French Indochina
Indochina
French
Indochina
(1887)
Cochin China,
Tonkin, and
Annam formed
Vietnam
Laos and
Cambodia (1893)
Ho Chi Minh in Paris
Ho Chi Minh presented his 8 Points at Versailles, joined the
Socialist Party and became a founding member of the
French Communist Party in 1921.
Japanese Occupation of Vietnam
Vo Nguyen Giap
Viet Minh
The Vietnamese Independence Party (and military resistance)
Headed by Ho Chin Minh, an “umbrella” organization led by Communists
NSC-68
“To the West, we will crush
you!” --Khrushchev at the UN
Battle of Dien Bien Phu, 1954
The Geneva Accords, 1954
•  Meant to resolve conflicts in Korea and
Vietnam
•  US, USSR, UK, France, PRC in
attendance—others came in and out
•  Battle of Dien Bien Phu was being fought
and the Korean War was on cease-fire
•  US never signed but pledged to support
provision of free-elections in Vietnam set
for 1956 to unify north and south
Ike, JF Dulles, and Diem
Ngo Dinh Diem and Ike
Origins of the Conflict for the US
1940: France falls to Germany, and
Japan takes over French
colonies in Indochina
1941-45 : Ho Chi Minh organizes
Vietminh to fight Japanese
occupation and briefly declares
Vietnam independent after the
defeat of Japan
1946: France-Indochina War begins
1954: French defeat leaves Vietnam
divided at the 17th parallel
1957: Guerrilla activity begins in
South, conducted by the
Vietcong with the aid of the
North
Ngo Dinh Nhu, Brother to Diem and Head
of the South Vietnamese Police Force
Madame Nhu
JFK Inherits Truman and Ike’s Policies
1940: France falls to Germany, and
Japan takes over French
colonies in Indochina
1941-45 : FDR doesn’t really have
time to deal with Vietnam but
says French left it worse off than
before they colonized it
1946: France-Indochina War begins
1950: US takes over responsibility of
paying for French War; by 1954,
we’re paying 80%.
1954: We ignore Geneva Accords,
support Diem 100%
1957: NLF (Viet Cong) begins
guerrilla activity to win the South
But first, trouble in Cuba
CIA Director Allen Dulles
Bay of Pigs, 1961
A quick stop at the Berlin Wall, where JFK declares, “Ich bin ein Berliner.”
Escalation Under JFK
•  Increases commitment to Ngo Dinh Diem
•  Promotes the Strategic Hamlet Program,
meant to separate the VC from the peasants
—a dismal failure
•  Increased American advisors from 550 to
16,000
•  CIA involved in the assassination of Diem in
November of 1963 following Buddhist riots
•  Leaves LBJ a critical and failing policy
Buddhist Monk Self-Immolates
Ngo Dinh Diem assassinated by his military
Containment Pre-1964
Diplomatic
–  NATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO), mutual security treaties with Japan,
Taiwan, South Korea
Economic
–  European Recovery Program, aid to Greece
and Turkey, trade/financial cooperation
Military
–  Berlin (1949, 1961), Korean War (1950-53),
Iran (1953) Guatemala (1954), Taiwan Straits
(1954, 58), Lebanon and Jordan (1958), Cuba
(1961), Laos (1961-62)
Domino Theory
1.  Loss of Vietnam would strengthen
communist movements in the region
increasing risk of communist takeovers
elsewhere.
2.  Failure to protect South Vietnam would call
into question the credibility of U.S.
commitments worldwide,
•  weakening alliances and causing allies to
seek accommodation, and
•  tempting the Soviet Union and China to test
our resolve elsewhere (esp., Europe).
Was Victory Possible?
Who was the enemy?
•  Vietcong insurgents in SVN
–  use of small, mobile groups engaged in hitand-run tactics, rather than control over
territory
–  relies on support of non-combatant
population and ability to blend in with noncombatants (VC Infrastructure, VCI)
•  North Vietnam: infiltration of troops (NVA),
arms, supplies to support the Vietcong
•  Soviet Union and China: provide economic aid,
supplies, and arms to North Vietnam
Was Victory Possible?
