Resistanceisfutile:
towardanon-moderndemocratizationoftechnology
Peter-PaulVerbeek
Appearedas:
Verbeek,P.P.(2013).‘ResistanceIsFutile:TowardaNon-ModernDemocratizationof
Technology’.In:Technè,Volume17,Issue1,pp.72-92.ISSN1091-8264
1.Introduction
PhenomenologyandMarxismhavealwayshadacomplicatedrelationship.Whenaskedaboutthe
possiblecontributionsofphilosophytosocialchange,inafamoustelevisioninterviewwith
RichardWisser,MartinHeideggerrepliedwithasharpcritiqueofKarlMarx.InhisTheseson
Feuerbach,Marxstatedthat“philosophershaveonlyinterpretedtheworld;whatmattersisto
changeit”(Marx,2000).Andagainstthis,Heideggershowedthatthisstatementignoresthatitis
infactbaseduponaveryspecificunderstandingoftheworlditself:itpresupposesthattheworld
ismakeableandchangeable.Forphenomenologists,Marxismoverlooksthehermeneutic
dimensionsofhumanexistence;forMarxists,phenomenologyispoliticallyignorant.
AndrewFeenbergisoneoftheveryfewscholarswhosuccessfullymanagestoconnectthesetwo
traditions.Firmlyrootedinneo-Marxism,hecriticallyintegratesphenomenologicalanalysesinhis
criticaltheoryoftechnology,culminatinginhisstudyHeideggerandMarcuse:TheCatastrophe
andRedemptionofHistory(Feenberg2005b).ForFeenberg,politicalpowerandthecultural
appropriationoftechnologyarecloselyconnected.Inhisview,technologyinvolvesbotha
decontextualizationandarecontextualization:whileitdetachesentitiesfromtheircontextin
ordertousetheminafunctionalway,theresultingtechnologiesarealwaysrecontextualized
whentheyacquireaplaceinsociety.Bothaspectsneedtobeaddressedinphilosophyof
technology.Moreover,becauseofhiscontextualandempiricalapproachtotechnology(cf.
Achterhuis2001),forFeenbergtechnologyisneverproblematicinitselfbutonlyinitsconcrete
workings.Andthisconnectscloselytocontemporaryapproachesinphilosophyoftechnology,that
focusonactualtechnologiesandtheirsocialandculturalimplications,ratherthan‘Technology’,as
abroadsocialandculturalphenomenon.ForFeenberg,then,thetaskofapoliticalphilosophyof
technologyisnottocriticizetechnologyassuch,buttofindanalternativetechnologicalrationality
andmateriality.
Inthisarticle,Iwilladdressthequestionofhowtoarriveatsuchan‘alternativetechnology’,
engaginginacriticalwaywithFeenberg’sapproach.Thecentralpointofdiscussionwillbethe
conceptualizationoftherelationsbetweentechnologyandsocietythatsupportsandguides
politicalanalysesoftechnology.WithanodtoHeidegger’scritiqueofMarx,Iwilldiscussthebasic
understandingofthehuman-technologyrelationthatunderliestheneo-Marxistapproachto
technology.Againsttheneo-Marxistdialecticalmodelofastrugglebetweentechnologyand
society,focusingonoppressionandliberation,Iwillproposeaphenomenologicalmodelinwhich
humanityandtechnologyarecloselyintertwined,andinwhichtechnologyhelpstoshape
frameworksofmeaningandinterpretation.
Atthebackgroundofthisdiscussion,aswillbecomeclearbelow,isthequestionofmodernity.
Whileacriticaltheoryoftechnologystrivesforthedevelopmentofanalternativemodernity,the
phenomenologicalapproachindicatedaboveratherresultsinanonmodernframework,inspired
bycontemporaryapproacheslikepostphenomenologyandactor-networktheory.Sucha
frameworkdoesnottakeasharpdivisionbetweenhumansubjectsandtechnologicalobjectsasits
startingpoint,butfocusesontheirinterwovencharacter.Thisdiscussionwill,finally,leadustothe
questionofhowtodopoliticswiththisnonmodernalternativetocriticaltheory.Iwilladdressthis
questionbyexpandingFeenberg’sanalysisofthedemocratizationoftechnology.Inadditionto
thereorganizationofpowerrelations,Iwillproposea‘democraticaccompaniment’of
technologicaldevelopments,inwhichthereintroductionofthequestionofthegoodlifeinthe
publicspherehasacentralplace.
2.Criticizingcriticaltheory
Dominationandresistance
Feenberg’scriticaltheoryoftechnologyintegratesclassicalMarxist‘technologycritique’with
contemporaryempiricalandcontextualapproachestotechnology.Ratherthanaddressing
‘Technology’,asabroadsocialandculturalphenomenon,headdressesactualtechnologiesand
theirpoliticalworkings.ForFeenberg,technologyisathoroughlypoliticalphenomenon.Not
becauseitprovidestheinfrastructureforindustrialization,asclassicalMarxismwouldhaveit,but
becauseitembodiespoliticalinterests,ideologies,andpowerrelations.Feenbergdevelopedthe
conceptofthe“technicalcode”toexplainthis.Atechnicalcode,inhisownwords,is“the
realizationofaninterestorideologyinatechnicallycoherentsolutiontoaproblem”(Feenberg
2005a).Suchcodesarenotalwaysexplicitlyformulatedbydesigners;mostoftentheycomeabout
implicitly:
Althoughsometechnicalcodesareformulatedexplicitlybytechnologists
themselves,Iamseekingamoregeneralanalytictoolthatcanbeappliedeven
intheabsenceofsuchformulations.Moreprecisely,then,atechnicalcodeisa
criterionthatselectsbetweenalternativefeasibletechnicaldesignsintermsof
asocialgoal."Feasible"heremeanstechnicallyworkable.Goalsare"coded"in
thesenseofrankingitemsasethicallypermittedorforbidden,oraesthetically
betterorworse,ormoreorlesssociallydesirable.
TheheartofFeenberg’sanalysisisformedbyhistheoryofinstrumentalization.ForFeenberg,
instrumentalizationistheessentialcharacteristicoftechnology.Instrumentalizationhastwo
manifestations:therearetwowaysinwhichtechnologyturnsentitiesintoinstruments,which
Feenbergcalls“primary”and“secondary”instrumentalization.Primaryinstrumentalization
consistsin“thefunctionalconstitutionoftechnicalobjectsandsubjects”:technologyapproaches
bothhumanandnonhumanentitiesintermsofthefunctiontheycouldhave.Secondary
instrumentalizationis“therealizationoftheconstitutedobjectsandsubjectsinactualnetworks
anddevices”(Feenberg1999,202):itoccurswheninstrumentstakeonaspecificsocialand
culturalrole,andbecomepartofrelationswithhumanbeings.
