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Effects of Coup-Proofing: Explaining Military Behavior during the Arab Spring
Michael A. Makara
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs
Syracuse University
[email protected]
Paper Prepared for the American Political Science Association 2012 Annual Meeting
Introduction
Scholars have articulated a menu of “coup-proofing” strategies that authoritarian regimes
have used to maintain civilian control over their militaries. While scholars agree that such
measures are an effective way to prevent coups in the classic sense, recent scholarship finds that
coup-proofing can adversely affect a regime’s ability to project military power abroad when
faced with external threats. However, little research explores whether and how coup-proofing
affects authoritarian regimes’ ability to resist domestic challenges to their rule. This article fills
this gap by exploring which coup-proofing measures solidify military support for a ruling regime
and which ones actually make a regime vulnerable to military defections during periods of
widespread popular protest.
The recent Arab Spring provides an opportunity to test the effect of coup-proofing on a
regime’s ability to resist internal dissent: when confronted with mass uprisings and orders to
repress protesters, some Arab militaries defected to the opposition (Tunisia and Egypt), some
remained loyal to the ruling regime (Syria and Bahrain), while others split between these two
options (Yemen and Libya).1 This variation is particularly puzzling given that, for decades,
Middle Eastern regimes had successfully exercised civilian control over their armed forces by
1
I use the term “military” in reference to a country’s regular army, while the term “security services” encompasses
special forces, parallel militaries, police, and intelligence personnel. I use “security apparatus” and “armed forces”
to refer to all of these branches collectively.
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utilizing a variety of coup-proofing strategies. However, the variation in military behavior
during this period suggests that not all coup-proofing strategies are created equal. I argue that
the variation in military defection patterns during the Arab Spring resulted from the varying
degree to which each country adopted three different coup-proofing strategies: building parallel
security institutions, distributing material incentives, and exploiting communal ties. Strategies
based solely on creating parallel security institutions and distributing material incentives can
create divisions and competition within the security apparatus that make the military susceptible
to defection when the ruling regime faces mass protests. However, coup-proofing strategies that
exploit communal ties mitigate these effects and are more likely to maintain military loyalty.
The lack of a communal strategy in Egypt left the regime exposed to the internal divisions that
make defection likely. Syria’s regime, by contrast, has successfully maintained security
apparatus loyalty by exploiting communal ties, while the split in Libya’s armed forces resulted
from a strategy that did so only partially.
This article begins by outlining the various coup-proofing strategies that Arab regimes
have adopted to keep their militaries in check and explains why military behavior during the
Arab Spring is so puzzling, both empirically and theoretically. Next, it presents a typological
theory of military defection based on different combinations of coup-proofing measures. It then
explores this theory with a detailed examination of civil-military relations in Egypt, Syria, and
Libya during the Arab Spring before concluding with some general observations.
The Arab Spring: An Opportunity to Revisit Coup-Proofing Theories
Scholars have long argued that building a strong, capable security apparatus is key for
repressing internal dissent, preventing regime overthrow, and sustaining authoritarian rule
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(Albertus and Menaldo, 2012; Bellin, 2004; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Skocpol, 1979). By
empowering their armed forces, however, authoritarian regimes run the risk that their militaries
will challenge for political preeminence.2 To protect themselves from this threat, authoritarian
regimes throughout the world have successfully prevented coups and bolstered their rule by
implementing a variety of “coup-proofing” strategies (Byman and Lind, 2010; Cook, 2007;
Quinlivan, 1999; Rwengabo, 2012). Such measures subordinate the armed forces to a country’s
political leadership, structuring civil-military relations in a way that reduces both their ability and
willingness to challenge the political status quo. In the Middle East, for example, coup-proofing
strategies have helped regimes virtually eliminate coup attempts since 1980, a remarkable trend
given the region’s tumultuous history of civil-military relations.3 In fact, the relationship between
Middle Eastern regimes and their militaries has been so strong over the past few decades that,
before the Arab Spring, political scientists had overwhelmingly commented on these regimes’
remarkable strength and durability (Bellin, 2004; Brownlee, 2002; Posusney and Angrist, 2005).
Three coup-proofing measures in particular have been common throughout the world:
building parallel security institutions, distributing material incentives, and exploiting communal
ties. First, regimes create parallel militaries and multiple layers of security services to insulate
themselves from military interventions. When regimes sense that the risk of a coup attempt is
high, they will protect themselves by creating parallel military institutions to balance against the
2
The tension between maintaining a capable yet subordinate coercive apparatus is what Feaver terms the “civilmilitary problematique” (Feaver, 1996). The civil-military problematique exists in any context—democratic or
authoritarian—in which control over the use of force is delegated to an agent (Feaver, 1999), and scholars have
usefully applied this idea to civil-military relations in the Middle East (Harb, 2003). In fact, Feaver’s observation is
even more important for Middle Eastern and authoritarian states, where the armed forces are often drawn from
prominent social groups (ethnic, tribal, etc.). Communal interests can trump national identities and mobilize
populations against a government, making it especially perilous for states to empower such communities militarily.
3
Be’eri (1982) documents 55 coup attempts across the Middle East from 1949 to 1980, half of which were
successful: Syria (16 attempts), Iraq (9), Sudan (9), Yemen (7), Egypt (3), Lebanon (2), Algeria (2), Morocco (2),
Mauritania (2), Libya (1), Jordan (1), and South Yemen (1).
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regular military (Belkin and Schofer, 2005; Quinlivan, 1999). Parallel militaries not only
discourage coup attempts by raising the costs of military intervention against the ruling regime,
but they are also strong enough to resist the regular army when coup attempts do occur.
Historically, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp, Iraq’s Popular Militia, and Libya’s
Revolutionary Committees exemplify this strategy (Kamrava, 2000: 82). Security services,
moreover, enjoy surveillance and intelligence capacities that allow them to monitor the regular
army and uncover coup plots before they occur. Along with parallel militaries, such forces
almost always enjoy a chain of command distinct from that of the regular military and an
organizational structure that ties them directly to the political leadership (Quinlivan, 1999: 141).
