The Sino-Russian Border:
Anatomy of a Problem Region
By
Eoin M. Heaney
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Advanced International Studies
The Diplomatic Academy of Vienna
June 16, 2010
Professor Thomas Row
Supervisor
Professor Gerhard Mangott
DA Reader
1
For My Parents
2
Abstract
The topic of this study is the Russian Far Eastern Region which borders China and its
prospects for the future. As it stands, the Russian Federation is losing an alarming
amount of its population on an annual basis. This problem is particularly acute in the
Far Eastern Region which also suffers from poor infrastructure, a depressed economy
and political fragmentation, meaning that it is becoming increasingly distant from
Moscow. At the same time, its neighbour to the south, China, is surging
economically and booming demographically. Historically, the region in question was
once in Chinese hands and at the moment, Chinese capital and labour is beginning to
move northwards. The border has always been a problematic sticking point in bilateral relations between the two powers, which has prompted some observers to
become concerned about the future security of the region. This study aims to come to
an understanding as to why the Sino-Russian frontier is emerging as a unique cross
border region in its own right. In placing current issues within an historical
framework and analysing the asymmetrical nature of the regions’ economy,
demographics, politics and society, this thesis explores the dimensions which make
this a problematic area.
3
Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations in text
5
Note about spelling in text
6
Introduction
7
Chapter One: Russia’s Eastward Expansion
12
Chapter Two: Contemporary Issues
26
Chapter Three: A Changing Society
44
Conclusion
57
Bibliography
60
Annex I: The Russian Federation Background Information
67
Annex II: Tables, Maps and Graphs
75
Acknowledgements
82
4
List of Abbreviations used in the text
CIS
Commonwealth of Independent States
CCP
Chinese Communist Party
CPSU
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
ESPO
East Siberian Pacific Ocean Pipeline
EU
European Union
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
KGB
Committee for State Security
NEP
New Economic Policy
PRC
Peoples’ Republic of China
RF
Russian Federation
RFE
Russian Far East
SCO
Shanghai Cooperation Agreement
SSR
Soviet Socialist Republic
UN
United Nations
UR
United Russia (Political Party)
US
United States
USD
United States Dollar
USSR
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
5
Note about spelling used in text
Names of authors, scholars and periodicals translated from Russian sources are
rendered in the Latin alphabet and not in Cyrillic.
Quotations from American sources are not rendered in Standard English spelling.
Most Chinese place names and personal names are given in the Wade-Giles system
of transliteration, e.g. Mao Tse-tung. Some newer sources however, appear in pinyin
such as Jung Chang.
6
Introduction
'As far as we were concerned, we weren't responsible for what our tsars had done,
but the lands gained from those tsarist treaties were now Soviet territory... besides, a
true Communist and Internationalist wouldn't assign any particular importance to
borders.. especially between fellow socialist states.' Nikita Khrushchev.1
'There are too many places occupied by the Soviet Union... the Russians took
everything they could... It is about time to put an end to this allotment.' Mao TseTung.2
The history of the frontier between Russia and China has been one of conquest and
Empire. From the 1850's onwards, tsarist Russia, eager to detract attention away
from defeat in the Crimea turned eastward. Although this was not the first time
which Russia had directed its gaze towards the Orient (traders had been drawn there
by the fur trade since the 16th century), in the context of 19th century Europe, which
Russia saw itself as a part of, nation and empire fused together driven by a desire to
spread civilisation to the Pacific. Although relatively backwards by Western
industrial and political standards, the Russians were still able to conquer vast
stretches of land by exploiting a Chinese Qing Dynasty weakened by the Opium
Wars and the Taiping Rebellion. Were it not for the checking of their power by the
Japanese in Manchuria in 1905, the territory gained could have been even greater. By
this time, Russia had become a true Empire spanning from the Baltic to the Pacific,
which altered the geostrategic balance of power creating an uneasy relationship
between Russia and its eastern neighbours, which persists in various forms to this
day.
1
S.C.M. Paine, Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and their Disputed Frontier, (New York: ME Sharpe,
1996) p. 1.
2
Ibid.
7
Yet, the far eastern possessions of Siberia and the Russian Far East, while remaining
resource rich, were never fully colonised or developed to the same extent that
imperial rivals had done so in Africa or the New World. At the moment, Russia is
facing an imminent demographic crisis as the country is losing huge numbers of its
population year on year, the situation in the Far East being particularly bad. When
combined with the explosion of China's population and reassertion on the world
stage, it is worth pausing to examine the future of what has become the longest
militarised border in the world between the Russian Federation and the Peoples’
Republic of China.
The region itself is an exaggerated example of the worst problems which plague
Russia as a whole; poor infrastructure, a declining population and an economy
propped up by erratic energy income, combined with extremely poor governance.
Considering that historically, the border region has always been a troublesome matter
between Russia and China, these issues raise questions about the security of the
region in the long term. Despite this, the sheer asymmetry of the region, in terms of
population, economics and political culture appears to be fostering the emergence of
a unique region in its own right as Chinese capital and labour moves north and the
two peoples intermingle. Therefore, the thrust of this work is to analyse the factors
which have contributed to this phenomenon, namely the historical dynamic,
demographics, the regional economy and the socio-political situation.
As diplomatic historian S.C.M. Paine has stated, if Russia and China were ever to
engage each other militarily in the future (which is unlikely, but not impossible) it
would be over control of the border regions.3 Despite the most recent agreement
signed between the two countries in 2008, which put an end to outstanding minor
border disputes, the future of the region is far from certain. Precedent exists: As
recently as 1969, when the Sino-Soviet split was at its worst, both sides came into
open conflict in the region for a brief period.
In order to present the developments in the region as they really are, and illustrate
their wider ranging consequences, the first necessary step to take is to engage with
the history of the region. Like many contemporary contentious border zones,
3
Ibid, p.355.
8
imperial expansion during the great land grabs of the nineteenth century is the
foundation for the dynamic which is present today. Therefore, an analysis of Russian
Imperial expansion and governance methods as well as an investigation into the
development of a specific Russian frontier identity is required grounding to be able
to interpret and explain the current situation.
In the second chapter, the pressing contemporary issues which affect the Russian Far
East (RFE) are expanded upon. Included in this is a section on current Sino-Russian
bilateral relations which, drawing upon recent excellent research presents the
relationship as it is, warts and all as opposed to what some commentators in the West
perceive as a totalitarian alliance, coming together to spite Europe and America.
