UDK: 32(4)
COBISS: 1.08
The Geopolitical Importance of Eastern Europe
for the European Union and Italy
Eva Fabrizio
Instituto de Geografía Umana, University di Milano, Via Festa del Perdono 7,
1-20122 Milano, Italia
Abstract
The paper focuses on two major geopolitical topics at the dawn of the 21. Century
and in the eyes of the Italian state: (1) the enlargement of the European Union and
(2) the boiling pot in the »Balkans«. Italy's strategic position relative to the Balkan
Peninsular makes Italy NATO's »aircraft carrier« in the Mediterranean and a potential watchdog of the Balkans. During the Serbian-Croatian conflict and the long
Bosnian crisis, NATO bases in Italy played a key military role. The Italian air force
also provided logistical support, although this support was discreet, mainly to avoid
a political backlash within Italy given Catholic pacifism and opposition from the excommunist voters. Italy might be tempted (and the signs are present at the political
level) to cast itself in the unusual role of a medium regional power. This would,
however, force it to tag along with the USA's influential geostrategies in Eastern
Europe; it is paradoxical that this line should be followed by the first Italian government guided and supported by the descendants of the Communist party. If
these predictions should come to pass, the inter-Mediterranean dialogue would be
sidelined to declarations, tourism and commerce.
Keywords: political geography, geostrategy, Eastern Europe, Italy, The Balkans
Introduction
Over the last ten years the term international
community
has g a i n e d cur-
r e n c y — a t least in t h e media and international relations—in t h e context of finding solutions for international p r o b l e m s a n d crises. W i t h i n a p h a s e of geopolitical transition, the period b e t w e e n t h e w a r against Iraq in 1991 a n d t h e intervention in K o s o v o in 1999 s a w a shift a w a y f r o m t h e need to legitimize international military o p e r a t i o n s t h r o u g h the U N s t a m p of approval to their justification
on »humanitarian g r o u n d s , « . S o m e have d e t e c t e d in this shift a confirmation
that t h e d e c l a r e d equality of the states in the W e s t p h a l i a S y s t e m is merely a
»functional f i c t i o n « 1 — i n reality there exists a p y r a m i d a l hierarchical structure, 2
g o v e r n e d by a »holy alliance« of powerful nations a n d international o r g a n i z a tions, 3 w h i c h o p e r a t e s as a w o r l d g o v e r n m e n t .
T h e geopolitical dynamics of crisis situations reveal four essential elements
in the operation of the current world order: stability, the territorial containment of
conflicts, e c o n o m i c globalization, and Western-style democracy. 4
In the hierarchy of the w o r l d h e g e m o n y , t h e U S A o c c u p i e s the a p e x of t h e
pyramid. It is t h e w o r l d political a n d e c o n o m i c leader. It controls t h e skies a n d
p o s s e s s e s most of t h e military force u s e d in international police actions. In
w o r l d politics a n d in military operations, the United States can almost always
rely o n unconditional s u p p o r t from Great Britain, a n d together the t w o play a
p r e e m i n e n t role within N A T O . F r a n c e has also t a k e n on a role o n the political
w o r l d stage as a p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r of the Security Council with veto rights,
but it has greater m a r g i n s for geopolitical m a n e u v e r i n g within the E u r o p e a n
Union. In this context F r a n c e ' s strategies overlap t h o s e of G e r m a n y , a country
that is still f o r c e d to o p e r a t e essentially at t h e e c o n o m i c level a n d only cautiously o n the political level. T h e d y n a m i c s of p o s t - I r o n Curtain E u r o p e have,
'
F. Eva, »InternationaI boundaries, geopolitics and the (post)modern territorial discourse: The
functional fiction,« in Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity, ed. D. Newman (Ilford, UK: Frank
Cass, 1999).
' J. Agnew and S. Corbridge, Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political
Economy (London: Routledge, 1995).
S. Strange, »Territory, state, authority and economy: a new realist ontology of global political
economy,« in The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order, ed. R. W. Cox
(London: Macmillan and United Nations University Press, 1997).
J. Agnew, Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics (London: Routledge, 1998).
D. Zolo, Cosmopolis. La prospettiva del governo mondiale (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1995).
R. Falk, Per un governo umano (Trieste: Asterios Editore, 1999).
4
Eva, op. cit.
however, s h o w n t h e beginnings of an i n d e p e n d e n t G e r m a n foreign policy (with
o c c a s i o n a l l y w o r r y i n g o u t c o m e s , s u c h as t h e hasty a n d a u t o n o m o u s recognition of Croatia in 1991).
