The Hong Kong Maritime Museum
Lecture
The Fleet that Gods Forgot:
The Story of the US Asiatic Fleet 1902 to 1942
Richard Wesley, Director
SATURDAY TALK: A LECTURE SERIES AT HKMM
2014
For those living in the Asia Pacific region today, the US Seventh Fleet is the epitome of great
power projection, replacing that of the British Navy whose presence in Asia was greatly
diminished after World War 2.
The sheer capability of US naval forces based in Japan is obvious to those fortunate enough to
be a guest aboard a visiting aircraft carrier, amphibious landing vessel or destroyer which
routinely dock in Hong Kong on friendship visits.
As members of the audience are well aware, current tensions in the South China Sea reflect the
importance of global trade sea routes that flow to and from the world’s second and third largest
economies, China and Japan and the mineral wealth below the sea.
As geo political tensions ebb and flow over the next decades, naval forces from countries in the
Asia Pacific region will continue to perform the very traditional role of power projection and
representation of national interests.
The presence of foreign naval forces on the China Coast, however, undoubtedly achieved its
high point in the early twentieth century. Foreign navies active in the region at this time were
drawn from Britain, France, Germany, the United States, Italy and Japan - all asserting individual
nationalist interests. The aim of this talk, however, is to highlight one aspect of a complex story,
that of the US Navy Asiatic Fleet. Formed on the instructions of President Roosevelt in 1902 to
consolidate American interests in the Philippines and China following the conclusion of the
American – Philippines War, it was ultimately destroyed by Japanese forces in defence of the
Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, and at Pearl Harbour nearly forty years later.
Today China is a super power with a surging economy, most likely to become the largest
economy in the world within two decades. It is a dominant player in world geo political stage, with
aspirations to create true blue water navy to support this diplomatic status. In 1902 however the
picture was very different. The Manchu Dynasty was about to fall, warlords struggled for power in
southern China, a nationalist movement under Dr. Sun Yat Sen was coalescing that would lead
to the foundation of the Chinese Republic in 1912 and partial reunification of the nation under
General Chiang Kai-skek in the 1920s.
Against this backdrop of collapse and renewal, foreign powers operated major trading and naval
facilities bases in the so called ‘treaty ports’. These numbered 38 in 1906, from which 1837 nonChinese firms operated. Of the estimated 38,857 foreigners associated with these companies,
3,447 were American. These treaty ports were located not only along the coast but on the shores
of the mighty Yangtze (Yangzi). The most well-known treaty ports included Shanghai, Tientsin
Hankou, Ningbo, Fuzhou, and Canton.
The narrative of the un-equal treaties, whereby foreign powers, including Britain, France,
Germany and the United States demanded and obtained the right to establish a trading presence
and protect their nationals by force of arms during the nineteenth century, is well known. The key
diplomatic arrangements forced on a weakened China included the Nan-king Treaty 1842, the
British Treaty of Tientsin 1858, the British and French Peking Conventions 1860 and the German
Convention of 1898.
Of central importance to the development of foreign trade in China during periods of uncertainty
was the ability of imperial powers to protect invested assets including warehouses, banks,
housing, lighthouses, port facilities and general infrastructure in cities like Shanghai with its
associated declared international quarters.
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In practical terms, a mobile naval presence was the most effective means of exerting authority in
times of civil strife or from acts of civil piracy against foreign controlled assets and the associated
nationals employed to run them. As a result, foreign diplomats focused on ensuring their naval
forces were given the right to operate freely in Chinese waters. The 1858 Treaty of Tientsin for
example stated clearly;
British ships of war coming for no hostile purposes, or being engaged in the pursuit of pirates,
shall be at liberty to visit all ports with the Dominions of the Emperor of China and shall receive
every facility for the purchase of provisions and the procuring of water, and, if occasion required,
for the making of repairs. The Commanders of such ships shall hold intercourse with the Chinese
Authorities on terms of equality and courtesy.
Subsequently a series of arrangements were negotiated by Western powers which enabled them
to carry out two critical missions within Chinese waters – protective actions – the active
preservation of lives and national assets - and punitive actions which referred to retaliatory
measures after violent events such as being fired on by hostile forces. Critically, foreign powers
were allowed to navigate the Yangzi River from the 1860s to protect merchant vessels and trade
centres at Hankou, Wuhu and Chinkiang, all deep inside China.
