CHAPTER I
C O N F L I C T S IN T H E P E R S I A N G U L F : A N O V E R V I E W
A s regards the regional conflicts, the Persian Gulf is distinct from other regions of the
world, less in terms of their seemingly endless number and more due to their varying patterns
and intensity-level.
History, coupled with the topography of the region, has given birth to a number of
territorial disputes. A s the cradle of w o r l d ' s two conflicting civilizations Arab and Persian each
c o n f i n e d to separate territorial boundaries, the region is the center stage of the conflict between
the two oriental ideologies. While s o m e countries still stick to centuries old Islamic conservatism, the grassroots of their socio-political system, w h i l e a few other have embraced 19-20th
centuries' Socialism, of course with added Arab-Islamic characteristics. This has given birth to
inter-state radicalism vs. Islamic conservatism in the region. With the emergence, or ree m e r g e n c e of Islamic radicalism during the last one and a half decades, the region is afflicted
with Islamic conservatism versus Islamic radicalism rivalry. The Arab peninsular countries
representing Islamic conservatism are embroiled in ideological rivalry with both the radical
right (Islam), represented by Iran, and the radical left, represented by Iraq. No less antagonistic
are the radical right and the radical left, although this conflict has been overshadowed by
territorial,Arab-Persian and Shia-Sunni rivalries between Iran and Iraq, the countries representing, respectively, the abovementioned radical streams.
It is in this p e r s p e c t i v e that this study endeavors to a detailed and analytical account of
regional conflicts in the Persian G u l f ( l ) .
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES
A) B O U N D A R Y D I S P U T E S :
1) T H E S H A T T - A L - A R A B D I S P U T E :
T h i s dispute is b e t w e e n Iran and Iraq. It is over the an 8 0 k m of the estuary of the river
Shatt-Al-Arab, which d i v i d e s the land boundaries of the two countries (2). A tributary of the
rivers E u p h r a t e s and Tigris, the Shatt-Al-Arab, 205 km long with an avg. breadth of 548 meter,
has historically been under A r a b control, excpet those few o c c a s i o n s w h e n the Persian empire
w a s in control of the s a m e and the land adjacent to it(3).
T h e demarcation of boundaries being an u n k n o w n practice during ancient and medieval
times, the possession of the Shatt shifted alternately between A r a b rule and Persian empire
withthe migration of people and or due to the shifting loyalties of the people, inhabiting the delta
5
of the river, from one p o w e r to the other one. T h e r e f o r e , there are little on record about the
dates of the " s h i f t s " in, and the duration of control over, the Shatt. Given the practice of non
relinquishment of claim from the Shatt by one of the disputants even when it happened
to lose it, the authenticity of the historical accounts and official records, e x c e p t those of
relatively modern period, can not be considered authentic.
H o w e v e r , there is a fundamental d i f f e r e n c e between the nature of conflict over the Shatt
d u r i n g the medieval days and that of present times. Earlier the Shatt was the part of dispute over
the entire landmass east of it, while in the 20th century, rather the 2nd half of this century to
be more precise, the Shatt alone is the m a j o r source of conflict.
This change has taken place due to g r o w i n g strategic importance of the river after the
discovery of oil in Iraq coupled with the expansion of trade between Iraq and the countries
linked to it by sea routes. The river's eastern side is I r a q ' s chief oil export outlet to the Persian
Gulf waters. L a y i n g overland pipelines through Syria and Turkey and constructing commercial
port at U m m - e - Q a s r , Iraq reduced its d e p e n d e n c e on the Shatt route by half. Yet, the oil shipped
t h r o u g h the Shatt estuary constitutes the mainstay of Iraqi economy(4). Besides, to Iraq the
Shatt is a p e r m a n e n t route for the supply of oil,while the pipelines carry the threat of closure
by the countries these pass through. Interestingly, both Turkey and Syria closed d o w n the Iraqi
pipelines passing through their territories.
T o Iran, the Shatt waten.vays facilitate direct access to the ports of K h o r r e m s h a h e r and
the industrial complex around A h w a z . However, for Iran the commercial and economic
i m p o r t a n c e of the Shatt reduced when t h e p r o t Bandar A b b a s and Kharag island w e r e developed
as the chief sources of its o i l ' s outlet(5). T h e river is important to Iran for d e n y i n g Iraq the
control over it given the latter's d e p e n d e n c e on it. It also enables Iran to s u p e r v i s e the Iraqi
navigation through it.
Iraq claims that not only has the Shatt been historically the part of Arab rule but since
the time of the b e g i n n i n g of the practice of b o u n d r y demarcation between Ottoman and Persian
empires, its sovereignty over it (the Shatt) has always been acknowledged by Persia in exchange
for A r a b recognition to its control over the a d j a c e n t landmass.
Iran rejects Iraqi claim on two counts. First, Iraq is not the successor state of the
O t t o m a n e m p i r e . T h e r e f o r e it is not entitled to extend any claim over the f o r m e r Ottoman
territories. Second, the old treaties, w h i c h recognised the O t t o m a n ' s e m p i r e ' s control over the
Shatt, now stand illegal for not being in accordance with the existing international law.
T h e successive Iranian governments swear by the international legal principles of the
midline of the river channel constituting the natural boundary of two states separated by a river.
T h e Iranian side f u r t h e r claims that after signing in 1975 the Algiers agreement to this effect,
Iraq is under the international obligation to abide by the ' T h a l w e g ' principle.
A s against this, I r a q ' s position has been that since according to internatirmal law obligations
undera treaty are not unilateral, therefore it w a s justified in abrogating the A l g i e r s treaty in
6
1980 when Iran indulged in the violation of those clauses of the treaty w h i c h provided for the
return of three border villages in K h u r r a m s h a h a r regions to Iraq by Iran.
A m i d claims and counterclaims, occasionally escalating into borderconflagrations(6),
the Shatt-Al-Arab dispute has quite a good number of times been negotiated over. These
negotiations culminated at least into f o u r m a j o r treaties(7).
T H E P E A C E T R E A T Y OF 1639 : This treaty was signed, f o l l o w i n g the T u r k i s h conquest of
Basra, in 1639 between the representatives of the Ottoman and the Persian empires. Under this
treaty, Persia accepted the Turkish suzerainty over the Shatt and s o m e areas peopled by the
A r a b s on its eastern side. The Persian empire retained the f r e e d o m of navigation and right of
e c o n o m i c exploitation of the river(8).
T H E S E C O N D E R U Z E R U M T R E A T Y : This treaty was c o n c l u d e d u n d e r the g o o d o f f i c e s of
Great Britain and Russia on May 31, 1947 in the Turkish city of E r z e r u m . U n d e r this treaty ;
a) the Turkish empire ceded to Persia the city and harbor a n c h o r a g e of M u h a m m a r a and the
island of Khizr (now Abadan) and Persia ceded some territories in the p r o v i n c e of Sulaimaneyah
and Z u b a b e b ; and, b) the Ottoman e m p i r e w a s allowed to retain control over the S h a t t ' s width
up to the deep water marker of the eastern shore, sans the territories of M u h a m m a r a h and the
islandof Khizr.
The treaty was, however, later rejected by the both the parties. T h e O t t o m a n empire held
that the treaty did not extend the A r a b sphere of control to the eastern s h o r e s of the river.
F o l l o w i n g the refusal, Britain and Russia recognized Ottamanian sovereignty over the whole
of the river in an 'explanatory n o t e ' (9). T a k i n g strong exception to the ' e x p l a n a t o r y n o t e ' ,
Persia retrogatively annulled its assent to the treaty. With this the b o u n d a r y c o m m i s s i o n , set up
u n d e r the treaty to fix the boundaries, w a s also dismantled.
T H E C A S T A N T I N O P L E P R O T O C O L 1913: The C o n s t a n t i n o p l e Protocol w a s signed among
Russia, Great Britain, Persian and Turkish empire (lO)This treaty re-established Turkish
control over the entire width of the Shatt and around the waters of M u h a m m a r a and Khizr. The
middle of the river channel was fixed as the boundary.
T H E T R E A T Y OF 1937: The heralding of Pahaivi rule under Reza S h a h in 1921 put the 1913
treaty and the earlier ones in jeopardy as the Shah refused to abide by any one of them. He did
not recognize the Basra port Directorate, established by Iraq to s u p e r v i s e negotiations on the
Shatt according to the 1913 treaty. T h e rejection of the treaty resulted in b o r d e r skirmishes
b e t w e e n Iran and Iraq (11). The S h a h also refused to give recognition to Iraq in resentment
against ' I r a q ' s control over the S h a t t ( 1 2 ) .
T h e matter was brought to the notice of the L e a g u e of N a t i o n s on N o v . 2 9 , 1934. The
L e a g u e appointed a rapporteur, an Italian diplomat, to mediate b e t w e e n the t w o parties to find
a negotiated settlement to the dispute. In part due to the e f f o r t s of the r a p p o r t e u r and in part
as a result of the Middle East pact, initiated in 1935 by Britain and Russia to resolve the
b o u n d a r y disputes, an Iran-Iraq border treaty was signed on July 4 , 1 9 3 7 in T e h r a n . The treaty
reaffirmed
^
Iraqi jurisdiction over the east of the Shatt and save the areas around the Iranian port of
M u h a m m a r a and A b a d a n the border ran along the Thalweg. In addition to this, Iran w a s granted
four miles anchorage zone of A b a d a n . Principle of freedom of navigation was established. The
transit fee was to be used for the maintenance and expansion of shipping lanes and a provision
w a s made for the conclusion of a convention for joint administration of the Shatt shipping and
related activities within two years of the signing of the agreement.
D I S P U T E IN T H E 1960S : The f o l l o w i n g two decades a f t e r the s i g n i n g of the 1937 treaty
marked a relative calm on the Shatt front. The two countries turned friends by joining the
C E N T O in 1955. In 1959, the Shah, however, reiterated Iranian claim over the eastern side of
the Shatt, accusing Iraq of not adhering to the T h a l w e g principle. In response, the then ruler
of Iraq, Gen. Qasim, renewed his claim over Abadan, M u h a m m a r a and other A r a b territories
u n d e r Iranian control as per the 1937 treaty. In 1959, the Shah unilaterally abrogated the treaty
of 1937 (13). Frequent outbursts of border clashes during the late 1950s and early 1960s were
r e p o r t e d . Iran continued accusing Iraq of backtracking from setting up the convention of the
j o i n t administration of the Shatt as agreed upon under the 1937 treaty, misappropriating the
transit fee and using it in the construction of hotels and airport and not paying the dues (14).
Iraq putforward the Iranian attempt to forcibly impose its jurisdiction over the Shatt as
t h e main reason behind not setting up the boundary c o m m i s s i o n by it (15).
It would be too far-fetched to conclude that Iran began abetting Kurdish rebellion in the
first half of the 70s to bargain a f a v o r a b l e settlement on the Shatt. For to keep Iraq preoccupiedwith its internal affairs might have stemmed as well from the Iranian strategy to
neutralize Iraqi threat on its own borders, to weaken Iraq internally and to intimidate the Arab
p o w e r s from forming an anti-Iranian strategic consensus in collusion with Baghdad.
However, this did help Iran in reinforcing a link b e t w e e n the Kurdish problem and the
Shatt issue as Iraq o f f e r e d to cede the estuary to Iran in return of Iranian assurance to stop
s u p p o r t i n g the Kurdish rebels. Following a green signal from Iraq, the Algerian president who
w a s hosting O P E C ' s annual summit being attended by the Shah and the then Iraqi vice-president
S a d d a m Hussien mediated between the two. The , Algerian e f f o r t s led to the signing of the
Algiers A g r e e m e n t . The treaty provided for the establishment of the boundaries along the
T h a l w e g and the Iranian side was called upon to keep its hand off from the Kurdish rebellion
(16).
T h e Algiers treaty had a major d r a w b a c k . It was a political agreement instead of a border
s e t t l e m e n t in the true sense of the term. Hence, its sanctity and durability w e r e doubted that too
in view of the fact that it was signed by Iraq under compulsion and by Iran from the position
of s t r e n g t h .
T h u s on Sept. 19, 1980, Iraq unilaterally abrogated the treaty with its President Saddam
H u s s e i n torn the text of the treaty apart in Algeria. Both the v e n u e , the same place where Iraq
8
w a s subjected to sign the humiliating treaty, and the t i m e — by then, it is said, the decision to
attack Iran on the 22nd of the same month was already t a k e n — c o n f i r m that the tearing of the
treaty was an exhibition of Iraqi decision to settle the issue on battleground beside meeting other
objectives(17).
THE IRAQ-KUWAIT DISPUTE :
Next to the Shatt, the most o u t s t a n d i n g dispute in the region is the one between Iraq and
Kuwait over the two islands of Bubiyan and Warbah. The w h o l e of Kuwait in itself is disputed
due to I r a q ' s claim that this country has historically been the part of Basra region under Ottoman
rule. Iraq did not forego its claim over Kuwait in exchange for massive Kuwaiti financial support
d u r i n g the Iran-Iraq War. Nor has it done so until now despite being battered in the Persian Gulf
W a r . The official map of Iraq shows Kuwait as its 17th province and there have been repeated
Iraqi incursions in the Kuwaiti territory in scant disregard to the latest demarcation of IraqiKuwait boundaruies by the UN Boundary demarcation Commission.
