Social Role-Taking: A Review of the Constructs, Measures, and Measurement Properties
Author(s): Robert D. Enright and Daniel K. Lapsley
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Review of Educational Research, Vol. 50, No. 4 (Winter, 1980), pp. 647-674
Published by: American Educational Research Association
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Review of Educational Research
Winter, 1980, Vol. 50, No. 4, Pp. 647-674
Social Role-taking: A Review of the Constructs,
Measures, and Measurement Properties
Robert D. Enright
and
Daniel K. Lapsley
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Social role-taking is examined psychometrically through a review of the
constructs,measures developed to representthe constructs,and the reliability
and validity of the measures. The construct is described in several different
ways in the literature. Most measures show adequate interraterreliabilities,
but there is less evidence regarding temporal stability or internal consistency
of the scales. The validation efforts have primarily been on the age-stage
relationship rather than on other aspects of the construct, although a more
expandedfocus has begun within the last few years. The review shows that
Chandler's cognitive, Selman's sociomoral, and Flavell's nickel-dime tasks
possess the best psychometric properties. Recommendationsfor improving
measurementin the social role-taking area are discussed.
The construct of role-taking has begun receiving increased attention recently from
educators and researchers in child development. Role-taking or perspective taking
represents the child's cognitive abilities to understand another person's thoughts or
feelings from the other's point of view. Despite G. H. Mead's (1934) early discussion
of role-taking and Piaget's (1926) pioneering research on egocentrism, the domain
remained relatively untapped until Feffer and Gourevitch's (1960) research. Later,
Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright, and Jarvis (1968) independently formulated research
under the role-taking construct. What we now have is almost two decades of research
using a variety of constructs and measures seen as related under the general heading
of role-taking development.
There have been two recent developments in this field within the last several years.
The first is the increasing popularity of social education programs which attempt to
promote role-taking development in children (Chandler, 1973;Chandler, Greenspan,
& Barenboim, 1974; Elardo, Note 1; Wentink, Smits-van Sonsbeck, Leckie, & Smits,
Note 2). The overall results of the programs show an inconsistent picture with some
showing growth in the children and others showing no growth at all. The second,
more recent development is the call by researchers for more attention to the
psychometric properties of the role-taking instruments. For instance, Kurdek (1978),
Rubin (1978), and Hudson (1978) have recently concluded that we need to examine
far more closely the measurement error in role-taking scales. Kurdek (1977a) and
Specialthanksto DanielKeating,RoyalGrueneich,MichaelSubkoviakandtwo anonymous
reviewersfor theirhelpfulcomments.
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ENRIGHT AND LAPSLEY
Rubin (1978) have further recommended an examination of the convergent-discriminant validation of these scales because the task performance may be affected by
children's verbal abilities.
It is not surprising that these recommendations for psychometric analyses have
waited for over two decades when it is realized that the theoretical orientation of
role-taking is Piagetian. It is often mistaken (Elkind, 1969) that Piagetian and
psychometric orientations are conceptually distinct. What is confounded in such
discussions is a theoretical orientation (such as individual difference IQ testing that
uses psychometrics) and a methodological orientation (psychometric theory). The
confound leads to such conclusions as: (1) Piagetian theory is concerned with stage
development across age and (2) psychometric theory is concerned with individual
differences within age. Although the constructs of stage development and individual
differences are distinct, stage theory is not incompatible with the psychometric
methodology that has been traditionally used to study individual differences. Psychometrics, quite simply, is concerned with test construction, the reliability of one's
measuring tool, and validation of the theoretical construct. Claiming that Piagetian
measuring tools are exempt from such precise methodology would seem to be
weakening the scientific precision of proposed findings. For example, suppose a
researcher correlated age with performance on Piagetian task A and did not find a
significant relationship. What is the conclusion here? An exclusive focus on theory
could lead to the conclusion that construct A is not developmental. A psychometric
focus, on the other hand, would lead to such a conclusion only after examining the
test construction and the reliability properties of task A. Possibly this tool is so filled
with measurement error that it does not accurately represent or measure the underlying construct. Psychometrics, then, can work in conjunction with such a theory to
help us more precisely measure our theoretical constructs.
Not only is it time to examine the psychometric properties of role-taking tasks to
aid basic research as Kurdek (1978), Rubin (1978), and Hudson (1978) suggest, but
also it would seem necessary to do so to aid educators in their social education
programs. As stated above, the results have been varied across these programs. Are
we to conclude when a program fails that the educational methods were inappropriate? A competing conclusion at the present time is that the measures selected were
either unreliable or measured a different aspect of role-taking than was emphasized
in the program. If such educational programs are to be successful, it would seem
necessary to have, as far as possible, error-free instruments as well as a clear
understanding of the subtle conceptual differences underlying the many scales that
have now appeared in the role-taking literature.
The purpose of the present article, then, is to address two issues with regard to
psychometric theory merging with Piagetian theory in the role-taking area. First, the
existing psychometric properties of the role-taking scales will be examined. This will
include an examination of the constructs as they are described in the literature, a
description of the measures used to operationalize the constructs, and an examination
of the reliability and validity of each scale. The second purpose is to draw conclusions
from these findings and to examine the ways of improving reliability and validity of
the scales. Although other reviews of role-taking do exist (Chandler, 1977; Ford,
1979; Hill & Palmquist, 1978; Shantz, 1975), none has analyzed each measure in
detail, allowing for a direct evaluation of the relative validation strengths of each.
648
SOCIAL ROLE-TAKING
Only this latter analysis will allow social educators to choose the most appropriate
scale for their programs.
As a final point before we present the psychometric analysis, it should be noted
that most investigators in this area have not had as their purpose the development of
psychometric instruments. Instead, many have attempted a descriptive analysis of
social role-taking stages through clinical interview procedures. For the most part,
these procedures have been successful in elucidating a stage sequence. Because the
field is relatively new, there has not been an attempt to develop only one role-taking
construct, to develop measures from psychometric theory, or to develop comparable
measures. This should not be seen as a fault or shortcoming of the researchers, but
instead should be seen as the current state-of-the-art.
The Role-taking Construct
On the most general level, all role-taking constructs refer to the process of "stepping
inside the other's shoes" and predicting the other's thoughts, feelings, or what the
other is seeing. The latter ability of visual or spatial role-taking will not be discussed
here because it does not necessarily require a social ability. That is, when the child
is at point A in a room and is asked how the room would look at point B, the child
has to only imagine the spatial arrangement of the room from that other perspective.
Understanding qualities of other people do not seem to be necessary to solve the
task. At the same time, the educational programs have not concerned themselves
with this dimension. Therefore, only cognitive and affective role-taking constructs
will be considered. For those interested in spatial role-taking, see Fehr's (1978)
review.
Social role-taking has generally been classified into two different constructs:
cognitive role-taking and affective role-taking. Cognitive role-taking refers to the
child's ability to think about what the other is thinking. Similarly, affective roletaking is the child's ability to understand another's internal, subjective, or feeling
states.
Cognitive Role-taking
Within the cognitive role-taking domain, there have been many researchers who
have described levels of development (see, e.g., Byrne, 1974;Chandler, 1972;DeVries,
1970; Feffer & Gourevitch, 1960; Flavell et al., 1968; Selman, 1971a, Selman &
Byrne, 1974; Kuhn, Note 3). Most of the researchers'levels show commonalities with
the other researchers' descriptions as well as with Mead's (1934) observations. A
summary of the stage sequences of four cognitive role-taking theorists is described in
Table I. The parallel trends in task performance described in the table are conceptual,
not empirical. An abstraction of the commonalities across the various sequences is as
follows:
At first, the child does not consider another's viewpoint. For example, if
the child likes candy, then he/she thinks everybody must like candy.
The child next realizes that others may think differently than the child
about a given situation. This is seen in Chandler's (1972) nonegocentrism
stage in which the child realizes he/she may have privileged information.
