Atypical Coalitions and their (In)Stability in Germany
Paper to be presented at the 23rd IPSA World Congress of Political Science,
Montréal, QC, Canada
July 19-24, 2014
Amir Abedi
Department of Political Science
Western Washington University
516 High Street
Bellingham, WA 98225-9082
U.S.A.
e-mail: [email protected]
Alan Siaroff
Department of Political Science
The University of Lethbridge
4401 University Drive
Lethbridge, Alberta
Canada T1K 3M4
e-mail: [email protected]
Work in Progress – Please do not cite without the authors’ permission
INTRODUCTION
In this paper we shall examine German state (Land) coalition patterns since 1949, focusing on
unstable coalitions, that is, coalitions that lasted less than the full legislative term. This has been
an atypical phenomenon in the Federal Republic of Germany. We want to explore the possible
relationship between party system/coalition type and coalition stability. We will show that
Germany has gone through four distinct periods in terms of coalition stability which in turn
reflect the evolution of party politics — and the variations in party politics across the Länder.
Our analysis thus indicates the existence of a correlation between the type of party system in
place and the likelihood of short-term governments being present. There also seems to be a
connection between the number of parties included in a government and the degree of its
stability. More specifically multi-party coalitions (involving three or more parties) tend to be less
stable. The level of congruence between the combination of parties governing federally and at
the Land level, though, does not appear to have a significant impact on the longevity of
governments.
Germany has traditionally been seen as a country with stable government coalitions both
federally and at the Land level (although Land governments are sometimes single-party
majorities). That is, coalitions were typically minimal winning involving only two parties
(treating the CDU/CSU as one party), with both parties office-seeking rather than strongly
ideological or populist, and with one large party and one smaller one. Thus, an ‘atypical
coalition’ is either a coalition that includes two parties that are fairly equal in size (e.g., a ‘grand
coalition’) or a coalition that includes more than two parties. Moreover, the party political
composition of an atypical coalition may be at cross-purposes with the party political
composition of the federal government.
The idealized view of German coalitions reflected the period beginning in the 1960s
where there were usually only the three traditional parties represented in a parliament. Prior to
this there was more coalition instability and/or variability (including oversized coalitions). The
rise of the Greens in the 1980s ushered in a third period and initially led to unstable SPD-Green
coalitions whenever the Greens were dominated by their more fundamentalist wing, although
eventually many stable SPD-Green coalitions were formed. However, as additional parties arose
in the 1990s, including idiosyncratic ones in individual Länder, the logic of coalition building
clearly became more complicated, with multiparty coalitions as well as coalitions at cross
purposes with the federal government. These atypical coalitions have been less stable, often
collapsing before the end of the legislative term when formed post-election — and in turn
frequently leading to early elections.
THE CONTEXT OF AND GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT GERMAN COALITIONS
Rather than mandating a clear division of powers Germany’s cooperative form of federalism
establishes an interdependent relationship between the federal and Land levels of government. It
thus encourages power sharing and consensus formation between the two levels. This is
reinforced by the nature of the Bundesrat, the powerful upper house in the country’s bicameral
legislature that reflects the composition of the various Land governments and has a veto over all
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laws that affect the interests/competencies of the Länder.1 Unlike in many other federations such
as, for example, Canada, the German party system is highly integrated in that the same parties
essentially compete at all levels of government. Hence, changes in the party political
composition of a Land government can significantly affect the ability of a federal government to
enact its policy agenda. One would consequently expect that the federal parties, especially those
in government, have a strong interest in seeing to it that coalition governments in power at the
Land level are congruent with the party political composition of the federal government. Prior
research has indeed shown that apart from the distribution of seats in the Land legislature and the
ideological positioning of the Land parties the party political composition of the federal
government plays an important role in influencing coalition formation at the subnational level.2
However, there is also evidence that shows that the Land parties’ particular preferences and
interests have a significant effect on the types of governments that emerge at the subnational
level, and, that even the federal parties themselves may accept ongoing incongruent coalitions in
the Länder because they view them as possible testing grounds for future federal coalitions.3
After all, “[n]o combination of parties has governed in Bonn [and Berlin] without previous
power-sharing experience at regional [sic] level.”4
Recent research by Ştefuriuc has shown that while coalitions which are congruent with
the composition of the federal government are generally more likely to form, in Germany,
despite the factors outlined earlier, incongruent coalitions occur much more frequently than one
may expect. She suggests that apart from asymmetrical election results, which mathematically
may not allow the formation of congruent coalitions in individual Länder, this is due to the fact
that while the federal governing parties may prefer congruence in order to pass legislation more
easily through the Bundesrat, other factors (like policy compatibility, prior governing experience
together, et cetera) may be more important in Land party decision making. Moreover, Land
parties may welcome the possibility to differentiate themselves from their federal counterpart,
especially if the federal party is not faring well in the opinion polls. In spite of the integrated
nature of the German party system, Land parties have a certain degree of autonomy that makes it
difficult for the federal head office to control the coalition-formation decisions of their
subnational organizations.5
Federal-level party organizations generally have had a significant degree of influence
over the behaviour of their Land counterparts during the government formation process.