Thefirstformofinstrumentalizationdecontextualizesandreducessubjectsandobjectstothe
functionstheycanhaveinatechnicalsystem,asanalyzedinvariouswaysbyMarx,Habermas,and
Heidegger.Technologicaldevelopmentrequiresareductionofhumansandthingsto‘raw
material’withfunctionalproperties.Thesecondformofinstrumentalizationconsistsina
recontextualizationofentities,placingthembackinthe“dimensionsofrealityfromwhichthe
primaryinstrumentalizationabstracts”(Feenberg1999,205).Here,thefocusisonhow
technologiesbecomepartofnetworksofrelations,andtakeonmediatingrolesinpeople’s
practicesandexperiences.Afterthereductionismofprimaryinstrumentalization,secondary
instrumentalizationbringsincomplexity,embodyinganentirelydifferentpoliticaldimensionof
technology.Besidesafunctionalizationofhumansandthings–whichcaneasilydevelopinto
exploitation–technologyalsogeneratesnewformsofmeaningandorganizesnewpracticesand
experiences.Atthislevel,thereisalsocreativeappropriationoftechnology,inwhichhuman
beingsuseandembedtechnologiesinunexpectedorevensubversiveways.
ForFeenberg,thecurrenttechnologicalconfigurationofoursocietyisdeeplyproblematic.
FeenbergsharesMarx’sanalysisthatourcapitalist,industrialsociety“orientstechnological
developmenttowarddisempoweringworkersandthemassificationofthepublic”(Feenberg
2005a,53).Feenbergcallsthiscontroloverthelaborprocess“operationalautonomy”,whichhe
definesas“thefreedomoftheownerorhisrepresentativetomakeindependentdecisionsabout
howtocarryonthebusinessoftheorganization,regardlessoftheviewsorinterestsof
subordinateactorsandthesurroundingcommunity”(ibid.).Thisautonomygivesthemanagersa
safeposition,farawayfromtheconsequencesoftheirdecisions,fromwhichtheycan“reproduce
theconditionsoftheirownsupremacyateachiterationofthetechnologiestheycommand”.This
situationultimatelyresultsintechnocracy,when“technologyandmanagementspreadtoevery
sectorofsociallife”(Feenberg2005a,55).
Yet,technologycantakeanotherdirection.“Whatcanbedonetoreversethetide?”,Feenberg
asks,immediatelyansweringthat“onlythedemocratizationoftechnologycanhelp”.Democratic
movementscancreate“alliancesofactors”whichmakesurethattheconsequencesoftheactions
takenarealsoexperiencedbythepeoplemakingthedecisions.Inthisway,agencyisrestoredto
“thosetreatedasobjectsofmanagementinthedominanttechnicalcode”(Feenberg2005a,55).
Inhisdemocratizationtheory,Feenbergclearlyshowshisdialecticroots:itprimarilycomesdown
toresistance.“Subordinateactors”,hesays.“mustinterveneinadifferentwayfromdominant
ones”(ibid.).Inordertoelaboratethis,FeenbergbaseshimselfonMichelDeCerteau–more
specifically,onDeCerteau’sinterpretationofMichelFoucault.DeCerteaumakesadistinction
between‘strategies’and‘tactics’.Strategiesbelongtoinstitutionalgroupsthathavethepowerto
actuallydevelopastrategy,whereastacticsbelongtothose“subjecttothatpowerandwho,
lackingabaseforactingcontinuouslyandlegitimately,maneuverandimprovisemicropolitical
resistances.”(ibid.)
ForFeenberg,theleveloftacticsisbyfarthemostinteresting.Tacticsaretheantidoteto
domination;theyarethemediumofresistance,becausetheyequippeoplewiththemeansto
counterthedominatingandexploitingeffectsoftechnology.Whilestrategiesbelongtotherealm
ofdecontextualizationandprimaryinstrumentalization,tacticsareformsofsecondary
instrumentalization.Theyareintherealmofrecontextualization,givingnewrolesandmeaningto
technologies,andthusrewritingthetechnologicalcode.
Fromdialecticstohermeneutics
TheimportanceofFeenberg’scriticaltheoryoftechnologycannotbeoverestimated.Hiswork
offersmanypointsofapplicationforpoliticalactionandforthefurtherdevelopmentofapolitical
theoryoftechnology.Yet,froma(post-)phenomenologicalpointofviewthereisalsoaproblem
withFeenberg’sconceptualizationoftherelationsbetweentechnologyandsociety.Thebasic
modeloftheserelationsinhiswork,fromhisdialecticalneo-Marxistapproach,isthatofa
struggle.Technologyandsocietyareconceptualizedastwoseparaterealms,andtheroleof
democracyistomakesurethatthepoweriswiththepeople,notwithtechnology.Iftechnology
invadestoodeeplyintothehumansphere,practicesofresistanceandsubversionareneededto
pushitbackintoitsownrealm.Thelogicofprimaryinstrumentalizationisalogicoftechnology,
whilethelogicofsecondaryinstrumentalizationishuman–andthefirstshouldnotoverrulethe
second.
Thisstruggle-modelrestsuponaconceptualizationofhuman-technologyrelationsthatishighly
contestable.ContemporaryapproacheslikeActor-NetworkTheoryandPostphenomenology
convincinglyarguethathumansandtechnologiesarecloselyintertwined,andcanonlybe
conceptualizedintheirinterrelations.DonIhde’spostphenomenologicalapproachtotechnology,
forinstance,focusesonhuman-technologyassociations,ratherthantechnologiesthemselves.By
analyzingthecharacterofthevariousshapesthesehuman-technologyrelationscantake,Ihde
unravelshowtechnologieshelptoshapehumaninterpretationsandpractices(Ihde1990).Bruno
Latour’sActor-NetworkTheoryworksalongcomparablelines.Inordertounderstandreality,
Latourclaims,weneedtogiveuptheaprioriseparationwemakebetweenhumanandnonhuman
beings.Human‘subjects’andnonhuman‘objects’arealwaysintertwined,andthenetworksof
relationsbetweenthemproducetheworldinwhichwelive(Latour1993).TheFrenchphilosopher
BernardStieglerevenspeaksaboutan‘originarytechnicity’ofhumanexistence:humanexistence
hasalwaystakenshapeincloseinteractionwithtechnologies(Stiegler1998).