From here, the largest single challenge faced by Russia and exacerbated in the RFE
is dealt with, that of demographic decline. Through rigorous statistical analysis
supported by official figures and research, the scale of the decline in the workforce
among ethnic Russians is highlighted in no uncertain terms. In order to emphasise
the general asymmetry of the relationship between the two countries, Chinese figures
are presented as well to add context. This approach is continued in a section on
Chinese economic dominance in the region, which looks into debts run up by the
Russian state and its agencies in setting up projects, specifically infrastructural and
energy related ventures. Finally, an examination into the extent to which the local
populace in the RFE feels disconnected from their local political leadership as well
as the effectiveness of said leadership is undertaken as this is a serious issue which,
as we will see if left unchecked will do serious damage to the long term credibility of
Moscow in the region.
The final section, entitled ‘A Changing Society’ presents the effects which these
changes and trends are having upon the population itself along the border. In order to
approach this comprehensively, the chapter begins with a theoretical framework
regarding cross border regions in general, focusing on the criteria involved which
make a successful and productive trans boundary zone. Data and statistics from the
region are then compared and contrasted to determine the degree to which such
integration has taken place. In order to focus on the most detailed aspect of this, a
case study regarding the neighbouring cities of Blagoveshchensk, Russia and Heihe,
China is undertaken. The subjects which are compared and contrasted include living
9
standards, governance, public opinion as well as an analasus of
the specific
economic sectors in which Chinese nationals are involved in north of the border.
This is combined with a study of emergent cross border socio economic trends
including migration and intermarriage, all of which when synthesised together
provide a well rounded picture of the RFE region and allow for an educated guess as
to its short term trajectory.
Disciplines and Methodology
This thesis is fundamentally grounded in the discipline of history as from my initial
research I have established that the key issues affecting the region today are directly
correlated to decisions taken by various Russian leaders during the period of
eastward expansion.
Despite this, International Relations, specifically that of politics will come into play
in respect to dealing with bi-lateral relations between Russia and China. As will be
seen, the future of the region may not be secured indefinitely by existing bi-lateral
agreements, but rather affected by internal developments. In this respect, there will
also be somewhat of a focus on statistics through demographic data as well as
economic and political analysis of the resources, structure and potential of the region
concerned. Furthermore, in analysing the concept of trans border regions, aspects of
political geography theory will be employed.
In terms of methodology, the first section shall be dedicated to synthesising the vast
historical body of work which exists in respect to the expansion of the Russian
empire. I have identified the experts in the field and have endeavoured to use these
definitive works as grounding for the project in general.
For the demographic and economic aspects of the study, I have made use of existing
research about population figures and trends, sourced from both Western and
Russian sources, in tandem with scientifically styled works on how to approach
demography as a subject. Further secondary sources have been identified through a
vast body of journal entries as well as analytical journalism found in the mainstream
media. In trying to keep as balanced a portrayal of the region as possible, I have
10
translated a number of Russian media sources, both private and state owned and
drawn upon the work of contemporary Russian scholars working in the area.
11
Chapter One: Russia's Eastward Expansion
12
The following is an analysis of Russia’s historical basis for becoming involved in the
Far Eastern region, specifically the Amur area bordering China upon which the topic
of this study is based. This task is essential in order to come to an understanding of
contemporary issues such as governance and bi-lateral grievances which persist in
various forms to this day. The Imperial experience of Russia differed greatly from
those of its contemporary counterparts for a number of reasons including geography,
internal politics and ethnicity, all of which need to be addressed to be able to deal
with the modern day state of play. The emergent relationship between the USSR and
the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) is significant as this was the period during
which an increasingly confident China challenged its former Imperial master over its
Tsarist colonial spoils. Furthermore, the development of a particular sense of Russian
identity needs to be dealt with, specifically regarding how Russians have
traditionally seen themselves as well as their Asian counterparts, in many cases
prejudices and beliefs which can be seen today.
1.1 'The Spirit of Columbus'
The roots of expansion run deep in the veins of Russian history, as far back as the
country's very inception as the state of Kievan Rus' which comprised the modern day
territories of European Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Kenneth Clark has described the
influence of the Nordic Vikings as having infused Europe with the 'spirit of
Columbus', and indeed it was under Viking rule that the Eastern Slavs of the region
constructed one of the most populous, expansive and above all successful states on
the continent during the tenth and eleventh centuries.4 (see fig. 1.1) Under the
stewardship of Vladimir the Great and his son, Yaroslav the Wise, the Golden Age of
Kiev saw great cultural and religious developments. Key to this was the introduction
of Orthodox Christianity which, expanding with missionary zeal, proselytised
peoples as far away as the northern White Sea and despite the best efforts of the
Soviet Union, remains the main religion of the region to this day.
Yet, as Nation States and Empires wax and wane over the course of time, the State of
Kievan Rus' was to meet its end through a series of events not entirely of its own
4
Kenneth Clark, Civilisation, (London: John Murray Publishers, 1969) p. 26.
13
making. The Crusades had done their part to shift the important Trans Europe trade
routes westward through actions such as the sacking of Constantinople which cut off
supplies to Kiev. Furthermore, throughout the later eleventh and twelfth centuries,
the territorial integrity of Rus' was chipped away by Turkic invasions from the East
and exacerbated by domestic infighting, migration patterns and feudalism. By the
time the Mongol Invasion had swept its way across the Eurasian landmass to the
gates of Kiev in 1237, there was little that could be done to prevent the State from
falling under the control of the Golden Horde. Despite this, or perhaps because of it,
the legacy of the ancient agglomeration of Kievan Rus' is held in high regard by
Russia's elite to this day. As it stands, a draft law is before the lower house of the
Russian parliament proposing that the 28th of July become a public holiday in honour
of the Baptism of Rus.5
The following two centuries were to be characterised by the submission of the
Christianised Eastern Slavs to the Mongol invaders. Nevertheless during this period,
one breakaway state was to emerge as a potential successor state to Kievan Rus’, that
of the Grand Duchy of Moscow. Using divide and rule tactics, the Muscovites
embarked upon a policy of expansion which involved securing the allegiance of
foreign elites, specifically against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to the West.
The loyalty of surrounding Slavic city states such as Novgorod and Smolensk was
ensured against common enemies to the West and East, which after the threat had
passed, were duly annexed to Muscovy.6 By 1380, under Prince Dmitri Donskoy the
Principality secured its own independence by defeating the Mongols for the first time
at the Battle of Kulikovo.
Secure in its identity as an Orthodox Christian bulwark against the Catholic west,
Muslim south and barbarian east, and buoyed by intermittent support from
Byzantine, Muscovy began consolidating its power base. However, its greatest
opportunity came about not through ingenious diplomatic moves or decisive military
victories, but paradoxically through the actions of the Mongol conqueror Timur who
was born in present day Uzbekistan. Known in the West as Tamerlane, he succeeded
5
RIA Novosti (Russian State owned news agency)
http://rianovosti.com/society/20100421/158676907.html Retrieved Online, (21/04/2010).
6
Andreas Kappeler, The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History, (London: Pearson Education Ltd.,
2001) p. 18.
