The Struggle for Mastery in Cilicia: Turkey, France, and the Ankara Agreement of 1921
Author(s): Yücel Güçlü
Source: The International History Review, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Sep., 2001), pp. 580-603
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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YUCELGUgLU
The Strugglefor Masteryin Cilicia:
Turkey, France,and the AnkaraAgreementof 1921
British and French officials during and after the First World
War referred to the lands enclosed by the Taurus and Amanus
mountains at the north-eastern corner of the MediterraneanSea by
the classical name Cilicia, which took in the Ottoman province of Adana
and the sanjakof Mara§.Despite the long-established Turkish name for the
region, Qukurova,the Allied usage crept into Turkish parlance;one finds
frequentreferencesto Kilikya in contemporaryOttoman documents.
Surprisingly little has been written about the struggle between the
Turkish Nationalists and France for mastery of Cilicia in the aftermathof
the First World War. Of the few works published in Turkish, most have
been memoirs, outstanding among them the memoirs of Damar Ankoglu
and Kasim Ener, the two most prominent Cilician Turkish patriots.1
French historians, apart from Paul du Veou, have also shown surprising
lack of interest:2even if the Levant between the wars played only a minor
role in French foreign policy, the same cannot be said of the historic consequences of the Anglo-French rivalry in the region. Perhaps French
scholars could find little to attract them in an episode marked by failure;
the struggle with Turkey over Cilicia tarnished the prestige of victorious
France by markingthe first French defeat in an imperialwar since the loss
of Canadain 1763.
Conversations in 1915 between Britain, France, and Russia, which
pointed to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire in the event of an
Allied victory, led on 16 May 1916 to what has been known ever since as
the Sykes-Picot agreement, signed by Sir Mark Sykes for Britain and the
former consul-general at Beirut, Francois Georges-Picot, for France. The
agreement delineated the areas of the Ottoman Empire to be acquired by
France on the one hand, and Britain on the other, and specified the political and administrative systems to be set up. The agreement promised
1 D. Ankoglu, Hatiralartm (Istanbul, 1961)and K. Ener, Qukurova Kurtulus Savasinda Adana
Cephesi
(Ankara, 1970).
2 P. du Veou, La Passion de la Cilicie: 1919-22 (Paris, 1954).
The International History Review, xxm. 3: September 2001, pp. 505-756.
cn issn 0707-5332 © The International History Review. All InternationalRights Reserved.
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The Strugglefor Cilicia
581
France a 'Blue' zone and an 'A' zone. The first was comprised of the
Levantine coast from Acre to the Taurus mountains, that is Lebanon, the
Ansarieh country, and the district of Iskenderun and Cilicia, extending
north-east into Anatolia in an ever-narrowing strip of land. The second
was comprised of the Syrian hinterland, including the cities of Damascus,
Horns, Hama, and Aleppo, and Upper Mesopotamiaincluding Mosul.1
The agreement determined which of the Allies occupied which region
after the armistice of Mudros, made on 30 October 1918at the request of
the Ottomans. A year later, afterdiscussions on 5 September 1919between
the British and French prime ministers, David Lloyd George and Georges
Clemenceau, France handed over Upper Mesopotamia, with Mosul, to
Britain.The territoryoccupied by British forces as the result of the Allied
victory was divided into four zones, all under the supreme authority of
General Sir Edmund Allenby as commander-in-chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force: the Northern Zone (Cilicia), administered by the
French; the Western Zone (Lebanon, the Ansarieh country, and the area
around Iskenderun), also administered by the French; the Southern Zone
(Palestine), administered by the British; and the Eastern Zone (the Syrian
hinterland, including Damascus, Horns, Hama, Aleppo), administered by
Emir Faisal. These arrangements were understood not to prejudge the
political settlement to be made at the peace conference at Paris.
The armistice of Mudros left the victorious Entente powers poised to
partitionalmost all of the Ottoman Empire with the aim of extinguishing it
as an independent internationalactor. The Allies envisaged that the future
Turkey, confined to Istanbul and central and northern Anatolia, would
have few resources and little freedom of action in the economic sphere.
Although the Allies' plans were not formalized until the treaty of Sevres,
made with the ImperialOttoman government on 10 August 1920, several of
the Allied states had tried to arrangefaits accomplis. In the spring of 1919,
Greek troops landed at Izmir and Italian troops at Antalya, while the
French occupied Cilicia, and British, French, and Italian troops were
stationed at the Straits. In response, huge protest meetings were held in
Istanbul, and local resistance movements in Anatoliawere co-ordinated by
Mustafa Kemal Pasha (later known as Atatiirk), the Ottomans' most distinguished general, who landed at the Black Sea port of Samsun on 19
May. Whereas Kemal, whose Nationalist troops controlled central and
eastern Anatolia, aimed to give political expression to the Turkish nation,
the ImperialOttoman government at Istanbul preferredto collaboratewith
the occupation forces in a bid to overthrow the nationalmovement.
1 For the text, see Dfocuments on] Bfritish] Fforeign] Pfolicy, 1919-39, series I, ed. E. L. Woodward
and R. Butler], iv. 245-7.
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582
YiicelGiiqlu
Figure i: The Sykes-Picot Agreement, 1916
As Cilicia was held by the Ottoman armies at the time the armistice was
signed, it was included in the territories claimed by the Turkish National
Pact, adopted at the end of the congress of Sivas on 11 September 1919.
The pact declared that the Nationalists would not agree to limitations on
their sovereignty or to the detachment from the Ottoman Empire of any
province inhabited by a Turkish majority; Cilicia and the area around
Iskenderunheld by the French being one.
At the conclusion of the armistice, the units of the Ottoman 7th Army
were entrenched at Deir el Jemal, twenty kilometres north-west of Aleppo.
The Ottoman line of defence stretched from the mouth of the Asi river,
south of Antakya, east to Tel Rifat, and ended at Deyrizor on the Eu-
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TheStrugglefor Cilicia
583
phrates. Even though the armistice stipulated that all forces on both sides
should remain behind their lines as of noon on 31 October, it contained
articleswhich could easily be misapplied by the Allies. The most notorious
article was the 7th, which allowed the Allies to occupy any part of the
Ottoman Empire in the event of a situation arising which threatened their
security. British forces, takingadvantageof this provision, began to occupy
towns in Cilicia from 17 December.
As of 1 November 1919, in accordance with Lloyd George's agreement
with Clemenceau, the British forces which provided the militarygarrisons
for Cilicia and Syria were replaced by French troops of what became
known as the Army of the Levant. No French troops entered the Eastern
Zone, which was left under the authority of Faisal; but the British forces
there were withdrawn. This arrangement, too, was provisional until the
final adjustment of mandates and the frontiers between them. Later in
November, General Henri Gouraud, one of France's most famous colonial
soldiers and high commissioner for Syria from 1920 to 1923, arrivedin Beirut as commander-in-chiefof the Army of the Levant. France's chief political representative in Syria was Robert de Caix, Gouraud's secretarygeneral and an economist intensely critical of British foreign policy.
Depicted by Stephen Longrigg, a former British army officer and colonial
office officialin Mesopotamiaand Syria, as narrow-minded,C. M. Andrew
and A. S. Kanya-Forstnerturn de Caix into an astute and complex figure
fully aware of the weaknesses thwartinghis government's ambitions and of
the consequences of its policies.1 His appointment nonetheless delighted
French colonial and commercial circles, as he had been one of the most
influentialadvisers on Near Easternpolicy since before the war.
That Cilicia was allotted to France rather than one of its allies is
attributablenot only to the Sykes-Picot agreement, but also to recognition
of France's long-standing economic and strategic interests in the area. By
July 1915,the Comite de l'Asie Francaisewas calling openly for annexation.
