Herman Bakvis - University of Victoria

Intergovernmental Governance: (Mis)
Understanding Canadian Federalism
Presentation to “Modes of Governance”
University of Victoria
October 14-15, 2011
Herman Bakvis
Overview
• Intergovernmental Governance (IG)
• Structural Features Shaping IG
• Inter- vs. Intrastate/jurisdictional vs horizontal
federalism
• Primary Forums
• Common (Mis)perceptions
• Five brief policy vignettes
• Discussion/Conclusion
Intergovernmental Governance (IG)
• The making of authoritative decisions and the
coordination of policies and activities of
different orders of government in order to
achieve mutual objectives.
• In federations where functions and
jurisdictions are invariably intertwined and
power tends to be shared, most decisions are
invariably joint decisions, even if not formally
labelled as such.
Structural Features Shaping IG
• Beyond basic definition of federalism (areal
division of powers, two orders of government
relating to same citizen body etc), variety of
different designs:
– Inter vs. intrastate distinction
– Dual/Jurisdictional vs horizontal/administrative
federalism
– Concurrent vs exclusive jurisdiction
– General vs. specific powers
Dual-Horizontal
Canada
Jurisdictional
Federalism
U.S.
Germany/EU
Horizontal
Federalism
• Canada exceptional in degree to which powers of 2 orders of
government spelled out
• Canada: competition between governments
• U.S: Competition between three branches of government
• German/EU direct representation in central institutions
Canadian Interstate Federalism
• Based on model of dual jurisdictions (even
watertight compartments at times), despite
high level of interdependence in different
policy areas
• Direct representation of constituent units in
central institutions lacking (weak second
chamber with representatives appointed by
federal government)
Consequences
• Relations between governments, not within
governments (e.g. European Council, Council
of Ministers)
• Executive federalism
• Primary venues for interaction are meetings of
first ministers, ministers and senior officials
• Varies from area to area, but overall little
scope for participation municipalities, interest
groups, and citizens
Forums/Arenas
• First Minister Conferences (FMC) or First Minister
Meetings (FMM) – latter more informal and more
common – Premiers and Prime Minister
• Council of the Federation – Premiers (10 provinces
and 3 territories) only
• Ministerial Councils
• Meetings of officials – preparatory work, support
councils, implementation of agreements
Forums/Arenas
• Operate at federal-provincial and
interprovincial level
• Other bodies:
– Federal cabinet – informal representation and
linkages with provinces
– Supreme Court – arena for final authoritative,
resolution of disputes, though governments often
reluctant parties to constitutional/jurisdictional
disputes
– Very low level of institutionalization!
Distinctive Features of Canadian
Executive Federalism
• 1st ministers, close advisers, 2-3 ministers and
selected top officials) predominant actors in the
system; minimal role for legislatures
• Power reinforced by Westminster system:
– Executive dominance of the legislature
• Reinforced further by recent trends:
– ‘Governing from the Centre’ (Savoie); ‘New
Political Governance’ (Aucoin)
Issues and Conflict
• Structure of system shapes conflicts and their
outcomes:
– Provincial governments see themselves as
exclusive guardians and representatives of
regional and provincial interests
– Conflict channelled through and articulated by
provinces to Ottawa
Issues and Conflict
• Major issues/cleavages:
– Quebec’s role in confederation
– Position of First Nations
– Symmetrical vs asymmetrical federalism
– East vs West
– Have vs have-not provinces
– Rural vs urban
• Major issues revolve around, and played out
through, debates over fiscal transfers
East-west tensions
Common (Mis)perceptions
• Canadian federalism generally conflict ridden
• Ottawa and provinces constantly at
loggerheads
• Lack of coordination in policy development
and implementation
• Policy drift/paralysis
• Canada one of the most decentralized
federations in the world
Conflict as theatre
Five policy vignettes
•
•
•
•
•
Education Attainment Standards
Welfare Reform
Health Care
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards
WTO Compliance
Education Attainment Standards
• Interprovincial agreement (no federal involvement)
• The Pan-Canadian Assessment Program (2006)
agreed upon by all 10 provinces and one territorial
government
• Provides standardized assessment through cyclical
tests of student achievement
• No transfer of funds, or sanctions. Assessment
reports are public
• Policy coordination provided by Interprovincial
Council of Education Ministers
Welfare Reform
• National Child Benefit (1997) – new federal
entitlement program delivered through tax system to
parents of eligible children
• Provinces agree to reinvest savings in social
assistance in enhanced and redirected social services
• Broad national framework, flexible enough for
Quebec
• No intergovernmental transfer of funds and no
formal intergovernmental agreement
Health care
• Canada Health Act (1984) and Canada Health
Transfer (since 1996), provides loosely conditional
funding to provinces for universal medical and
hospital insurance
• Block grants account for 25 % of actual P/T
expenditures
• The unconditional transfer program of Equalization
provides additional funding to 6 of 10 provinces
• Since 1999 feds pursue reforms (cost containment,
accountability and innovation) through nonbinding
framework agreements and incremental, conditional
funding
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards
• Federal parliament ratifies Kyoto Accord (2002)
• Elaborate but ineffectual intergovernmental (F/P/T)
and government-industry collaboration, fails to
produce binding emission standards
• Harper federal government admits failure on Kyoto,
2006
• No new binding national legislation. Major polluting
provinces (Alberta) oppose Kyoto process
• British Columbia introduces carbon tax
WTO Compliance
• Federal Parliament cannot implement treaties in
matters of provincial jurisdiction – some claim WTO
trade agreements within federal jurisdiction – not
tested in courts
• Since 1980s extensive mechanisms for F-P-T
consultation (but no veto)
• Successful consultation and cooperation for WTO
negotiation and implementation; provincial interests
reflected in Agreements including exceptions,
exemptions and other provisions
• Compliance issues continue to be dealt with on a
cooperative basis
Discussion
• Health care the only really fractious area
• Education (provinces only) and WTO
compliance (fed-province) characterized by
high level of cooperation and coordination
• Welfare reform – mutual adjustment and
cooperation
• Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards –
unilateralism by Ottawa, then reversal with
certain provinces taking the lead
Conclusion
• In Canada mutual objectives achieved through
jurisdictional autonomy and bargaining, &
through mutual adjustment and competition,
rather than central coordination
• Canadian case suggests that, given the right
conditions, the objectives can be achieved in a
system that accords the constituent units
greater autonomy