However, while it is true that federal party organizations have a certain degree of influence over
government formation in the Länder, Land party organizations are not just mere branches of the
federal party. Instead they often pursue their own interests even if these run counter to those of
the federal party.6 Moreover, Land parties have a certain degree of influence on their federal
counterparts. After all, office holders at the federal level both at the executive and legislative
levels are generally recruited from the Länder. For example, most German chancellors were
former Land politicians, if not minister-presidents.7
Regional issues can significantly impact government formation at the sub-national level
and sometimes incongruent coalitions are formed because relationships between parties and
leaders at the Land level are distinct from the same relationships at the federal level.8 In general
the level of regional party autonomy seems to have increased in all major parties in the third and
fourth periods of party system development. The growing autonomy of Land party branches has
gone hand-in-hand with the increasing socio-economic diversity that characterized the Länder in
3
West Germany in the 1980s (pitting the economically more successful Southern Länder against
those in the North), and since the reunification of Germany in 1990 the much starker socioeconomic differences that distinguish the new Eastern Länder from those in the West.9 This
temporal increase in the autonomy of Land parties is thus a consequence of the greater diversity
overall of reunified Germany (the ‘Berlin Republic’) versus the former West Germany (the
‘Bonn Republic’), especially earlier on. As Detterbeck and Renzsch summarize:
Since the 1990s one can determine a tendency to increased political autonomy of the Land
associations of the parties with regards to their electoral strategies, their practical political
orientations, and their choice of coalition partner. As we have seen, it has become more difficult
to reproduce the national pattern of competition at the Land level. Land politicians are ready to a
greater extent than before to position themselves as “champions” of Land interests even against
their federal party, in particular during their election campaigns.10
Germany has traditionally been seen as a country with stable government
coalitions both federally and at the Land level. That is, coalitions were typically minimal
winning involving only two parties, with both parties office-seeking rather than strongly
ideological or populist, and with one large party and one smaller one. The fact that investiture
votes are required both at the federal and Land levels before a new government can begin its
work is generally seen as an important institutional factor that encourages the formation of
majority (coalition) governments and discourages the formation of minority (whether singleparty or coalition) governments.11 Thus, given this ‘bias’ towards majority governments one
would expect that there would be very few, if any, short-lived Land governments in Germany. In
this paper we try to examine these exceptions to the rule, that is, those governments that lasted
less than four years and could thus be considered to be short-lived. We want to find out whether
there has been any change over time in the prevalence of these types of governments. We are
also interested in examining possible correlations between the type of party system in place - or
the specific type of coalition in existence - at a particular time and the likelihood of short-lived
governments emerging. In other words, are short-lived governments a ‘random’ occurrence that
arise solely due to contextual factors or are they the result of certain background conditions that
make it more likely that governments will not survive their entire term?
THEORIES OF COALITION STABILITY
Germany has generally been a good fit with the theoretical arguments about cabinet (in)stability.
For its part, this literature has two main approaches: the first speaks to the structural or
contextual factors which affect cabinet stability (and indeed to some extent cabinet formation in
the first place); the second speaks to the effects of exogenous shocks, generally seen as random
events, which would trigger the end of a cabinet. Our focus is simply on the first approach, as we
group all short term governments together, that is, we are not concerned with when exactly they
end (early). In terms of the first approach, the traditional concern was the structural features of
the coalition. Dating back to Riker, Axelrod, and de Swaan, this long-established literature notes
that parties will aim for coalitions that are ‘minimal winning’ (with just enough members for a
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majority) rather than oversized, that are ideologically connected (ideally involving parties
adjacent in the ideological spectrum), and that ultimately combine both of these aspects as
‘minimal connected winning’ coalitions.12 Empirically, in postwar Western Europe minimal
winning coalitions have been the second most durable type of government (behind only singleparty majorities), whereas minority coalitions have been the least durable type.13
The literature also notes that cabinet instability is greater when the parliament is more
fragmented overall due to the larger number of coalition possibilities, as the number of parties in
the cabinet increases (a linear measure, but for our purposes a dichotomy will be made below
between two parties and three or more), as the fractionalization of the government parties
increases (holding the number of parties constant, this is greater the more equal they are in size),
and to the extent that they straddle a major cleavage such as social class.14 In terms of the
number of parties in the cabinet, Saalfeld notes that:
The larger the number of parties in cabinet, the more scope for inter-party disagreement and the
higher the potential transaction costs of managing conflict, especially when there are strongly
diverging preferences concerning policy or the distribution of offices.15
More broadly, institutional features will affect the stability of (coalition) governments, such as
the length of the parliamentary term (longer tends to aid overall cabinet stability as parties are
less likely to defect for short-term advantages given the consequent longer time until the next
election), whether there is positive parliamentarianism (as Strøm et al. phrase it, this feature
“may have a tendency to make for uncomfortable coalitional ‘marriages’” to pass the vote of
investiture), whether opposition parties can influence policy (without being directly accountable
for unpopular policies), whether the head of government has the constitutional power to call
early elections (as in, say, Denmark) and can thus act strategically here, and whether the head of
state plays a role in politics and/or policy. Regarding the length of the parliamentary term,
although the overall effect is argued to be one of greater cabinet stability, as implied there is in
some places a secondary opposite effect via the increased likelihood of the head of government
calling early elections (at a time of strategic advantage) in the late part of the term.16
As noted above, in Germany – at least during its simplified party system of the 1960s and
1970s, but even through the 1990s – a standard coalition involved two parties of unequal size,
led by one of the major parties (either the Christian Democrats or the Social Democrats), and
with as the junior partner the (traditionally flexible and office-seeking) Free Democratic Party
(FDP) or later (for the SPD) the Greens. All of these features maximized cabinet stability.