In t e r m s of geostrategy, g e o g r a p h i c position is still relevant. In a world
that has b e e n s p e d up by the m e d i a a n d c o m p u t e r s , the e x c h a n g e of g o o d s
a n d the m o v e m e n t of people still t a k e place in »real« time. In addition, K o s o v o
d e m o n s t r a t e d that airborne military t e c h n o l o g y is insufficient to control territory
a n d that t r o o p s on t h e g r o u n d are still n e e d e d .
The Role of the European Union and Italy
In d e v e l o p i n g their geopolitical strategies, states take into a c c o u n t their
location a n d d r a w upon their o w n cultural values, v i e w e d as lifestyles a n d
symbolic points of reference. In c o n c e i v i n g its strategy for Eastern Europe,
G e r m a n y s e e s itself in a central position. A s regards the s o u t h e r n b a n k s of t h e
M e d i t e r r a n e a n , Italy a n d other s o u t h e r n E u r o p e a n nations o c c u p y a special
position. It is no e x a g g e r a t i o n to s a y that the Nordic countries do not entirely
m a n a g e to fit in with the M e d i t e r r a n e a n ' s , a n d this can be s e e n as o n e of t h e
m a n y e l e m e n t s that contributed to the stall in the integration p r o c e s s outlined
in 1995's B a r c e l o n a Declaration. This declaration w a s a significant a n d ambitious s t a t e m e n t of political will that could h a v e h a d major socio-political c o n s e q u e n c e s in the signatory countries of the s o u t h e r n M e d i t e r r a n e a n a n d at the
level of international relations. 5 It s h o u l d be pointed out, h o w e v e r , that the
d i f f e r e n c e s in w e a l t h b e t w e e n the northern a n d s o u t h e r n b a n k s of the Mediterranean s h o w no signs of diminishing a n d that this d i f f e r e n c e is e x p e c t e d to
increase f r o m 1:10 to 1:20 by 2010. 6 F r o m t h e geopolitical standpoint, since
1995 t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n situation has r e m a i n e d substantially at a standstill,
with no feasible w a y of i m p l e m e n t i n g the p r o c e s s called for in the Barcelona
Declaration having been f o u n d — t h e r e a s o n partly being that it relies too heavily o n senior officials, experts, a n d ministers for its implementation.
Other E u r o p e a n countries have, however, s e e n greater d y n a m i s m and/or
a greater n e e d to get involved. A n event of great geopolitical
importance
for E u r o p e o c c u r r e d in 1997, with the a c c e p t a n c e of the c a n d i d a t u r e of five
Eastern E u r o p e a n countries (Estonia, Poland, C z e c h Republic, Hungary, a n d
6
R. Gillespie, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Ilford, UK: Frank Cass, 1997).
World Bank. 1992.
Slovenia) a n d C y p r u s for a d m i s s i o n to the E u r o p e a n Union. T u r k e y , w h i c h has
now been on the waiting list s i n c e 1964, only m a n a g e d to have its a g r e e m e n t
o n c u s t o m s union with the EU renewed. B e s i d e s yet a n o t h e r rejection for Turkey, this time t h e r e w a s t h e a d d e d insult of C y p r u s ' s a c c e p t a n c e as a candidate, w h i c h it s e e s as (geo)political interference in a contentious a n d yet-to-beresolved situation.
Since then relations b e t w e e n the E u r o p e a n Union and T u r k e y have been
h e a d i n g in uncertain a n d
u n c h a r t e d directions. W h e n the cold w a r e n d e d ,
T u r k e y ' s role in t h e strategy g a m e of t h e e a s t e r n M e d i t e r r a n e a n might have
a p p e a r e d less important, s i n c e the d a n g e r of a R u s s i a n attack
decreased
significantly. H o w e v e r , the p r e s e n c e of oil reserves in the C a s p i a n S e a a n d in
several republics of e x - S o v i e t central A s i a has brought to the f o r e the n e e d for
the transportation (by m e a n s of pipelines) of m e t h a n e and oil to the s h o r e s of
the M e d i t e r r a n e a n a n d the Black Sea. T h e entire area has, h o w e v e r , proven to
be geopolitically u n s t a b l e a n d even a p o w d e r keg for a r m e d
uprisings.