Thehumanbeingcannotbeunderstoodinisolationfromtechnology,justliketechnologycannot
beunderstoodinisolationfromhumanity.Conceptualizingthisrelationintermsofstruggleand
oppressionislikeseekingresistanceagainstgravity,orlanguage.Technologyhelpstoshapewhat
itmeanstobehuman.Thisdoesnotimply,ofcourse,thatallrolesoftechnologyinhuman
existenceareequallydesirable,andthathumanbeingsareinfactpowerlessvictimsofthepower
oftechnology.Butitdoesimplythatthemodelofoppressionandresistancemightnotbethe
mostproductivemodelifonewantstochangeundesirableconfigurationsofhumansand
technologies.
Ifthereisastrugglebetweenhumansandtechnologiesatall,itshouldbeconceptualizedinthe
wayHeideggerconceptualizedartworksasastrugglebetween‘earth’and‘world’.Aworkofart,
HeideggerarguesinTheOriginoftheWorkofArt,bringsaworldintobeingonthebasisof
‘earthly’elements,likeclothandpaint,bronze,vibrationsoftheair,etcetera(Heidegger1971).
Experiencingaworkofartisexperiencingthecomingintobeingofaworld,outofthesematerial
elements.WatchingVanGogh’spaintingofapairofpeasantshoes,inHeidegger’swell-known
example,setsintomotiona‘struggle’betweentheclothandthepigmentontheonehand,and
therealityofthepairofshoesthatarisesoutofthesematerialelementontheother.Inthis
struggle,thereisnooppressionandliberation,butinteractionandmutualshaping.Itwouldbe
strangetosaythatthepaintoppressestheshoes,ortheotherwayround:thetwoarenecessarily
connected.Similarly,formsofhumanexistenceandarrangementsofsocietyare‘revealed’inthe
relationsbetweentechnologicalmaterialitiesandthehumanbeingswhodesign,organize,anduse
them.
Anexamplemayservetoillustratethedifferencesbetweenthesepositions.Fromadialectical
perspective,atechnologylikeFacebookcanappearasathreattosociety.Afterall,itembodies
thepowerofafewmightypeoplewhoearnalotofmoneybyanalyzingourpersonalprofilesand
sellingtheseanalysestoadvertisers.Moreover,Facebookcanbeseenasathreattothequalityof
socialrelations,becauseitmakesusshallow(Carr2011)andconsumerist(Borgmann1984,1999).
Inordertoreversethetide,activistscouldtrytohacktheFacebookwebsite,ortodevelop
alternativedigitalsocialnetworksinwhichthepowerisnotwithasmallelitebutwiththeentire
communityofusers.Also,peopleshouldbeeducatedabouttheeffectsofFacebookonthequality
ofthesocialrelationstheyareinvolvedin,inordertobeabletodevelopacriticalrelationtoit.
Froma(post)phenomenologicalperspective,though,Facebookissimplyoneofthemediathrough
whichfriendshipcantakeshape.Justlikereal-lifeconversations,letters,ore-mails.Ratherthan
alienatingpeoplefromeachother,itmediatestheirrelations,offeringnewwaysofinteraction.
Theseneednotalwaysbedesirable–butthecentralideaisthat,whenintegratedinpeople’s
everydaylives,technologieslikeFacebookdonotfunctionastechnologicalinvasionsaliento
humanexistence,butastheverymediaofhumanexistence.Tobesure,therearepowersof
capitalismbehindit,andFacebookisperforminga‘primaryinstrumentalization’ofitsusersin
ordertomakemoneyoutoftheirsocialinteractions.Butseeingthisasasituationofoppressionto
whichresistanceistheonlyanswerwouldnotdojusticetothecomplexityofthesocialand
culturalrolesofFacebook.Ratherthanresistingoppressionanddevelopingtacticstocounterthe
strategiesoftheexploiters,citizensinatechnologicalworldshoulddeveloptechniquestogivea
desirableshapetheirtechnologicallymediatedexistenceandtoorganizetheirtechnological
society.Thisdoesnottakeawaytheimportanceofcounteringthepowerofthebigcompaniesif
thesewouldformathreattosociety.Butitshowsthatanexclusivefocusonthedialecticsof
oppressionandliberationleavesmanycrucialsocialandculturalaspectsoftechnologyuntouched.
Technologiesoftheself
Inordertoarriveatsuchanapproach,analternativeisneededtoDeCerteau’sreadingof
Foucault.ThefoundationsforsuchareadingofFoucaultarelaidintherecentworkofSteven
Dorrestijn(Dorrestijn2012).DorrestijnreadsFoucault’sworkonpowerthroughthelensofhis
laterworkonethics.WhileFoucault’searlierworkfocusesonthenormalizingworkingsofspecific
forcesandstructuresinsociety,thelasttwovolumesofhisHistoryofSexualitycanbereadasan
investigationintohowhumanbeingscanshapetheirexistenceininteractionwiththesepower
structures.Insteadofbeingtheobjectsofpower,humansthenappearassubjectswhodevelopa
productiveinteractionwiththepowersthatbe.
Foucault’sworkonpowershowshowmodernsociety,eversincetheEnlightenment,hasnotonly
producedamodernsubjectthathascometoseeitselfas‘autonomous’,butalsoaseriesof
implicitpowerstructuresthatmakethesubjectmuchlessautonomousthanitmightseemtobe.
Hospitals,prisons,andschoolshaveanormalizingpower:theyimplicitlydeterminehowhuman
beingsaresupposedtolive,andwhatisnormalandabnormal.Quiteoften,asDeCerteau’s
positionillustrates,Foucault’sworkonpowerisreadinadialecticalway:asastoryabout
oppressionandliberation.And,obviously,thisinterpretationmatchesnicelywithneo-Marxist
approaches.Oppressionistheretoberesisted:politicalactivityshouldaimtodevelopcounterprogrammesagainstoppressivepowerstructures;subversivepracticesshouldrestorepowerto
theoppressed.Aswesaw,Feenberg’sproposaltodemocratizetechnologytakesplacesexactly
alongtheselines.BytakingsideswithDeCerteau,Feenbergadoptsamodelofpowerinwhich
technologyoppresseshumanbeings,andtacticsneedtobedevelopedtoresistthisoppression.
