Journal of African History, 48 (2007), pp" 27-44. © 2007 Cambridge University Press
doi:IO.1017/S002I8S3706002490 Printed in the United Kingdom
27
REBELLION, MARRONAGE AND JIHAD:
STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE TO SLAVERY
ON THE SIERRA LEONE COAST, c.1783-1796
BY BRUCE MOUSER
University of Wisconsin-La Crosse
ABSTRACT: The Yangekori Rebellion was among the earliest extensive uprisings
within Africa to be reported in European documents. This rebellion, which lasted
for more than a decade, included domestic and market-bound slaves as well as free
persons, all of whom became involved in promoting significant changes in traditional socioeconomic and politicalpatterns. What made this rebellion unique and
more informative for the present and for research relating to external slave trading
and to rebellion within the diaspora, however, were its complex and local-based
context, its multiple centers and its substantial involvement in a timely religious
movement intent on transforming coastal society. Also instructive is the synergetic
response that occurred among autocratic and otherwise quarrelsome rulers who
were responsible for ending this "rebellion, for re-establishing landholding patterns, and for defending themselves effectively against socioeconomic and political
change.
KEY WORDS:
Slavery resistance, slave trade, Islam, Guinea, Sierra Leone.
SINCE the mid-I98os, a sizeable literature has been published on the topic of
slave resistance, whether that occurred in the form of evasion, subversion or
non-insurrectionary behaviors within the slave-using system or as outright
rebellion when slaves no longer were willing to tolerate ill treatment and
were ready to accept the consequences of rebellion. Much of that writing has
focused on the peculiarities of plantation systems that existed in the New
World l Many authors have suggested that rebellion or other forms of resistance were of African origin, often assuming African context and agency to
be easily identified. In general terms, slave rebellions within precolonial
Africa have most often been described with reference to a trans-Atlantic
commerce and as those acts related to: (I) opposition during the process of
enslavement Or period of capture within Africa; (2) flight or escape during
the march coastward where slaves were to be warehoused before shipment;
(3) rebellion while being held in pens or barracoons upon the African coast
and awaiting buyers; or (4) mutiny aboard ships, either when a part of the
1 Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, 'Strategies and forms of resistance: focus on slave women
in the United States', in Gary Okihiro (ed.), In Resistance (Amherst, 1986), 143-6;
Vincent Thompson, The Making of the African Diaspora in the Americas I44I-IgOO
(New York, 1987), 107, II6-37, 149; Robert Paquette, 'Social history update: slave
resistance and social history', Journal of Social History, 24 (1991), 681-5.
28
BRUCE MOUSER
coasting process, when still in sight of Africa's shore, or during the Middle
Passage. 2
In 1986, Bronislaw Nowak published an essay in Hemispheres (Warsaw)
on the subject of a slave rebellion of the third type (rebellion during the
holding period on the African coast) that began around 1783 in the coastal
state of Moria, located in the borderlands of Guinea and Sierra Leone on
Africa's windward coast. This was a region distinguished by r800 for production of cotton cloth, sea-salt and kola - much of which was destined for
interior-based commerce - and for growth of rice consumed regionally or
sold to provision ships involved in the slave trade,3 This also was a section of
coast well-known for exporting slaves into the Atlantic market in exchange
for European and American products, including tobacco, rum, firearms,
gunpowder and other minor manufactured items. Nowak interpreted this
rebellion as stemming almost entirely from circumstances associated with the
trans-Atlantic slave trade. In his analysis, slaves had been brought coastward
by interior-based suppliers in a steady fashion, but slave demands in the
New World had tapered off in consequence of the American Revolution
(1775-84), with the consequence that a large number of slaves had accumulated upon the coast in anticipation of buyers and were being used temporarily in commodities production. Nowak reasoned that nearly all rebels
would have been destined ultimately for the Atlantic trade, that they probably had been on the coast for a long period of time and that they likely
rebelled as a consequence of harsh treatment and/or foreknowledge of their
probable fates.
At about the same time as Nowak's writing, another and continuing stream
of analysis focused upon opportunities for mischief and change of status that
occurred within New World slave-holding systems, and for strategies of
escape and survival outside them. Many writers described conditions in the
Caribbean basin, but much of that analysis pertained as well to circumstances in the American South. Resistance took interesting and varied forms.
Slaves could feign illnesses or stupidity as ways to irritate and slow down the
system and make it inefficient and costly. They could sabotage or misplace
equipment, or they could intentionally damage themselves or the crop
2 See David Richardson, 'Shipboard revolts, African authority, and the African slave
trade', William and Mary Quarterly, 58 (2001), 69-92; Edward Pearson, 'A countryside
full of flames', Slavery &; Abolition, 17 (1996), 22-50; John Thornton, 'African dimensions of the Stono Rebellion', American Historical Review, 96 ·(1991), 1101-13; Richard
Rathbone, 'Some thoughts on resistance to enslavement in Africa', Slavery & Abolition,
5/6 (1986), 11-22; Richard Sheridan, 'Resistance and rebellion of African captives in the
transatlantic slave trade before becoming seasoned labourers in the British Caribbean,
1690-1807', in Verene Shepherd (ed.), Working Slavery, Pricing Freedom (New York,
2001), 183-7; Julius Scott, 'Crisscrossing empires: ships, sailors, and resistance in the
Lesser Antilles in the eighteenth century', in Robert Paquette and Stanley Engerman
(eds.), The Lesser Antilles in the Age of European Expansion (Gainesville, 1996), 132-6;
Hilary Beckles, Natural Rebels: A Social History of Enslaved Black Women in Barbados
(New Brunswick, 1989), 153-'7; Martin Klein, 'The slave trade and decentralized societies', Journal of African History, 42 (2001), 49-65; Sidney Mintz, 'Enduring substances, trying theories: the Caribbean region as oikoumene', Journal of the Royal
Anthropological Institute, 2 (June 1996), 299-300.
3 Bronislaw Nowak, 'The slave rebellion in Sierra Leone in 1785-1796', Hemispheres
(Warsaw), 3 (1986), 151-69.
REBELLION, MARRON AGE AND ]IHA D
29
through seeming ignorance.' At the top of slave ranking within those systems
were household servants who were generally expected to serve owners' daily
requirements as tailors, barbers, cooks, horse tenders, coachmen, maids,
butlers and so forth. These slaves enjoyed, if one can use that term, certain
privileges, which might include access to political information, a degree of
freedom to work and move about with limited supervision, and perhaps
even a sense of security and permanence. Tasks were assigned, and each slave
was expected to assume responsibility for his/her own chore and, indirectly,
his/her own welfare and advancement. Privilege and proximity to owners,
however, afforded special opportunity for harm and resistance. Almost
universally, plantation cooks, for example, were Africans; most great houses
expected slaves to taste food before it was served to owners and guests.
Overseers or slave-drivers were also of privileged rank, obtaining rewards
not available to field hands· General labor itself was divided into specialized
task-oriented work (blacksmiths, coopers, stevedores, teamsters, weavers
and carpenters) or more general labor gangs assigned to group projects.
Those with special skills were generally given greater freedom of action/
movement than were those slaves belonging to gangs.