Barely a week after the independence of Kuwait, Iraq began c o n t e m p l a t i n g the takeover
of the w h o l e country through the use of force. It had also begun a m a s s i n g troops on the
international borders(18). H o w e v e r , theBritish and Saudi threats to resort to force to protect
the i n d e p e n d e n c e of Kuwait prevailed upon Iraq to drop the idea.
B e f o r e invading Kuwait on A u g . 2, 1990, Iraq might have made little e f f o r t s to regain
Kuwait, but it continued to eye Bubiyan and Warbah.On times, it p r o p o s e d to relinquish its
claim on the whole of Kuwait if the latter returned the two Islands, even on lease.
Bubiyan and W a r b a h are close to the junction of Kuwait and Iraq.Bubiyan lies within
one mile of Kuwait shore and within five miles of Iraq's. W a r b a h is approximately two miles
f r o m the Kuwaiti shore and less than a mile away from Iraq. The two islands are strategically
vital to the disputants. T h e y c o m m a n d a narrow strip of water w h i c h the Iraqi ships must pass
through to arrive at the port of U m m - i - Q a s r . They contain huge deposits of oil. And I r a q ' s
control over them would extend its Maritime boundaries to a far larger area of the Gulf sea-bead
underneath which lies oil in abundance.
Iraq has stuck to coercive diplomacy on the islands issue. It occupied the island twice
in 1970-71 and built a road through the Kuwaiti dessert territory of the Persian Gulf in 1972
and made limited military forays in 1977. Kuwaiti sovereignty over the two island is recognized
under a bilateral agreement with Ottoman empire in 1932, w h e r e b y Iraq accepted K u w a i t ' s
suzerainty over them.
A m i d military hiatus in early 70s, there also came a phase w h e n the two countries tried
to settle the issue amicably. In the mid-70s , Saudi Arabia mediated to w o r k out a mutually
agreeable solution. The settlement of this crisis came in sight when the A r a b states exerted
pressure on Kuwait to lease half of the Bubiyan to Iraq and withdraw its claim over W a r b a h .
H o w e v e r , Kuwaiti g o v e r n m e n t ' s opposiiton to this plan eluded the solution. Kuwait was agreed
to lease both of the islands to Iraq for ninety nine vears(19).
T H E OMAN-UAE DISPUTE:
The dispute between Oman and the UAE is on a 10 mile long coastal strip along the
borders. The border between the U A E and Oman in the Al-Khaki region are still undemarcated
and, t h e r e f o r e , contain the seeds of the eruption of a dispute in future(20).
Oman dates its sovereignty over the coastal strip back to mid 19th century saying that
it has traditionally been used by one of its tribes as grazing land. The dispute over the area in
question erupted w h e n the oil was discovered there. The UAE started oil explorartion in the area
in 1974 which w h i c h Oman opposed by claiming the region as its territory. In 1977, oil was for
the first time extracted off shore in the area(21). Kuwait ignited the dispute further by
helpingRas-al-Khaima establish an oil refinery in the disputed area.Oman demands a land
corridor connection between its mainland and Musandam Peninsula throughAl Fujairah and
S h a r j a h (22)
DISPUTES A M O N G THE UAE SHEIKHDOMS :
Disputes within the UAE, which is a single politcal unit, bear all the characteristics of
the ones between t w o or more states (23). The seven S h e i k h d o m s which constitute the U A E are
tied up in a lose c o n f e d e r a t i o n with each of them maintaining a sort of soverignty over its
b o u n d a r i e s . There lacks a central authority to decide about the boundary disputes and
d e m a r c a t e the b o u n d a r i e s among themselves. The m e m b e r - S h e i k h d o m s have entered into
boundary d e m a r c a t i o n treaties with other states of the region in sovereign capacity.
The dispute b e t w e e n Sharjah and Dubai is over a portion of land situated five km inside the
l a t t e r ' s territory w h e r e S h a r j a h has constructed a large shopping and business center there. This
conflict reached alarming proportions in the late 70s, and an armed conflict looked, even the
breakup of the c o n f e d e r a t i o n , inevitable. T h i s crisis was averted due to President Sheikh
Z i y a d ' s intervention who managed to persuade the disputants to refer the case to a panel of
European
lawyers.
The M u s a n d a n peninsula is another disputed territory, involving Ummal Qaiwain and
Fujairah as well as the UAE as a w h o l e and Oman, the most peculiar of existing b o r d e r conflicts
in the world. A valley dividing Ras-Al-Khaima and Saharjah is also a under dispute between
them. T h e disputed territory is reported to have huge deposits of p h o s p h a t e ( 2 4 ) . S h a r j a h and
F u j a i r a h have also fought over the boundary demarcation issue. In one of such battles in 1972
about t w o dozen soldiers from both the sides w e r e killed(25).
THE SAUDI-IRAQ DISPUTE :
T h o u g h far from being finally settled, the Saudi-Iraq boundary disputehas remained
s u b s i d e d due to an agreement reached between the two countries to consider the disputed land
as neutral zone. T h i s agreement was signed by the two governments on July 2 , 1 9 7 5 . However,
the dispute is v u l n e r a b l e to being exploited as a pretext to launch military aggression by one of
them against the other. In other words, the state of political relations b e t w e e n Iraq and Saudi
Arabia shall determine the intensity of this dispute.
DISPUTE OVER T H E BURAIMI OASIS :
10
T h e dispute over the Buraimi Oasis is between the UAE and Saudi Arabia on one hand,
and Abu Dhabi and the U A E on the other. The Oasis, divided between Oman and the UAE, is
a few hundred kms inside the southern corner of the Persian Gulf. It consists of nine villages
inhabited by a population of mixed tribal origin. The dispute has arisen due to the absence of
the practice of boundary d e m a r c a t i o n in the past and the changing loyalties of the inhabitants
b e t w e e n the contenders(26).
T h e dispute has been a bone of contention following its increasing strategic importance
in the w a k e of changing political and e c o n o m i c scenario in the region after the First World War.
T h e Buraimi oasis, via W a d i - A l - J a z z i , controls access to the coast of Dhahran and Interim
O m a n , the oasis is also the primary water resource for Abu Dhabi and contains a substantial
deposit of oil. This conflict c a m e to the fore for the first time in 1933 when the Saudi government
a w a r d e d oil concession to A R A M C O in the region lying between the eastern and the western
extents of Abu Dhabi.
Britain which was then representing O m a n ' s and s h e i k h d o m s ' interests challenged the
Saudi authority to grant c o n c e s s i o n , on the basis o f A n g l o - O t t o m a n conventiuon in 1913 and
A n g l o Turkish convention in 1914, which described the territory as the part of Oman and the
Sheikhdoms:
This dispute was almost settlled in 1936 as the parties to the dispute acceded to a
p r o p o s a l by Britain to d e m a r c a t e the oasis among t h e m s e l v e s . H o w e v e r , the outbreak of the
S e c o n d World War prevented a formal agreement to this e f f e c t .
T h e issue w a s raked up again by the Saudi government in 1949 in a note to Britain in
w h i c h " the sovereignty over the greater part of the territory lying b e t w e e n the base of the Qatar
p e n i n s u l a and the South eastern corner of the Persian G u l f w a s claimed(27). The Buraimi
constituted a major portion of the territories claimed by the Saudi g o v e r n m e n t .
T h e oasis was o c c u p i e d by Saudi Arabia in 1952. The British Protectorate also
r e c o g n i z e d the Saudi o c c u p a t i o n so long an agreement could not be reached at between the
disputants. The negotiations b e t w e e n Oman and Saudi Arabia over the Buraimi issue began in
1954. They agreed to hold negotiations in the presence of a third party in Geneva. These talks
took place in in 1955 but n o t h i n g tangible could copme out of it also. T h e failure of Geneva talks
w a s followed by the expulsion of Saudi forces, stationed since 1952, f r o m Buraimi in the same
year. An attempt by the UN in 1953 to resolve the dispute by s e n d i n g a fact-finding mission
under Herbert de Pibbibng also failed(2S).
It was not before the b e g i n n i n g of the 70s did the possibility of settlement arise. In the
first quarter of the 70s the disputants showed the willingness to resolve it through negotiations.
A s a result, Saudi Arabia and the U A E signed a border agreement on July 29, 1974. Under
this agreement :
1) Saudi Arabia renunciated its claim over Buraimi in exchange for a corridor to the Gulf in
K h o r - A l - U d a i d and also a triangular strip of land on Abu D h a b i ' s eastern border near Qatar.
11
2) Rich Zararah (Sabah) oil field was divided between the U A E and Saudi Arabia.
3) Oman was given three and Abu Dhabi six of Buraimi villages (29).
(B) O F F S H O R E D I S P U T E S :
IRAN'S CLAIM O V E R B A H R A I N :
Iran's claim o v e r Bahrain, a group of 33 islands situated between Qatar and Saudi
A r a b i a n coast, (30) dates b a c k to the 19th century. Though the islands did not constitute the
part of the Persian e m p i r e for most of the times, it never recognized Bahrain as a country nor
its
protectorate, the Great Britain (31). However, this conflict too, as did the other ones,
accentuated following the discovery of oil in Bahrain in the 1920s (32).
Iran stakes claim over Bahrain on the basis of the latter h a v i n g been the part of the Persian
empire from a period p r e c e d i n g the advent of Islam in Arabia til the Portuguese occupation of
the island in 1507(33). B a h r a i n was a Portuguese colony far about a perion of hundred years
b e f o r e returning to P e r s i a ' s s o v e r e i g n t y from 1602 to 1782.
Since 1702, Bahrain has been ruled by Arabs and from 1862 by the British power.
However, the Iranian side claims that Britain never established its sovereignty over Bahrain and
in principle recognized Persia as the legitimate sovereign(34).
The Iranian claim is disputed. The treaties signed b e t w e e n Britain and the ruler of
Bahrain refer Bahrain to as an " independent country" with British jurisdiction on its foreign
affairs.
Iran raised the issue f o l l o w i n g the Britain's decision to w i t h d r a w from the Persian Gulf
in 1968. It opposed negotiations a m o n g nine trucial S h e i k h d o m s , w h i c h included Bahrain, for
a confederation. It, instead, d e m a n d e d the return of the island to Iran.
Interestingly, a f t e r the British withdrawal the crisis m a d e a headway towards the
solution against all e x p e c t a t i o n s . During 1968-69, Saudi Arabia used it good offices to convince
Bahrain and Iran to settle the issue peacefully. The S h a h ' s visit to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
b r o k e the
ice, paving the w a y for an a n n o u n c e m e n t by the Shah on Jan. 4, 1969 that "Iran would forgo
its claim over Bahrain if the people of Bahrain do ot want to j o i n my country" .
The two countries also d e c i d e d to refer the issue to the U N . T h e then General Secretary,
U Thant, appointed Vittorio W i n a s Peare Guicciardi, the then D i r e c t o r General of the UN o f f i c e
in Geneva, as his personal representative to head a fact-finding mission. The mission visited
Bahrainbetween March 30 and April 1 8 , 1 9 7 0 . In its report the mission maintained that people
of Bahrain wished for an i n d e p e n d e n t state. Subsequently, the U N passed a resolution on May
11 1970 declaring Bahrain as an independent country. The resolution was accepted by the Shah.
THE IRAN-UAE DISPUTE :
T h e dispute between Iran and the U A E is over Abu Musa and two Tunb islands, lying
m i d w a y between the two countries. This dispute is the result of the overlapping of the territorial
claims (35). Abu Musa is situated at 43 miles from Iran and 35 miles from the coast of S h r a j a h .
T h e greater and lesser T u n b s are situated about 20 miles from the Iranian island of Qeshm(36).
T h e area became a source of potential crisis after the discovery of oil in the Persian Gulf
region. However, until the British withdrawal (by then these islands had become strategically
significant too) the dispute was limited to staking of the claims and counter claims. The
dispute virtually started in 1969 when Iran objected to the granting of oil concession to
Occidental P e t r o l e u m ' in Abu Musa and an area three miles u n d e r the its territorial sea limits
by U m m - A l Qaiwain on Nov. 16,1969. Sharjah followed the suit by granting concession on Dec.
20, 1969 to 'Butte Gas and Oil' in the island and on its territorial w a t e r s . Sharjah also extended
its sovereignty over Abu Musa by a royal decree, dated Sept. 19, 1969.
T h e islands are vital for Iran and the U A E for d i f f e r e n t reasons.These are important to
the UAE as they contain vast deposits of oil. For Iran the islands are important from political
and security point of views than the economic. Iran p o s s e s s e s enough oil reservoirs to be allured
by the oil underneath the islands. But a physical control over them can immensely reinforce
I r a n ' s position in the Strait of Hurmuz. T h o u g h the importance of the islands to Iran has not
receded as such with the passage of time, it was certainly greater on the eve of the British
pullout, w h i c h provided Iran an opportunity to indulge in a m u s c l e - f l e x i n g exercise by virtue
of its geographical, military and demographic p r e p o n d e r a n c e over the Arab Sheikhdoms
awaiting independence.
Iran occupied the islands on Nov. 30 1971, a day b e f o r e the British withdrawal.
E n c o u r a g e d in part by Britain's reluctance to restore the islands to their rightful owner and in
part by the U A E ' s helplessness, the Shah was able to negotiate a favorable agreement with the
latter.According to this agreement, the U A E recognised I r a n ' s military control over the
islands(37).
