Terence Zuber. Inventing the Schlieffen Plan: German War Planning 1871-1914. Oxford and
New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. xii + 340 pp. $72.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-19-925016-5.
Reviewed by Kelly McFall (Department of History/Political Science, Bethany College)
Published on H-German (May, 2004)
Almost every Western Civilization class includes a
well-rehearsed and well-intended lecture on the tenuous
nature of historical “truth.” Many of us, as instructors
of such courses, devote a significant percentage of limited classroom time to working with primary documents,
running simulations, and exploring causation in order
(among other goals) to convey the difficulties inherent
in evaluating inevitably inadequate evidence. Yet, almost
unavoidably, we will at some point in the semester confidently offer our students an explanation or narrative so
widely accepted it simply must be correct. Then, every
so often, someone comes along to challenge that explanation.
in fact both more sensible and less aggressive than the
Schlieffen Plan as usually portrayed. Zuber’s argument
persuasively demolishes the commonly accepted version
of the Schlieffen Plan. But his claim that the Schlieffen
Plan itself never existed is more speculative and rests on
a reading of evidence that is plausible but not conclusive. Military historians interested in the outbreak of the
First World War will need to read this book and decide
for themselves. Others will want to follow the debate
closely, but may prefer to wait for a consensus to emerge.
Zuber, who served as an officer in the American army
in Europe and later received his doctoral degree from the
University of Wuerzberg, lays out the heart of his arguTerence Zuber takes on one of the most widely re- ment in one long (eight-five page) chapter claming the
peated stories of freshman level Western Civilization: the Schlieffen Plan never existed. The documentary materiSchlieffen Plan. As told in most classes, a single plan for als for this claim are necessarily scarce, since an allied
military operations, drawn up by Alfred von Schlieffen in bombing raid in the Second World War destroyed many
1905, governed German actions in 1914. This plan called of the relevant records. However, in addition to exploitfor an offensive war in the west (including an invasion of ing previously discovered (but, according to him, generBelgium) in order to destroy the French army in a vast en- ally neglected) records, Zuber utilizes a number of newly
circling operation and knock France out of the war in six discovered documents, most importantly a manuscript
weeks. Schlieffen’s successor, Helmuth von Moltke (the containing summaries and descriptions of a variety of
Younger), modified the way the German army would be war plans, staff rides and other preparations for war
deployed, but accepted the necessity of invading Belgium made during Schlieffen’s time as Chief of the General
and the inevitability of war once mobilization had been Staff. Zuber uses these materials to present a gradual
ordered. The result, of course, was the British declaration evolution in Schlieffen’s thinking leading to a clear vision
of war, the over-extension of German supply lines, the for a European war. Far from a rigid offensive strategy
defeat of the Marne, and the emergence of trench war- demanding a lockstep attack against France, Schlieffen
fare.
planned to counter-punch against France, Russia or both,
depending on the military situation when the war broke
Zuber’s book, Inventing the Schlieffen Plan: German out. The likelihood of confronting simultaneous attacks
War Planning 1871-1914, is a frontal assault on this nar- by both France and Russia forced Germany to take the
rative. The Schlieffen Plan, he argues, was the postwar offensive as well. As the situation became fluid, the Gerinvention of German officers who wanted to avoid the
man Army could then use the mobility offered by railblame for Germany’s defeat. Schlieffen’s intentions were
roads and by effective training and practice to find and
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attack an open flank wherever and whenever it appeared.
Zuber argues this broad strategic approach was firmly established by the turn of the century (pp. 161-164). To
be sure, Schlieffen eventually acknowledged the size of
the German deployment and the location of French fortifications required a German attack in the west to move
through Belgium. However, this did not change his willingness to fight the French army wherever a favorable
opportunity presented itself. Indeed, in most of the exercises Schlieffen led, the decisive battles occurred in eastern France, southern Belgium and Western Germany, and
a flanking movement around Paris was never more than
a worst case scenario.