Within the Caribbean basin context, flight from and survival alongside the
slave-using system was possible through a variety of strategies. Single or
even small groups of runaways who left a plantation with little or no intent to
return could seek refuge in mountainous or inaccessible regions where indigenous peoples lived or where population density was low. They might
become bandits. They also might flee to another island and/or the jurisdiction and protection of another slave-holding but less oppressive regime, a
circumstance that made it difficult for them to return to their former status.
Runaways often found competing colonial entities even willing to accommodate the existence of a small group of runaways, especially if that occurrence embarrassed rival systems or served political or economic interests. 6
Within that context, the term grand marronnage refers to a rebellion in which
slaves rose in permanent flight against a prevailing socioeconomic order,
often killed owners and destroyed plantation property, and always moved
4 David Gaspar, Bondmen and Rebels: A Study of Master-Slave Relations in Antigua
(Baltimore, 1985), 172-83; Beckles, Natural Rebels, 157; Sheridan, 'Resistance', 183;
David Gaspar, 'Slave importation, runaways, and compensation in Antigua, 1720-1729',
in Joseph Inikori and Stanley Engerman (eds.), The Atlantic Slave Trade (Durham,
1992),3°1-20; Stephan Palmie, 'Introduction', in Stephan Palmie (ed.), Slave Cultures
and the Cultures of Slavery (Knoxville, 1995), xvii; Sidney Mintz, 'Slave life on
Caribbean sugar plantations', in Palmie (ed.), Slave Cultures, 13-18; David Geggus,
'Slavery, war, and revolution in the Greater Caribbean, 1789-1815', in David Gaspar
and David Geggus (eds.), A Turbulent Time: The French Revolution and the Greater
Can'bbean (Bloomington, 1997),5-32; Eugene Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World
the Slaves Made (New York, 1974).
5 Robert Paquette, 'The drivers shall lead them: image and reality in slave resistance',
in Robert Paquette (ed.), Slavery, Secession, and Southern History (Charlottesville, 2001),
31-51; Gaspar, Bondmen and Rebels, 172-83; Thompson, Making of the African Diaspora,
139-53; Hilary Beckles, 'The slave-drivers' war: Bussa and the 1816 Barbados slave
rebellion', Boletin de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe, 39 (Dec. 1985), 105-6.
6 Hilary Beckles, 'From land to sea: runaway Barbados slaves and servants,
163°-1700', in Gad Heuman (ed.), Out of the House of Bondage: Runaways, Resistance
and Marronage in Africa and the New World (London, 1986), 93-4.
BRUCE MOUSER
30
into 'less-traveled districts' where rebels might remain within autonomous
strongholds for varying periods. There they built fortifications for collective
defense, planted and harvested crops for their own subsistence, formalized a
political and economic order and fashioned coping strategies designed to
maintain social survival. 7 Most interestingly, many maroon communities
were led by former overseers or slave drivers, and generally included privileged slave classes/ranks as well as field hands, the latter generally considered, perhaps erroneously, to have been the most alienated in their
previous status as a result of harsh punishments. 8 This type of desertion
differed significantly from petit marronnage which pertains to a temporary
and unauthorized absence and a return to former or reduced status following
appropriate punishments.
In light of this writing on rebellion within the American context and of
recently published research concerning patterns of rural protest in northwestern Sierra Leone, forms of servitude or subordination (from forms of
clientage and pawnship to chattel slavery) within West Africa, and the nature
of slave rebellion in Fuuta laloo, it is expedient to revisit Nowak's primary
premise and to integrate into that analysis some aspects of insurrection in
the framework of a slave-using system and some contributory events that
Nowak overlooked originally.9 In his search for causes for, and even the
circumstances of, this slave rebellion which lasted for more than a decade,
Nowak relied heavily upon a few published accounts, and he adhered to a
7 Gabriel Debien, 'Marronage in the French Caribbean', in Richard Price (ed.),
Maroon Societies (Baltimore, 1979), 107-8; Michael Craton, Testing the Chains:
Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies (Ithaca, 198z), 61-5.
8 Gaspar, Bondmen and Rebels, 172; Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman, 'Changing
views of slavery in the United States South: the role of Eugene Genovese', in Paquette
(ed.), Slavery, 7-9; Beckles, 'Slave-drivers' war', 85-1°9; Leslie Manigat, 'The relationship between marronage and slave revolt and revolution in St. Domingue-Haiti', in
Vera Rubin and Arthur Tuden (eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Slavery in New World
Plantation Societies (New York, 1977), 420-38; Jerome Handler, 'Escaping slavery in a
Caribbean plantation society: marronage in Barbados, 1650s-1830s', New West Indian
Guide, 71 (1997), 183-225·
9 Ismail Rashid, 'Patterns of rural protest: chiefs, slaves and peasants in northwestern
Sierra Leone, 1896-1956' (Ph.D. thesis, McGill University, 1998), 16-36; Ismail
Rashid, 'Escape, revolt, and marronage in eighteenth and nineteenth century Sierra
Leone hinterland " Canadian Journal of African Studies, 34 (2000), 656-83; Roger Botte,
'Stigmates sociaux et discriminations religieuses: l'ancienne classe servile au Fuuta
Jaloo', Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, 34 (1994),109-36; Claire Robertson, 'Africa in the
Americas? Slavery and women, the family, and the gender division of labor', in David
Gaspar and Darlene Hine (eds.), More than Chattel: Black Women and Slavery in the
Amen'cas (Bloomington, 1996), 5--'7; Ray Kea, 'When I die, I shall return to my own
land', in John Hunwick and Nancy Lawler (eds.), The Cloth of Many Colored Silks
(Evanston, 1996), 159-93; Paul Lovejoy and David Richardson, 'The business of
slaving: pawnship in Western Africa, c. 1600-1810', Journal of African History, 42
(2001), 67-89: Martin Klein, 'Defensive strategies: Wasulu, Masina, and the slave trade',
in Sylviane Diouf (ed.), Fighting the Slave Trade: West African Strategies (Athens OH,
Z003), 73; Klein, 'The slave trade and decentralized societies', 49-65; Boubacar Barry,
Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade (Cambridge, 1998); Walter Hawthorne,
'Strategies of the decentralized: defending communities from slave raiders in coastal
Guinea-Bissau', in Diouf (ed.), Fighting the Slave Trade, 161.