H o w e v e r , the agreement, which is still relevant, is not the final settlement as both Iran
and the U A E regard it a temporary measure and each of the two, as a matter of principle,
considers them an integral part of their territories. A M e m o r a n d u m of Understanding signed
b e t w e e n the two countries two days after the Iranian occupation read "neither Iran nor S h a r j a h
will give up its claim to A b u Musa nor recognize the other p a r t y ' s claim"(38).
T h e Islamic regime did not abandon the S h a h ' s occupation of the islands, instead decided
to retain it which was a manifestation, as an observer views, of continuing with the S h a h ' s
national security policy in connection to the islands (39).
THE OMAN-IRAN DISPUTE:
T h i s dispute now stands settled. The area under question w a s a narrow strip of water,
21 nautical miles wide between Iranian islands of Jazirat Larak and the Omani islet of great
Qioin(40). Of 21 nautical miles of this w a t e r w a y , a 6 nautical mile stretch falls under the
territorial jurisdiction of both the countries.
13
Iran and Oman signed a treaty on July 25, 1974 which divided the common boundaries
into respective territorial waters on the Thalweg p r i n c i p l e . H o w e v e r , even then some points of
d e m a r c a t i o n do not strictly conform to this principle. For i n s t a n c e , the 21st demarcation point
is 4.40 nautical miles closer to Oman than Iran.
T h e full-fledged demarcation of the o f f s h o r e b o u n d a r i e s between these countries is also
subjected to the delimitation of the offshore boundaries b e t w e e n Oman and Ras-Al Khaymah
as well as between Oman and Sharjah.
T h e absence of delimitation of boundaries between O m a n and the two UAE Sheikhdoms
carries a threat that any concession by the f o r m e r to the latter t w o in delineating their o f f s h o r e
b o u n d a r i e s shall tamper with the Oman-Iran agreement of 1974.
THE DISPUTE BETWEEN KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA:
T h e dispute between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait is r e g a r d i n g the neutral zone w h i c h
consists of small islands of Umma-Al Maradim and Qaru in the upper part of the Persian Gulf.
These islands A R E S I T U A T E D 16 and 25 miles off the costs of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
respectively.
T h e dispute over the two islands started over the g r a n t i n g of the oil rights when the oil
w a s discovered in the region. However, a settlement, t h o u g h temporary, prevented the
escalation of the dispute. The two countries under the treaty of Uqair of 1922 decided to
consider the islands as 'neutral z o n e ' . Since then the dispute is limited to the difference of
interpretations over the t e r m s and conditions of the ' w o u l d be final settlement'.
Kuwait w a n t s to regain its sovereignty over the islands w h i l e Saudi Arabia has proposed
for co-sovereignty, m e a n i n g the partition of the neutral zone by half between them.
Although a p e r m a n e n t solution remains elusive since 1922, the issue has never escalated
into a serious political or military crisis(41).
THE BAHRAIN-QATAR DISPUTE :
T h e dispute b e t w e e n Bahrain and Qatar is over the H o w e r islands. Sixteen in number,
H o w e r being the largest of them, these islands are b a r r e n . L o c a t e d over the village of Zubarah
of Qatar in the Bay of Salwa in the south-east corner of the Persian Gulf, Hower islands are
scantly one mile off from the Qatar peninsula from where it can be reached by foot at low tide.
B a h r a i n ' s claim over the islands is based on it being the traditional home to the ruling family.
In the w a k e of the dwindling oil resources in Bahrain and Qatar, the Hower islands aire
increasingly b e c o m i n g vital for the two countries because of vast reservoir of oil these
possess(42).
H o w e v e r , the dispute has so far not turned into a major political, diplomatic or military
hiatus between the two countries. It is, rather, confined to occasional reiteration of claim over
the islands by each party, and accusing the other of conducting military m a n e u v e r s (43).
T H E SAUDI ARABIA-IRAN DISPUTE :
T h e Saudi Arabia-Iran dispute was over Al-Arbiyah and A1 Farsiyeh islands and the area
b e t w e e n the two islands. The two countries resolved the issue in 1968. Under an agreement,
the boundaries were divided into three main segments. The median line between the opposite
coasts constituted the boundaries in the southern segment. Saudi Arabia retained rights over
A l - A r b i y a h and Iran over A1 Farsiyeh (44). The median line principle is also applied in the
d e m a r c a t i o n of boundaries in the northern segment with the island of Kharag placed under
Iranian jurisdiction on the condition that the non-oil deposits will be shared by Iran with Saudi
Arabia(45).
T H E IRAN-KUWAIT DISPUTE :
T h e dispute between Iran and Kuwait pertains to the delimitation of bouridary in the
u p p e r part of the Persian Gulf waters. T h e y have failed to resolve it through negotiations.
Instead, by granting oil concessions and carrying out other activities in the region in question
both Iran and Kuwait have maintained a s e m b l a n c e of control over the upper Gulf.
A l s o , Kuwait has refused to recognize I r a n ' s sovereignty over the Kharag island, 209
miles off the Kuwaiti mainland. Iran dismisses Kuwaiti sovereignty over the Faylakh island, 15
miles from the Iranian mainland.
T H E IRAN -QATAR DISPUTE :
A c c o r d i n g to a bilateral agreement signed on Sept. 20, 1969, Iran and Qatar have
d e m a r c a t e d their o f f s h o r e boundaries " in accordance with international Law and the Law of
s o v e r e i g n t y " . The two countries,however, have yet not decided about the status of a number
of islands lying on the either side of the boundary delimitation mark. Beside this, the northern
terminal point is still undemarcated, p e n d i n g the delimitation of Qatar-Bubiyan offshore
boundaries.
SAUDI ARAB-OMAN :
Saudi Arab and Oman extend conflicting claims over the water w h o l e of the Umm
Z a m m u l and the s u r r o u n d i n g territory in the u n d e m a r c a t e d border area covering the northwest
riches of the Rub-Al Khali region.
IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICTS
T h e Persian Gulf region is the hotbed of a variety of ideologicalconflicts. These range
f r o m the geo-cultural ones, such as Persianism vs. Arabism, to the one between an indigenous
and the alien ideologies, such as L-^ft Radicalism vs. Arab Conservatism, to intra ideological
ones, such as Sheism vs. Sunnism or Radical Islamvs. Conservative, or Puritanical, Islam.
PERSIANISM VERSUS ARABISM :
Separated by the Persian Gulf waters, Iran and the Arab countries represent Persian and
15
Arab.
ideologies respectively. Each of the two ideologies d e n o t e s to a distinct language,
culture and ethnicity.
Even Islam, the c o m m o n religion of the peoples on both sides, has failed to blur the
d i f f e r e n c e s and animosity b e t w e e n these two ideologies. In fact, Persia was the only defeated
p o w e r which did not give up its pre-Islamic cultural ethos and the tradtional language for the
o n e s represented by the c o n q u e r i n g Islamic forces from the A r a b region. This happened despite
the fact that the people of Persia embraced Islam in o v e r w h e l m i n g n u m b e r , and a large majority
of them willingly.
Newly converted M u s l i m s of Persia saw to it that they retained their language and culture
by reducing the sphere of A r a b i c language and Islam to religious aspects of their lives only (46).
T h e Arab Muslims and their Iranian counterparts are since then culturally and ethnically
apart(47).
As against the case of Iran, Islamic conquests in Iraq and Syria and Egypt led to the
replacement of the latter's traditional Aramaic and Coptic languages respectively by Arabic.
E v e n Arabic became one of the principle languages beside Greek and Latin, Roman and
B y z a n t i n e empires f o l l o w i n g the Islamic conquests there(48).
The Arab rule in Persia did not, however, last long enough to have been able to replace
an ancient nationalism with A r a b i s m . A f t e r regaining the control f r o m Arabs, The Persian rulers
revived Persian nationalism and thrived on its animosity to A r a b i s m over successive centuries
in order not to let the Islamic concept of transnationalism, based on the unity of ' U m m a h ' (the
M u s l i m community the w o r l d over), under ' K h i l a f a t ' r u l e influence people of Persia.
The geo-political factors have played a significant role in abating the Arab-Persian
rivalry. Each national ideologies grew in different geographical settings, segregated by a fairly
large body of sea water, w i t h well defined political boundaries.
However, the post W o r l d W a r II, rivalry between Iran and A r a b countries are more
territorial than cultural in nature. The Arabism of Nasserite variety in the 60s espoused the
concept Arab as ' O n e N a t i o n ' stretching from Atlantic to the Persian Gulf. The Saddamite
variety espouses revival of the 7th century Arab empire which included t o d a y ' s Iran conquered
in 638 A . D . in the battle of Qadisiya. Saddam described the Iran-Iraq w a r as the replica of the
battle of Qadisiya and p o t r a y e d his country as the defender of A r a b nationalism against the
"Persian racism"(49).
The Shah of Iran in the 70s re-claimed the UAE, Bahrain and parts of Kuwait, Iraq and
Saudi Arabia on the basis of the erstwhile Persian rule of these regions. If the Shah attempted
to establish physical control over A r a b territory, the Islamic g o v e r n m e n t , which repalced the
Shah, is said to have tried to expand the boundaries indirectly,by aspiring for Iran-like
revolutionary changes in the A r a b countries of the Perasian Gulf and subsequently subordinating the new governments to its central authority on the principle of "Islam knows no
boundaries"(50).
16
During the 70s, both Saddam Hussein and the Shah p r o j e c t e d themselves as the mirrorimage of Arab and P e r s i a n heroes, respectively. Saddam portrayed himself as Nebuchadnezzar
and the Shah as Cyrus, the founder of the Persian empire.
However, ideological rivalry between Iran and the Arab countries is not real but has been
evoked to give s u b s t a n c e to the typical 20th century inter-state aspirations for domination,
influnce or national d e f e n s e . That is why when these interests are served in maintaining peaceful
relations, these ideologically antagonistic countries become f r i e n d l y . F o r instance, the Shah
mend ties with the A r a b m o n a r c h i e s and Iraq (with the latter since 1975 by signing Algiers
A g r e e m e n t ) in the 70s.
In other w o r d s , the ideological rivalry has been evoked w h e n the relations between the
two sides have d e t e r i o r a t e d . T h i s has not initiated the deterioration of relations as the case
w o u l d have been.
During the 50s, 60s and much of the 70s, factors other than the Arab-Persian rivalry
d o m i n a t e d the relations b e t w e e n Iran and the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. In the 50s, Iraq
and Iran enjoyed very f r i e n d l y relations by virtue of being the m e m b e r s of C E N T O . S o were the
relations between Iran and the A r a b countries in the 70s,except for a couple of years in the
b e g i n n i n g of that d e c a d e , s t r e n g h t e n d further by their c o m m o n orientation towards the US. Iran
rescinded its claim over Bahrain in 1972. It helped Oman to quell D o h f a r resurgence.Saudi
A r a b i a agreed to take up the responsibility of "policing" the Gulf along with Iran even though
it largely mistrusted and envied the latter. Despite being apprehensive of the S h a h ' s hagemonic
designs, the smaller states looked to it as their protector against the threats from the Soviet
Union and radical Iraq, a c o - A r a b viewed with a lot more skepticism than Iran. Iran was amused
by the imposition of 1973 oil e m b a r g o against the US and other allies of Israel and led the Arab
countries from the front in the subsequent quadrupling of the oil prices.
T h u s the Soviet threat, c o m m o n affinity with the US, threats from radical powers of the
region and the oil took m u c h of the sting out of the ideological rivalry between Arab countries
and Iran in that d e c a d e .
In the 80s, the a d v e n t of Islamic government to power in Iran and its bid to export Islamic
revolution to the A r a b c o u n t r i e s were interpreted by the latter as a manifestation of Persianism,
linking the Iranian d e s i g n s to T e h r a n ' s historical claims over the Arab World.
However, in reality the Persian-Arab ideological rivalry had by and large diminished
after the S h a h ' s d e p a r t u r e . Imam K h o m e i n i ' s rhetorical p r o n o u n c e m e n t s on export of revolution did not smack of territorial expansion. Nor did they a c c o m p a n y the threat of an armed
attack to overthrow m o n a r c h i c a l g o v e r n m e n t s .
The Islamic I r a n ' s policy towards its Arab neighbors d u r i n g the Iran-Iraq War can not
be dubbed as a militant expression of Persianism. If Iraq tried its best to color the war as a rivalry
between A r a b and Persian ideologies, Iran saw to it that Iraq did not succeed in its effort.Iran
described the war as ' J i h a d ' , the term which also applies to the the defeat of Persia at the hands
17
of A r a b s in 638 A . D . T h e portraying of the w a r in terms of A r a b - P e r s i a n rivalry was not in the
interests of Iran as one of its war objectives was to win over the A r a b masses in the name of
Islamic brotherhood so that they could rise in revolt against their own governments in an
expression of religious solidarity with Persian people.
T h e Arab s t a t e s ' support to Iraq stemed from realpolitik than ideological considerations,
such as the espousal of A r a b cause by Baghdad. In such a scenario, the ideologically driven nonbelligerent Arab states would have sought total humiliation of Iran. On the contrary, once the
c h a n c e s of the s p r e a d i n g of the war to their territories receded, they preferred a stalemate
between Iran and Iraq or the end of the war in a draw with both the belligerents returningexhausted
and militarily w e a k . T h e A r a b states also w a n t e d that from the w a r Iraq emerged as a docile and
h u m b l e power, obliged for their financial assistance to it, and not as a military giant turning to
settle its territorial s c o r e s with them. The glorification of Arabism did not certainly call f o r s u c h
a policy.
