ESRC UK Centre for Evidence Based Policy and Practice:
Working Paper 13
Social care knowledge: SCIE-like
‘typologies’
Ray Pawson
ESRC UK Centre for Evidence Based Policy and
Practice
Queen Mary
University of London
Email: [email protected]
© January 2003: ESRC UK Centre for Evidence Based Policy and Practice
Ray Pawson is Reader in Social Research Methodology at Leeds University, and the
second visiting senior research fellow at the ESRC UK Centre for Evidence Based
Policy and Practice. This Working Paper is the second in a series emanating from a
research project on Types and Quality of Knowledge in Social Care, commissioned by
the Social Care Institute for Excellence (SCIE).
The SCIE project
In June 2002 the Social Care Institute for Excellence commissioned an eight month,
two stage study to devise a classification of types of social care knowledge, and
develop standards for judging their quality. The research team includes members from
Leeds University (Ray Pawson and Colin Barnes), Salford University (Andrew Long)
and the ESRC UK Centre for Evidence Based Policy and Practice (Annette Boaz and
Lesley Grayson). The project is led by Annette Boaz.
This paper is the second in a series of three ‘starter papers’ that describe stage one of
the project. Primarily intended as working documents for the team, and as background
briefings for SCIE on the progress of the project, they are reproduced here to illustrate
the challenges faced in identifying the kinds of knowledge that might be of value as
evidence in social care, and in categorising them in a way that is useful and useable
both for those who organise knowledge, and for those who make use of it.
Abstract
This paper moves on from the initial attempt at identifying potential categories of
knowledge to be included in a classification of social care knowledge to examine what
existing classifications have to contribute, in particular to the task of rationalising and
simplifying the 13+ categories of knowledge already identified in Working Paper 12.
A selection of eight from the many available classifications is examined. From this
analysis, two possible approaches to classification are identified based on the
purposes of knowledge (Route 1), and the sources of knowledge (Route 2). These are
further examined, drawing on the eight existing classifications, using a matrix
approach for Route 1 and a tree or lineage approach for Route 2.
Key words: social care; knowledge; classification
The purpose of the Working Paper series of the ESRC UK Centre for Evidence Based
Policy and Practice is the early dissemination of outputs from Centre research and
other activities. Some titles may subsequently appear in peer reviewed journals or
other publications. In all cases, the views expressed are those of the author(s) and do
not necessarily represent those of the ESRC.
Social care knowledge: SCIE-like ‘typologies’
Introduction
This is the first draft for another Starter Paper on ‘existing typologies’ and on scouring them
for hints that we can use. Whilst our particular task is unique, there has been no shortage of
previous attempts to classify and codify ‘forms of knowledge’ in social care-related activities.
The selection examined below calls on typologies of ‘forms of evaluation’, ‘forms of action
research’, ‘forms of social research’ and ‘forms of social work knowledge’, ‘models of
professional knowledge’ and so on. The last is often accompanied by hand-wringing about
whether social work is actually a profession (control of a formalised body of knowledge being
one of the classic defining feature of a professional body (Thyer, 2002)). Note, that I stop
short at eight typologies: there are many, many more available but they are chips off the same
block and the gains to be had from considering any more are probably slight. Note also, that I
found no exact parallel to our task. There is nothing out there considering itself to be a
typology of ‘social care’ knowledge.
Some of the frameworks are extremely detailed and I append charts and diagrams of the full
typologies at the end of the document. To save the reader a lot of page flapping I duplicate the
‘horizontal axis’ from each typology as the first point of comparison – in other words I
reproduce the various authors’ thoughts on key types without listing their ideas on content.
It is intended that this paper be read in conjunction with Starter Paper 1 (SP1; reproduced in
this series as Working Paper 12). The upshot of SP1 is that we have candidates galore (13+)
for consideration as ‘types’ but that such a number would be far too unwieldy for anyone to
use (or even remember). The battle is on to simplify them and this is the prime focus of the
discussion in each of the eight sections below.
1. Owen and Rogers (1999) – ‘Forms’ of evaluation and their ‘primary
orientation’
Pro-active
synthesis
Clarificative
clarification
Interactive
improvement
Monitoring
justification/
fine-tuning
Impact
justification/
accountability
This example is, perhaps, the nearest I have found to a ‘model’. It has probably the most
comprehensive range of ‘orientations’ that I have uncovered. As well as being presented in a
rather formidable table (see Appendix 1) it is used as the framework for an entire book, which
goes on to spell out in further detail the approaches, issues and standards that are entailed
within each approach.
The main problem with the 13+ types lurking in SP1 is that the organising framework (the
horizontal axis) is expressed in terms of ‘forms of knowledge’. This terminology is part of the
brief, of course, but in classification terms it is too open-ended and ambiguous. It fetches in
orientations that are basically ‘techniques’ (consultation) as well as others that are
‘epistemologies’ (post-modernism). It also fetches in orientations that are part of the
organisational chassis of social care (the legal framework) as well as others that are almost
subliminal (tacit knowledge).
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Owen and Rogers avoid this initial typological fuddle by formulating the horizontal axis more
narrowly. The five headings are clearly formulated with respect to ‘purposes’ – clarification,
fine-tuning, accountability etc. (but note, perversely, that these aims are referred to as ‘forms’
of inquiry and ‘orientations’). Thinking in terms of the different purposes to which enquiry is
put allows the authors to collapse some of the finer technical distinctions that can be drawn
between approaches. So, for instance, both ‘needs assessment’ and ‘research review’ are
considered as ‘proactive’ forms of evaluation in that their purpose is to dig out information on
problems and potential solutions before an intervention is designed. Similarly, ‘action
research’ and ‘empowerment’ are corralled together under the purpose of ‘improving
practice’. The aim of these examples, by the way, is to demonstrate the simplification
potential of ‘purpose’ as a classificatory device rather than to affirm these particular
marriages.
The Owen and Rogers format is also useful because of the insightful way that a significant
range of characteristics is assembled for the vertical axis. We can borrow some of these,
though we will clearly need to go beyond them.
However, there are some immediate problems that prevent wholesale borrowing of the Owen
and Rogers framework. The typology relates mainly to ‘program evaluation’ and therefore
omits any mention of ‘tacit’ knowledge, which has a focus at the level of the individual
decision. Some of the ‘audit’ and ‘regulatory’ and ‘legislative’ approaches in social care have
the wider remit of ‘service provision’ and are also not covered as a form of programme
evaluation.
