Society in Transition 2003, 34(2)
1
Forging the links: globalisation and family patterns
Susan C. Ziehl
Department of Sociology and Industrial Sociology, Rhodes University,
P O Box 94, Grahamstown 6140
[email protected]
Until recently, there has been little dialogue between scholars who have
been researching and theorizing about globalisation and those working in
the field of family studies. It is often said that globalisation is affecting
family patterns, but the exact nature of that effect is seldom fleshed out.
The purpose of this article is to discuss some attempts at linking these two
fields of study. I provide a critical appraisal of Giddens and Castells’ work
in this area – particularly their claim that globalisation has resulted in the
demise of the conventional nuclear family. While both provide interesting
and insightful analyses of the family-globalisation connection, they overestimate the extent to which family life in the West has changed, and underestimate the importance of regional variation that preceded the modern
era – and still persists today. The major shortcomings of their analyses are
conceptual and methodological, as they do not distinguish between a
household and a domestic life cycle.
Introduction
Globalisation, the buzzword in the social sciences since the 1990s, has been the subject of
debate and controversy. There are differences of interpretation as to what this concept
means, and even when different scholars agree on the meaning, they disagree as to
whether it represents something ‘really new’.
But debates about globalisation have had very little impact on family studies in sociology as in the social sciences generally. Family sociology textbooks, such as those of
Aulette (1994), Eshleman (1994), Elliot (1996), Muncie et al (1997), and Bidwell & Van
der Mey (2000), fail to devote any attention to globalisation. The subject does not even
appear in their respective indexes. Ironically, a much earlier publication – Zinn & Eitzen
(1990) – does have a section dealing with globalisation, but it consists of less than one
page. Similarly, at the recent ISA conference in Montreal, not one paper on globalisation
was presented in the Family Research Committee sessions.
There are a number of possible reasons for this lack of engagement on the part of family sociologists with globalisation debates. Firstly, globalisation tends to be conceptualized
primarily in economic and political terms. Globalisation has been seen as synonymous (or
at least principally about) the economic and political integration of societies across the
globe; and one of the debates has been about whether or not this has actually occurred. The
family is seen as an institution that differs from the polity and economy, and that raises
different empirical and theoretical concerns. The traditional juxtaposition of the family
(seen as representing the ‘private realm’) and the economy and polity (‘the public realms’)
2
Society in Transition 2003, 34(2)
could then be one of the reasons for the lack of dialogue between family and globalisation
scholars.
Secondly, there is the question of the ‘type’ of scholars involved in these two areas of
enquiry. The majority of those interested in broad global trends in economic and political
affairs are male, while (numerically speaking) family sociology is still predominantly a
female preserve. This is not a hard and fast distinction. There are a number of male family
sociologists and female economists. But on the whole, the gender divide between the various academic disciplines and sub-fields of Sociology remain. For instance, at the ISA
meeting held in Montreal (1998), about 70% of the contributors to the Family Research
Committee were female, almost exactly the same as the percentage of male contributors to
the Economy and Society Research Committee. In the case of the Ad Hoc Committee on
Globalization, the proportion of male contributors was close to 90%. Possibly this gender
divide in academic interests and research also contributes to the lack of dialogue between
family and globalisation scholars. A more general tendency for scholars who specialize in
different disciplines and sub-disciplines not to converse with each other is reinforced.
This is not to suggest that there have been no attempts to link discussion of globalisation and family issues. While family sociologists may not have been paying much attention to globalisation, some globalisation theorists have been analysing the family. Smith &
Wallerstein (1992), Therborn (2001), Giddens (2001,2002), and Castells (1997) serve as
examples.
Globalisation debates
While acknowledging that this is a point of debate, Held et al (1999:2) define globalisation
as ‘the widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all
aspects of contemporary social life, from cultural to criminal, the financial to spiritual’.
Held et al (1999) suggest that three broad positions have emerged around this issue,
namely the ‘hyperglobalist’, ‘sceptical’ and ‘transformationalist’ approaches.
The hyperglobalist perspective – associated with the work of Ohmae (1995), Albrow
(1996) and others – claims that the contemporary world is significantly different from
what it was in the past, in that the world economy is increasingly integrated. Hyperglobalists argue that due to the intensification of ‘transnational networks of production, trade
and finance’, today’s world is one big global market place.
Another major claim is that national governments no longer have the power and
authority they once had, as ‘the needs of global capital impose neoliberal economic discipline on all governments’ (Held et al, 1999:4). Consequently, states become mere managers of economic affairs on behalf of international organizations rather than the architects of
their own economic fate. In the process, national governments find it increasingly difficult
to sustain existing levels of social protection, which spells the end of the welfare state as
we know it. Hyperglobalizers differ amongst themselves as to whether these changes are
beneficial or detrimental to the global citizenry. Neoliberals see them in a positive light,
claiming that such changes represent the triumph of the individual over the state and of
‘the market principle over state power’ (Held et al,1999:3). On the other hand, neo-Marxists see in these changes the increasing world domination of capitalism and point to new
Society in Transition 2003, 34(2)
3
forms of inequality that have replaced the old North-South divide.
Hyperglobalists identify some cultural consequences to these economic and political
changes such as the growing dominance of a ‘consumerist ideology’ that ‘imposes a new
sense of identity, displacing traditional cultures and ways of life’ (Held et al, 1999:4).
In short, from this point of view, globalisation is real, new, primarily an economic phenomenon, eroding the power of the state in favour of the market and a growing global citizenry following a global, consumerist culture.