The Arab states outside the Persian Gulf region did not d e f i n e their positions in the war
on the basis of A r a b - P e r s i a n rivalry. This is illustrated by the fact that barring Egypt and Jordan,
most of the n o n - P e r s i a n Gulf Arab countries, from P D R Y to Algeria, supported the Non-Arab
Iran.
That the Iran-Iraq war was the very epitome of an ideological rivalry is further
invalidated by the fact that a considerable section of the the A r a b population of Iran supported
the country they w e r e the citizens of and thousands of Iranians residing in Arab countries did
not sympathise
with I r a n ' s war. Given a large scale settlements of Arab people in Iran and the Iranians' in Arab
lands, the ethnicity and ideology based support of these peoples to the belligerents must have
cut across the national and regional boundaries.
At present, T h e A r a b - P e r s i a n rivalry is not all that overt in nature. H o w e v e r , It has not
entirely disappeared. The Islamic government has not abandoned Iran's historical claims over
A r a b territories, as borne out by the raking up of the Abu Musa and T u n b s issue by it with the
U A E in mid-1992. On quite a few occasions, the Iranian clerics have claimed to be the spiritual
leader of the p e o p l e of Bahrain and the UAE as well as the people of Iranian origin live in these
countries. This can hasten one to conclude that the Persianism in the guise of Islam or the
vice-versa continues to be an important foreign policy agenda of Iran.
T h e controversy over the name of the region is the most vivid example of Arab-Persian
rivalry in the 1990s. T h e Islamic government of Iran is not even ready to name it as 'Islamic
G u l f a proposal that is acceptable to the A r a b states. Whereas, the A r a b governments have
since the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war ceaselessly called it as ' A r a b G u l f in total disregard to
the fact that it has been referred to as 'Persian G u l f in historical and official Arabic language
r e c o r d s ( 5 1 ) . T h e I r a n i a n media refer to the G C C as (P)GCC. It is surprising that the GCC
m e m b e r states have not responded by putting the prefix ' A r a b ' before the word ' G C C .
T h e fact that the A r a b countries and Iran are predominantly peopled by Sunnis and Shias
respectively has created an impression that the Arab-Persian animosity has sectarian connota-
18
tions. This prognosis is a largely untested logic. Going by this logic, the Arab Shias should have
identified themselves with the Persianism practiced by the p e o p l e of the same sect in Iran. So
have done the Iranian Sunnis vis-a-vis the Arabism. In o t h e r w o r d s , the Arab-Persian rivalry can
acquire a sectarian d i m e n s i o n only by repudiating its very basis.
Also, Sheism is not an anti-Arab creed since it was the o f f i c i a l creed of the Persian empire
and later of Iran and the largest concentration of its f o l l o w e r s is in Iran. As a matter of fact,
Sheism took birth in the A r a b land as a result of d i f f e r e n c e s o v e r the sucession after the death
Prophet M o h a m m e d , an A r a b . Needless to say, Hazrat Ali, w h o m the Shias, the word Shia
literally meaning his ' s y m p a t h i z e r s ' , claim as the true s u c c e s s o r of the Prophet and who is held
in the highest esteam a m o n g the revered Islamic figures by t h e m , was also an Arab.
I R A N ' S I S L A M I C R A D I C A L I S M VS. I R A Q ' S B A A T H I S T R A D I C A L I S M :
This ideological conflict has a definite geographical c h a r a c t e r being confined to Iran and
Iraq only. Iran is the only proponent of the radical Islam in the Persian Gulf and none other than
Iraq practices Baathism in that region.
As Iran has a c q u i r e d the reputation of an Islamic state and Iraq as the only follower of
Baathism, roughly the A r a b replica of Socialism if not exactly the Marxism Leninism, this rivalry
is principally the one b e t w e e n a religious idelogy and a secular one. Yet, when the Baathism
c o n f r o n t s the Iranian I s l a m i s m , it too takes recourse in Islam. T h e Arab ethnicity of the prophet,
the revelation of the Holy Quran in Arabic, a recognition to this l a n g u a g e ' s superiority over the
non-Arab languages, and the introduction of Islam in the A r a b region so that the brave,
adventurous and e n l i g h t e n e d A r a b s could spread it all t h o r o u g h the world are used by Iraq as
A r a b challenge to I r a n ' s self-proclaimed role of the c h a m p i o n of Islamic cause in the 20th
century.
The very s e c u l a r nature of Baathist doctrine comes in the handy for Iran to dub Iraq's
ruling regime as " i n f i d e l " . Iran is doubly compelled to launch religious propaganda against Iraq
as it c o n f o r m s to its b r o a d e r s t r a t e g y of instigating the Sunnis, beside the the Shia population,
of Iraq against S a d d a m regime.
It is not p o s s i b l e to dissociate this stream of idelogical rivalry from the Iran-Iraq War
and the historical a n t a g o n i s m between the two states. Had there b e e n no war between them, they
would have cshed in on their rivalry in their quest for regional d o m i n a n c e , in interfering in each
o t h e r ' s internal a f f a i r s particularly in the context of Kurdish rebellion, which has been
spearheaded by both the secular and the Islamic groups in Iraq as well as in Iran, and in
legitimizing their respective stands on the boundary disputes.
This ideological rivalry has not always been incompatible. This is borne out by the fact
that the Baathist g o v e r n m e n t of Iraq granted fifteen years a s y l u m to Imam Khomeini, more so
it extended support to his struggle against the Shah and o f f e r e d him to use Shie religious
centers, Najaf and Karbala, in Iraq as the base for the same. H o w e v e r , it can not be denied that
the Baathist support to Imam K h o m e i n i ' s Islamic struggle s t e m m e d from " e n e m y ' s enemy is
friend" logic than from any ideological solidarity.
19
But, the Baathist support to Islamic struggle in the pre r e v o l u t i o n days points to the fact
that the Baathist-Islamic radicalism rivalry can at times be s u b o r d i n a t e d to the existing patterns
of inter-state relations and internal (both in Iran and Iraq) and external environment.
This is further reinforced by the fact notwithstanding the conflicting nature of two
doctrines, Iran avoided d e m e a n i n g the Baathism as a w h o l e so as not to displease the war ally,
Syria, the other Baathist state in the Arab world. Interestingly, In its defamation campaign
against Iraq, Iran has targeted the ruling regime of Iraq more than the Baathism.
I S L A M I C R A D I C A L I S M VS. I S L A M I C C O N S E R V A T I S M :
This conflict is of Immense academic interests as it centers around the issues concerning
Islamic state and g o v e r n m e n t , political rights of people under Islam, mode of political change,
and the Islamic
economy.
Iran's Islamic radicalism quotes from the Holy Quran and other Islamic sources to dub
the Arab monarchies as " u n - I s l a m i c " and prove that Islam p r o v u i d e s for a government by a'
religious personality " a b l e to rule" and "supported by the p e o p l e " (52).
The Persian Gulf monarchies maintain that the Holy Q u r a n ' s concept of state calls for
the establishment of a " w e l f a r e state" and not a particular f o r m of government or state.
Islamic radicalism of Iran exhorts people to uproot an u n p o p u l a r government as this is
their Islamic duty w h i l e the Arab conservatism quotes Q u r a n i c verses, asking the people to
remain faithful to their country and government.
Islamic radicalism of Iran highlights people's right u n d e r Islam to participate in the
public affairs while the A r a b conservatism considers people rights are confined to being
properly looked a f t e r by their government and provided basic necessities of life.
similarly, the I r a n ' s Islamic radicalism is for equal distribution of state's resources
income among people and describes the government as c u s t o d i a n of these resources while
Islamic conser\'atism of the Arab countries interprets that the s t a t e ' s total control over
means of economic p r o d u c t i o n is the logical extension of the g o v e r n m e n t ' s right to act as
custodian.
and
the
the
the
Taking a leaf f r o m Islamic principles, the Iranian g o v e r n m e n t describes the conservative
regimes as "un-Islamic' because of these being unpopular and ruled by non-religious personalities, deriving the source of their power from the tribal setup than from the people as single unit
of the political system.
As against this, the A r a b regimes accuse the Iranian g o v e r n m e n t of being sectarian and
racial, aiming at creating a w e d g e within the Islamic community of the world, creating instability
in neighboring Muslim countries, and involved in a large-scale oppression of people of Islamic
20
subsects other that the Shia and Non-Muslim minorities inside the country.
Interestingly, the two ideologies bear a few similarities too. For instance, both the
ideologies do not support Westminster model of d e m o c r a c y . Nor do they maintain that the
Quranic concept of an able and popular government necessitates periodical elections (53), the
party system and a constitutionally recognized opposition.
On the question of rights o f w o m e n , n o n - M u s l i m s and aliens, the two camps practice the
policy of " d e n i a l " in violation of the Islamic principles in this regard.
This ideological conflict veers around political and to a limited extent social and
economic issues. The Shia-Sunni differences over ' F i q h ' (Islamic jurisprudence), such as the
interpretation of the Quran and the Sunnah or the p e r f o r m i n g and the timing of prayers, have
not cropped up.
T h i s conflict is a ideological conflict in the true sense of the term and not an inter-state
rivalry in the guise of an ideological conflict: A l t h o u g h it is widely held in the case of Iran that
behind the veneer of " e x p o r t of ideology", there lies inherent its territorial ambitions in the
region.
T h i s perception can be discounted on the ground that I r a n ' s high profile campaign for
"export of ideology", aiming at overthrowing the u n - I s l a m i c governments, is not matched by
its little role in f o m e n t i n g , sponsoring and sustaining the rebel forces, many of w h o m are also
inspired by the Islamic revolution, in the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. U n d e r g o i n g a
process of political chaos and instability soon after c o m i n g to the power and later entangled in
a war with Iraq, the Iranian government was hardly in a position to and capable of doing
so.Thus, it deliberately limited its campaign to a great deal to rhetorics only in the hope that
the Arab people on their own would succeed in toppling the monarchical g o v e r n m e n t s . O n l y in
a few cases, such as in 1980 coup attempt in Bahrain and strikes in Shia-dominated areas of
Saudi A r a b i a and Kuwait in the aftermath of the s u c e s s of the Islamic revolution, could the
Iranian i n v o l v e m e n t , that too latent, be established.
A f u l l - b l o o d e d Iranian involvement would have resulted into the eruption of a large scale
rebellion spreaded all through the region, instead of the stray cases of politically motivated
violence c o n f i n e d to a few countries and few places in the each of them.
T h r o u g h o u t the war, Iran relentlessly propagated for the export of revolution through
press, broadcasts, and speeches of clerics and other leaders (54). But on the other hand it
refrained from e x p a n d i n g the war to the non-belligerent Persian Gulf countries even w h e n
provoked by Iraq to do so. Iran even decided not to retaliate against the shooting down of its
f o u r a i r c r a f t s by Saudi Arabia in 1984. I t s a t t a c k o n the ships of A r a b countries in 1987 was more
symbolic than real. This proves that Iran's rehetorics about the export of revolution w a s not
matched by an aggeressive stand agaisnt the Arab allies of Iraq in the region.
A f t e r the end of the Iran-Iraq War, particularly in the 1990s, the relations between Iran
and its c o n s e r v a t i v e neighbors have improved with Iran having almost abandoned its export of
21
revolution policy.
Principally, Iran still regards the conservative socio-political system of the Arab Gulf
states as un-Islamic but does not give vent to its feeling through radio broadcasts or in policy
p r o n o u n c e m e n t s . In this decade the most contentious aspect of the ideological rivalry between
Iran and the Persian Gulf monarchies is the issue of the status of Mecca and Madina, where the
two holiest of Islamic shrines are situated.
Considering the twin cities as b e l o n g i n g to the Muslim the World over, Iran refuses to
r e c o g n i z e Saudi sovereignty over them. It has urged the Saudi government to hand the
administration of the shrines to a confederation of all the Muslim states. Iran also has the desire
to keep the ideological conflict alive, not with a view to antagonise the Arab neighbors but
public consumption and to retain its claim as the only Islamic state in the world.
A R A B R A D I C A L I S M VS. A R A B C O N S E R V A T I S M :
Iraq and South Yemen represent the A r a b radicalism and the monarchical A r a b governments of the Saudi peninsula the Arab conservativism. Form South Y e m e n ' s side, this dispute
r e f l e c t e d in its opposition to the independence of trucial states after the British withdrawal and
their m e m b e r s h i p to the A r a b League. It also got manifesated in South Y a m e n ' s military and
financial support to the D o h f a r rebellion in Oman.
South Y e m e n pursued its boundary disputes with O m a n and
of i d e o l o g i c a l r i v a l r y i n s t e a d of a d o p t i n g m i l i t a r y p o s t u r e s
c o n f r o n t a t i o n . T h i s is why it never asked for Soviet U n i o n ' s help,
l a t t e r ' s military presence on its ports, with a view to establish its
regions.
Saudi Arabia in the cloak
or i n d u l g i n g in direct
available in the form the
control over the disputed
Beside giving unflinching support to the Dohfar rebellion, spearheaded by the 'Popular
Front for Liberation of Oman (PFLO), later named as the ' P o p u l a r Front for the Liberation of
Occupied G u l f ( P F L O G ) , the National Front government of South Y e m e n described the D o h f a r
m o v e m e n t as the extension of its revolutionary struggle in the Persian Gulf.