There are also some problems with mutual exclusivity and inclusivity (see SP1). Owen and
Rogers do have ‘emancipatory research’ as a sub-sub-category of their interactive approach
(#3). Classifying ‘empowerment’ as a form of programme improvement might be a bit
wounding for the user-led radicals and a bit too low-profile in the balance of UK social care
activities. On first reading, I also have problems distinguishing between ‘clarificative’ and
‘interactive’ (they both sound rather improving to me). My guess is that clarificative is in
there because Owen is very fond of getting programme goals articulated and because
‘evaluability assessment’ was high on the agenda a few years back. There are also further
boundary problems in placing specific techniques in this framework, e.g. should audit be in
‘monitoring’ or ‘impact’? should systematic review be in ‘pro-active’ or ‘impact’?
In short – some mileage in this one (scope, purpose as framework, presentation ideas, and
vertical axis content).
2. Mark et al (2000) – Four purposes of evaluation
Assessing merit
and worth
Program and
organisational
improvement
Oversight and
compliance
Knowledge
development
This again relates mainly to ‘program evaluation’, being from a US text that seeks an
‘integrated framework’ for understanding that mode of inquiry (see Appendix 2). And again it
is a relatively clean classification because it uses ‘purposes’, in this case quite unequivocally,
as the column headings. Comparing it to Owen and Rogers, it is virtually the same in terms of
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‘oversight and compliance’ (= ‘monitoring’). ‘Assessing merit and worth’ is almost the same
as ‘impact’. ‘Programme and organisational improvement’ is the same as ‘interactive’.
Perhaps the only difference in this respect is that these headings are rather clearer (partly a
question of better chosen terminology, partly a question of sticking closely to the ‘purpose’
criterion).
Mark et al do, however, add ‘knowledge development’ as an item not considered by Owen
and Rogers. This orientation is from the academic end of evaluation and the knowledge in
question is seen in terms of, and assessed by, the normal standards of social science, i.e.
developing and refining theories through empirical evidence. Hence, what is catered for in
this final category are the theory-driven approaches to evaluation and the long-term,
‘enlightenment’ model of research usage (Thyer, 2002).
Comparing Owen and Rogers to Mark et al, the latter lacks ‘pro-active’ knowledge, i.e.
assessment and problem identification. It may be that Mark et al consider this as part of their
‘oversight’ category, and this is the first of several potential overlaps within their
classification system. The typology lacks even the faintest whiff of ‘emancipation’ as a
legitimate purpose of evaluation research (this is America and Mark et al assume a consensual
notion of ‘social betterment’ as applied to all policy making). They are also unconcerned with
‘frameworking’ knowledge like legislation.
This typology is not so useful on the vertical axis. It does have a further breakdown by
‘inquiry modes’ – description, classification, causal analysis, values inquiry (see appendix).
These relate in rather complex ways to the four types (if you are assessing merit and worth
you need a bit of causal analysis, a smidgen of values inquiry and so on). ‘Inquiry modes’ are
also presented rather narrowly in terms of research techniques and we will want to travel
rather further in our search for vertical components.
In short, Mark et al offer affirmation of the potential of ‘purpose’ as the classification
framework and perhaps some sharper terminology. Overall, their typology is too research
driven (not surprisingly given that this is the purpose) to cover the whole SCIE line.
3. Hart and Bond (2000) – Action research typology
Consensus model of society
Rational social management
Experimental
Organisational
Conflict model of society
Structural change
Professionalising
Empowering
The focus of this approach is even narrower – just ‘action research’, i.e. the approach in which
stakeholders and researchers intermix, and findings are introduced into, and tested out, in
practice. The typology, quite properly, acknowledges that this formula has been stretched in
recent years and now it carries sub-types within itself, especially in relation to which
particular stakeholders call the tune and to what end.
It seems to work well as a typology in the following respects. There is a clear focus to the
sub-types; in this case it is about ‘purpose’ again, although it is assumed that these purposes
may be directed at a much wider spectrum of political objectives and policy goals than in
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typologies 1 and 2. The idea of defining ‘orientations’ in terms of who defines the ‘problem’
is, potentially controversial but the notion of differentiating forms of knowledge according to
whether they espouse rational social management or structural political change could, of
course, be handled on the vertical axis. Hart and Bond, by the way, are excellent on the
vertical axis in many other respects (see Appendix 3; lots of interesting suggestions for our
typology, not discussed further here).
Hart and Bond’s effort doesn’t work so well in the following terms. The ‘experimental type’
of action research is arguably a bit of a sham; it is there to provide a conceptual contrast to the
emancipators. Basically, in their so-called ‘experimental action research’ all the key decisions
are made externally, which makes it the antithesis of action research. It goes without saying
that Hart and Bond’s typology does not, and could not possibly, work in terms of the full
gamut of non-action approaches and so most of the 13+ categories in SP1 are ignored.
Interestingly, it is not clear whether this effort picks up on ‘tacit knowledge’. Potentially,
action research is the form of research most reliant upon and friendly towards ‘everyday
wisdom’. But folk ideas are not considered as knowledge until they get picked up in the
action research cycle of research, negotiation and education. We could go along with this and
omit knowledge-that-just-hangs-about entirely from our typology, but if we consign it to
oblivion it will send out unmistakable signals that professionals won’t like. Also, in terms of
documented knowledge, would it eliminate from consideration the kind of descriptive
material exemplified by the 2pp Community Care article on ‘how we do it here’ or ‘what
about this for a new approach to x’?
In terms of comparisons with the first two typologies, Hart and Bond echo ‘clarificative’ and
‘interactive’ from Owen and Rogers as well as ‘program and organisational improvement’
from Mark et al. The ‘experimental’ and ‘organisational’ sub-forms of action research may
nudge into the ‘oversight’ and ‘monitoring’ elements of the first two typologies. Given its
narrower focus, it is inevitably able to discover sub-divisions within what others see as the
uniform domain of action research.
In short, this one provides food for thought. Whatever classification we devise, this shows that
it will be prone to sub-sub-categories. It is again a model of typology presentation and has
some good vertical axis content.
4. Peile (1988) – Research paradigms in social work
Empirical Alternative
Normative Alternative
This is quite an elderly typology but also (apparently) quite famous in its time (see Appendix
4). It pulls in many of the classical binary opposites in social research (qualitative vs.
quantitative, value-free vs. value-laden, cause vs. meaning etc.) in a ‘paradigm wars’
presentation before the author goes on to suggest that some newly emerging paradigms (now
quite old) might ‘resolve the stalemate’.
As a typology, it works well in the following respects. It does capture, in the roundest sense,
the idea of ‘forms of knowledge’ or ‘orientations’ or ‘paradigms’ being comprehensive
frameworks. That is to say, it shows how a simple set of organising principles can work itself
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into all aspects (epistemological, ontological, ethical, political, methodological) of social
work knowledge. Accordingly, it is another useful pointer to some items on the vertical axis.
It is also, incidentally, a model for how to annotate a typology with illustrative cases (look at
the footnotes).