What would “victory” require?
•  An end to North Vietnamese support for
the insurgency in SVN.
•  Political reforms in SVN that would
diminish local support for the insurgency
(land reform, anti-corruption,
democratization).
•  An increase in the effectiveness of SVN
military so that counter-insurgency could
be handled domestically, rather than by
US.
Was Victory Possible?
Obstacles to compelling NVN restraint:
•  The asymmetry of resolve: North Vietnam
had stronger interest at stake.
•  The actions that would be needed to
break NVN resolve would likely lead to a
wider war (esp., with China).
Was Victory Possible?
Obstacles to compelling SVN reform:
•  The “stakes vs. leverage” dilemma: How
do you coerce a vital ally?
•  The dependency problem: The more the
U.S. protects SVN government, the less
incentive it has to reform.
•  Nation-building vs. nationalism
Congress, The President, and
War Powers
Who Has the Power to Wage War?
Vietnam: A Case Study
The Constitution and War Powers
Congress
Article I, Section 8. The Congress shall have Power
Clause 10: To define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences
against the Law of Nations;
Clause 11: To declare War… and make Rules
concerning Captures on Land and Water;
Clause 12: To raise and support Armies…
Clause 13: To provide and maintain a Navy;
Clause 15: To provide for calling forth the Militia to
execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
Insurrections and repel Invasions….
The Constitution and War Powers
President
Article II, Section 2: The President shall be
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the Militia of the several States,
when called into the actual Service of the United
States…
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided
two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors…
The Separation of War Powers
“Those who are to conduct a war cannot in
the nature of things, be proper or safe
judges, whether a war ought to be
commenced, continued or concluded.
They are barred from the latter functions
by a great principle in free government,
analogous to that which separates the
sword from the purse, or the power of
executing from the power of enacting
laws.”
—James Madison
The Separation of War Powers
“The [President of the United States] would
have a right to command the military and
naval forces of the nation; the [King of
Britain], in addition to this right, possesses
that of declaring war, and of raising and
regulating fleets and armies by his own
authority. ”
—Alexander Hamilton
The Federalist No. 69
The UN, NATO, and War Powers
The United Nations Participation Act (1945):
•  “Section 6. The President is authorized to
negotiate a special agreement or agreements
with the Security Council which shall be subject
to the approval of the Congress by appropriate
Act or joint resolution providing for the numbers
and types of armed forces, their degree of
readiness and general location, and the nature
of facilities and assistance, including rights of
passage, to be made available to the Security
Council on its call for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security in accordance
with article 43 of said Charter.”
The UN, NATO, and War Powers
The North Atlantic Treaty (1949):
•  “Article 5. The Parties agree that an armed
attack against one or more of them in Europe or
North America shall be considered an attack
against them all and consequently they agree
that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of
them…will assist the Party or Parties so attacked
by taking forthwith…such action as it deems
necessary, including the use of armed force, to
restore and maintain the security of the North
Atlantic area.”
•  “Article 11. This Treaty shall be ratified and its
provisions carried out by the Parties in
accordance with their respective constitutional
processes. “
War Declarations in U.S. History
• 
• 
• 
• 
War of 1812
Mexican-American War (1846)
Spanish-American War (1898)
Word War I (1917)
–  Germany
–  Austria-Hungary
•  World War II
–  1941: Japan, Germany, Italy,
–  1942: Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania
Undeclared Major Wars Since
1945
•  Korea (1950-53)
•  Vietnam (1965-73)
•  Persian Gulf (1991)
•  Afghanistan (2001-present)
•  Iraq (2003-2011)
A Declaration of War
Whereas the Imperial Government of Japan has
committed unprovoked acts of war against the Government
and the people of the United States of America: Therefore
be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
That the state of war between the United States and the
Imperial Government of Japan which has thus been thrust
upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and the
President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the
entire naval and military forces of the United States and the
resources of the Government to carry on war against the
Imperial Government of Japan; and, to bring the conflict to
a successful termination, all of the resources of the country
are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.