Sceptics disagree with almost all these claims, even though they, too, conceptualise
globalisation as primarily an economic phenomenon, arguing instead that the world economy is less integrated today than it was during the latter period of the 19th century, when
the gold standard was in place. The sceptics concede that there may be more cooperation
and trade between nations today than in the past. But they do not see this as resulting in a
global marketplace, but in trade within discrete blocs consisting of Europe, North America
and the Asia-Pacific regions. They prefer to speak of the internationalisation – rather than
globalisation – of economic activity as they do not believe that economic cooperation and
trade is taking place in as large a ‘geographic space’ as was the case during the ‘age of
world empires’ (Held et al, 1999:5). They also dispute the notion that nation states are
becoming mere puppets of global capital. Rather, they afford national governments a
greater capacity to act and decide the fate of their nations. In this regard, the sceptics point
to the influence which national states have had in creating and sustaining the very international organizations of ‘global governance’ which the hyperglobalizers claim are now their
masters.
Sceptics also disagree with the notion that old forms of stratification (North/South,
First World /Third World) are being replaced with a new international division of labour.
From their point of view, the contemporary economic order is reinforcing rather than
improving existing patterns of inequality. Since, for example, most foreign investment
flows occur within First World societies, they remain the winners and the Third World/
South, the losers. The sceptics also do not believe that we are at the dawn of a ‘global civilization’ governed by ‘a global culture’. Instead, they see the increasing fragmentation of
the world into ‘civilization blocs and cultural and ethnic enclaves’ (Huntington, 1996 in
Held et al, 1999:6). Finally, the sceptics place great emphasis on the role of Western societies (particularly the United States) in controlling the economic and political affairs of the
world. What appears to be globalisation is nothing more than the extension of western
domination across the globe.
To summarise, from the skeptical point of view, globalisation is not real, not new and
has not eroded the power of the state.
The transformationalists draw on elements of each of the above. Like the hyperglobalists, they claim that globalisation is indeed real and new and is having a massive impact
on societies across the globe. On the other hand, they agree with the sceptics that globalisation has not resulted in the smashing of state power or the destruction of state sovereignty. What has happened, they claim, is that national governments have to operate in a
dramatically changed world order. It is a world order that is increasingly interconnected
economically, politically and socially. But it is not one in which all societies have become
4
Society in Transition 2003, 34(2)
the same and forged into one. They distinguish between a ‘single global system’ (which
they regard as an accurate description of reality) and a ‘single world society’ (which they
reject).
What distinguishes the ‘transformationalists’ from the other approaches is the view
that the outcome of the process whereby societies are becoming increasingly integrated
(globalisation) is uncertain. From their point of view, globalisation is fraught with contradictions and is influenced by contingencies thus making it difficult to predict what lies
ahead.
Transformationalists do not see globalisation as resulting in the destruction of the
state, but claim instead that national states are being transformed within the context of the
new global system. But the outcome of this process of transformation cannot be known in
advance, as different states devise different strategies for dealing with the environment
they now face. From this point of view, national states are no longer ‘autonomous, selfgoverning entities’ but find themselves in a situation where they must share power with
international, as well as local, bodies. In other words, the power, function and authority of
national states have been ‘re-engineered’ rather than destroyed (Held et al, 1999:8).
Transformationalists also do not believe that ‘nothing has changed’ as far as the old
forms of stratification are concerned. From their point of view, a new international stratification system has emerged which is more complex than the old North/South divide. They
distinguish between three categories of ‘winners and losers’: the elite, contented and marginalized; and claim that these distinctions cut across societies and geographic regions. So,
for instance, they claim that the traditional First World/Third World distinction can be
found in any of the world’s major First World cities, while at the same time globalisation
is benefiting an elite in traditional Third World societies (Held et al, 1999:8).
In short, from a transformationalist point of view, globalisation is a powerful force –
that has resulted in a changed world order, new and more complex forms of stratification,
a transformed relationship between national governments, international bodies and local
communities – whose ultimate impact cannot be predicted in advance.
As can be noted from the discussion above, globalisation debates have been seen as
primarily about economic integration or lack thereof; state power, and forms of inequality.
Culture has tended to take a back seat – at least in Held et al’s description of globalisation
debates on which the above discussion was based. Yet it is in the relation of globalisation
to culture that the most obvious link with family studies is to be found. If globalisation
were resulting in a single, uniform global culture, we would expect family life across the
globe to become increasingly similar. If, on the other hand, globalisation is a myth, then it
cannot be seen as effecting any change in family life (assuming that this has occurred).
From a transformationalist point of view one could argue that globalisation has had a massive impact on family life, but that the outcome of this process is complex and uncertain.
Migration represents another linkage between globalisation debates and studies of
family life. From a hyperglobalist viewpoint improved transportation and communications
systems have facilitated the rapid movement of people around the globe. However, what is
important here is not the speed or magnitude of people’s movements, but the direction of
migration flows. Prior to the 1940s, migration flows were almost exclusively in an East-
Society in Transition 2003, 34(2)
5
West, North-South direction. Since then the direction has been more or less reversed. Consequently, many Western societies are experiencing an increase in the ‘ethnic mix’ of their
populations. Elliot (1996) devotes a chapter to the impact of ethnic differentiation on family life in Britain in which she does not mention globalisation.
The impact of globalisation on the family
While few family sociologists have engaged the various debates around globalisation, globalisation theorists have presented analyses of its impact on family life, as exemplified by
Anthony Giddens and Manuel Castells, both associated with the ‘transformationalist’
approach.
Runaway world?
Giddens takes up the issue of globalisation and family life in his introductory textbook
Sociology (4th edition, 2001) and in the 1999 Reith Lectures broadcast by the BBC and
later published in the form of Runaway World – How Globalization in reshaping our lives
(2nd edition, 2002). In Sociology the following quote appears in a chapter entitled ‘A
Changing World’ (Giddens, 2001:61; emphasis added):
Globalization is fundamentally changing the nature of our everyday experiences … forcing a redefinition of intimate and personal aspects of our
lives, such as the family, gender roles, sexuality, personal identity … We
are faced with a move towards a new individualism (before which) the
weight of tradition and established values is retreating ... traditional frameworks of identity are dissolving and new patterns of identity emerging.