On the downside, it is a clear example of forcing a classification – there are only two polar
opposites to accommodate everything. {There is, of course, another school of typology
formation – the minimalist, ‘ideal-type’, one-sided-accentuation-of-reality approach that
makes a virtue out of this. But I don’t think we are going down that road for SCIE}. In short,
as an empirical typology it fails to reflect the full variety of forms of knowledge that we have
to deal with. Sticking with just two ‘forms’ corrals widely differing approaches together like
qualitative and emancipatory research, or like realism and RCTs. It also omits some ‘forms’
altogether, for example tacit and framework knowledge. Nor do Peile’s bridgeheads for the
creative synthesis of the two approaches seem to have stood the test of time. They are either
just different again (like the ‘creative paradigm’, an early form of relativism/post-modernism)
or they are partial or unsuccessful attempts at synthesis (like the ‘new paradigm’ approach).
In short. A dreadful warning that the ‘po-mos’ are correct about one thing – it’s all so much
more messy these days. Once again it is a research-led typology that struggles with anything
outside the academic journals but a potentially useful model in terms of annotation and
presentation.
5. Hammersley (2000) – Varieties of social research: a typology
Theoretical
scientific
research
Theoretical
substantive
research
Dedicated
practical
research
Democratic
practical
research
Contractbased
practical
research
Autonomous
practical
research
This sketches on a much bigger canvas in seeking to clarify the distinction between ‘pure’ and
‘applied’ research. Hammersley is worried about demands that investigations meet standards
appropriate to both types of ‘inquiry’, and his expectation that different forms of research
should meet very different standards is of obvious relevance to this project.
He believes that one traditional way of perceiving the distinction between ‘basic’ and
‘applied’ research is misconceived – application is not simply the implementation of
foundational knowledge. Accordingly, the pure and the applied should be distinguished in
terms of the immediate goals of inquiry, which Hammersley calls ‘scientific inquiry’ and
‘practical inquiry’ (see Appendix 5). Two different ‘validating mechanisms’ are involved. In
the first there is a slow, continuous, collective ‘evaluation’ by members of the research
community. Practical inquiry, by contrast, is validated according its ‘relevance’ to its
immediate audience, which is normally responsible for dealing with a particular phenomenon
in a particular locality.
Hammersley then moves onto subsets. Scientific inquiry is categorised as ‘theoretical’ or
‘substantive’. The first is about abstract, general causal relationships between concepts; the
second provides explanations of perennial issues and cases. Practical inquiry gets a rather
more complex set of types, distinguished first of all by whether the researcher has an
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autonomous role and secondarily by whether the research is aimed at all stakeholders or a
particular subset. This gives four sub-types as per the diagram (see Appendix 5).
The paper ends at this point. Hammersley’s claim is simply that there are key differences in
forms of knowledge, but details on how they are validated (i.e standards) are omitted.
Is this of any use to us? The framework of the typology is an unusual mix; the types are forms
of ‘research’ yet again, but distinguished by a mixture of ‘purpose’, ‘audience’, and
researcher ‘autonomy’ (its nearest neighbour is probably Hart and Bond). It is certainly of
potential relevance to our endeavour, in as much as the 13+ types identified in SP1 could
probably be mapped onto this framework. It might thus offer another way of simplification. It
also clarifies some of the distinctions involved e.g.
• RCTs seek a ‘scientific’ warrant rather than a ‘practical’ one
• Audit is for governance rather than enlightenment
• User-led inquiry is dedicated, not autonomous
• Post-modernism is strictly for the journals
Against its further take up is:
• The fact that it just classifies forms of ‘research’ – so pimpernel tacit knowledge, and
skulking legal and organisational knowledge are missing once again
• It probably involves as many borderline disputes as all the other typologies – for example,
imagine trying to judge how much ‘autonomy’ a researcher has had
• It lacks a vertical axis – it assumes we know the ‘kind of thing’ to which Hammersley is
referring
In short, half a loaf is half a loaf. It is hard to evaluate a typology without it being put to use.
However, it provides more support for ‘purpose’ as the defining criterion, and a further loud
hint to get ‘audience’ and ‘autonomy’ on the vertical axis.
6. Adams, Dominelli and Payne (1998) – Social work: themes, issues, critical
debates
This takes us a little beyond the formal attempts at typologies of knowledge. I thought it
might be worth a look at how social care (social work) professionals make knowledge
distinctions, using the textbook as the ‘public pronouncement’ of how wisdom has
sedimented and compartmentalised. The aim is to explore the use of chapter headings as
‘prototype-typologies’ in line with the view of textbooks as the ‘footprint’ of a discipline.
As a practical approach this proved difficult because social work texts mark and demarcate
their territory in a massive number of different ways:
• By client group – elderly, offenders, mentally ill etc.
• By intervention options – therapy, education, group, community work etc.
• By relationship/role – listener, empathiser, adviser, professional, problem solver etc.
• By problem – drugs, homelessness, mental health, sex offending etc.
• By cause of problem – moral, psychiatric, psychological, interactional, cultural,
contextual etc.
The nearest one seems to get to a ‘knowledge’ demarcation is the division of the field by
‘practice theories’, a term which Payne defines as follows: ‘practice theories seek to explain
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in organised ways how social workers may usefully act, using their knowledge about the
social world in which they are involved’. The idea (I think) is that these theories emerge in
reflective practice about what works for clients but become institutionally hardened through
training, textbooks and networks. They then provide a resource that can be continually called
upon in interventions with particular cases and specific clients.
Using the chapter headings from Part II of Adams et al (see Appendix 6) thus gives the
following typology. (Remember that this is a ‘horizontal’ axis, I just can’t fit it all across the
page)
Counselling
Groupwork
Community work
Psychosocial work
Cognitive behavioural practice
Task-centred work
Radical social work
Feminist social work
Anti-oppressive practice
Post-modern approaches
This is potentially a very worrying classification for our task. The first half-a-dozen types
have not really showed up in the 13+ SP1 categories, yet they might well constitute the key
knowledge base of a great deal of social work practice. Practice theories provide the basic
justifications for particular types of intervention and so they undoubtedly stand as the
‘orientations’ or ‘forms of knowledge’ in our remit. The book chapters are not written to a
common format, so they are hardly in the form of a typology, but it would be possible to
compare each approach systematically in terms of: how it views the problem; what it deems
to be successful outcomes; what resources it calls upon; how it links with other agencies; how
it collects evidence to develop its theories; and so on. In short, these practice theories have
features of, or are, ‘paradigms’ in a rather classic sense.
So, what to do about them? We are looking to simplify, not to add orientations, and clearly we
could not manage an additional phalanx of practice theories on the vertical axis. The problem
is instructive and again it lies with the ambiguity of using ‘forms of knowledge’ as the
classification base. We now have ‘practice theories’ limbering up alongside ‘organisational
knowledge’ and ‘tacit knowledge’ and ‘research knowledge’ and ‘user knowledge’, each one
having sub-types and each one with the capacity to sustain a typology of its own.