Often endowed with overlapping jurisdictions and with the civilian leadership in control of how
resources and responsibilities are distributed, these functionally-similar organizations compete
with one another in a market-type environment for privilege rather than against the regime itself
(Quinlivan, 1999: 148–149). While creating parallel militaries and establishing multiple layers
of security services are analytically distinct coup-proofing strategies, they each represent a more
general attempt to undermine security apparatus cohesion and pit different factions against each
other.
Second, scholars have argued that material incentives and the ability to finance coupproofing strategies is the key to maintaining security apparatus loyalty (Brooks, 1998; Quinlivan,
1999). Parallel security institutions can only balance against one another if they are wellequipped and well-trained, an endeavor that requires substantial resources.4 It comes as little
surprise, therefore, that authoritarian regimes often prioritize the development of security
4
It is worth noting that some scholars argue that decreased funding is the most effective method to guarantee that
the armed forces remain out of politics, as this weakens the military and undermines its ability to stage a coup. See
Clardie (2011) for a useful review of this argument.
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apparatus capacity over other domestic concerns, increasing funding for the armed forces even
when economic hardship forces budget cuts in other areas.5 Yet the cost of coup-proofing
extends well beyond simply arming the various armed forces that serve a regime, as those in
power will often purchase the military’s loyalty with economic incentives and patronage
unavailable to the rest of the population (Bellin, 2004; Kamrava, 2000). In Egypt, for example,
the officer corps enjoys privileged access to the best housing, medical care, and salaries, and in
general it has benefitted from productive capacities that allow it to dominate a wide range of
industries (Harb, 2003: 285–286). In theory, such a strategy co-opts the military and ties its fate
to that of the regime. By granting economic benefits, the ruling regime attempts to give the
military a stake in its continued survival, thereby discouraging any aspirations the military might
have to intervene in politics against its civilian leadership.6
Finally, authoritarian regimes have exploited communal identities when building their
armed forces and promoting officers within their ranks, granting particular favor to communities
with a history of regime loyalty. Staffing the security apparatus with members of a ruler’s
family, tribe, or ethnic group has become commonplace in authoritarian regimes as they attempt
to fill their security apparatuses with trustworthy personnel. This is particularly important in the
Middle East, where communal identities are politically salient and often form the basis of
political mobilization. By favoring loyal communities, regimes hope to guarantee military
obedience by establishing congruence between the security apparatus and the political
leadership. Under Saddam Hussein, for example, observers described Iraq’s military as being
5
In an attempt to keep their armed forces happy, for example, defense expenditures among Middle Eastern and
North African regimes are nearly double the global average.
6
In some states, particularly those in the Gulf, oil rents are sufficient to sustain the government’s patronage
networks (Hertog, 2011). In countries without significant oil wealth, ruling regimes have financed their militaries
through a combination of foreign aid and a commitment to “pay the military first” (Bellin, 2004: 148).
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“Tikriti,” reflecting the extent to which Hussein staffed the military with personnel from his
hometown (Quinlivan, 1999: 135).
Theoretically, there is no reason why uniformly coup-proof regimes should not have
prevented military defection throughout 2011 during the Arab Spring. In addition to preventing
direct seizures of power, the coup-proofing strategies discussed in this section should also protect
regimes against military defection and the myriad ways in which the armed forces can challenge
the civilian leadership (Croissant et al., 2010). As Taylor notes, “…the notion of a coup is really
shorthand for a range of military behaviors, both active and passive, that can lead to a change in
the executive leadership of the state” (Taylor, 2003: 6). For example, investing military
personnel in the status quo, providing material benefits and privileging loyal communities should
discourage any military behavior—coup, defection, or otherwise—that might disrupt the political
order. More than merely preventing coups, coup-proofing strategies bind the security apparatus
to the ruling regime to such an extent that the two become mutually dependent on one another
(Bellin, 2004: 143). Even though they did not stage coups in the classic sense, therefore, it is
puzzling that the Tunisian and Egyptian militaries defected in their entirety once mass uprisings
began calling for regime change in early 2011. Widespread defections similarly occurred in
Yemen and Libya, though in these cases the security apparatus split between protecting their
regimes and defecting to the opposition. Only in Syria and Bahrain have armed forces continued
to defend the ruling regime, a decision made more remarkable due to the contrast that it creates
between these cases and those Arab Spring cases in which defection did occur. 7
7
While an exclusive focus on civil-military relations does not do justice to the complexity of the Arab Spring, the
military’s pivotal role in each uprising makes this topic particularly worthy of attention, especially since for decades
the relationship between civilian leaders and their militaries in the Middle East has been so strong.
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If the literature on coup-proofing suggests that there are qualitative differences between
various coup-proofing strategies, then the Arab Spring demonstrates that not all of these
strategies are created equal. The six countries that experienced mass uprisings during the Arab
Spring had used a variety of measures to control their armed forces prior to 2011. However, it is
clear that the variation in military behavior during the Arab Spring illustrates that some coupproofing strategies made the ruling regime better able to defend itself against popular uprisings
than others. This puzzle thus highlights a theoretical blindspot in the existing civil-military
relations literature: while scholars have demonstrated that coup-proofing is an effective way to
maintain military loyalty, they have said much less about how these strategies might actually
make authoritarian regimes vulnerable when they face threats to their rule. The literature that
has studied this topic, moreover, has focused on how coup-proofing affects military effectiveness
in interstate war, giving little attention to how such strategies might impact a regime’s ability to
use its security apparatus to quell domestic challenges (Biddle and Long, 2004; Pilster and
Bohmelt, 2011). The Arab Spring can help fill this gap by providing scholars with an
opportunity to explore how different coup-proofing strategies affect military behavior when
called upon to repress popular dissent. By addressing this issue, this article thus answers recent
calls to revisit theories of civil-military relations and authoritarian durability in light of the Arab
Spring (Bellin, 2012), a focus that has received little attention despite widespread commentary
on the military’s pivotal role in these events (Barany, 2011; Bellin, 2012; Droz-Vincent, 2011;
Gause III, 2011).8
Research Design
8
Bellin’s (2012) recent reevaluation of her seminal 2004 article on the robustness of authoritarianism is a notable
exception.