It was supported by the chambers of commerce in Lyons and Marseilles
and, in late August, by the commission for foreign affairsof the chamber of
deputies. To France, Cilicia meant cotton and an outwork in the defences
of Syria. As the gateway to Syria, it was seen as a vital link in France's
strategyto dominate the eastern Mediterranean.2
The French colonial party and its supporters at the Quai d'Orsay aimed
1 C. M. AndrewandA. S. Kanya-Forstner,
FranceOverseas:TheGreatWarand theClimaxof French
ImperialExpansion(London, 1981);S. Longrigg,Syria and Lebanonunder the FrenchMandate
(London,1958).
2 Statement,Fichon,21March1919[ransj, M[inisteredesj A[ttairesjl^trangeresjdyne-JLioan
[1910'The FrenchColonialPartyand
29]/i3, pp. 30-49. See also, C. M. AndrewandA. S. Kanya-Forstner,
HistoricalJournal, xvii (1974),82-6.
FrenchColonialWarAims,1914-18',
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584
TiicelGiiglii
from the beginning of the war to acquire the eastern Mediterraneancoast
and the hinterland stretching from the Sinai in the south to the Taurus
barrier of south-eastern Anatolia in the north, including all of Cilicia and
the lowlands to the east. Colonialists saw the Taurus barrieras the natural
northern frontierfor France's new Levantine latifundium;their supporters
in the army and navy seized on the potential value of the harbour at Mersin, the relatively well-developed system of land transport, and the easy
avenues of approach to Syria and Mesopotamia. Mersin was the busiest
port on Anatolia's south coast and the terminus of the railwayfrom Tarsus
and Adana which carried much of the produce of the rich Adana plain.
Although the harbour was not enclosed, there was a good jetty and sheltered anchorage, and a breakwaterhad long been under consideration.1
With the British entrenched in Cyprus and Egypt, and Italy newly set
up in Tripoli and the Dodecanese Islands, France, which sought compensation, saw Cilicia as an asset in the race to balance the power of Britain. The need to counterbalance British influence in the Near East was
buttressed in colonial circles by the assumption that France would never
be a true Mediterraneanpower until it acquired Cilicia and Syria. A base at
Adana, Cilicia's largest city, which stood astride the Istanbul-to-Baghdad
railway, would give France a pressure point on Britain's lines of communication, an obstacle to Turkish onslaught from the north, and quick
access to the interior of Syria. Having yielded direct control over Syria by
the Sykes-Picot agreement, the Quai d'Orsay worried whether SyrianpanArab nationalistswould foment trouble in French North Africa. Control of
Cilicia was expected, therefore, to help France to control not only its
Syrian mandate but also its North African colonies by allowing it to stifle
opposition movements in Syria before they could spread to the Maghreb.2
The mountain districts of the province of Adana were rich in unexploited
minerals, and the fertilecoastal plain, which produced cotton, rice, cereals,
sugar-beet, and fruit, and afforded abundant pasture, was well watered by
rivers that descended from the Taurus range. The Adana plain was the
.centre of the cotton-growing belt, from which the French had imported
cotton since medieval times; they set up the first powered gins and mills at
Adana in 1864. German capital and managementquadrupled the output of
raw cotton between 1899 and 1913without having to extend the areaunder
1 Memo, de Caix to Bnand, 26 Jan. 1920, MAE
S[yrie-]L[iban-]C[ilicie i9io,-22]/22, pp. 27-9. For the
French view of Cilicia, see S. Roberts, A History of French Colonial Policy: 1870-1925 (London, 1929),
ii. 591-4.
2 Ibid.; C. Albert, 4LaSyrie francaise', Etudes, clvii
( 1918),385.
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The Strugglefor Cilicia
585
cultivation.A survey in 1914by irrigationexperts predicted that the Adana
plain alone could rival all of Egypt in agriculturalyield. So great were the
expectations of Cilicia that the French government encouraged French
banks to join British banks in the 1880s in funding the railwayfrom Adana
to Tarsus and Mersin. With an eye on Turkish cotton, silk, cereals, fuels,
and copper, French colonialists tried to rival the German concession in
Anatolia by carving out an immense domain stretching from the Black Sea
coast to the trace of the Baghdad railwayin south-easternAnatolia, and by
1
negotiatinga loan to the Ottoman governmentin 1913-14. Thus, before the
had
staked
out
a
French
the
the
of
outbreak
war,
significant economic
in
Cilicia.
interest
After the war, in May 1919, the Quai d'Orsay and the chambers of commerce of Marseilles and Lyons sent a team of scholars, led by Professor
Paul Huvelin of the University of Lyons, to conduct a socio-economic survey of the region and recommend how France could benefit. The Comite
de l'Asie Francais published three of the team's exhaustive reports which
contain detailed, glowing forecasts of potential yields. The report prepared
by the noted agronomist E. C. Achard on the outlook for agricultural
development, predicted exports of cereals from Cilicia alone at 1,500,000
tons, plus 350,000 tons of raw cotton and 600,000 tons of cotton seed.
Added to equally rosy estimates of exports of wool, olives, and fruits, they
naturallycaught the attention of French industrialand transportinterests.2
Like raw cotton and cereals, wool had long figured among major French
imports; and influential French periodicals, under the guidance of their
colonialist masters, had been heralding a post-war scramble for raw materials among industrialized countries since the summer of 1918. In fact, this
was not mere colonialist propaganda. The minister of commerce between
1915and 1919, Etienne Clementel, who was not noted for colonialist sympathies, took the allotment of raw materialsseriously enough to convene an
internationalconference at Paris on the subject in the autumn of 1916.3
Post-war France was second only to Britain among the European states
in its consumption of cotton. The war had spawned a world-wide shortage
and France, as a major producer of textiles and garments - it was the
largest French industry urgently needed a reliable source of cheap raw
material. With only insignificant quantities available within the overseas
empire and an industry relying on foreign imports, raw cotton, followed
1 H. Lecomte,Le Coton(Paris,1900), pp. 318-25,330-85;^Thobie, Merits et imperialisme
francais
ottoman:1895-1914
dansVempire
(Paris,1977),pp. 53-64,683-9.
2 P. Huvelin,Quevautla Syrief,Documentseconomiques,politiques,et scientihques,Pans, 1921,no.
1, p. 6; E. C. Achard,Le Cotonen Cilicieet en Syrie,Documentseconomiques,politiques,et scientifiques(Paris,1922),no. 3, pp. 22-3and54.
3 M. Trachtenberg,
'A New EconomicOrder',FrenchHistoricalStudies,x (1977),320-4.
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586
Tiled Giiclii
closely by cereals, underlay France's interest in Cilicia, which was calculated to produce two-thirds of its needs.1
As Syria had never existed as a country with political boundaries, even
though its status was foreseen in the Sykes-Picot agreement, the Allies
could not settle for the existing boundaries of the Ottoman provinces - for
instance, the province of Aleppo ran deep into areas occupied by Turkish
Nationalists. When France tried to define Syria's boundaries and to consolidate its control there, the Nationalists, established in the Anatolian
interior, began to organize armed resistance throughout Turkish territory
under Allied occupation.
