start with the notion of the
radial semantic set, as used not only for lexical items, but for morphemes such as case,
number and person markers. Analogical change depends on the saliency of some features of
the prototypical member of the set, against which other members are compared and then, in
many cases, changed. Saliency in itself is not a monolithic construct, but is arranged in a
hierarchy of features which are language and time specific and therefore not predictable.
4.2.
There is no place in the scope of this paper to test the other four of Kurylowicz`s laws. I
believe, however, that the first, third, and fifth are also understandable within the framework
outlined above, and that such an analysis will shed further light on the nature of analogy.
In addition, there is much work to do on the actual assignment of saliency to given features,
linguistic or non-linguistic. The question goes beyond the scope of linguistic per se; it is a
matter of cognitive psychology, I should think, and will be answered as we answer
questions about how much of the world we are born ready to understand and how much we
must learn about. Child cognitive development will not be sufficient on its own, moreover,
since adults are capable of learning new ways of seeing the world and, both linguistically
and extralinguistically, of making analogical leaps leading to new organization and new
insight.
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