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This article draws upon the Arab Spring to articulate a theory linking military defection
to the coup-proofing strategies that Arab regimes have employed to maintain control over their
armed forces. It provides an explanatory typology that illustrates how different combinations of
coup-proofing strategies (the independent variable) should affect the military’s decision to
protect the ruling regime amid mass protests or defect to the opposition (the dependent variable).
Each cell in the typology represents a specific “type” of coup-proofing strategy and defines both
the expected value on the dependent variable for that strategy as well as the logical implications
that should exist if the theory is true. The analysis uses process tracing to explore one case from
each type and illustrate how different coup-proofing strategies actually affected military
defection during the Arab Spring. Process-tracing is a method in which, rather than relying on
correlation and statistical probability, researchers unpack the causal chain through which a
hypothesized independent variable affects a given outcome (George and Bennett, 2005). It
establishes support for a given hypothesis by generating multiple observations within a given
case and assessing whether that evidence uncovers traces of the proposed causal relationship
(Bennett and Elman, 2006: 459). Researchers establish confidence in conclusions based on
process-tracing when the observations generated for a case create a complete, unbroken narrative
of the intervening steps between the independent and dependent variables and when each
observation is predicted by the stated hypothesis.
The combination of typological theorizing and process-tracing is particularly helpful for
studying military defection during the Arab Spring. Each of these is useful for understanding
how multiple independent variables interact to affect a given outcome (Elman, 2005: 298;
George and Bennett, 2005: 212). In this respect, typological theorizing is best able to help
articulate the theorized interaction between multiple variables, while process tracing can bridge
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the gap between theory and empirics by exploring whether this hypothesized causal processes
exists in reality. Additionally, typological theorizing can complement process-tracing by
allowing researchers to generalize their within-case analysis across a range of case types.
Coup-Proofing and Military Defection: A Typology
This section outlines a theory of military defection based on three coup-proofing
strategies: building parallel security institutions, distributing material incentives, and exploiting
communal ties.9 The theory assumes that all militaries and security personnel seek to protect
their corporate interests and will be motivated to defect from the ruling regime when these
interests are violated. Eric Nordlinger identifies four interests that can motivate such behavior:
budgetary support, autonomy, the absence of functional rivals, and institutional survival
(Nordlinger, 1977: 66–68). Of these, institutional survival is the most fundamental, representing
an “existential interest” that must be guaranteed before a military can pursue any of its other
corporate interests (Cook, 2007: 16). While it is difficult to discern the relative importance of
these interests, this theory only asserts that institutional survival will be the military’s top
priority.
Given these assumptions, the combination of two coup-proofing strategies—building
parallel security institutions and distributing material incentives—risks creating divisions within
the security apparatus that have, ironically, often motivated military interventions (Lee, 2009;
McFaul, 2005; Thompson, 1976; Zimmerman, 1983). Establishing parallel militaries creates
9
This paper provides a theory of military behavior, not of regime change. While scholars have long argued that the
military’s decision to protect a ruling regime from political threats or defect to the opposition is key to
understanding authoritarian breakdown and revolution (D’Anieri, 2006; Katz, 2004; Lee, 2009; Skocpol, 1979),
military defection alone is not always a sufficient explanation for regime change. In Libya, for instance, regime
change occurred in 2011 only after NATO forces intervened on the opposition’s behalf.
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multiple rival power centers that must be accommodated financially. These different
organizations must compete over finite budget resources for training and weaponry and contend
with one another over access to regime patronage. Such benefits typically include access to the
best housing, salaries, and economic opportunities, though jockeying for political influence can
similarly reinforce intra-military competition. Together, these strategies weaken the armed
forces’ overall cohesion and increase the chances that some within the security apparatus will
feel that their corporate interests have been neglected by the status quo. Borrowing from Lee’s
terminology, these “divide-and-rule tactics” create “winners” and “losers” among different
factions of the security apparatus (Lee, 2009: 645).10 Discontented with their position vis-à-vis
their rivals, those factions within the security apparatus that benefit least from the current regime
will be motivated to defect to improve their circumstances.
However, explanations for military behavior based exclusively on the pursuit of corporate
interests and divisions within the security apparatus are insufficient, as military grievances are
common across countries whereas defections and other interventions are not (Lee, 2008; Taylor,
2003: 16). This suggests a need to identify both the structural causes of military intervention and
the proximate causes that trigger this behavior (Belkin and Schofer, 2003). Mass uprisings
against a ruling regime provide such a catalyst, indicating that political conditions are ripe for
defectors by signaling that the regime’s legitimacy is waning. Popular uprisings similarly signal
that constituencies exist within society that can provide sufficient protection for those in the
military who break ranks, an important indication given that defection is a dangerous option for
10
These categories correspond to the distinction in the political transitions literature between “hard-liners” and
“soft-liners” (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986), a distinction that refers both to divisions in the military as well as to
the political elite more generally.
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security apparatus personnel.11 Grasping this opportunity, those within the armed forces that
have been neglected by the ruling regime (Lee’s “losers”) will defect in the hopes that regime
change and a new government will better provide for the interests that Nordlinger identifies.
Initial defections may then create a cascade of defection within the military, as even those
factions most loyal to the regime come to believe that they must defect to preserve their
privileged status and avoid being on the losing side of the uprising when the dust settles.
Even when combined with popular mobilization and widespread dissent against a regime,
however, intra-security apparatus divisions and competition by no means make defection
inevitable. After all, despite the presence of competition and rivalries within the armed forces of
each country that experienced mass uprisings during the Arab Spring, military behavior varied
significantly across the region throughout 2011. Rather, the effect of parallel militaries and
material incentives on military behavior depends on how the security apparatus has been
structured relative to a country’s prominent ethnic, tribal, or sectarian cleavages. Such
“compositional” coup-proofing strategies prevent defection by guaranteeing that the military’s
most basic corporate interest, institutional survival, depends on the regime’s continued
dominance. In a socially diverse state in which such cleavages are highly politicized, “stacking
the deck” within the security apparatus with co-ethnics or communal allies becomes a way for
the ruling regime to consolidate power, maintain loyalty, and assert influence over political rivals
(Brooks, 1998: 32; Enloe, 1980). In extreme cases, regimes will even recruit personnel from a
particular sectarian or ethnic group from abroad to staff the security apparatus. However, such
strategies create resentment among those that find themselves outside of the regime’s inner circle
and disadvantaged both politically and economically relative to the privileged communal group
11
Such allies might include labor unions, political parties, religious organizations, student movements, or civil
society organizations (Lee, 2009).