Foucault’slaterworkadoptanentirelydifferentrelationtopower.Ratherthanresistingpower
structures,itapproachesthemas‘sourcesoftheself’,ifImayborrowTaylor’sexpression(Taylor
1989).Powerstructuresarenotalientohumanbeings,butformthebasisofourexistence.Rather
thanresistingthem,weneedtodevelopproductiveinteractionswiththem.Suchproductive
interactionsFoucaultcalls‘self-practices’,oreven‘technologiesoftheself’(Foucault1997,223-
252).HediscoveredthemparticularlyintheethicsofsexualityinancientGreece.Thereandthen,
sexualitywasnotapproachedsomuchintermsofinhibitionsandobligations,butintermsof
‘styling’oneselfasasexualsubject.Indealingwiththepassions,themainquestionwasnotwhat
wasallowedandwhatnot,buthowtofindagoodwayofdealingwiththem.Givingthepassions
notenoughspacewouldbedenyingapartofoneself,whilegivingthemtoomuchspacewould
makehumanstheirslaves,whichwouldalsoresultinlosingoneself.
Theethicsofsexuality,therefore,wastheartoflivingalife-with-passions.Ratherthanbeingan
externalinvader,thepassionswereconsideredtobeconstitutiveforhumanexistence–notinthe
sensethattheydetermineus,butinthesensethattheyurgeustogovernthem.Ethicalactivity
wasnotdirectedataliberationfromoppressivepowers,butasdevelopingafreerelationtothese
powers.Notmakingoneselffreefrompower,asanautonomoussubject,wasthecentralaim,but
engaginginafreerelationwiththesepowers,byunderstandingtheirworkingsandgetting
involvedinthewaystheyhaveanimpactonone’ssubjectivity.Between‘yes’and‘no’itwas
lookingfora‘how’.
MakingFoucault’sapproachofthe‘technologiesoftheself’fruitfulforapoliticalphilosophyof
technologyrequiressometranslationwork,astheworkofStevenDorrestijnshows(Dorrestijn
2006).Justlikethepassions,technologieshaveacontinuousimpactuponus.Theartoflivingina
technologicalculture,then,istheartofgivingadesirableshapetoone’stechnologicalmediated
subjectivity,andtotheorganizationofourtechnologicalsociety.Insteadoffocusingonthe
questionofwhichtechnologiesareacceptableandwhicharenot,themaintaskistoaskourselves
howwewanttoshapeourrelationswithtechnologies.Andinsteadofdevelopingthetacticsof
resistance,weneedtacticsof‘subjectivation’.
ThistranslationofFoucault’srevivalofclassicalGreekethicsmakesclearthatacknowledgingthe
fundamentalintertwinementoftechnologyandsocietydoesnotrequireustogiveuponpolitics.
Yet,atthesametimeitisfarfromself-evidentwhatapoliticalphilosophyoftechnologycouldbe
whenitbasesitselfonthefundamentallytechnologicallymediatedcharacterofhumanexistence.
Iftheseisno‘external’positionfromwhichto‘criticize’technology,butonlyaposition‘from
within’,whatcanpoliticsbe?Doesn’tthispositionboildowntoasurrenderbeforethestruggle?
Inwhatfollows,Iwillarguethattheoppositeistrue.BuildinguponFoucault’sconceptofthe‘limit
attitude’Iwillshowthatdemocratizationdoesnotneedtotaketheshapeofexternalcritiquebut
canalsobeaformofaccompanyingtechnology.
3.Fromcritiquetogovernance
Howtodopoliticaltheoryoftechnologyifcritiquecannotbethemodel?Inthesymmetrical
approachofBrunoLatour,inwhichhumanandnonhumanentitiesplayequalroles,andinthe
mediationapproachofpostphenomenology,wherehumanpracticesandexperiencesarealways
technologicallymediated,theredoesnotseemtobean‘outside’positionanymorewithrespect
totechnology.Andifthereisnooutsideanymore,fromwherecouldwecriticizetechnology?
Here,itisveryhelpfultoconnecttoFoucault’sapproachtothephenomenonof‘critique’inhis
lecture‘WhatisEnlightenment?’(Foucault1997a).Inthistext,Foucaultislookingforananswerto
whathecalls‘theblackmailoftheEnlightenment’.Thisblackmailconsistsinthefactthatitis
extremelyhardtocriticizetheEnlightenment,sinceallattemptstodosoaretypicallyexplainedas
beingagainstit.AnyonewhodarestodoopenadiscussionabouttheEnlightenmentraisesthe
suspicionofbeingagainstrationality,democracy,andscientificinquiry.Foucault,however,wants
toexploreifanalternativeEnlightenmentwouldbepossible–muchlikeFeenberg’sattemptto
formulatean‘alternativemodernity’.
Asthetitlesuggests,Foucault’stextisprimarilyoccupiedwiththeworkofImmanuelKant.Infact,
itproposesanempiricalandpracticalreinterpretationofKant’sideasontheEnlightenment.
Ratherthanaimingatatranscendentalapproach,whichfocusesonnon-empiricalconditionsof
possibility,FoucaultreinterpretstheEnlightenmentasanattitude.ForKant,Enlightenmentwasa
wayoutof“immaturity”,using“reason”ratherthanaccepting“someoneelse’sauthoritytolead
usinareaswheretheuseofreasoniscalledfor”(Foucault1997a,305).Thisrequirescritique:
critiquecantellusunderwhichconditions“theuseofreasonislegitimateinordertodetermine
whatcanbeknown,whatmustbedone,andwhatmaybehoped”(Foucault1997a,308).Such
critique,accordingtoFoucault,mustbeunderstoodasanattitude,an“ethos”.Thisattitudeis
alwayslookingforthelimitsofwhatseemstobegivenandself-evident.
FoucaultcallsthisEnlightenmentattitudea“limitattitude”.Thislimit-attitudeislookingfor“the
singular,thecontingent,andtheproductofarbitraryconstraints”in“whatisgiventousas
universal,necessary,obligatory”(Foucault1997a,315).AndwhileKantwaslookingforformal
limitswithinwhichthesciencesaretoplaythemselvesout,Foucaultislookingforwhatlimitsthe
subject.Critique,as‘enlightened’activityparexcellence,thenbecomesaformofpracticalselfinquiry:investigatingwhatusthebeingsthatweare.Thisalsorelatestothemodernselfunderstandingoftheautonomoussubject.Thelimit-attitudemakesvisiblethatthisself-
understandinghasahistory,andthereforeitalsoshowsthatotherformsofsubjectivityare
possiblethanthatoftheautonomoussubject.