In this passage Giddens, then, makes the claim that globalisation is impacting significantly
on culture, identity and family life. However, the actual connection between these phenomena is not fleshed out. In that chapter he does illustrate the impact of globalisation on
work patterns (which do have a link with family life). He argues that globalisation affects
American and Western European workers differently – the former ‘responding to the pressures of global competition’ by working longer hours and the latter refusing to do so
(2001:64). While this does illustrate the ‘open-endedness’ of the transformationalist
approach, it is hardly a substantive treatment of the connection between globalisation and
family life: depending on where you live, your parents are either going to be spending less
or the same time with you as a result of globalisation.
Even in the chapter entitled ‘Families’ the connection between globalisation and the
family, and the impact of globalisation on family life, is not discussed in any detail. It is
mentioned in the introductory comments and is implicit in his discussion of British families of South Asian origin, but not elaborated on. He indicates that South Asian children
are exposed to ‘two very different cultures’ and that ‘although there appear to be some
signs of change … – such as young people wanting a greater say in marriages … – on the
whole the South Asian families continue to be remarkably strong’ (2001:189). But
nowhere is the connection between these observations and globalisation made. Similar
lacunae are present in Runaway World (2000). An entire chapter is devoted to ‘Family’,
yet globalisation is not mentioned in that chapter and the word ‘global’ appears only twice.
6
Society in Transition 2003, 34(2)
But while Giddens himself does not make explicit connections between globalisation
and family life, it is possible to deduce such links from his work. He defines globalisation
as the intensification of social relations and increasing interdependence of people around
the world: ‘Globalization refers to the fact that we all increasingly living in ‘one world’, so
that individuals, groups and nations become more interdependent’ (Giddens, 2001:51 &
52).
He sees globalisation as caused by political factors, economic factors, and the ‘communications revolution’.
On the political front he claims that one of the most important developments that took
place in the twentieth century was the spread of democracy. He indicates that since the
mid-1970s, a large number of societies have adopted the democratic model such that ‘there
are few states in the world today that don’t call themselves democratic’ (2000:68). In his
view, this change on the political level is a function of three factors: economic, cultural
and informational. Firstly, there are the economic changes associated with globalisation:
the replacement of agriculture and manufacture with industries trading in knowledge and
information. Giddens contends that the rise of this new economic system (also known as
the knowledge or ‘weightless’ economy) requires businesses to restructure themselves by
becoming more flexible and less hierarchical and adds that this (economic) restructuring is
reflected in the political realm (Giddens, 2001:54). ‘Authoritarian government becomes
out of line with other life experiences, including the flexibility and dynamism necessary to
compete in the global electronic economy’ (Giddens, 2002:72).
The second driving force behind the spread of democracy, in Giddens’ view, is the
erosion of the force of tradition. In contemporary society, Giddens contends, individuals
are no longer bound by customs and habits which determine who they are and what they
will become. Rather, post-modern individuals consciously choose their own goals and
make and remake their own identity – drawing on a variety of cultural resources in the
process. To illustrate this idea he uses the example of ‘a black urban South African’ who
‘today might continue to be strongly influenced by the traditions and cultural outlooks of
his tribal roots at the same time as he adopts cosmopolitan styles and tastes – in dress, leisure pursuits, hobbies and so forth – that have been shaped by globalizing forces’ (Giddens, 2001:64). In other words, for Giddens the global citizen is one who is constantly
confronted with a series of different ‘cultural repertoires’ and chooses from among them to
form a type of hybrid identity. With regard to democracy, he claims that the reduction in
the force of tradition means that ‘old forms of power’ lose the support they previously had:
For increasing numbers across the world, life is no longer lived as fate – as
relatively fixed and determined ... Political power can no longer draw upon
reserves of traditional deference, or respect (Giddens, 2002:72).
The third factor responsible for the spread of democracy, according to Giddens, is the
communications revolution. Here he is referring to the various technological improvements that have facilitated the rapid spread of information across the globe. A global order
where information is so readily available and can be disseminated at great speed from one
part of the world to another, Giddens contends, results in a compression of time and space.
Another consequence, in his view, is that politicians lose their monopoly over knowledge
Society in Transition 2003, 34(2)
7
– one of the earlier pillars of their power:
In a world based upon active communication, hard power – power that
comes only from the top down – loses its edge. The economic conditions
that the top-down Soviet economy, or other authoritarian regimes, couldn’t
handle – the need for decentralization and flexibility – were mirrored in
politics. Information monopoly, upon which the political system was
based, has no future in an intrinsically open framework of global communications ... old mechanisms of government don’t work in a society where
citizens live in the same information environment as those in power over
them (Giddens, 2002:74,75).
This democratisation of knowledge has two contradictory consequences for Giddens.
Firstly, it has led to disillusionment with politics in societies where democracy is well
established. This is because the media regularly trivializes political issues by personalizing
and sensationalising them (2002:78). On the other hand, the communications revolution
has been one of the factors behind the destruction of authoritarian regimes and thus the
promotion of democracy. He regards the Soviet Union as a case in point, claiming that the
media played a large role in bringing about its demise.
In sum, Giddens claims that the spread of democracy as a political system is due to the
greater availability of information, an increase in the speed with which it is disseminated,
the demands of the new economic order and the lessening of the hold of tradition. However, Giddens frequently makes the point that globalisation is not just something ‘out
there’. It is also something ‘in here’ affecting our personal lives and, in particular, our family lives. In this regard he claims that alongside the process of political democratisation
there has been a process of the ‘democratization of emotions’ which, in turn, is leading to
the demise of ‘the traditional family’. He uses the latter to refer to both a household type in
which women live with their husbands and children and a serious of values and beliefs,
which define the rights and obligations of family members, as well as the meaning of marriage. Giddens acknowledges that historically there have been different family systems
that are linked to different cultures; he uses the examples of China (which has had a strong
tradition of arranged marriages) and Europe (where that tradition was far less pronounced). Yet he claims that ‘the family in non-modern cultures did, and does, have some
traits found more or less everywhere’ (2002:54).