REBELLION, MARRONAGE AND JIHA D
31
confidence that this rebellion was principally linked to trans-Atlantic commerce. In much of his reconstruction, Nowak struggled with fragments of
information from those who observed the rebellion firsthand or from those
who generally identified informants. To his credit, Nowak identified deficiencies, biases and information voids when those were evident, and he
made an admirable effort to piece together a narrative and analysis based
upon what was then understood and available in published materials. Nowak
cautioned, however, that additional data would surely exist in official and
unpublished records and invited others to search those for a more complete
reconstruction and analysis. lO
With respect to the latter, Nowak was indeed accurate, but perhaps not
to the degree or with the consequence that he might have expected. Nowak
had relied primarily upon accounts from three persons who traveled in the
region between 1783 and 1796, the years generally fixed as covering the main
phase of the rebellion. Of these writers, Adam Afzelius and Thomas
Winterbottom had visited the contested terrain during the rebellion's
closing phase; both were more interested in explaining its failure than its
causes or characteristics and, as agents of the Sierra Leone Company, both
opposed the slave trade. John Matthews, a person generally regarded as
sympathetic to slave-holding who maintained a trading post on the Sierra
Leone River and who associated closely with indigenous and European
merchants in the area, may actually have lived in Moria for a short
time before 1786.11 Matthews's letters demonstrate a keen eye for personal
observation and provide important insight into the type of slavery or subordination existing along this section of coast. Writers recounted stories
and traditions circulating at the time of their visits, all obtained from victors,
ruling classes and trader~. Many of those fragments were presented in a
disjointed fashion, without the vantage of distance or generality to bring
them into a more meaningful focus. Multiple and corroborating sources,
however, often reveal connections that require several readings to reach
clarity. Interestingly, no French accounts have been located regarding this
rebellion, even though several French traders lived in towns within
Sumbuya and French seamen were known to have visited the !les de Los."
Fig. 1 provides a chronology of those who visited the coast and who left
accounts of what they observed or heard about the character of the slaveowning system and how they registered what had happened during this
period of rebellion.
Fundamental to any analysis of rebellion in Moria is an understanding
of the region's underlying natural commerce and the political and slaveusing context for the early 1780s. From the beginning of that century,
African merchants along this coast had supplied interior markets with
locally produced sea-salt and kola nuts and increasingly with cotton goods,
and had received cattle, ivory, gold, gum, beeswax and slaves in return. 13
10 Nowak, 'Slave rebellion', 153.
11
John Matthews, A Voyage to the River Sierra Leone on the Coast of Africa (1778/
London, 1968), 69.
12 Pierre Labarthe, Voyage au Senegal, pendant les annees I784 et I78S, d'apres des
memoires de Lajaille (Paris, 1802). See Adam Afzelius, in Peter Kup (ed.), Adam Ajzelius,
Sierra Leone Journal, I795-I796 (Uppsala, 1967), 113-33. 13 Matthews, Voyage, 14.
32
BRUCE MOUSER
European travelers in Moria or bordering regions
1785 - Matthews: Voyage.
1792 - August Norden·$kiotd: in 'Diary of Lieutenant Clarkson, R.N.', Sierra Leone Studies (March
19271.
1793-9 - zachary Macaulay: Unpublished diary and journals of Zachary Macaulay, Macaulay
Collection, Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, California. Published excerpts in
Viscountess Knutsford, Life and Letters ofZachary Macaulay (London, 1900), and annotated
transcriptions for 1793·4 correspondence in Suzanne Schwarz (ed.), Zachary Macaulay and the
Development of the Sierra Leone Company, 1793-94 (2 vals.) (Leipzig, 2000 and 2002).
1794 - James Watt: in Bruce Mouser (ed.), Journal of James Watt: Expedition to Timbo Capital of
the Fula Empire in 1794 (Madison, 1994).
1796 - Afzelius: Sierra Leone Journal.
1796 - Thomas Winterbottom: An Account of the Native Africans; in the Neighbourhood of Sierra
Leone (2 vols.) (1803/London, 1969).
1802 - Richard Bright: 'Richard Bright journal, September and October 1802', in Bruce Mouser (ed.),
Guinea Journals: Journeys into Guinea-Conakry during the Sierra Leone Phase, 1800-1821
(Washington, 1979),31-113.
1802 - Alexander Smith: 'Alexander Smith journal, December 1802', in Mouser (ed.), Guinea
Journals, 115-36.
1805 - Alexander Smith: 'Journal of a voyage from Sierra Leone to the River Kisi Kisi ... February
1805', in Bruce Mouser, 'The 1805 Fon3kariah conference: a case of political intrigue, economic
advantage, network building', History in Africa, 25 (1998), 236·62.
1806/15 - Reverend Peter Hartwig: 'Po Hartwig's journal of travels in Mandingo and Susu countries
from 9 April 1806to 13 July 1806', in Bruce Mouser and Nancy Mouser, Case of the Reverend
Peter Hartwig, Slave Trader or Misunderstood Idealist? (Madison, 2003), 85·107.
1806 - Alexander Smith: Unpublished 'Journey to Furicaria by Mr. Smith, 1806', Sierra Leone
Collection, University of Illinois at Chicago.
1806n - Reverend Leopold Butscher: in Bruce Mouser (ed.), Account of the Mandingoes, Susoos, &
Other Nations, C. 1815 (Leipzig, 2000).
Fig.
1.
Travelers and accounts of Moria, 1785-18°7.
On the coast, European traders established trading centers in the estuary
of the Sierra Leone River, upon the Iles de Los not far offshore from
Cape Sangara, and within principal coastal river towns sufficiently open to
Atlantic interaction and commerce. European, Euro-African and African
traders acted as middlemen in the Atlantic-based trading network,
joining the demands of interior-based Africans for firearms, gunpowder
and foreign goods, on the one hand, to the demands of Europeans for African
products and slaves, on the other .14 In effect, several trading systems intermingled upon the coast: one linked to interior demands for salt and kola;
one linked to coastal demand for meat and interior trade goods; and one
linked to the Atlantic slave trade in exchange for firearms and manufactures.
Into this commercial network, already operational by the 1720S, flowed
Manding- and Mande-speaking Djula/Sarakuli/Susu traders from the interior who settled in existing coastal communities and facilitated greater
14 Afze1ius, Sierra Leone Journal, 121; Bruce Mouser, '!les de Los as bulking center in
the slave trade, 1750-1800', Revue Franfaise d'Histoire d'Outre-mer, 83 (1996), 77-90;
George Brooks and Bruce Mouser, 'An 1804 slaving contract signed in Arabic script from
the Upper Guinea coast', History in Africa, 14 (1987),341-7; David Eltis, Philip Morgan
and David Richardson, 'The African contribution to rice cultivation in· the Americas'
(unpublished paper read at Georgia Workshop in Early American History and Culture,
University of Georgia, 2 Dec. 2005), 9-1 I.
33
interaction with interior-based trades, effectively increasing demands for
locally produced sea-salt, kola and cotton cloth. 15 In most cases, interiorbased outsiders/strangers were welcomed by coastal Baga and Bullom
land holders for the increased commerce that they generated and for the
protection that they supplied. In the state of Sumbuya, for example, Djula/
Susu lineages became military guardians for Baga/Bullom rulers, while at
the same time enriching themselves as long-distance traders, middlemen in
expanding Atlantic-based trades, operators of cotton and rice plantations,
and producers of sea-salt and collectors of kola nuts for interior markets.