As a typical example, the child under observation may see Child A wave
good-bye to his/her father as he leaves in the car. Child B then comes along
649
CN
L/
TABLE 1
Summary of Developmental Levelsfor Role-taking Constru
Chandler
(privileged information)
Selman and Byrne
(sociomoral task)
Flavell
(nickel-dime game
Total egocentrism in that the child confuses his/her thoughts with the thoughts
of others
Child attributeshis/her knowledge to others in a probabilistic way
Tendency for egocentric response to
change to nonegocentric
Level 0: Egocentric role-taking; no differentiation of viewpoints
Level 0: S unable to impute
or offers one without justifi
Nonegocentrism: the child is aware that
he/she can have privileged information
in that Si' and 0" view the same solution
differently because they have different
data about it
Level 1: Subjective role-taking; S realizes
that O can think differently than S because both may have different data regarding a given situation
Level 1: S is aware that O ha
Level 2: Self-reflective role-taking; the
child can view him-/herself from O's
viewpoint. This is a sequential ability
Level 2: S thinks that 0 is a
thoughts
Level 3: A "generalized other" perspective
in which S can simultaneously consider
the viewpoints of self and O
Level 3: Infinite regress, S kn
aware that S knows O's str
Note. S' = the experimental child or subject
0 = the other person being considered
SOCIAL ROLE-TAKING
and offers a toy car to A. Child A starts to cry. If the experimental child has
this ability, he/she should understand that child B does not understand
exactly why child A is crying because B did not see the previous incident
between A and the father. In other words, the experimental child and child
B have two different understandings of the situation. If the child realizes
this and does not attribute the previous knowledge of A and the father to
child B, then the child has acquired this level of cognitive role-taking.
Selman and Byrne's (1974) subjective role-taking describes a similar
phenomenon, but not in a privileged information context. Selman's sociomoral procedure has shown that the child realizes another person has
thoughts and feelings different from the self's, but the child cannot yet
simultaneously consider the self's and the other's viewpoints in resolving a
moral dilemma. Flavell et al.'s nickel-dime game describes this stage as
level I in which the child realizes the other person has a game strategy, but
the child does not yet realize that the other is thinking about the child's
strategy.
This stage is also seen in Feffer and Gourevitch's (1960) simple refocus
I level in which the child changes a story when retelling it from different
characters' viewpoints. Although this level shows that the child is aware of
differences between characters, he/she still confuses roles, showing that the
child is not yet aware that characters take each others' perspectives.
The next stage seems to occur when the child can switch roles cognitively
and view the world, including the self, from the other's viewpoint. This is
described in Selman and Byrne's self-reflective role-taking, Flavell et al.'s
level 2, and Feffer and Gourevitch's consistent elaboration stages.
Finally the child can step back from a situation and view all perspectives
simultaneously. This is described in Selman and Byrne's level 3, Flavell et
al.'s infinite regress level 3, and Feffer and Gourevitch's change of perspective level.
It should be noted that not all theorists study this entire stage sequence. The
privileged information construct, for example, ends with an awareness of differences.
Also, some theorists such as Chandler (1972) and Feffer and Gourevitch (1960)
postulate transitions between stages. For example, before the child understands
privileged information he/she has a tendency to fluctuate between egocentrism and
nonegocentrism (Chandler, 1972).
In explaining what underlies or is responsible for reasoning on a particular level,
theorists have chosen one of three interrelated ideas: egocentrism, operative knowing,
and role-taking structure. Egocentrism is a Piagetian (1926) concept which refers to
the child's inability to switch the focus of interpreting the world from a self-referenced
system to an other-directed system. This would be analogous to the first level
abstracted from Table I. Egocentrism is no longer the prevailing cognitive style when
the child is able to decenter his/her cognitions. That is, when the child has acquired
operational structureswhich allow him/her to consider the selfs own viewpoint and
those of others in a balanced fashion then egocentrism in role-taking is no longer
observed. From this developmental point, the child begins to increasingly decenter
his/her perspective until he/she can shift foci from self to other in a coordinated and
flexible fashion as the situations demand. In this regard the concept of decentration
is not viewed as a unidimensional construct, in that one is either "centered" or
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ENRIGHT AND LAPSLEY
"decentered." Rather the progress from egocentrism to mature perspective-taking
takes place along a decentering continuum which culminates in successive and then
simultaneous apprehension of self-other viewpoints (Selman, 197la; Urberg & Docherty, 1976).
To further explain what underlies role-taking abilities across the developmental
levels, Youniss (1975) has suggested the concept of operative knowing. This concept
brings explanations in social cognition more in line with Piaget's later theoretical
work as Furth (1969) remarks. Operative knowing refers to the use of cognitive
actions or schemes in coming to know an object or a person. The action here is
meant to be taken literally just as one has a physical action when reaching for an
object. In the case of role-taking, when the child is faced with the possibility of
understanding another person, that child will operate via mental action systems on
the other person. Knowing the other person, then, is a result of two things: (a) the
characteristicsof the other person and (b) the particular cognitive actions performed
by the child. The resulting knowledge of the other will differ among children who
perform different cognitive action systems on the other. The differential knowledge
defines the different role-taking stages. The differential mental action systems
explains in theory the existence of progressive stages.
As with egocentrism, operative knowing is still vague in theory if we are not given
a precise description ofjust what the mental action systems are at each level. Selman's
(1971a; Selman & Byrne, 1974) construct of role-taking structure is an attempt to
describe such cognitive actions. As such, Selman's work is a specialized case of the
more general notion of operative knowing. To simplify, let us take only one level
and show the underlying structure responsible for social knowing on that level. On
level two, Selman symbolizes the mental action system as S <= O. In words, the
subject (S) can take the perspective of the other (O). At the same time, the subject is
aware that O is considering S's perspective. This action, in theory, leads to the roletaking ability of the child to consider the other's thoughts about the child. For
example, the child may be able to reason, "I wonder if Billy thinks that I'm a nice
person?"
Whether one accepts the explanations of either egocentrism/decentration or operative knowing, theorists interested in cognitive role-taking usually adhere to certain
assumptions about the developmental levels. First, the Piagetian levels of concrete
and formal operations (developed to explain logical reasoning) are considered to be
necessary, but not sufficient for the parallel levels of role-taking. For example, a
child is considered to be in concrete operations if he/she demonstrated reversibility
in conservation tasks. Selman (1976) maintains that without the reversibility structure,
the child cannot develop the reciprocity structure of level 2 role-taking, which, in
effect, is a reversibility of perspectives.
Second, there should be an internal consistency of responding across tasks because
one's ability constitutes an organized, consistent way of reasoning about the social
world. Third, the levels are considered invariant in that the child cannot skip from
level 1 to level 3. Likewise, regression should not occur in level of reasoning. Fourth,
the levels are considered hierarchical.They are characterized by increased complexity
and integration as one moves up the stage ladder. For instance, lower levels are
characterized by a focus on the self. Later, the child integrates this perspective with
the perspective of the other. The added complexity of self and other leads to
reciprocal role-taking. Next, the levels are considered in theory to be universal.
652
SOCIAL ROLE-TAKING
Presumably, the sequence of development can be found in all cultures. Sixth,
although stage theory is not normative, in that all six-year-olds are expected to be on
a given level, the stages are linked to the idea of competence or social adequacy
(White, 1959), so that children lagging far behind peers would be expected to show
inadequate social interactions. Finally, the cognitive domain, like any role-taking
domain, is considered to measure abilities other than only verbal or logical ability.
It is important to keep in mind that not all researchersand theorists in this area have
described their construct so as to include all of the above points. Most, however, do
suggest a link between their constructs and Piagetian structural theory. Therefore,
while the above stage assumptions are not necessarily made explicit in all manuscripts
discussing theory, those assumptions are certainly implicit.
Affective Role-taking
Affective role-taking, the ability to infer the feeling states of others, is often
confused with empathy, defined as the ability to share the feelings of others.
Consequently, much of the research in this area has been devoted to resolving the
conceptual distinctions between these concepts (Borke, 1971, 1972, 1973; Chandler
& Greenspan, 1972; Feshbach & Roe, 1968; Flapan, 1968; Hoffman, 1976; Hoffman
& Levine, 1976; Rothenberg, 1970). In theory the affective role-taking dimension
should differ from cognitive role-taking in subject matter only.