It was on this basis that the navies of Europe and the United States participated in the death
throes of the Manchu dynasty and the emergence of the Republic of China over a ninety year
period. For much of this period (1850 – 1940), the dominant naval power was the British which
had bases located in India, Singapore and critically Hong Kong and Wei-Hai-wei. This
dominance was reflected in the type and number of vessels based in China, in contrast with
other nations such as the USA.
As the later discussion will reveal, the US Navy presence in China was largely marked by
government parsimony, with deficiencies including the use of second hand and elderly vessels
and limited force structure. Indeed, some of these factors contributed to the tragic end of the
Asiatic Fleet at the hands of the Japanese in 1942.
On a brighter note, Rear Admiral Kemp Tolley, a former commander of this force points out, the
US navies famed Yangzi Patrol, an offshoot of the Asiatic Fleet, was the longest ever peacetime
operation, lasting 12 years short of century. The first US gunboat reached Wuhu on the shore of
the Yangzi in 1854, and following the end of the Civil War in 1861, the Navy had a continuous
presence until 1941, driven out not by Chinese Nationalist forces, bandits or warlords, but the
ferocity of Japanese land forces.
The initial allocation of vessels by the US Navy to Chinese waters was modest, with the Civil War
era Monocacy and Ashuelot double-ended paddle-wheelers traversing the lower reaches of the
Yangzi for two decades, despite often suffering from mechanical failures. As these vessels
reached the end of their life they were replaced by “Spanish” gunboats including Elcano, Quiros,
Samar and Villalobos. All of these vessels had been captured in the Spanish-American War
(1898), where the US took effective control of nearby Philippines.
These vessels formed part of an Asiatic Squadron, with this formation being upgraded to Fleet
status in 1902 by President Theodore Roosevelt. This new fleet was charged with defending both
the Philippines and Guam, along with ensuring America’s open door trade policy to China
remained a reality. While a Fleet in name it was recognised over the next two decades that it was
to be the weakest of the US Navies formations, indeed just two years after its creation Roosevelt
withdrew all battleships from the Far East. In early 1907 a change of policy actually saw the
Asiatic Fleet abolished, becoming the first Squadron of the United States Pacific Fleet. It was
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however re-stablished in January 1910. Despite this inconsistency, from 1916 the Fleet was
controlled by senior Admirals and the views of the fleet Commander in Chief were normally more
influential than the Ambassador to China.
By 1924, when it became clear that national disorder in China was reaching a peak, the entire
fleet consisted of only one cruiser, twenty four stack-destroyers, twelve submarines and eleven
gun boats. The later performing a police service against bandits on the Yangzi rather true force
projection. At the time American nationals were divided on the value of the river patrols, on the
one hand seen as a source of agitation to the Chinese population by creating resentment, while
others saw them as the only source of genuine protection available during times of trouble.
From the mid-1920s it was also clear to senior diplomats in Washington, within the leadership of
the US Navy and to the astute observer that the policy settings in China were based on a
foundation of sand. The ideas of extraterritoriality, most favoured nation treatment, foreign
concessions and force projection through gunboats were increasingly seen as inappropriate and
unsustainable as tools of American policy.
At the core of US Navy service in China during this period, and what made it unique, was
patrolling the Yangzi River. From the 1850s foreign trade penetrated China largely through the
Yangzi basin and its various tributaries. Battleships and heavy cruisers on the other hand were
largely limited to blue water patrols, triangulating between Manila, Japan, Shanghai and Hong
Kong.
For four generations of US naval servicemen, despatch to the China Patrol was seen largely as a
career highlight and remembered with great affection. For most, their service in China
represented a long period of relatively routine service, riotous shore leave and only occasional
life threatening incidents. The film Sand Pebbles (1961), starring Steve McQueen and shot on
location in Hong Kong using a locally produced replica gunboat, seeks to capture the larger than
life experience of the Blue Jackets on the Yangzi.