14
in destroying the remains of the Mongol system, breaking it up into separate, much
weaker khanates such as Crimea, Kazan and Sibir’.7 By the time Ivan III (Ivan the
Great) had come to power in 1462, he was able to throw off the Mongol hold
completely and unite Northern and Southern Rus’ under rule from Moscow.
Following the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the rise of Muscovy was solidified by
the claiming of the legacy of the Eastern Byzantine Empire, going so far as to adopt
the double headed eagle as the official coat of arms. The door to the East was ajar
and the steppes of Asia lay before them.
This epoch has been identified as having been instrumental in the shaping of
Russians’ attitudes towards the East in general which persists in various forms to this
day. In his work ‘Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing and the New Geopolitics’,
Prof. Bobo Lo identifies the development of what he terms as a ‘Mongol Complex’
from this time. Largely, the Mongol invasions, unlike the experience seen from other
Empires, did not impart any civilisational trappings upon the vanquished Russian
people. During this period, little was produced in the way of art, literature or
governance structures. The focus instead was on purely military power governed
through a tributary system.8 Therefore, this period, when looked back upon in the
nineteenth century, was to have a profound and lasting effect on the Russian psyche,
associating civilisation with themselves and Western Europe and backwardness with
the hordes from the Orient which would come into play in their future dealings with
the Chinese.
1.2 Tsarist Expansion
In a ceremony deliberately reminiscent of the coronations of the old Byzantian
emperors, Ivan IV, immortalised later by Western historians as Ivan the Terrible,
crowned himself the first Tsar of Russia in 1547. His reign was marked by a vast
aggrandisement of Russian territory and saw the beginnings of Russia’s
transformation into a dynastic state from which emissaries were sent throughout
Europe and beyond and in which a centralised bureaucracy began to emerge. A
7
John Darwin, After Tamerlane: The Rise and Fall of Global Empires, 1400-2000, (London: Penguin
Books Ltd., 2008) p. 67.
8
Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing and the new Geopolitics, (London: Royal Institute
of International Affairs, 2008), p.18.
15
combination of advanced firepower and the disorganised nature of the peoples to the
east meant that the forces of Ivan IV met with great success in their conquests, taking
the Khanates of Kazan, Astrakhan and even making inroads east of the Urals in what
is known contemporarily as Siberia.9
Despite this, defeat was experienced along the Western borderlands in the Livonian
Wars against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This is the earliest instance of a
theme common throughout Russian history; the ongoing playoff between Eastern and
Western interests in which defeat in one arena would result in the turning of attention
to another. Nevertheless, the eastward advances were a significant step for Russia, as
they marked the beginning of its multiethnic, multi confessional empire which would
eventually gather enough momentum to see it reach the shores of the Pacific Ocean.
Defeat at the hands of the Polish ushered in what is known in Russian history as the
'Time of Troubles', which was characterised by the collapse of the tsarist system,
civil war and the rule of foreigners. Yet, this was to be short lived as by 1612, the
Poles had been forced from Moscow and the following year a new dynasty- the
Romanovs acceded to the throne and would remain there until their deposing by
Bolshevik forces in 1917. Throughout the seventeenth century, the territory of Russia
continued to expand in the east, west and south, helped particularly by the acquisition
of the eastern half of Ukraine following yet another skirmish with an increasingly
weakening Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth. The loyalty secured by the Cossack
horseback warriors from the region was to prove invaluable in the drive eastwards.10
1.3 Imperial Russia takes its Place among the World Powers
The proclamation of the Russian Empire by Peter the First (immortalised afterwards
as Peter the Great) was to ensure that the year 1721 became a watershed in Russian
history. Under his stewardship, Russia defeated Sweden which resulted in securing
much sought after ports in the west. The port capital of Saint Petersburg was
established, the importance of which cannot be underestimated as its position on the
Baltic facing towards Europe saw the filtering through of many western ideas which
9
Darwin, After Tamerlane, p. 69.
Kappeler, The Russian Empire, p. 38.
10
16
had a profound effect on the development of Russian society and influenced greatly
the world view of subsequent Tsars.
The century which saw the creation of the Spanish, Portuguese and English seaborne
Empires, was also the first to see contact between expansionist Russian settlers and
the powers of the Chinese Manchu dynasty. It has been said that all Imperial
aggrandisement is driven by 'pull' factors.11 At the diagonal opposite end of Europe,
the Spaniards were drawn to South America by the lure of vast deposits of gold and
silver, where to the natives they appeared as gods on horseback. The Russians on the
other hand had no such advantage, following the trails laid down by early fur traders
and encountering far more advanced societies than those of their contemporaries in
South America.
The region surrounding the Amur River which delineated not just the northern
boundaries of the Manchu heartland at the time, but remains as the contemporary
border between Russia and China was first entered and indeed occupied by Russia in
the 1640s. However, the Manchu’s, who were in the process of consolidating their
hold over China, were able to drive them out by the 1680s with little difficulty. This
is understandable considering that during this time the European powers in general
were still in third place behind the military and cultural might of China and the
Islamic World. The Treaty of Nerchinsk was to follow in 1689 which saw the
Russians disbanding many settlements and agreeing to leave the region to the
Chinese. For the most part, the area was forgotten about and effectively abandoned
for over a century as successive Tsars became more preoccupied with events to the
West.12 These first settlers were effectively abandoned by officialdom until the
resurgence of interest in the area in the nineteenth century. This attitude was to have
a profound influence on the development of a frontier mentality amongst those who
remained.
Throughout the following century, Russia’s place on the world stage was secured
under the leadership of Elisabeth I and Catherine II, who continued to expand
11
Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals from the Sixteenth Century to the
Present, (London: Pimlico, 2003), p. 205.
12
Mark Bassin, Imperial Visions: Nationalist Imagination and Geographical Expansion in the Russian
Far East, 1840-1865, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 3.
17
territorially to the west and south. In alliance with Prussia and Austria, Alexander I
fought and defeated Napoleon’s France in 1812 and proceeded to represent the
country singlehandedly at the Congress of Vienna in 1820. However, despite victory
over Napoleon, the French Revolution had unleashed the forces of liberalism and
embryonic nationalism across Europe which would prove impossible to contain.
When officers from the wars attempted to introduce liberal ideas into Russian
society, above all the abolition of serfdom, they were met with strict opposition from
the reactionary Tsars, in particular Nicholas the First. When combined with the
effects imposed on the Black Sea Fleet following defeat in the Crimean war, Russia
was left behind the rest of Europe socially, economically and military.13
1.4 The Unequal Treaties and a Weakened China
The resurgence of Russian interest in its Far Eastern acquisitions in the middle of the
nineteenth century coincided with the imperial drives of its Western European
neighbours invigorated by the progress made during industrial revolution and a post
Enlightenment worldview which advocated spreading their ‘superior’ cultures far
and wide. Particularly in the Russian case, the railway played a huge part in this
process as a means of tying disparate parts of the Empire together as it facilitated the
movement of people, goods and ideas expediently from Moscow to outlying regions.