Approved, December 8, 1941
An Authorization to Use Force
The President is authorized to use the Armed
Forces of the United States as he determines to be
necessary and appropriate in order to—
(1) defend the national security of the United
States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq;
and
(2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security
Council resolutions regarding Iraq.
Approved October 11, 2002.
Uses of U.S. Armed Forces 1950-1989
Years
Mission
1950-53
1954-55
1958
1961-62
1962
1962
1964-73
1965
1970
1975
1980
1982
1982
1983
1986
1987-88
Korean War
Taiwan Straits
Lebanon
Laos
Thailand
Quarantine of Cuba
Vietnam War
Dominican Republic
Cambodia
Mayaguez incident
Iran hostage rescue
Sinai peacekeeping
Lebanon
Grenada
Libya
Persian Gulf tanker Action
Congress
Authorized Opposition
?
?
no
no
pre
no
pre
no
no
no
no
no
pre
no
pre
post
no
no
no
post
no
no
no
no
pre
no
post
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
UN?
yes
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
yes
no
no
no
Uses of U.S. Armed Forces 1990-2011
Years
1990
1991
1992
1993-94
1993-2003
1993-99
1993-95
1994
1994
1995-2005
1996
1998
1998
1999
199920012003-
Congress
Mission
Authorized Opposition
?
?
Saudi Arabia (Desert Shield)
no
no
Persian Gulf War
pre
no
Somalia (UNITAF)
post
no
Somalia (UNOSOM II)
no
pre/post
Iraq no-fly zone
pre
no
Macedonia peacekeepers
no
no
Bosnia no-fly zone
no
no
Rwanda refugee assistance
no
pre/post
Haiti
no
pre/post
Bosnia PKs (IFOR/SFOR)
no
pre
Zaire
no
no
Afghanistan/Sudan strikes
no
no
Iraq air strikes
pre
no
Kosovo (air strikes)
no
pre
Kosovo (peacekeepers)
no
no
Afghanistan War/GWOT
pre
no
Iraq War
pre
post
UN?
no
yes
yes
yes
?
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
no
yes
yes
no
And now,
back to
Vietnam. . .
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident
and Resolution
Escalation and Lies Continue
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident
•  Aug. 1964, two incidents were reported of
NVA PT boat attacks against USS Mattox
and Turner Joy, destroyer class naval
vessels
•  Pentagon claimed they were on a “routine
mission” in “international waters” when
attacked.
•  Lies and truth-stretching occurred.
The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
•  In response to attacks on US naval
vessels, LBJ sought congressional
authorization to retaliated by air.
•  LBJ wanted congress in with him as
election approached
•  “Gulf of Tonkin” Resolution gave the
president a “blank check” to stop the
spread of communism in Vietnam
•  Only two congressmen voted against.
Gulf of Tonkin Incident/Resolution
Date
Source: John Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.), pp. 54-55.
Aug-71
Mar-71
Oct-70
Jun-70
Aug-69
Mar-69
Oct-68
May-68
“Mistake”
Dec-67
Jul-67
Feb-67
Sep-66
Apr-66
Nov-65
Jun-65
Jan-65
“Not a Mistake”
Jan-70
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
Aug-64
Percent
Support for the Vietnam War, 1964-71
The Shadow of Truman
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
The Truman doctrine (1947)
The “Loss of China” (1949)
The Korean War (1950-53)
McCarthyism (1950-54)
Truman’s Fate
Domestic Political
Considerations
1.  The political costs of “losing Vietnam”
• 
• 
Fear of electoral retribution
LBJ’s domestic agenda: The “Great
Society” program
2.  The constraint against full escalation
• 
• 
Anticipated and actual opposition
Guns and butter?: The need to fund the
“Great Society” program
Choices and Constraints
Disengage
Lower
bound
Upper
bound
Minimum Necessary
to Prevent Loss of
South Vietnam
Maximum Feasible
Full-Scale
Military Effort
Strategies Ruled Out Under LBJ
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Use of nuclear weapons
Ground invasion of North Vietnam
Destruction of dike and dam system
Bombing of civilian populations
Mining of North Vietnamese ports
Invasion of Cambodia and/or Laos
Military Strategy
1.  Counter-insurgency in the South
2.  Coercive air power against the North
(Rolling Thunder) with the goals of
• 
• 
stopping the flow of men and supplies into
the South and
reaching a peace agreement.