However, f o l l o w i n g the suppression of the Dohfar movement in 1975, South Yemen
deviated from its radicalism in favor of entering into formal relations with the monarchical
g o v e r n m e n t s . Saudi Arabia-South Yemen diplomatic relations were established in 1976. In the
late 70s, South Y e m e n established diplomatic relations with Qatar and Bahrain and in 1982 with
O m a n too. With Kuwait and the UAE, which had diplomatic ties with South Y e m e n since late
60s and the early 70s respectively, South Y a m e n closed ranks on political and e c o n o m i c fronts
(55). T h e s e two countries became A d e n ' s largest trading patterns and principal aid givers in the
Persian Gulf region.
In fact, B e f o r e 1975, the Arab-Israeli War and the oil embargo had paved the way for
r a p p r o c h e m e n t between South Yemen and the Gulf kingdoms. But this was overshadowed by
Y e m e n ' s total support to the Dohfar movement. The defeat of the movement let pragmatism
take
22
p r e c e d e n c e over ideology. South Yemen found the conservative regimes as a source of
e c o n o m i c aid and diplomatic entree in the Persian Gulf politics.
T h e radical threat to the Arab neighbors from the Baathist Iraq always persisted in some
form or other but remained subsided in the two decades preceeding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
in 1990. Both the rivals used to verbally criticize each o t h e r ' s ideology but neither did Iraq
resort to helping radical forces within the monarchical states nor did the monarchical governments utilize their financial clout to help the Kurdish rebellion inside Iraq.
In fact, the conservative states w e r e more concerned at the dangers of Iraqi expansionism, basically a Pre-Baathist characteristic, than at an covert or overt attempt on I r a q ' s part to
create internal instability (56). The incidences of I r a q ' s direct military actions against neighbor
A r a b s are far more than those of supporting leftist m o v e m e n t s or rebellion in these countries.
T h i s proves that Iraqi military invasions or threats were based on the objectives other
than the ideological ones. These objectives can be summarized as the control over oil resources
and the expansion of national frontiers by Iraq. Otherwise, had the occupation of Kuwait had
an ideological connotation only, Saddam Hussein would have pulled his forces out of it after
installing a pro-Iraq democratic government instead of annexing it.
T h e Geo-strategic dimension, bereft of any ideological flavor, of Iraqi confrontation
with the Arab states is f u r t h e r highlighted by the contrast in Iraqi objectives of attacking Iran
in 1980 and Kuwait ten years later. The nature of Iraqi attack against Iran, particularly the
d e p l o y m e n t of force and the limited number of battalions used in initial days, show that Iraq's
main aim was not to occupy Iran but to create political chaos, leading to the removal of the
Islamic government.
Even Iraq did not officially announce the annexing of the Iranian territories it conquered
during the war, although liberation of the Khuzestan, peopled by Arabs and claimed to be the
part of Iraq under T u r k i s h rule, was one of B a g h d a d ' s official war objectives.
On a number of occasions the relations between the Iraq and its A r a b neighbors were deideologised. The relations in the 70s can be described as friendly and in the 80s as very close.
T h e r e w e r e irritants and constraints but none amounted to the deterioration in the relations.
Commonalty of interests, including the realisation fact that they belong to the same
ideological camp in Arabi-Iran rivalry, overcame the ideological constraints in the bilateral
relations. Iraq was courted by the conservative states to contain the Shah in the same way as
the latter was used to c h e c k m a t e the Baathist threat.
On the Arab-Israeli issue and that of the oil embargo, Iraq joined hands with the
conservative regimes and after the E g y p t ' s ouster f r o m the A r a b fold, Iraq tired to win over
these regimes to prop it up as the new leader of the A r a b world.
T h e Islamic revolution and the outbreaking of the Iran-Iraq W a r followed in quick
s u c c e s s i o n . The threat these events posed to Iraq as well its Arab neighbors brought them
E3
closer, with the conservative states p r o v i d i n g financial support to Iraq to the tune of $50 billion
and
B a g h d a d claiming to have fought the war on behalf of all the A r a b countries of the region.
The relations between Iraq and the conservative Arab states since the f o r m e r ' s invasion
of Kuwait remain severed and soured. As a result, the ideological rivalry has again cropped up,
but in a changed form if not the substance.
Saddam H u s s e i n ' s tirade against monarchical governments is now more on Islamic lines
than the Baathist. However, it w o u l d be too early to presume that S a d d a m Huseein has finally
24
shunned the Baathism at least in the sphere of his relations w i t h the neighbor Arabs. But what
can be said with a m e a s u r e of authority that at present the ideological rivalry is a reminiscent
of the 1980s' I s l a m i c c o n s e r v a t i s m vs. Islamic radicalism b e t w e e n Arab states and Iran and not
a reflection of the Iraqi radicalism vs. Arab conservatism.
DYNASTIC RIVALRY
The Persian Gulf is the arena of another form of c o n f l i c t also, that is among the rulers
of Arabian peninsula. T h i s conflict lacks the "personality c u l t " as is found in the one between
Hafiz-Al-Assad and S a d d a m Hussein. Rather it is a continuation of age-old dynastic rivalries.
The conflict over the Buraimi Oasis between Saudi A r a b i a and Oman is inter-linked with
the dynastic rivalry b e t w e e n the rulers of the two countries. For King Fahad the oasis is the
matter of ancestral p r i d e . For Sheikh Ziyad it is the symbol of pride too as it has been his
ancestral home and the place where he spent his formative years.
In the case of S h e i k h Ziyad of Abu Dhabi and Sheikh Rasheed of Dubai,the dynastic
conflict between t h e m revolvs around the issue of the respective claims to the post of the head
of the state of the U A E . Z i y a d extended his claim for and s e c u r e d the top slot on the ground
the Rashid's family o c c u p i e d second position in the tribal hierarchy before it moved out from
Abu Dhabi for Dubai and settled there in the early 19th century. Sheikh Saqar bridles at being
contended with a l o w e r niche in comparison to the rulers of A b u Dhabi and Dubai.
Both Qatar and B a h r a i n opted out from the n e g o t i a t i o n s on the proposed federation of
nine trucial states at the eve of the British withdrawal mainly b e c a u s e Al-Khalifa of Bahrain and
al Thani of Qatar w e r e not prepared for a position lower in rank to that of the other o n e ' s in
the power a r r a n g e m e n t .
C A U S E S OF C O N F L I C T S IN T H E P E R S I A N G U L F
The causes of the v a r i o u s conflicts in the Persian Gulf are rooted in the history, politics
and geo-strategy of the r e g i o n .
HISTORY:
History, both distant and the recent, is described as the m a j o r source of the outbreak and.
continuance of both ideological and territorial conflicts in the region.
The b o u n d a r i e s of present states have always been in a state of flux in the past, hence
overlapping claims over a particular portion of land and islands by two countriers and in some
cases more than that. T h e Ottoman empire stretched, in the Persian Gulf region, over t o d a y ' s
Kuwait, parts of Iraq and Iran. The Persian empire, which Iran represents, included the UAE,
Bahrain and a n u m b e r of islands presently under K u w a i t ' s and Saudi A r a b i a ' s control. As a
result, Iraq extends its c l a i m s over both Kuwait and the areas adjacent to the S h a t t ' s estuary.
25
Iran, on the other hand, j u s t i f i e s its claim over the U A E and Bahrain.
T h e territorial disputes in the region are the continuation of those existing since long.
T h e Shalt dispute, f o u g h t over by the Ottoman and Persian e m p i r e s over hundreds of years, is
the most notable a m o n g these.
Changing loyalties of the people of the disputed area f r o m one disputant state to another
and the human o c c u p a t i o n in an area shifting from the people of one ethnicity in a particular
period to the p e o p l e of some other ethnicity in the other periods have given birth to
contentious claims.
Came the E u r o p e a n powers and they divided the region in "spheres of influence" in total
disregard to the historical, ethnic and geographic realities(57). These "spheres of influence"
emerged as s o v e r i g n states after the British withdrawal. But the withdrawal alsoled the mother
countries to revive their claims on these newly independent states as these happened to be the
part of their historical boundaries.
TERRITORIAL NATIONALISM :
One of the n e g a t i v e e f f e c t s of the A r a b s ' contact with the E u r o p e a n powers has been the
inculcation of a s t r o n g sense of territorial nationalism a m o n g the former. In the pre-colonial
days, this practice w a s limited to Ottoman and Persian empires. T h e Saudi peninsula was by and
large ignorant of territorial nationalism of the western kind. But the growing consciousness of
statehood has interlocked the peninsular states into rivalries w h i c h did not exist in the past; for
example, disputes on sovereignty over the continental shelf bed and territorial water. The
national consciousness prevented the small Sheikhdoms from coalescing into a single political
unit and even e n s u e d conflicts a m o n g various constituents of a state, for instance, the UAE.
POLITICAL SYSTEM :
Since most of the regional countries are not d e m o c r a c i e s , people, the media, interest
g r o u p s and armed f o r c e s do not keep a check on their g o v e r n m e n t ' s territorial designs(58). It
is not to deny that the b o u n d a r y disputes do not exist b e t w e e n two democracies, but the
possibility of the f l a r i n g up of these disputes into full-fledged conflicts is remote in the case of
two democracies.
In fact, the non democratic countries have glorified wars to establish political legitimacy.
In some cases the ruling regimes have deliberately stayed away f r o m finding a peaceful solution
to the their d i s p u t e s out of the fear that granting s o m e c o n c e s s i o n s to the opponent power
during
the peace process may lead to a public revolt. This w a s one of the underlying reasons behind
I r a q ' s refusal to pull out of Kuwait when the war with allies and the likely defeat had become
inevitable. A m e e k surrender than a valiant defeat at the hands of a far stronger military power
ran a greater risk.
GEOGRAPHY:
T h e intricate geo-structure of the Persian Gulf region is alone the cause of many a
26
conflict. Iraq would have had hardly any objection to d e m a r c a t e its boundaries with Iran along
the Shatt through the T h a l w e g method had the access of this oil exporting country to the sealanes not passed through the neighbor's side of the T h a l w e g .
Most of the islands in Persian Gulf waters fall within the 12 nautical territorial water
limits of more than one state. Persian Gulf is shallow with its average depth being 40 meters.
Because of these reasons all of the seabed is the continental shelf is subjected, according to the
c o n t e m p o r a r y international law, to economic exploitation by almost all the countries of the
region. T h e width of the Persian Gulf is far less than the prescribed limit of 200 nautical miles.
T h e result : o v e r l a p p i n g of rights over resources u n d e r n e a t h the waters.
T h e western side of the Persian Gulf is more shallow. T h i s results into the formation of
a large n u m b e r of islands that lie within the territorial j u r i s d i c t i o n of the majority of the coastal
states on the w e s t e w r n side and are, therefore, subject to multilateral disputes.
It is relatively deeper on the Iranian side. T h e r e f o r e , there are fewer islands on this side.
This compells Iran to eye on all those islands on the western side coast which fall well within
T e h r a n ' s territorial limits. The problem is further c o m p o u n d e d due to the fact that an island
constitutes the part of land territory of a country, extending, t h e r e b y , its territorial water limits
farther.
T h e T h a l w e g m e t h o d od the settlement of a particualr d i s p u t e does not suit to the Persian
G u l f ' s typical geo-physical conditions. The employing of this method implies physically
dividing a number of islands. Added to this is the problem that from where the medianline be
m e a s u r e d , the coastline of the main territory of a country or the coastline of the islands that that
county
possesses.
T h e oil factor f u r t h e r complicates the issue. T h e parties to a territorial dispute are not
prepared to relinquish their claims overislands f a l l i n g u n d e r t h e i r s o v e r e i g n jurisdiction as these
islands and the seabed over 12 nautical miles all around it contain a large oil reservoirs (Bubiyan,
W a r b a h and H u w a r , Abu Musa and Tunbs) (59).
A c c o r d s pertaining to island disputes do not qualify as ideal and permanent settlemeijts.
There lies inherent the possibility of violation, annulment and v a r y i n g interpretation of these
accords by either of or both the states. Both Iran and the U A E describe Abu Musa and T u n b s
as the integral part of their territories although they have already s i g n e d ah agreement according
to which the f o r m e r e n j o y s military control of them and the later the economic and the
administrative control.
T h e signing of treaties on the Shatt and their a b r o g a t i o n s have followed one after the
other s i n c e the 17th century. A number of agreements on b o u n d a r y disputes are half-baked.
They at best have frozen a dispute for the time being instead of providing a permanent solution
(Saudi A r a b - K u w a i t agreement on Neutral Zone).
27
Y a w n i n g a s y m m e t r i e s in size and military strength between the disputantsis one of the
main causes behind the boundary disputes a s s u m i n g the form of military conflagrations.
Interestingly, the large-sized states'mindset is that they are not prepared to recognize their tiny
neighbors as a state of equal status in the internartional c o m m u n i t y . The military prowess of
these countries i n d u c e s them to undo what they consider an injustice done to them by the British
p o w e r s . T h i s approach underlines I r a q ' s b e h a v i o u r towards Kuwait and that of Iran towards the
U A E or Bahrain.
T h e s t r o n g e r p o w e r s ' urge for regional s u p r e m a c y is the by-product of the abovementioned a s y m m e t r i e s . The Shah occupied the U A E ' s islands knowing that the U A E did not
have the capability to withstand the Iranian assault. The same force worked behind Iraqi designs
in Kuwait. The annexation Kuwait would p r o j e c t Iraq as a formidable land-sea p o w e r vis-a-vis
other A r a b states of the region and Iran w a s an important part of Saddam H u s s e i n ' s over all
strategy behind i n v a d i n g Kuwait.