Arguments for not getting too worried about practice theories are as follows:
• There are simply too many of them. The list above is only for social work and presumably
mental health, probation, work with the elderly and so on will have spawned other brands
of intervention. Some, of course, will be shared. No doubt there are ‘cognitive
behaviouralists’ in probation and gerontology, and ‘counsellors’ in prisons and sheltered
homes etc. but, given the existence of sub-sub-types across a range of clients and contexts,
these practice theories are probably too numerous to handle.
• They come and go. As such, practice theories may be too ephemeral for a permanent place
in a typology. For instance, the chapter on ‘groupwork’ in Adams et al compares it to
flares and loons.
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However, practice theories cannot be dismissed out of hand. Some on Adams et al’s list were
identified under another form of knowledge in the 13+ of SP1. Thus Anti-oppressive practice
(Adams et al #9) is familiar in typological terms (SP1 #6) because it has already been
identified as a form of research practice (user-led). However, I do not see that such re-location
could apply to all of the practice theories (especially the individual-focused ones).
In short, the ramifications of this ‘typology’ need further discussion. It suggests that it will be
monstrously difficult to ignore sub-sub-types. However, it provided no clues on how we might
accommodate them.
7. Trinder (1996) – Social work research: the state of the art (or science)
Empirical Practice
Pragmatism and
Partnership
Critical Research
This returns us to more familiar territory. The platform of the classification is ‘social work
research methodology’ and the clusters are simply the author’s interpretation of the three
main tribes. It is closely related to Peile (#4) above, making room for another distinctive
research orientation that emerged in the 90s. The one difference is that Trinder tries to relate
each method to ‘wider, social political and philosophical changes’. In other words, the
classification also covers the putative usage of the ‘findings’ of each research orientation.
There is, incidentally, no formal presentation of a typology, so nothing is appended on this
one.
Empirical practice is very much identified with RCTs and the Macdonald/Sheldon wing of
social care. Measurement and output are privileged and this serves to emphasise certain
processes within social care such as risk assessment, audit, performance management and so
on. Some of these activities are depicted as separate orientations in SP1, so their inclusion
here is a fairly major act of compression. It probably also corrals ‘impact’ and ‘monitoring’
from Owen and Rogers (and the equivalent from Mark et al). According to Trinder, empirical
practice is located philosophically in ideas about the rational management of society.
Specifically, it is about the regulation of practitioners.
The second grouping, ‘pragmatism and partnership’ spotlights a category that is intuitively
recognisable but one that I’ve not come across in the literature expressed in quite this way.
Fuller is the author identified by Trinder as the supreme pragmatist and according to him,
‘pragmatic research is the study of social work as it is?’. (Trinder’s view (and mine) is
basically, ‘ah, were it all so easy’) ‘Pragmatism and partnership’ thus refers to a loose
amalgam of case studies and descriptive reports, usually qualitative and usually
commissioned by a government or local agency. It is quite a narrow group, identified within
the qualitative research tradition in SP1 (i.e. a small bit of one of the 13+). Why it figures so
large for Trinder, I think, is its political clout. She associates pragmatism with policy
partnership as follows; ‘it is closely linked to the anti-intellectual traditions in mainstream
social work’. Research findings are seen as self-evident truths about administrative
arrangements and working practices. They are about making the system work better or more
reliably (c.f. Mark et al’s ‘program and organisational improvement’).
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The third groups is ‘critical research’, which sees ‘politics and participation’ as the domain
concerns of research. Research is not fact-finding but located within a world of unequal
power relations between genders, classes, races, professionals and clients. The house style is
participatory, small-scale, bottom-up research designs. The wider vision of social care
assumed in all this is an emancipatory/critical view of society in which issues have to be
addressed from the point of view of the ‘victims’. All this is familiar from SP1 and several
typologies considered above as the ‘emancipatory’ and ‘user-led’ orientations, with maybe a
bit of ‘action research’ thrown in for good measure.
Trinder is clearly not that enamoured with the first two approaches, and considers that the
third may founder on the familiar problem of the million stakeholders’ standpoints.
In short, this is a research driven typology (once again) and so ignores tacit, organisational
and practice knowledge (as per usual). Despite the academic purview, the finer distinctions
between some specific research methods are also crushed (c.f. Peile). The link to ‘wider
social philosophies’ is interesting but is a standard matter for the vertical axis. Nothing much
new here except the daunting (or haughty?) vision that government agencies are only really
interested in the ‘mish-mash of descriptive pragmatism’ produced within the second stable.
8. Hudson (1997) – A model of professional knowledge for social work
Theoretical
Knowledge
Personal
Knowledge
Practice
Wisdom
Procedural
Knowledge
Empirical
Knowledge
I get the feeling that this source might be very obscure. It is from the ‘practice forum’ section
of Australian Social Work, and in the small print admits to being part of the PhD thesis of a
practising social worker.
Nevertheless, it has much going for it. It is very simple. Five is a good number and each type
comes with a clear definition (see Appendix 7). The basic argument is that a range of different
forms of knowledge has influenced social work. These have shifted over the years as different
cultural and professional influences have prevailed. The author suggests that social work
needs eclecticism and so needs a form of ‘professional knowledge’, which incorporates all
five and which allows the practitioner to switch from one to the other as befits the needs of
the problem, situation or client. In particular, the paper prescribes an increase in the use of
theoretical and empirical knowledge which, according to Hudson, have tended to be dormant
in social work practice.
How does it stand in relation to the others? ‘Procedural knowledge’ pulls in the legal,
administrative and inspection angle. ‘Empirical knowledge’ combines all the different forms
of research based knowledge. ‘Practice wisdom’ is pretty near to Adams et al’s ‘practice
theories’ (but perhaps a bit more folkloric). ‘Personal knowledge’ is the common sense, tacit
stuff that is used on the ground. ‘Theoretical knowledge’ covers more abstract conceptual
frameworks. This is the least clear – it is explained in rather abstract terms with a nod to
Popper – but might include the ‘policy think pieces’ which have bothered us elsewhere.
In short, this is very wide ranging. For once, tacit and organisational knowledge are not
excluded. Indeed, the typology might (unsurprisingly) be rather biased towards the social
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worker’s everyday decisions (practice wisdom and personal knowledge are a bit similar). It is
also packed very, very tightly in its empirical research corner. A significant omission,
however, is anything about the ‘user perspective’. One reason why this typology spans the
social care knowledge field quite well (users apart), is that the five types can be thought of as
‘sources’ of knowledge. Hudson does not label them so – she too calls them 'forms of
knowledge’.