Strategies for Using Air Power
1.  Coercion: Demonstrate resolve to inflict even greater
damage if demands are not met
•  Tactics: incremental escalation from low- to highvalue targets, with pauses to permit negotiations
•  Advocated by: civilians (MacNamara)
2.  Denial: Physically disrupt enemies ability to move
people and supplies (air interdiction)
•  Tactics: target lines of communication, petroleum
facilities
•  Advocated by: chairman of JCS and army
3.  Punishment: Destroy enemy will and morale
•  Tactics: sustained, intense attacks on industrial
targets
•  Advocated by: air force
Between the Minimum Necessary
and the Maximum Feasible
1.  Incremental escalation 600,000
Aid
Military advisors
Covert operations
Air strikes
Ground troops
2.  Minimal mobilization
• 
• 
• 
500,000
Troop Level
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
0
1960
1962
1964
Refusal to call up reserves
Draft with service limited to 12 months
Resisted tax increase until 1967
Year
1966
1968
Goals in Vietnam
Assistant Secretary of Defense
John McNaughton, 1965
10 % – To permit the people of SVN to enjoy
a better, freer way of life.
20 % – To keep SVN (and the adjacent)
territory from Chinese hands.
70 % – To avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat
(to our reputation as a guarantor).
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
“Not a Mistake”
“Mistake”
Date
Source: John Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.), pp. 54-55.
Aug-71
Mar-71
Oct-70
Jun-70
Jan-70
Aug-69
Mar-69
Oct-68
May-68
Dec-67
Jul-67
Feb-67
Sep-66
Apr-66
Nov-65
Jun-65
Jan-65
Tet Offensive, 1-3/1968
Aug-64
Percent
Support for the Vietnam War, 1964-71
After Tet (1968)
March 10: Westmoreland requests 206,000 more troops
March 12: Anti-War Sen. Eugene McCarthy (D-MN) gets 42
percent of vote in New Hampshire Democratic primary
March 19: Robert Kennedy enters race for Democratic
nomination on an anti-war platform
March 31: In televised address, LBJ announces
–  intention to end escalation, halt bombing north of 21st
parallel
–  start a peace initiative
–  “I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of
my party for another term as your President.”
April 4: LBJ rejects Westmoreland’s request and sets troop
level at 541,000
1968 Democratic Convention
Nixon’s Political Strategy
1.  De-legitimize dissent
2.  The “Madman strategy”
3.  Triangular diplomacy
• 
• 
The “China card”
Détente
Nixon thaws Cold War relations
with Detente
Nixon visits China, 1972
Nixon’s Strategy
1.  “Vietnamization”: Shift responsibility to
South Vietnamese Army while reducing
U.S. troop presence.
2.  Threats/escalatory efforts to show
continued resolve
• 
• 
• 
• 
Secret bombing of Cambodia (1969)
Invasion of Cambodia (1970)
Invasion of Laos (1971)
Christmas bombing (Dec. 1972)
U.S. Troops in Vietnam, 1969-1972
600000
500000
400000
300000
200000
100000
0
Dec-68 Jun-69 Jan-70
Jul-70
Feb-71 Sep-71 Mar-72 Oct-72
Anti-War Protests
Invasion of
Cambodia
100
Linebacker and
Mining of Haiphong
80
60
Oct. 15
Moratorium
40
Invasion
of Laos
20
0
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
Source: Doug McAdam and Yang Su, “The War at Home: Antiwar Protests and Congressional Voting, 1965 to 1973,” American
Sociological Review 67 (Oct. 2002), p. 711.