Comparatively little has been written on the subject of US Navy Service life in China, with the
exception of Rear Admiral Kemp Tolley who wrote Yangtze Patrol, the US Navy in China, with
the bookend of the story produced by Captain W. G. Winslow who records the destruction of the
Asiatic Fleet in the publication, The Fleet the Gods Forgot. This relative paucity of written
material concerning every life on the US Navy China Station has often been speculated upon but
the fact that service was largely peaceable goes a long way to explain this oversight. Today’s
historians often refer to the quotation by British statesman, William Cecil that ‘Soldiers in peace
are like chimneys in summer’ to explain why their record has largely been overlooked. Despite
this, within the traditions of the US Navy, the ‘China hands’ had a reputation for being the best
professionally at sea, and on land, unrivalled in drinking and womanising.
As with most navies prior to modern times there was a great duality between the experience of
enlisted member and officers in their daily lives. For the later, many accompanied by their wives
and families and based in major centres including Shanghai, life was luxurious. Most had
spacious quarters, servants and access to the Shanghai Club and the American Club which
formed the basis for an active social life. Similarly most vessels were well equipped with home
comforts, with small gun boats at least providing the comradery of tightly knit crews and access
to exotic inland locations whilst on patrol.
For the enlisted men there was the normal temptations offered by large cities but over time clubs
and respectable social contacts were developed by various expatriate women’s organisations.
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Certainly, however, the popular image of the regular enlisted Blue Jacket was summed up by the
much quoted response to a question to an enlisted man on how he spent his pay ‘most of it goes
for the likker and wimmen. The rest I spend foolishly.’
Life on board ship away from the health threats posed by malaria, cholera, small pox and a
variety of sexually transmitted diseases was superior to that of other destinations due to the
availability of local labour to carry out much of the hard physical work. Tasks undertaken by ‘local
crews’ ranged from routine maintenance such as cleaning and painting to stoking the wood and
coal-fired furnaces. Laundry services and food preparation were also provided by Chinese
labour, ensuring that the local crew, especially on gunboats was equal to or greater than the
number of US Navy enlisted men.
In addition to China’s exotic location and its political instability, a distinctive aspect of the service
in the Asiatic fleet was the importance of operating in inland waterways rather than only in the
open sea. Inland waterway service demanded that a new class of vessel be developed, the
gunboat. Key qualities of such craft included manoeuvrability, limited size – ranging from 100 and
270 feet in length and above all a shallow draft. The US Navy responded over time with the
development of varied classes of gunboat to supplement vessels captured from the Spanish.
These included the Monocracy, Wilmington, Guam, Panay and Luzon class. During the twentieth
century most vessels had a top speed of between 15 and 16 knots, a complement of between 50
and 70 men, and armed with two three-inch guns and an assortment of machine guns. Vessels
of this size were normally adequate, especially if operating in pairs to move quickly, evacuate
most numbers of expatriates and laydown accurate fire in the case of civil disturbances. They
were of course no match for entrenched shore based artillery and consistent air attack.
The geography of the Yangzi shaped the activities undertaken by the US Navy and the type of
vessels deployed. Nearly 3,000 miles in length, western gunboats were deployed over 1,700
miles of navigable river. The lower Yangzi meanders through low-lying flood plains, utilised for
rice growing but interspersed with swampland, isolated villages and major cities. The later
include Nanjing, before reaching Hankou, some 600 miles from the sea. The Upper Yangzi,
which for the US Navy terminated at Chungking, some 1,500 miles from the sea, was
characterised by close-in mountains, navigation hazards, rising water levels and the spectacular
Three Gorges. Because of these hazards, for the most part patrolling was limited to the Lower
and Middle Yangzi.
Between 1920 and 1940 there was a string of actions involving the US Navy with international
ramifications. The deterioration of political and military affairs prompted the previously designated
Yangzi Valley Force to the more formal Yangzi Patrol, a key element of the Asiatic Fleet in 1920.
Two incidents epitomise the times. In January 1927 Nationalist forces under Chiang Kai – shek
entered Hankou which contained a British concession and unleashed an orgy of bloodshed after
westerners had been evacuated by river. Thirty five foreign warships lay off the city, including
nine American vessels, their presence designed to encourage calm and allow the return of
commercial interests. Two months later however Nanking fell to the Kuomintang (KMT) and more
anti foreign rioting broke out. An Anglo American Flotilla was then forced to lay down a barrage
to allow a group of Standard Oil executives to be evacuated. Incidents such as this continued unabated as the entire Yangzi basin became a battle ground between Nationalist, communists and
warlords for the control of territory.