T h e regional motives, however, have been the source of conflict b e t w e e n the two
symmetrical p o w e r s also. Saudi Arabia and Iran under the Shah, despite maintainig friendly
relations, w e r e reluctent in co-sharing the role of the regional policeman. Saudi Arabia
thoroughly o p p o s e d Iranian intervention in O m a n to suppress the Dohfar m o v e m e n t though it
in itself w a s threatened considerably by the likelihood of D o h f a r s ' victory. Saudi Arabia also
expressed reservations to the American decision to bestowthe responsibility of policing the
Persian Gulf on the Shah.
A replica af Iran-Saudi Arabia relations w a s those between Iraq and Saudi A r a b i a during
the Iran-Iraq W a r . Saudi Arabia never liked the prospects of an outright victory of Iraq. And
one of its objectives to help Iraq financially w a s to neutralize Iraqi claim of d e f e n d i n g
the Arab world all alone.
A m o n g e n e m i e s , Iran and Iraq have competed for this status by containing each o t h e r ' s
influence a m o n g the Arab peninsular countries, through entering an arms race and trying to
o u t m a n e u v e r each other on regional issues
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLICTS
AN OUTGROWTH OF HISTORICAL CONFLICTS :
T h i s p r o g n o s i s , although true to a large extent, needs to be re-examined as histoi-y may
not be the both a factor in all the conflicts and not a factor at all in some specific conflicts.
In most of the cases of territorial disputes in the region the causes of their origin is found
in the history. T h i s approach is wittingly or unwittingly influenced by the historical rights the
disputant states a d v a n c e to the territory in question. For example, the reasons behind these
disputes are generally stated to be the absence of the practice of boundary demarcation, shifting
tribal loyalties and h u m a n migration from and to a disputed area. But these very f a c t o r s at a same
28
time deny the historicity of a dispute due to following reasons.
First, since the boundary d e m a r c a t i o n s were not common in the past and those carried
out by the imperialist powers were arbitrary, the modern nation-states in the Persian gulf are
not the legal and typical case of successor states. Second, if the human migration was a
continuous
p h e n o m e n o n in the past, a portion of land which a state claims on the basis that it w a s the part
of the territory of its mother state during a particular period might have been the part of the
m o t h e r state of the other state d u r i n g s o m e other period (s).
Also, in the past the disputes in the region were tribal not the territorial. The wars in
those days were fought not for the extension of boundaries but for conquering tribe or tribes
by another tribe. The possession of land the defeated tribe inhabited was, therefore, the result
not the f a c t o r behind the outbreak of those w a r s . The territorial jurisdiction of a state were
d e t e r m i n e d by the loyalty it received from tribes. Thus, the territorial boundaries of a state were
not necessarily contiguous as is the case with modern nation states. Thus, the intra-tribal wars
of the old days are not a precursor of present territorial disputes in the Persian Gulf.The only
dispute w h i c h fits into the description of a historical dispute is that over the Shatt between Iran
and Iraq.
M o s t of the territorial disputes in the region are the outcome of the geo-strategic factors.
T h e s e have erupted after the discovery of oil or as a result of eco-strategic requirements of a
20th century nation-state (60), while a dispute of historical magnitude generally happens to be
an ever persisting p h e n o m e n o n . But in the case of the disputes in the Persian Gulf region it seems
that their historical antecedents have been re-discovered by the disputants to give sustenance
to theirclaims. This is further substantiated by the fact that the territories w h i c h are strategically
and economically not important have not been the bone of contention between the two states.
A l t h o u g h in a region u n d e m a r c a t e d in the past, each portion of land can be a subject of dispute.
A s matter of fact, the b o u n d a r y disputes in the region are the product of a recent history,
the unnatural demarcation of the states and carving out of a web of small states on the western
shore of the Persian Gulf by the colonial powers. With tribal loyalties b e i n g the main
determinant
of the territorial boundaries of A r a b peninsular states during the pre-colonial days, some tribes
have not reconciled to the fact that a tribe dominated by it in the past is now the part of another
state f o l l o w i n g the arbitrary d e m a r c a t i o n of the region in the 18th, 19th and the early 20th
centuries. The c o m i n g up of small states on the western shore of the narrow body of Gulf waters
has created the disputes over the demarcation of the territorial water and right over the
continental shelf among themselves and with Iran on the other side.
THE SUPERPOWERS RIVALRY :
Of the Third World conflicts those in the Persian gulf region were hardly an extension
of s u p e r p o w e r s rivalry. All the disputes preceded superpowers rivalry in general and their
rivalry in the Persian Gulf, which started after the British withdrawal except in I r a n ' s case, in
particular.
29
These are local in nature and they had not involved the s u p e r p o w e r s on the opposite
sides. All the conflicts in the A r a b Peninsula are between the countries which belong to the US
bloc. Thus the US practiced neutrality and either of the disputant sides did not generally seek
Soviet support, leaving, t h e r e f o r e , a little room for the s u p e r p o w e r s ' involvement.
The dispute b e t w e e n Iraq and Kuwait, the one involving the countries of opposite global
p o w e r blocs was a l o w - p r o f i l e dispute when the cold warwas in its hey day. Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait took place w h e n the Soviet Union had almost retired f r o m global politics. Although the
w a r between Iraq and Iran w a s fought when the New cold war w a s in full swing, but partly due
to I r a n ' s antagonism vis - a - v i s the s u p e r p o w e r s and partly due to the fact that the threat of Iran
emerging, if it h a p p e n e d to win the war, into a regional power independent of supoerpowers
domination,the two s u p e r p o w e r s sided with Iraq.
The US has not s h o w n any interests in resolving the boundary disputes among its allies.
It did not consider these disputes detrimental to its policy of containment of the Soviet Union
as the chances of either of the parties to the dispute turning to the Soviet Union for support were
almost unlikely.
The role of the s u p e r p o w e r s in the conflict prevention has been negligible. They did not
make any endeavor jointly or separately to resolve any of these imbroglios, except once while
cooperating to assure the a d o p t i n g of the Security Council Resolution 5 9 8 which turned out to
be the basis of the end of the Iran-Iraq War. But, the acceptance of the resoltuion 598 by Iran
w a s an independent decision and not a result of any external pressure. In the termination of the
Iran-Iraq war, t h e r e f o r e , the role of the superpowers w a s confined to facilitating the adopting
of the resoltuion 5 9 8 .
The superpowers did play the role of the conflict-manager directly as well as indirectly.
C o m m o n bond with the US restrain the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf from escalating their
boundary disputes. Both the s u p e r p o w e r s perceived the regional c o n f l i c t s as issues of local
significance, therefore r e f r a i n e d from using these in their global confrontation. This way they
prevented the internationalization of these conflicts (61).
LARGELY NON-VIOLENT :
Majority of the c o n f l i c t s in the Persian Gulf have been non-violent. Only four of them
viz., the Iranian o c c u p a t i o n of A b u Musa and Tunbs, the Iran-Iraq dispute over the Shatt in the
70s, the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Persian Gulf War fall
in the category of violent disputes.
The territorial dispute, in particular, has strictly been a diplomatic duel, with a few of
them occasionally escalating into border skirmishes such as the one between Oman and Saudi
A r a b i a in 1955, Iran and Iraq d u r i n g the 70s over the Shatt and Saudi Arabia and Qatar in
S e p t e m b e r 1992.
T h e Iran-Iraq W a r and the Iraqi aggression of Kuwait look on the face of it a war over
boundary disputes but actually the issues behind the outbreak of these crises were other than
30
w h a t normally do not constitute the part of a territorial dispute. As regards the Iran-Iraq war,
it started immediately a day after Iraq abrogated the 1975 A l g i e r s agreement, while the side
w h i c h started the war w a s Iraq not Iran. The issues which prompted military action were I r a q ' s
aim to topple the Islamic Revolution, to pre-empt an internal resurgence by the Shie population
and to emerge as the leader of the Arab World by defeating its traditional enemy Iran, which
a f t e r the revolution had begun to look dangerous to the internal stability of each of the Arab
countries of the Persian Gulf.
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait w a s not an outburst of the brewing up of the tension over
contentious Bubiyan and W a r b a h islands, an issue which, otherwise, did not rake up throughout
the Iran-Iraq War and two years after its end. A boundary dispute with a potential to culminarte
into an invasion or a war must have hardly been a subsided one in the preceding decade.
T h a t the conflicts in the Persian Gulf have not turned volatile is explained in the very nature of
these conflicts. The territorial conflicts are more technical than political which entail a
negotiated settlement than a military solution. Some of the conflicts are under the process of
settlement and, therefore, by and large subsided. As far as the conflicts over the exploitation
of natural resources and extension of territorial jurisdiction are concerned, the parties know
that the use of force to realize their objectives would not give legitmacy to their claim.
The settlements of these conflicts through the use of f o r c e is harmful in cost-benefit
calculations also. As far as the Arabian peninsular countries are concerned, they run the risk of
rupturing security ties and economic and political cooperation among themselves by doing
so.
The smaller countries with a limited manpower and an underdeveloped economic base
are vulnerable to a long w a r . Recognizing their relatively w e a k e r military strength and the lack
of strategic depth, they ensure it that they do not provide the stronger power an excuse for
starting a war(62). In a few cases, these conflicts could not flare up due to the militarily w e a k e r
s t a t e s ' passive reaction to a stronger p o w e r ' s aggrandizement. T h e UAE did not resist Iranian
occupation of its islands. In 1977, Saudi Arabia allegedly occupied some o f t h e disputed islands
in the neutral zone between it and Kuwait but the latter decided not to retaliate. In the w a k e
of Saudi attack on its military post in September 1992, Qatar did not o f f e r any resistance. It,
instead, used political means, such as thretening to withdraw from the GCC. to avert the crisis.
Before the Iraqi invasion the Kuwaiti government tried to use diplomatic means and financial
resources, to an extent of agreeing to give in to Iraqi demand of oil price hike and w a i v i n g off
its debts to it, to avert it. T h e UAE, w h o s e three islands Iran had occupied, maintianed most
cordial relation with T e h r a n in the Iran-Iraq war.
In the perception of the Arab peninsular countries the security threats to them emanated
f r o m outside powers viz., Iran, Iraq, Israel and the Soviet Union. T h e common threat perception
restrained them from b l o w i n g up the intra-regional dispute in order to exhibit unity and
solidarity
a m o n g themselves to extra regional threats.
31
T H E IRAN-IRAQ A N D T H E PERSIAN GULF WARS — A N EXCEPTION :
The Iran-Iraq W a r q u e s t i o n e d the merit of generalizing the Third World wars. Experts
have held that a war b e t w e e n the two Third World countries t e n d s to b e c o m e a s w i f t and short
a f f a i r on two counts viz., possession of highly sophisticated w e a p o n s by them and economic
inability to sustain a long w a r . Contrary to this, the Iran-Iraq w a r w a s the longest war of this
century fought between the two countries possessing sophisticated w e a p o n s . Their economies
u n d e r w e n t a decline but not to the extent of persuading them to end the war. Instead, they
m a n a g e d their economic a f f a i r s in a way that these provided s u s t e n a n c e to the war. Iran did it
by developing a self-reliant economy based on optimum use of its industrial base and manpower
strength and Iraq with the help of foreign assistance and by i m p o s i n g e c o n o m i c
austerity.
As regards the Persian Gulf War, Iraq saw its invasion of Kuwait as a quick fix to its
e c o n o m i c woes. The e c o n o m i c embargo did not force it to w i t h d r a w f r o m Kuwait when the war
with the allied forces had become inevitable and the invasion of Kuwait begun to look an
e c o n o m i c misadventure. Four years of the imposing of the e c o n o m i c embargo, which has
severely bitten it particularly the poor section, has yet not d a m p e n e d I r a q ' s resolve to exhibit
that it can withstand such hardships.
This particular case bring home two lessons. First, e c o n o m i c constraints still do not
happen to be a factor i n f l u e n c i n g a Third World leader's w a r - m a k i n g decision howsoever 'real"
these might be. Second, a Third World country has an inbuilt e c o n o m i c strength to fund a war
and its people an u n d e r s t a n d i n g that the economic deterioration resulting from the war is not
an abnormal development.
These full-fledged w a r s in the Persian Gulf underline a m a j o r d i f f e r e n c e between aThird
W o r l d W a r and the one in the Industrialised World. That d i f f e r e n c e is in attitudes of the two
p e o p l e s towards the war. In Industrialised World the people are haunted by the would be
disastrous effects of a w a r on their economic well being as well as the security of their lives,
particularly of the armed f o r c e s personnel. They, therefore, p r e f e r that the war is avoided. In
the Third World, the patriotic zeal and in some cases religious f e r v o r have developed a pro-war
attitude among the p e o p l e . In the Iran-Iraq war, local populace constituted a m a j o r chunk of
the Iranian army (63). In the Persian Gulf War, people voluntarily j o i n e d the Iraqi army. Third
W o r l d P e o p l e ' s u n f a i l i n g support to their government even t h o u g h d e f e a t e d further substantiates this hypothesis. A f t e r Iraqi defeat popularity of Saddam H u s s e i n has remained more or less
intact, barring the aberration of about a fortnight-long revolt by Kurds and the Shia people of
m a r s h l a n d . But they had resorted to rebellion to cash in on to d e f e a t their political opponent.