The core characteristics of ‘the traditional family’ in Giddens’ view are that women
and children are denied rights; women do not work outside the home; there is a double
standard regarding sexuality (for men a sign of manhood and women a sign of immorality); the dual conception of women (madonna/whore categorization); marriage is based on
economic considerations; sexuality is tied to reproduction and homosexuality is regarded
as a disease.
He claims that the family of the 1950s is a later development of the traditional family –
the major difference being that by then romantic love had replaced economic considerations as the basis of marriage. ‘Since then’, he claims, ‘the family has changed much further’ (Giddens, 2002:58):
The details vary from society to society, but the same trends are visible
almost everywhere in the industrialised world. Only a minority of people
8
Society in Transition 2003, 34(2)
now live in what might be called the standard 1950s family – both parents
living together with their children of the marriage, where the mother is a
full-time housewife and the father the breadwinner. In some countries,
more than a third of all births happen outside wedlock, while the proportions of people living alone has gone up steeply and looks likely to rise
even more. In most societies, like the US or Britain, marriage remains very
popular ... In Scandinavia, on the other hand, a large proportion of people
living together, including where children are involved, remain unmarried.
Up to a quarter of women aged between 18 and 35 in the United States and
Europe say they do not intend to have children – and they appear to mean
it.
Other changes which Giddens thinks are occurring include the rise of ‘the couple’ and
‘coupledom’, along with the greater acceptance of homosexuality. For him ‘coupling’ and
‘uncoupling’ are better descriptions of peoples’ personal lives than ‘marriage and the family’, while he views homosexuality as the logical extension of the separation of sexuality
from reproduction (Giddens, 2002:57,59). He also identifies a move towards ‘the pure
relationship’ which has features in common with the principles of democracy. These are
trust, open dialogue, equality and the absence of arbitrary power and violence (Giddens,
2002:62). He claims this process is manifesting itself not just in the couple relationship but
also in the relationship between parents and children, as well as between friends. In this
way Giddens is able to tie together – albeit indirectly – the broad globalisation forces that
are usually conceptualized in economic and political terms to the intimate affairs of personal lives. His general thesis appears to be that the process of democratization that has
taken place in the political realm is now taking place in the personal realm and the result is
the erosion of ‘the traditional family’.
While Giddens (2002:64) concedes that ‘there are many questions to be asked of all of
this ... the most obvious is that I have concentrated mainly upon trends affecting the family
in Western countries’, he claims that the developments which have taken place in the West
will be duplicated elsewhere. In his view, it is the persistence of ‘the traditional family’ in
non-Western societies that is an impediment to the further spread of democracy and economic development and it is only a matter of time before it buckles under the forces of globalisation:
What about areas where the traditional family remains largely intact ...?
Will the changes observed in the West become more and more global? I
think they will – indeed that they are. It isn’t a question of whether existing
forms of traditional family will become modified, but when and how (Giddens, 2002:65).
In sum, Giddens contends that substantial and significant changes are taking place in the
arena of personal relationships and family life and that the major force behind those
changes is globalisation. He furthermore contends that one of the consequences of those
changes is the erosion of the conventional nuclear family (what he calls the traditional
family of the 1950s) – a trend that has started in the West and will spread to the rest of the
world in time.
Society in Transition 2003, 34(2)
9
The end of patriarchy?
Castells (1997) is more explicit than Giddens in drawing a connection between globalisation and changes that have occurred in family life. He sees the ‘patriarchal family’ as one
of the major sources of patriarchy (rule of men over wives and children) and claims that, in
the course of the twentieth century, both have come under siege. Castells relates women’s
employment – for him the major challenge to patriarchy and the patriarchal family – to the
rise of ‘an informational, global economy’, changes in the area of reproductive technology, and the rise of feminism.
Castells finds evidence of this ‘crisis of the patriarchal family’ in:
• increasing incidence of divorce and separation;
• the delaying and avoidance of marriage;
• the increasing variety of household structures which do not conform to the ‘classic nuclear
family model’;
• an increase in illegitimacy;
• the delaying and restriction of childbearing.
He supports these contentions with statistics drawn mainly from a report by the Population
Council, an international nonprofit organisation, on ‘the transformation of families in the
world’ (J. Bruce et al, 1995 in Castells, 1997:139).1 These are presented in the form of
eleven sets of statistical tables and figures.
The first of Castells’ tables shows that in nine selected countries the crude divorce rate
has increased from 1971 to 1990 in all, except Egypt. Castells explains this as a possible
indicator of a trend towards ‘Islamization’ in that society. It is important to note that six of
the first nine countries are in First World societies, five are in North America or Europe
and only one is in South America while another is in North Africa. The next twelve countries for which Castells displays data are all in North America or Europe.
Castells’ second table shows that in 12 selected countries, which overlap to some
extent with the first nine, ‘there is a discrepancy between the levels of divorce for each
country, but there is a general upward trend between 1970 and 1990, and between 1980
and 1990, with (again) the exception of the United States in 1990, partly because almost
55 percent of marriages ended up in divorce in this country in 1990’ (Castells, 1997:141).2
The third set of figures ‘shows the decreasing rate of marriage survival between older
and younger cohorts of women for Italy, West Germany and Sweden’ (Castells, 1997:144145). It is difficult to interpret the meaning of these figures.