Foucault’sideasaboutcritiqueaslimit-attitudecouldinspireanalternative‘criticaltheory’of
technology.Whatsetsthelimit-attitudeapartfromotherformsofcritiqueisthewayitpositions
itself.Whilecritiqueplacesitselfoutsideofthephenomenaitrelatesto,forthelimit-attitude
thereisnooutside.Thehumansubjectisalwayssituatedwithintheworldtowhichithasa
relation.Inthecontextoftechnologythismeansthattheframeworksfromwhichonecancriticize
technologyaretechnologicallymediatedthemselves.Wecanneverstepoutofthesemediations.
Themostfarwecangetis:tothelimitsofthesituationwearein.Standingattheborders,
recognizingthetechnologicallymediatedcharacterofourexistenceandourinterpretations,we
caninvestigatethenatureandthequalityofthesemediations:wheredotheycomefrom,what
dotheydo,couldtheybedifferent?
Assuch,theFoucauldianlimit-attitudeprovidesa“wayout”ofthequestionifpoliticalreflection
andactionarestillpossiblewhenweadoptthesymmetricalapproachofLatourorthemediation
approachofIhde.RatherthanlettingourselvesbeblackmailedbytheEnlightenment–fearing
thatanonmodernconceptualizationoftechnologyandsocietyasinterwovenwouldmakeit
impossibletohaveareasonableandnormativediscussionabouttechnology–thealternativelyenlightened‘limitapproach’canofferadifferent,nonmodernpoliticalapproachtotechnology.
Nottheassessmentoftechnologicaldevelopmentsfromoutsideisthecentralgoalofpolitical
actionandtheorythen,butratheritsaccompaniment,‘fromwithin’,borrowingaconceptfrom
theBelgianphilosopherGilbertHottois(Hottois1996).
Thecrucialquestioninsuchapoliticsofaccompanimentisnotsomuchwherewehavetodrawa
boundarybetweenhumanbeingsontheonehandandtechnologiesontheother.Itratherishow
weshouldgiveshapetotheinterrelatednessbetweenhumansandtechnology,whichhasinfact
alwaysbeenacentralcharacteristicofhumanexistence.Thelimit-attitudeleadstoapolitical
theorythatisnotpreoccupiedwiththequestionofwhetheragiventechnologyismorally
acceptableornot,butthatisdirectedatthequalityofourlives,aslivedwithtechnology.
Focusingonthecloserelationsbetweenhumanbeingsandtechnologiesdoesnotmean,tobe
sure,thatallrelationsareequallydesirable,andthatnocriticalperspectiveoftechnologyis
possibleanymore.Ratheritimpliesthatpoliticsneedstoengagedeeplywithactualpracticesof
design,use,andimplementation.Givingupanexternalpositiondoesnotmakeusgiveupall
criticaldistance;itonlymakessurethatwedonotoverestimatethedistancewecantake.The
Foucauldianlimit-attitudeurgesustodevelopa‘critique’fromwithin,engagingwithhow
technologicalpracticesactuallytakeshape,andfromasituationthatistechnologicallymediated
itself.
InlinewiththeworkofMichelFoucault,this‘technologyaccompaniment’canbeseenasaform
of‘governance’.Bydeliberatelyshapingone’sinvolvementwithtechnologyandwiththeimpact
technologycanhaveonone’sexistence,itbecomespossibletogivedirectiontoone’s
technologicallymediatedsubjectivity.Governanceneedstobedistinguishedsharplyfrom
‘steering’.Governingtechnologicaldevelopmentsimpliesarecognitionoftheirowndynamics,and
oftherelativelylimitedautonomyhumanbeingshaveintheirrelationstotechnology.The
phenomenologicalapproachtotechnologythatIindicatedabove,inoppositiontoadialectical
approach,entailspreciselythathumanbeingsare‘implied’intechnologicaldevelopments,just
liketechnologiesare‘implied’inhumanexistence.Fromsuchaphenomenologicalpointofview,
themodernistambitionto‘steer’technologyandto‘protect’humanityagainsttechnological
invasionsneedstobereplacedwithamoremodestambitiontogovernthedevelopmentof
technologybytakingitssocialimplicationsintoaccount,andtogovernone’ssubjectivityin
relationtothosetechnologies.
4.AlternativeDemocratization:governingthepoweroftechnology
Feenberg’swayoutofthethreatoftechnocracyisademocratizationoftechnology,asexplained
above.Thestrategiesofthepowerfulneedtobecounteredwiththetacticsoftheoppressed.The
functionalizingimpactofprimaryinstrumentalizationcanonlybebalancedbythemeaningful
activitiesofsecondaryinstrumentalization.Technocracyordemocracy,theseseemtobethe
alternativesthatFeenberg’sapproachhastooffer.Andinthisway,Feenberg’saproachthistakes
usrightbacktoFoucault’s‘blackmailoftheEnlightenment’:notoptingforademocratizationof
technologyimpliessigningupfortechnocracy.
Yet,thisisafalsedilemma–justlikethe‘blackmailoftheEnlightenment’was.Feenberg’s
‘tactical’elaborationofthedemocratizationoftechnology,basedonDeCerteau,isnottheonly
waytoavoidtechnocracy.Thestrugglemodelbehindit,aswesaw,doesnotdoenoughjusticeto
thethoroughlyinterwovencharacterofhumanityandtechnology.Andthisiswherethe
importanceofaphenomenologicalapproachtopowercamein.
Aphenomenologicalapproachtopowershowsthatnon-technocraticformsofengagementwith
technologiesinvolvemuchmorethanthetacticsofresistance.AsisimpliedinFeenberg’sown
conceptofsecondaryinstrumentalization,humanbeingscanalsodevelopcreative
reinterpretationsoftechnologies,andshapetheirexistenceinaproductiveinteractionwith
technologicalmediations.Suchdealingswithtechnologiesdonotembodyresistancebut
confidence–understoodaselaboratedabove.Andratherthantacticstheyinvolve‘technologies
oftheself’,whichaimatgoverningtechnologicaldevelopmentsratherthansteeringorresisting
them.
ElsewhereIhaveexplainedthisapproachintermsoftrust(KiranandVerbeek2011).Often,
politicaldiscussionsabouttechnologyrevolvearoundtrustintechnology,movingbetweenthe
extremesofrelyingontechnologyversusbeingsuspiciousofit.Anaïveinstrumentalistviewof
technologyblindlytruststhattechnologicalinstrumentswillrealizethegoalstheyweredesigned
for,whileascepticalandsuspiciousviewdistruststheworkingsoftechnologies.Whilethemodel
ofrelianceischaracteristicfortechnocraticpolitics,puttingallfaithintechnology,themodelof
suspicionischaracteristicfor(neo-)Marxistapproachesthatfeartechnocraticthreatto
democracy.