My Lai Massacre, 1968
•  Hundreds of villagers massacred in the
village of My Lai in the Spring of 1968
•  Covered up by those involved for a year
•  Life Magazine revealed photos of the
massacre in 1969, leading to protests and
a shocked American public
•  A Court Martial of Lt. Calley followed,
which divided the American public
My Lai Massacre, 1968
Kent State and Jackson State
Killings, May 1970
Final Moves
1.  Easter Offensive and Operation
Linebacker (April-May 1972)
2.  “Peace is at Hand”? (Oct. 1972)
3.  Nixon wins reelection by a landslide
(Nov. 1972)
4.  Christmas Bombings (Dec. 1972)
5.  Paris Peace Accords (Jan. 1973)
Peace Terms
1.  American withdrawal in exchange for
release of POWs
2.  Recognition of a post-war role for the
Provisional Revolutionary Government, a
rival government set up by the Vietcong
3.  North Vietnamese troops allowed to remain
south of the DMZ, in territory captured in
Easter Offensive
4.  Reunification of Vietnam would take place
peacefully, through mutual agreement
International Effects: Dominoes?
*
*
*
The 1973 War Powers Act
When U.S. armed forces are introduced “into hostilities or
into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated”:
1.  The president must notify Congress in writing within 48
hours.
2.  The operation must terminate after 60 days unless
• 
Congress has declared war or otherwise authorized the mission
• 
Congress explicitly extends the 60-day limit, or
• 
the deadline cannot be physically met due to an armed attack
on the United States
3.  The president may extend the limit an additional 30 days
(for a total of 90) if the additional time is needed to safely
remove the forces.
4.  Congress can terminate the operation before the 60 days
are up with a concurrent resolution.
The U.S. Military Adjusts
•  Policy toward media
–  pools
–  embeds
•  The All-Volunteer Force
•  The Weinberger/Powell Doctrine
The Weinberger/Powell Doctrine
1.  Is a vital US interest at stake?
2.  Will we commit sufficient resources to win
(swift, decisive, overwhelming)?
3.  Are the objectives clearly defined? Is
there an “exit strategy”?
4.  Will we sustain the commitment?
5.  Is there reasonable expectation that the
public and Congress will support the
operation?
6.  Have we exhausted our other options?
Watergate and Vietnam
Watergate and Vietnam
•  The release of the Pentagon Papers in
1971 drove Nixon’s staff to form the
“plumbers.” They stop leaks and do dirty
tricks.
Domestic Policy
Advisor John
Ehrlichman and
Chief of Staff Bob
Haldeman
Watergate and Vietnam
Watergate and Vietnam
•  The plumbers broke in to Daniel Ellsberg’s
psychiatrist’s office.
Defense analyst
Ellsberg at his trial.
Watergate and Vietnam
•  Even though the Ellsberg case was thrown
out, the plumbers remained.
CREEP—The
Committee to ReElect the President—
made use of them.
The Watergate apartments and office buildings, Washington DC
Watergate and Vietnam
•  Young reporters Woodward and Bernstein
were tenacious in their reporting for the
Washington Post.
Watergate and Vietnam
•  They had a secret inside contact who
tipped them off named “Deep Throat.” His
identity was not revealed until 2005.
Mark Felt,
No. 2 man
at the FBI
Watergate and Vietnam
•  Congress opens hearings in 1973.
Special Counsel to
the President John
Dean breaks ranks
and informs the
committee that he
told the president of
the danger of the
cover-up.
“There’s a cancer growing on the presidency.”
Watergate and Vietnam
•  The White House taping system is
revealed, and the battle for the tapes
begin.
Watergate and Vietnam
•  The investigation took its toll on Nixon.
Watergate and Vietnam
8/9/74
Watergate and Vietnam
Gerald Ford Pardons Nixon
Fall of Saigon, April 30, 1975