Along the Forekariah, Bereira and Melikori rivers, in contrast, Manding
trading lineages copied expansionist trends then current within Fuuta
J aloo among the Fula and carried out wars of political and territorial
conquest - both under the cloak of jihad. With Fula allies, these Manding
seized many towns along the coast, intermarried with or replaced ruling
families, and enslaved indigenous peoples to their own political will and
Islamic regime. On the coast, they produced a loosely structured state of
Moria whose towns were administered by headmen from important lineages
and whose state structure was governed by the Alimaami (ruler and head of
the Toure lineage) of Forekariah town. While Sumbuya was technically
a Baga-/Bullom-governed state protected by Djula/Susu lineages, Moria,
in contrast, was a Manding and Muslim state that operated according
to Manding political patterns." Because the 1783-96 rebellion had its
genesis within the state of Moria, the following description of slave-using
pertains to circumstances within that state, although similar but perhaps less
repressive conditions prevailed in neighboring Susu-dominated regions of
Sumbuya to the north and Benna in Moria's immediate eastern hinterland
(see Fig. 2).
By far the most relevant source regarding slave-holding practice within
Moria around 1783 is John Matthews, a former officer in the Royal Navy,
who took up employment in Sierra Leone for 2 years beginning in 1785.
His observations, confirmed and elaborated by reports from numerous
others in succeeding years, provide a portrait of a social and political order
REBELLION, MARRONAGE AND JiHA D
Rashid, 'Patterns of rural protest', 24; Afzelius, Sierra LeoneJournal, 121.
See Mahawa Bangura, 'Contribution a l'histoire des Sosoe du I6e au 1ge siecle'
(memoire de fin d'Etudes Superieures, Institut Polytechnique Gamal Abdel Nasser,
Conakry, 1971-72), 86-8, for evolution of Moria. See also Bright, 'Journal ... 1802',
94-5, for another explanation for migration and settlement at Fon~~kariah c. 1720;
Winterbottom, An Account, I, 7, for migrations that occurred 'not more than seventy
years ago [c. 1730]'; Nicholas Owen, Journal of a Slave-Dealer: A View of some
Remarkable Axcedents ... on the Coast of Africa and America from the Year I746 to the
Year I757 (London, 1930),92-101, who dated the beginning of political consolidation at
1758; James Hopewell, 'Muslim penetration into French Guinea, Sierra Leone, and
Liberia before 1850' (Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1958), 108-9, for acquisition of
control in these rivers; David Skinner, 'Mande settlement and the development of
Islamic institutions in Sierra Leone', International Journal of African Historical Studies,
I I (1978); Andre Arcin, Histoire de la Guinee Fran~aise (Paris, 1911), 135-40; Laurent
Berenger-Ferand, Les peuples de la Senegambie (Paris, 1879), 160-1. Skinner, 'Mande
settlement', 42-3, identified two religious wars - one early in the eighteenth century in
Benna, led by Lahai Salihu Yansane, and a second in Moria in the 1750S, led by Fode
Katibi Toure.
15
16
BRUCE MOUSER
34
13°W
,
J
l099/1J.
I
I
C"
N
1
j
- - - Escarpment
oI
5
10
d
Fig.
20
2.
l
JOkm
Moria and the Yangekori Rebellion, 1783-96. Map drawn
by Bruce Mouser.
in which the many were dominated by the few. 17 By Matthews's account,
slavery was a common practice along this coast, accounting for' three fourths
at least' of the population among the Susu and Baga/Bullom peoples - a
likely exaggeration, even in Sumbuya state located immediately inland from
the IIes de Los. He estimated that the ratio of slaves to free persons within
Moria was' much greater' .18 Ismail Rashid assigned it at 70 to 80 per cent in
the 177os.19 Matthews thought it ordinary 'for a head man [Morian village
chief] to have two or three hundred slaves of both sexes, exclusive of their
domestics who are very numerous' and usual for' principal men' to own
up to 1,000 slaves, many of whom lived at a distance in 'slave towns,.20
17 See numerous descriptions in Afze1ius, Sierra Leone Journal; Watt,Journal; Bright,
'Journal ... 1802'; Hartwig, in Mouser and Mouser, Case of the Reverend Peter Hartwig.
18 Matthews, Voyage, 149.
19 Ismail Rashid, "'A devotion to the idea of liberty at any price": rebellion and
antislavery in the Upper Guinea Coast in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries', in
Diouf (ed.), Fighting the Slave Trade, 140. Butscher, in Mouser (ed.), Account of the
Mandingoes, 10-II, estimated in c. 1815 that two-thirds of Moria's population was of
slave status. Watt, Journal, 5 I, estimated that slaves exceeded free men in Fuuta Jaloo at a
ratio of five to one.
20 Matthews, Voyage, 149-50. Matthews, 93-4, also noted that domestic slaves, market
slaves and free persons were generally distinguishable in general appearance, with those
from the interior' not so robust or well made as the native free men'. Hartwig, in Mouser
and Mouser, Case of the Reverend Peter Hartwig, 63-4, estimated that Fendan Modu
Dumbuya of Sumbuya owned 1,000 domestic slaves in 1806.
REBELLION, MARRONAGE AND JIHA D
35
Of those numbers, 'domestics' were considered to be those who had been
born as slaves upon the coast, and, by virtue of that status and local
custom were guaranteed certain privileges and protections. Such domestics
Matthews divided into two groups: those ministering to the daily demands of
their masters, and those fixed to the soil- the laboring class. Matthews reported those living within the owner's compound as often appropriating the
owner's name, being thought 'in some respect ... as a branch of the [owner's]
family' , and available for being' hired out' for a variety of occupations (pilot,
cook, sailor, bearer) toEuropeans and other Africans, with wages accruing to
owners. 21
Slaves in the laboring class, in contrast, lived in the owner's rice- and
cotton-growing and salt-production villages, or lugars (farms), and were
'held in no· higher estimation than any other animal that contributes to its
cultivation' .22 Any slave owned for less than one year possessed none of these
rights, was not protected by customary law, and was considered as saleable.
All domestic slaves of more than one year's tenure, Matthews claimed, constituted warriors who fought the battles of their owners. 23 In exchange, such
slaves acquired refuge, albeit within a subservient status. That status was so
rigidly protected that it could be broken only for due cause (adultery, theft,
witchcraft), when so judged within a customary court and according to
customary law, or Islamic law in the Morian case. 24 Writing 20 years later,
Peter Hartwig, who was one of the earliest missionaries of the Church
Missionary Society and who lived nearly a decade in Moria, observed that
laboring slaves were governed by free overseers or by domestic slave-drivers
who held privileged rank and who ruled harshly. The most severe punishments were reserved for runaways who were usually sold outright or killed,
often in public executions. Plantation slaves provided allegiance and a
measured amount of labor to owners, and in return received protection,
security (to a degree) and an allotment of land and time to be used in
individual efforts. 25
21 Matthews, Voyage, 150. See also John Graf, in Bruce L. Mouser (ed.), Journal of a
Missionary Tour to the Labaya Country (Guinea/Conakry) in I8SD (University of Leipzig
Papers on Africa, I) (Leipzig, 1998), for an interesting view: 'A Home-born slave can
never be sold, except for crimes which he may have committed or when taken prisoner in
war; so that sold slaves are generally the criminals or cowards or idlers to whom the state
of vassalage must prove wholesome to themselves and beneficial to Society at large'.