Occasionally and exceptionally, there were ‘grand coalitions’ of the two main parties such as
federally from 1966 to 1969, which theoretically would not be assumed to be as stable. Finally,
within Germany there have been few variations in terms of institutional features across the
Länder, except for a variation in term lengths between four and five years (with a general
evolution towards five).17 Moreover, it should be emphasized that German governments
themselves cannot call early elections; generally each Landtag has this “power” to dissolve itself
(via an absolute majority vote) and in some Länder popular initiatives can also do this. In any
case, likewise the institutional features in Germany seem to lead (increasingly) to stable
coalitions.
5
]
IDENTIFYING FOUR PARTY SYSTEMS/TIME PERIODS
We will turn our attention first to the possible role that party system characteristics might play in
facilitating short-lived governments. In examining elections and government formation in
Germany from 1949 through 2013, we can distinguish roughly four time periods: a ‘formative’
multi-party period lasting until 1961 of bipolar but imbalanced competition in which the left was
clearly weaker, a two-and-a-half-party period lasting from 1961 to 1983 of stable triangular
competition with a limited number of coalition patterns in which the classical liberal FDP played
a crucial role, a period (1983-2005) of more balanced bipolar multi-partism which was
characterized by party de-concentration especially on the left and more complex coalition
formation patterns, and, a period beginning with the federal election in 2005 that has seen both
further de-concentration and a significant drop in support for the two main catch-all parties, that
is the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social
Union (CSU), as well as the Social Democratic Party (SPD). In the mid-1960s the FDP drifted to
the centre-left of the political spectrum emphasizing a civil liberties agenda and becoming more
accepting of social welfare programs and a more active state role in the economy, which
eventually helped the party to establish a federal governing coalition with the Social Democrats
in 1969. This began to change in the early 1980s when the free market liberal wing of the party
gained the upper hand and serious strains between the two coalition partners began to emerge.
This would ultimately result in the FDP switching sides in 1982 and forming a coalition with the
centre-right Christian Democrats. In the late 1990s and especially after losing power to the SPDGreen coalition in 1998, the party moved even further to the right on economic issues,
advocating lower taxes, a much reduced role of the state in the economy and cuts in social
programs. Thus, there is a much greater sense of bipolarity in the German party system, with the
FDP now being more on the right than the centre. The Greens encouraged and profited from the
FDP’s transformation into a more neo-liberal party by winning over many of the left-liberal
voters who no longer felt at home with the Free Democrats.18
While the four periods generally apply to both the national and sub-national levels there
are several important exceptions. For example, in terms of national government-formation
patterns one could make the case that the second period did not end until 1998 when, with the
inclusion of the Greens in the governing coalition, for the first time since 1960 a party other than
the traditional three was represented in the federal government.
In Tables 1 and 2, we distinguish four types of party systems (or, if one prefers, patterns)
based on the number of parties with seats in the parliament after each election, regardless of the
(large or small) number of seats in each case. There are two-party systems (with the two always
being the CDU/CSU and the SPD), three-party systems (which are often two-and-a-half-party
systems if one were to make a size distinction), and four-or-more-party systems. These tables
also provide information on the number of single-party majorities in the parliament. Such singleparty majorities always occur in two-party systems (the only alternative here would be an exact
tie in seats between the two parties), but are also common in three-party and four-or-more-party
systems – in the latter case reflecting an outcome of one-party dominance. Most crucially,
though, the key point is the contrast federally between the second period involving a three-party
system (CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP) with consequent limited coalition options, and the first,
6
third, and fourth periods which were/are more multiparty. At the Land level, this contrast is not
as sharp, not only because of variations across the Länder, but because of smaller parties that
carried over from the first period to the second at the Land level even if not federally (such as the
DP), won seats earlier at the Land level than federally (the Greens), or won seats at the Land
level but never federally (such as the NPD). The distinction between the third and fourth periods
becomes most obvious when one examines the Land level data (Table 2). Unlike in the third time
period, in the fourth period almost all Länder party systems fit into the four-or-more-party
systems category. The share of single-party majority governments is also significantly lower than
in the preceding three periods.