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(McLauchlin, 2010). Regime change is thus extremely perilous for communally-selected
members of the security apparatus, as a new regime would likely perceive such forces to be
disloyal and hostile, perceptions that often result in purges, “ethnic reshuffling,” and “wholesale
ethnic turnover” in the security apparatus (Horowitz, 2000: 528–529).12 This is particularly the
case when the armed forces have historically committed crimes and repression for which they
could be punished if they suddenly lose power (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, 2010). These
consequences are possible because, rather than being institutionalized as part of the state, the
security apparatus’s existence is based upon communal ties with the existing regime. Given the
threat that popular uprisings pose to its institutional survival, therefore, a communally-based
security apparatus will be willing to defend its most fundamental corporate interest by repressing
those who seek regime change.
Based on the above observations, three general types of coup-proofing strategy exist: acommunal, communal, and partial-communal. What distinguishes these strategies is extent to
which they exploit the ethnic, tribal or kinship ties that exist within society. The competition
between military factions that results from building parallel militaries and distributing material
incentives is present in all three, though it is only salient and consequential when not obstructed
by a compositional strategy that makes the armed forces concerned about their institutional
survival over other corporate interests.
A-Communal: “A-communal” coup-proofing strategies are those in which no ethnic,
sectarian, or kinship group is privileged over another in the composition of the security
apparatus. Most likely this is because society itself is relatively homogenous and no such
cleavages exist, guaranteeing communal congruence between the armed forces and civilian
12
Horowitz refers to ethnic compositional strategies, but his logic similarly applies to other communal groups.
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population. This coup-proofing strategy (or lack thereof) is the least likely to prevent military
defection when faced with mass protests, as the competition created by the proliferation of
parallel militaries and control over material incentives can operate unabated. Unlike coupproofing strategies with a strong communal component, security apparatuses lacking a
communal composition are not wedded to the status quo by fear of reprisal from communal
rivals. The absence of a communal dimension insulates the armed forces from changes in the
civilian leadership and reduces the risk that security apparatus personnel will be purged simply
due to regime change. Under these circumstances the military’s institutional survival is ensured
despite the presence of popular dissent against the political regime. Defection from the ruling
regime thus becomes a plausible option for pursuing other corporate interests, as there is no
reason to believe that the military would not survive a political transition.
Communal: A “communal” strategy is the most effective way to prevent military
defections. In pursuing this strategy, ruling regimes recruit most, if not all, security apparatus
personnel from loyal ethnic, tribal, or religious sects in an effort to achieve homogenization
between political and military elites (Horowitz, 2000: 534). Personnel recruited on this basis
will be threatened by widespread dissent against the regime and the potential for political change
that this creates, as there is little chance that communally-recruited military personnel will
survive the regime turnover that often accompanies power changes in socially heterogeneous
contexts. The armed forces do not exist independently of the civilian regime, and they will
therefore be willing to repress popular protests when they occur. While competition within the
security apparatus might exist, moreover, this competition should take a backseat to the concerns
over institutional survival that members of different factions share in common. For this reason,
coup-proofing based on a communal strategy makes defection unlikely.
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Partial-Communal: Finally, a “partial-communal” coup-proofing strategy is one in
which only a portion of the security apparatus is recruited based on communal, kinship, or
loyalty ties. Special security forces responsible for the political leadership’s personal safety
might be particularly likely to be staffed with the regime’s communal allies. However, this
strategy leaves a significant portion of the armed forces without any special ties to the political
leadership and, consequently, without any particular stake in the regime’s survival. This creates
competing attitudes toward the regime change, with those personnel recruited on the basis of
communal affiliations remaining invested in the regime’s continued rule and those who are not
recruited based on kinship ties being more willing to accept changes to the status quo. This latter
group does not enjoy a close relationship with the ruling regime (if it did it would likely be part
of the communally-based forces) and almost by definition is more likely to be recruited from
politically or economically underprivileged groups. Amid political crisis, defection is therefore a
plausible solution with which to rectify marginalization or any perceived threats to institutional
interests that might exist. Given their involvement in the armed forces, moreover, defecting
military personnel have the arms with which to challenge those in power. The likely result is
armed conflict and civil war, as defectors will be confronted by hardliners in the security
apparatus whose institutional survival is tied to the regime. Table 1 summarizes these categories
and their effects on military behavior.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
In sum, two of the most common coup-proofing strategies—building parallel security
institutions and distributing material incentives—create divisions and competition within the
security apparatus that, when combined with popular uprisings, motivate military defection. The
theory is therefore limited in scope to countries that experience widespread protest and makes no
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attempt to explain military behavior outside of these conditions. Whether or not defection
occurs, however, depends on the extent to which the fate of the security apparatus has been tied
to the ruling regime through communal strategies.
Military Defection during the Arab Spring
This section is divided into three parts. The first part illustrates how coup-proofing
strategies in Egypt contributed to the military’s motivation to defect from the ruling regime. The
parts that follow focus on Syria and Libya in an attempt to explain why the armed forces have
remained loyal to the regime (Syria) or split between continued loyalty and defection (Libya).
Egypt: A-Communal Strategy and Regime Defection
Egypt is one of the two countries in which the armed forces defected in their entirety
during the Arab Spring, effectively ending Hosni Mubarak’s rule. As tens of thousands of
protestors flooded Tahrir Square, Mubarak ordered the military to intervene on his behalf and
repress those calling for the regime’s overthrow. The military refused orders to fire upon
protestors as they demanded an end to Mubarak’s rule, and without the armed forces’ protection,
the president had no choice but to relinquish power. Authoritarian regimes have a long history
of successfully repressing popular dissent, but in this case the military’s defection marked the
end of the road for one of the most durable regimes in the Middle East.