Whereas the British and French, and later, the Germans and Italians squabbled over
strips of land throughout Africa, Russian nationalists believed that in order for their
country to consolidate itself as a major power, it must tighten its grip in the East.14
Moreover, what was to benefit them most in this respect was the nature of the
Chinese state with which they were to engage with.
As John G. Stoessinger points out, the twentieth century was 'the first in over two
thousand years in which China had not considered itself to be the centre of the
universe'. For centuries, China thought of itself as the 'Middle Kingdom', the apex of
civilization between heaven and earth and anyone from outside its borders was
deemed to be inferior and barbaric. For centuries any external relations were carried
13
14
David Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon, (London: Penguin Books, 1966), p. 158.
Bassin, Imperial Visions, p. 70.
18
out by means of the tribute system in which anyone wishing to trade with the Empire
would have to prostrate themselves before the Emperor, admitting their inferiority.15
Yet, the years of the latter nineteenth century were marked by decline under the Qing
Dynasty during which China became known as the 'sick man of Asia'. A hermetic
belief in its own culture meant that it's rulers were closed to the ideas of the
Industrial Revolution spreading from Europe. Weakened greatly by defeats suffered
as a result of the Opium Wars with Britain, what followed was a carving up of its
territory and resources by industrialised Western and Japanese powers which is
remembered and resented to this day.16 (see fig. 1.2)
A combination of opportunism and a desire not to be left behind by other advancing
powers spurred Russia to action. Despite being one of the weaker European powers,
Russia was able to wield considerable power in Asia. The first of the ‘Unequal
treaties’ imposed upon China was that of the Treaty of Aigun, ratified in 1860, which
effectively reversed the original Treaty of Nerchinsk, transferring huge amounts of
land away from China as well as forcing open the region to trade. (see fig. 1.3) This
was followed by subsequent treaties co-signed between China and the Imperial
powers including Russia such as the Treaty of Tianjin which served to forces open
Chinese ports for trade. These actions have not been forgotten in China where even
today, schoolchildren are taught that the provinces north of the border are rightfully
Chinese, to be reclaimed like Hong Kong and Macau.17
Later on in the century, these agreements were solidified by entering into an
‘alliance’ with China against an increasingly powerful Japan. Termed the LiLobanov treaty and named after Russian foreign minister Alexey Lobanov and
Chinese viceroy Li Hongzhang, the agreement was designed to act as a mutual
security pact. However in reality, Russia was firmly in control and used this as an
opportunity to increase its troop presence and, begin the construction of the Chinese
sections of the Trans-Siberian railroad, lifeline for the region and a direct connection
with Moscow. (see fig. 1.4)
15
John G. Stoessinger, Nations in Darkness: China, Russia and America, (New York: Random House,
1971), p. 4.
16
S.C.M. Paine, Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and their Disputed Frontier, p.1.
17
David Wall, ‘Chinese Reoccupying Russia’, in The Japan Times, 5th May, 2006.
19
This is evidence of the fact that Russia had always seen itself as vulnerable in the
region. As a continental power with maritime aspirations, Russia has always tried to
portray itself as the dominant geopolitical force in North East Asia. Yet, this position
has been perpetually challenged, most notably by the Japanese, to whom they lost to
in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905 which highlighted the weakness of Russia’s real
military power in the region and marked the first defeat of a European power by a
non European one in the modern age.
1.5 Russian National Identity and World Mission:
The concept of a singular identifiable sense of 'Russianness' is important to consider
as it has ramifications for the contemporary situation in the Far East. Is Russia solely
a European nation, an Asian one, or more likely a distinct combination of the two?
As we have seen from the early days of Kievan Rus' and Muscovy, early Russian
leaders made a point in distinguishing themselves from both the Catholic west and
Muslim east by embracing the Orthodox church and the legacy of Byzantium.
Furthermore, as argued by Dominic Lievan, Russian identity derives much of its
origins from the very geography of the place itself. The location of Moscow is
distanced from the ancient and modern centres of civilisation and trade routes. The
geographical make up of Russia is more Asian than European, foregoing
mountainous terrain which is conducive to the development of unique cultures within
a small space for vast open plains, encouraging homogeneity. Furthermore, the
presence of poor, heavily forested land and an inhospitable climate meant that
agricultural development was difficult and required constant movement in order to
find arable soil and animals to hunt.18 Notwithstanding these negative connotations
regarding climate and geography, they have instilled Russians with a deep sense of
individuality, as throughout history from Napoleon’s conquests to Nazi Germany
they have kept invaders at bay.
This concept of vast open land lying before an aggrandising power, confident in its
own culture and history had contemporary parallels. The colonisation of the Eastern
lands was justified in much the same way as the British had done so in Africa in that
18
Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals, p. 203.
20
they were undertaking the development of land and resources which had been
‘wasted’ by the indigenous nomadic population. Nevertheless, until the reign of Peter
I, there was an underlying respect for some of the ways of the Tatars, Mongols and
other peoples from the East which went so far as to see the adoption of values such
as the importance of the pre-eminence of the military as well as the continuation of
tributary relationships in far flung provinces.19 Peters reign however was to change
this and provide the basis for what can be described as a modern Russian identity
which finds itself drawing from both Europe and Asia.
Gilbert Rozman suggests that this sense of identity has bred a sense of absolutism
which finds itself difficult to reconcile with the reality on the ground in the
contemporary Far East. He describes continuing attempts to lure ethnic Russians
eastward combined with a maintained belief in militarisation as being ‘no longer
feasible and discredited’.20 Traditionally there has been little understanding of Asians
and indeed little will to do so. Rozman suggests that in order to balance their
strategic, economic and civilisational objectives in the region, Russians are obliged
to adjust their behaviour to adapt to Asian traditions and social networks, which
would eventually contribute to the emergence of a more mixed and less ‘Russian’
part of the Federation.
1.6 Twentieth Century Friction
On the face of it, relations between Moscow and Beijing during the twentieth century
should have developed amicably, as the two countries were ideologically bonded by
a ‘shared fealty to Marxism-Leninism’.21 However, this was not to be the case as the
burden of history weighed heavily on the relationship from the beginning. In fact,
even in the much weakened state of China at the beginning of the twentieth century,
opposition to ‘Imperialism’ is evident as early as 1919 and the 4th May movement
which protested against the Treaty of Versailles decision to transfer the formerly
19
Darwin, After Tamerlane, p.68.
Gilbert Rozman, ‘Russia in North East Asia: In Search of a Strategy’, in Russian Foreign Policy in
the 21st Century and the Shadow of the Past , Levgold, Robert (ed.), (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2007), p. 365.