Turkey's
geographic
position
therefore
once
again
independent
makes
the
country vital for both N A T O a n d the EU. 7
Nevertheless, in the a b s e n c e of a major military threat, s u c h as that o n c e
p o s e d by the U S S R , g o o d relations b e t w e e n E u r o p e a n d T u r k e y are less crucial; on the o n e h a n d T u r k e y ' s stability a n d military reliability are held in high
regard, but o n t h e other, relations b e t w e e n the t w o are less c o u r t e o u s b e c a u s e
of T u r k i s h violations of h u m a n rights a n d t h e m e t h o d s it used in d e a l i n g with
the Kurds. Current geopolitical conditions a n d the different relationships that
individual E U countries have with T u r k e y m e a n that European diplomatic strategy pulls In different directions, but moves towards the future admission of
Turkey to the EU nevertheless have b e c o m e significant.
T h e United States a p p e a r s to have a clear political a n d military geostrategy as regards E u r o p e a n d t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n — t h a t is, e x t e n d its o w n a n d
N A T O ' s influence e a s t w a r d to fill in the g a p s left by the collapse of t h e f o r m e r
Soviet Union as quickly as possible. T o a c h i e v e this the US m u s t rely o n support from Europe. Eastern E u r o p e a n countries are not all equally d e p e n d a b l e ,
however. E a c h is f a c i n g the transition f r o m a state-controlled e c o n o m y to capitalism with v a r y i n g d e g r e e s of s u c c e s s . Their a c c e p t a n c e into the EU must,
therefore, be a gradual p r o c e s s . C a n d i d a t e s m u s t be a s s e s s e d on a c a s e - b y c a s e basis, as has b e e n d e m o n s t r a t e d by t h e long d r a w n out talks o v e r the
years of a d m i s s i o n s to both the EU a n d N A T O .
S. Manor, »Ankara guarda a! greggio asiatico,« II Sole 24 Ore, 4 A ugusl 1998.
There are basically two criteria for evaluating and accepting new member
states (these are expected to be formalized by 2 0 0 0 - 0 2 ) plus one tacit condition:
1. an irreversible commitment to capitalist economics, guaranteed by regulations and laws and demonstrated by the existence of specific economic
indicators
2. the established operation of Western-style parliamentary democracy, demonstrated by the tension-free change of governments
There can, however, be no mistaking the tendency of the ELI to favor relations with countries w h o s e social and cultural practices (and per capita incomes) are comparable to those of its existing members.
The third (tacit) criterion appears to be »border stability.« None of the
countries w h o s e candidacy has been accepted (Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia) have, or potentially have, dangerous border
conflicts that could involve the rest of the EU. Cyprus may be a real geopolitical problem, but geographically it is far from mainland Europe and also an
island, a feature that simplifies the territorial containment of conflicts. The inclusion of Cyprus in the European Union could also be a source of s o m e satisfaction for Greece, given its opposition to certain ideas, such as the inclusion
of Turkey and relations with the areas of Macedonia in the ex-Yugoslavia. It
should also be mentioned that there have been some important developments
in relations between Greece and Turkey. Reciprocal offers of aid after the
recent earthquakes and the exchange of visits by ministers both indicate that
something is in the air. Greece has certainly not failed to notice its secondary
strategic importance compared with Turkey. Likewise, it has had to come to
terms with the substantial inefficacy of its opposition to the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999.
From the point of view of the territorial containment of conflict, the EU
does not look favorably on the fact that if Turkey were to become a member
state, the Kurdistan problem would automatically become an »internal« matter,
obliging it to assume diplomatic responsibility for it. A d d e d to this, if the Kurds
became European citizens it would be necessary to ensure their freedom of
movement within the EU. Germany would not be overly happy about this, but
for Italy and Greece it would mean a significant fall in the arrival of clandestine
immigrants to their shores. A d d e d to this is the fact that such an extended
Europe would border directly onto the hottest areas of the Near and Middle
East (Iraq, Iran, Syria, and the former Soviet Caucasian Republics) and place
it in the i m m e d i a t e vicinity of J o r d a n and Israel/Palestine. T h e s e potential d a n gers w o u l d slow d o w n the p r o c e s s of integration, but it w o u l d s e e m that this
path has already b e e n taken. T h e m o r e active relations b e t w e e n T u r k e y a n d
Israel during t h e s e c o n d half of the nineties might act as a further e l e m e n t to
favor broader c o o p e r a t i o n with Europe.