The Nationalist challenge was strongest in Cilicia where the French
occupation caused deep resentment among the Turkish inhabitants. The
Society for the Defence of the Rights of Cilicia organized meetings, condemned the French aggression, and protested on 18 January 1919 to the
Allied high commissioners at Istanbul that their acts contravened natural
justice, the principles proclaimed at the peace conference, and Article 12 of
Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, which stipulated that the Turkish
portions of the Ottoman Empire should be assured of sovereignty. The
society gave warning that Britain, France, and Italy, in using the partition
of the Ottoman Empire to shore up a balance of power between them,
would only reap trouble. As Cilicia was a Turkish territory inhabited by
Turks, Turkish Nationalist forces were now preparing for large-scale
guerrillawarfarewith the aim of driving the French out.2
France had sent only twenty thousand troops to keep order in Cilicia
and Syria. They included the remnants of the Armenian and Syrian
Legions and the French units which had preceded Gouraud. Thus, upon
his arrivalat Beirut, he found only two skeletal divisions: the 1st Division,
formerly the 156th Infantry Division, sent from Istanbul, commanded by
GeneralJulien Dufieux with headquartersat Adana, and the 2nd Division,
a mixture of metropolitanand colonial units commanded by GeneralMarie
de Lamothe with headquarters at Zahle in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon.
The core of each consisted of a metropolitanregiment, the 412th and 415th
Infantryrespectively. Muslim troops from France's African colonies supplied the remainder.3
In January 1920, the recently founded Turkish Nationalist movement,
with Kemal at its head, launched a series of hit-and-run attackson French
l Huvelin,Quevautla Syrie?\Achard,Le Cotonen Cilicie.
2 Irade-iMilliye,editorial,17Nov. 1919,p. 1.Ankoglu,Hatiralanm, pp. 72-91;Ener,Qukurova,pp.
30-48.
3 Gouraudto Millerand,5 Feb.1920,MAESLC/135,pp. 28-9.
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TheStrugglefor Cilicia
587
outposts between the Mediterraneanand the Euphrates, and east of the
river. Apparently in expectation of trouble from Faisal's forces in Damascus, Gouraud had concentrated his troops and heavy equipment at Beirut,
leaving only small units widely dispersed from Mersin to Resulayn, east of
Urfa. The militarygovernor of Cilicia, Colonel Edouard Bremond, therefore had increasingdifficultyin maintaininghis hold on the area.x
The Nationalists soon had an opportunity to reveal their aims and to
judge whether the French might succumb to the right sort of militaryleverage. At a meeting between Kemal and Georges-Picot at Sivas on 5 and 6
December 1919, Kemal demanded Cilicia and the sanjakof Iskenderun for
Turkey. In reply, Georges-Picot tied the evacuation of Cilicia to the right
to supervise the local administrationand minority rights, and collaboration
with France in Turkey's economic development. He added that the northern frontier of France's mandate in Syria should be drawn to the north of
Iskenderunas the naturaloutlet for Aleppo.2
On 21 January 1920, Turkish Nationalist troops besieged the French
garrisonof Mara§,the first step in Kemal'scampaign to force the French to
withdraw from Cilicia. Troops sent from Adana on 9 Februarydid relieve
the garrison, but the difficulty of supplying Mara§became so acute that
Gouraud decided on the following day to order evacuation. During the
march south, the French troops were almost wiped out by the Turks. By
10 February, three weeks of fighting had claimed more than five hundred
French lives and, although the French held their Muslim troops in Cilicia
on a short rein, many deserted out of sympathy for their co-religionists. In
an attempt to buttress France's position, the ministry of war sent reinforcements; by May, the thirty thousand troops under French command in the
Near East in Marchhad been increased by ten thousand.3
For the French, the retreatfrom Mara§was merely the beginning of their
difficulties. The Army of the Levant was inferior in both numbers and
equipment to the British forces it replaced, and almost before it had time to
look around, was embroiled with Turkish Nationalists in the north and
Faisal's Syrian forces in the south. The Turks in the north, however, were
of a differentcalibre from the troops of the so-called Arab army. Courageous and strong-willed, the Turkish soldier was able to withstand hardship,
accept losses, and recover quickly from defeat. Foreign military experts
rated his qualities highly: they noted his fine physique, sobriety and
1 Ankoglu, Hatiralanm, pp. 74-84; Ener, Qukurova,pp. 33, 39, 60; Col. E. Bremond, La Cilicie en
1919-20 (Paris, 1921), pp. 7, 16.
2 Note on peace with Turkey, 2 Feb. 1920, MAE Syrie-Liban/22, pp. 214-21; Capt. K. de GontautBiron, Commentla France s'est installee en Syrie: 1918-19 (Paris, 1922), pp. 337-413 For details about the military operations, see A. H. Saral, Turk Istiklal Harbi: Giiney Cephesi (15
Mayis 1919-20 Ekim 1921) (Ankara,1966), volume iv.
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588
YiicelGuglii
earnestness, innate bravery, tolerance for privation, and coolness under
fire. For courage, doggedness, and physical toughness, he had hardly an
equal; no other army could have survived, let alone fought, in the appalling
conditions the Ottoman army faced during the First World War. The
French troops were no match for the Turkish Nationalist forces, who used
surprise and wide dispersal to take advantageof French weakness.1
Gouraud at Beirut and the government in Paris followed the progress of
the fighting in Cilicia with growing alarm. This is obvious from the
messages they exchanged between February and June 1920, which were
markedby recriminationson the government's failureto provide adequate
military resources and Gouraud's misuse of those available to him. Clemenceau's successor as prime minister, Alexandre Millerand, became so
annoyed at the loss of prestige that he took steps to remove Gouraud from
his military command and relented only when the general threatened to
resign the post of high commissioner.2
Although Kemal had concluded from his talks with Georges-Picot that
the French might withdraw from Cilicia if left in undisputed possession of
Syria, his offensive was designed to force them to negotiate and to secure a
favourable territorialsettlement. By May 1920, in addition to Mara§,the
French had surrenderedUrfa to the Nationalists and also Pozanti, near the
Cilician Gates, which commanded the north-south route into Cilicia.
Negotiations continued throughout the fighting. A Turkish emissary,
MazharMufit (Kansu), visited Gouraud in March 1920 and, on 20 May, a
French delegation led by de Caix arrived in Ankara for talks with the
Nationalists. On the 23rd the French agreed, in return for a twenty-day
truce beginning on the 29th, to withdraw their forces south of the MersinTarsus-Adana-Islahiyerailwayline and from Antep.3
The truce, criticized in the Grand National Assembly, also alarmedboth
the British and Faisal, who was trying to hold out against the French in
Syria. Although the Nationalists had hitherto co-operated with Arab tribes
who lived along the Turkish-Arabic linguistic frontier, Kemal now revealed that he was willing to make a separate bargain with the French,
leaving Faisal, who had a long history of bargaining separately with the
British, to look afterhimself. Kemalhoped to use the truce to obtain Allied
recognition of the Nationalistgovernment.
1 See, e.g., MajorD. McCallum,'The Frenchin Syria:\g\g-24\ Journalof the CentralAsianSociety,
xii (1925),13.See also, Brig.S. Ali El-Edroos,TheHashemiteArabArmy:1908-79(Amman,1980),pp.
187-8.
2 See, e.g., Gouraudto Millerand,11May 1920,MAESyrie-Liban/135,
pp. 129-31and Millerandto
Gouraud,1 June1920,MAESyrie-Liban/136,
pp. 122-5.
3 War report, 13June 1920 [Ankara,TurkishGeneralStaffMilitaryHistoryand StrategicStudies
DirectorateArchives,henceforthTESE], Kol.:1st.,593-139-46;Frenchmilitaryefforts[in the Levant
(1Nov. 1919-18Aug. 1921)],pp. 4-5 [Vincennes],Ministryof] D[efenceArchives]7N 4192.