21
Rajan Menon, ‘The Limits of Chinese-Russian Partnership’, in Survival, Vol. 5, no. 3, (June-July
2009), p. 99.
20
21
German possessions of Qingdao and Jiaozhou to Japan, overlooking the fact that they
were originally Chinese. The movement grew into a larger anti-imperial group
concerned with a Chinese national revival comprised of Bolsheviks, democrats,
supporters of the semi-authoritarian Chiang-Kai Shek.22 Yet, the USSR under Stalin
supported both Mao Tse-Tung’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the
nationalists under Chiang Kai-Shek throughout the 1930s, ostensibly with the aim of
keeping Japan at bay.
When Mao came to power in China in October 1949, he chose to ally strongly with
the USSR, the strength of which is exemplified by the fact that almost immediate
involvement in the Korean War in defence of international Communism was to see
the loss of one million Chinese troops.23 However, from the beginning of their
relationship, the colonial issue was continuously at the fore. Not only were there
feelings of unease that Russian financial and technical assistance was stymieing
sovereignty and independence of action for the PRC, but the USSR continuously
refused to even consider the return of territory to China taken during its Imperial
past. As early as the 1945, the World War II Yalta conference had turned back the
clock to Tsarist times by tacitly restoring Russian privileges in the area in return for
Russian engagement against Japan.24 Moreover, through its client state in Mongolia,
Moscow appeared to have aggrandised its power in the East even further. This was
unforgiveable for Mao, who saw the retention of such territory as fundamentally
contradictory to the tenets of a socialist system.25
The ideological gap between the two States widened during the 1950s and 1960s.
The Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was denounced by Mao for deviating from the
‘true Marxist-Leninist path’, particularly after his overtures to President Eisenhower
of the United States and his speech denouncing Stalinist excesses. Furthermore, Mao
who was on a mission to restore the self esteem and prestige of China after a ‘century
of humiliation’ was intent on recovery of the borderlands and took every opportunity
to denounce Soviet ‘military aggressiveness’ throughout the bloc, including Eastern
22
Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing and the new Geopolitics, p. 23.
Ibid, p. 24.
24
John Halliday and Jung Chang , Jung, Mao: The Unknown Story, (London: Vintage Books, 2006),
p. 292.
25
Ibid, p. 295.
23
22
European uprisings.26 By 1960, Khrushchev had had enough and withdrew all
Russian advisors from China.
Throughout the decade, the border remained a huge point of contention, as both
countries built up their troop levels. Tensions had reached the stage where Mao was
publicly confronting the USSR with having annexed Chinese territory:
‘About a hundred years ago, the areas east of Baikal became Russian
territory, and since then Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Kamchatka, and
other areas have been Soviet territory. We have not yet presented our
account for this list.’27
The list was indeed long and the point was continuously driven home by Mao
that ‘socialist states could hardly remain true to their principles while
retaining colonial spoils.’28
By 1969, there were 21 Soviet divisions and 28 Chinese divisions staring each other
down across the Amur River. This served to reinforce mutual stereotypical
prejudices of the ‘yellow peril’, poised to swarm over the border against the Russian
imperial aggressor.29 Skirmishes were fought to a stalemate over the possession of
islands in the channel of the Amur River which brought tensions to their highest
levels ever. According to Jon Halliday and Jung Chang, all options were on the table
at this stage and they even postulate that the Russian’s were considering the use of
nuclear weapons against the PRC.30 The situation became mitigated somewhat after
the interdiction of President Nixon of the United States, as both nations focused their
respective attention on negotiating with the Americans. Nevertheless, Sino-Soviet
‘relations’ remained on ice for much of the following years with little cross border
exchange or high level interaction.
26
John Halliday and Jung Chang , Mao: The Unknown Story, p. 421.
Menon, ‘The Limits of Chinese-Russian Partnership’, p. 102.
28
Ibid
29
Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing and the new Geopolitics, p. 26.
30
John Halliday and Jung Chang, Mao: The Unknown Story, p. 425.
27
23
The Russian terms glasnost and perestroika, translating roughly as ‘openness’ and
‘restructuring’ respectively, are familiar to Western ears and in many ways sum up
the events which played out on the international stage during the 1980s as the USSR
came to deal with the structural realities it was facing politically and economically.
Yet, it would be arrogant to assume that the renewed interest in rapprochement was
directed solely at the United States and Europe. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s
1986 speech in Vladivostok broke the mould in terms of Sino-Soviet relations as he
declared that the border area should ‘become a zone of peace and friendship’
between the two nations.31 In the first concession offered to China since the signing
of the unequal treaties, Gorbachev moved from a policy of containment to
engagement with China by declaring that the border should run directly down the
River Amur, sharing the islands between them instead of the previous ‘agreement’
where they were solely Russian possessions.32
The closing years of the twentieth century were to see a cautious thawing of relations
between Moscow and Beijing. Numerous factors were behind this, not least the
personal chemistry which existed between President Boris Yeltsin and Chinese
Premier Jiang Zemin, yet the effects of the Russian economic collapse also played a
significant role. Despite having bought into the ‘Washington Consensus’ of market
liberalisation, most ordinary Russians were left worse off financially than during the
days of the USSR. Despite the fact that a fire sale of state assets in the context of
improperly forced laws and property rights was largely to blame for the trouble that
ensued, Western political and economic models were heavily criticised which
facilitated the turning of attention eastward.33
Throughout the 1990s, border agreements were signed and confidence building
measures implemented such as the mutual withdrawal of troops from within 100
kilometres of the line of demarcation as well as the embryonic creation of what
would become the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).34 This process was to
form the foundation for what is today considered the contemporary Sino-Russian
partnership.
31
Carolyn Mc Giffert Ekedahl and Melvin A. Goodman, ‘Gorbachev’s ‘New Directions’ in Asia’, in
Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. VIII, No.3, (Fall 1989), p. 5.
32
Lo, Bobo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing and the new Geopolitics, p. 28.
33
Ibid.
34
Lo, Bobo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow Beijing and the new Geopolitics, p. 29.
24
As we have seen, the Russian experience in carving an Empire from a position of
defeat has profoundly influenced their world view. As a nation which has adopted
traditions and repelled threats throughout its history from both the West and the East,
it has developed a unique sense of identity, reinforced by its geographic features
which can be described as being neither exclusively European nor Asian. Yet, during
the period which saw the rise of the great European Empires, Tsarist Russia saw
itself as being no exception, embarking upon a conquest of lands to the east. The
humiliation of the Chinese through the unequal treaties was never forgotten; indeed it
was publicly resurrected by Chairman Mao Tse-tung as a serious point of contention
not long after the foundation of the PRC. What can be described as a ‘teacher’ versus
‘pupil’ dynamic between the USSR and PRC during this period further compounded
colonial era stereotypes and stoked tensions and it was not until the conciliatory hand
offered by Gorbachev in the 1980s that this was to change.