T h e five countries w h o s e a d m i s s i o n has b e e n temporarily
postponed
(Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, R o m a n i a , a n d Bulgaria) c o m p l e t e the picture of
W e s t e r n E u r o p e ' s o b v i o u s push e a s t w a r d . This p u s h is given i m p e t u s by t h e
N A T O - U k r a i n e military a g r e e m e n t a n d t h e o p e n i n g of the so-called »partnership for p e a c e « to Croatia in May 2000.
Russia d o e s not s e e this e x p a n s i o n in a particularly f a v o r a b l e light, a n d it
is no longer possible to ignore R u s s i a ' s views. President Putin's firm g r a s p o n
the reins p r o m i s e s greater internal e c o n o m i c a n d political stability for Russia.
But it also points to the recovery of the country's international role, t h e g e o p o litical fallout of w h i c h remains to be s e e n . If the ability to resist international
pressure is any m e a s u r e of power, Russia's military action in C h e c h n y a a n d its
substantial i m p e r v i o u s n e s s to the outcry of the international c o m m u n i t y d e m o n s t r a t e d a significant recovery of strength.
A further sign of Eastern E u r o p e ' s i m p o r t a n c e can be f o u n d in the decisions m a d e at t h e Madrid S u m m i t of 8 - 9 July 1997, w h e n N A T O w a s exp a n d e d t h r o u g h t h e inclusion of Poland, t h e C z e c h Republic, a n d Hungary,
w h i l e Slovenia a n d R o m a n i a w e r e p l a c e d o n a waiting list for inclusion. President Clinton, d u r i n g a visit to Bucharest, stated that » R o m a n i a is o n e of the
strongest c a n d i d a t e s . « 8 T h e d i s a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n the nine countries in favor
of the i m m e d i a t e inclusion of R o m a n i a a n d Slovenia, a n d the five o p p o s e d
(three are u n d e c i d e d ) w a s resolved by the United States exerting its role as
the u n d i s p u t e d leading nation a n d objecting. »In a military alliance, discipline
prevails,« stated Clinton, w h o s e position w a s s u p p o r t e d by t h e British Prime
Minister, w h o said, » N A T O is not a political club.« 9
A m o n g its v a r i o u s decisions, the Madrid S u m m i t set up the M e d i t e r r a n e a n
C o o p e r a t i o n Group, t h e aim of w h i c h is to s t r e n g t h e n d i a l o g u e b e t w e e n N A T O
and countries in t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n . This u n d e r s c o r e s t h e fact that t h e Mediterranean is r e g a r d e d as important from the point of v i e w of security, but less so
f r o m the point of v i e w of overall political strategy. N A T O ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n to
8
9
A. Geroni, »Clinton in Romania: la NATO vi aspetta,« II Sole 24 Ore. 12 July 1997.
M. Cerretelli. »Slovenia e Romania, si vedrr nel '99,« II Sole 24 Ore, 9 July 1997.
r
push itself e a s t w a r d s is decidedly stronger t h a n its push to g o south. Given the
large overlap b e t w e e n N A T O a n d EU m e m b e r s , d i f f e r e n c e s in the priority of
objectives might be attributable to t h e influential p r e s e n c e of the U S A in only
o n e of t h e t w o bodies.
A n e w d e v e l o p m e n t in the field of c o m m o n d e f e n s e a g r e e m e n t s w a s t h e
f o r m a t i o n in 1998 of the Multinational P e a c e Force of S o u t h - E a s t
( M P F S E E ) by the ministers of d e f e n s e of Italy, G r e e c e , A l b a n i a ,
Europe
Romania,
Turkey, Slovenia, a n d M a c e d o n i a . O n c e m o r e it is worth noting the predominantly E u r o p e a n - B a l k a n interest in the territory c o n c e r n e d a n d T u r k e y ' s inv o l v e m e n t for its military reliability. It is significant that d e l e g a t i o n s f r o m t h e
U S A , N A T O , EU, a n d O S C E w e r e present at the c e r e m o n y . 1 0 T h e K o s o v o
crisis, h o w e v e r , s h o w s very clearly that this kind of lower-level strategic agreem e n t carries insufficient w e i g h t to influence c o m p l e x geopolitical d y n a m i c s .