Fourthly, Castells presents data for selected developing countries which display ‘rates
1. The Population Council conducts research on biomedical, social science, and public health issues
(URL: www.popcouncil.org/about/about.html). The full reference to their report is Bruce, J. Lloyd,
C.B. & Leonard, A. 1995. Families in Focus: New Perspectives of Mothers, Fathers and Children.
New York: Population Council.
2. Here Castells uses a highly problematic divorce statistic. It is called the marriage/divorce ratio and
compares the number of marriages contracted in a particular year with the number of divorces
granted in that year and is the basis of the 50% of marriages ending in divorce notion. However, it
is extremely misleading since divorces granted in one year do not come from marriages contracted
in that year but all existing marriages. The ‘specific divorce rate’ (number of divorces per 1000
marriages) is much more accurate and produces a much lower divorce rate.
10
Society in Transition 2003, 34(2)
of dissolution, for different causes, of first marriages for women aged 40-49’ and indicates
that ‘with the exception of Tunisia, it oscillates between 22.8 percent and 49.5 percent,
with a peak of 60.8% in Ghana’ (Castells, 1997:146) (emphasis added). The different
causes include the death of a spouse.
The fifth figure shows ‘the general trend towards the reduction of first marriages in
countries of the European Union’ while another figure shows that, with the exception of
Mexico and Germany, the crude marriage rate has declined from 1970 to 1990 (1997:146).
The next table shows ‘the percentage of women aged 20-24 who have never married’
and the comment is ‘with the exception of Ghana and Senegal, between one-third and twothirds of young women are unmarried; with the exception of Spain and Sri Lanka, the proportion of unmarried women 20-24 has increased since 1970. Worldwide, the proportion
of married women aged 15 and older declined from 61 percent in 1970 to 56 percent in
1985’ (Castells, 1997:147).
Castells presents data on non-marital births as a percentage of all births for both developed and developing countries and concludes that ‘an increasing proportion of children are
born out of wedlock in developed countries ... and the most important observation concerns the trend: in the United States, the proportion jumped from 5.4 percent of all births in
1970 to 28% in 1990’ (Castells, 1997:149). Castells does not discuss the trend with respect
to developing societies, since he only has data for one year.
The next table presents data on the proportion of ‘all households with dependent children and at least one resident parent in developed countries’ (single parent households)
and shows that there has been an increase between the early 1970s and mid-1980s.
Another table shows that in the case of European countries, despite regional variation – the
contrast between northern Europe and North America with southern Europe, ‘where traditional family structures resist better’ – and ‘excepting Ireland and Switzerland, – the proportion of one-parent households with children in the mid-1980s represented between 11
percent and 32 percent of all households’ (Castells, 1997:151). 1
In the case of developing countries, Castells claims a similar trend is discernable in the
data on households headed by women de jure (Castells, 1997:151). Here de jure headship
refers to the person who was designated as the usual head of the household as opposed to
the de facto head – that is ‘headship on day of interview’ (Castells, 1997:149):
(The data show) an overall upward trend in the proportion of femaleheaded households between the mid-1970s and the mid/late 1980s (with
some exceptions, e.g. Indonesia, with Brazil showing over 20 percent of its
households in this (de jure female headed) category in 1989, up from 14
percent in 1980 (Castells, 1997:151).
The second last set of statistics concerns the proportion of all households that are single
person households:
... with the exception of Southern Europe, it (single person households)
oscillates between 20 percent and 39.6 percent of all households, with 26.9
percent for the UK, 24.5 percent for the US, 22.3 percent for Japan, 28.0
percent for France, and 34.2 percent for Germany. Obviously, most of
1. Here Castells is presenting data on the single parent households as a proportion of all families rather
than all households.
Society in Transition 2003, 34(2)
11
these households are formed by single elderly, and thus the aging of the
population accounts for a good part of the phenomenon. Still, the fact that
between one-fifth and over one-third of households are single does call
into question the pervasiveness of the patriarchal way of life (Castells,
1997:152).
Finally, Castells (1997:152) presents data which show a reduction in fertility in developed
societies and claims this is ‘the most obvious consequence of the crisis of the patriarchal
family’. In other words, he sees reduced fertility as a way in which women ‘counteract’
patriarchy. Again despite some exceptions or countervailing tendencies (such as the
increase in Scandinavian fertility in the 1980s and the rise in non-marital births), Castells’
general conclusion is that the reduction in fertility is a way in which women ‘hit back’ at
patriarchy.
In Castells’ view the implication of all of the trends discussed above is that the conventional nuclear family is becoming ‘a minority form’, despite two exceptions (Spain and
Japan). He concedes that demographic factors do play a role and that single parenthood is
often accompanied by poverty rather than women’s empowerment. Yet Castells argues for
a general trend towards the destruction of the conventional nuclear family in most developed societies, claiming that the major force behind this trend is women’s liberation. He
furthermore contends that, in time, this trend is likely to affect both developing societies
and those developed societies that are presently an exception to the rule:
Overall, it seems that in most developed countries, with the major exceptions of Japan and Spain, the patriarchal family is in the process of becoming a minority form in the way people live. In the United States, only about
one-quarter of all households in the 1990s fits the ideal type of married
couple with children ... If we add the qualification ‘with the couple’s children’, the proportion drops. Certainly, not all is women’s liberation.
Demographic structure has something to do with it: another one-quarter of
households in the US are one-person households, and the majority of them
are elderly people, mainly women .... None the less, the general trend, as
shown in a few statistical illustrations, is toward the weakening and potential dissolution of traditional family forms of unchallenged patriarchal
domination, with wife and children clustering around the husband/father
(Castells, 1997:155-156).
He explains Spain’s exceptional status with reference to youth unemployment and housing
shortages, which he claims ‘precludes the formation of new households in the largest metropolitan areas’ (Castells, 1997:156). In the case of Japan, by contrast, it is Japanese culture that is holding back the feminist movement and thus retarding the destruction of the
patriarchal family. But in his view it is only a matter of time before ‘Japanese uniqueness’
fades away.