Table 1. German Federal Party Systems Since 1949
Party Systems since 1949 Federal Republic
August 1949-August 1961
Two-Party System
Three-Party System
Four-or-More Party
System
September 1961-February 1983
3(1)
Two-Party System
Three-Party System
6
Four-or-More Party
System
March 1983-August 2005
Two-Party System
Three-Party System
Four-or-More Party
System
September 2005-September 2013
5
Two-Party System
Three-Party System
Four-or-More Party
System
3
Note: Single party majorities in brackets; CDU/CSU always treated as one party.
7
Table 2. German Land Party Systems Since 1949
Party Systems
since 1949
BadenBavaria Berlin Bremen Hamburg Hesse Lower North-Rhine
Württemberg*
Saxony Westphalia
August 1949-August 1961
Two-Party System
1(1)
1(1)
Three-Party
System
Four-or-MoreParty System
2(1)
1(1)
1(1)
1(1)
2
4
3
3(2)
1(1)
4
2
2(2)
1(1)
4
3
4
2(2)
1(1)
September 1961-February 1983
Two-Party System
Three-Party
System
Four-or-MoreParty System
1(1)
1(1)
3(2)
4(4)
5(3)
2(2)
2(1)
1(1)
1
3(2)
6(4)
March 1983-August 2005
Two-Party System
Three-Party
System
Four-or-MoreParty System
4(4)
5(2)
1(1)
7
1(1)
3(1)
5(1)
4(1)
2(1)
2(2)
2(1)
6(1)
3
4(1)
2
2
1
September 2005-September 2013
Two-Party System
Three-Party
System
Four-or-MoreParty System
2
2(1)
2
2
*including antecedent Land of Württemberg-Baden election of 1950. Note: Single party majorities in brackets.
Table 2. German Land Party Systems Since 1949 (contd.)
Party Systems
since 1949
Rhineland- Saarland
Schleswig- Brandenburg Mecklenburg Saxony
Palatinate (since 1957) Holstein (since 1990) -Western
(since
Pomerania
1990)
(since 1990)
August 1949-August 1961
Two-Party System
Three-Party
System
Four-or-MoreParty System
2(1)
1(1)
1
3
September 1961-February 1983
Two-Party System
Three-Party
System
1(1)
4(3)
2
1(1)
8
Saxony- Thuringia
Anhalt (since
(since
1990)
1990)
Four-or-MoreParty System
1
1
4(2)
March 1983-August 2005
Two-Party System
Three-Party
System
Four-or-MoreParty System
1(1)
4
1(1)
3(3)
2(2)
1(1)
3
2(2)
3(2)
1(1)
5(1)
3
1
1(1)
4
1
2
2
2
1
September 2005-September 2013
Two-Party System
Three-Party
System
Four-or-MoreParty System
2(1)
2
2
1
Another way to ascertain whether there are indeed four distinct, qualitatively different,
party system time periods is to consider the combined seat shares of the two major federal parties
(CDU/CSU and SPD). This will provide us with a proxy measure for the degree of concentration
of the party system. Table 3 provides average two-major-federal-party seat scores for the four
party system time periods at the federal and Land levels.
Table 3. Two-Major-Federal-Party (TMFP) Seat Concentration Average Scores (by time period)
Party System Time Period
August 1949 - August 1961
September 1961 - February
1983
March 1983 - August 2005
September 2005 - September
2013
Average TMFP Scores in
Federal Elections
78.8
90.7
Average TMFP Scores in
Land Elections
76.9
91.7
83.3
71.6
81.3
67.6
What emerges from the data in Table 3 is the high degree of concentration during the
second time period. Also evident is the trend towards deconcentration in the third time period, a
trend that has clearly accelerated in the fourth period (both at the federal and Land levels). The
fourth time period also stands out in that it shows that the two major federal catch-all parties
have lost a lot of support. They are now jointly even weaker than they were in the first, formative
period of the (West) German party system. Moreover, this characteristic is even more evident at
the Land level (the gap between the scores of the federal and Land levels has also increased
significantly during the fourth period). Thus, based on these data one might assume that there is a
correlation between the prevalent type of party system and the amount of short-term
governments that occur during that time period. Clearly, we would expect to see fewer shortterm governments during the second time period and a higher share of short-term governments
during the first and, especially, fourth time periods.
9
Table 4. Short-Term Land Governments (by time period)
Party System Time
Period
August 1949 - August
1961
September 1961 February 1983
March 1983 - August
2005
September 2005 September 2013
Number of Short-Term
Land Governments
9
Average Number of Short-Term
Land Governments Per Year
0.75
10
0.47
12
0.54
7
0.875
Table 4 provides the number of short-term Land governments for each time period and,
since the time periods vary by length, the average number (per year) of Land governments that
did not last their full legislative term. As we expected, the average number of short-term Land
governments is lowest in the second time period and highest in the fourth and first time periods,
indicating a correlation between the type of party system and the likelihood of a government not
lasting the entire term. Next, we will explore whether there is also an association between the
type of (coalition) government formed and the likelihood of a higher number of short-term
governments.