Although the tasks employed to index empathic awareness (Borke, 1971;Feshbach
& Roe, 1968) in very young children seem to require only the primitive skills of
identifying the affective state of another, or in projecting one's own feeling to the
other in an emotionally stereotypic situation, these skills nonetheless represent
developmentally prior abilities which serve as important precursorsto genuine social
decentration and affective role taking. An integration of the available research in
this area, then, would seem to suggest the following developmental sequence:
At first, young children are aware that emotional states originate in other
people (Hoffman, 1976);
Next, children are able to correctly anticipate the affective reactions of
others through the mechanism of projection, identification, and stereotyping
(Borke, 1972);
When asked to adopt different roles in affect-arousing situations, children
confuse their own point of view with those of others (Chandler & Greenspan, 1972);
Children can assume multiple viewpoints relative to the affective states
of others in a flexible and coordinated fashion (Chandler & Greenspan,
1972).
Explanations of performance at the latter two levels of this sequence rely primarily
on the decline of egocentrism and the ascent of perspectivistic thought, an achievement of middle childhood in the Piagetian conceptualization of cognitive development. Hoffman (1976; Hoffman & Levine, 1976) would argue that the first level
described above may signify an innate precursor of empathic distress, itself a
component of altruistic motivation which may have survival value for the species.
Not until the highest level does the child show decentering ability that would
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ENRIGHT AND LAPSLEY
characterize actual role-taking. Because this domain is also Piagetian, it would share
the structuralistassumptions described for the cognitive domain.
The Role-taking Measures
Just as there are several different constructs which supposedly define role-taking,
there are many measures now in use which supposedly measure the construct. For
example, in adding the measures of two studies (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, and
Brady-Smith, 1977; Wentink et al., Note 2) there are a total of 12 different tasks or
measures used to assess role-taking. Because of space limitations the most popular
measures and those for which psychometric data have been obtained will be
described. This will be done for both cognitive and affective role-taking domains.
Cognitive Role-taking
Based on the number of researchersusing the task, Flavell et al.'s (1968) cognitive
measure, usually referred to as the "apple-dog" story, is probably the most popular
of all role-taking tasks. It is a task employing privileged information in which the
child knows more about a story then someone else. It assesses the extent to which the
child realizes that the other person views the situation differently because the other
lacks some knowledge about the story. The child is first shown a seven picture
sequence. The cards are as follows: (a) A boy is walking along a sidewalk; (b) The
boy looks frightened as he sees an angry looking dog running toward him; (c) The
boy, looking over his shoulder, runs from the dog who continues chasing him; (d)
The boy runs toward an apple tree a few feet away. The dog is not shown. The boy's
face is hidden by some leaves; therefore, no anxiety is apparent; (e) The boy is
climbing up the tree while the dog stands below, apparently barking; (f) The boy is
shown in the tree, not looking at the dog, nor appearing frightened. The dog is
pictured as walking across the street with its back to the boy. No apparent expression
is on the dog's face; (g) The boy is in the tree eating an apple. The dog is not in the
picture.
After the child tells the story, cards b, c, and e, all of which showed a ferocious
dog, are removed. Another person then enters the room and the child must predict
how the new person will tell the story. If the child can decenter from his/her own
perspective, then the child should accurately predict the other's conception of a new
story. The following researchers have incorporated this measure into their work:
Hollos (1975), Hollos and Cowan (1973), Hudson (1978), Kurdek and Rodgon
(1975), Marvin, Greenberg, and Mossler (1976), Mossler, Marvin, and Greenberg
(1976), Selman (1971a), West (1974), Zahn-Waxler et al. (1977), Kurdek (Note 4),
and Olejnik (Note 5).
Chandler's (1973) role-taking measure also assesses cognitive role-taking. As with
the Flavell et al. task it too deals with privileged information. With Chandler's
measure, the child is exposed to two story characters, one who has privileged
information and another who does not. It assesses the extent to which the child
understands that each character, because of differential knowledge, views a given
situation differently. The child is given 10 to 12 items, each consisting of a series of
cartoon sequences which show a character psychologically influenced by a series of
events. A new characterwho did not observe the prior events witnesses the subsequent
behavior. For example, a boy playing baseball accidently breaks a window. After654
SOCIAL ROLE-TAKING
wards a knock at the boy's door produces a reaction of fear in him. His father, not
knowing of the broken window, looks puzzled. In theory, if the experimental child
is capable of adopting a perspective other than his/her own, then the child should
realize and report that the father does not know why the boy appears afraid. Because
such an ability develops by middle childhood (Chandler, 1972), ceiling effects are
possible with this measure during middle childhood and beyond. A low score
represents low egocentrism or high ability to decenter. This measure has been
employed by Chandler (1972), Chandler et al. (1974), Kurdek (1977a,b), Leahy and
Huard (1976), Rubin (1978), and Urberg and Docherty (1976). Similar kinds of tasks
have been developed by Rotenberg (1974) and Mossler, Greenberg, and Marvin
(Note 6).
Flavell et al.'s (1968) nickel-dime game assesses the child's reasoning about an
opponent's thoughts in a game of strategy. In theory, the more complexly the child
can reason about the other's thoughts, including the other's thoughts about the child,
the more successful the child will be. The child is first presented with two plastic
cups. Under one cup is a nickel and under the other is a dime. The contents of both
cups are easily identified because there is an extra nickel taped to the top of the cup
housing the game nickel. A dime is taped to the other cup. In its original version, the
opponent is to leave the room. The child is to remove one of the coins under a cup
and the opponent is to reenter and choose one of the cups which he or she believes
still houses some money. If the opponent picks the cup with money still under it,
then he/she keeps the money. While the opponent is out of the room, the experimenter asks the child which cup he/she thinks the opponent will pick and why. If
the child decides that the opponent will pick the dime cup because it has more
money, this would represent a lower level of role-taking activity. Note there is little
role-taking on the child's part beyond the perspective that the opponent is capable
of thinking about the game materials. A higher level response occurs when the child
reflects on the opponent's thoughts about the child. For instance, the child may say,
"He would want the dime. But he knows that I know this. So he may pick up the
nickel cup." Further recursive thinking is also measured. The nickel-dime game or
similar guessing games have been used in the research of Byrne (1974), DeVries
(1970), Iannotti (1978), Kurdek (1977b), Moir (1974), Selman (1971a,b), Kuhn (Note
3), and O'Connor (Note 7). Besides in Flavell et al., a scoring manual for the nickeldime game can be found in Selman and Byrne (1973).
Selman and Byrne (Note 8) have described a relatively new method for assessing
cognitive role-taking development. An open-ended dilemma is read or shown via
filmstrip to the child. The child is then interviewed with a series of questions about
the story. As an example of a story, Holly was asked by her dad not to climb trees.
Holly's friend, Sean, asks Holly if she would help him retrieve his kitten caught in a
nearby tree. Holly must decide whether or.not to climb the tree to save the kitten. If
she does, she will be breaking her promise to her dad. To assess role-taking activity,
questions are asked such as "Why might Sean think Holly won't climb the tree?,"
"What does Holly think her father will think of her if he finds out?" As with the
Flavell et al. task, this task assesses the extent to which the child can take multiple
perspectives. The ability to take multiple perspectives is seen by Selman and Byrne
as a characteristic of operative thinking/structuralism. As a scoring example, if the
child understands that Holly can reflect on her dad's thoughts about her, the child is
scored on level 2 for that response. The highest level exhibited throughout the
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ENRIGHT AND LAPSLEY
interview constitutes that child's final score. Such sociomoral interviews have been
employed in the work of Byrne (1974), Kurdek (1977b), Selman and Byrne (1974),
Selman and Damon (1976), Selman and Lieberman (1975), and Gordon, Damon,
and Selman (Note 9).
Miller, Kessel, and Flavell (1970) have described another cognitive task to assess
recursive thinking. This task assesses the extent to which a child can reason about
another's thoughts in four categories: (a) the other thinking about another person;
(b) the other thinking about action between people (e.g., a conversation); (c) the other
thinking about another's thoughts (one-loop recursion); and (d) the other thinking
about thinking (two-loop recursion). The child is first shown a series of people in
cartoon-type drawings. The child is taught to distinguish between scalloped cartoon
clouds representing thought in the cartoon character and smooth clouds representing
talking. Once this is grasped, the child is shown four characters: A boy who is the
main character doing the thinking, a girl, a mother, a father, all of whom will be the
object of the boy's thoughts or conversation. The experimenter explains that the child
is to orally trace the thinking of the cartoon boy. The boy's thinking is to be in a big
"thinking cloud." Up to 18 cards randomly ordered are shown to the child. Some
cards represent lower levels of recursive thinking while others are quite complex. For
example, in the first card, the boy is thinking of an apple. If the child says, "The boy
is thinking of an apple," (some fruit, etc.) it is correct. On a higher level of complexity,
the cartoon boy may be thinking about the father's thoughts about the boy. For the
experimental child to understand this cartoon, he/she would in theory have to be
aware that the cartoon boy can think of another's thoughts about himself. One point
is given for each correct answer. This measure has been used by Rubin (1973, 1978)
and by Wentink et al. (Note 2).