Emerging suggestions for us
It may be useful to run the rule over a few more such efforts although I haven’t been able to
locate one that stimulates a significantly different response in my brain. Thus I halt
temporarily here.
Two rather different typological frameworks are suggested by the examples above.
‘Knowledge’, perforce, is an unwieldy beast and it is already clear from SP1 that that it will
resist any simple classification system. A typology of ‘knowledge’ is a bit like a typology of
‘everything’. Those discussed here suggest two ways to go, each starting with the obvious
tactic of limiting the horizontal axis to one ‘dimension’ of knowledge:
•
Route 1. Typologies 1, 2 and 3 suggest that there is much to be gained by looking at
‘purpose’ as the foundation of the typology. What is knowledge for, what is it supposed to
do? Using purpose has the added attraction for phase two of the project in that it gives us
an immediate handle on ‘standards’. Standards, as we argued from the outset, have to be
‘fit for purpose’ and this should make the second part of the exercise fit neatly with the
first. So, the course of action here would be to attempt to work with some version of
Owen and Rogers, and Mark et al’s typology.
•
Route 2. Typology 8, and the difficulties uncovered by the (chapter headings) typology 6,
suggest that it might be wise to use ‘sources’ of knowledge as the backbone. The course
of action here would be to work with some version of Hudson’s model. We would have to
look at ‘user knowledge’ as an additional source and perhaps think about collapsing
‘personal knowledge’ and ‘practice wisdom’ (they emerge from the same ‘source’, I
think). The typology would also have to become multi-level. That is to say, each category
would have to acknowledge sub- and perhaps sub-sub types. ‘Empirical knowledge’ has
been dissected in detail in SP1 and clearly there are profound differences within the
research strategies uncovered there. Similarly, legislation and inspection form part of
Hudson’s procedural knowledge. They have the same ‘source’ at the institutional level but
don’t have the same ‘orientation’ and won’t have the same ‘standards’. If we don’t
acknowledge sub-types, then diversity of this kind will make life very difficult when we
get to standards.
I close with some preliminary thoughts on the two routes.
10
Route one: a purpose-based typology
Attempt one: Adapt Owen and Rogers. Go with purpose as the identifier. Add ‘emancipatory’
and combine ‘clarification’ and ‘interactive’.
Pro-active
Interactive
Emancipatory
Monitoring
Evaluation
Identifying
needs,
problems and
existing best
practice
Clarifying,
improving and
developing
ongoing
practice
Empowering
users and
changing
oppressive
structures
Managing,
benchmarking,
auditing and
regulating
provision
Discovering
what works,
why, when
and
wherefore
Attempt one again: Same idea using Mark et al language.
Pro-active
assessment
and trouble
shooting
Programme
and
organisational
improvement
Empowerment
and user
control
Oversight,
monitoring
and
compliance
Evaluation
of
programme
effectiveness
Identifying
needs,
problems and
existing best
practice
Clarifying,
improving and
developing
ongoing
practice
Emancipatory
research aimed
at changing
oppressive
structures
Managing,
benchmarking,
auditing and
regulating
provision
Discovering
what works
why, when
and
wherefore
Attempt two: Stick with ‘purpose’ as the identifier. Add ‘tacit knowledge’ even though it will
cause havoc when it comes to creating standards, and add Mark et al’s ‘knowledge
development’ even though theory development and enlightenment seem small potatoes in the
battle for social care.
Pro-active
assessment and
trouble
shooting
Programme
and
organisational
improvement
Emancipatory
research and
promoting user
control
Oversight,
monitoring
and
compliance
Evaluation of
programme
effectiveness
Circulating
tacit
wisdom for
practical
decisions
Testing social
science
theory for
knowledge
development
Measures to
assess client
needs, identify
problem
sources and
chart existing
best practice
Action
approaches to
clarify, improve
and develop
ongoing practice
Empowerment
of users by
adopting their
values and
changing
oppressive
structures
Information
management
for
benchmarking,
auditing and
regulating
provision
Formal
research to
discover what
works, why,
when and
wherefore
Promoting
skills,
reflexive
judgement
and active
decision
making
though
experience
and training
Generating
concepts and
general
propositions to
enlighten the
policy
community
11
Route two: a sources-based typology and a new way of mapping
Route 2 makes the modifications noted above to Hudson’s model of ‘professional knowledge
forms’ to create base-line categories that identify different institutional sources of knowledge.
Knowledge deriving from users is added, ‘procedural’ is re-labelled as ‘organisational’ (better
to identify the ‘source’), and practice and tacit are combined since they both emerge from
practitioners’ heads.
In addition I’d like to contemplate a rather different way of mapping the territories of social
care. Thus far, our (my) mind has been locked into ‘typologies’, that is to say a matrix with
rows and columns. However, there is another way of sorting and ordering in complex
systems, based on the idea of ‘trees’ or ‘lineages’. The idea is to start with the identification
of a few major ‘families’ and then detail their membership at second, third and subsequent
levels. This has the great advantage of allowing for sub-types and sub-sub-types of whatever
it is one is trying to classify. A first sketch is attached as Appendix 8 but I’ll build up to it step
by step as follows:
1) The first level is made up of basic sources of knowledge amended from Hudson’s model.
Organisational
Practitioner
Procedural
knowledge,
setting
boundaries and
limitations on
service
provision.
DoH, social
services,
charities etc.
Knowledge
gained from
the conduct of
social care
practice, tacit
wisdom and
professional
stratagems
Social
workers,
probation
officers etc.
Policy
Community
Grand policy
themes from the
wider policy
community,
hortative and
explanatory
ideas and
concepts
Ministers, think
tanks, agencies
(including
SCIE) etc.
Empirical
Research
Evidence
gathered
systematically
by prescribed
methods,
process and
outcome data
Academics,
research units
and institutes
Users
Knowledge
gained from
the experience
of using
services,
research and
reflection
User-led
organisations
and
individuals
2) The second level shifts down to the ‘processes’ or ‘broad strategies’ or ‘vehicles’ through
which the knowledge is created. The idea is that the same source of knowledge may utilise
rather different strategies for arriving at the intelligence required to make it function. This
gets us close to the realm of ‘forms of knowledge’ (our original goal) but as we are at level
two of this model, we can accommodate rather more of these strategies than in a matrix. To
take the simplest example – ‘organisational knowledge’:
Organisational knowledge – subtypes. This is procedural knowledge about the management
and legislative context that governs social care, and it is drawn from quite different strategies
– inspection, audit and legislation. This gives three sub-types:
Organisational Knowledge
Inspection
12
Audit
Legislation
Following this example, each of the other four ‘sources’ can be identified with a range of
strategies in a similar manner.
Practitioner knowledge – subtypes. One obvious vehicle is ‘training’ which gathers up
practitioner knowledge into a curriculum of experiential learning. Another is the ‘practice
theories’ which organise and justify different types of interventions (Adams et al, 1998).