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TheStrugglefor Cilicia
589
The British criticized the armistice for precisely this reason; it was a
blow to the Allies' prestige and the first step towards recognition of the
Turkish Nationalists as a government in control of Asia Minor, and with
whom the French would eventually have to treat. Lloyd George observed
that Kemal's victories in Cilicia enhanced his prestige, encouraged the
Nationalists to attackterritoriesassigned to other Allies, and shattered the
Allies' reputationfor invincibility.1
The French, however, were not yet ready to make an acceptable bargain. On 17June, the Turks denounced the truce, owing to the disembarkation of French reinforcementsat Zonguldak Eregli ten days earlier. Convinced that the French were trying to take advantage of the armistice to
strengthen their position, the Nationalists announced the renewal of hostilities on the 18th. The announcement caused alarmat Paris, where public
opinion was becoming restless over the cost in money and blood of the
French occupation of Cilicia.2
In August, the Allies made peace with the Ottoman Empire. The treaty
of Sevres stipulated that the Turkish homeland in most parts of Anatolia
and eastern Thrace should be partitioned among Greece, Italy, France,
and Armenia. France acquired central and southern Anatolia including
Cilicia and the right to occupy the region to the north of Urfa. To enforce
the treaty against the Turkish Nationalists, however, would be more difficult. Signed by officials of the Imperial Ottoman government, it was denounced by the Nationalistgovernment and never ratified.3
While the Turkish Nationalists were harassing the French in Cilicia, an
Arab rebellion had compelled Gouraud to extend his lines in Syria. He
could neither reinforce Cilicia from Syria nor obtain reinforcements from
France. Demobilization deterred Millerand from sending troops from
France, where public opinion and the chamber of deputies were opposed
to further bloodshed and expenditure, especially in the Near East. The
First World War, which had decimated France'smale population, had also
destroyed or absorbed much of its fixed capital. To meet Gouraud's demands, the ministry of war had to withdraw troops from Istanbul and the
Balkans, and weaken its hold on Morocco.4 The Nationalists, meanwhile,
were increasingly successful in Cilicia, as one post after another surrendered and the French position there became untenable.
1 Derbyto Curzon,4 June 1920[Kew,PublicRecordOffice],F[oreign]O[fficeRecords]371/5049/E
5869.
2 Ener,Qukurova,
pp. 157-61;du Veou,La Passiondela Cilicie,pp. 219-20.
3 For the treatyof Sevres,see GreatBritain,TreatySenes, no. 11(1920), I reatyot Peacewith 1urkey
signedat Sevres,10Aug.1920,Cmd. 964 (London,1920),pp. 16-32.
4 Warreport,6 Dec. 1920,TESE, Kol.:1st.,597-148-25;Frenchmilitaryefforts,MD 7N 4192,p. 10.
For French public opinion, see N. Ingram, The Politics of Dissent: Pacifism in France: 1919-39 (London, 1991).
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59°
YilcelGiiglii
By November 1920, the French had concluded that the costs of trying to
control Cilicia, one being the repercussions in Syria, outweighed the benefits. Questions were asked in the chamber of deputies and articles criticizing the government appeared in the press. Many Frenchmen, some of
them influential, sympathized with the Turkish National movement and
looked to solve the Turkish question by conceding the main plank in the
Nationalists' programme, namely, the maintenance undivided of Turkey
proper. One highly respected Frenchjournalist, Edouard Herriot, argued
in November 1920 that ;if we were wise enough to conclude a real peace, a
French peace with the Turks; if we took their legitimate demands into
account; if we realized that having confined Turks into Anatolia, we cannot
allow them to be menaced; if we had the sense not to treat the men as
insurgents who are simple patriots, the problem of Syria would, in our
opinion, be solved quickly enough.'1
By 1921, the Nationalists had seized the initiative from the Allies. In the
face of a two-pronged offensive to the west towards Inonu and the southwest towards Afyonkarahisar,the Italianforces near Konya and the French
units around Maras were retreatingin disorder. By an agreementwith the
Nationalists of 13 March, Italy withdrew from Anatolia in exchange for a
concession for an Italianfirm to work the ZonguldakEregli coal mine. The
agreementleft the French in a critical situation in Cilicia: they could either
pour in more men and equipment, or withdraw in the hope of making a
bargainwith the Nationalists in anticipationof a British bid for a protectorate or peace on their own terms, or of a Russian bid to gain control of the
Straits. Keeping eighty thousand troops in the region cost France 500
million francs a year. In choosing withdrawaland a separatepeace with the
Nationalists in the hope of playing the leading role in the economic
development of Anatolia, France undermined the treatyof Sevres.2
When the Allied Supreme Council met in London in February1921,its
agenda included modifications to the treaty. On 9 March, however, the
French prime minister, Aristide Briand, unbeknownst to his Allies, made
an agreementwith the Nationalists'foreign minister, Bekir Sami (Kunduk),
under which France and Turkey agreed to cease hostilities in Cilicia within
a week, after which France would withdraw its troops to the sanjak of
Iskenderun; exchange prisoners; disarm both the populace and the local
Nationalist troops; set up a mixed administrationin areaswhere Christians
formed the majority of the population; and create a mixed gendarmerie
under both Turkish and French officers. In addition, the agreement prol E. Herriot, 'La Syrie et la Cilicie', Le Rappel, 22 Nov. 1920, 1.
p.
2 French military efforts, MD 7N 4192, pp. 11-13;'Secret French
Report on the Situation in Cilicia and
Syria', 28 Feb. 1921, FO 371/7801.
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claimed a generalamnesty and equal rights;joint economic development of
the region assigned to France by the Sykes-Picot agreement;French concessions to run the Baghdad railway from Pozanti to Nusaybin and work
the Erganicopper mines; a customs union between Turkey and Syria;and
a special administrationfor the sanjakof Iskenderun in recognition of the
preponderance of Turkish inhabitants. The new frontier between Turkey
and the French mandate in Syria would run from a point to be chosen on
the Gulf of Iskenderun, immediately south of Payas, and extend due east,
along the Baghdadrailway,to Cizre.1
Without waiting for the Nationalists at Ankarato comply with the first of
these conditions, much less ratify the agreement, on 12 March the war
minister, Louis Barthou, instructed Gouraud's military deputy, General
Noel Garnier-Duplessis, at Beirut by telegram to halt operations throughout Cilicia. The Quai d'Orsay sent similar instructions to de Caix, who
was standing in for Gouraud while he was in London at the conference
acting as Briand's military adviser. Two days later, Garnier-Duplessis
replied, asking Barthou to cancel the shipment of troops and materielfrom
North Africa. Similarly, de Caix lost no time in conferring with GarnierDuplessis and Dufieux on how to carry out the agreement. The French,
owing to their lack of the military might they needed to back up their
policies in the Near East, were keen to withdraw from Cilicia as soon as
possible. They had let themselves in for a nasty surprise.2
After failing to persuade Lloyd George to take up an offer to turn a
Nationalist state into a barrierto Bolshevik penetration, Sami left London
on 17 March but dallied at Paris, Rome, and Istanbul on the way home to
Ankara.The text of the London agreementreached Ankaraby telegramon
the 13th, courtesy of the French liaison officer at Zonguldak. When the
acting foreign minister, Ahmet Muhtar (Mollaoglu), read it before the
Grand National Assembly on the day Sami left London, it was rejected out
of hand, despite Kemal's presence in the chair, as a violation of the
National Pact. The clauses on the mixed gendarmerie, mixed administration in Christian areas, and economic concessions to France in central
Anatoliawere criticized as symbols of foreign domination: they smacked of
spheres of influence and Capitulations. The assembly, nonetheless, welcomed the confirmationthat the Allies were no longer acting in concert.3
Several clauses of the London agreement conflicted with the provisions
1 Note, 4 April 1921, MAE Syrie-Liban/35, pp. 184-7. Text of Briand-Sami accord in Contemporary
Review (April 1921), pp. 677-9.