T h e standstill in the E u r o - M e d i t e r r a n e a n partnership project, t h e signing
of the e x p a n s i o n of N A T O (and t h e a g r e e m e n t s with Ukraine a n d Croatia), the
decision regarding the future a d m i s s i o n to the E U of countries interested in
military partnership, a n d t h e setting up of t h e p e a c e f o r c e in t h e
Balkans
(in Bosnia a n d Kosovo) all underscore the leading role of the U S A a n d its capacity (or power) to direct far-reaching geopolitical strategies in w h i c h it has an interest and to w a s h its hands of (or e v e n obstruct) those in w h i c h it does not.
Since t h e e n d of W o r l d W a r II, t h e United States' role in the Mediterranean has b e e n supervisory a n d regulatory. A n d with the United States n o w the
sole w o r l d s u p e r p o w e r , this is m o r e the c a s e today than ever. It is directly
involved in the s o u t h e a s t e r n M e d i t e r r a n e a n area (the I s r a e l - P a l e s t i n e issue),
but since it greatly fears so-called Islamic f u n d a m e n t a l i s m ,
it m o v e s
very
cautiously w h e r e the Islamic w o r l d is c o n c e r n e d a n d views geopolitical initiatives in w h i c h it neither plays the leading role nor is directly involved, s u c h as
the E u r o - M e d i t e r r a n e a n partnership, with a d e g r e e of distrust.
A priority of both the United States a n d the E u r o p e a n Union is t h e s p r e a d
of t h e capitalist e c o n o m y , t h r o u g h w h i c h both are able to maintain their hegemonic role a n d derive benefits for their o w n e c o n o m i e s . In t e r m s of potential
markets, t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n a n d Eastern E u r o p e are both of interest to them,
but g r e a t e r familiarity with the cultures a n d c u s t o m s of Eastern
Europeans
m a k e s t h e m preferred partners in plans for the rapid d e v e l o p m e n t of trade.
11 Sole 24 Ore, 27 September 1998
This i m b a l a n c e may, h o w e v e r , be »neither appropriate, nor justifiable« 1 1 if it
leads to E u r o p e limiting its o w n geopolitical action a n d strategic subjection to
t h e USA.
Political stability (in w h a t s o e v e r f o r m ) is a prerequisite for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of e c o n o m i c s y s t e m s . Not being a military body, the E U u s e s agreem e n t s a n d e c o n o m i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g s to a c h i e v e its objectives—it is p r e p a r e d
to formally r e c o g n i z e as equal t h o s e countries with w h i c h it enters a g r e e m e n t s
in the belief that t h e o u t c o m e of e c o n o m i c c o o p e r a t i o n is d e m o c r a c y a n d stability. T h e U S A , o n the other hand, has a l w a y s c o u p l e d military strategy with
e c o n o m i c strategy to g u a r a n t e e the stability n e e d e d for its e c o n o m i c interests.
World's instability zones
Since the capitalist c o n s u m p t i o n s y s t e m burns c o n s i d e r a b l e quantities of
fuel, it must have g u a r a n t e e d supplies of oil a n d m e t h a n e . T o date, the s o u t h ern M e d i t e r r a n e a n a n d A r a b countries have a n s w e r e d this n e e d but at a price
(oil shocks, confrontation with O P E C , fluctuating oil prices, a n d so on) a n d of
an o n g o i n g i n v o l v e m e n t in maintaining political stability in the p r o d u c t i o n areas. T h e availability of oil f r o m the C a s p i a n S e a has created n e w prospects
a n d has reinforced t h e e a s t w a r d push of the U S A a n d Europe.
Of course, for t h e m o m e n t it cannot be c l a i m e d that the so-called stability
factor has been satisfied. T h e r e are at present conflicts a r o u n d the C a u c a s u s
area (both to the north a n d south), w h e r e present (and projected) oil pipelines
pass. But it n e v e r t h e l e s s a p p e a r s that E u r o p e a n d t h e USA believe they can
obtain more lasting a n d m a n a g e a b l e results in this area than in others. In any
case, almost all the existing pipelines are o p e r a t i n g a n d any p r o b l e m s that
m a y e m e r g e will c o n c e r n t h o s e yet to be built, particularly as regards their
course.
Despite its e c o n o m i c difficulties, Russia is stable. Its oil c o m p a n i e s w e r e
therefore allowed to t a k e part in plans to extract oil f r o m the C a s p i a n a n d Kazaki oilfields, a l o n g s i d e a large contingent of U S a n d E U c o m p a n i e s . S i n c e he
is a g u a r a n t e e of authority a n d d e c i s i v e n e s s , Putin must be r e g a r d e d as a
positive element, d e s p i t e t h e formal a n d predictable calls from t h e international
" G. Lizza, »L'Europa tra regionalizzazione e globalizzazione,«
ed. G. Lizza (Turin: UTET, 1999).