Coup-proofing strategies in Egypt have centered on two measures: building parallel
security institutions and distributing patronage and material incentives. During his rule, Hosni
Mubarak staffed an array of security units tasked with defending his rule and monitoring each
other. In early 2011, Egypt’s Ministry of Interior employed approximately 1.4 million people, a
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number that includes police, informants, and a variety of armed security forces (Sayigh, 2011:
403). The largest among these are the Central Security Forces (CSF), a unit roughly equal in
size to the regular army and primarily responsible for quelling domestic opposition and checking
the military’s power.
Egypt’s security apparatus also benefitted from extensive economic and political
privileges. Throughout the 20th century, the military enjoyed access to the best salaries, housing,
and health care in the country, and it controlled a variety of profitable private sector industries
allowed it to ensure its economic fortunes even further. Control over manufacturing industries,
service provision, and even tourism has made the military Egypt’s premier economic institution.
Some sources even report that the military accounts for up to 40 percent of Egypt’s economy
(Masoud, 2011: 25). It has also benefitted from substantial foreign rents, as well as from a
domestic budget that remains “off the books” (Harb, 2003: 285–286).
However, the combination of these two strategies encouraged the competition within the
security apparatus that motivated military defection once protests began in Egypt in early 2011.
While the military had long enjoyed privileged access to economic opportunities, its fortunes had
steadily declined over the past decade as Mubarak increasingly relied upon—and funded— his
internal security services. In relative terms, the military’s budget had declined compared to that
of the Ministry of Interior, a trend that the military resented (Barany, 2011: 28). Perhaps more
importantly, the military has felt threatened by the increasing “civilianization” of Egyptian
politics. Since the 1970s, the Egyptian military has become used to “ruling without governing”:
while avoiding the day-to-day responsibility of running the country, the military has always been
the final arbiter in Egyptian politics (Cook, 2007). Yet until 2011 its position had come under
attack by Mubarak’s growing rapport with civilian factions within his National Democratic Party
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(NDP). In particular, the military has openly criticized the idea that Mubarak’s son, Gamal,
might succeed his father as president. The military saw Gamal’s ties to the NDP’s younger
business elite as a threat to its economic privileges, a point exacerbated by the fact that he would
be the first Egyptian president without a military background.
The rifts in Egypt’s security apparatus proved consequential as protests against
Mubarak’s rule gained momentum in January 2011. Inspired partially by Tunisia’s example,
mass protests on January 25 and January 28 (the “Friday of Anger”) attracted hundreds of
thousands of Egyptians to Tahrir Square in downtown Cairo. The sheer size of the protests
dwarfed anything that had occurred previously, overwhelming the police and security units
responsible for crowd dispersal. As police and gendarmerie withdrew from the streets, the
crowds reacted with jubilation as the army entered Tahrir Square to assume security
responsibilities and announced that it would not fire on the civilians that had gathered. The
protesters used this opportunity to expand their activities to include strikes and other forms of
civil disobedience. As the president’s last line of defense, the military’s announcement sealed
Mubarak’s fate, as the president transferred power to the military little over a week later on
February 11.
Unlike the cases discussed below, the Egyptian regime did not pursue a compositional
coup-proofing strategy to maintain security apparatus loyalty. Egypt is relatively socially
homogeneous, making such a strategy difficult to implement. Rather than being demonized as a
puppet of the ruling regime, the Egyptian military is “part of the people” and a symbol of
national pride. It exists independently of the civilian leadership and will survive institutionally
regardless of the regime’s fate. However, it would be an oversimplification to argue that the
military defected due solely to its affinity with Egypt’s protesters. For example, observers of
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18
Egypt’s post-Mubarak political transition have been almost uniformly cynical about the
military’s role in this process. Rather than continue to support popular calls for democracy, the
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), Egypt’s transitional military government, has
used the transition to try to guard its economic interests and insulate itself from civilian
oversight. Many Egyptians have protested what they perceive as the military’s effort to hijack
the constitutional reform process, highlighting a right that suggests that the military has been
motivated more by its pursuit of its corporate interests than by its affinity with the protest
movement.
Syria: Communal Strategy and Regime Protection
Syria has experienced protests similar to those in Egypt. However, whereas the Egyptian
military refused to support an unpopular regime, Syria’s security apparatus has largely remained
cohesive and loyal. It has refused orders to repress popular protests, a decision that has allowed
Bashar Al-Assad’s regime to remain in power while at the same time resulting in extensive
civilian casualties. Regime repression has resulted in approximately 8,000 civilian deaths, and
the president’s grip on power, while tenuous, appears to be holding.
Coup-proofing strategies in Syria resemble those implemented in Egypt in a number of
ways. In addition to its regular army, Syria boasts an extensive security apparatus that includes
its Republican Guard and a variety of mukhabarat (intelligence) branches. Additionally, while
officers do not enjoy the same economic opportunities as they do in Egypt, security apparatus
personnel often benefit from generous defense expenditures and opportunities for personal
financial gain. Under Hafez Al-Assad, for example, Syrian officers exploited their positions for
personal economic gain, often through smuggling drugs and consumer goods between Syria and
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19
Lebanon (Brooks, 1998: 26). This practice continues today among some officers, but in a more
limited fashion due to the current president’s campaign against corruption.
The Syrian regime’s inability—or unwillingness—to distribute material benefits equally
across the security apparatus has fostered resentment among many armed forces personnel.
Bashar Al-Assad has attempted to prevent military coups by keeping the regular military weak,
underfunded, and poorly-equipped relative to the internal security services. In terms of
economic influence, moreover, the military’s status and opportunities for personal gain have
diminished rapidly since Hafiz Al-Assad’s death in 2000, an issue made worse by the fact that
many officers believe that the president’s recent anti-corruption campaign has unfairly and
disproportionately targeted the army. Even within the security services the most lucrative
positions do not extend to all officers. These conditions have, in fact, provided motivation for
military defection during the 2011 uprising, as mounting frustrations have reportedly prompted a
majority of officers to sympathize with the protesters’ demands (International Crisis Group,
2011b: 27).