22 Matthews, Voyage, 150. For discussion of types of servitude, see the classical interpretation given by Walter Rodney, 'African slavery and other forms of social oppression on the Upper Guinea Coast in the context of the Atlantic slave-trade',Journal of
African History, 7 (1966), 431-43·
23 Matthews, Voyage, 150-1. Watt, Journal, 53, contended that domestic slaves in
Fuuta jaloo were allowed to carry weapons only when outside their owner's territory,
clearly indicating an apprehension that weapons in the hands of slaves might be used
against owners as easily as against enemies.
24 Matthews, Voyage, 153; Afze1ius, Sierra Leone Journal, 128. See also John Leyden,
A Historical and Philosophical Sketch of the Discoveries & Settlements of the Europeans in
Northern & Western Africa (Edinburgh, 1799), 213-14, whose description of rights of
domestic slaves is similar to that given by Matthews in 1788.
25 Hartwig, in Mouser and Mouser, Case of the Reverend Peter Hartwig, 92. Watt,
Journal, 61, noted that the punishment for insurrection in Fuuta 1aloo was to have one's
'throat cut', the same as that mentioned by Hartwig.
BRUCE MOUSER
Runaways were especially troublesome and a constant problem along this
section of coast. Islands located close by, mangrove inlets on the oceanside,
and nearby highlands offered ideal opportunities for marronage, whether it
be of short duration or for a longer period. Moria had the additional disadvantage of being bordered on the northwest and north by the rival Baga/Susu
state of Sumbuya, on the north and northeast by the mountainous terrain of
the SangarajYangekori Hills, and on the east by the Susu state of Benna.
Runaways might seek escape through a substitution of master, either by reinventing their status as domestic slaves or by establishing a new status as
'near free' clients under the safeguard of different patrons. Matthews noted
that such communities of former Morian slaves and' run away Suzee [Susu] ,
were already living on the lIes de Los in 1785 upon lands that belonged
traditionally to Sumbuya, and that former Morian slaves were fighting as
allies of Sumbuya in an extended conflict then being waged between
Sumbuya and Moria. 26
By Matthews's account, the slave uprising in Moria, which may have included the lIes de Los slaves mentioned above, began because Manding
owners had become capricious regarding customary protections and because
slaves had seized an opportunity to alter their status. Novak reasoned contrarily in his 1986 analysis that the slaves that rebelled around 1783 consisted
of a different slave rank without protections or privileges - those who were
destined for the trans-Atlantic slave commerce, who had been brought
coastward in anticipation of buyers, and who had accumulated in large
numbers, perhaps as a consequence of a lackluster 1782 trading season. To
be sure, it was not uncommon that slaves destined for sale might be expected
to perform manuallabof- under close supervision; that certainly was the case in
other areas of this section of coast. It is also reasonable to infer that marketbound slaves unfit for sale abroad, rather than being put to death, would have
been sent to lugars as general labor.27 Matthews's description, however, lacks
any mention of such slaves, stating in 1786 instead:
The slaves took an opportunity, when the principal part of their [Moria's] fighting
men were out upon an expedition [against Sumbuya], to attack their masters;
several of whom they put to death, and had their heads carried before them on
poles, as ensigns of victory and liberty; they then set fire to the rice which was
ready to be cut [October], which reduced the Mandingoes to the utmost distress,
who [the rebels] afterwards retreated to their towns,28 which they fortified in such a
manner, and so effectually stopped every avenue that led into the country from
26 Matthews, Voyage, 16,89. For more on conflict between Sumbuya and Moria, see
Bright, 'Journal ... 1802',65-7,74,79,84; Mouser, 'The 1805 Forekariah conference',
219-62; 'Diary of Lieutenant Clarkson, R. N.', Sierra Leone Studies (Mar. 1927), 97-8.
27 Rashid, "'A devotion to the idea"', 140. Hartwig, in Bruce Mouser and Nancy
Mouser (eds.), The Reverend Peter Hartwig, I804-I8I5: A Sourcebook of Correspondence
from the Church Missionary Society Archive (African Studies Program) (Madison, 2003),
62-3, mentioned in 1806 that Moria regularly brought slaves to the coast for sale in the
trans-Atlantic trade and for use in their' Lugards'. Macaulay, in Schwarz (ed.), Zachary
Macaulay, II, 18, and Mungo Park, Travels in the Interior Districts of Africa ... in the
Years I795, I796, and I797 (London, 1799), 289-90, noted temporary use of market
slaves in local production.
28 It is likely that these towns mentioned here were actually original slave towns
operated by Manding owners and staffed with domestic slaves.
REBELLION, MARRON AGE AND JIHA D
37
whence the Mandingoes could receive assistance, that their late haughty masters
were under the necessity of suing for peace - whether they will return again to their
former obedience, or assert their independence, is yet undecided. 29
While this rebellion may have begun with perhaps only a few hundred
participants, it expanded rapidly into a significant uprising and survived
for 13 years, partly as a consequence of important strategies adopted by
the rebels and partly because of advantageous opportunities on and within
Moria's borders. In Matthews's narrative, the rebellion had started in 1785,
but later accounts suggest that Matthews in all likelihood had telescoped
events into a shorter period, and that they may have taken perhaps two
growing seasons to be realized'· It is probable that the rebels would have
squandered some portion of their initial freedom, unless of course the rebellion had been meticulously planned in advance, even before they sought
sanctuary outside Moria's boundaries and before the rebellion's initial phase
had run its course. It is also evident that there were perhaps several rebellions, and that there was no single leader among the slaves. From a subaltern perspective, however, the rebels had little option once they had brutally
slain owners, burned vital crops and sacked several villages but to obtain
hasty and protective agreements with whoever was their immediate
neighbor or with Moria's primary adversary in the region, Sumbuya. It is
also doubtful that leaders in Sumbuya had encouraged or helped to launch
the insurrection, for no slave holder would willingly have gambled to
support a slave rebellion that might spread inadvertently to his own clients.
But once the rebellion had occurred, both rebels and Sumbuya sought
advantage. In effect, Sumbuya's ambiguous and longstanding military
skirmishes with Moria before 1783 and continuing disputes along their
common boundary as late as 1785 made it possible for many rebels to move
beyond Moria's immediate ability to respond. Some rebels, consequently,
switched masters by pledging allegiance to Sumbuya and enlisting among
its warriors - a conclusion already in place by the beginning of the 1785
rainy season. 31
Others, led by a number of ill-defined leaders, adopted more complicated
strategies for survival- retreat to less-traveled and less accessible regions and
to land available for growing food. This also included the establishment of a
socioeconomic order that would protect and prolong their existence. In that
sense, these rebel groups were replicating types of marronage common in the
Caribbean - as well as traditionally applied along this stretch of coast. Some
slaves who had been used in mangrove rice production may have sought
refuge deeper into mangrove areas, but that possibility is not mentioned in
the sources. A 'sensible and clever Slave' named Mumby built defenses for a
group of about 600 fugitive domestic slaves' in the very Mandingo Country,
surrounded by his Masters and Tyrants'; interestingly this isolated group
must have adopted unique survival strategies that permitted them to remain
Matthews, Voyage, 154-5.