Geografia della nuova Europa,
community for the respect of human rights in Chechnya and
elsewhere.
Apart from anything else, peace in Chechnya would be very useful for guaranteeing the security of present and future oil pipelines. Russia has everything to
gain from presenting itself as a stable nation, capable of controlling the territory
through which the pipes to carry the black gold can be calmly plan. Given the
geopolitical
difficulties
surrounding
the
sections
through
Iran,
Georgia—
through Armenia, which is in conflict with Azerbaijan—or Kurdistan, the Russian path is the most secure; and this goes a long way to calming any voices
that may be raised against Putin.
Although still unstable, the Caucasus area would appear to frighten the
W e s t less than groups of Islamic fundamentalists or uncontrollable states,
such as Iraq, Iran, Syria, or Libya. Integrating all the countries lying between
Europe and the Caspian Sea as quickly as possible through economic and/or
military agreements is becoming a priority that will most likely guide future US
and EU diplomacy and geostrategy. Integration and counting on Turkey as an
ally therefore remain essential. It is thus better to turn a blind eye to the undemocratic attitudes of powerful Turkish generals (the ban on the Islamic
party, for example), the government's alliance in May 1999 with the extreme
right »Grey Wolves« party to form a new government, and the methods used
to repress Kurdish revendication.
From the point of view of the distribution of military power, there can be no
doubting that at present there is an imbalance in the USA's and the West's
(NATO) favor. This imbalance will continue at least until such a time as other
military powers emerge, either for the first time (China) or again (Russia). This
imbalance in military strength reduces the likelihood of the use of large-scale
military force (following the Gulf W a r , the mere threat of military force could be
enough) and encourages a policy of territorial containment of crises. This was
the case in the bloody internecine war in Algeria, as well as the situations in
Cyprus, Chechnya, and Caucasus, as well as with the plight of the Kurds and
so on. It was also true of the tragic ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, even if the
bombing of the Serbia and Yugoslavia was required. From the perspective of
territory, the conflicts in the Balkans were contained within borders and acceptable limits that allowed the rest of Europe to go about its economic business without any great disturbance.
The expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe and the stated desire to redefine the role of the organization to make it a tool for »spreading Western
v a l u e s of d e m o c r a c y a n d market e c o n o m i c s « 1 2 a n d to enlarge »the z o n e of
direct W e s t e r n political v a l u e s « 1 3 are important geostrategic factors that increasingly u n d e r s c o r e t h e leading role of the USA. T h e role of N A T O — p o l i t i c a l
a n d not purely military—is b e c o m i n g m o r e important in Europe. It is no coincid e n c e that, to better infiltrate t h e area, the idea of t h e i m m e d i a t e inclusion of
A l b a n i a a n d M a c e d o n i a in t h e organization w a s m o o t e d , a n d that K o s o v o has
essentially b e c o m e a »protectorate« o v e r s e e n by t h e N A T O countries o n behalf of a UN that, in t h e final analysis, is only involved to cover a military o p e r a tion instigated by others.
T u r k e y ' s role as a reliable ally w a s g i v e n further p r o m i n e n c e by G r e e c e ' s
s t a n d against t h e b o m b i n g of Y u g o s l a v i a a n d its support of its O r t h o d o x Christian Serbian brothers.
Conclusion
International relations c o m m e n t a t o r s o f t e n criticize the EU for its inability
to formulate a u n a n i m o u s and influential foreign policy. But it is difficult for it to
be anything other than what it is, a n d not only b e c a u s e the EU lacks true political
unity a n d adequate institutions. Europe is essentially a society, 1 4 and this is both
its strength and w e a k n e s s . It is a force based on an ability to invent Utopias
a n d set itself objectives, 1 5 and this is probably part of the reason that the EU
is so attractive, as evidenced
by the numerous
requests for
membership.
N e w m e m b e r s i m a g i n e that union can be e s t a b l i s h e d without any party d o m i nating, despite t h e geopolitically strong positions o c c u p i e d by the e s t a b l i s h e d
m e m b e r s . T o date, the w i d e n i n g of the EU has t a k e n place t h r o u g h c a n d i d a t e s
m o v i n g into line with t h e EU before their actual m e m b e r s h i p . Despite t h e fact
that e c o n o m i c s c a n n o t replace political vision a n d that privileged positions d o
exist, in effect the E u r o p e a n self-construction p r o c e s s leaves m a n y
doors
o p e n . T h e most c o m m o n l y perceived w e a k n e s s of Europe, on t h e other hand,
13
14
S. Erlanger, »A historic dav for European geopolitics,« International Herald Tribune,
12 March 1999.
J. Fitchett, »NATO moves eastward,« International Herald Tribune, 13-14 March 1999.
Levy, op. cit.