EXAMINING GERMAN ELECTIONS AND GOVERNMENT FORMATION
As has been mentioned before, during the ‘stable’ triangular period (1961-1983) with few
exceptions (such as the short successful run of the right-wing extremist National Democratic
Party between 1966 and 1972) no more than three parties (CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP) were
represented in the lower house of the federal legislature, the Bundestag, and in the various state
legislatures (Landtage). Coalition patterns were fairly predictable as there were only three
possible combinations of parties, namely, a combination of either one of the two major parties
with the Free Democrats or a ‘grand coalition’ of CDU/CSU and SPD. Moreover, the dynamics
of Länder government formation was governed by similar considerations to those at federal
level, and Länder government composition became, with few exceptions, essentially congruent
with the pattern of government and opposition at federal level (with either single party
CDU/CSU or SPD government or coalition formation reflecting the coalition situation at federal
level.19
During that time period the sub-national party systems were thus undergoing a
‘nationalization process’.20 However, that process now appears to have reversed itself in the last
two decades or so. The third (1983-2005) and fourth (2005-2013) periods we identified earlier
have been characterized by growing electoral instability (in terms of electoral volatility) and the
entry of first the Greens and later (after Germany’s re-unification) the post-communist Party of
Democratic Socialism (PDS)/now the Left Party (Die Linke) into the Bundestag and various
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Land parliaments. Several other parties such as the right-wing extremist Republikaner, the
National Democratic Party (NPD) and German People’s Union (DVU) as well as a number of
more mainstream protest parties like the Instead Party (STATT Partei), Work for Bremen (AfB),
the Party of State-of-Law Offensive (PRO), and most recently the Pirate Party managed to gain
representation in the sub-national parliaments of several Länder. This has obviously complicated
the coalition formation process. Not only has it increased the number of possible combinations of
parties but the fact that the FDP has more often than in previous decades failed to win seats in
Land parliaments has ‘forced’ the two major parties to try out new coalition patterns that more
frequently than in the past deviated from the coalition in place at the national level.21
Specifically, as of writing (July 2014) the FDP is represented in only nine of the 16 Landtage,
versus Die Linke which is in ten Landtage and the Greens who are in every single one.
Comparing coalitions at the federal and Land levels in Germany one can identify several
distinctive categories of coalitions. In defining these types of coalitions we use the categories of
Detterbeck and Renzsch22 but modify them somewhat. In terms of coalitions, they make a threefold distinction between ‘congruent’, ‘alternative’, and ‘incongruent’ coalitions. First of all, a
‘congruent’ coalition is one involving exactly the same parties as in the national coalition (for
this purpose the CDU/CSU is treated as one party). Next, an ‘alternative’ coalition is one in
which none of its members are in the national government; that is, a coalition composed entirely
of national opposition parties. Lastly, an ‘incongruent’ coalition is one where at least one of the
participating parties is in government at the national level while at least one other participating
party is in opposition nationally, or is not represented nationally. Beyond this, though, we wish
to single out those ‘incongruent’ coalitions that ‘carry over’ from the previous period. One would
not expect Land coalitions to change the day the federal coalition changes, but perhaps after the
next Land election. Consequently, an ‘incongruent but carry over’ coalition is not as striking
as ‘other incongruent’ coalitions, defined as those incongruent coalitions formed (or
maintained) after a Land election. These ‘other incongruent’ coalitions thus show a greater
break with the national political and coalition pattern.
Does the type of coalition have any influence on the likelihood of governments lasting
less than their entire legislative term? Do most short-term governments fall into the category of
‘incongruent’ coalitions? This is the question that we will turn to in this following section. Table
5 shows the number of all of the governments that were formed in post-1949 (West) Germany
organized by type of government. It also includes data on the number (and percentage) of shortterm governments. The data indicate, first, that (not surprisingly) all single-party minority
governments, which are a fairly rare occurrence in Germany, did not last the full term.
Interestingly, alternative coalitions, which bring together parties that are in opposition at the
national level, are generally very stable. Only a small percentage of them collapse before the end
of the legislative term. What then about (‘other’) incongruent coalitions? Surprisingly, and
contrary to our expectations, it turns out that they are no more likely than congruent coalitions to
be short-term governments.
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Table 5. Short-Term Land Governments Post-1949 (by type of coalition)
Government Type
Single-Party Minority
Congruent
Overall
Number of
Governments
12
48
Alternative
24
Incongruent*
76
Number of Short-Term
Governments
11 plus 1 bare majority
12, of which 3 minority and 1
over-sized
2, of which 1 ended by
reunification
13, of which 1 ‘grand’
Percentage of
Short-Term
Governments
100.0
25.0
12.5
14.5
*Note: just ‘other’ incongruent coalitions, not ‘carry-over’ ones
Thus, if the type of coalition, unlike the type of party system, does not necessarily explain
why some governments are unstable, what other variable might be of interest in that regard? Our
earlier discussion of party system time periods and more specifically the changes over time in the
degree of concentration of the German party system both at the federal and Land levels might
provide an answer. We saw that government formation has become more complex due to the
decreasing level of support for the two major federal parties and the increasing number of
smaller parties that have successfully established themselves at the federal and/or Land levels.