‘Tacit knowledge’ also belongs here but, as ever, is likely to cause problems – it is a ‘vehicle’
of sorts for practitioner knowledge, but is it a strategy?
Policy community knowledge – subtypes. Here, I have in mind the products of the ‘chattering’
(or thinking) classes that surround social care. They may have power, or simply aspire to it,
but in either case the main vehicle for their ideas is ideas, packaged in the form of paper
which might be white, green or grey. These materials could be subdivided into the ‘academic’
and the ‘political’ (a mighty fine line to be drawn). The former would include works of longterm theory building, conceptual enlightenment etc., and the latter everything from the
manifesto to the political thought piece.
Empirical research knowledge– subtypes. These are usually ‘academic’ too, but distinguished
from the aforementioned because these researchers get their hands dirty. The chosen vehicle
is the ‘research report’. As noted throughout our discussions so far, there are potentially
dozens of these research families. At this second level I would distinguish broad research
strategies, leaving level three to pick up the finer technical distinctions. Possible candidates
are thus ‘evaluation research’, ‘action research’ and ‘descriptive research’ (the ‘pragmatic’ or
‘qualitative’ case studies provided by agencies about themselves).
User knowledge – subtypes. This is harder to grasp in terms of ‘strategies’. I suppose user
views always used to be tacit (and thus completely ignored) but nowadays, the user’s voice
comes to us as ‘emancipatory research’. This can be distinguished from the previous category
(empirical research) in respect of who controls the research agenda, for it is the user rather
than the researcher who calls the tune. The other vehicle of user knowledge is probably the
campaigning thought piece, which gets it uncomfortably close to the policy community
category.
3) The third level is made up of the outputs (the methods, the techniques-on-the-ground, the
practical manifestations, the actual bits of paper) that constitute knowledge from that source. I
will not attempt to list all the potential sub-sub-categories here but, as examples: audit has a
few distinctive subtypes and techniques to do with ‘performance indicator methodology’,
‘cost-benefit’, ‘cost-utility’ analysis etc., and social care has fetched up its own specialisms
here, by way of ‘joint reviews’, ‘best value audits’ and so on. Practice theories have already
been covered in the chapter headings of the Adams text book, and evaluation research is also
standard text book stuff.
At the sub-sub-group level, we could end up with 30 or 40 distinctive manifestations of
knowledge so it is bound to be more discerning than a six-headed typology, although overlaps
would still occur aplenty. Exploring the third level further would be worthwhile only if we
were pretty sure that the end product of this approach to classification would be useable.
13
References
Adams R, Dominelli L, Payne M (1998) Social work: themes, issues and critical debates
London: Macmillan
Hammersley M (2000) Varieties of social research: a typology International Journal of Social
Research Methodology Jul 3(3) pp221-229
Hart E and Bond M (2000) Using action research. In: Gomm R and Davies C (eds) Using
evidence in health and social care London: Sage
Hudson J (1997) A model of professional knowledge for social work Australian Social Work
Sep 50(3) pp35-44
Mark M, Henry G, Julnes G (2000) Evaluation San Franscisco: Jossey-Bass
Owen J and Rogers P (1999) Program evaluation London: Sage
Peile C (1988) Research paradigms in social work: from stalemate to creative synthesis Social
Service Review Mar vol. 62 pp1-19
Thyer B (2002) Developing discipline-specific knowledge for social work: is it possible?
Journal of Social Work Education Winter 38(1) pp 101- 113
Trinder L (1996) Social work research: the state of the art (or science) Child and Family
Social Work vol.1 pp233-242
14
Appendix 1 (Owen and Rogers, 1999)
Table 3.1
Orientation
Typical
issues
Key
approaches
Table 3.2
Evaluation forms: orientation, typical issues and key approaches
Proactive (Form A)
Clarificative (Form B)
Interactive (Form C)
Monitoring (Form D)
Impact (Form E)
Synthesis
Clarification
Improvement
Justification/finetuning
Justification/accountability
*Is there a need for the
program?
*What do we know
about the problem that
the program will
address?
*What is recognised as
the best practice in this
area?
*Have there been other
attempts to find solutions
to this problem?
*What does the relevant
research or conventional
wisdom tell us about this
problem?
*What do we know
about the problem that
the program will
address?
*What could we find out
from external sources to
rejuvenate an existing
policy or program?
*Needs assessment
*Research review
*Review of best practice
(benchmarking)
*What are the intended
outcomes and how is the
program designed to
achieve them?
*What is the underlying
rationale for this
program?
*What program elements
need to be modified in
order to maximise the
intended outcomes?
*Is the program
plausible?
*Which aspects of this
program are amenable to
a subsequent monitoring
or impact assessment?
*What is the program
trying to achieve?
*How is this service
going?
*Is the delivery
working?
*Is delivery consistent
with the program
plan?
*How could delivery
be changed to make it
more effective?
*How could this
organisation be
changed so as to make
it more effective?
*Is the program
reaching the target
population?
*Is implementation
meeting program
benchmarks?
*How is
implementation going
between sites?
*How is
implementation now
compared with a
month ago?
*Are our costs rising
or falling?
*How can we finetune
the program to make it
more effective?
*Is there a program
site which needs
attention to ensure
more effective
delivery?
*Has the program been
implemented as planned?
*Have the stated goals of the
program been achieved?
*Have the needs of those
served by the program been
achieved?
*What are the unintended
outcomes?
*Does the implementation
strategy lead to intended
outcomes?
*How do differences in
implementation affect
program outcomes?
*Has the program been costeffective?
*Evaluability assessment
*Logic/theory
development
*Accreditation
*Responsive
*Action research
*Quality review
*Developmental
*Empowerment
*Component analysis
*Devolved
performance
assessment
*Systems analysis
*Objectives based
*Process-outcomes studies
*Needs based
*Goal free
*Performance audit
Evaluation forms: all dimensions
Proactive (Form A)
Clarificative (Form B)
Interactive (Form C)
Monitoring (Form D)
Impact (Form E)
Orientation
Synthesis
Clarification
Improvement
Justification/fine tuning
Typical
issues
State of
program
Major
focus
Timing
(vis-à-vis
program
delivery)
Key
approaches
[see Table 3.1]
[see Table 3.1]
[see Table 3.1]
[see Table 3.1]
Justification/
accountability
[see Table 3.1]
None
Development
Development
Settled
Settled
Program context
All elements
Delivery
Delivery/outcomes
Delivery/outcomes
Before
During
During
During
After
*Needs assessment
*Research review
*Review of best practice
(benchmarking)
*Evaluability assessment
*Logic/theory
development
*Accreditation
*Responsive
*Action research
*Quality review
*Developmental
*Empowerment
*Component analysis
*Devolved performance
assessment
*Systems analysis
Assembly
of evidence
Review of documents
and data bases, site visits
and other interactive
methods. Focus groups
and delphi technique
useful for needs
assessments.