Affective Role-taking Measures
There have been several measures of affective role-taking (Borke, 1971, 1972;
Burns and Cavey, 1957; Chandler and Greenspan, 1972; Feshbach and Roe, 1968;
Flapan, 1968;Gottman, Gonso, and Rasmussen, 1975;Rotenberg, 1974;Rothenberg,
1970; Feshbach and Kuchenbecker, Note 10; Shantz, Note 11; Watson, Note 12).
Only those developed by Rothenberg, Flapan, and Chandler and Greenspan will be
detailed here. The Borke procedure, though popular and controversial, will not be
discussed because her task is only appropriate for preschoolers. Thus, it would not be
used in elementary or secondary social education programs.
In Rothenberg's task, four tape recordings of a male and female engaged in
interactions which depict adult concerns are played to the child. In each story an
affect occurs encompassing across the stories the emotions of happiness, anger,
anxiety, and sadness. For example, in the anxiety story the man tells the woman that
he has invited some friends to come for dinner. The woman does not feel she can be
ready and does not know where to start. Adult problems are presented to avoid the
problem of the experimental child's identifying with the characters rather than
understanding them from the other's point of view. Before the story is played, the
child is instructed to focus on only one character to provide a similar point in
listening for all subjects. After the story, the child is asked how the character felt and
why he/she felt that way. To prevent carryover from a previous story, each story
uses a different pair of male-female actors. To receive the highest score, the child
656
SOCIAL ROLE-TAKING
must be aware of changes in feelings of the focal character. In the previous example,
the woman changed from calm or happy as the man came home to anxious after he
told of the plans. The measure has also been used by Hudson (1978), Johnson (1975),
Moir (1974), and Rubin (1978).
The Flapan (1968) procedure entails the presentation of two sound-film clips
which portray episodes of social interaction. Each film contains "a sequence of events
that constituted a complete self-contained story, with an introductory scene establishing a 'problem,' intervening scenes on the same theme, and a scene concluding
the action dealing with the theme" (p. 11). Each of the two film selections are shown
in five episodes, with each episode lasting between 1.5 and 3 minutes. At the
conclusion of each episode in each film the child is asked to give an accounting of
what occurred during the scene portrayed. Responses to this unstructured interview
are scored for affective sensitivity if the subject is able to infer or interpret feelings,
interpersonal perceptions, and intentions or expectations that are not obviously
expressed or labeled. Following this, standardized questions are asked of the child
for each episode to determine the kinds of interpretations that are given to the feeling
when attention is directed to specific events in the episode. This has not been a
widely used task.
Chandler and Greenspan's (1972) task consists of two parts. The first half of the
procedure utilizes three cartoon sequences which portray the story characters in
affect-arousing situations "leading inevitably to feelings of anger, fear, and sadness"
(p. 105). Subjects are questioned at this point to determine their anticipation of the
emotional reaction of the story characters. A sequel to these stories is included in the
second phase of the assessment procedure. The central characters, who are shown to
behave in a consistent manner with their previously aroused affective state, arejoined
by a late-arriving character who witnesses only the demonstration of the emotional
behavior, but not the antecedant circumstances that caused it. The child is required
first to relate the entire story from his/her own point of view and then to reinterpret
the events from the limited perspective of the partially informed bystander. If the
privileged information available only to the child is part of the account offered as
descriptive of the point of view of the late-arriving bystander, then such a response
is considered egocentric. This two-step assessment procedure adopted by Chandler
& Greenspan allows an educator to distinguish developmentally between less mature
affective sensitivity and flexible role-taking.
Cognitive and Affective Role-taking Measures
Feffer and Gourevitch's (1960) projective role-taking task (RTT) was the first roletaking measure to be developed. Both cognitive and affective responses are elicited.
The child is first shown a variety of cut-out figures of people and two different
scenes. The child is asked to tell a story about each scene using any of the figures.
Usually three figures are used per story. Next, the child must retell each story several
times, each time from the viewpoint of one character who appeared in the child's
initial story of that scene. In theory, each new role that the child takes adds to the
perspective-taking complexity of the situation. A successful performance is evaluated
by the child's ability to decenter or refocus attention to the new character's point of
view. If the child refocused on the character's perspective while retelling the story,
but did not decenter entirely, the child was scored on the simple refocusing level. For
657
ENRIGHT AND LAPSLEY
example, suppose in the initial story the child described the father as having a
"terrible day at the office." In the retelling, the child in the father's role might say,
"It's 5:00 and I'm hungry," without mentioning the office. Although he/she could
take the perspective of the father the child did not consistently refocus on the father's
concerns in the initial story. If the child can change perspective at will, that is, take
the role of the father and of a second character, the mother, who is aware of father's
sadness, then the child is given an even higher score. For more details on the scoring
system see Schnall and Feffer (Note 13). This measure has been used in the following
research: Keller (1976), Kurdek (1977a,b), Piche, Michlin, Rubin, and Johnson
(1975), Turnure (1975), Wolfe (1963), and Marsh and Serafica (Note 14). The above
measures' psychometric properties will now be described.
Reliability of Role-taking Measures
Reliability can be thought of as consistency. There are two different ways a
measure can show consistency: across items and across time. The former is referred
to as internal consistency while the latter is temporal stability. Interraterreliability is
a consistency check on two or more raters or scorers. The coefficient tells the extent
to which the judges' scores are proportional when expressed as deviations from their
means. Interrateragreement gives the degree to which one judge gives the exact same
scores as the other judge. For example, suppose two raters independently rated three
items. Rater No. 1 assigned the scores 1, 3, 5 while Rater No. 2 assigned the scores
2, 4, 6 to the same items. Their interrater reliability would be r = 1.00, while their
exact agreement would be 0 percent. See Tinsley and Weiss (1975) for a discussion
of these two interraterconsistency checks.
Tables II and III give the existing reliability data in role-taking. Table II shows the
cognitive tasks; Table III shows the affective measures. Most, although not all, of the
values represented in both tables were derived from Pearson product moment
correlation coefficients. Although reliabilities such as internal consistency have
specific techniques for deriving a coefficient (Cronbach's alpha, Hoyt's reliability,
Spearman-Brown formula, Kuder-Richardson formula) these have not been traditionally used in role-taking. The exceptions follow. Feffer and Gourevitch (1960)
performed a X2test of independence rather than a Pearson r to derive their internal
consistency estimate. Chandler (1973) used a Spearman-Brown split-half reliability
treating five of the cartoon sequences as one item and the other five sequences as
another item. Piche et al.'s (1975) interrater reliability coefficient was derived by
Scott's r.
What becomes immediately apparent when examining both tables is the few
studies represented when compared to the total number of role-taking studies
undertaken. Less than half of the studies are represented. Of those represented, few
cite all reliabilities. Such information would be helpful in interpreting the usefulness
of a given measure because each reliability answers a different question about that
measure. By far the most represented reliabilities encompass interrater agreements
and reliabilities. It seems that consensus has set a precedent in that these reliabilities
are seen as sufficient for reporting a measure's consistency. Although these data give
valuable information, they tell us more about the judges' accuracy than something
about the measure's consistency.