He concludes that ‘If current trends continue to expand throughout the world, and I
contend they will, families as we have known them will become, in a number of societies,
a historical relic not too long in the historical horizon’ (Castells, 1997:156).
While feminism is ‘at the root of this crisis’ through its promotion of women’s
employment, Castells further argues that globalisation is, in part at least, responsible for
both feminism and increasing female employment. Globalisation is therefore indirectly
12
Society in Transition 2003, 34(2)
responsible for the destruction of the ‘patriarchal family’. Globalisation, he claims, has
created a demand for jobs that are ideally suited to women: flexible, part-time, requiring
human relations skills, and offering comparatively low pay. It is the type of employment
opportunities generated by the ‘informational, global economy’ (electronics, insurance
and banking industries, for example) that got women out of the kitchen and into the labour
force. The increasing economic independence of women associated with increased levels
of employment, Castells claims, meant that they were in a better bargaining position vis-àvis their husbands. This, in turn meant that women were ‘freer’ to leave unhappy marriages or avoid marriage altogether, so causing the destruction of the patriarchal family as
Castells defines it:
(Thus), the type of worker required by the informational, networked economy fits the survival interests of women who, under the conditions of
patriarchalism, seek to make compatible work and family, with little help
from their husbands. This process of full incorporation of women into the
labour market, and into paid work, has important consequences for the
family ... the ideology of patriarchalism legitimizing domination on the
basis of the family’s provider’s privilege was decisively undermined. Why
could husbands not help at home if both members of the couple were
equally absent for long hours, and if both were equally contributing to the
family budget? ... With no proper child care, no planning of the spatial connection between residence, jobs, and services, and deteriorating social
services, women were confronted with their reality: their beloved husbands/fathers were taking advantage of them ... the soil was ready for the
seeding of feminist ideas that were simultaneously germinating in the
fields of cultural social movements (Castells, 1997:174-175).
In sum, Castells claims that globalisation is the major force behind the rise in female
employment, feminism, the divorce rate, non-marital births, and the avoidance of marriage
– all of which culminate in the destruction of the family as we knew it.
End of the family as we know it?
Giddens and Castells provide interesting, insightful and complex analyses of the impact of
globalisation on family life. They are to be congratulated for bringing the family into discussions of globalisation which up to recently have tended to focus exclusively on economic and political issues. Given the breadth of their analyses it is not possible to me to
comment on all the claims they make. I will confine myself to one area: the question of
living arrangements. As noted, both claim that as a result of globalisation the conventional
nuclear family (traditional family of the 1950s in Giddens analysis and the patriarchal
family in Castells) is on the verge of extinction in the West and that this will also happen
elsewhere.
In the discussion that follows my concern will be with two propositions derived from
Giddens and Castells’ analyses:
1. there has been a substantial decline in the family as it is known in the West and globalisation is the major force behind that development;
2. family life across the globe is becoming increasingly similar.
Society in Transition 2003, 34(2)
13
The death of the conventional nuclear family in the West?
Giddens and Castells find evidence of a decline in the traditional/patriarchal family (from
this point on referred to as the conventional nuclear family), in the proportion of all households that consist of ‘a married couple and their children’. However, there are problems
with this methodology. It is not at all clear that a reduction in the proportion of all households that consist of ‘mum, dad and the kids’ is evidence for the claim that ‘the family as
we know it’ is on the way out.
The problem with their methodology is that it is informed by a static approach to family life. No one stays in the same household for their entire lives. Household composition
is always in flux as people move, marry, give birth and die. This is where conceptual
issues become relevant.
To distinguish between a static and more dynamic approach to family life, I will use
the term household to refer to the domestic situation people find themselves in at one point
in time. I will use the term family pattern to refer to the series of households that people
participate in over the life course. This is also often referred to as a domestic life cycle.
Ideal-typically, one can distinguish between two domestic life cycles: one associated with
the nuclear family model and one with the extended family model. I call the first ‘the
nuclear family pattern’ and the second ‘the extended family pattern’ to draw attention to
the fact that each one is associated with a number of different household types. In the case
of the nuclear family pattern these are nuclear (at own birth); couple (at marriage); nuclear
(at birth of first child), couple (at departure of last child) and single person households (at
death of spouse). In the case of the extended family pattern, the ‘markers’ for the various
household types (i.e. the reasons for the change in household composition) are less obvious and clear-cut. Suffice to note at this stage that the extended family pattern is associated with only two household types: nuclear and extended. When one adopts this more
dynamic approach to family life one notices that there is hardly any evidence of a substantial decline in the popularity of the conventional nuclear family pattern in those societies
which are deemed to be at the forefront of this development.
Below, I (re)present a table drawn from Giddens incorporating a dynamic component.
This is achieved by grouping together the various household types that make up the conventional nuclear family pattern.
Table 1 Distribution of family and household types in Britain, 1961-1998
Household Type
One person household
Couples (no children)
Couple with dependent childrena
Couple + non-dependent children
(Nuclear Family Pattern)
Lone parents + dependent children
Lone parents + non-dependent children
Multi-family households
Two or more unrelated adults
1961
11
26
38
10
(85%)
2
4
3
5
1971
18
27
35
8
(88%)
3
4
1
4
1981
22
26
31
8
(87%)
5
4
1
5
1991
27
28
25
8
(88%)
6
4
1
3
1998
28
28
23
7
(86%)
7
3
1
3
a. ‘Dependent children’ include all children up to the age of 15 plus all those persons aged 16-24 who
are economically inactive (mainly in education) and who are living with at least one of their parents
(European Commission,2001:115).
Source: The Guardian, 27 March 2000 p.3, quoted in Giddens, 2001:176.