2 Barthou to Garnier-Duplessis, 12 March, Garnier-Duplessis to Barthou, 14, 15, 18 March 1921, MD
Liban [1016-30!, box 3669: Briand to de Caix, 12 March 1921, MAE SLC/138, p. 29.
3 H. Edip (Adivar), The Turkish Ordeal (New York, 1928), p. 255 and Ankoglu, Hatiralanm, pp. 21719.
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TiicelGiiglii
of the National Pact, which the Grand National Assembly had agreed on 17
July 1920 should determine the terms of peace with the Allies. Whereas
France, despite offering to withdraw its troops from Cilicia, expected to
maintain a commercial monopoly, control the gendarmerie, and supply
advisers - in fact, to acquire a mandate in all but name - the National Pact
prohibited both a mandate and a protectorate. Even scientific and economic aid was acceptable only if it was untaintedwith imperialism.1
In counter-proposals made on 18 May 1921, the Nationalists eliminated
the terms they regarded as interference in Turkey's domestic affairs:the
mixed gendarmerieand administration,and the disarmingof the Nationalist forces. They postponed the general amnesty until Turkish forces
arrived two days after the French evacuation - in the hope of preventing
Armenians who had massacred Turkish civilians during the occupation
from escaping - and shifted the frontier twenty kilometres to the south.
They also removed the economic concessions, but offered to incorporate
them into letters of intent to be annexed to the treaty.Finally, the Nationalists added two provisions: that the treaty should end the state of war
between Turkey and France, and that France should support Turkey's
legitimate territorial demands during the peace negotiations with the
Allies. The last stipulation referredobliquely to the Nationalists' aim to recover Izmir and eastern Thrace, and their hope of binding France both to
recognize Turkey's sovereignty over the territories that it demanded, and
to renounce the various forms of control envisioned during the peace conferences with the Ottomans.2
Although the aborted London agreement helped to calm the northern
frontier of Syria, the overwhelming Nationalist victory over the Armenian
forces on the Caucasian front, followed by the treaty of Gumrii on 2
December 1920, had left the French government in little doubt of the likelihood that the Nationalistswould eventuallyhave their way. The treaty,the
first international agreement made with the Nationalist regime, annulled
the treaty of Sevres, and many eastern Anatolian towns, including Kars,
assigned to Armenia at Sevres, were handed back. When victory over the
Armenians was followed by victories over the Greeks at the battles of
Inonii on 9 Januaryand 31 March 1921,France's eighty thousand troops in
Cilicia were seen as an unaffordabledrain on resources which the French
parliamentwas no longer willing to supply.
The victories graduallywon over French public opinion to support for
the Nationalist regime. A balance-of-payments'problem, which eventually
1 T. Biyikhoglu, Atatiirk Anadolu'da: 1919-21 (Ankara, 1959), p. 77. Biyiklioglu was chief of operations
for the Turkish high command on the Western Front and later Kemal's secretary-general. He had
access to the presidential archives: S. Tansel, Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya Kadar (Ankara, 1974), iii. 157.
2 Biyiklioglu, Atatiirk Anadolu'da: 1919-21.
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The Strugglefor Cilicia
593
led to the crisis of 1924-6, provoked cries in the chamber of deputies for
retrenchment.Questions were asked and unfavourablecomment appeared
in the press: Le Temps openly supported the Nationalists and ;the loyal
endeavours of the Ankaragovernment'.1Similarly, businessmen who had
invested or traded in the Near East before the First World War, or who
aspired to obtain profitableconcessions, spread the word around Paris that
the future belonged to the Nationalists; that if the government supported
them, France stood to reap enormous profits.
Cilicia proved to be an awkward location for a French army caught
between the Turkish Nationalists and Syria at a time when developments
in the Arab world were disquieting. On 27 August 1921, the British made
Faisal king of the protectorate of Iraq and his brother, Abdullah, head of a
native administration in Transjordan. Owing to the events in Damascus
the previous year, the French had no reason to expect relations between
the French administrationin Syria and the governments of Iraq and Transjordan to be cordial. Gouraud thus found himself surrounded by unfriendly neighbours: unless France reinforced the Army of the Levant to
make it strong enough to defend all of Syria's frontiers simultaneously, it
had to choose whether to make peace with the Turks or the Arabs. The
French chose the Turks.
Owing to the Nationalists' rejection of the London agreement, their
strained relations with the French almost reached a crisis prior to the
Greek advance in July 1921 towards Ankara.With the memory of the outcome of the battles at Inonii fresh in their minds, however, the French decided in May to make a second attempt to reach a settlement. The Turks,
for their part, although willing to cease hostilities on the Cilician front in
order to give undivided attention to the Greeks, were keen to exploit the
state of French public opinion at home and France's militaryweakness on
the spot. The balance of advantagefavouredthem ratherthan the French.
The head of the delegation sent to Ankara to try to salvage the London
agreement was Henri Franklin-Bouillon, an ambitious Radical Socialist
politician, formerpresident of the senate foreign relations committee, and a
former minister of propaganda in the war cabinet. He saw friendship with
the Nationalists as both a counterpoise to the Bolshevik menace and a way
to appease political opinion within France's Muslim colonies, which were
expected to supply a third of the French army's troops; many Muslims
would be stationed permanently in France. Having arrived in Istanbul on
27 May in the guise of a war correspondent, he sought out the represen1 Y. Akyuz, Turk Kurtultq Savaji ve Fransiz Kamuoyu:1919-22 (Ankara, 1975), passim.
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TiicelGilglii
tatives of the Nationalist government, and once certain of a sympathetic
reception at Ankara, left Istanbul in secret and sailed to Inebolu on the
Black Sea coast where he was met by Yusuf Kemal (Tengir§ek), Sami's
successor in May 1921as foreign minister. On thejourney to Ankara,Yusuf
Kemal, having discovered the purpose of Franklin-Bouillon'smission, telegraphed the news to Ankara. Thus, Mustafa Kemal and General Mustafa
Fevzi (Qakmak),the acting foreign minister, were able to instruct the permanent under-secretaryfor foreign affairs,Yusuf Hikmet (Bayur),ahead of
time to prepare the Turkish response.1
After reachingAnkaraon 9 June, Franklin-Bouillonrested for a few days
in an attempt to disguise Briand's eagerness for an agreement. Nonetheless, despite Franklin-Bouillon'sclaim that he had no official status, the
Nationalists knew better the moment he suggested that the treatyof Sevres
should form the basis for discussions. The Nationalists, who refused,
suggested the National Pact instead. As Franklin-Bouillonwas ignorant of
its terms, he asked for time to study it. On 21June, both sides agreed as a
compromise to use the London agreement as the basis.2The compromise
suited the Nationalists better than the French.
Briandhad instructed Franklin-Bouillonto exchange the end of the hostilities in Cilicia for economic concessions and a remnant of the former
Capitulations to protect the substantial French investments in loans, economic development, schools, and missions. The Capitulations had restricted the Ottoman Empire's ability to regulate its own trade and gave a
range of extraterritorialprivileges to foreign nationals, including immunity
from taxation and sequestration, and the right to consular jurisdiction.
These Mustafa Kemal would no longer allow. The 'political, economic,
legal, military, and cultural independence' stipulated by the National Pact
must be acknowledged.3
Franklin-Bouillon, who had found several clauses of the National Pact
diametrically opposed to France's aims, despaired of making a definitive
agreement. He shuttled revised drafts to Istanbul for referral to Briand,
who had, at length, to take Gouraud into his confidence. Owing to Briand's dislike of paperwork, he needed someone outside the Quai d'Orsay
who knew the background to the London agreement to help him to drafta
replacement. Thus, Franklin-Bouillonfound himself constantly travelling
between Ankara, Istanbul, Beirut, and Adana, acting more as a courier
l Franklin-Bouillon
to Briand,2 June 1921,MAETurquie[io,i8-2O,]/i72,p. 129. For YusufKemal's
own accountof his role,see Y. KemalTengirsek,VatanHizmetinde(Istanbul,1967),pp. 246-9.