At a time in which Russia is increasingly becoming dependant on China in both the
economic and political sphere, the tacit historical grievances which China still
harbour towards their former colonial antagonists gives the current bi-lateral
relationship a greater sense of perspective and frames the debate surrounding the
Russian far east.
25
Chapter Two: The Contemporary Situation
26
The current bilateral relationship between Moscow and Beijing is often hyped by
Western observers as being a threat to Western interests, yet this is simply not the
case as will be seen. This section beings with an analysis of their relationship vis-àvis the border in particular. Following this, three topics of great importance are
analysed, namely demographics, economic trends and the political structure of the
RFE region. The issue of demographic decline is a huge problem throughout the
Russian Federation and is particularly acute in the RFE. Therefore, in this chapter a
thorough analysis is undertaken to determine the extent of this and its implications.
The case will also be made that years of neglect have seen citizens in the region
become detached from the political process which has been tarnished by corruption
and mismanagement, resulting in a serious waning of the power the Federal
Government in Moscow wields in the region. Related to this is the emergence of
what can be termed a burgeoning sub regional identity, clearly distinct from what
one would regard as being classically ‘Russian’.
Further compounding these issues is the emergent trend of Chinese economic
dominance, not just globally but specifically in the RFE which is funding a number
of projects designed primarily to extract natural resources from the area to fuel its
ever expanding economy. Overall, the aim of this section is to present a balanced
picture as to the contemporary state of play in the RFE and highlight the main issues
affecting it both domestically and externally.
2.1 Current Bilateral Relations and Perceptions
Undoubtedly, contemporary Sino-Russian relations have come a long way in the last
twenty years. So much so in fact that, many contemporary Western observers such as
Robert Kagan have become worried about the prospect of an ‘authoritarian alliance’
emerging to conspire against US and European interests.35 This idea is rubbished by
Prof. Bobo Lo, writing for the Centre for European Reform, who states that this fear
35
Robert Kagan, End of Dreams, Return of History, (Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 2008)
Retrieved Online: http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html. (02/04/2010).
27
attributes a sense of common purpose to the Sino-Russian relationship which does
not exist.36
In reality, the ‘Strategic Co-operation Partnership’ is a misnomer as on the ground,
Russian and Chinese objectives tend to conflict rather than coincide. For example,
the two powers often compete for influence in Central Asia, an area which both of
whom considers being a part of their sphere of influence. Furthermore, despite recent
friction with the European Union, Russia has recently begun playing up its
‘European heritage’, distancing itself from the East. Vladimir Putin has recently
resurrected the idea propagated by Gorbachev of a common European civilisational
identity which further undermines the relationship.37 According to Alexandrei P.
Tsygankov, the former Premier’s mission while he was in power was to improve the
economic conditions of the population at large in order to prevent exploitation by
neighbouring countries.38 To this end, he made an infamous hyperbolic speech
regarding the future of the nation:
‘I do not want to dramatise the situation, but if we do not make every
real effort, even the indigenous Russian population will soon be
speaking mostly Japanese, Chinese and Korean’39
Despite the above bullish attitude, the border issue is no longer a topic of
outright hostility between the two powers as all outstanding bilateral
territorial disagreements have been settled by various treaties. Nevertheless,
the Russians remain deeply suspicious of any Chinese involvement in the
resource rich, yet under populated region.
Moreover, on a global scale, Moscow and Beijing both have different views on how
the post Cold War order should evolve, with Russia advocating a tripolar setup
between itself China and the US, whereas China favours the more likely prospect of
a future bipolar order between itself and the US. Much has been made of the Sino36
Bobo Lo, Ten Things everyone should know about the Sino-Russian Relationship, Centre for
European Reform Document, 2009. (Retrieved Online:
http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/pb_china_bl_dec08.pdf )
37
Ibid
38
Andrei P. Tsygankov, “Putin and Foreign Policy, in Herspring, Dale R., “Putin’s Russia: Past
Imperfect: Future Uncertain”, (Plymouth, UK: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Ltd., 2007) p.
211.
39
Andrei P. Tsygankov, “Putin and Foreign Policy”, p. 217.
28
Russian ‘rapprochement’ from Western media sources, yet their bi-lateral
relationship is asymmetrical in every respect; demographically, economically and
structurally, making it more of a limited partnership than a burgeoning alliance.
In fact, according to Gilbert Rozman, it is Russia’s absolutist belief in itself as a
European power which is holding back the implementation of a progressive policy
regarding the border region. A profound lack of interest in economic integration with
Asia has retarded growth in the area for the past twenty years. Furthermore, their
fundamental approach to the area has remained unchanged for decades and has
categorically failed. According to Rozman, Russia needs to balance its strategic,
economic and civilsational objectives by adjusting to Asian traditions and social
networks.40 As we will see in subsequent sections of this chapter, doing so will be an
absolute requisite given the forecast trends of Chinese economic influence and
demographic increase.
A theme prevalent among experts in the field of Russian external relations is that
Russia is unable or unwilling to acknowledge its relative weaknesses on the world
stage, continuing to see itself as a great power and expecting to be treated as such.
Regarding the ‘partnership’ with China, this attitude has served Russia poorly. Lilia
Shevtsova succinctly sums up the dynamic thus:
‘Moscow does not seem to notice how Beijing exploits this
partnership in its own interests, graciously allowing Moscow to
delude itself that it is a leading partner.’41
This is borne out by the myriad of contradictory policies which Moscow pursues in
relation to the RFE which represent a gulf between day to day policies and long term
strategic goals including the ongoing sales of arms to China, despite persistent fears
about encroachment in the RFE.42 Furthermore, as argued by Shevtsova, Russia’s
40
Gilbert Rozman , “Russia in North East Asia: In Search of A Strategy”, in Levgold, Robert (ed.),
“Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century and the shadow of the Past”, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2007), p.343.
41
Lilia Shevtsova, “Russia Lost in Translation: The Yeltsin and Putin Legacies”, (Washington D.C.:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), p. 178.
42
Gilbert Rozman, “Russia in North East Asia”, p. 351.
29
acquiescence to the SCO has actually served to further the PRC’s interests in Central
Asia, allowing the Chinese to erode a traditionally Russian sphere of influence.43
Overall, the situation in the RFE and Russia’s standing on the world stage mirrors in
many ways the conditions present 150 years ago when Russia first engaged with
China. With the fall of the USSR, their weakness has been exposed through the
joining of former Soviet Bloc countries of the European Union and the ‘colour
revolutions’ of Georgia and Ukraine. As a result, once again their attention has
turned eastwards to China, yet on every conceivable level the relationship between
the two is noticeably asymmetrical in favour of Beijing.