14
Society in Transition 2003, 34(2)
It will be noted, that in 1998, the vast majority of households in Great Britain (86%), conformed to one or other of the phases of the conventional nuclear family pattern. It will also
be noted that in 1961 this was also the case – the percentage of households falling within
the conventional nuclear family pattern being almost exactly the same (85% compared to
86%). This is hardly adequate evidence for the claim that there has been a significant
change in domestic arrangements since the 1960s:
The dominance of the nuclear family was steadily eroded over the second
half of the twentieth century … Less than a quarter of households in Britain conform to the model of the traditional family (Giddens, 2001:175).
The data for the 1960s is instructive with respect to the conceptual and methodological
issues I am raising. They show that even at that time (ten years into the ‘golden era of the
nuclear family’), nuclear family households, as such, did not predominate statistically.
Then, as now, they represented a minority of all household types. It is therefore inappropriate to focus on one household type when making claims for or against the notion that
there has been a substantial and significant change in the way people live their domestic
lives.
Indeed, from the data in Table 1 one cannot be sure that the nuclear family households
depicted there were couple households previously and would become couple households
again in future, followed by single person households. This can only be determined with
absolute certainty if we had data on the life course of individuals which show whether they
have or have not participated in the nuclear family domestic life cycle.
In the absence of that information, Table 2 shows the proportion of all individuals in
Great Britain who were in one of the phases of the conventional nuclear family pattern in
1981 and 1992. Note, once again, that the vast majority of people – 87% in 1981 and 85%
in 1992 – fall into this pattern.
Table 2 Households and people in Great Britain, 1981 and 1992
Type of Household
% of households
1981
22
% of people
1981
8
% of people
1992
11.1
Married Couple
26
20
23.4
Nuclear Family (Dep. Children)
32
49
39.9
Nuclear Family (Indep. Children)
8
10
10.9
88%
87%
85.3%
Lone parent dependent children
4
5
10.1
Other
9
8
4.6
One Person
Nuclear Family Pattern
Source: Adapted from Social Trends 13 & 24 in Haralambos and Holborn (1995:355).
This is not to imply that there has been no change in family life in Western societies in the
course of the twentieth century. Single parent families are today three times as common as
they were in the 1960s and the rise in the divorce rate is undoubtedly one of the main rea-
Society in Transition 2003, 34(2)
15
sons behind that trend. However, in 1998 they constituted only 7% of all households in
Great Britain – hardly a substantial proportion of all households.
It is also true that nuclear family households have reduced significantly as a proportion
of all households since the 1960s, from 38% (1961) to 23% (1998), as Table 1 shows. But
it is doubtful that globalisation is the major force behind that trend. Demographic factors
have been far more influential than Giddens and Castells give them credit for. For
instance, the increase in the average age at marriage since the 1960s partly explains the
increase in single person households, and the reduction in fertility explains the increase in
couple households among the younger age groups. People wait longer before marrying and
therefore enter the couple household stage later and with fewer children, the time spent in
couple-plus-children households, is reduced. Similarly, the increase in one person and
couple households at the older end of the age spectrum is almost entirely explained by the
reduction in fertility (enter the couple household phase sooner) and increased longevity
(stay in the single person household phase longer). In this regard, I take issue with Castells
when he claims that the increase in single person households (most of which contain an
elderly woman) ‘calls into question the pervasiveness of the patriarchal way of life’
(1997:152). Most elderly women would probably be much happier if their husbands were
still alive and the old patriarchal way of life could be continued. At the very least, this is a
thesis worth exploring.
In sum, when one puts family life in dynamic perspective, one notices that there has
been no significant departure from the conventional nuclear family pattern in Western
societies such as Great Britain (and the United States). Globalisation cannot therefore be
seen as responsible for any major departure from conventional family living – since very
little has in fact occurred. I have no doubt that if the relevant data were available, they
would show that today (as in the 1960s) the vast majority of people in Great Britain and
the United States get married (at one stage in their life); have and live with their children
(at one stage in their life), live with a spouse (when their children leave home) and alone
(when their spouse dies). Similarly, with respect to the declining frequency of nuclear
family households, I submit that demographic factors (rather than globalisation) are the
major force behind that trend.
Global convergence of family patterns?
Giddens and Castell’s thesis about how family life is changing in a global context can be
seen as an extension of William Goode’s original theory of family change. In the 1960s
Goode (1963, 1964) claimed he was witnessing the spread of the nuclear family model that
had become predominant in the West to the rest of the world. What differentiates these
more contemporary analyses from Goode’s is in what is being ‘exported’. It is no longer
the nuclear family itself but its demise that is now purportedly being spread across the
globe. However, as there is little evidence of the demise of the nuclear family model – i.e.
a significant departure from the nuclear family pattern – in Western societies, it is not possible to say whether or not anything has been ‘exported’.
Neither Giddens nor Castells provide comparative longitudinal data on household
composition patterns in non-Western societies in support of their claim that the same gen-
16
Society in Transition 2003, 34(2)
eral trend with respect to domestic arrangements is occurring across the globe. Note that
their specific stances regarding the impact of globalisation on family life betray one of the
distinguishing features of the ‘transformationalist’ approach. As described earlier, transformationalists claim that globalisation is real and new but that the outcome of this process
is uncertain and contradictory. Yet both Giddens and Castells predict that the trends they
see happening in the West (First World societies) will eventually occur elsewhere. In the
convergence/divergence debate initiated by Goode, they assume a stance in favour of the
former.