2 Franklin-Bouillon
to Briand(viaDufieuxandGouraud),30 June1921,MD Liban,box 4B 2;sameto
same,1July1921,MAETurquie/173,p. 96. See also,Tengirsek,VatanHizmetinde,pp. 249-50andK.
Atatiirk,Nutuk(Istanbul,1950-9),ii. 620-3.
3 Pelleto Briand,13July1921,MAETurquie/173,p. 10.
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595
than as an envoy. The need to consult Paris, Istanbul, and Beirut caused
long delays and wasted valuable time, given the warnings from the high
commissioner at Istanbul, General Maurice Pelle, that the British, too,
were makingsecret overtures to the Nationalists.1
On 28 July, Franklin-Bouillon told Briand that progress under these
conditions was impossible; he suggested that he should return to Paris for
instructions. At this moment, the Greeks launched the final phase of their
offensive towards Ankara, a two-pronged attack from the vicinities of
Eski§ehirand Afyon. As the Greek high command was confident of victory, Briand decided on 19 August to await the outcome of the campaign.
In so doing, he took a calculated risk. If the Greeks prevailed, France
could dictate its own terms to the Nationalists. If, on the other hand, the
Nationalists held the line before Ankara, or even drove back the Greeks,
they would take a tougher line with France.2
By the time Franklin-Bouillonreturned from Paris to Ankaraon 19 September, with full powers to negotiate a treaty, the Nationalists had defeated
the Greeks at Polath, seventy-five kilometres short of Ankara, the crucial
engagement of the campaign. Briand, sceptical of the Nationalists' chances
of success, had hesitated to propose any terms they were likely to accept.
His hesitation, however, was overcome by the proof of their power after a
victory over the Greeks in a battle at Sakarya that lasted for twenty-two
days from 23 August to 13 September and stopped the Greek advance on
Ankara.3
Proud of their achievementand confident of furthersuccess, the Nationalists were likely to raise their demands. In pinning his hopes on the
Greeks, Briand had lost his bet: Kemal would now set the tone of the
negotiations that began on 24 September. Knowing that France could not
administer its mandate in Syria without an agreement with its neighbour,
the French steeled themselves to settle for harsh terms. They, in fact, had
no choice. With the Greeks in retreat, Kemal, for the first time, could
deploy all of the Nationalist forces against the French in Cilicia.4
The negotiations, which dragged on for more than three weeks, focused
on the southern frontierof Turkey, the Capitulations,and minorities. In an
attempt to split the Allies, the Nationalists were willing to leave the sanjak
of Iskenderun under French rule, as stipulated in the aborted London
agreement.But they refused appeals for Capitularyconcessions and privil1 Pelle to Briand, 13July 1921, MAE Turquie/173, p. 10.
2 Franklin-Bouillon to Briand, 28 July, 16 Sept., Briand to Gouraud, 19 Aug. 1921, MAE Turquie/173,
pp. 19, 58, 117.
3 Ankara agreement, 2 Nov. 1921, TESE, Kol.: 1st., 600-156-6; Pelle to Briand, 19 bept., *ranklinBouillon to Briand, 30 Sept. 1921, MAE Turquie/173, pp. 129, 196. Also Atatiirk,Nutuk, ii. 623-5.
4 Ataturk,Nutuk, ii. 623-5.
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TiicelGiiglii
eges for minorities. The most they would offer was adherence to the terms
governing the protection of minorities incorporated within the peace
treaties, and they agreed to transferthe management of the section of the
Baghdad railwaybetween Pozanti and Nusaybin, as well as the branches in
Adana, to a French consortium, with concessions on exploitation and
traffic.Yusuf Kemaltold Franklin-Bouillonthat his governmentwould also
be willing to grant ninety-nine-yearconcessions for iron, chrome, and silver mining in the Har§utvalley, provided Turks owned 50 per cent of each
company. Owing to the Nationalists' need of help from French experts,
they would consider requests for other similarconcessions.1
Franklin-Bouillonagreed, in return, that France would employ Turkish
as an official language in the sanjak of Iskenderun, appoint officials of
Turkish origin to districts with Turkish majorities, and provide facilities
for the development of Turkish culture. France would also allow Turkish
goods to travelby way of the port of Iskenderun free of customs and, most
important, allow the sanjakto have its own flag incorporating the Nationalist flag. As flags are regardedas signs of statehood or, at least, of a distinct
political entity, France hereby recognized the distinctness of the sanjakof
Iskenderun from Syria. To the Nationalists, who regarded the flag as the
first step towards autonomy for the sanjak, the Ankara agreement had a
significantbearing on futuredisputes over it between Turkey and France.
Although the Nationalists yielded to France's objections to the revision
of the frontierand the two-day delay for the general amnesty, they yielded
little else. With the elimination of the Greek threat from the west, Kemal
felt no urgency in ending the struggle for Cilicia:he and his colleagues perceived France from the start as exhausted, financiallyweak, and unwilling
to fight anotherwar.2
Although Briand had given Franklin-Bouillonand his assistant, Colonel
Louis Mougin, a Turcophile, full powers to negotiate, they confined themselves to a role scarcely less pedestrian than the one Franklin-Bouillonhad
played in June and July. They referredall of the Nationalists' demands to
Briand and relayed his replies to Kemal without comment, as if they were
no more than post-office clerks. Perhaps, however, Kemal's resolve, in
return for an agreementwith France, to demand its support in settling disputes with the other Allies, in preparation for a general peace, persuaded
Briand to over-ride Franklin-Bouillonand take the crucial decisions himself. The moment the concessions France had made became public, they
were bound to offend Britainand Italy. On 19 October, therefore, Briand,
1 Gouraud to Bnand, 1 Oct., Bnand to Gouraud, 14 Oct., Berthelot to Gouraud, 15 Oct., FranklinBouillon to Briand, 18 Oct. 1921, MAE SLC/137, pp. 217, 278, 281, 298.
2 Atatiirk,Nutuk, ii. 79-81; A. F. Cebesoy, Milli Miicadele Hatiralart (Istanbul,
1953), pp. 149, 159.
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597
under heavy economic and parliamentarypressure, instructed FranklinBouillon to sign the latest draftof the agreementhe had sent to Paris.
Meanwhile, on the 4th, the Grand National Assembly began to interrogate the Turkish plenipotentiaries. Deputies showed keenest interest in
the boundary with Syria and the terms of cession of the sanjak. Many
objected to Franklin-Bouillon'sline, arguing that the frontier should run
from Ras-Ibn-Han, on the Mediterraneanten kilometres north of Latakia,
thus including the sanjakof Iskenderun and its environs, as well as a large
part of the province of Aleppo. The hearings continued until the 18th,
when Kemalhimself stepped in to relieve the foreign minister in defending
the agreement.1According to Franklin-Bouillon, who watched the proceedings from the gallery (with an interpreterat his side), Kemal saved the
day. Towards evening, the assembly approved the agreement, and two
days later, on 20 October, Franklin-Bouillon and Yusuf Kemal signed it.
Then, in accordancewith Article 1, orders for an immediate cease-firewere
wired to all units. The war for Cilicia had ended.2
The agreementpleased the Quai d'Orsay. The director of political affairs,
Emmanuel Peretti de la Rocca, remarked on 29 October 1921 that it 'has
given us popularity not only in Turkey but throughout North Africa. The
letters I get from Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt are enthusiastic. Today,
the Islamic world is for us. We have returned to the traditional policy of
France, that of our kings, of the empire, of the Republic.'3 However true,
the Ankara agreement also illustrated France's weakness in the face of
Muslim pressure.