Contrary to Egypt, however, the Syrian government relies heavily on a compositional
coup-proofing strategy that ensures loyalty and mitigates competition within the security
apparatus by privileging a single sectarian minority. Syria has a long history of maintaining
military loyalty by exploiting communal ties, a strategy that began during the mandate period
when French officers privileged religious minorities when staffing the security apparatus.
Today, after a series of coups and coup attempts resulted in purges of disloyal officers during the
1960s, Alawite Muslims—a minority sect comprising approximately ten percent of Syria’s
population— account for over 90 percent of Syria’s officer corps (Zisser, 2002: 119). This
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20
strategy has created communal congruence between the security apparatus and the Alawitedominated political elite.
The fact that the security apparatus has generally not turned against Al-Assad despite the
fact that some personnel feel that their corporate interests have been violated suggests the power
of the regime’s communal coup-proofing strategy. According to one report, “the regime in effect
took the Alawite minority hostage, linking its fate to its own” (International Crisis Group, 2011c:
2). The president’s communal strategy, in other words, has guaranteed that the security
apparatus’s institutional survival depends on its defense of the status quo. It has done so by
perpetuating the notion that retribution against Syria’s Alawite community would be severe if the
government falls. Al-Assad has gone to great lengths to frame the opposition as a threat to the
Alawite population, going so far as unleashing “thugs” in ethnically diverse areas to stoke fears
of sectarian violence and spreading rumors of Sunni attacks against Alawite communities
(Ismail, 2011: 543). This fear and sense of insecurity makes regime change seem particularly
threatening and has prompted most Alawites to remain loyal to Al-Assad, if only begrudgingly.
Such a narrative is not entirely fabricated, however. Sectarianism has long been salient in Syria,
as anti-Alawite prejudices among Sunnis have historically been reinforced by Alawites’
disproportionate access to government jobs and economic opportunities. Rather than being “part
of the people,” moreover, many Syrians consider the security apparatus to be directly implicated
in perpetuating an unjust political system. In addition to violence during the recent unrest, for
example, the Alawite-dominated military has historically used force against the Sunni majority
population, as was the case in 1982 when it massacred tens of thousands of civilians during a
revolt in Hama. This repressive behavior and the general distrust of the military that it creates
increase the risk of purges and retribution against the military in the event of regime change.
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21
Stated bluntly, while life under Al-Assad is not ideal, life under a new regime would likely be
much worse.
This is not to say that Al-Assad’s regime is invincible, as Syria has suffered immensely
from clashes between Al-Assad’s forces and military defectors. However, the presence of the
Free Syrian Army (FSA)—an opposition military consisting of military defectors—is not
inconsistent with this paper’s argument. Syrian defectors have come almost entirely from the
military’s Sunni rank and file, a group that, unlike Alawite officers and personnel, is not bound
to Al-Assad’s rule. Syria’s Alawite community is simply not large enough to staff the entire
security apparatus, making it impossible for the regime to implement a communal strategy
perfectly (Quinlivan, 1999: 135–137).13 Despite the media attention that the FSA has received,
moreover, the security apparatus has largely remained intact, and the scale of defections should
not be overstated. As of this writing, many of the estimated 15,000 to 25,000 members are
believed to be civilians rather than military defectors, and some within the opposition believe
that even these numbers are exaggerated. Especially when compared to the approximately
400,000 active personnel staffing Syria’s security apparatus (including 220,000 army personnel
and 110,000 in the paramilitary forces), even the most generous estimates of FSA strength do not
suggest that defections have occurred beyond more than a small segment of the armed forces
(“Middle East and North Africa”, 2011: 330).
Libya: Partial-Communal Strategy and a Security Apparatus Split
13
This observation raises a point on methodology and case classification. The three general coup-proofing
strategies discussed in this article are best understood as ideal types. Although Al-Assad cannot staff his security
apparatus exclusively with Alawite personnel, the degree to which Alawites dominate the officer corps, security
services, and much of the military much more closely resembles a communal strategy rather than it does Libya’s
partial-communal strategy.
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22
Widespread violence throughout 2011 prompted some scholars to describe Libya as
having experienced a civil war (Barany, 2011). What distinguishes Libya from Syria, however,
is the nature of the violence that it has experienced. While conflict in Syria has largely been
characterized by one-sided repression by the regime against its opponents, Libya’s security
apparatus has split such that much of the violence in these countries has occurred between
military defectors and those who remain loyal to the regime. With a death toll exceeding 10,000,
these dynamics have made Libya perhaps the most dangerous conflict to emerge out of the Arab
Spring.
Like other countries affected by the Arab Spring, the Libyan regime had created an
elaborate system of overlapping security institutions alongside its regular army. Moammar
Qaddafi’s Revolutionary Committees, tribal militias, and mercenary forces are key elements in
this former group. The regime has also tried to buy the loyalty of their security apparatus by
distributing material incentives. In addition to keeping his security apparatus (particularly the
special security forces) well-armed and well-paid, for example, Qaddafi has kept his armed
forces loyal by offering them privileged access to expensive consumer goods.
What differs about Libya, however, is that the security apparatus has been grafted onto
significant political divisions within society. Unlike in Syria, where the entire security apparatus
falls under the almost exclusive control of a single religious sect, control over the Libyan
security apparatus is divided between multiple competing communal groups. As one scholar
noted, “the divisions in the Yemeni and Libyan armed forces reflected the many deep-seated
divisions in their respective societies” (Barany, 2011: 30). While not an exact demarcation,
Libya’s prominent cleavages during the 2011 uprising coincided with geographic boundaries
between the country’s eastern and western regions. In the west, Qaddafi relied on kinship ties
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23
when creating political alliances, with the Qadadfa, Margariha and Werfella tribes forming his
base of political support. It is thus little surprise that he relied heavily on these tribes and his
immediate family when staffing his most important security services. Qaddafi recruited security
and intelligence personnel primarily from the Margariha and Werfella clans, and his son,
Khamis, is a notable example of family ties to the security sector. By contrast, tribes in eastern
Libya have traditionally been much less supportive of Qaddafi’s regime. Transportation between
east and west is difficult, and a number of tribes extend their territory into western Egypt. As a
result, eastern Libyans often identify more with Egypt than they do with Libya. Historical
rivalries between tribes allied with Qaddafi and eastern clans also created societal rifts, divisions
that were exacerbated by the belief that the regime had ignored the east when promoting
economic development and distributing patronage in the form of political favors and oil wealth
(International Crisis Group, 2011a: 17–18). These anti-regime sentiments extended to the
military units stationed in the east as well. While Qaddafi reserved security service positions for
family members and tribal allies, he drew upon populations from all regions when recruiting the
regular military. However, after surviving multiple coup attempts, Qaddafi was determined to
keep his army weak, underpaid, and underprivileged compared to the security services (Barany,
2011: 30).