It was not a rebellion s t e m m i n g from an anguish against a g o v e r n m e n t which brought
humiliation
to the country.
T h e case of v i c t o r i o u s A m e r i c a was altogehter different. A f t e r a f e w months of euphoria
and despite the fact that the US army did not suffer even one tenth of the expected casualties,
people began to question the American rationale behind fighting s o m e one e l s e ' s war. The
defeat of the hero of the w a r , George Bush, in the presidential election created an impression
that not a grand victory but its negative effects determined A m e r i c a n p e o p l e ' s attitude towards
the war.
The a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d wars have re-started the process of Isiamization of War(64). The
approach to war of the Iranian army against Iraq in the Iran-Iraq W a r and that of the Iraqi army
against the Multinational Forces is marked for religious f a n a t i c i s m , indifference to death and
a cult of martyrdom (65). T h e s e two w a r s also invalidate British Historian John K e e q e n ' s theory
o f " abolition of battle" w h i c h visualizes that due to modern w e a p o n s ' capacity to over-kill and
kill brutally, there w o u l d grow a disillusionment with the war a m o n g soldiers(66). However,
in the case of the two wars, patriotism, loyalty to the government, religious zeal, and sacrificial
urge offset the fear of m o d e r n w e a p o n s brutality and increased s o l d i e r s ' enthusiasm for a war.
However, the Iran-Iraq w a r substantiates the contention that m o d e r n wars, even those
i n v o l v i n g a Third World country on each side, can not be w o n . Both Iran and Iraq did not meet
their primary war o b j e c t i v e s . Yet the realization of this failure d u r i n g the course of the war did
not let them stop the w a r . The short-term gains, a few m a j o r military breakthroughs, some
positive effects of the w a r on internal f r o n t — s o c i a l cohesion and political consolidation — and
the fear of p e o p l e ' s b a c k l a s h in case the war was stopped, kept t h e m proceeding ahead.
The Persian Gulf W a r r e a f f i r m e d the contention that there is no one- to-one correspond e n c e between a victory and the objectives of a starting a w a r . T h e US victory in the Persian
Gulf War was total, yet not all its war objectives were materialized. On one hand, the US
succeededin liberating Kuwait, refurbishing its dominance over the regional states, the United
Nations, European allies and the w o r l d as a whole for that m a t t e r , but, on the other, it failed
to oust Saddam, d e c i m a t e Iraqi military strength and turning it into a docile p o w e r .
A R M S A N D C O N F L I C T S IN P E R S I A N G U L F :
Persian Gulf is the w o r l d ' s largest arms recipient a c c o r d i n g to the region-wise breakup.
T h i s tends one to draw a link between arms acquisition and the eruption and escalation of
v a r i o u s disputes and the c o n f l i c t s in the region. But this, in most of the cases, does not hold true.
A s regards the boundary disputes, the disputants" arms spree and the resultant strengthening
of their defense network have not prodded them to settle their s c o r e s through the use of force.
T h e Persian Gulf countries launched a massive arms acquisition drive in the 70s, but they, in
the same decade, settled most of their disputes also. A r m s p l a y e d a role in the Iran-Iraq War
and the Iraqilnvasion of Kuwait in 1990. However, in both the cases arms (purchases and arms
race) were not the c a u s e of the war but an instrument to carry this on.
The arms acquisition has not generally caused a spurt in regional disputes mainly because
it has been defense oriented. Militarily stronger powers have played the role of regional
policemen (Iran and Saudi Arabia in the 70s), protecting s m a l l e r states' security, with whom
they happen to be in dispute with on territorial issues. The s o u r c e s of arms supply have been
either common or those f r o m the same bloc, who have, in turn, ensured that regional allies do
not use these arms to fight a m o n g themselves. In additon, arms race in the region has proved
to be a deterrence also.
33
T H E PERSIAN GULF COUNTRIES AND THE R E G I O N A L AND INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEMS :
Most of the Persian Gulf conflicts have failed to i n f l u e n c e the regional and international
systems with the Iran-Iraq W a r and the Persian Gulf W a r b e i n g an exception. The disputes
within the A r a b i a n peninsula did not change the political landscape of the region, disrupt
friendly ties a m o n g the disputants, lead to their division into Soviet and American power blocs
and prevent the f o r m a t i o n of the Gulf Cooperation C o u n c i l .
As against this, as far as the regional system is c o n c e r n e d , the Iran-Iraq w a r established
the p r e p o n d e r a n c e of regional threat (from Iran) over the external one (from the USSR),
stimulated the r a p p r o c h e m e n t between Iraq and other arab countries of the region, led to the
formation of a common security system and poJiticaJ and e c o n o m i c union, the GCC. As regards
the Internationa! system, the Iran-Iraq war became the first such case where the USSR and the
US were not seen pitted against each other. The w a r w a s a non-issue in the starting or the
w h i p p i n g up of the Second Cold War.It was indeed a p r e l u d e to its end.
The Persian Gulf W a r altered the International system by checkmating the evolution of
a multi-polar w o r l d order in favour of a unipolar one headed by the US, arresting the drifting
of the center of gravity from the hands military power to e c o n o m i c powers and preventing the
breaking up of the West E u r o p e - U S alliance following retrenchment of the Soviet Unionfrom
an active role in internbationl politics.
C O M M O N B O N D S A N D C O N F L I C T S IN P E R S I A N G U L F :
Conflicts a m o n g the Arab peninsular countries are subordinated to the commonalty of
political and e c o n o m i c interests. With monarchey being the c o m m o n form of the govenrment
thorough out the region, these governments are not e n g a g e d in abetting and fomenting internal
strifes in one another countries. For, they hold that any radical or revolutionary political change
in one country will have a far-reaching cross-border implications. Instead, these governments
have in establishing the G C C evolved a regional mechanism of quelling internal dissension by
sharing intelligence information and pledging not to allow radical elements any facilities in
o n e ' s territory.
The oil is another source of regional cooperation a m o n g the Arab countries of the
Persian Gulf. M o r e or less common impact on them of the energy scenario in the industrialized
w o r l d has struck a great deal of policy coordination on price and production of oil, leading to
the formation of a cartel within the OPEC. The smaller oil producers have some resentment
against Saudi-price moderation and over-production policy, but they have not let their
r e s e n t m e n t grow out of p r o p o r t i o n s .
Saudi A r a b i a , w h i c h has the potential to b e c o m e the destabilising power to the regional
system o w i n g to its geographical, economic and military superiority over neighboring countries, has acted as ' p a t r o n ' and not as a confrontationist. It has sought to evolve a system of
r e g i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n to carve out the niche of a regional p o w e r for itself.In addition, the
common regional threats, either Iran or Iraq or Israel, have expedited Saudi Arabia to bring the
34
rest of the countries of the peninsula together. In the process, Saudi Arabia has either settled
its disputes with others or has not let them to remain an irritant in its relationship with the latter.
T H E G C C AND T H E SETTLEMENTS A N D SUBSIDING OF DISPUTES :
G C C ' s formation ensued the settlements of a few c o n f l i c t s at least.This regional body
has been instrumental in the resolving disputes between Qatar and Bahrain on Huwar island in
March 1982 and Fash-Al-Dibal in 1986, and between Oman and P D R Y (in 1986). However,
more than resolving disputes among the m e m b e r states(67), the G C C has arrested the process
of the eruption of conflicts as the member-states avoid giving publicity to these lest they impinge
on the existence and the f u n c t i o n i n g of the organization.
T E R R I T O R I A L D I S P U T E S A R E D E V O I D OF E X P A N S I O N I S T D E S I G N S :
A good number of disputes in the region do not carry the s e e d s of expansionist designs.
T h i s is borne out by their "give and take basis" settlement. For instance, according to the Saudi
A r a b i a - B a h r a i n agreement 1958, Bahrain relinquished its sovereignty over Abu Safah island in
e x c h a n g e for the Saudi o f f e r to share the revenues with the f o r m e r . Under Saudi Arabia-Iran
a g r e e m e n t on o f f s h o r e boundary agreements, the two countries distributed among themselves
the Firaydun and Marjan oil fields and gave half effect to Kharag island with each agreeing to
have an equal share in oil and other o f f s h o r e exploitation (68). Abu Dhabi and Qatar settled
their dispute over Bundaq oilfield by agreeing to establish c o m m o n sovereignty (69) over it.
T H E L I K E L I H O O D O F T H E R E C U R R E N C E OF T H E R E G I O N A L D I S P U T E S :
T h e recurrence of majority of the regional disputes is by and large an improbability, but
in the present circumstances only. Since most of them are far f r o m being settled or are vaguly
settled, their recurrence can not be ruled out if and when the regional scenario undergoes a
drastic c h a n g e .
T h e Saudi case o f f e r s an interesting example. Saudi A r a b i a is involved in the largest
n u m b e r of boundary disputes. But it has underplayed them for the sake of maintaining a ' f a t h e r
f i g u r e ' position among smaller states. What if a country or most of them reject Saudi
' p a t e r n a l i s m ' . Saudi Arabia, then, would re-enact these disputes to intimidate its erstwhile
f r i e n d s so as to maintain its regional power status.
I m p o r t a n c e of Bubiyan and Warbah islands has heightened to Iraq with the transfer of
its port U m m - E - Q a s a r to Kuwait by the UN Boundary C o m m i s s i o n . It is now more pressed more
than e v e r not to relinquish its claim and on these islands.
T h e dispute over the Shatt has since last many centuries kept on recurring mainly because
the a g r e e m e n t s on them have been signed by one of the parties under duress. Therefore, the
m o m e n t situation changes in favor of the party at the receiving end, it deviates from its
c o m m i t m e n t . Saddam gifted the Shatt to Iran during the Gulf W a r but that decision was purely
c i r c u m s t a n t i a l . He might have regretted his decision after the end of Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.
With the U m m - E - Q a s r port having been given to Kuwait and Iraqi access to sea has quenched
f u r t h e r , the revival of the Shatt dispute would sooner or later constitute a major policy objective
of Iraq.
35
Most of the boundary settlements are incomplete. The northern terminal point and a few
islands between Iran and Qatar are still left undemarcated despite the fact that this issue settled
as per a boundary agreement between the two countries in 1969. In the case of Iran-Bahrain,
Makhilu, Jabrin and Muharraq are left unsettled in the 1971 boundary settlement between them.
A few terminal points were not delimited u n d e r l r a n - O m a n boundary agreement in 1974. These
may be the fresh source of conflicts in the future.
REFERENCES AND FOOTNOTES
1.
The dispute in the region have for the sake of convinience been divided as
territorial ideological disputes etc. However, the a f o r e - m e n t i o n e d categorization is not
a
genuine one given the many-dimensional nature of a conflict in the region. The
Persian
Gulf w a r w a s both an intra-regional territorial dispute as well as the one
between
aregional and extra regional powers, rthe latter depending upon
w h o m one considers as
the two main parties to this w a r . Similarly, the war between
Iran and Iraq can be described
as both the territorial and ideological disputes or
even none of them if one c o m e s up with
the argument that neither had the underlying
ideological rivalry nor the territorial dispute
between the two countries reached such
a l a r m i n g proportions that the w a r had b e c o m e
inevitable. Rather, that war was an
o u t c o m e of the Saddam H u s s e i n ' s comparative
a s s e s s m e n t of the existing state
of political conditions in and military prowess of, the two
countries, if one looks at
the factors leading to the w a r f r o m a micro and
fromslightlyprejudiced
(agianst Iraq) angle.
2.
Alasadur, Drysaddle & Blake, Gerald H., The Middle East and North A f r i c a , Oxford
University Press, L o n d o n , UK. 1985, P. 85.
3.
See Safwat, Fathi N a j a t & Al-Najjar, Mustafa, " Arab S o v e r e i g n t y over the Shatt-alArab during the K a ' b i d e Period", in Al-Azhary, M.S. (ed.) : T h e Iran-Iraq War : a
Historical, E c o n o m i c and Political Analysis. D.K. A g e n c i e s Private Ltd., New Delhi,
India, 1984.
4.
Closure of the Shatt d u r i n g the Iran-Iraq War reduced Iraqi oil exports by 50 percent.
5.
Khadduri, Majid, D i x o n , Herbert & John, Anthony, M a j o r M i d d l e Eastern Problems in
International Law, A f r i c a n Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington
D.C. , USA , 1972, P p . 8 8 - 9 0 .
6.
The researcher does not consider the Shatt-Al-Arab d i s p u t e as o n e of the causes of the
Iran-Iraq war. A detailed description substantiating this v i e w p o i n t is given in the chapter
on the Iran-Iraq W a r .
7.
Hunseler Peter, " T h e Historical Antecedents of the Shatt a l - A r a b D i s p u t e " in Al-Azhary
M.S. (ed.): The I r a n - ' r a q W a r : A Historical, Economic and Political Analysis, D K.
Private Agencies Ltd , New Delhi, India, 1984, P. 10.
26
8.
Khalicl Bin Abdul Aziz, Yehaeda, Alsudiary and others (eds.), Five W a r Zones : The
V i e w s Of Local Military Leaders, Pergamon B r a s s e y ' s International D e f e n c e Publishers,
W a s h i n g t o n , U S A , 1986 Pp. 12-13.
9.
