Childless Aristocrats. Fertility, Inheritance, and
Persistent Inequality in Britain (1550 – 1950)
Paula Gobbi1
1 Université
Marc Goñi2
catholique de Louvain
2 University
of Vienna
Motivation
Persistent inequality.
Nowadays in England, less than 1% of the population owns 70% of
the land (Cahill, 2002).
Inheritance.
High levels of inequality are the result of a legal instrument: the
marriage settlement.
Fertility.
Settlements affected the fertility behavior of the British elite,
which in turn also affected inequality (indirectly).
Q: How the inheritance scheme affected reproduction rates among
British peers?
What are the implications for inequality?
0
2
10
20
30
childlessness, %
number of births of mothers
3
4
5
6
40
Fertility & childlessness in the elite
1600-09 1650-59 1700-09 1750-59 1800-09 1850-59 1900-09 1950-59
marriage year
* sample: married women whose father is a peer
Heirs vs. non-heirs
Surviving children
Inheritance
Heirs received all the land, younger brothers and sisters received an
allowance
Marriage settlements
I
Signed upon the marriage of the heir
I
The heir committed to pass the estate unbroken to the next
generation in exchange for an anticipation
I
De facto entailment
I
Settled dowries and allowances
This paper
Estimate the effect of marriage settlements on childlessness
exploiting the demographic aspect of settlements.
Rationalize the link between inheritance, fertility, and wealth
inequality.
Literature
1. Historical demography
I
Malthus (1798); Chesnais (1992); Clark and Cummins (2009);
Goñi (2015)
2. Fertility and inequality
I
I
Number of children: Becker (1960); Heckman and Walker
(1990); De la Croix and Doepke (2003); Adsera (2005);
Dettling and Kearney (2014)
Childlessness: Aaronson, Lange, and Mazumder (2014);
Baudin, de la Croix, and Gobbi (2015)
3. Inheritance and inequality
I
Habakkuk (1950); Chu (1991); Engerman and Sokoloff (2000);
Bertochi (2006); Piketty and Saez (2006); Acemoglu (2008);
Allen (2009); Long and Ferrie (2013); Clark and Cummins
(2015).
Road map
1. Introduction
2. Data – Hollingsworth’s dataset
3. Empirical analysis
4. Theory
5. Summary
source: Cokayne’s Complete Peerage (1913)
Matching sons with fathers in Hollingsworth’s dataset
I
I
Using name, surname, date of birth, accuracy, etc. we match
94.54% of the individuals
For the remaining 5% (1,554 observations), we did it
manually with the help of www.thepeerage.com
Summary statistics
mean
se
min
max
N
sample
0.263
3.475
4.715
0.080
0.004
0.029
0.031
0.008
0
0
1
0
1
31
31
9
15,146
15,146
11,161
2,598
married
married
married, ≥ 1 child
married
23.468
28.821
50.853
46.959
0.457
0.913
0.227
0.491
0.070
0.092
0.246
0.230
0.075
0.005
0.003
0.008
2
8
1
1
-49
0
0
0
71
74
111
102
59
5
1
1
7,812
7,475
10,971
12,023
15,184
18,759
18,759
3,967
married wom
married men
women
men
married
dead after 30
dead after 30
matched parents
0.444
0.433
0.063
0.060
0.176
0.505
0.214
0.280
0.399
0.236
0.003
0.003
0.001
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.003
0.003
0.003
0.003
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
26,461
26,461
26,461
26,461
26,499
26,499
26,499
26,499
26,499
20,868
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
A. Fertility variables
Childlessness
All live births
All live births (if > 0)
Stillbirths
B. Other demographic variables
Age at first marriage (wom)
Age at first marriage (men)
Age at death (wom)
Age at death (men)
Age difference
Number of marriages
Never married
Last child is a girl
C. Socioeconomic status variables
Baron offspring (non-heir)
Duke offspring (non-heir)
Baron heir
Duke heir
Heir
English peerage
Scottish peerage
Irish peerage
Marrying a commoner
Marrying after inheritance
Road map
1. Introduction
2. Data – Hollingsworth’s dataset
3. Empirical analysis
4. Theory
5. Summary
Empirical analysis
0
χi,j,b,d = βmi,j,b,d + µj + µb + µd + Xi,j,b,d γ + i,j,b,d
I
χ indicates if individual i did not have any children.
I
m indicates if i’s father died before the wedding of his heir.
→ proxy for not having signed a marriage settlement.
I
µj , µb , and µd are family, birth year, and marriage decade FE
I
X: social status, age at marriage (wife), age at death,
stillbirths in the family, and number of siblings.