2.2 Russia’s Demographic Deficit
Recent demographic statistics available for the Russian Federation are disastrous.
Due to a lethal demographic mix of low birth rates and high mortality, its estimated
population for 2010 is 140,367,000 which is predicted to decline at a rate of almost
500,000 per annum for the next five years.44 This figure is an estimate due to the fact
that the census planned for October 2010 has been postponed until 2013, ‘due to the
economic crisis.45 Open estimates provided by the United Nations suggest that by the
year 2050, the headcount could be anywhere from 133 to 100 million inhabitants
based upon medium and high variants respectively.46 These numbers are tempered
somewhat by a flow of returning ethnic Russians from the former Soviet Socialist
Republics but this is not indefinite and when complete, will further exacerbate the
problem, the scale of which cannot be underestimated. (see fig. 2.1)
Not only are people not having enough children, but the death rate is twice that of
Western countries. Alcoholism, HIV/AIDS and suicide rates are well above average
43
Lilia Shevtsova, “Russia Lost in Translation: The Yeltsin and Putin Legacies”, p. 180.
World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, Vol. 1 Comprehensive Tables, (New York: United
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2009), p. 406.
45
“Russia Postponed Nationwide Population Census”, in RIA Novosti, 18th Sep., 2009 (Retrieved
Online, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090918/156176042.html )
46
World Population Prospects, p. 406.
44
30
and do not appear as being dealt with in a meaningful way.47 Furthermore, Russia has
the highest rate of cardio-vascular disease out of all industrialised nations.
As
history has shown, Russia's leaders have often focused their attention on arms races
and industrialisation rather than the immediate needs of their people. Even now as its
oil fuelled economy struggles during the global recession, the Kremlin is still giving
billions of dollars worth of loans to former Soviet republics such as Kyrgyzstan and
Belarus in a bid to retain its traditional sphere of influence.48
This demographic deficit is exacerbated in the Far Eastern region which borders
China as many ethnic Russians are moving west in search of opportunity. In some
areas along the border, the population density is as little as 1.1 per square kilometre
while in neighbouring Chinese provinces, it is 140 times this figure.49 The most
striking example of this would be the Amur Oblast which borders China and has a
population of only 900,000 with a density of 2.5 per km/sq. Conversely its Chinese
counterpart Heilongjiang province has a population of over 38 million and a density
of 83 per km/sq. Both regions are of comparable area.
Delving into the specifics of the statistics reveals exactly the scale of the problem
which faces the Russian Federation from a demographic standpoint. In order to fully
understand the figures involved, it is necessary first to engage with the scientific
discipline of demography itself. Massimo Livi-Bacci, author of A Concise History of
World Population describes the attainment of a stable and secure population level as
a constant trade off between biological and environmental obstacles, namely the laws
of mortality and reproduction and the resistance to which these laws encounter. 50 On
a global scale, the past thirty years have seen fertility rates exceed mortality rates by
200% which is astronomical considering that from the year 0 A.D. until the Industrial
Revolution in the 1750s, the relationship was 1.5%. Thus, he extrapolates from this
the theory that population rates can be used as a crude index of prosperity.51
47
‘The Incredible Shrinking People’, in Enigma Variations: A Special Report on Russia: The
Economist, (Nov. 29th, 2008), p. 12.
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid.
50
Massimo Livi-Bacci, A Concise History of World Population (3rd. Ed.), (Malden: Blackwell
Publishers, 2001), p. 5.
51
Ibid, p. 1.
31
The growth potential of a population is calculated as being the function of two
measures; the number of births per woman and the life expectancy of an infant at
birth. What are termed the ‘components of fertility’ are biosocial elements which
determine fertility rates and include short birth intervals, an absence in birth control
as well as the age of a woman at marriage. Furthermore, mortality rates are
determined by the life expectancy of an infant at birth, as well as their ‘survivorship
function’ which includes the rate for all the potential causes of premature death.52
Demographers tend not to consider mortality rates for individuals beyond their
reproductive years (50+) as being relevant, although there are indirect social effects
provided by older adults who undoubtedly contribute to the store of societal
knowledge.
Therefore, the reproductive success of any population depends on the number of
children born to each woman that survive to reproductive age themselves. If the
fertility rate is greater than 2.0, there is growth - if it is 4.0, the population will
double within a single generation.53 As we will see, when we apply the statistics
available from Russian sources, the scale of the imminent demographic collapse
becomes evident.
The final restrictor on population growth is that of environmental constraints. Having
already dealt with the geography and climate of the RFE, it is easy to see how this
particular aspect has contributed to the slow growth of the Russian population in the
region in the past. Inhospitable climates, precipitation levels and the availability of
arable land act as inhibitors against population growth. This is evinced by the fact
that the highest concentrations of people in Russia’s Amur Oblast reside close to
rivers and decent land, leaving most of the region practically devoid of people.54
52
Ibid, p. 11.
Ibid, p. 15.
54
Natalia Ryzhova, and Grigory Ioffe, ‘Trans-border Exchange between Russia and China: The Case
of Blagoveshchensk and Heihe’, in Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 50, no.9, (2009), p.
351.
53
32
2.3 The Russian Far East: Exacerbated Decline
In 2008, the fertility rate for the entire Russian Federation was 1.4, which means that
every woman of childbearing age produced only 1.4 children against a replacement
level of 2.0. Furthermore, average life expectancy was only 67 and as low as 60 for
men. Without taking migration into account, the country showed a negative annual
decrease of .3% of its entire population for the year.55 As bad as these figures sound
even when compared to Western Europe, which is facing similar difficulties
regarding fertility figures, when the statistics specifically for the RFE are
extrapolated they tell an even more worrisome story. (see fig. 2.2)
During the period from 1989 to 2002, the Russian Federation saw its population
decrease by 1.2%. Yet, in the RFE, the effects of this decrease were markedly higher,
as much as 16.8% (14.5% in the Amur Oblast), the reason being that in addition to
existing concerns, the region experienced negative domestic migration as ethnic
Russians travelled west in search of opportunities. 56 In terms of the makeup of the
overall population, 1992 was a watershed year as it was the first time that decline
was recorded on an absolute basis. Another benchmark was reached as recently as
2007 as the working age population began to decrease for the first time, due to
retirements and premature deaths, a delayed effect of a consistently low birth rate.
The main issue which separates Russia from other countries experiencing consistent
low birth rates is the topic of migration. Other developed countries, particularly the
United States have shown that high levels of inward migration can offset a decline in
‘native’ birth rates, keeping the labour market buoyant. Increased inward migration is
a solution of sorts, although the political and social ramifications are extremely high
and sweeping changes to the immigration regime in the Russian Federation would
find little support from the public at large or the politicians in power. These aspects
shall be discussed subsequently as it is necessary to first deal briefly with Chinese
demographic statistics.