When interpreting any given value, it is possible to subtract the value from the
658
TABLE
II
Reliabilityfor Cognitive Role-taking Measures
Measure
Apple-dogstudy
Olejnik (Note 5)
Chandler'smeasure
Chandler (1971)"
Chandler & Greenspan (1972)
Chandler (1973)
Olejnik (Note 5)
Piche et al. (1975)
Leahy & Huard (1976)
Urberg & Docherty (1976)
Kurdek (1977b)
Rubin (1978)
Nickel-dime game and other guessing
games
Byrne (1974)
O'Connor (Note 7)
Kurdek (1977b)
Sociomoral dilemmas
Selman & Byrne (1974)
Byrne (1974)
Selman & Lieberman (1975)
Kurdek (1977b)
Recursivethinking
Rubin (1973)
Rubin (1978)
Other CognitiveMeasures
Mossler et al. (1976)
Measure
Ages/Grades
Grades k-3
Not available
Grades 1-7
Ages 11, 13
Grades K-3
Grade 4
Grades 4-6
Ages 3-5
Grades 1-4
Preschool
Grade 1
Grade 3
Grade 5
at each age
N
Nat
Not available
86 (total)
45
40
20
-22
14
24
26
41
36
40
16
-25
24
Ages 4, 6, 8, 10
Ages 10, 13, 16, adult
Grade 2
Grades 1-4
10
16
68
24
Ages 2.5-6.5
a Reported in Chandler et al. (1974)
Tempor
Stabilit
Stabili
40
Ages 10, 13, 16, adult
Grades 3-5
Grades 1-4
Grades K, 2, 4, 6
Preschool, grades 1, 3, 5
Consiste
Internal Consistency
.91
.92
.65 to .86
.56
.68
.26
.33
.32
.52 (all grades)
.77 to .85
.69
.41
.62
.62
.66
20
143 (total)
10-20
.84
.85 to .
.90 to .93
ON
ON
Reliabilityfor
Measure
Rothenberg'smeasure
Rothenberg (1970)
Moir (1974)
Rubin (1978)
Hudson (1978)
Flapan's task
Flapan (1968)
Chandler& Greenspan
Chandler & Greenspan (1972)
Feffer's measure
Feffer (1959)
Feffer & Gourevitch (1960)
Wolfe (1963)
Piche et al. (1975)
Turnure (1975)
Keller (1976)
Marsh & Serafica (Note 14)
Kurdek (1977b)
TABLE III
Affective and Cognitive-Affective Role-taking Me
Measure Ages/Grades
Ages/Grades
Grades 3, 5
Age 11
Preschool
Grade I
Grade 3
Grade 5
age
N at each age
-50
Temp
Cons
Internal Consistency
emp
.28 to .47
40
26
41
36
40
.18
.20
.39
Grade 2
110
.50 (all grades)
.70 to .75
Age 6
Age 9
Age 12
20
20
20
.64
.67
.82
Grades 1-7
Adults
Ages 6-7, 8-9, 10-11, 12-13
Ages 10-21
Grade 4
Ages 7, 9, 12
Ages 12.5
Ages 4-10
Grades 1-4
86(total)
35
-20
-90
20
20
67
20
24
.42
.40
.27
.40
SOCIAL ROLE-TAKING
integer 1 to derive an estimate of the amount of error in the scores. For instance, a
coefficient of .97 represents a measure which produces scores with only .03 or 3
percent error. This means that any given score is probably very close to its theoretically true score (see Stanley, 1969). With this in mind, it is clear that all of the
measures represented can be scored with a minimum of judges' errors. The consistency of the other aspects of reliability for most measures, however, either is not as
strong or is unclear because of lack of data. The exceptions are Chandler's task,
Selman's sociomoral dilemmas, and the nickel-dime game, all of which appear to
have an adequate degree of internal homogeneity and temporal stability. Poor
internal consistency, on the other hand, is apparent in the Rothenberg affective task,
and in the Feffer scale.
It should be noted also that Rubin's (1978) technique of examining internal
consistency within age leads to quite different conclusions than when that statistic is
obtained by collapsing across age. In both instances in which he did this, Rubin
obtained poor internal consistencies within each age, but minimally acceptable values
when collapsing across age. One must be cautious in interpreting the within-age
values because the restricted range may be producing spuriously low correlations.
The lack of adequate reliability values in many measures creates a problem in
turning to the validity results. One usually does not draw conclusions about a
measure's relationship with other variables until that measure has been first found to
be reliable (Nunnally, 1967). This is the case since, if measurement error is responsible
for the scores on one of the measures, acceptance of a null hypothesis may have
come about anomalously through random fluctuations in that measure. False negatives, then, and at times false positives, may be the result. Unfortunately, the focus
in role-taking has been predominantly on validity outcomes without a concomitant
focus on reliability.
Construct Validity
All social cognitive developmental scales are theory-based. That is, the scales are
developed to reflect the construct underlying that scale. Whenever a scale is so
constructed, then the researcher must demonstrate through empirical evidence that
the scale does represent that particular construct. This is done by studying the
relationships between the scale and other variables which would be expected in
theory to either show a relationship or not. Such a procedure to elucidate the
connection between a scale and its underlying construct by studying relationships
between the scale and outside variables is construct validation. This section will
consider the construct validity of role-taking.
Cognitive Role-taking
Given that the cognitive and affective constructs as outlined previously are
structural/developmental, then there are at least 11 validation criteria for a construct
valid scale. These criteria are in Table IV.
Turning to the cognitive scales first, we see that the first criterion is clearly
supported with all scales because all previously cited stage theorists have shown the
levels to appear in the expected order with their scales. Validation criteria two and
three have no data for any of the measures. With regard to the fourth validation
criterion, the apple-dog story, because it is a one item test, is not amenable to internal
consistency analyses. Chandler's (Chandler 1972; 1973;Olejnik, Note 5) measure and
661
ENRIGHT AND LAPSLEY
TABLE IV
Summary of Evidence Needed to Validatethe Role-taking Constructsas StructuralDevelopmental
ValidationCriteria
1. Stages should increase with age to reflect the developmental nature of the construct.
2. Criteria should be established which clearly state the kinds of evidence necessary to
support one and refute the other theory of egocentrism/decentration or operative
knowing, if these two are seen as conceptually distinct.
3. It should be demonstrated that the necessary but not sufficient Piagetian stages do
precede and are in part responsible for a corresponding role-taking level.
4. High internal consistency is needed to show that a child's reasoning represents a
structured whole.
5. High temporal stability with no regression to lower levels is needed to support the
invariance construct.
6. Criteria must be established with empirical support to show that the stages are
hierarchical.
7. Cross-cultural evidence must be obtained to demonstrate the universality of the stages.
8. For the cognitive tasks, significant correlations with other cognitive role-taking scales
must be obtained to demonstrate homogeneity within the domain. Affective tasks
should also relate to cognitive tasks if there is a general role-taking domain.
9. For the affective tasks, significant correlations with other affective role-taking scales
must be obtained to demonstrate homogeneity within this domain. Cognitive tasks
should also relate to affective tasks if there is a general role-taking domain.
10. Differences on the scale between groups reflecting different levels of social adjustment
would be expected to show the reasoning and behavior relationship.
11. There should be a higher within-scale or within-domain correlation than correlations
between the scale and general intelligence.
Mossler et al.'s (Note 6) adaptation of that measure have shown evidence to support
the conclusion of a homogeneous domain. This is further supported by Urberg and
Docherty's (1976) cluster analysis in which Chandler's tasks all clustered together
showing common variance. Both the nickel-dime game and Selman's sociomoral
dilemmas also seem to have support (see Table II). For the fifth criterion, while
Chandler's, the nickel-dime, Selman's sociomoral dilemmas, and the recursive thinking scales all show moderate stability (see Table II), no study to date has examined
the invariance assumption. No scale has been examined via criteria six or seven.
For the eighth criterion, when comparing Chandler's measure with the
apple-dog
story, Olejnik (Note 5) and Kurdek (1977a) found relationships between the measures. Kurdek's findings, however, may be sample specific because he used a stepwise
multiple regression procedure without cross-validation. The maximization procedure
used may have produced spurious results. In a chi-square analysis, Selman (1971a)
found a significant relationship between the apple-dog story and the nickel-dime
game. Although Chandler's task did correlate with both Miller et al.'s recursive
thinking task and a guessing game similar to the nickel-dime game (Rubin, 1978), it
did not relate to Feffer's task. Either the poor internal consistency or the affective
components of the Feffer measure could have been partly responsible for the lack of
relationship between the two. The sociomoral dilemmas in a principal components
analysis have been related to Feffer's task (Kurdek, 1977b). The principal components
662
SOCIAL ROLE-TAKING
solution, however, is probably inappropriate in light of the minimal internal consistency of Feffer's scale.