Generally relies on
combination of
document analysis,
interview and
observation. Findings
include program plan
and implications for
organisation. Can lead to
improved morale.
Relies on intensive
onsite studies, including
observation. Degree of
data structure depends
on approach. May
involve providers and
program participants
Systems approach
requires availability of
Management Information
Systems (MIS), the use of
indicators and the
meaningful use of
performance information.
*Objectives based
*Process-outcome
studies
Needs based
*Goal free
*Performance audit
Traditionally required
use of preordinate
research designs,
where possible the use
of treatment and
control groups, and the
use of tests and other
quantitative data.
Studies of
implementation
generally require
observational data.
Determining all the
outcomes requires use
of more exploratory
methods and the use of
qualitative evidence.
15
Appendix 2 (Mark et al, 2000)
Four Purposes of Evaluation
1. Assessment of merit and worth: the development of
warranted judgements, at the individual and societal level, of
the value of a policy or program
2. Program and organizational improvement: the effort to
use information to directly modify and enhance program
operations
3. Oversight and compliance: the assessment of the extent to
which a program follows the directives of statutes,
regulations, rules, mandated standards or any other formal
expectations
4. Knowledge development: the discovery or testing of general
theories, propositions, and hypotheses in the context of
policies and programs
Four Inquiry Modes for Evaluation Practice
1. Description: methods used to measure events or experiences,
such as client characteristics, services delivered, resources, or
client’s standing on potential outcome variables
2. Classification: methods used for grouping and for
investigating the underlying structures of things, such as the
development or application of a taxonomy or program subtypes
3. Causal analysis: methods used to explore and test causal
relationships (between program services and client
functioning, for example) or to study the mechanisms through
which effects occur
4. Values inquiry: methods used to model valuation processes,
assess existing values, or dissect value positions using formal
or critical analysis
16
Appendix 3
Action research typology (Hart and Bond, 2000)
Consensus model of society
Rational social management
Action research type:
Conflict model of society
Structural change
Experimental
Organisational
Professionalising
Empowering
Re-education
Re-education/training
Reflective practice
Consciousness raising
Enhancing social science/
administrative control and
social change towards
consensus
Enhancing managerial
control and organisational
change towards consensus
Enhancing professional
control and individual’s
ability to control work
situation
Enhancing user-control and
shifting balance of power;
structural change towards
pluralism
Inferring relationship
between behaviour and
output; identifying causal
factors in group dynamics
Overcoming resistance
to change/restructuring
balance of power between
managers and workers
Empowering professional
groups; advocacy on behalf
of patients/clients
Empowering oppressed
groups
Social science bias/
researcher-focused
Managerial bias/clientfocused
Practitioner-focused
User/practitioner-focused
Close group, controlled,
selection made by
researcher for purpose of
measurement/inferring
relation between cause
and effect
Work groups and/or mixed
groups of managers and
workers
Professional(s) and/or
(interdisciplinary)
professional group/
negotiated team
boundaries
Fluid groupings, selfselecting or natural
boundary or open/closed
by negotiation
Fixed membership
Selected membership
Shifting membership
Fluid membership
Problem emerges from the
interaction of social science
theory and social problems
Problem defined by most
powerful group; some
negotiation with workers
Problem defined by
professional group; some
negotiation with users
Emerging and negotiated
definition of problem by
less powerful group(s)
Problem relevant for social
science/management
interests
Problem relevant for
management/social science
interests
Problem emerges from
professional practice/
experience
Problem emerges from
members’ practice/
experience
Success defined in terms of
social science
Success defined by
sponsors
Contested, professionally
determined definitions of
success
Competing definitions of
success accepted and
expected
Social science, experimental
intervention to test theory
and/or generate theory
Top-down, directed change
towards predetermined aims
Professionally-led.
predefined, process-led
Bottom-up, undetermined,
process-led
Problem to be solved in
terms of research aims
Problem to be solved in
terms of management aims
Problem to be solved in
the interests of researchbased practice and
professionalisation
Problem to be explored as
part of process of change,
developing an understanding
of meanings of issues in terms of
problem and solution
5 Improvement and
involvement
Towards controlled
outcome and consensual
definition of improvement
Towards tangible outcome
and consensual definition
of improvement
Towards improvement in
practice defined by
professionals and on
behalf of users
Towards negotiated outcomes
and pluralist definitions of
improvement; account taken of
vested interests
6 Cyclic processes
Research components
dominant
Action and research
components in tension;
action-dominated
Research and action
components in tension;
research-dominated
Action components dominant
Identifies causal processes
that can be generalised
Identifies causal processes
that are specific to problem
context and/or can be
generalised
Identifies causal processes
that are specific to problem
and/or can be generalised
Change cause of events;
recognition of multiple
influences upon change
Time-limited, task-focused
Discrete, rationalist,
sequential
Spiral of cycles,
opportunistic, dynamic
Open-ended, process-driven
Experimenter/respondents
Consultant/researcher,
respondent/participants
Practitioner or researcher/
collaborators
Practitioner researcher/
co-researcher/co-change
agents
Outside researcher as
expert/research funding
Client pays an outside
consultant – ‘they who pay
the piper call the tune’
Differentiated roles
Outside resources and/or
internally generated
Outside resources and/or
internally generated
Merged roles
Shared roles
Distinguishing criterion
1 Educative base
2 Individuals in groups
3 Problem focus
4 Change intervention
7 Research relationship,
degree of collaboration
Differentiated roles
17
Appendix 4 (Peile, 1988)
Table 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF ALTERNATIVES TO EMPIRICISM
Empirical Alternative
Prediction
Bias limitation (value free)
Separation of knowledge
Observation
Quantitative
Measurement and testing
Objective
Detachment
Certain knowable world absolutism
Focus on content
Aim for certainty
Normative alternative
Explanation52
Bias incorporation (value ladenness)53
Integration of knowledge and values54
Understanding55
Qualitative56
Insight and intuition57
Subjective57
Involvement57
Relativism – multiperspectives58
Focus on process59
Reliance on faith60
NOTE. Superscript numbers refer to notes accompanying text.
Table 2
THE PARADIGMATIC CONTEXT OF EMPIRICISM AND NORMATIVISM
Cosmological assumptions (the universe
as a totality)
Empiricism
Normative
Causal deterministic view of reality.
Knowledge is contextual and a symbolic social
construction.
Events can be explained and their meaning
for people uncovered.
Parts can only be understood in context.