Dep. variable: Childlessness (1650-1882)
heirs’ wives
non-heirs’
wives
peers’
dau.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Marrying after inheritance
0.047**
(0.019)
0.051***
(0.019)
0.040**
(0.018)
0.077**
(0.038)
0.054
(0.070)
-0.000
(0.033)
Husband’s siblings (#)
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.006
(0.005)
-0.007
(0.009)
-0.001
(0.004)
0.022
(0.019)
0.025
(0.019)
-0.034
(0.053)
0.013
(0.110)
0.015***
(0.002)
0.014***
(0.004)
0.016***
(0.005)
0.021***
(0.003)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.002**
(0.001)
Husband’s age at death
-0.003***
(0.001)
-0.004***
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.001*
(0.001)
Still to live births (fam)
0.189
(0.315)
1.600**
(0.785)
-20.514*
(11.686)
-10.825***
(3.263)
Father-in-law is a duke
Wife’s age at marriage
Wife’s age at death
Social status
Family FE
Birth year FE
Marriage decade FE
Observations
Adjusted R2
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
1,525
0.003
1,524
0.014
1,438
0.059
1,438
0.021
1,060
0.082
2,475
0.170
Standard errors clustered by family in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
births
Scotland
IV analysis
Endogeneity – omitted variables
Father’s health
Low preferences for children (not captured by family FE)
→ may affect the decision to delay marriage.
Instrument: birth order of the heir
A higher birth order affects the probability of signing a settlement
(the father is older → higher probability to die before the wedding).
Birth order is exogenous to the decision to be childless.
First stage:
mi,j,b,m =
15
X
0
βn I(ri,j,b,m = n) + βz Zi,d + µd + Xi,j,b,m γ + i,j,b,m
n=2
I
ri,j,b,d is the birth order of individual i.
I
µd are marriage decade fixed effects.
I
X: social status, age at marriage (wife), age at death, and
stillbirths in the family.
Second stage:
0
χi,j,b,d = β m̂i,j,b,d + µj + µb + µd + Xi,j,b,d γ + i,j,b,d
First stage (1650-1882)
Dep. Variable: Marrying after husband inherits
Birth order:
coef
se
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
12th
13th
15th
reference
0.044*
0.103***
0.117***
0.121***
0.184***
0.196**
0.129
0.186*
0.070
-0.096
0.169
-0.211
-0.407
(0.026)
(0.031)
(0.037)
(0.043)
(0.057)
(0.081)
(0.088)
(0.110)
(0.102)
(0.216)
(0.262)
(0.263)
(0.369)
Controls
Family FE
Birth year FE
Marriage decade FE
YES
NO
NO
YES
F test
Observations
36.497
1,444
Controls: social status (wife), age at marriage (wife), age at death (both),
stillbirths (hus. family); Standard errors clustered by family in parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Second stage (1650-1882)
Dep. Variable: Childlessness
OLS
IV
0.077**
(0.038)
0.125***
(0.034)
Controls
Family FE
Birth year FE
Marriage decade FE
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Observations
1,441
1,441
Marrying after husband inherits
Controls are number of siblings (husband), social status (wife),
age at marriage (wife), age at death (both spouses), stillbirths
(husband’s family); Standard errors clustered by family in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Road map
1. Introduction
2. Data – Hollingsworth’s dataset
3. Empirical analysis
4. Theory
5. Summary
Set up
Unitary household decision model, utility:
L2
L1
2
e
+β δ(m1 ) ln
u(c, L1 , L2 ) = ln c +ln(ν +n)+βδ(m0 ) ln
L0
L0
where
m=
1 if at least one child is male
0 otherwise.
Budget constraint:
c = r (1 − λ0 )L0 + pλ0 L0 − qn − α(1 − λ0 )L0
Marriage settlement
Formally, the legal framework is:
λ0
λ0
λ1
λ1
=λ
=0
= λ and α = 0
= 0 and α = ᾱ
if
if
if
if
M0
M0
M1
M1
=0
=1
=0
=1
which implies the following dynamics
L1 = (1 − λ0 )L0
and L2 = (1 − λ1 )L1
Quasi-hyperbolic discrete discount function
1
βδ
β2δ
τ
τ +1
τ +2
t
Fertility
I
Probability of having an heir given n births:
P(m0 = 1|n) = 1 − (1 − κ)n ,
where κ is the probability of having a son at each birth.
I
Expected utility for a non-childless household
Em0 [u(c, L1 , L2 )|n] = (1 − κ)n u + (1 − (1 − κ)n )u
I
Indirect utility of childless couple
u(c, 0) = ln c + ln ν − βδ ln
L1
L0
2
+ β δ ln
L2
L0
Decisions
Household choose the optimal number of children and whether to
sign a marriage settlement or not.
Assumption: Myopic foresight, i.e., m0 = m1e = m
1. For each pair M0 , M1 , the household evaluates optimal fertility
n? > 0 and compares the indirect utility at n = n? and n = 0.
2. M0 given, the household decides whether to sign the
settlement with the heir or not.