For the ninth criterion, the correlations across cognitive and affective role-taking
domains are low with no significant relationships in most cases (see Kurdek &
Rodgon, 1975; Moir, 1974; Rotenberg, 1974; Kurdek, Note 4). The only significant
relationship (.34) has been between the apple-dog story and Rothenberg's tasks
(Hudson, 1978). The latter did not relate significantly to the nickel-dime game (Moir,
1974). For the 10th criterion, Chandler (1972, 1973; Chandler et al., 1974) has shown
that emotionally disturbed and delinquent children score lower on his measure than
do normal children. In a similar way, Selman (1976) has demonstrated that his
sociomoral dilemmas can discriminate emotionally disturbed from normal children
and adolescents.
Finally, for criterion 11, Chandler's measure shows adequate convergent-discriminant validity. Chandler (1973) reports an internal consistency of .92 and a correlation
of-.30 between role-taking and IQ as measured by the Peabody Picture Vocabulary
Test (PPVT). The higher within-domain correlation suggests a distinct domain apart
from IQ. Similarly, Kurdek (1977b) has shown that the internal consistency for the
Chandler tasks is in the .60's whereas the Chandler and IQ (via Raven's Progressive
Matrices) is .51. An r to z transformation, however, should be performed on the
latter values to test for a statistically significant difference. Only Rubin's (1978) data
are contradictory of the above. He has demonstrated that a composite of the
Chandler, Miller et al., and guessing game role-taking tasks correlated .18 with the
PPVT and only .20 within themselves. This could be a function, however, of the
unreliability of any of the tasks or of a lack of construct validity within a larger
cognitive role-taking domain rather than a lack of discriminant validity for the
Chandler measure. The nickel-dime game via a parallel form correlated .69 internally,
but correlated .40 with the Raven's test (Kurdek, 1977b), thus satisfying the lth
criterion. The latter study further reports a higher internal consistency (.62) for
Selman's dilemmas than between that scale and Raven's (.38).
In summary, 11 criteria would be needed if any given cognitive role-taking measure
is to demonstrate construct validity. The criteria and their evidence for each measure
are in Table V. All measures passed the first and eighth criteria showing that all are
developmental and suggesting that all tap a similar domain. No measure passed all
criteria. Caution should be used as stated previously in judging any criterion that
requires a correlation with another role-taking measure because not all measures
have demonstrated adequate reliability. An examination of the table reveals that
both Chandler's and Selman's tasks show the best construct validity. When this is
coupled with the adequate reliability of these tasks, these measures seem appropriate
for use in scientific investigations. It should be stressed, however, that the two scales
measure different aspects of cognitive role-taking as seen in Table I. The one
drawback of the Chandler scale is its potential for a ceiling effect. The drawbacks of
the Selman scale are its interview format with nonstandardized probe questions and
the subjective scoring criteria (see the Role-taking Measures section). The nickeldime game also may be appropriate for educational programs because it passed five
validation criteria, and failed only one, the latter being a lack of relationship with an
unreliable scale. The one rather surprising set of results is that for the apple-dog
story. Although the apple-dog task is very popular with researchers, it has yet to
demonstrate adequate reliability and construct validity. This is not the case because
663
ENRIGHT AND LAPSLEY
TABLE V
Summary of A vailable Construct ValidationEvidencefor CognitiveMeasures
Evidence for Scales
Chandler
NickelNkelDime
Recursive
Recursve
Thinking
Validation Criterion
Apple-Dog
1. Relationshipwithage
2. Egocentrismor operativeknowing
3. Piagetianstagesas necessary
4. Homogeneity
5. Temporalstability;invariance
yes
na"
yes
na
yes
na
yes
na
yes
na
na
na
na
6. Hierarchization
7. Universality
8. Relationshipwithothercognitive
scales
9. Relationwithaffectivescales
na
na
yes
na
yes
partial
support
na
na
yes
na
yes
partial
support
na
na
yes
na
yes
partial
support
na
na
yes'
na
na
partial
support
na
na
yes
yes
na'
na
na
10. Relationwithbehavior
11. Convergent-discriminant
validity
na
na
yes
yes
not supported'
na
yes
yes
yes
na
na
Sociomoral
ana = not available
"The relationshipis withthe Feffertask,whichis difficultto classifyas eithercognitive
or affective.
'There was no relationshipwith the Feffertask,whichis difficultto classifyas either
cognitiveor affective.Forthesepurposes,it is givenmoreweightas a cognitivevariable
becauseif therewerea relationship,
it mightbe attributable
to the overlapbetweenthe
cognitivecomponentsof the two constructs.
dThe nonsignificantrelationshipwas with the Rothenbergscale, which has shown
questionableinternalconsistencyreliability.
the scale has failed any criteria, but rather because there have been few tests of its
reliability and validity.
Affective
Measures
The affective measures of role-taking developed by Rothenberg (1970), Chandler
and Greenspan (1972), and Flapan (1968) all satisfy the first validation criterion. For
criteria two and three there are no available data. The fourth criterion regarding
high internal consistency was not met by all the scales. Rothenberg's (1970) withindomain correlations of .28-.47 do not produce strong evidence of a homogenous
domain. Hudson's (1978) data, however, show homogeneity for this scale. Chandler
and Greenspan (1972) offer no evidence that a child's reasoning represents a
structured whole. Flapan (1968), while reporting only moderate reliability estimates
for her younger subjects, calculates a coefficient of .82 for the eldest subjects sampled
in her study.
The Flapan and Chandler and Greenspan procedures have no evidence for the
remaining validations criteria. The Rothenberg measure has no evidence for criteria
five, six, and seven, though it does have evidence for the remaining four criteria.
Regarding the eighth criterion, a relationship between the Rothenberg task and the
apple-dog story was significant (Hudson, 1978) although its relation with the nickeldime game, a cognitive role-taking task, has been negligible (Moir, 1974). Rubin's
(1978) correlation of the Rothenberg scale and one intended to tap empathy (Borke,
664
SOCIAL ROLE-TAKING
1971), a construct similar to affective role-taking, yielded no significant relationships,
a test of the ninth criterion. The Rothenberg task seems to satisfy the 10th criterion
in that high scores on affective role-taking have been related to peer and teacher
ratings of one's interpersonal skill. The final criterion is not satisfied. The Rothenberg
task does not appear to be a domain separate from general intelligence, as both sets
of correlations were reported in the .20's. A summary of the construct validity of
each measure is in Table VI. It seems clear that the Rothenberg scale does not
demonstrate adequate construct validity. The validity of the other two scales is still
unknown.
Cognitive and Affective Measures
As with all other measures, the Feffer scale is related to age, thus satisfying
criterion one (see, e.g., Feffer & Gourevitch, 1960; Kurdek, 1977b; Turnure, 1975).
There is no evidence for the next two criteria. It is clear that criterion four is not
supported as the values in Table III indicate. Criterion five has partial support
because one study (Kurdek, 1977b) found adequate temporal stability. While criteria
six and seven have no evidence, criterion eight has partial support because the scale
has been related to the sociomoral dilemmas (Kurdek, 1977b) but not to a task
similar to the nickel-dime game (Rubin, 1978). The only other criterion evaluated
has been the 11th(see Table VI), which has partial support. Two sets of data for
Feffer's scale suggest that the individual stories of that measure share more common
variance with IQ than with parallel forms of the stories. For instance, Turnure (1975)
reports an internal consistency for the Feffer scale of .40, but a correlation with the
Kuhlmann and Anderson IQ test of .60. Similarly, Keller (1976) found higher
correlations between the scale and IQ than between two of Feffer's stories. Only
Kurdek (1977b) has found a higher within-scale r (.40) than an r (.19) between the
scale and IQ via Raven's test.
Although this is a popular scale with researchers, it does not warrant use in social
education programs for several reasons: (I) the construct is not clearly defined; (2)
the internal consistency reliability is low; and (3) there is only one validation criterion,
TABLE VI
A
Construct
Validation
vailable
for Affective and Cognitive-AffectiveMeasures
Summary of
Evidencefor Scales
Validation Criterion
Rothenberg
Chandler&
Greenspan
Flapan
Feffer
1. Relationship with age
2. Egocentrism or operative knowing
3. Piagetian stages as necessary
4. Homogeneity
5. Temporal stability; invariance
6. Hierarchization
7. Universality
8. Relationship with cognitive scales
9. Relation with other affective scales
10. Relation with behavior
11. Convergent-discriminant validity
yes
na"
na
partial support
na
na
na
partial support
not supported
yes
not supported
yes
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
yes
na
na
yes
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
yes
na
na
not supported
partial support
na
na
partial support
na
na
partial support
na = not available
665
ENRIGHT AND LAPSLEY
the first one, that has clear support. Any educational program that failed with this as
the dependent measure would be left with too many competing hypotheses regarding
the failure.