Thomas Winterbottom, An Account of the Native Africans in the Neighbourhood of
Sierra Leone (London, 1803), I, 154, also dated the rebellion as I785 or 1786, suggesting
that that particular rebellion had led to a retreat to Yangekori.
31 Afze1ius, Sierra Leone Journal, 129.
29
30
BRUCE MOUSER
reasonably unmolested until its members were permitted to move as free
persons to Benna in the interior around 1791.32 Still others, led by Dangasago
and unnamed other leaders, moved to five or six villages in the foothills of the
Yangekori Hills that belonged to Sumbuya and that were sparsely populated
with free Susu peoples. There they settled and were initially welcomed for
the manpower and skills that they brought with them - a situation that could
not have occurred without at least Sumbuya's passive approva1. 33
Once settled among the villages of Yangekori, Kania and Funkoo, and
with a fragile cease-fire established between the rebels and Moria, the rebel
leaders did what was necessary to protect their strongholds. Village defenses
were assured through the building of walls and sentinel towers, and the acquisition of several cannon from traders upon the coast. 34 Other runaways
flowed steadily into these refuges, until their numbers began to concern
slave holders in Sumbuya and free persons native to these villages. Firearms
and gunpowder, moreover, were costly essentials that led the rebels to raid
for slaves whom they could then trade at coastal factories for necessary
European manufactures. When Moria initiated a policy of capturing farmers
attached to these rebel villages, the latter retaliated in kind (probably in 1786/
7) by attacking Morian towns and seizing slaves, and in a few cases important free persons who could be ransomed. These insults resulted in an
undated large expedition from Moria, 'but they [the rebels] defended
themselves so well, that, after losing several people, the Mandingos were
obliged to make a precipitate retreat'.35 That unsuccessful attempt to overrun the Yangekori strongholds was followed by a period of' slight skirmishes
and predatory expeditions, without any material advantage accruing to either
side'.36 For all practical purposes, a temporary stalemate had again been
reached.
The circumstances of that standoff changed during the 1789190 dry season, however, with significant consequences for leaders in all camps, whether
rebels or customary elites. Beginning during the 1789 rainy season, and continuing for at least a year, this section of coast was visited by a holy man from
the interior named Fatta, who claimed to have been designated a Mahdi and
instructed to lead a jihiid of cleansing and correction. 37 This was also a time
when sanctioned rulers of both Sumbuya and Moria had died, and both
states were engaged in prolonged and contentious procedures for selecting
new ones. 3S Declaring himself a native of 'Mandugo, capital of Conya' (unidentified), Fatta claimed to be a lineal descendant of Ali b. Abu Talib and
cousin of Muhammad and a fulfillment of Islamic prophecy. By the time of
his arrival in Moria, Fatta had crossed the state of Benna where Susu leaders
reluctantly rallied to his cause and joined his march coastward. Fatta arrived
32 In ibid. 126, Afzelius also mentioned that Mumby, his group, and recently arrived
'run away Slaves from the Yanghia Curree' were thriving in Benna in March 1796.
33 Ibid. 122, 126; 'Winterbottom, An Account, 1,154.
34 Afzelius, Sierra Leone Journal, 122, 123.
35 Winterbottom, An Account, I, 155.
36
Ibid.
The dates of 1789/91 for thejihiid are taken from Zachary Macaulay's journal, entry
dated 12 Dec. 1793 (Schwarz, Zachary Macaulay, I, 31). See also Winterbottom, An
Account, 1,246-50, for his account of Fatta's visit to the coast.
38 Macaulay, in Schwarz, Zachary Macaulay, II, 18, 30-1.
37
REBELLION, MARRONAGE AND JIHA D
39
in Moria with' a large concourse of followers' numbering perhaps 15,000,
who pitched tents, clearly sending shockwaves through coastal communities.
Even the Fula were hesitant to question his authority. Each headman was
required to present himself before Fatta, swear allegiance to him, and deliver
gifts and tribute; and each was tested for his knowledge of Islam. Some
elders were beheaded for heresy and incorrect thoughts. Supplies and provisions for his followers (army) were requisitioned from landholders. All
loyal followers were required to wear yellow- or orange-colored garments, a
convenient method for identifying those who had not submitted to his
authority. For the moment, all disputes between states then ongoing were
ended. Even· European traders operating commercial establishments upon
the coast were required to wear yellow clothing and to pay a special insurance
fee that was imposed to protect their property"
Whether a matter of answering Fatta's summons or of exploiting an opportunity for significant change in customary practice upon the coast, rebel
leaders met with Fatta and his leaders and offered their allegiance and strategic incorporation of their warriors within Fatta's army. To be sure, rebel
leaders had little option - the same choice had probably been given to ruling
elites in Benna, Moria and Sumbuya. 40 Even John Ormond, an important
slave trader in the Rio Pongo, was summoned to Moria and paid tribute
to the Mahdi. Indeed, one rebel leader was reportedly executed. But more
importantly, Fatta's policies signaled a degree of leveling upon the coast
and the potential for a major remodeling of the socioeconomic landscape,
albeit still within an African context. The rebel leader Mumby and his
splinter group, for instance, were granted their' freedom' and permitted to
move to Benna territory and away from Moria proper, a circumstance that
would need to be resolved later." The rulers of Benna, Moria and Sumbuya
were humbled and humiliated, and the temporary ruler of Moria was even
ordered to put his own brother to death. The military protector to the
Sumbuya ruler later reported his belief that Fatta intended to execute all
elders throughout the coast as a way to end the old order and effect change 4 '
As is often the case in iconoclastic movements, Fatta's message of a new
regime challenged the very foundations of society and provided those
domestic slaves and free persons with obligations to important persons with
ample opportunity to alter their status and perhaps switch allegiance to other
patrons.
In effect, the arrival of Fatta with his calls for cleansing and transformation
and opportunities that his policies provided to subalterns within Benna,
Moria and Sumbuya to redefine the customary authority of elders and elites
was an unacceptable change for landholders. Massive desertion among
domestic slaves to the Mahdi's cause and Fatta's observed excessive demands
upon landlords were additional ingredients that helped to produce a common
Winterbottom, An Account. I, 247-8.
Ibid. I, 249. recorded a report given him by Fendan Modu Dumbuya of Sumbuya:
'On being ordered into his presence. he [Fendan Modu] crawled on all fours for near a
hundred yards in token of his veneration of the prophet, and in hopes of conciliating him
by this instance of absolute submission'.
41 Afzelius, Sierra Leone Journal, 120, 126; Macaulay, in Schwarz, Zachary Macaulay,
I, 19-20.