C. Cerreti, »Un 'idea di Europa,« in Geografia della nuova Europa, ed. G. Lizza
(Turin: UTET, 1999).
is its inability to construct itself as a political entity a n d o p e r a t e with a c o m m o n
foreign policy. But not e v e r y o n e s h a r e s this negative view. 1 6
W o r l d political d y n a m i c s are increasingly m o v i n g t o w a r d s world government, e c o n o m i c globalization, a n d efforts for rapid a n d »efficient« resolution of
conflicts. T h e cultural influence of the US s u p e r p o w e r in t h e formulation of
future policies is very strong. A n d it is in this light that t h e proposals to reform
t h e Security Council a n d the increasingly active a n d interventionist role of
N A T O s h o u l d be seen.
R e g a r d i n g the internal d y n a m i c s b e h i n d the political c o n s t r u c t i o n of the
EU, c o m m e n t s by the G e r m a n foreign minister, Fischer, g a v e n e w impetus to
t h e d e b a t e o n the future of Europe. After a d e c a d e d o m i n a t e d by a r m e d conflicts a n d d i s c u s s i o n of appropriate intervention, politics has a g a i n t a k e n the
upper h a n d a n d the largest a n d most authoritative s t a t e s — F r a n c e a n d Germ a n y — h a v e regained their guiding role. For t h e m o m e n t , Italy r e m a i n s in a
supporting role, but this w a s not the c a s e in recent military operations, this
representing a significant new d e v e l o p m e n t .
Its strategic position relative to t h e Balkan Peninsular m a k e s Italy N A T O ' s
»aircraft carrier« in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n a n d a potential w a t c h d o g of the Balkans. During t h e S e r b i a n - C r o a t i a n conflict a n d the long B o s n i a n crisis, N A T O
b a s e s in Italy played a key military role. T h e Italian air force also provided
logistical support, a l t h o u g h this s u p p o r t w a s discreet, mainly to avoid a political
b a c k l a s h within Italy given Catholic pacifism a n d o p p o s i t i o n f r o m t h e exc o m m u n i s t voters.
A s regards A l b a n i a , Italy o r g a n i z e d a n u m b e r of o p e r a t i o n s (Pellicano 1
a n d 2, a n d A r c o b a l e n o ) , but m o r e with s o c i o - e c o n o m i c e n d s a n d m o r e with a
local policing role than fully f l e d g e d territorial o c c u p a t i o n . T h e main objective
w a s to filter a n d s l o w d o w n the flow of immigrants to Italy by e n c o u r a g i n g internal stability t h r o u g h e c o n o m i c aid. A s the d e c a d e progressed, h o w e v e r , the
crisis in t h e B a l k a n s s a w Italy b e c a m e increasingly involved. T h e Italian military g a i n e d clout internationally, w h i c h resulted in increasing d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g
a n d c o m m a n d responsibilities in joint o p e r a t i o n s with N A T O .
T h e K o s o v o crisis revealed an Italy c o n s e n t i n g to N A T O strategies a n d
o n e that w a s d e c i d e d l y useful at the level of military support. It w a s an Italy—of
politicians a n d c i t i z e n s — i n c r e a s i n g l y d i s p o s e d to overlook Article 11 of its
constitution, w h i c h rejects w a r as a m e a n s of resolving conflict. T h e b o m b i n g
of Iraq in 1991, p e r f o r m e d u n d e r the authorization of the UN, set off a sponta-
Levy, op. cit.
n e o u s w a v e of strikes in Italy. T h e s a m e did not occur in 1999 f o l l o w i n g b o m b a r d m e n t s instigated by N A T O without the UN s t a m p of approval. O n the other
hand, its g e o g r a p h i c proximity a n d the proliferation of Catholic a n d lay nong o v e r n m e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n s that support solidarity s a w t h e Italians providing aid
(machinery, food, m e d i c i n e s a n d m o n e y ) to the a f f e c t e d populations parallel to
t h e d e t a c h m e n t of Italian soldiers a n d Carabinieri in international policing operations in Bosnia a n d K o s o v o .