Once protests began calling for regime overthrow, Libya’s security apparatus split
according to the political divisions and rivalries in which it was embedded. Cities in eastern
Libya, particularly Benghazi, became the heart of anti-Qaddafi opposition once Libya’s uprising
began in February 2011. Libya’s opposition enjoyed armed support from sympathetic military
personnel, who shared the anti-regime sentiments present throughout the region’s population.
While minor defections spread to western Libya, including Misrata and Zintan, only in the east
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24
did military units defect in their entirety, creating a safe haven for the opposition and a base from
which NATO operations could commence in March. However, that opposition ran up against
military hardliners with every interest in defending the ruling regime. For Qaddafi’s family and
tribal supporters within the security apparatus, continued regime support was the only option, as
“their power and legitimacy entirely derive from their proximity to the Leader” (International
Crisis Group, 2011a: 10). Without political institutions that might have allowed Qaddafi’s allies
to retain their positions in the event of regime change, Qaddafi’s closest allies had little choice
but to fight against the regime’s opposition.
Libya exhibits important similarities to the cases discussed above. Like Egypt, divisions
and competition within the security apparatus have motivated defection among the Libyan armed
forces. However, unlike in Egypt, the survival of the entire security apparatus was not
guaranteed in the event of regime change: while disenchanted military personnel with
everything to gain from regime change defected, the fate of those officers with close family
connections to Qaddafi was tied to the regime’s continued rule. This latter point similarly
highlights the difference between military behavior in Libya versus that in Syria. Each of these
regimes has manipulated communal and familial ties when staffing their armed forces.
However, whereas Al-Assad’s regime has concentrated military control within a single religious
sect, such a compositional strategy has only partially been adopted in Libya, where control over
the use of force is distributed across multiple competing communal groups with varying degrees
of loyalty to the ruling regime. This created a situation in which the opposition calling for
regime change was well-armed and capable of putting up a fight against military hardliners
defending the status quo. The partial-communal coup-proofing strategy adopted in Libya prior
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25
to 2011 thus represents a lethal combination of the coup-proofing measures used elsewhere in the
region, an arrangement that resulted in both protracted conflict and, ironically, regime overthrow.
Tunisia, Bahrain, and Yemen during the Arab Spring
The theory presented in this article is not limited in scope to the cases discussed above.
In Tunisia, Bahrain, and Yemen, for example, the regime’s dependence on building parallel
security institutions and distributing material incentives created the same divisions and
competition within the security apparatus as elsewhere in the region. The variation in military
behavior between these cases can thus be explained by their divergent communal strategies. In
Tunisia, social homogeneity makes a compositional coup-proofing strategy impossible. The
military, resentful of the Presidential Guard’s privileged economic and political position, had
little reason to defend the government since its institutional survival was not threatened by
regime change. It thus balked when called upon to aid security services struggling to repress the
country’s protests, effectively ending President Ben Ali’s rule.
By contrast, Bahrain’s monarchy has long instituted a communal strategy that privileges
the country’s Sunni minority—representing only about 25 percent of the population—over a Shia
majority when staffing the security apparatus.14 Bahrain’s Shia community has long suffered
from political marginalization and economic discrimination, prompting demands in early 2011
that the monarchy relinquish power. The regime’s repressive response to these challenges only
fueled Shia grievances and stirred sectarian tensions. Calls to overthrow Bahrain’s monarchy are
particularly threatening to the Sunni minority—including the security services—given that
regime change would likely involve overhauling the security apparatus to reflect the country’s
14
To institute its communal strategy more completely, the Bahraini government has recruited Sunni foreigners from
abroad to staff its security apparatus.
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26
majority Shia composition. Additionally, accusations of Iranian influence during the protests
further stoke Sunni fears and amplify the perceived threat that Bahrain’s uprising poses to the
monarchy.
Finally, Yemen’s partial-communal coup-proofing strategy divides the security apparatus
between the country’s largely autonomous tribes and President Saleh’s close relatives, who
control the regime’s security services. Rifts between these two have become public knowledge,
with a number of prominent tribes and military officers arguing that their influence and fortunes
had been usurped by the president’s family members. When protests began demanding the
president’s resignation, these factions positioned themselves to take advantage of a potential
power redistribution by defecting to the opposition. Yemen’s uprising thus resulted in a
stalemate between the regular army loyal to tribal defectors and the special forces who had a
greater stake in the regime’s survival.
Alternative Accounts of Civil-Military Relations during the Arab Spring
The primary goal of this article is to explore how different coup-proofing strategies affect
military behavior when authoritarian regimes face challenges to their rule. In addition to this
objective, it is worth considering how the explanation for military behavior offered above
compares to other accounts of the Arab Spring. Rather than discussing intra-security apparatus
competition, previous work has explained military behavior during the Arab Spring by
emphasizing the military’s professionalism or cultural affinity with those calling for regime
change. As professional institutions, according to this argument, the Tunisian and Egyptian
militaries were unlikely to repress mass protests, as doing so defies the military’s professional
responsibility to defend society, democratic values, and norms of civilian control over the armed
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27
forces.15 Moreover, the institutionalized nature of these two security apparatuses allowed them
to survive a potential regime change. Similarly, given their shared ethnicity, nationality, or
culture with their country’s citizens, repression would have jeopardized these militaries’ prestige
and reputation as a source of national pride. The size of the protests thus raised the cost of
repression in Tunisia and Egypt, encouraging the armed forces to split with the ruling regime in
each case (Bellin, 2012; Droz-Vincent, 2011).