42 Winterbottom, An Account, I, 249.
39
40
40
BRUCE MOUSER
front among traditional elites against changes, whatever their nature. But by
far the most important irritant was the perceived alliance formed between
Fatta and the rebel leaders and the growing power held within rebel
strongholds in the Yangekori Hills, for, from the rebels' perspective, Fatta's
appearance had provided them with more opportunities than costs. Before
order could be restored among domestic slaves and the power of traditional
landowners re-established, however, Fatta's invincibility needed to be
tested and discredited. That opportunity came in the 1790/1 dry seasoninterestingly enough, when a jilted lover revealed that Fatta had been
wounded twice before and had scars to prove it. When Fatta learned that
coastal headmen were rallying to oppose him, he fled to Benna, a supposed
safe haven. But the rulers in Benna, like those in Moria and Surnbuya, also
believed themselves to have been undermined by Fatta and his followers,
and they combined with coastal elites to bring Fatta to justice. Still fearing
his special powers, however, and 'making it a point of conscience not
to shed the blood of so extraordinary a scholar by the usual mode of
execution viz. cutting the throat, they dispatched him with the stroke of a
hammer'.43
From 1791 to late 1795, circumstances upon the coast were fluid, but
most importantly, from the rebels' perspective, traditional landlords
were gradually reasserting their authority among subject peoples and over
territory, and joining forces to oppose runaways and, increasingly, any
efforts by the rebels to consolidate their own might upon the coast. Fluid
conditions, however, meant that the rebels were able to harvest crops
and secure sufficient surpluses in rice and cotton with which to purchase
needed firearms and munitions. In these circumstances, the rebels were
forced to rely entirely upon their own resources, and to look for opportunities that weakness or lack of coordination between Benna, Moria and
Sumbuya might afford. Many former slaves who had changed allegiance
during the Fatta period of '789-9' joined the rebels within their strongholds
where walls were strengthened and a reserve of food was collected for
the upcoming battle. By December '793, working agreements had
been reached between the rulers of Benna, Moria and Sumbuya that required
that all runaways be returned to owners and that rebels be, in future, systematically deprived of rice harvests and sources of gunpowder and firearms.
43 Bright, 'Journal ... 1802', 97. Bright, 48, wrote that the person who struck the fatal
blow was Brama Sayo of Benna. Winterbottom, An Account, I, 250, reported that it took
some time for many to believe that Fatta was in fact dead. While most welcomed his
departure, many continued to revere him as a prophet, and collected his teeth, hair, nails
and various other parts of his body as relics and grign' to protect them from harm.
Macaulay, in Schwarz, Zachary Macaulay, I, 20, wrote: 'But even when they saw his
skull shattered to pieces they could not persuade themselves that he was dead, they cut his
body in a thousand pieces, and by many it is still believed that though Mahade has
disappeared for a time, he will shortly return, to take vengeance on his murderers, and to
establish his kingdom'. C. B. Wadstrom, in An Essay on Colonization (New York, 1<)68),
Part 2, 86--7, who reported mainly from works of others who had visited the coast, claimed
that Fatta's 'generals' contended for power after his death, with losers being sold to 'a
French slave-ship, lying off a factory near S. Leone'. The same account as that given by
Wadstrom appeared in Sierra Leone Company, Substance of the Report ... I794 (London,
1794),9 6 -'7.
41
Zachary Macaulay, then governor of the British settlement at Freetown,
wrote prophetically and hyperbolically:
REBELLION, MARRQNAGE AND JIRA D
The present combination of African chiefs to crush these people and the gallant
struggle it is likely they will make for their liberty will form a parallel to the history
of Europe at this moment [1793]. The only difference seems to be in the number of
combatants, the game and the stakes are the same. 44
While the configuration of this' combination of African chiefs' is unclear,
it is certain that significant efforts were made during the period between
1793 and 1795 to consolidate agreements among as many rulers as possible
and to resolve longstanding differences between states. This was also a time
for states to replace temporary sovereigns with those sanctioned by
regional landlords. Those efforts were significantly advanced during the 1794
rainy season, moreover, when yet another holy man from the interior
arrived in Moria, proclaiming' himself a prophet sent by God' ,45 This time,
coastal rulers and electors responded differently from how they had when
Fatta first appeared. Experience had clearly demonstrated that chaos
could spread easily when a religious zealot proposed significant changes in
customary systems of land use and rule. On this occasion, perhaps to
manipulate developments to their own advantage and gain control of the
process, the new ruler of Moria, Sitafa Morani, convened a conference
of regional leaders and electors and summoned the self-proclaimed
prophet, named Karimou, to present his mission before the 'meeting of
all chiefs', which would judge the validity of his claim." For whatever
reason, Karimou failed to appear at the meeting. But the conference
itself, probably the first of many such conferences that were to follow, emboldened landlords and new rulers with new-found authority and increased
their determination to resolve their common rebel problem and remove the
sanctuary that the Yangekori marronage had provided domestic and marketbound slaves. Adam Afzelius wrote during this period that many slaves were
leaving their owners' fields to join rebels at Yangekori, and that those defections and rumors then circulating upon the coast had caused general alarm
among owners that more would take flight if a combined troop loyal to customary elites was not formed quickly. As a consequence, and repeating
Afzelius's characterizations, Monge Simba of Wonkapong, acting ruler of
Sumbuya, was named 'Commander in chief of the combined forces', and
Alimaami Sitafa of Forekariah, the newly designated ruler of Moria, was
appointed 'General of the attack'. 'All the headmen of the Suso and
44 Schwarz, Zachary Macaulay, II, 30-1. On 12 December 1793 (31), Macaulay noted:
'The deserters having enjoyed three years of repose since Mahadi's death have cultivated
rice of which they have now a good stock on hand and with their overplus they have been
laying up store of arms and ammunition'. In a personal communication (3 Apr. 2006),
Paul Richards wrote: 'Macaulay's comments were rather astute - and might have been as
applicable to DFID [Department for International Development of the UK Foreign &
Commonwealth Office] post-rebellion strategy of chiefly restoration in AD2000 as to the
global revolutionary climate of the late 18th century! How little life has changed'.
45 Macaulay, unpublished journal of Zachary Macaulay, entry dated 9 Sept. 1794.
46
Ibid.
42
BRUCE MOUSER
Mandingo towns' combined with the allied force and provided troops.47
Dala Modu Dumbuya, son of the protector to the ruler of Sumbuya, said that
'five Kings' participated in this conference, and it was then that he was given
the charge to 'take the place [Yangekori]'.48
The assault against remaining rebel villages began after the rice harvest of
1795/6. Several small towns (among them Kania and Funkoo) that were loyal
to the rebels were easily overrun, and captives were either killed or sold. The
major assault against Yangekori town by 2,5oo-plus alliance warriors went
slowly and took more than 5 months to succeed, for the town was newly
fortified on three sides (the fourth faced the mountain) with 12-foot walls
and three sentinel towers, and was well supplied with food and munitions
collected in advance" A new well had been dug within the town's walls.