Thus, the question whether a higher number, that is, more than two, parties in government is
more likely to lead to instability, should be our next focus. After all, as noted earlier, the
theoretical literature on cabinet stability suggests that cabinet instability is greater as the number
of parties in the cabinet increases. While this is a linear measure, for our purposes a dichotomy
between two parties and three or more should suffice.
There have been two types of German governments that normally do not last a full term.
The first of these are minority governments. Of course, most minority governments in Germany
have been single-party ones and are thus beyond the scope of this analysis. However, there have
been three unstable minority coalitions: in Berlin between the SPD and the Greens from June
2001 to January 2002, recently in North-Rhine Westphalia between the same two parties from
July 2010 to June 2012, and briefly in Schleswig-Holstein between the CDU and the FDP back
in June and July 1951. The minority coalition in North-Rhine Westphalia was the only one
formed post-election (the two parties being one seat short of a majority) and they campaigned
successfully for a majority in the 2012 election (specifically, there were large gains in 2012 for
the SPD).
The other type of German government that has mostly been unstable has been multiparty
coalitions of three or more parties, although usually ‘just’ three parties. This instability reflects
presumably the greater difficulty in reaching agreement compared to a two-party coalition. Table
6 lists all multiparty coalitions in the German Länder since 1949, distinguishing between the
stable (that is, lasting) and unstable ones. Of the stable multiparty coalitions, all but one were led
by the CDU/CSU and in a time (the first party system era) when this was the strongest political
force. Indeed, the first federal government of 1949 to 1953 was also a stable multiparty coalition,
although it was followed (after the 1953 federal elections) by unstable multiparty ones. The
12
unstable Land coalitions have mostly been incongruent with the federal government of the day. It
is also the case that no coalition that included both the FDP and the Greens has gone a full term.
Repinski has referred to the ‘traffic-light’ version of this (led by the SPD) as having centrifugal
forces that are too strong.23 In any case and crucially, to the extent that party system
deconcentration in the third and fourth party system eras has led to and will continue to lead to
more multiparty coalitions, there has and will be a parallel increase in unstable governments at
the Land level.24
Table 6. Stable and Unstable Multiparty Land Governments Post-1949*
Land
Time Period
Congruence with
Federal Government
Those Which Lasted A Full Term (roughly, that is a month or two short is fine)
Baden-Württemberg
March 1956 - May 1960
Bavaria
Bavaria
Hamburg
Lower Saxony
Dec. 1950 - Dec. 1954
Dec. 1958 - Dec. 1962
Dec. 1953 - Dec. 1957
June 1951 - May 1955
Schleswig-Holstein
Oct. 1954 - Oct. 1958
Parties
CDU, FDP/DVP,
GB/BHE
CSU, SPD, GB/BHE
CSU, GB/BHE, FDP
CDU, FDP, DP
SPD, GB-BHE,
Zentrum
CDU, GB-BHE, FDP
Incongruent coalition
Incongruent coalition
Congruent coalition
Congruent coalition
Incongruent coalition
Congruent coalition
Those Which Lasted Less Than A Full Term
Baden-Württemberg
April 1952 - Oct. 1953
FDP/DVP, SPD, GBBHE
SPD, FDP, GB/BHE,
BP
Bavaria
Dec. 1954 - Oct. 1957
Berlin
Jan. 1951 - Sept. 1953
SPD, CDU, FDP
Brandenburg
SPD, FDP, Alliance 90
Bremen
Hamburg
Lower Saxony
Nov. 1990 - March
1994
Dec. 1991 - Feb. 1995
Oct. 2001 - March 2004
May 1955 - Nov. 1957
North Rhine-Westphalia
Saarland
Schleswig-Holstein
July 1954 - Feb. 1956
Nov. 2009 - Jan. 2012
Sept. 1950 - June 1951
SPD, FDP, Greens
CDU, PRO, FDP
DP, CDU, FDP, GBBHE
CDU, FDP, Zentrum
CDU, FDP, Greens
CDU, BHE, FDP, DP
Incongruent coalition
Incongruent coalition
(breakup after 1957
federal election)
Incongruent coalition
(all-party government)
Incongruent coalition
Incongruent coalition
Alternative coalition
Congruent coalition
Incongruent coalition
Incongruent coalition
Congruent (oversized)
coalition
*not counting governments that came to power midterm, and then completed the term
Beyond these two main types of unstable coalitions in Germany, both of which are
clearly atypical, the remaining unstable cases are a mixed bag. Some involve coalitions that
ended early so a new coalition could be formed to duplicate the federal pattern. This pattern
occurred after the creation of the federal grand coalition in 1966 (with Land governments thus
13
ending early in Baden-Württemberg and Lower Saxony), and after the creation of the SPD-FDP
federal government in 1969 (with the Land government thus ending early in North RhineWestphalia). However, such “need” to match the federal government has not existed since then.