Againstthesetwooppositeapproaches,athirdformoftrustexistsinrelationtotechnology.This
couldbecalledconfidence,anditinvolvestrustingoneselftotechnology.Ratherthanbeing
suspiciousoftechnology,thisapproachrecognizesthefactthathumanexistencetakesshapein
closeinteractionwithtechnologies.Butratherthantrustingtechnologyblindly,‘succumbing’toit,
itseestheinterwovencharacterofhumanityandtechnologyasatask,assomethingthatrequires
work.Trustingoneselftotechnologycomesdowntotakingresponsibilityforone’stechnologically
mediatedexistence,inatechnologicalsociety.
Fromsubversivetechnologytotechnologiesoftheself
Oneofthemostwell-knowncase-studiesFeenbergworkedonistheMinitelcaseinFrance.
Minitelwasaninformationretrievalsystem,introducedinthe1980’s,thatusedthetelephoneline
toconnectcitizenstocentraldatabases,enablingtolookupallkindsofinformationthatmightbe
useful.Usersofthesystem,though,appearednottobeveryinterestedinthiscentralizedsystem,
andmainlyusedittoconsultthephonedirectory.Untilhackerstransformedthesystemradically,
andmadeitpossibletouseitfortheexchangeofmessages.Fromthenon,thesystembecame
verypopular–butitdidnotresembleatallthesystemthatwasoriginallydesigned.Bycreatively
appropriatingandredefiningthesystem,usershadactuallysucceededtochangethetechnological
systementirely(Feenberg1995).
InFeenberg’sanalysis,thiscasestudyisastoryaboutthevictoryofthepeopleagainsttheelite.
ThereconfigurationofMinitelintoacommunicationsystemisamodestformofrebellion.By
refusingtherulessetbytheelite,andbycreativelydevelopingacounternarrativeanda
counterdesign,theoppressivestrategyofthepowerfulwasfrustratedbythepowerless.Even
thoughIamverysympathetictoFeenberg’seffortstodebunkdeterministicapproachesto
technology,Ithinkthatthismodelofstruggleisnotabletocoverallpoliticallyrelevantaspectsof
theinteractionsbetweenhumansandtechnologies.TheactualimpactoftheMinitelsystem
remainsoutofsightinthismodelofoppression-versus-resistance–afterall,itwasthe
‘reconfigured’Minitelsystemthatintroducednewformsofinteractionandcommunication,and
thereforeitisthisimpactthatdeservesnormativereflectioninthefirstplace.
Here,weneedtoaugmentFeenberg’sanalysis.Fromaphenomenologicalpointofview,themost
relevantthingtostudyhereishowcommunicationmedialikeMinitelhaveanimpactonthe
qualityofourdailylives.Andthatisexactlywhatthetheoryoftechnicalmediation,asdeveloped
inthecontextof‘postphenomenological’studiesofhuman-technologyrelations,isconcerned
with.Fromtheperspectiveofmediationtheory,theimpactofcomputer-mediated
communicationshouldnotbereducedtotheideologyfromwhichitcomes,butshouldbestudied
intermsofthematerialmediationofpeople’sexperiencesandpractices.Ratherthanseeinga
technocraticideologyinstalledthroughtechnologiesthatreducepersonalcommunicationto
functionalinteraction,mediationtheoryinvestigateshownewcommunicationmediahavespecific
amplifyingandreducingworkingswithrespecttothewaysinwhichhumanbeingscanbepresent
toeachother.Fromthisperspective,politicalactivitiesregardingtechnologiesshouldnotso
exclusivelyfocusonbreakingthepoweroftheelite,butonshapingthequalityofourlives-withtechnologies.
Letmeillustratethiswithanotherexampleofgovernmentregulationoftechnology–anexample
thatIhavediscussedinearlierpublicationsfromanethicalperspectiveandthatIwouldliketo
giveapoliticalelaborationhere:theuseofobstetricultrasoundinantenataldiagnostics(Verbeek
1998a;1998b).Overthepastdecade,ithasbecomeverynormal–alsointheFoucauldiansense
oftheword–tohaveseveralsonogramsmadeduringpregnancy.InTheNetherlands,thetypical
situationatthismomentistohavetwoscansmade.Onetakesplacearound11or12weeksof
pregnancy,todeterminethetermofthepregnancyandoftenalsotocalculatetheriskofDown’s
syndrome.Thesecondsonogramisthenmadearound20weeksofpregnancy,toscantheentire
bodyofthefetusandcheckitshealthcondition.Thesecondscanisincludedinthestandard
coverageofallinsurancecompanies;thefirstscaniscoveredonlyinspecificcircumstances,but
neverthelessvirtuallyeverybodychoosestohavethatscandonebecauseithasbecomethe
standard‘confirmation’ofpregnancyandthefirstvisualencounterwiththeunborn.
InpreviouspublicationsIhavedrawnattentiontothe‘materialmorality’thatisembodiedinsuch
diagnostictechnologies.Obstetricultrasoundhelpstoconstitutethefetusanditsparentsinvery
specificways:thefetusisconstitutedasapossiblepatient;congenitaldefectsareconstitutedas
preventableformsofsuffering;andexpectingachildistranslatedintochoosingachild,alsoafter
theconception.Butthereisapoliticaldimensiontothistechnologythatdeservesattentiontoo.
Thelarge-scaleintroductionofobstetricultrasoundhasimportantimplicationsforhowwe,asa
society,dealwithcongenitaldiseases,andhowwedrawalinebetweena‘normal’andan
‘abnormal’fetus.Eventhoughthereisasubstantialgroupofpeoplewhochoosenottoaborta
childwithDown’ssyndrome,itisbecomingevermorenormaltoseeDown’ssyndromenotasa
fatebutasapreventabledisease.
Alsothe20-weekscanhasimportanteffects.Ithasbeenshown,forinstance,thatsincethe
introductionofthisscreeningeverfewerbabieswithschisis(a‘harelip’)areborn.Andonecan
imaginethereasonsforthis:at20weeksofpregnancy,afacewithschisislooksterribly
malformed,andonecanhardlybelievethatsurgerycanindeedrepairthisverywell.Still,this
effectwasnotintendedatallwhentheDutchparliamentdecidedtointroducethe20-weekscan
asascreeninginstrument.