Some who had escaped capture elsewhere expanded the ranks of the rebels
within their last significant stronghold. But some at Yangekori concluded
that defense was impossible, and these sought refuge among Mumby's group
in Benna. 50 At Yangekori, rebels repelled repeated attacks, with a steady loss
of life on both sides. Beginning early in '796, the allies changed tactics from
that of frontal attacks to that of a blockade. They built a palisade about a mile
outside the rebel's defensive walls, cut down trees and brush around the
town, and reduced the size of the allied force to 1,000 warriors in order
to starve the town's population of approximately 500 people, or to wait for a
final attack or a surrender. 51
While the specifics of the final battle are unclear, the rebellion apparently
ended quickly. In March '796, the allied forces received detailed information concerning Yangekori's defenses from an American trader who had
visited the rebels, and they assembled several thousand warriors and cannon
for a final assault. Perhaps equally important in timing, however, was
the arrival of an official Fula ambassador from Timbo with a demand' to get
this [trade] road open [as] soon as possible'." The general bombardment
began on 22 March and an offer was given to the rebels - surrender and
leaders would be put to death or sold, slaves would be returned to their
former status, and free persons would be 'released'. 53 One of the three remaining leaders at Yangekori, a free Susu, surrendered with a small group to
the alliance, and apparently was treated fairly. Another leader was killed in
the bombardment. On 28 March, the last rebel leader, a 'great warrior and
daring fellow' named Dangasago, was betrayed by a friend, was decoyed out
of Yangekori supposedly with a promise of gunpowder, and was seized. 54
Dangasago's capture signaled the fate of the insurrection, but defenders
Afzelius, Sierra Leone Journal, 119, 122-3.
'Evidence by Dalu Mohammed, corrected from Minutes of Council, 5 August
1809', found in Hull University Library, Thomas Perronet Thompson papers, DTH/l/
16. See Winterbottom, An Account, I, 195.
49 Afzelius, Sierra Leone Journal, 122. Winterbottom, An Account, I, 156, described
these towers as 'circular bastions'.
50 Afzelius, Sierra Leone Journal, 119, 130.
51 Ibid. 119, 122-3. Winterbottom, An Account, I, 156, described the palisade as 10 feet
tall and' about twenty yards distant from the walls'.
52 Afzelius, Sierra Leone Journal, 119, 121, 132. Both Afzelius and Matthews, Voyage,
86--7, noted that seldom did an army exceed 500 men. An army of several thousand,
therefore, would have reflected the combined armies of several headmen or 'kings'.
53 Afzelius, Sierra Leone Journal, 119, 123.
54 Ibid. 122-3, 126.
47
48
REBELLION, MARRONAGE AND JIHA D
43
resisted for several days while the allies continued to await their surrender.
Dangasago's destiny was ominous:
[Dangasago] was yesterday cut to pieces amidst the acclamation of the combined
armees - His head was cut of[f] and divided into two pieces and afterwards even
the arms and legs were cut of[f] and the body in this mangled situation thrown out
of the camp, there to rotten or be devoured of wild beasts. 55
The fate of the remaining rebels is less certain in the sources. Dala
Modu claimed to have paraded the captives before the' five Kings' and told
Governor Macaulay of Sierra Leone that only 150 were killed in the final
attack and that 100 boys and 15 girls were sold as slaves. 56 Dala Modu also
reported that the walls were torn down and the town of Yangekori completely destroyed. A few years later, Richard Bright reported significantly
different figures of 1,000 of those captured being put to death, 1,000 as enslaved, and a final 1,000 as dismissed, although he may have included all of
those involved in the insurrection. 57 Winterbottom reported simply that, in
the final battle, the allies' rushed in, and ... cut the throats of the wretched
inhabitants who survived'.58
While the chronology of events is reasonably clear, several questions regarding the course of this rebellion remain. Still uncertain are the definite
dates for its beginning and for causes that led to the uprising in the first place.
Rather than interpret this rebellion as a single event or as coming from a
single-status group, moreover, it seems more reasonable to believe that it
began as an isolated event but escalated regionally and quickly, and probably
in different locations. It is also probable that it grew to include bands of
domestic as well as market-bound slaves, and certainly even some people of
free-but-subaltern status who were caught up in the enthusiasm and who
wanted to bring about social change. Cruel treatments towards slaves and
disregard of subject peoples in Moria may have been primary causes, but
opportunity - during a period of political confusion and disunity within
states, and warfare between states upon the coast - was a major contributing
factor.
Perhaps causes were soon forgotten, for once away from' masters), rebels,
whether former slaves or subalterns, needed to adopt strategies for survival,
within an African setting and context. Some placed themselves under different patrons, substituting one for another. One group, that led by Mumby,
reached accommodation with former 'masters' and survived through collaboration. Others undoubtedly were defeated in battle but were unrecorded,
and some became bandits. Still others must have accepted their fate and
returned to the yoke of their masters.
The group that became identified as the Yangekori Rebellion lasted
for more than a decade and most likely included more than one center. Its
leaders developed strategies and worked within realities that permitted this
to occur. They should be credited for many of their successes, but a lack
of resolve, direction and cooperation among their natural opponents
55
Ibid. 130.
'Evidence by Dalu Mohammed'; Macaulay, journal of Zachary Macaulay, entry
dated 10 May 1796.
57 Bright, 'Journal ... 1802',81.
58 Winterbottom, An Account, I, 158.
56
44
BRUCE MOUSER
contributed significantly to their longevity. Current data reveal nothing of
the socioeconomic order established by rebels or of their long-term' objectives. It is doubtful that they were democratic or republican. Nor is it certain
that they abolished slavery. At least one of its leaders was originally of free
status. Nothing is known of their ethnic identities, religions, languages,
rankings or gender. Successful strategies, however, demanded that rebels
protect themselves with walls, warriors, surplus crops that they could use in
trade, favorable agreements with neighbors, and a willingness to accommodate to local offensive and defensive norms. For example, they raided for
wives and for slaves that they traded for firearms. Had it not been for intermittent skirmishes between states and political confusion within those states,
however, the Yangekori Rebellion would have ended much earlier. Sumbuya
permitted the rebels to remain within its nominal territory and to trade with
Europeans via a corridor or through contacts with the coast - so long as
Moria remained Sumbuya's enemy. In effect, as long as the Yangekori rebels
remained within their confined space, Sumbuya was willing to tolerate their
existence as a convenient diversion.
The Yangekori Rebellion failed, however, for many reasons. In general,
slave rebellions tend to collapse eventually. In this case, perhaps there were
failures of leadership. But it is generally accepted that rebellions must grow
and expand to survive; they must become offensive and conquer something
in order to recruit new membership and women. Perhaps leaders became
complacent with Sumbuya's perceived acceptance of their solitary status.
That posture worked, so long as they represented no genuine threat to the
survival and status of traditional landlords. That situation changed, however,
when Fatta brought his socioeconomic revolution - his iconoclasm - to the
coast, and when he combined the slave armies with his own. Once the social
and economic order of landlords - as a group - was gravely threatened, the
stage was set for a collective decision to resolve internal political problems,
destroy the rebellion, restore chiefly prerogatives and socioeconomic standing, and return to a normal but changed reality. The landlords possessed
manpower, customary rights as first-comers, religious sanction, access to
firearms and assistance, ability to call upon clan and extended relationships,
and power to reward. An alliance of 'five Kings' and the ability of the combined armies to maintain an indefinite blockade sealed the rebellion's fate.
In the debate concerning African agency in slave uprising and successful
marronage, the Yangekori Rebellion may supply a model that could be applied to the New World experience. But it also seems reasonably clear that
the several Moria-based rebellions of this period occurred as a consequence
essentially of local dynamics and not necessarily as by-products of the slave
trade as such.