Some two-party Land coalitions broke up early due to scandal; others due to policy differences.
The latter explanation was the case with the SPD-Green coalition in Hesse from 1985 to 1987 –
at a time and place when the Greens were more fundamentalist – and also with the one CDUGreen coalition, that of Hamburg from 2008 to 2011.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
German Land coalitions have become more unstable in recent decades; a pattern not merely
going back to what was the situation in the 1950s but in fact exceeding this. The only
institutional change of relevance here has been a shift to a longer five year legislative term in
almost all of the Länder where this had been four years.25 Theoretically, one would assume that
this change to five year terms would lead to more stable coalitions. We argue that in and of itself
that is the causality of longer terms, however in Germany its effect has been less than the clearly
greater effect of party system deconcentration, with Germany seeing a sharp drop in support for
the traditional two catch-all parties (Volksparteien), with this effect being stronger in the new
Länder of the East, with more parties being elected, with specifically protest parties being more
likely to be elected, and ultimately with one of these protest parties even finding its way into
Land government – PRO (also known as the Schill party) in Hamburg in 2001. More generally,
the German Länder have seen a return to three-party coalitions which have been clearly less
stable (even if they are nevertheless sometimes congruent) than the two-party coalitions that
were a central aspect of the concentrated 1961 to 1983 national party system era.
In terms of regional variations, we can note the Länder where there have been not just
one but two short-term coalitions in each of the two most recent party system eras. For the most
recent era, from 2005 to 2013, this has been the case in both Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein. In
both of these the combined seat share of the two national Volksparteien has fallen down to the
60s (as a percentage), a huge drop from the very high combined level (90 percent plus) of the
previous era. For that previous era, from 1983 to 2005, having two or more (actually three) short
term coalitions was the case in Berlin, Hamburg, and Hesse. These three Länder were where the
Greens had a particular impact, not surprisingly given that these Länder (and Bremen) are urban,
industrialized, and Protestant. More-than-three-party politics has thus been a key antecedent
feature of the return of atypical and unstable coalitions in Germany. Further research will allow
us to clarify what aspect of party system deconcentration has been the most crucial; in particular,
to test whether there is a breakpoint of support for the two largest national parties – or more
likely, a breakpoint in support / lead for the more successful of these two within a Land – below
which an atypical coalition becomes more likely. On a related matter, we also suspect that the
greater stability of grand coalitions in the post-communist Eastern Länder arises from the fact
that in the specific Land in question one of the two major national parties is not truly a major
party in terms of levels of support and/or being clearly back of the one actual major party.
14
NOTES
1.
Simon Green, Dan Hough, and Alister Miskimmon, The Politics of the New Germany, 2nd
edition (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 76-80.
2.
See, Thomas Bräuninger and Marc Debus, ‘Der Einfluss von Koalitionsaussagen,
programmatischen Standpunkten und der Bundespolitik auf die Regierungsbildung in den
deutschen Ländern’, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 49/2 (2008), pp. 309-338; Marc Debus,
‘Party Competition and Government Formation in Multilevel Settings: Evidence from Germany’,
Government and Opposition, 43/4 (2008), pp. 505-538; Klaus Detterbeck and Wolfgang Renzsch,
‘Symmetrien und Asymmetrien im bundesstaatlichen Parteienwettbewerb’, Uwe Jun, Melanie
Haas, and Oskar Niedermayer (eds), Parteien und Parteiensysteme in den deutschen Ländern
(Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008), pp. 39-55; Klaus Detterbeck and Wolfgang
Renzsch, ‘Multi-Level Electoral Competition: The German Case’, European Urban and Regional
Studies 10/3 (2003), pp. 257-269; Dan Hough and Charlie Jeffery, ‘Germany: an erosion of
federal-Länder linkages?’ Dan Hough and Charlie Jefferey (eds), Devolution and Electoral
Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), pp. 119-139; Uwe Jun,
Koalitionsbildung in den deutschen Bundesländern: Theoretische Betrachtungen, Dokumentation
und Analyse der Koalitionsbildungen auf Länderebene seit 1949 (Opladen: Leske + Budrich,
1994); Franz Urban Pappi, Axel Becker, and Alexander Herzog, ‘Regierungsbildung in
Mehrebenensystemen: Zur Erklärung der Koalitionsbildung in den deutschen Bundesländern’,
Politische Vierteljahresschrift 46/3 (2005), pp. 432-458.
3.
William M. Downs, Coalition Government, Subnational Style: Multiparty Politics in Europe’s
Regional Parliaments (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998), pp. 221-266.
4.
Downs, Coalition Government, Subnational Style, p. 229.
5.
Irina Ştefuriuc, Government Formation in Multi-Level Settings: Party Strategy and Institutional
Constraints (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 136-140.
6.
Ştefuriuc, Government Formation in Multi-Level Settings, p. 139.
7.