Inthisexample,Feenberg’sproposalforademocratizationoftechnologyreachesitslimits.Even
thoughademocraticdecisionwasmadeabouttheintroductionofthistechnology,itsactual
impactonpeople’severydaylivesremainedunaddressed.Noproperanalysiswasmadeofthe
potentialwaysinwhichthismid-termscreeningcouldreorganizepeople’sexperienceofexpecting
achild,andthewaysinwhichpeoplefeelresponsibleforthelivesoftheirunbornchildren.For
thatreason,thescreeningisofferedwithoutapropersystemthatcansupportpeopleintheir
decisionsaboutparticipatinginthescreeningprogramornot,andaboutwhattodoifthescan
hasspecificoutcomes.
IfDeCerteau’sreadingofFoucaultwouldbetheonlyperspectiveavailableforpoliticalreflection,
wewouldneedtoaddressthiscaseintermsofastrugglebetweenthestrategyofthegovernment
orthemedicalsystemontheonehand,andthepeopleontheother.Expectingparentsthenhave
thechoicebetweenfollowingthetechnocraticimperativeandsubjectingthemselvestothe
screeningprogram,ordevelopingatacticstocounterthisimperativeandbreakthepowerofthe
system.Therealdecisions,though,concernthewaysinwhichhumanbeingsdealwiththe
screeningsystem,howtheyshapethemselvesasexpectingparentsininteractionwiththe
mediatingpowerofthistechnology.Whatisneededhere,isnotatacticstofightagainstthe
strategiesofthepowerful,butarepertoireof‘technologiesoftheself’,todealresponsiblywith
thenewwaysinwhichantenataldiagnostictechnologieshelptoshapepregnancyandthemoral
decisionsthatcomewithit.
Therearemorewaystodealwiththeavailabilityofantenataldiagnosticsthansimplyapplyingall
ofthem,afterall.Thedecisiontousethesetechnologiesisalsoadecisiontoengageinavery
specificrelationwithone’sunbornchild.Andsuchformsofengagementcanbeshapedinvarious
ways.Whenexpectingparentsareawareofthepotentialimpactsofdiagnostictechnologies,they
candeliberatelychoosetogiveitaspecificplaceintheirexistence.Sonogramscanthenresultin
different‘stylesoftechnologicallymediatedparenthood’.Forinstancebyusingsonogramsonlyto
determinethetermofpregnancywithoutgettinganyfurtherinformation.Ortodeliberatelyscan
formedicalproblems,tobepreparedwhenthebabycomesratherthantohaveanabortion.Orto
beabletopreventone’schildfromhavingtolivealifefullofsuffering.
Inordertoshapeone’stechnologicallymediatedsubjectivity,though,usersneedtobeequipped
adequatelytodevelopacreativerelationtothetechnologiesthataffecttheirlives.Andthatis,
actually,whatisoftenlacking.Whenthe20-weekultrasoundscreeningprogrammewas
introducedinTheNetherlands,forinstance,theimpactofthisscreeningonpracticesand
experiencesregardingpregnancywerenotadequatelyaddressed.Ratherthanmerelygiving
expectingparentsinformationaboutthehealthconditionoftheirunborn,thescreening
programmecreatedanewrelationbetweenparentsandfetus,includingnewresponsibilitiesand
moralquestions.Andthisrequiresaninfrastructuretoassistpeopleingivingshapetothis
relation.JustliketheDutchhealthcaresystemdoesfor,say,palliativechemotherapy.Forsuch
treatments,thereisadelicatebalancebetweenthequalityoflifeandtheexpectedimpacton
people’slifeexpectancy.Patientsareextensivelyhelpedtomakeabalanced,personaldecision
here,shapingtheirownlivesascancerpatientsinrelationtothetechnologicalmeansthatare
available.Technologiesoftheselfhaveasocialinfrastructurehere,asitwere–andasimilar
infrastructurewouldbebeneficialinthecaseofobstetricultrasoundaswell.
Restoringpublicdiscussionsaboutthegoodlife
Here,analternativedemocratizationoftechnologybecomesvisible.Democratizationdoesnot
needtoconsistingivingbackthepowertothepeoplethattechnocracytookawayfromthem.It
canalsoconsistincreatingapublicrealmwherepeoplecandeliberateaboutthewaysinwhich
theyincorporatetechnologiesintheirdailylives.
Theleadingquestionforsuchapoliticsof‘self-governance’is:whatisagoodwayoflivinga
technologicallymediatedlife?Thisisnotapoliticalquestionthatposesitselfinoppositionto
technology,butaquestionthataccompaniestechnologicaldevelopments.Itfocusesonthe
qualityoftherelationsbetweenhumansandtechnologies.But,moreimportantly,thisapproach
alsochallengesmodernistpoliticalthinkingbecauseofitsfocusonthequestionofthegoodlife.
Thecoreofmodernistpoliticaltheory,afterall,ispreciselytheexpulsionofthequestionofthe
goodlifefromthepublicrealm.Ideasaboutthegoodlifebelongtheprivaterealm;inthepublic
realmweonlydiscusstherulesthatmakeitpossibleforeverybodytoanswerthequestionofthe
goodlifeindividually.Wewouldnotwantachurch,stateormonarchtoanswerthatquestionfor
us.Thispoliticalmodelmakespossiblealargepluralityofvisionsofthegoodlife,butattheprice
ofaratherthinpublicdiscussion,inwhichanyargumentthatbasesitselfexplicitlyonavisionof
thegoodlifeisimmediatelyputasideasirrelevant(Valkenburg2009).Technological
developmentstakethisliberalistidealtoitslimits.Becauseoftheirexplicitimpactonthewayswe
liveourlives,technologieskeepputtingthequestionofthegoodliferightinfrontofus(cf.
Borgmann1984,Swierstra2002).Andifpoliticaldiscussionsabouttechnologykeepreferringthat
questiontotheprivatesphere,politicswillneverbeabletoaddressitadequately.
Butisitpossibletogivethegoodlifeanewplaceinpolitics?Wouldn’tthatbetheendof
democracy?Theobviousobjectionagainstsuchanon-modernpoliticalapproachisthat
reintroducingthequestionofthegoodlifeinthepublicrealmwouldthreatentheliberalcharacter
ofoursociety.Butthatwouldonlybethecaseifpoliticswouldaimatorganizinganoverarching,
uniformanswertothequestionofwhatmakesagoodlife.WhenwefollowHannahArendt's
interpretationofclassicalGreekpolitics,though,acompletelydifferentpictureemerges.Inher
view,discussionsofthegoodlifeintheclassicalpoliswererootedinplurality(Arendt1958).Not
thedesiretodevelopoverarchingframeworkswasthedrivebehindpoliticalaction,butinteraction:actingwithothers,shapingone’sexistenceintheencounterwithothersandwithother
waysoflivingone’slife.