When applied to the Arab Spring, however, arguments that invoke professionalism and
cultural affinity confront a number of empirical anomalies. In Egypt, for example, the same
military that was unwilling to repress the popular uprising against Hosni Mubarak has behaved
quite differently since the former president’s ouster. While serving as the country’s transitional
government, the SCAF has sanctioned crackdowns against those who disapprove of the
military’s role in Egypt’s transitional government, resulting in hundreds of casualties since
September 2011 alone. As mentioned, moreover, the military government has preferred to use
its influence over the post-Mubarak constitutional reform process to ensure its interests and
insulate itself from civilian control rather than promote a democratic transition. This behavior is
hardly becoming of any professional military and has invited widespread popular backlash
against the armed forces as many accuse the military of hijacking Egypt’s political trajectory.
This is not to say that individual members of the armed forces and security apparatus—
particularly the rank and file tasked with maintaining control over the protests—did not feel an
affinity with the protesters or did not hesitate when fulfilling their orders or even refuse such
orders all together. However, it suggests that officers’ decisions regarding regime defection
15
Quinlivan (1999: 152–153) suggests that professionalism (or “expertness”) can actually prevent military political
interventions by making military officers aware of the risks associated with such behavior.
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28
were based on more than a concern over the military’s reputation. The emphasis on the
institutionalized nature of the Egyptian military is also insufficient. Institutionalization certainly
helps explain how defection became possible or thinkable for the military, but it does not explain
the military’s motivation for turning against Mubarak’s regime.
In Tunisia, moreover, cultural affinity does not explain why internal security forces were
more than willing to carry out orders to repress civilian protestors. After all, in this socially
homogeneous country, those who fired upon the protesters to protect Ben Ali “resembled” their
victims just as much as the regular military, engaging in repression that reportedly killed
hundreds and resulted in over 2000 injuries. Finally, arguments that emphasize professionalism
or institutionalization do not convincingly explain why large portions of the Libyan and Yemeni
armed forces defected from each ruling regime. Tribal interests in these divided societies
generally trump other considerations, and tribe-government relations rest on patrimonial ties
rather than meritocratic or professional norms. As institutions embedded in this context, neither
the Libyan nor the Yemeni security apparatus can be considered a professional organization
(Phillips, 2008).16 Indeed, commentators on the Arab Spring have not claimed that either
security apparatus is professional or institutionalized; however, they are unable to explain why a
non-professional military broke with the ruling regime in each of these cases. Lacking
institutionalization, defectors in each case could not have been certain that they would retain
their position in the post-uprising period. Rather, intra-security apparatus competition motivated
defection among those who felt that breaking ranks would provide them with a better opportunity
to improve their fortunes than would standing pat and defending the status quo.
16
While security apparatus reform in each post-uprising context could yield more professional institutions, this was
not the case during the period under investigation.
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29
Conclusion
This article aims to make two contributions. First, it explores how military behavior
during the Arab Spring informs broader civil-military relations theories, an endeavor that has
received little attention since the Arab uprisings began. Studying the effect that different coupproofing strategies have on regimes’ ability to maintain military support amid domestic
challenges to their rule advances our understanding of civil-military relations in authoritarian
regimes and authoritarian durability and breakdown, more generally. Second, the article offers a
parsimonious theory that explains military behavior during the Arab Spring. In doing so, it adds
to recent research on the Arab Spring by illustrating how intra-security apparatus competition
affected the military’s decision to protect the ruling regime or defect to the opposition.
While coup-proofing has long subordinated Arab militaries to civilian control, the Arab
Spring has revealed that such strategies are not equally effective. In Egypt, strategies that relied
upon building parallel militaries and distributing material incentives created divisions within the
security apparatus that encouraged military defection once popular protests began demanding the
regime’s overthrow. Similar dynamics encouraged defection in Libya, though in this case
partial-communal compositional strategies tragically divided the security apparatus in half,
pitting armed military defectors and regime loyalists against one another. Paradoxically, these
cases illustrate that measures designed to ensure military loyalty to the regime actually created a
structural weakness within the security apparatus that came to the fore once protests began early
last year. In Syria, by contrast, communal compositional strategies that staff the security
apparatus with a single religious sect have proven effective at maintaining civilian control over
the military and enabling regime repression.
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30
While the theory presented in this paper does not aim to explain military behavior in the
absence of widespread protests, it is worth considering how this argument might apply beyond
the six cases under examination. The theory should explain military behavior in any country that
experiences mass uprisings against the ruling regime, as the coup-proofing strategies discussed
within are not unique to any one region. Regarding Arab countries that continue to experience
more limited protests, moreover, this article suggests that the lack of overt military intervention
should not necessarily be mistaken for regime strength or military loyalty. Indeed, as scholars
have argued (Belkin and Schofer, 2003), the absence of widespread dissent or a proximate
trigger for defection might simply mask structural weaknesses within the security apparatus that
can, in different circumstances, make a regime vulnerable to authoritarian breakdown.
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31
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TABLE 1: Typology of Coup-Proofing Strategiesa
A-Communal
Communal
Partial-Communal
Dependent Variable Security Apparatus
Defects
Security Apparatus
Protects
Security Apparatus
Divides
Popular resentment
toward military;
repression; absence of
significant competition
within security
apparatus or
competition is muted;
fear of defection; fear of
retribution
Communally-recruited
forces remain loyal;
marginalized forces
defect; intra-security
apparatus competition;
armed conflict; civil
war
Syria, Bahrain
Libya, Yemen
Observable Intra-security
Implications apparatus competition;
popular support for
military; aggrieved
military factions
defect in pursuit of
corporate interests
Arab Spring Cases Egypt, Tunisia
a
I have simplified this table by collapsing it into three categories representing three types of coupproofing based on communal strategies. This is because the two other independent variables—
funding and parallel militaries—are ubiquitous across authoritarian regimes.