Numerical example
For some configuration of parameters, we find:
I
M0 = 1
⇒
M1 = 1 and n∗ > 0
I
M0 = 0
⇒
M1 = 0 and n∗ = 0
That is, fertility can lead to wealth consolidation, childlessness can
allow wealth to trickle down
parameters
Road map
1. Introduction
2. Data – Hollingsworth’s dataset
3. Empirical analysis
4. Theory
5. Summary
Summary
In the absence of a marriage settlement, heirs were 10 percentage
points more likely to be childlessness
Model rationalizes the relation between inheritance, fertility, and
inequality
The rich get richer and the poor get—children!
The Great Gatsby
Back up slides
Fertility in the elite
7
30
20
%
number of births
4
5
9
-5
50
19
9
-0
9
00
19
9
-5
-0
50
00
18
18
9
-5
9
50
17
-0
-5
00
50
17
16
00
16
marriage year
9
0
2
-0
9
9
9
-5
50
19
19
00
-0
9
9
-5
-0
00
-0
50
18
18
17
50
9
-5
9
-5
9
50
00
17
16
16
00
-0
9
0
2
3
3
10
10
20
%
number of births
4
5
30
6
6
7
40
Non-heirs' wives
40
Heirs' wives
marriage year
births (average)
childless (%)
births (average)
childless (%)
* sample: married women whose husband is heir to a peerage
* sample: married women whose husband is a peers' non-heir son
more
Childlessness in the elite
7
30
20
%
number of births
4
5
9
-5
50
19
9
-0
9
00
19
9
-5
-0
50
00
18
18
9
-5
9
50
17
-0
-5
00
50
17
16
00
16
marriage year
9
0
2
-0
9
9
9
-5
50
19
19
00
-0
9
9
-5
-0
00
-0
50
18
18
17
50
9
-5
9
-5
9
50
00
17
16
16
00
-0
9
0
2
3
3
10
10
20
%
number of births
4
5
30
6
6
7
40
Non-heirs' wives
40
Heirs' wives
marriage year
births (average)
childless (%)
births (average)
childless (%)
* sample: married women whose husband is heir to a peerage
* sample: married women whose husband is a peers' non-heir son
back
Surviving children
Extensive margin
30
%
20
10
0
5
3
2
number of births
4
6
40
Intensive margin
1700-09 1750-59 1800-09 1850-59 1900-09 1950-59
marriage year
all births
surviving > 6mth
1700-09 1750-59 1800-09 1850-59 1900-09 1950-59
marriage year
childlessness
childlessness (surviving < 6mth)
* sample: married women whose father is a peer
* sample: married women whose father is a peer
back
Dep. variable: All live births of mothers (1650-1882) (poisson)
heirs’ wives
non-heirs’
wives
peers’
dau.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
-0.033
(0.035)
-0.034
(0.035)
-0.012
(0.034)
-0.043
(0.046)
0.131*
(0.069)
-0.023
(0.044)
Siblings (hus.)
0.011**
(0.005)
0.011**
(0.004)
0.010**
(0.004)
-0.012*
(0.006)
-0.009
(0.010)
0.003
(0.004)
Controls
Family FE
Birth year FE
Marr. dec. FE
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
1,263
1,262
1,203
1,203
839
1,759
Marrying after
inheritance
Observations
Controls are social status (wife), age at marriage (wife), age at death (both spouses),
stillbirths (husband’s family); Standard errors clustered by family in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
back
Dep. variable: Childlessness (1650-1882)
heirs’ wives
without Scotland
only Scotland
Marrying after inheritance
0.130**
(0.060)
-0.324
(0.483)
Husband’s siblings (#)
-0.002
(0.006)
-0.047
(0.055)
Father-in-law is a duke
0.016
(0.022)
-0.036
(0.076)
Wife’s age at marriage
0.011**
(0.005)
0.066
(0.047)
Wife’s age at death
0.000
(0.001)
-0.016
(0.014)
Husband’s age at death
-0.004**
(0.002)
0.003
(0.014)
Still to live births (fam)
1.514*
(0.824)
135.820
(146.599)
Social status
Family FE
Birth year FE
Marriage decade FE
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Observations
Adjusted R2
1,089
0.095
249
0.304
Standard errors clustered by family in parentheses; *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
back
Example
Parameter
Value
Explanation
β
0.8
Time preference
δ
0.0
Degree of altruism towards distant relatives
δ
0.9
Degree of altruism towards direct descendants
ν
5.0
Fertility preference
r
0.2
Rents of land
p
0.2
Price of land
λ
0.1
Share of land sold if no settlement
q
0.2
Cost of children
ᾱ
0.005
L0
100
Initial amount of land
κ
0.5
Probability of having a son at each birth
back
Share of the inheritance anticipated when signing a settlement