ThisismuchinlinewithFoucault’saestheticinterpretationoftheethicsofthegoodlife.For
Foucault,ethicsultimatelyresteduponachoiceofstyle–astyleonegive’stoone’smoral
subjectivity.Shapingone’sexistence,then,resemblesgivingshapetoaworkofart.Thegoodand
theaestheticcoincide:kaloskagathos,beautiful-and-goodatonce.One’sownexistencecanbe
demonstratedasanexampleofthe‘artofliving’,andotherpeople’slivescanbeapproachedlike
thataswell.Theroleofthegoodlifeinpolitics,then,isnottoenforceonespecificwayofthe
goodlife,buttoorganizeapublicexchangeofvisionsofthegoodlife.
Thisaestheticinterpretationofthegoodlife,then,bringsusbacktoHeidegger’sconceptualization
ofart.ForHeidegger,aswesaw,artistobeconceptualizedasastrugglebetweenearthand
world.Inthisstruggle,thematerialelementsoftheearthhelptodiscloseaworld.Similarly,the
artoflivingone’slifecanbeseenasastrugglebetweentechnologyandhumanbeings.Inthe
waysinwhichhumanbeingsshapetheirexistenceininteractionwithtechnologicalmediations,
specificwaysoflivingcomeabout.Andinthecomplexinterplaybetweenmediatingtechnologies
andtheircriticalandcreativeusers,humanbeingsare‘revealed’asspecificbeingswithaspecific
existence.Shapingone’stechnologicallymediatedsubjectivity,therefore,isaformofart,andin
thepublicrealmpeoplecanlearnfromthewaysinwhichotherpeoplemasterthis‘artofliving’.
Politicsthenbecomesnothingmoreorlessthanapublicforumforencounterswithwaysofliving,
andthereforewithanswerstothequestionofthegoodlife.
Thisphenomenologicalapproachtothedemocratizationoftechnologyisanecessaryadditionto
Feenberg’sneo-Marxistanalysis.Powerstructuresareeverywhere,buttherelationsbetween
humansandtechnologiescannotbeexhaustivelyanalyzedintermsofpower.Ifthereisastruggle
betweentechnologyandsociety,itisastruggleinwhichhumanbeingsarenotonlyoppressedbut
alsogivenaspecificcontextforshapingtheirexistence.Andthisimpliesthatthepoliticsofpower
andthepoliticsofthegoodlifeaugmenteachotherinatleasttwoways.First,thereismoreat
stakeinpoliticsthanthedistributionofpower,justasthereismoreatstakethantheencounterof
variousvisionsofthegoodlife.And,second,politicalactionsdirectedatademocraticdistribution
ofpowershouldalsotakeintoaccounthowpowerrelationsenablehumanbeingstoshapetheir
livesininteractionwithtechnologicalmediations.Ademocratizingpoliticsoftechnology,
therefore,shouldaccompanytechnologicaldevelopments,addressinghowtheyraisequestions
aboutthegoodlifeandorganizingasocietalinfrastructureforaddressingthesequestions
adequately.Theliberalistfocusofourliberaldemocracywouldthenbetransformedintoa
pluralistfocus.Nottheautonomousindividualthatistobeliberatedfromoppressiveforcesisthe
centerofpoliticsthen,butthepluralityofvisionsofthegoodlife.Democracythenrealizeswhat
itsnameactuallyindicated:power-to-people,intheplural,ratherthantoindividuals.
5.Conclusion
Contemporaryinsightsintheinterwovencharacterofhumanityandtechnologyurgespolitical
philosophyoftechnologytomovebeyondthedialecticalmodelofoppressionversusliberation.
Ratherthanconceptualizingthestrugglebetweenhumansandtechnologiesasoppressive,it
needstobeunderstoodasproductive:humanbeingsshapetheirexistencebydevelopingcreative
relationstomediatingtechnologies.
Ifthisstruggleshouldbeunderstoodinadialecticalwayatall,thisshouldhappenalongthelines
NietzschesetoutinAlsosprachZarathustra,inZarathustra’slectureabout“themetamorphoses
ofthespirit.”Zarathustradescribeshowthespiritbeganintheshapeofacamel,bearingheavy
loadsandkneelingdowntobeloadedwithmore.Afterthat,ittooktheshapeofalion,which
definesitselfinoppositiontothecamel,replacingtheoppressive“Thoushalt”ofthecamelwitha
subversive“Iwill.”Thelion,however,onlydefinesitselfinoppositionwhatitdoesnotwanttobe,
andthereforeitisnotabletocreatesomethingnew.Forthat,thespiritneedstotakeonathird
shape:theshapeofachild.Thechildembodiesa“sacredYes,”a“newbeginning,”a“first
movement”(Nietzsche[1883]1969).
ThisNietzscheanparablecanbeamodelforpoliticalphilosophyoftechnology.Byfreeingitself
fromthedialecticaltensionbetweenoppressingtechnologiesversusdemocraticliberation,
politicalphilosophycanachieveanalternativedemocratizationoftechnology.Notonlya
redistributionofpower,butalsothequestionofthegoodlifehasacentralplaceinthisapproach.
Fromapoliticalperspective,notonlythethreatoftechnocracyandoppressiveelitesisarelevant
issue,butalsothewaysinwhichtechnologiesraisequestionsregardingthegoodlife.
Technologieshaveaprofoundimpactonthewaysinwhichhumanbeingslivetheirlives,anddeal
withmoralandpoliticalissues.Arealtechnocracycomesaboutwhentechnologiesimplicitly
answerthequestionofthegoodlifeforhumanbeings.Politicalaction,therefore,needstoenable
humanbeingsto‘read’theintricateconnectionstheyhavewithtechnologies,andtoexplicitly
shapetheirexistenceininteractiontothesetechnologies.Thisrequiresareintroductionofthe
questionofthegoodlifeinthepublicrealm.Nottoimposeonespecificvisionofthegoodlifeto
societyatlarge,buttoequippeoplewitharich,pluralcontextforansweringthequestionofthe
goodtechnologicallymediatedlife.Phenomenologywithoutpoliticsisempty–withanodtoKant,
thistime–butpoliticswithoutphenomenologyisblind.
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