A Comparison of the Measures Across Domains
It is clear from Tables V and VI that cognitive role-taking is the most developed
domain regarding validity. It appears that this domain is both developmental and
cognitive (see criteria one and eight, Table V). The cognitive tasks with the most
validity also have evidence to suggest that even though they shared variance with
general intelligence, they can be discriminated from it. It should be kept in mind,
however, that a comparison between internal consistency within role-taking and a
correlation with intelligence offers only a rough estimate of discriminant validity.
Even so, the evidence here is in direct opposition to Ford's (1979) conclusion
regarding cognitive egocentrism in general. This discriminant validity is an advantage
for social educators, because gain on these measures, most likely, will not lead to the
competing conclusion that the educational program promoted only verbal ability or
general intelligence rather than cognitive role-taking per se.
Although the usual educational procedure is to develop a program and to then
choose a relevant measure, such a strategy may not work effectively in role-taking
education. Affective role-taking programs may be difficult to do at present. Not only
are the measures questionable, but the constructs are currently confounded with
empathy. Carefully designed and researched affective role-taking programs may
have to wait for further psychometric development of the domain. For those
interested in cognitive role-taking programs, Chandler's and Selman's tasks and the
nickel-dime game are recommended, given that these are relevant to the skills chosen
in the program.
Conclusion and Recommendations
in Role-taking
The above analysis leads to four general conclusions. First, there are conclusions
with regard to the construct itself. The construct of social role-taking is used in the
literature in several different (but possibly overlapping) ways. There is cognitive roletaking with variations within that domain (see Table I) and there is affective roletaking with a controversy of empathy and role-taking existing within it. It is
recommended that future role-taking studies clearly define the subconstruct and
assumptions of that subconstruct. This is not always done at present. For example,
in one study (Ambron & Irwin, 1975) 32 role-taking items are correlated with moral
judgment but not theoretical classification of role-taking is reported. Without knowing into which role-taking construct to place the various items, the reader cannot
judge the theoretical usefulness of the data. As a second point with regard to the
construct, most theory at present contains untestable assumptions. It would seem that
such assumptions as invariance and regression, while philosophically useful, do not
lend themselves to clear scientific conclusions if the theorist maintains that even one
or two subjects regressing violates the assumption. Because measurement error occurs
in all tests, it may be unclear whether observed regressions are due to error or to a
true developmental regression.
A second general conclusion regards the construction and choice of measures.
Decisions, at present, as to which measure to use in a study seems to be based more
666
SOCIAL ROLE-TAKING
on consensus rather than on whether the measure is reliable. For instance, the appledog story has been used extensively, but the measure, as stated previously, has yet to
demonstrate psychometric value. Similarly, the Rothenberg scale has limited psychometric value. To begin alleviating the measurement problems it is recommended that
new role-taking measures be developed because most existing role-taking tasks
simply do not have the number of items needed for rigorous psychometric analyses.
It is recommended that the classical approach to test construction be taken because
it has proven so successful in the past with other areas such as personality psychology.
Although this approach is not new, it is new for the role-taking area. It is recommended, then, that the following steps be taken:
1. Define a domain and specify the hypothetical constructs of that domain.
2. Develop what appears to be a homogeneous item pool reflecting the domain.
For example, the number of Chandler's bystander cartoons could be increased using
existing ones as a guide. Because children's responses to any item are brief, a 20-item
test may not increase fatigue.
3a. Do an item analysis to empirically test for homogeneity. It may be difficult to
analyze each item on the clinical measures common in role-taking because not all
children are given the same questions. Yet, the researcher can still select those
questions that consistently lead to responses by most or all subjects and analyze the
items via item discrimination (Nunnally, 1967). The latter concerns the average
intercorrelation among items and could be used for any of the scales. One way to
analyze discrimination is to correlate each item with the total score. Because roletaking scales have so few items, it may be best to do an item-total correlation with
that item removed from the total. Otherwise, the correlation may be inflated. This
will tell the research whether any given item differentiates between the average total
score of people receiving high scores and the average total score of people receiving
low scores.
Another procedure, item difficulty, is relevant only for items that have objective
right or wrong answers. A measure such as Chandler's could be adapted so that a
composite of the correct answers rather than a stage score represents the total score.
Difficulty refers to how hard or easy an item is. For instance a p-value of .5 for an
item means that 50 percent of the sample answered the item correctly. Selecting items
with difficulty half-way between chance and 1.00 leads to maximum spread of scores.
The use of item difficulty and discrimination together can lead to the selection of the
most reliable items which tend to discriminate among people as much as possible.'
'For open-endedquestionsthep-valuedesiredis usually.5 for each item becauseit is halfway between0 (or chance)and 1.00.For a dichotomousitem such as the adaptedChandler
measure(in whichthe child role-takesor not) chanceis probably.5 (the child has one chance
in two of obtainingthe rightanswer).The mid-pointbetweenchanceand 1.00wouldthen be
.75, which would be the p value sought.The open-endedand dichotomousdistributionsare
representedbelow:
0
(chance)
.5
Open-endedItem
100
.75
.5
(chance)
DichotomousItem
100
667
ENRIGHT AND LAPSLEY
3b. Even if a researcher does not wish to spend the time required in 3a, he or she
could still construct parallel form tests and, treating each score as an item, do an
internal consistency on the two or three forms.
4. With the more easily scored scales like Chandler's cognitive scale, eliminate
those items that are too difficult or too easy for a given age group. With any of the
scales, eliminate those items that are not highly correlated with total score. In both
the difficulty and discrimination procedures, new items could then be added and
tested via 3(a, b) above because fewer items tend to lower reliability. Again, the
purpose is to maximize internal consistency. This is the case because the domains are
theory-based, representing a distinct ability, and therefore should have high internal
consistency.
5. For those particularly interested in educational uses, the next step would be to
retest a sample and, via a time 1 to time 2 correlation on each item, select only those
already internally consistent items that are temporally stable. This latter property is
especially important for those measuring change because the investigator certainly
does not want spurious change due to poor stability in the dependent measure
following an experimental procedure.
6. Replicate by sampling from a different population to eliminate results that are
sample specific.
7. Use the measure to validate the construct and the items with the possibility of
adding or eliminating items depending on correlational results with other domains.
For instance, referring to Table IV, one would expect one of Chandler's cognitive
role-taking items to correlate positively with Selman's cognitive measure. On the
other hand, one would probably eliminate an item that shares much variance with
general intelligence.
What has happened is that researchers have gone from steps 1 and 2 to step 7,
bypassing test construction. The result is few significant relationships with other
measures and no confidence in those findings that are significant because of possible
sample specificity and measurement error. Ford (1979), too, has overlooked this test
construction point, calling for a reevaluation of the egocentrism construct based on
the lack of relationships, even before well-constructed scales have been developed.
Some (Zahn-Waxler et al., 1977) have suggested that to alleviate role-taking measurement problems one should administer a battery of role-taking tasks and derive
one score which would be a "stable indicator." The resulting variate is a composite
of the various tasks. Such procedures would seem, however, to confuse the issue more
than rectify it because of the problems of multiple constructs possibly being represented in the variate as well as uncertain reliabilities for many items also being
represented. Multiple scales might be used without a composite if it is eventually
found with adequate measures that people vary in their role-taking abilities across
the various role-taking areas. Until systematic attempts are made to resolve the
methodological questions regarding test construction, however, such a conclusion
may be premature.
A third general conclusion regards the existing reliabilities of the various roletaking scales. One factor which might contribute to the unstable reliabilities of some
role-taking measures is the influence of practice effects. Researchers have not
investigated whether subjects demonstrate improved performance on later trials in a
multitrial assessment procedure, though conceivably some role-taking tasks would
be amenable to such a response bias. In the Chandler (1972) procedure, for example,
668
SOCIAL ROLE-TAKING
is it not possible that children would respond differentially to the latter cartoon
sequences after having been exposed to earlier cartoon trials? Perhaps it is the
influence of practice effects which accounts for the disparate estimates of internal
consistency reported by Chandler (1973), Kurdek (1977b), and Rubin (1978). Such
an explanation has yet to be ruled out.