accused the General Staff of missing the chance to win
the war in 1914. These critics focused on two key issues: the failure of the German attack in 1914, and the
decision to attack France rather than Russia. This argument steadily gained momentum as the consequences
of Germany’s defeat became clearer.[1] Zuber suggests
the officers of the new Reichswehr understood the postwar reputation of the officer corps depended on who
was to blame for the army’s failure. The solution was to
point the finger at a few particular officers (in particular
Moltke; Wilhelm Bulow, the commander of the Second
Army; and Lieutenant-Colonel Hentsch, the liaison officer who ordered the retreat on the right wing in 1914) for
failing to understand and implement the war plans drawn
So what of the famous 1905 memorandum Ger- up by Schlieffen and thus costing Germany the chance
hard Ritter and others believe outlined the Schlieffen to defeat France in 1914. To convince the German pubPlan? Zuber argues this memorandum (which he dates lic, the officers launched a publicity offensive (conducted
to early 1906) was not actually a war plan at all, but rather through newspapers, military journals and the German
a political ploy. According to Zuber, two fundamental
official history of the war) whose core element was the
challenges shaped Schlieffen’s strategic planning. First
creation of the “Schlieffen Plan,” a plan that, had its tenets
was his recognition that Germany had to plan for a two been followed, would have guaranteed victory.[2] Much
front war against powerful enemies. The second was the later, this fabrication received support from an influential
German government’s consistent refusal to authorize a German historian, Gerhard Ritter. According to Zuber,
mobilization of German manpower equivalent to that of Ritter’s conviction that Germany’s catastrophic recent
France or Russia. The only way to address the first was
history resulted from the militarization of German polito overcome the second. The government would have
tics and society drove him to misinterpret the planning
to raise the relatively low rate of conscription of Ger- documents he discovered among Schlieffen’s personal
man manpower and enable the German army to mobilize papers in the National Archives in Washington D.C. Ever
and deploy all of its trained reserves immediately upon since, historians have generally accepted Ritter’s analysis
the outbreak of war if Germany was to have a chance. rather than examining the documents themselves. And
Schlieffen had proposed this almost immediately after beso, the myth of the Schlieffen plan.
coming Chief of the General Staff, but the government
had rejected his request outright. The 1905 memoranZuber’s book paints as complete a picture of Gerdum, in Zuber’s view, sought to force the government’s man prewar military planning as we are likely to get.
hand by constructing a war plan that would work only if Not only does he present material dealing with Schliefthe government provided the money to increase the size fen’s period as Chief, but he provides similar detail for
of the army. But, in Zuber’s view, no military planner both Moltke’s as well. His summaries of the various exwould construct an actual war plan that relied on nonex- ercises and plans are exhaustive, almost blow by blow
istent units (p. 197). Accordingly, he simply passes over summaries of years of war games. At times, this dethe memorandum as irrelevant to Schlieffen’s strategic tail threatens to swamp the reader, and more systemthinking.
atic chapter introductions, summaries and restatements
of the argument would have helped the earlier chapters
So how did the mythic Schlieffen Plan become so (the chapter dealing with Schlieffen’s activity as Chief of
widely accepted? Zuber argues, in two chapters that the General Staff is considerably better in this respect, as
(oddly) bracket the lengthy discussion of German war
is the conclusion). In addition, some explanation of techplanning at the heart of the book, that the Schlieffen Plan
nical military terms and translations of words he leaves in
was the postwar invention of a number of German offi- German might have helped non-specialists grapple with
cers (notably Wilhelm Groener and Hermann von Kuhl). this material (although these will likely cause little diffiEven before 1914, German strategy, and the prestige and culty for Zuber’s primary audience). But it is clear Zuposition of the General Staff that designed it, was the sub- ber possesses an encyclopedic knowledge of a tremenject of intense controversy. During the war itself, critics,
dous amount of material as well as the easy familiarity
notably the influential historian Hans Delbruck, publicly
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with military planning, terminology and culture natural
to a former military officer (indeed, he suggests that both
Delbruck and Ritter went wrong, at least in part, because
they were untrained in military affairs).
Regardless, the driving force behind Zuber’s claims
is broader than the details of military deployments and
planning. Although he affords it comparatively little
space, what he really hopes to do is to re-open the Fischer debate. His conclusions, he suggests, require a
What becomes apparent is that, while Zuber has re-evaluation of Germany’s guilt for the war (p. 302).
changed the terms of the debate, his central conclusion
Without the Schlieffen Plan, German guilt fades away,
is likely to remain controversial.[3] At a minimum, Zusince the assumption that Germany’s inflexible, aggresber’s book demonstrates that the “traditional” presenta- sive military planning had forced it to expand a mere
tion of the Schlieffen Plan needs significant revision. In Balkan conflict into a world war no longer applies.
fact, both Schlieffen and Moltke (the Younger) believed
in the importance of operational flexibility and mobility,
Here, Zuber’s claims are somewhat less convincing.
and planned to strike the French flank wherever it pre- The Fischer debate was always as much (or more) about
sented itself. The mobilization and deployment of Ger- war aims and attitudes throughout German society as
man forces may have been predetermined and inflexi- it was about the military, and Zuber’s conclusions say
ble. Their actions beyond the first few days of the battle nothing about this broader kind of militarism. Moreover,
were not (although Zuber acknowledges that Moltke dis- his claim that other countries also had aggressive war
trusted his, or anyone’s, ability to manage complicated plans merely restates what has been accepted by historimaneuvers with the massive armies employed by mod- ans for years. Finally, suggesting Schlieffen did not want
ern nation-states and was less willing to plan for the to fight a preventative war says nothing about Bernhardi
kind of freewheeling maneuvers Schlieffen embraced). or his intellectual allies. Tilting the scales away from
Moltke may have changed the focus of the campaign by German guilt requires stronger evidence than Zuber prostrengthening the left wing, but this did not fundamen- vides.