The Turkish Nationalists were elated at the agreement, both as a tribute
to the success of their army and as presaging the recognition of their sovereignty. The agreement stabilized the Nationalists' position, freeing from
foreign occupation without cost a large area of the territory they claimed
and extending their rule across southern Anatolia, one of the most fertile
and strategicallyvital regions of Asia Minor.
The agreementimplied that one of the Allies had recognized the Grand
National Assembly and the terms of its National Pact. As Kemal explained
on 6 March 1922: 'The fact that one of the most powerful of the states that
1 Briand to Franklin-Bouillon, 19 Oct. 1921, MAE Turquie/174, p. 229. On the hearings, see Tiirkiye
Biiyiik Millet Meclisi Gizli Celse Zabitlan (Ankara, 1980), ii. 258-372 (4-18 Oct. 1921) and FranklinBouillon to Briand, 18 Oct. 1921, MAE Turquie/173, pp. 257-8.
2 Franklin-Bouillon to Briand, 18 Oct. 1921, MAE Turquie/174, p. 210; Proceedings of the Secret
Sessions of the Grand National Assembly (Ankara, 1980), ii. 360-72; text of Ankara agreement in the
League of Nations: Treaty Series, no. 1285, liv (1926-7), 177-93. The agreement was approved by the
French on 28 Oct. 1921, such approbation entailing de piano that of the Turkish government.
3 MAE to Gouraud, 29 Oct. 1921, MAE Syne-Liban/137, pp. 212-13.
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Tiicel Giiclii
had signed the treaty of Sevres . . . had come to a separate understanding
with us, proved to the whole world that that treaty was merely a rag.'1As
the Allies were no longer united, France would become the Nationalists'
amicus curiae by supporting them at the forthcomingpeace conference.
Kemal's successful tactic of splitting the Allies by dealing with them
separately now allowed him to switch most of the eighty thousand troops
facing the French away from Cilicia and back to the western front, where
they were needed to continue pushing back the Greeks. He re-equipped
them with the arms, including Creusot guns, ammunition, and supplies,
for forty thousand men the French agreed to leave behind in the territory
they evacuated. As the French also offered further consignments from
Syria, the Ankaraagreement and the French withdrawal from Cilicia gave
the Nationalists parity with the Greeks. It negated the advantage Greece
had gained from the materielBritainsupplied to it.2
For the French, the agreement represented a realistic choice, if they
wished to consolidate their hold on their Syrian mandate. Yet nowhere did
the Ankaraagreementmention France as mandatoryover Syria;it referred
to Syria merely as Turkey's neighbour to the south. Although the French
archives contain no explanation, the reason was deference to the Nationalists, who did not recognize the mandate system and would not until
Turkey's entry into the League of Nations on 18July 1932. The Nationalists spoke of the sanjak of Iskenderun as if perforce, for the time being,
they were leaving a Turkish territoryunder French trusteeship. They did
not regard the cession as binding or final, or concede that the French
might treatthe sanjakas part of Syria.
The agreementcaused problems in Anglo-French relationsin the period
leading up to the Chanakcrisis of September 1922. Britainconsidered that
France had undermined the Allied position. The foreign secretary, Lord
Curzon, after a series of interviews in London with the Greek prime
minister, Dimitrios Gounaris, sought to retrieve the position by arranging
a meeting of the Allied foreign ministers to discuss new peace terms, followed by a meeting of the Supreme Council in Istanbul, to place them
before the Nationalists. Early in January 1922, however, after a Supreme
Council meeting at Cannes, Briand fell from power, and his successor,
Raymond Poincare, refused to agree to a conference. He had his way,
partly owing to the fall at the same time of the Italiangovernment.
French policy towards the Near East in the aftermathof the First World
War reveals the continuing rivalry among the great powers. The evacuation of Cilicia and the grant of local autonomy in the sanjakof Iskenderun
1 Atatiirk'iin Soylev ve Demecleri: 1910-38 (Ankara, 1961), i. 235.
2 Rumbold to Curzon, 8 Nov. 1921, FO 371/6477/E 12582.
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were designed to weaken the British and the Greeks in the Aegean and the
eastern Mediterranean,while autonomy for the sanjak was meant to buy
the goodwill of the Nationalists. The Ankara agreement also gave France
temporary security against the Nationalists, and by alleviating fears of expense, casualties, and an uncertain future in the Levant, may be said to
have strengthened the French hold on Syria. As the Nationalists had
already defeated the French troops in Cilicia, the agreement did not alter
the balance of militaryadvantage.Moreover, the French - who viewed the
British in the Near East as rivals, resented the Hashemites, and perceived
their schemes as British-inspiredplots - had no hesitation in embarrassing
the British. Events in the Near East showed how far the two former allies
were drifting apart, partly because of France's irritation by what it perceived as British support for the Greeks: a Greek victory in western Anatolia would mean British ascendancy in the Aegean and British domination
of the Straits. Thus, France did not object when its withdrawal from
Cilicia enabled the Nationalists to turn on the Greeks, whereas to the British, who saw the French action as a betrayal,it became one more grievance
to add to a lengthening list. Nonetheless, there is no evidence for Marcel
Hornet'sclaim that the Ankaraagreementwas made primarilyto embarrass
Britain.1The truth is that France, defeated by the Nationalist forces, was
obliged to make peace.
The fluid internationalsituation after the First World War offered many
opportunities to the Turkish Nationalist government. When the coalition
of victorious Allies split apart even before the peace treaties were drawn
up, the Nationalists exploited the divisions to the full, helped by the Allies'
war-wearinessand reluctance to extend their military commitments. The
Nationalist leaders also understood the tone of French public opinion.
They read the major European newspapers and their representatives at
Paris, London, and Rome kept them posted on developments there. They
even penetrated the ImperialOttoman government and the Allied chancelleries in Istanbul.
Long-term French interests in the Levant also dictated a rapprochement
with the Nationalists. Francewould face formidableproblems in protecting
its investments if Anatolia was partitioned between the Allies and their
associates, Greece and Armenia, or shared out as mandates and spheres of
influence. French bondholders held more than 50 per cent of the Ottoman
public debt, and as a result, French bankers played a major role in the
Imperial Ottoman Bank: France therefore stood to jeopardize both its
investments and its influence in the event of a partition.2
1 M. Hornet, UHistoire secretedu Traite Franco-Syrien (Paris, 1936), p. 238.
2 Note on Near Eastern questions, 21 Dec. 1921, MAE Syne-Liban/208, pp. 45-50; consul, Aleppo, to
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The Nationalists' hostility would also jeopardize France's bid to take
over Germany's pre-war pre-eminence in the region. France hoped to use
Turkish nationalism to thwart the other European powers, just as Britishsupported Arab nationalism menaced France's ambitions in the Levant.
Their rivalry led to controversies over the interpretation of the wartime
agreements, the oil around Mosul, and control of the Straits. In Anatolia,
the British supported the Greeks, whereas the French saw the Nationalists
as a bulwark against Anglo-Greek influence. Instead, however, of being
turned into a French client resembling the Hashemites for the British, the
Nationalists adroitlyplayed off one of the Allies against the other.1
The Ankara agreement obliged France not only to withdraw from
Cilicia, but also to surrender part of the mandate the Supreme Allied
Council had assigned to it. This territory running west to east, from the
Gulf of Iskenderun to the left bend of the Tigris opposite Cizre, comprised
about sixteen thousand square kilometres. France, in fact, surrenderedthe
line laid down by the treaty of Sevres for one which began at a point south
of Payas, fifteen kilometres north of Iskenderun, ran eastwards to a point
on the Baghdad railway forty-five kilometres north of Aleppo, and thereafter followed the course of the railway to Nusaybin in such a way as to
place the railway line in Turkish territory, together with the stations and
sidings between Qobanbey and Nusaybin. From Nusaybin, the new frontier turned north-east to the Tigris at Cizre. With the exception of the
sanjak of Iskenderun, which joined Turkey in 1939, the new frontier for
the most part followed the naturallinguistic divide between Turks to the
north and Arabs to the south.