The world is predictable, knowable,
and measurable.79
Fragmentary view of reality (reality
can be understood as separate parts).80
Ontological assumptions (the essence
of nature and human nature)
Epistemological assumptions (knowing
and how knowledge is generated)
Behavior can be explained in causal
deterministic ways. It has a mechanistic
quality.81
People are manipulatable and controllable.83
Behavior is intentional and creative.82 It can
be explained, but is not predictable.
Knowledge arises from experimentation and
observation and is grounded in the certainty
of sense experience.84
Knowledge arises from interpretation and
insight and is grounded by empathic
communication with the subjects of the
research.85
Symbols, meanings, and hidden factors are
essential to understanding.
Rejection of metaphysical knowledge.86
People shape their own reality.
Ethical assumptions
A separation between knowledge and values.87
Science produces knowledge. How it is used
is a value, ethical or moral question, and is
outside the concern of science.88
Values are the subject of research
Moral or ethical relativism. Leads to disinterest
in ethical issues or anarchic
individualism.89
Spiritual assumptions
Rejection of spiritual explanations or a clear
separation between science and religion.
Relativism of spiritual beliefs. Such beliefs
important in the social construction of meaning.
Relationship and political assumptions
The relationship aim between science and society
is control.90
The value-free stance implicitly supports the
dominations of the established order.92
Mutually supportive with both high technology
capitalism and centralized industrial
socialism.94
The relationship aim is empathetic
communication.91
Implicitly conservative since there is no
structural or historical analysis of society.93
Mutually supportive with a liberal society
allowing individual freedom and selfdetermination.
NOTE: superscript numbers refer to notes accompanying text.
18
Appendix 5 (Hammersley, 2000)
Figure 2 A typology of social research
Scientific inquiry
19
Practical inquiry
The immediate audience is fellow
researchers
The immediate audience is practitioners and
policymakers of various kinds, as well as others
who have a practical interest in the particular
issue
The aim is to contribute to a
cumulating body of knowledge
The aim is to provide knowledge that will be of
immediate practical use
Findings are assessed primarily in
terms of validity; with a preference for
erring on the side of rejecting as false
what is true rather than accepting as
true what is false
Findings are assessed in terms of relevance and
timeliness as well as validity, with the latter
being judged on the basis of lay as well as
research-based knowledge
Theoretical
scientific
research
Substantive
scientific research
Dedicated practical
research
Democratic practical
research
The aim is to
develop and test
theoretical ideas:
to produce
knowledge about
general causal
relationships
The task is to
provide
descriptions and
explanations of
particular cases
relevant to
perennial, value
issues
The goal is to provide
information that is
needed by a specific
group of
policymakers or
practitioners at a
particular time
The purpose is to
provide information that
will be of use to anyone
concerned with a
particular, currently
pressing, issue
Contract-based
practical research
Autonomous, practical
research
This is commissioned
on the basis of a
contract to produce
specific information
Researchers play an
autonomous role in
producing practically
relevant information
Appendix 6 (Adams et al, 1998)
11. Counselling Helen Cosis Brown
Introduction
Theoretical groupings within counselling
Counselling and social work
Issues
Conclusion
Further reading
16. Task-centred work Mark Doel
Introduction
Task-centred work and other social work ideas
The essence of task-centred work
Issues
Conclusion
Further reading
12. Groupwork David Ward
Where has all the groupwork gone?
The demethoding of social work
Groupwork and work-in-groups
A continuing need for groupwork
Re-establishing groupwork
Further reading
17. Radical social work Mary Langan
Introduction
The roots of radical social work
The radical social work diaspora
The end?
Conclusion
Further reading
13. Community work Marjorie Mayo
Introduction
The context
‘Mapping’ community work: definitions and recent
history
Community work and social work
Alternative perspectives and implications for practice
Some current issues and dilemmas
Conclusion
Further reading
18. Feminist social work Joan Orme
Introduction and context
Feminist theories for social work
Feminist social work practice
Issues
Conclusion
Further reading
14. Psychosocial work David Howe
Introduction
The socialness of self
Inner working models
Attachment and relationship-based theories as
examples of a psychosocial perspective
Assessments
Practice
Conclusion
Further reading
15. Cognitive-behavioural practice Katy Cigno
Introduction
The policy context of social work
Cognitive-behavioural practice
Areas of practice and links with effectiveness
Assessment and intervention
Conclusion
Acknowledgement
Further reading
20
19. Anti-oppressive practice Beverly Burke and
Philomena Harrison
Introduction
What is anti-oppressive practice?
Amelia’s story as told to a friend
Theory into practice
Further reading
20. Postmodernism and discourse approaches to social
work Nigel Parton and Wendy Marshall
Introduction
What is meant by postmodernity and postmodernism?
Social work and the postmodern
The importance of discourse and language
Possible implications of postmodern perspectives for
practice
Dedication
Further reading
Appendix 7 (Hudson, 1997)
Figure 1. Model of professional knowledge forms
THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE
EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE
‘A set of concepts, schemes or
frames of reference that present an
organised view of a phenomenon and
enable the professional to explain,
describe, predict or control the
world’.
‘Knowledge derived from research
involving the systematic gathering
and interpretation of data to
document and describe
experiences, explain events, predict
future states or evaluate outcomes’.
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
‘An inherent or spontaneous process
where the worker is necessarily
committing him or her self to actions
outside of immediate consciousness,
or is action based on a personalised
notion of ‘common sense’. Such
knowledge includes intuition,
cultural knowledge and common
sense.
21
PROFESSIONAL
KNOWLEDGE
‘The cumulated information or
understanding deriving from
theory, research, practice or
experiences considered to
contribute to the profession’s
understanding of its work and
that serves as a guide to its
practice’.
PROCEDURAL KNOWLEDGE
‘Knowledge about the organisational,
legislative, or policy context within
which social work operates’.
PRACTICE WISDOM
‘Knowledge gained from the
conduct of social work practice
which is formed through the
process of working with a
number of cases involving the
same problem, or gained
through work with different
problems which possess
dimensions of understanding
which are transferable to the
problem at hand.
Appendix 8: Route 2 typology
Level I
Organisational
Practitioner
Policy Community
Empirical Research
Users
Procedural knowledge and
management governing social care
Knowledge gained from conduct of
social care
Grand policy themes
Exhortative and explanatory ideas
and concepts
Evidence gathered systematically
Process and outcome
Knowledge gained from
experience of service use and
reflection
Level II
Inspection
Audit
Legal
Level III
Best-value
Cost-benefit
Practice wisdom
counselling
groupwork
community
Training
cognitive
Tacit
anti-oppressive
Political
thought pieces
Theoretical
manifestos
Evaluation
RCTs
Key
Level I: Primary Source
Level II: Knowledge Strategy
Level III: Practical Manifestation
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Process
Single case
Descriptive
Action Research
Theory-driven
Empirical
Emancipatory
Ideological
Co-opted
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