Persia later accepted the 'explanatory note' on Aug. 15, 1912 under Russian pressure.
10.
In 1907, Persia w a s divided into three z o n e s — R u s s i a n sphere of influence in north, the
British in south, and a neutral zone in the middle.
11.
K h a d d u r i , M a j i d & Dixon, Herbert (ed.) N. 5, Pp. 66,90.
12.
Iran recognized Iraq in 1929.
13.
The reasons behind the abrogation of the treaty by the Shah can be attributed to his fear
that the Baathist regime of Iraq, that had come to p o w e r by u p r o o t i n g the Iran-friendly
g o v e r n m e n t of Gen. Qasim, would make m a x i m u m use of the Shatt estuary to expand its
i n f l u e n c e among other Arab powers in the name of A r a b i s m , the corner-stone of the
Baathist ideology. Another reason lies in the S h a h ' s h a g e m o n i c design in the Persian
Gulf
following the British announcement of withdrawal from the east of Suez in 1967.
Unrestricted navigation to Iranian port of in the Persian Gulf w a s the key to this
strategy.
14.
L e a g u e of Nations, "Boundary Treaty B e t w e e n Iran and Iraq of July 4, 1937" Treaty
Series, Vol. 190 (1938), p. 256 in the Christian Science M o n i t o r June 5, 1969, P. 4.
15.
Iraqi Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s , " Facts Concerning the Iraqi-Iranian Frontier, January
1960, P. 20.
16.
It may be noted that the treaty did not make a direct r e f e r e n c e to Iranian support to
Kurdish rebellion. Rather it enjoined upon the two states to refrain f r o m interfering in
each o t h e r ' s internal affairs.
17.
T h e dispute over the Shatt during 80s and after is dealt w i t h in the chapter on the IranIraq War.
18.
Eilts, Fredrick Hermann, "Foreign Policy Perspectives of the Gulf S t a t e s " in Sindeller,
Richard H.III & Paterson, J.E.(eds.) Crosscurrents in the Gulf : A r a b Regional, and
Global Interests, Routledge, London, UK., 1988, P. 2 4 .
19.
S i n g h , K.R., Conflict and Cooperation in the Gulf, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Studies, Oct.-Dec.
1974, Vol. 15, No. 4, P. 498.
20.
M i d d l e East in the 20th Century, Jerusalem, 1972 in A s o p a Sheel K., Oil A r m s and Islam
in the Persian Gulf, Printwell Publishrrs, Jaipur, India, 1986, P. 30.
21.
S w e a r i n g e n , Will D., " Sources of Conflict over Oil in the Persian/Arabian Gulf, The
M i d d l e East J o u r n a l , Vol. 35, No.3, S u m m e r 1981, P.322.
22.
Eilts, Fredrick Hermann, N.18, p. 32.
23.
T h e U A E consists of seven trucial S h e i k h d o m s . In 1971, after the British withdrawl from
the region, they decided to merge into a federation. Ras-Al Khaima joined the federation
in 1972. T h e seven UAE S h e i k h d o m s are Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, A j m a n , Ummul
Qaiwan, F u j i r a h and Ras A) Khaima.
24.
A n t h o n y , J o h n Duke, "Aspects of Saudi A r a b i a ' s Relations with other Gulf States", in
A]-Azhery M.S.(ed.) The Iran-Iraq W a r ; A Historical, E c o n o m i c and Political Analysis,
D.K. A g e n c i e s Ltd., New Delhi, India,1984, P.152.
25.
Ibid, P. 152
26.
In the first quarter of the present century the oasis remained independent of the control
of any of the disputants states.
27.
Noyes, J m a e s H, The Clouded Lens: Persian Gulf Security and US Foreign Policy,
H o o v e r Institute Press, USA, 1982, P. 19.
28.
For detail see Allen, Calvin H j r , . O m a n : The Modernization of the Gulf States, Westview
Press, B o u l d e r , Colorado, U S A Pp. 111-114.
29.
See for detail A n t h o n y , John Duke, N. 24, Pp.
30.
K h a d d u r i , M a j i d , Dixon, Herbert & A n t h o n y John, N. 5, P. 96
31.
See for detail, Ibid. Pp. 96-102.
32.
Bahrain is rich in oil, generates m o d e r a t e sized revenue from oil exports, has an oil
refinery and is a leading commercial center in the Persian Gulf region.
33.
The Iranian claim is disputed because after the advent of Islam Bahrain, as happened to
other A r a b peninsular countries, was occupied by he Arab-Islamic forces.
34.
Khadduri, M a j i d . : " I r a n ' s Claim to the Security of B a h r a i n " American J o u r n a l of
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, Vol. 45, 1951, Pp. 34-38.
35.
T h e s e islands are within 12 nautical miles territorial limits of both the countries. Abu
M u s a dispute is between Iran and S h a r j a h and the two T u n b s between Iran and Ras A1
Khaima.
36.
A l a s a d u r , D r y s a d d l e , Bhike, Gerald H, N. 2, P. 127.
155,170.
28
37.
T h e agreement was signed between Iran and Sharjah on Nov. 29, 1969. It s t i p u l a t e d joint
o c c u p a t i o n " of the island and joint sharing of revenues. Iran also agreed to let the Butta
Gas Oil Company, which was awarded the concession by Sharjah, continue e.xploring the
oil. See "Iranian o f f e r to Buy T h r e e Gulf Island Reported" M i d d l e East E c o n o m i c
Survey (Beirut) Dec. 15, 1971.
38.
M a c D o n a l d , Charles C.: " I r a n ' s Strategic Interests and the Law of S e a " , T h e M i d d l e
East J o u r n a l , Vol. 34, No. 3, S u m m e r 1980, P. 312.
39.
S w e r a i n g e n , Will D., N. 21, P. 327.
40.
Alsadur, Drysaddle & Blake, Gerald, H., N. 2, P. 9.
41.
The reports of Saudi occupation of these islands in 1977 by some s o u r c e s is not
substantiated by relevant evidences.
42.
Alsadur, Drysaddle & Blake, Gerald H, N. 5., P. 4.
43.
For instance, a Qatri ministerial statement in 1976 described Hower as integral part of
Qatar and condemned Bahraini military exercises. Similarly, Bahrain in 1978 criticized
the presence of Qatri warships in the waters around the Howars.
44.
For the text see US Department of State , "Continental Boundary: B a h r a i n -Saudi
A r a b i a " International Boundary Study, March 10, 1970.
45.
The agreement over the Kharag island could be finalised with most d i f f i c u l t y . Initially,
Iran wanted that the median line be measured from the Kharag island. S a u d i Arabia
wanted a median line existing between the main islands of the two c o u n t r i e s . In 1965,
Iran
and Saudi Arabia agreed to establish a boundary line existing at an e q u i d s t a n c e
f r o m the
two proposed median lines, later, Iran rejected this w h e n it realized that
this would extend
Saudi control over the o f f s h o r e oil discovered by the Iranian
concessionaire. Saudi
Arabia gave a sympathetic consideration to I r a n ' s position
and proposed division of
Boundaries in such a way that oil resources w e r e equitably shared. G i v e n the Saudi
concession, Iran also dropped its insistence on retaining its full control of the Kharag and
the measurement of the median line f r o m the 12 nautical miles off the island.
46.
It w a s a remarkable achievement in view of the fact that Islam is a religion w h i c h provides
a w h o l e set of code of conducts in social andcultural realms of the life of a f a i t h f u l .
47.
For detail see Hunter Shireen, "Arab-Iranian Relations and the Stability in the Persian
G u l f , The W a s h i n g t o n Quarterly, Vol. 7, No.3, S u m m e r 1984, P. 68.
48.
See Lewis, Bernard, " The M a p of the Milddle East : A Guide f o r P e r p l e x e d " , T h e
39
A m e r i c a n S c h o l a r , W i n t e r 1989, Pp. 33-36.
49.
Hunter, Shireen, N. 47, P. 68.
50.
Long, David E., "Saudi A r a b i a and'Its Neighbors: Preoccupied Paternalism" in Cross
currents in the Gulf, P. 192
51.
See for detail C. E d m u n d Bosworth., "The Nomenclature of the Persian G u l f in Alvin
J. Cortell (ed.) : T h e Persian Gulf States, Baltimore, John H o p k i n s University Press,
1980, Pp. 17-34.
52.
The Iranian Radio A r a b i c broadcast begins with a Quranic verse, "kings dispoil
county when they enter it and make the nobles of its p e o p l e its means".
a
53.
It may be noted that in Iran the head of the g o v e r n m e n t — the president—is directly
elected
but the head of the state—the spiritual l e a d e r — , who is vested with
s u p r e m e executive
p o w e r s and the pfower to exercise v e t o over the executive orders
and legislations of the
g o v e r n m e n t , is not elected but appointed by a body of
clerics.Some Arab monarchies
have established representative political institutions.
But these bodies are not elected on
the basis of universal adult franchise, have
limited powers, consist of a fairly large
number of nominated representatives
and are subject to dissolution by the King at his
will.
54.
Western sources say that due to I r a n ' s preoccupation with Iraq, the fervor behind export
of revolution d a m p e n e d . But this inference is not logical as the western sources relate
it
to a sharp decline in I r a n ' s visible involvement in f o m e n t i n g internal dissension
in the
Arab countries, without evaluating whether was there really any marked decline
in I r a n ' s
export of revolution propaganda also. I r a n ' s export of revolution policy
w a s confined to
rhetorics in the pre-war period. S o did it remain so a f t e r the
o u t b r e a k of the Iran-Iraq
War. Hence, there was harldy any "noticeable'' or sharp
decline in the Iranian attempt
to export the revolution.
55.
Halliday Fred, " T h e Gulf in International A f f a i r s " in Paridham, B.R. The Arab Gulf and
the Arab World, C r o o m h e l m , L o n d o n , UK., 1988 Pp. 1 0 0 - 1 0 2 .
56.
Iraq refrained from s u p p o r t i n g subversive elements in the A r a b Gulf largely because the
left-oriented f o r c e s w e r e w e e k , lacked popular support, and w e r e more Nasserite than
Baathist.Iraq had little track with the other streams of rebels, the Islamists. During the
Persian Gulf crisis and the war, Iraq received sympathy f r o m the Islamic resistance
groups but this did not graduate into their identification w i t h Iraq. A f t e r the Iraqi defeat,
they moved f u r t h e r away from Iraq, which now lacks both the will and the clout to strike
a nexus with the latter. Iraq has never been in a sound position to influence the Arab
armed forces, the intelligence and the internal security p e r s o n n e l despite the fact that
they, given their m o d e r n outlook, seem more responsive to a secular ideology. A close
monitoring of thse elements by the ruling regimes, their unconditional loyalty to the
establishment and the American influence on them have lessened the chances of military
takeover or coup e n c o u r a g e d by a foreign power in the c o u n t r i e s of Arab monarchies in
the Persian Gulf.
CO
57.
Alvarez, Luis Echeverria, "Tension and Conflict in the Third World", Vol.3, No.4 .
October , 1 9 8 1 , P . 6 4 7 .
58.
The International Bank for Reconstruction and D e v e l o p m e n t , "The E c o n o m i c Develop
ment of Kuwait, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1965,P. 89 in A1 Ebrahim, Hassan Ali
: Kuwait and the G u l f : Small States and the International System, C r o o m h e l m , London,
UK, 1984, P. 49.
59.
H a m e e d , M a z h e r A., Saudi Arabia, the West and the Security of the Gulf, Croomhelm,
UK. & A u s t r a l i a , P. 5.
60.
For example, the S h a h ' s main intention behind o c c u p y i n g the islands of Abu Musa and
two T u n b s w a s to flank the Persian Gulf from both the sides, see Eilts, H e r m a n n
Frederick., N. 18, Pp. 26-27.
61.
Haass, Richard N., " Regional Order in the 1990s: The Challenge of the Middle East.
T h e W a s h i n g t o n Quarterly , Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 1991, Pp. 181-187.
62.
Chubin, S h a h r a m , " Third World Conflicts : Trends and P r o s p e c t s " International
C o n f l i c t Research, No. 127, Feb. 1991, Pp. 154-156.
63.
Abidi A . H . H . , " D e v e l o p m e n t s in the G u l f ' U.S.I. Journal, Vol. 118, No. 499, Oct-Dec.
1988, P. 365, and Sick Gary " I r a n ' s Quest for S u p e r p o w e r s Status ", Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 65 , N o . 4 Spring, 1987, Pp. 7 0 5 - 6 .
64.
Harkavy, Robert G.,"The Lessons of Recent Wars : T o w a r d Comparative A n a l y s i s " in
Harkavy, Robrt E. & N e u m a n , Stephen G. (eds.). The Lessons of Recent W a r s in the
Third World : A p p r o a c h e s and Case Studies, L e x i n g t o n Books, Canada, U S A , 1985, Pp.
17-18.
65.
Dietl, G u l s h a n , " F o r e i g n Policy of Saudi Arabia : Internal and External C o n t e x t s " India
Quarterly, Vol. 47, Nos. 3 & 4, July-Dec. 1985, P. 370 and Allen Calvin H. (Jr), N. P.
117.
66.
H a r k a v y , Robert G., N. 64, P. 18.
67.
Most of the boundary disputes among the m e m b e r states still exist. Nor have most of
them been b r o u g h t before the GCC for settlement.
68.
S w e r a i n g e n , Will D., N. 21, P. 329.
69.
Ibid, P. 329.