Further, in addition to poorly constructed test items or practice effects, low internal
consistency estimates may also be related to the content of role-taking measures. If
the content of such measures varies in terms of such variables as item complexity or
familiarity, or other stimulus properties, then the resulting test performance may not
be an accurate reflection of role-taking ability. An analogous situation exists in the
spatial perspective-taking domain. In a recent review, Fehr (1978) identified numerous methodological variables such as stimulus dimensionality, the number of objects
presented in the spatial arrays, the presence or absence of landmarks, the familiarity
of the stimuli, the orientation and nature of the other observer, and others, all of
which contribute to wide fluctuations relative to the onset and decline of egocentric
responding. A similar concern for content variables in the social role-taking domains
may reduce the occurrence of false positive and false negative diagnoses, and improve
reliability estimates.
Yet a third factor concerning internal consistency yet to be considered is that
consistent performance on role-taking tasks may itself be a developmental phenomenon. In the Flapan (1968) study, for example, age trends in both the structured and
unstructured phases of the assessment procedure are evident, indicating that older
subjects are more consistent responders than younger subjects. Internal consistency
also shows changes with age in the Rubin (1978) study, with reliability estimates
ranging from .18 for subjects in the first grade to .39 for fifth-graders, the eldest
subjects sampled. However, caution must be exercised in evaluating the trends
reported in these studies because the reliability coefficients were calculated with a
restricted range of scores. One possible way to overcome the restricted range problem
would be to assess three groups of younger subjects, say first, second, and third
graders and three groups of older subjects in grades five, six, and seven. One could
then compare the pattern of internal consistency responding of younger and older
subjects with an expanded range of scores.
A fourth general conclusion which can be reached is that the validation focus in
role-taking is, at present, too narrow. The social role-taking constructs are highly
complex and yet the validation focus has primarily been on the age-stage relationship.
If a true validation picture is to emerge, it would seem that researchers must begin to
ask questions about necessary conditions for growth, hierarchization, cross-cultural
generalizations, the relationship with behavioral competence, and expanded discriminant validation studies. As a way to begin examining necessary conditions for
growth, role-taking researchers could follow Walker and Richards' (1979) approach
of examining such necessary conditions in the moral judgment area via training
programs. For example, these researchers found it easier to train stage 3 subjects
(who take a group perspective) to think on stage 4 (a societal, abstract perspective)
if the subjects already had some evidence for abstract thinking on Piaget's formal
operational stage. Not only could such findings have utility for basic research, but
also for education, since educators would know how to maximize the probabilities
for role-taking change.
669
ENRIGHT AND LAPSLEY
To examine the hierarchization assumption, role-taking researchers could follow
Rest's (1973) lead in the moral area by asking comprehension questions for each
role-taking level. The assumption here is that if the child understood stage three
statements, he or she should also be able to understand stage two and one statements.
Further, the child's lack of understanding the stage two statements should lead to the
same lack of comprehension for higher stages. Guttman analyses could then be used
to assess the hierarchical nature of the stages.
The examination of a role-taking relationship with behavioral competence could
be expanded to include ecological validity or naturalistic observation of behavioral
reciprocity. Such analyses have begun in the area of moral judgment with successful
results (Enright & Sutterfield, 1980). Knowledge of a role-taking and social behavior
relationship in school children could give educators a clue as to how newly acquired
role-taking abilities could aid the child in his or her everyday social interactions.
As a validation suggestion for discriminant validity, the current convergent-discriminant validations could possibly be improved via a multitrait-multimethod
analysis (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). This could be done by sampling a role-taking
domain in two different ways, such as Selman's interview, which relies on verbal
production, and a paired-comparisons version of the same trait, which relies on
recognition. For the latter, a procedure similar to Enright, Franklin, and Manheim
(1980) could be used. This would provide the multimethod. The within-domain
relationship, then, could be compared with IQ, again assessed in two different ways,
one a production and the other a recognition task. This would provide for the
multitrait component. The expectation, of course, is that both Selman procedures
would share greater variance than that between the Selman and IQ traits.
Two assumptions which appear untestable to us are criteria two and part of five.
Regarding the former, if egocentrism and operative knowing are two distinct explanations, as Youniss (1975) insists, then there should be concomitant evidence or
discussion of why operative knowing as opposed to egocentrism should be considered
the underlying cognitive mechanism responsible for the level observed in the child.
The invariance assumption of the fifth criterion appears to have no empirical support
because it was derived from a philosophical assumption (see, e.g., Selman, 1976) that
is not easily amenable to empirical investigation. That is, as stated previously, if a
child regresses there is no way to unconfound the two possibilities of either a true
regression or measurement error which has led to temporal instability in the test. If
a theorist wishes to include untestable assumptions in his or her role-taking model,
it should be clearly stated that these, indeed, are untestable. It is our view, however,
that assumptions in scientific work should eventually lead to testable hypotheses.
Given both the reliability and validity difficulties that exist at present in roletaking, it is not at all surprising to find inconsistent results in role-taking education
programs. It is quite possible for an educator to develop a program to promote a
privileged information ability, but assess that program with, for instance, Feffer's
measure which is more concerned with cognitive and affective role-taking. Also, the
tasks chosen as the dependent measure may be so internally inconsistent or temporally unstable as to blur actual change. A careful choice of measure by potential
educators could alleviate some of these problems.
In conclusion, the development of any science usually proceeds from vague,
intuitive ideas, to imperfect measurement, to standardization. It seems that roletaking is at the point where the field must move toward greater refinement of
670
SOCIAL ROLE-TAKING
measurement. Given the philosophical tradition of this area, however, some may
claim that in doing so we are sacrificing a richness of theory for precision. This does
not,have to be the case. The constructs could remain as they are with a few alterations
in the untestable assumptions. Measurement need not impair a detailed construct,
but'rather requires that the construct is indeed testable. If it is realized that the roletaking instruments are subject to the same measurement laws as are intelligence and
personality tests then the transition from imperfect to more precise measurement may
be easier. At the same time, if it is realized that psychometrics is blind to the notion
of individual differences, stage-related properties, or any other theoretical approach,
progress may be realized in linking measurement methodology and social cognitive
stage theory. Social education programs could only benefit from such precision.
Reference Notes
1. Elardo, P. ProjectA WARE. Paper presented at the fourth annual H. Blumberg Symposium,
Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1974.
2. Wentink, W., Smits-van Sonsbeck, B., Leckie, G., & Smits, P. The effect of a social
perspective-taking training on role-taking ability and social interaction in preschool and
elementary school children. Paper presented at the meeting of the International Society for
the Study of Behavioral Development, Guilford, Great Britain, March 1975.
3. Kuhn, D. The development of role-taking ability. Unpublished manuscript, Columbia
University, 1972.
4. Kurdek, L. Perceptual,cognitive,and affectiveperspective-takingand empathyin kindergarten
through third-gradechildren. Paper presented at the meeting of the Society for Research in
Child Development, Denver, April 1975.
5. Olejnik, A. Developmentalchanges and interrelationshipsamong role-taking, moraljudgments
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6. Mossler, D., Greenberg, M., & Marvin, R. The early developmentof conceptualperspectivetaking. Paper presented at the meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development,
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young children. Paper presented at the meeting of the Society for Research in Child
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concept of moral intentionality.Unpublished manuscript, Harvard University, 1974.
10. Feshbach, N., & Kuchenbecker, S. A three component model of empathy. Paper presented
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meeting of the American Psychological Association, New Orleans, September 1974.
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complex reasoning? Paper presented at the meeting of the Society for Research in Child
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13. Schnall, M., & Feffer, M. Manual for the scoring of the role-taking task. Unpublished
manuscript (No. 9010), n.d. (Available from [ADI Auxiliary Publications Project, Photoduplication Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.]).
671
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14. Marsh, D., & Serafica, F. Perspectivetaking and moraljudgment: A developmentalanalysis.
Paper presented at the meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, New
Orleans, April 1977.
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AUTHORS
ROBERT D. ENRIGHT, Assistant Professor, Department of Educational Psychology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706. Specialization: Social cognitive
development.
DANIEL K. LAPSLEY, Department of Educational Psychology, University of
Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706. Specialization: Social cognitive development.
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