Ten years later the waters off Nanking saw another conflict, this time between Chinese
Nationalist troops and invading Japanese. In September 1931 the Japanese annexed Mongolia
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and over the next six years Chinese Nationalist forces were unable to expel them. In July 1937
Northern China was invaded, with the Japanese capturing Beijing and Shanghai. To prevent
Japanese access to the Yangzi and Nanking, a boom was constructed across the river which
trapped 13 British, six American and two French Gunboats.
This barrier was eventually overcome and the Japanese surrounded Nanking in December 1937.
The USS Panay was moored a few kilometres from the city protecting a group of Standard Oil
Tankers. On 12 December the vessel was attacked by 12 Japanese aircraft and hit by two
bombs, sinking it in shallow water with the loss of two lives and numerous injuries. The survivors
were then rescued by an Anglo American Flotilla and taken down river. This incident disturbed
American public opinion and hardened attitudes against Japanese aggression. The massacre of
Chinese civilians with the fall of Nanking had also horrified international opinion.
Over the next four years the Japanese consolidated their hold on the Lower Yangzi and trade
gradually diminished, with the Japanese suspicious of Westerners, making commercial activities
problematic. Limited availability of fuel also prevented extensive patrolling.
Japanese ambitions beyond China became increasingly clear in the four-year lead up to the
Pearl Harbour attack and inevitably the centre of gravity for the Asiatic Fleet was most plainly
Manila and the Philippines. Increasingly its task was to defend American interests in the
Philippines, rather than China, and the size of the fleet gradually expanded. On the 8th December
1941 the Asiatic Fleet consisted of 1 heavy cruiser, 1 light cruiser, 13 Clemson Class destroyers,
1 destroyer tender, 29 submarines, 5 gunboats, 1 yacht, 6 minesweepers, 2 tankers, 1 ocean
going tug, 4 seaplane tenders, 1 submarine rescue vehicle, three submarine tenders, 6 motor
torpedo boats and a schooner.
It is beyond the scope of this talk to outline in detail the fate of the Asiatic Fleet but it’s clear that
despite the heroism of the naval crew they were no match for the Japanese in defending the
Philippines. In the five months from the bombing of Pearl Harbour to the surrender of General
Wainwright in Corregidor on May 5th, 19 out of a total 40 surface vessels were sunk, including the
US cruiser Houston with the loss of 693 lives.
Numerous reasons have been given for explaining the inability of the Asiatic Fleet to defend the
Philippines. The initial strategy relied on the fleet’s submarines to harass the Japanese before
landing and then prevent significant resupplies. Explanations for a lack of success in achieving
this outcome included inexperienced commanders, inadequate defensive planning and poor
deployment, lack of use of mines, defective torpedoes and inadequate training. The Asiatic Fleet
were involved in five main battles between 24 January and the 28th February 1942, both alone
and with allied forces. These were the Battles of Balipapan, Flores Sea, Badung Strait, Java Sea
and the Sundra Strait.
The subsequent capture of the Dutch East Indies led to the retreat of the remaining ships to
Australia where they would fall under the command of the South West Pacific Area which would
establish the 7th Fleet in 1943. The last admiral in charge was Admiral Thomas C. Hart who was
relieved of command on 14th February 1942. His service was later characterised as ‘moral
courage, in the face of discouraging surroundings and complex associations’.
Some 60 years later, March 1, 2002 was declared Asiatic Fleet Memorial day to acknowledge the
service of the Asiatic Fleet in the dark days of World War 2 and the generations of service
provided by the US Navy personnel in Chinese waters.
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Fig 1
Fig 2
Figure 1: British warships in Shanghai c. 1931. Source: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division
Washington, D.C. 20540 USA, http://lccn.loc.gov/2006685952
Figure 2: Chinese gunboats on the Yang-tse-kiang, Shanghai, China, c. 1902. Source: Library of Congress Prints
and Photographs Division Washington, D.C. 20540 USA, http://lccn.loc.gov/89711599
Figure 3: Admiral Thomas Hart, 1905-1945. Source: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division
Washington, D.C. 20540 USA, http://www.loc.gov/item/hec2009007825
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