O n e c o m m e n t a t o r has d i s c e r n e d a partial d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e Italian
a n d G e r m a n positions d u r i n g t h e K o s o v o crisis a n d has interpreted this as a
sign of future a u t o n o m y in t h e area of foreign policy. 1 7 But this is possibly a
s o m e w h a t rash interpretation, p e r h a p s t h e result of t h e c o m m e n t a t o r ' s distant
position (Texas). In c o n c r e t e t e r m s , it is significant that Italy has e x c l u s i v e
military responsibility o v e r a part of K o s o v o , this placing it o n the s a m e level as
t h e U S A , Great Britain, a n d F r a n c e (the c u s t o m a r y international w a t c h d o g s ) ,
as well as G e r m a n y , w h i c h for t h e first time since W o r l d W a r II is being permitt e d to dispatch a sizeable military force o u t s i d e its borders. Given its strategic
location relative to the Balkans, in an attempt to e m e r g e from its d e c a d e s - o l d
position o n the military sidelines, Italy might be t e m p t e d (and t h e signs are
present at the political level) to cast itself in the u n u s u a l role of a m e d i u m regional power. This w o u l d , h o w e v e r , force it to tag along with the U S A ' s influential g e o s t r a t e g i e s in Eastern Europe; it is p a r a d o x i c a l that this line s h o u l d be
f o l l o w e d by the first Italian g o v e r n m e n t g u i d e d a n d s u p p o r t e d by the d e s c e n d a n t s of the C o m m u n i s t party.
If t h e s e predictions s h o u l d c o m e to pass, t h e r e w o u l d be a n o t h e r c o m p e l ling reason for special t r e a t m e n t for Eastern Europe, w h i l e the south a n d interM e d i t e r r a n e a n d i a l o g u e w o u l d be sidelined to declarations of principle a n d
subject to the fickle d y n a m i c s of t o u r i s m a n d c o m m e r c e .
" Stratfor's Free Kosovo Crisis Center, Stratfor Inc., 504 Lavaca, Suite 1100, Austin, TX7870I.
http://www.stratfor.com/kosovo/crisis/, Stratfor Global Intelligence Update, May 3, 1999.
Geopolitični pomen Vzhodne Evrope za
Evropsko zvezo (EU) in Italijo
Povzetek
Prispevek
obravnava
dvoje aktualnih geopolitičnih vprašanj
na prehodu v
21. stoletje skozi prizmo italijanske države: (1) širitev Evropske zveze na vzhod
in (2) žarišče evropske nestabilnosti - Balkan. Diskusije o organiziranosti EU in
širitvi Evropske zveze so vzplamtele po govoru nemškega zunanjega ministra
Joschke Fischerja leta 2000. Po skorajda desetletju oboroženih spopadov in
umirjanju le-teh s prisilnimi sredstvi, je v ospredje ponovno stopila politika. Največji in najbolj vplivni državi evropskega kontinenta - Francija in Nemčija - sta
vzeli ponovno vajeti v roko. Trenutno je Italija v vlogi »stranskega igralca«, čeprav je bila v devetdesetih letih aktivni in enakovreden član vojaških misij na
Balkanu. Geostrateški položaj Italije je pripomogel k temu, da je ozemlje države
postalo »letalonosilka« evropskih in NATO interesov v Sredozemlju. Italiji je
poslej namenjena vloga skrbnega opazovalca dogajanju na njej sosednjem, s
konflikti prepreženem polotoku. Čeprav je bila vloga letalskih sil Italije zaradi
pacifistične nastrojenosti italijanskega katoliškega prebivalstva ter nasprotovanja
močne levosredinske opozicije v posredovanju na ozemlju bivše Jugoslavije
omejena, se zdi, da Italijo mika prevzeti vlogo čuvaja na Balkanu. Izziv, postati
regionalna supersila, se zdi sedanjemu vodstvu - naslednikom nekdanjih komunistov, zares vabljiv. V kolikor bo ta usmeritev prevladala bo zavel nov veter v
odnosu Evropske zveze do držav nekdanjega komunistične vladavine v Vzhodni
Evropi in na Balkanu. Dialog med državami Sredozemlja, ki je nekaj časa obetal
uspehe in ga je Italija usmerjala, bo za nekaj časa odstavljen na stranski tir,
oziroma mimo deklaracij in turističnega pretoka ne bo prišel.