Frank Decker, ‘Parteien im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Krise oder
Wandel?’, Andreas Kost, Werner Rellecke, and Reinhold Weber (eds.), Parteien in den
Deutschen Ländern: Geschichte und Gegenwart (Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2010), pp. 71-99,
pp. 91-92.
8.
Decker, ‘Parteien im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Krise oder Wandel?’,
Kost, Rellecke, Weber (eds.), Parteien in den Deutschen Ländern: Geschichte und Gegenwart,
pp. 91-93.
9.
Detterbeck and Renzsch, ‘Symmetrien und Asymmetrien im bundesstaatlichen
Parteienwettbewerb,’ pp. 50-52.
10.
Detterbeck and Renzsch, ‘Symmetrien und Asymmetrien im bundesstaatlichen
Parteienwettbewerb,’ pp. 52 (translated by authors).
15
11.
Ştefuriuc, Government Formation in Multi-Level Settings, p. 49.
12.
William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962);
Robert Axelrod, Conflict of Interest (Chicago: Markham, 1970); Abram de Swaan, Coalition
Theories and Cabinet Formations: A Study of Formal Theories of Cabinet Formation Applied to
Nine European Parliaments after 1918 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1973).
13.
Michael Gallagher, Michael Laver, and Peter Mair, Representative Government in Modern
Europe, 5th edition (Maidenhead, Berkshire: McGraw-Hill, 2011), pp. 446-447.
14.
Gallagher, Laver, and Mair, Representative Government in Modern Europe, 5th edition, pp. 448449; Michael Taylor and V.M. Herman, „Party Systems and Government Stability“, American
Political Science Review, Volume 65: 1 (March 1971), pp. 28-37; Paul Warwick, „The Durability
of Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies“, Comparative Political Studies,
Volume 11: 4 (January 1979), pp. 465-498.
15.
Thomas Saalfeld, “Institutions, Chance, and Choices: The Dynamics of Cabinet Survival”, pp.
327-368 in Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman, eds., Cabinets and
Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2008), p. 344.
16 .
Saalfeld, “Institutions, Chance, and Choices: The Dynamics of Cabinet Survival”, pp. 327-368 in
Strøm, Müller, and Bergman, eds., Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life
Cycle in Western Europe, pp. 353-356; Kaare Strøm, Torbjörn Bergman, Wolfgang C. Müller,
and Benjamin Nyblade, “Conclusion: Cabinet Governance in Parliamentary Democracies”, pp.
403-430 in Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman, eds., Cabinets and
Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2008), p. 414.
17.
The only Länder that currently use 4-year legislative terms are the city states of Bremen and
Hamburg, however the latter will switch to a 5-year term in 2015. The other Länder all used to
have 4-year terms as well but eventually switched to 5-year terms: Saarland (as of 1955), North
Rhine-Westphalia (as of 1970), Rhineland-Palatinate (as of 1991), Saxony and Thuringia (as of
1994), Bavaria and Lower Saxony (as of 1998), Brandenburg (as of 1999), Schleswig-Holstein
(as of 2000), Berlin and Baden Württemberg (as of 2001), Hesse (as of 2003), and, MecklenburgWestern Pomerania and Saxony-Anhalt (as of 2006).
18.
Green, Hough, and Miskimmon, The Politics of the New Germany, 2nd edition, p. 100.
19.
Charlie Jeffery, ‘Party Politics and Territorial Representation in the Federal Republic of
Germany’, West European Politics 22/2 (1999), p. 135.
20.
Geoffrey Pridham, ‘A “Nationalization” Process? Federal Politics and State Elections in West
Germany’, Government and Opposition, 8/4 (1973), pp. 455-473; Roland Sturm, ‘Party
Competition and the Federal System: The Lehmbruch Hypothesis Revisited’, Charlie Jeffery (ed),
Recasting German Federalism: The Legacies of Unification (London: Pinter, 1999), p. 198.
16
21.
Jeffery, ‘Party Politics and Territorial Representation’, pp. 144-146 and 154-156; Roland Sturm,
‘The Territorial Dimension of the New Party System’, Stephen Padgett (ed), Parties and Party
Systems in the New Germany (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993), pp. 105-107; Sturm, ‘Party
Competition and the Federal System’, pp. 201-202.
19.
Detterbeck and Renzsch, ‘Multi-Level Electoral Competition: The German Case’, Table 1, p.
260.
23.
Gordon Repinski, ‘Ampelkoalitionen: Gescheitert an der Piepmatz-Affäre’, Der Spiegel
(http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ampelkoalitionen-gescheitert-an-der-piepmatzaffaere-a-532223.html), accessed on July 2, 2014.
24.
Note that there have been no multiparty federal coalitions since the 1950s. There have been some
discussion of these recently, usually of the red-red-green type, and our analysis suggests that if
these had been formed they likely would have been unstable.
25.
As of reunification in 1990, 14 of the 16 Länder had four year parliamentary terms; by 2015, only
Bremen and the Federal Republic itself will still have this feature.
17