The British government, in the person of Curzon, took vigorous exception to the Ankara agreement. He argued that the alteration of Syria's
northern frontierdid not concern France alone. Although the mandatehad
been awarded to France, it represented the collective Allied victory: thus,
the retrocession of territoryby France to Turkey without notice to Britain
and Italy contravened the treaty of Sevres, the Franco-British treaty of 14
September 1914, and the London pact of 30 November 1915, of which the
last two had prohibited a separatepeace. Although France replied that the
agreementwas not a treatyof peace, merely a local arrangementwith a state
which had received neither dejure nor defacto recognition, the claim of a
tractation locale implied recognition of the Grand National Assembly at
FO, 15 March 1922, FO 371/3468; A. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay (London, 1946),
pp. 146-57, is inaccurate in detail.
1 Note, 19 April 1923, MAE Syrie-Liban/208,
pp. 29-33. Curzon, in an interview on 4 July 1919 with
Paul Cambon, the French ambassador at London, complained of the revival of the spirit of rivalry
between the British and the French over Turkey: Curzon to Derby, 4 July 1919, tel. no. 956, DBFP, iv.
661-2.
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TheStrugglefor Cilicia
601
Ankaraas the sovereign authorityin Turkey.1As Britainstill supported the
moribund Imperial Ottoman government at Istanbul, the Ankara agreement was tantamountto a separateFranco-Turkishpeace.
Curzon wondered whether the agreement contained an additional clandestine clause. As Franklin-Bouillonwas thought to be one of the leading
Turcophiles among the French colonial party, the British interpreted a
letter sent to him from Yusuf Kemal as evidence that Franklin-Bouillon
might have exceeded his instructions and entered into understandings of a
serious and far-reaching nature. The French denied it: the concessions
were 'not connected with any secret engagement, either written or verbal,
entered into by Franklin-Bouillon,relative to eventual co-operation on the
part of France'.2As the Quai d'Orsay refused to offer any furtherexplanation, Britain and France remained bitterly divided over the Ankaraagreement and the effects were felt farbeyond the Near East.3
Both the French colonial party and Syrian Arab nationalists criticized
the agreement on the grounds that Turks living in the sanjak were given
special privileges. They accused the French government of neglecting to
defend Syria's northern frontier and of withdrawing from areas of great
economic and strategicimportance to it. Thus, France, in its own interests
and without consulting Syrians, had abandoned Syrian territorywhich it
had undertakento defend.4
The French government, on the other hand, claimed that Syria benefited from the agreement. Thus, for instance, at the ninth session of the
permanentmandates commission of the League of Nations, when France's
usually perceptive representative, de Caix, was asked directly about the
effect of the Ankaraagreement on Syria, he replied that the stability of its
frontiers was one of the benefits it derived from the French mandate. He
added that when Syria, perpetually in conflict with Turkey, gained its
independence, the agreement would be a dead letter, for the Nationalists
had made it with France.5
1 GreatBritain,Turkey no. 1 (1922),CorrespondencebetweenHis Majesty'sGovernmentand the
FrenchGovernmentrespectingthe AnkaraAgreementof 20 Oct. 1921,Cmd.1570(London,1922),pp.
5, 117.The treatyof Sevres,which had not been ratified,was notjuridicallybinding,while the mandates,as of 20 Oct. 1921,the dateof the Ankaraagreement,had not been confirmedby the Leagueof
Nations.
2 Ibid.,p. 118.The archivesof the TurkishGeneralStaffMilitaryHistoryandStrategicStudiesDirectorateand the Frenchministriesof foreignaffairsand defence do not containa secret annex to the
Ankara agreement. For Curzon, see G. H. Bennett, British Foreign Policy during the Curzon Period,
1919-24(London, 1995), ch. 5.
3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Directorate General of Research and Policy Planning: Kurtulus
Savasimiz: 1919-22 (Ankara, 1973), p. 163.
4 Du Veou, La Passion de la Cilicie, p. 304.
5 Minutes, 9U1session, 1926, League of Nations: Permanent Mandates Commission(Geneva, 1926), pp.
118-19.
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YucelGiiglii
602
Right-wing publicists in France criticized the agreement as the sacrifice
of the rich prize of Cilicia, of Christian friends, and of Syria's true line of
defence. Jerome and Jean Tharaud, two of the most famous, called the
agreement 'an unfortunateprecedent'. Dufieux claimed that it 'augurs the
speedy loss of Iskenderun and Antakya' and a former foreign minister,
Henri Froidevaux, added that it was 'destined to facilitate new Turkish
demands and abandonmentby France of the district of Iskenderun'.1
To the ordinary Frenchman, however, the word Cilicia did not conjure
up much; he might suspect its economic importance, yet did not trouble
himself about its future and took little interest in what happened to it. The
French press published little about it, because the public was uninterested
in the affairsof the Levant as long as they did not cost money or lives.2
The military evacuation of Cilicia proceeded smoothly and on time
without a single casualty or serious incident. It was preceded, however, by
the flight of the Armenians whom France had employed as gendarmerie
and militia. Although both the Turks and the French tried throughout
November and December to persuade the Armenians to stay behind, the
advice was of no avail. Armenians who had been made to fight for the
French and to sign petitions begging them to accept the mandate, chose to
run away with their formermasters.
The French flag was finally lowered at Adana, amid suitable honours
from Turks and Frenchmen alike, on 5 January 1922. The Turkish press
publishedjubilant articles, illustratedwith photographs, about a transferof
power which should serve as a model for the rest of occupied Anatoliaand
Thrace. Franco-Turkishrelations remained close, the Nationalists opened
a diplomatic mission at Paris in November 1921, and Franklin-Bouillon
shuttled back and forth until the armisticeof Moudaniaon 11October.3
The Ankaraagreementwas not a peace treaty,merely a bilateralagreement
between two governments not ratifiedby the two parliaments.At the close
of 1921,however, the French senate eagerly acquiesced in the agreementas
it lessened France's responsibilities in the Near East: they would have accepted any compromise settlement of the Cilician question. The agreement put an end to the fighting in Cilicia pending the conclusion of the
1 Du Veou, La Passion de la Cilicie, p. 305.
2 C. M. Andrewand A. S. Kanya-Forstner,
'FrenchBusinessand FrenchColonialists',Historical
Journal,xix (1976),996.
3 Underits terms,Greecewas to evacuateeasternThraceup to the riverMericwithinthirtydays,and
Turkishsovereigntyoverthe region,as wellas overthe StraitsandIstanbul,wasrecognized.In return,
Turkeypromisedto respecta neutralzone aroundthe Straits,pendingthe signatureof a definitive
treaty.
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The Strugglefor Cilicia
603
final peace settlement on 24 July 1923 at Lausanne, at which time a bilateral
exchange of letters between the Turkish and French delegations led by
General Ismet Inonii and Pelle stated that nothing in the treaty should be
held to invalidatethe agreement'sstipulations. The Ankaraagreementthus
became part of the general peace settlement with Turkey, made ironically
under the direction of Lord Curzon.
Ministry of ForeignAffairs of the Republicof Turkey
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