tally change the operation. Rather, it represented a difNarrowly conceived, Zuber is engaged in a debate
ferent view of how to ward off a French attack and catch
about
German intentions and preparations for war with
the French with an open flank.
historians like Arden Bucholz, Annika Mombauer and
The case for completely discarding the “Schlieffen Holger Herwig. Accordingly, while his book is too dePlan” rests on shakier ground. Zuber demonstrates that tailed and limited in scope for undergraduates or for hisSchlieffen war-gamed eastern deployments throughout torians interested in broader questions, military historihis period as Chief of Staff, and argues this proves Schli- ans of the period will find it necessary reading. More
effen kept an open mind about the course of military op- broadly, though, Zuber’s book is symbolic of the broaderations. Nevertheless, he still must explain why Schlief- ening discussion among historians about the First World
fen, in his final war plan, appeared to abandon any effort War. Historians like Stig Foerster (who has challenged
even to protect the eastern front against a Russian attack. the idea that the German military went to war expecting
Here, his conclusion that the 1905 memorandum was not a quick and decisive end to the conflict [4]) have chalrelevant to Schlieffen’s military thought is reasonable, lenged long held assumptions and forced historians to
but not proven. In the same way, his interpretation of the re-examine this most important conflict. It is too early
postwar debate is persuasive but lacks the smoking guns to determine what will emerge as the next revealed wisthat would conclusively prove the kind of conspiracy he dom that will form the core of Western Civilization texts.
suggests. Similarly, basing his argument on war plans But the conversation should be fascinating.
and Schlieffen’s critiques of these leaves open whether
Notes
these plans represented Schlieffen’s actual intentions in
a future war. (I largely accept this, but others might rea[1]. Delbruck was especially interested in the second
sonably raise questions.) The destruction of most of the of these, invoking the aura of the elder Moltke to argue
German army archives in an allied bombing raid in the the decision to move west rather than east was a crucial
Second World War leaves Zuber functioning much like a mistake. Zuber rejects Delbruck’s argument out of hand,
medieval historian, using all of his logical powers to find suggesting Moltke the Elder had himself come to accept
meaning and significance from documents that were not the need to attack first in the west.
designed to provide them. In the end, I’m convinced Zu[2]. Holger Herwig’s account of the attempt by Gerber has cast considerable doubt on the existence of the
man
officers and politicians to persuade Europeans that
Schlieffen Plan, but has not proven his case.
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the German army had never been militarily defeated
suggests this kind of cynical publicity campaign was
quite conceivable. See “Clio Deceived: Patriotic SelfCensorship in Germany after the Great War,” in Military
Strategy and the Origins of the First World War, ed. Steven
E. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Stephen Van Evera
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
pretation,” in Journal of Military History, 66 (July 2002), p.
683. And at least one has responded with a detailed critique of Zuber’s interpretation. See Terence M. Holmes,
“The Reluctant March on Paris: A Reply to Terence Zuber’s ’The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered,’ ” War in History,
8 (2001), pp. 208-232.
[4]. For example, Stig Foerster, “Der deutsche Generalstab und die Illusion des kurzen Krieges, 1871-1914,
Kritik eines Mythos,” Militaergeschichtliche Mitteilungen,
54 (1995), pp. 61-95.
[3]. The debate over Zuber’s conclusions has raged
since the initial appearance of his thesis in a 1999 article.
See, Terence Zuber, “The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered,”
War in History, 6 (1999), pp. 262-305. Some historians are
obviously convinced; for example, see the presentation
of German war plans in Hew Strachan’s The First World
War: To Arms (Oxford and New York: Oxford University
Press, 2001), pp. 163-174. Some have simply written off
his work as irrelevant; for example, Holger Herwig, “Germany and the Short War Illusion: Toward a New Inter-
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Citation: Kelly McFall. Review of Zuber, Terence, Inventing the Schlieffen Plan: German War Planning 1871-1914.
H-German, H-Net Reviews. May, 2004.
URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=9342
Copyright © 2004 by H-Net, all rights reserved. H-Net permits the redistribution and reprinting of this work for
nonprofit, educational purposes, with full and accurate attribution to the author, web location, date of publication,
originating list, and H-Net: Humanities & Social Sciences Online. For any other proposed use, contact the Reviews
editorial staff at [email protected].
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