This claim is also problematic because research indicates significant regional variations in domestic arrangements in both the present and the pre-modern eras (see for example Laslett & Wall, 1972; Kertzer, 1991). So even if there were a general trend towards
uniformity in domestic life throughout the world, then societies in different regions would
have entered that process at very different starting points. More specifically, family historians have shown that even in the pre-modern era there were significant differences in the
family patterns followed in the Southern and Eastern parts of Europe compared to the
North West (Laslett & Wall, 1972; Wall, Robin & Laslett, 1983; Hanjal, 1983; Kertzer,
1991). And Ziehl (forthcoming) demonstrates that in the latter part of the 20th century those
differences persist. These differences correspond roughly to the difference between the
nuclear and extended family patterns sketched above. Ziehl (forthcoming) argues that
when one compares an African society such as South Africa with a Western society such
as Britain, then it becomes clear that domestic life is being conducted in very different
contexts.
Regional differences need to be taken into account when theorising about how family
life is or is not changing around the world. Giddens alludes to such differences by comparing China and Europe, but does not integrate them sufficiently into his analysis, except to
say that the trends he has identified are developing ‘unevenly in different regions and cultures’ (Giddens, 2002:51). Similarly, Castells does not pay sufficient attention to the fact
that the ‘exceptions’ he frequently encounters in his data are not individual but regional
‘exceptions’. In other words, individual societies are not lagging behind or contradicting
the general trend. Instead, in broad regions of the world that encompass numerous societies, family life is conducted very differently to that in the West, based on a particular
domestic arrangement and a series of ideas which inform family behaviour.
Conclusion
In assessing Giddens and Castells’ writings on the impact of globalisation on family life, I
do not wish to suggest that they are completely off the mark or that they have nothing valuable to offer either globalisation scholars or family scholars. Both conceptualise the family as referring to a particular domestic arrangement and a set of ideas about how family
members ought to relate to each other as well as practices informed by those ideas – e.g.
ideas and practices relating to husband-wife and parent-child relationships. Quite possibly
there have been major changes in the quality and contents of husband/wife and parent/
child relationships in the course of the twentieth century, which are spreading from the
West in conjunction with the spread of democracy as part of the globalisation process.
Society in Transition 2003, 34(2)
17
However, within the confines of this article, it has not been possible for me to engage that
aspect of their scholarship. Rather, the focus has been quite narrowly on their claims with
respect to domestic arrangements; what I have called households and family patterns.
My argument is that Giddens and Castells have overestimated the magnitude of the
change in the way people live in households. Perhaps a larger proportion of people in
Western societies are following non-conventional family patterns (involving, for example,
a phase of single-parent living), but this does not apply to the vast majority. Possibly many
of the parent-plus-children households presented in the tables above involve second or
third marriages, and so suggest non-conventional domestic life cycles. But again, neither
possibility is likely to be true for anything like the majority of Western populations.
A different picture of family life in the West emerges when a dynamic approach is
adopted because the perspective that is regularly portrayed in the media, as in family sociology textbooks, grossly exaggerates the extent and impact of divorce (see Ziehl 2001/2).
The regular approach also fails to distinguish between a (nuclear family) household and a
(nuclear) family pattern, the major argument of this article.
I have argued that far greater attention needs to be paid to pre-modern and contemporary regional differences in family patterns when making pronouncements about the convergence or divergence of family life in a global context. When one does, a complex and
contradictory picture emerges. Perhaps it is the post-second world war migration flows to
Europe – a feature of the globalisation process – that is making those societies ‘less western’ in terms of general cultural outlook and family patterns. At the same time, the spread
of Western culture via the media to a global audience – another feature of globalisation –
could result in non-Western societies becoming more Western in cultural outlook and family patterns. I present these as hypotheses that await future research. As such, they are
more in keeping with the open-ended and contradictory stance on the outcome of globalisation that characterises the ‘transformationalist’ approach.
References
Aulette, J.R. 1994. Changing Families. Belmont: Wadsworth.
Bidwell, L.D. & Van der Mey, B.J. 2000. Sociology of the Family. Needham Heights: Allyn Bacon.
Castells, M. 1997. The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. Volume 1. The Rise of the
Network Society. Oxford: Blackwell.
Elliot, F. 1996. Gender, Family and Society. London: MacMillan.
Eshleman, J.R. 1994. The Family. Boston: Allyn Bacon.
Giddens, A. 2001. Sociology (Fourth Edition). Oxford: Polity Press.
Giddens, A. 2002. Runaway World – How Globalisation is Reshaping Our Lives. (Second edition).
London: Profile Books.
Goode, W. 1963. The Family. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
Goode, W. 1964. World Revolution and Family Patterns. New York: The Free Press.
Haralambos, M. & Holborn, M. 1995. Sociology – Themes and Perspectives. (Fourth edition).
London: Unwin Hyman.
Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D., Perraton, J. 1999. Global Transformations. Oxford: Polity
Press & Blackwell.
Kertzer, D. 1991. Household History and Sociological Theory. Annual Review of Sociology 17:155-
18
Society in Transition 2003, 34(2)
179.
Laslett, P. & Wall, R. (eds) 1972 Household and Family in Past Time. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Muncie, J., Whetherell, M., Langan, M.., Dallos, R. & Cochrane, A. 1997. Understanding the
Family. London: Sage.
Smith, J. & Wallerstein, I. 1992. Creating and Transforming Households. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Therborn, G. 2001. African Families in a Global Context. Paper presented to the Workshop on
Global Processes, Cape Town. November 29-December 2.
Wall, R, Robin, J. & Laslett, P. (eds.) 1983. Family Forms in Historic Europe. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Ziehl, S.C. 2001/2. Divorce Statistics – A Case of the Wool Being Pulled over our Eyes? Southern
African Journal of Demography 8 (1):9-22.
Ziehl, S.C. (forthcoming) Multiculturalism, Globalization and Family Patterns – A view from
South Africa. Paper to be presented to the 36th World Congress of the International Institute of Sociology.
Beijing. China. 2004.
Zinn, M.B. & Eitzen, D.S. 1990. Diversity in Families. New York: Harper Collins.