55
PRB (Population Reference Bureau), 2008 World Population Data Sheet, Washington D.C.,
Population Reference Bureau, 2008.
56
Ryzhova and Ioffe, ‘Trans-border Exchange between Russia and China’, p. 350.
33
Endeavours such as the ‘one child policy’ have managed to bring down the Chinese
fertility rate from a massive 5.8 in 1970 to a technically below replacement figure of
1.6 in 2008.57 However, for the moment the population is still growing due to natural
momentum as the current generation of parents were born at a time when fertility
was high.58 Moreover, despite the explosive economic growth experienced by China
in recent years, the distribution of recent advances has not been uniform. There are a
number of areas in which the potential for economic migrants remains high,
particularly the province of Heilongjiang which borders Russia’s Amur Oblast. A
part of the old ‘rustbelt’, where industries outpaced by technological advancements
elsewhere have been closing, it is poor not just by Western standards, but also
Russian. In 2006, the median income was a mere 150 USD per month compared to
400 USD across the border.59
Despite these figures, recent Kremlin backed attempts to entice ethnic Russians
eastwards have met with little success. Furthermore, Chinese migration of any
amount is perceived a threat by the ruling elites and instead of regulating what is a
requirement to shore up the regional economy, it is pushed underground.60 The mass
media does little to help the situation as Russian outlets have done their part to warn
of the dangers of an under populated eastern frontier using scaremongering 'yellow
peril' like terminology. Furthermore, in China school children are taught that the
provinces north of the border are rightfully Chinese, to be reclaimed like Hong Kong
and Macau. For example, the following is an excerpt from an article published in
Rossiya newspaper dated March 2004:
‘Lately, the numbers of Chinese citizens illegally coming to Siberia
and the Russian Far East have been growing steadily... there are
already ten to twelve million of them at minimum.’61
57
PRB (Population Reference Bureau), 2008 World Population Data Sheet, Washington D.C.,
Population Reference Bureau, 2008.
58
Ryzhova and Ioffe, ‘Trans-border Exchange between Russia and China’ p. 350 (A similar ‘echo
effect’ was experienced in the West during the 1980s as the Babyboomer generation of the 1950s
began having children themselves)
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid, p. 351.
61
N. Orlov, ‘Velikaya kitayskaya ekspansiya’ (The Great Chinese Expansion), in Rossiya, 11th March,
2004.
34
In stark contrast, serious Russian scholars of migration estimate the actual number of
Chinese citizens to be as little as 400,000.62 Although this figure is taken from 2001,
there is little chance that in the intervening three years, their population had shot up
by over ten million. As will be seen in subsequent sections, official media sources
supported by the Kremlin tend towards hyperbole, reflecting more the fears of those
in Moscow, rather than the locals in the RFE and tending to ignore the facts on the
ground.
Nevertheless, the Russian workforce is still decreasing year on year and there is
indeed a trend of Chinese immigration emerging. Figures from Russia's Federal
Border Guard Service state that 80% of all Chinese immigration to Russia takes
place in the Far Eastern region and the numbers are increasing.63 While there is no
evidence to suggest that these individuals are anything but economic migrants filling
the places of Russians, the fact is that the areas they are repopulating were once
Chinese is of note. The specifics and implications of these trends shall be dealt with
in the third chapter.
The importance of demographics from a strategic and economic perspective cannot
be underestimated. As Jack A. Goldstone, writing in Foreign Affairs notes, 'twenty
first century international security will depend less on how many people inhabit the
world than on how the global population is composed and distributed'.64 Thus,
emphasis on composition, rather than sheer fertility or mortality rates will be the key
to understanding the scale of the problem which demographic change presents.
Philip Longman, author of The Empty Cradle, succinctly sums up the relationship
between population growth and economic growth by stating that, 'a nation's GDP is
literally the sum of its labour force time's average output per worker’. Thus, a decline
in the number of workers implies a decline in an economy's growth potential.' 65
Working from this angle, he provides some insightful observations which these
62
A.G. Vishnevskiy, (ed.), Naseleniye Rossii 2001. Devyaty yezhegodnyy demograficheskiy doklad
(Russia’s Population in 2001. Ninth Annual Demographic Report) Moscow, Russia: INP RAS, 2002.
63
‘Chinese Migration in Russia’ in Russia in Global Affairs, Vol.2, (Apr-Jun, 2005), p.2.
64
Jack A., Goldstone, 'The New Population Bomb: Four Megatrends that will Change the World' in
Foreign Affairs (January/February 2010), Retrieved Online
(http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65735/jack-a-goldstone/the-new-population-bomb)
(08/02/2010).
65
Philip Longman, 'The Global Baby Bust', in Foreign Affairs, (May/June 2004), Retrieved Online
(http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59894/phillip-longman/the-global-baby-bust )
35
trends are having and have had already in Russia by describing the potential security
implications which negative population growth can bring about. He describes the fact
that for a number of years in both the former Soviet Union and Russia, couples have
been having only one or two children. This has a knock on effect for military
conscription and recruitment as due to these decreased sized families; he claims that
every child has become a 'Private Ryan'.66 The analogy is apt, as it describes a soldier
whose loss would mean overwhelming devastation to his or her family. Longman
links this to the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. By 1990, the number of 'core
Russians' between the ages of 15-24 had shrunk to 25% of what it had been twenty
five years previously. The author cites the desire to protect this dwindling resource as
being the reason for the creation of the first real antiwar movement in Russia.67
Thus, demographic decline has numerous side effects, particularly in the Far Eastern
Region, affecting security, society and the economy.
2.4 China’s Increasing Economic Influence:
Over the last ten years, trade between the Russian federation and the Peoples’
Republic of China has increased hugely, yet, this rise has been extremely
unbalanced. China maintains a huge trade surplus with Russia, despite needing large
amounts of raw materials and energy. Moreover, Russia accounts for less than 2 per
cent of China’s foreign trade and more worryingly from a Russian standpoint, mutual
investment is negligible. In 2007, China invested less than 1 billion USD in Russia
whereas vice versa, hardly any money was invested across the border by Russians.68
Writing in Demokratizatsiya, Russian strategic studies expert Stephen Blank draws
attention to the risk which Russia faces in coming under the political and economic
influence of China primarily as a result of its own disastrous policy regarding energy
resources in the region.69 He cautions against the arrogant belief held by the Russian
elite which maintains that the United States is on the way down and Europe is too
66
This is a reference to the film Saving Private Ryan, in which US soldiers risk their lives to bring
back the last remaining brother of three servicemen killed in Normandy during World War II.
67
Ibid.
68
Ibid.
69
Stephen Blank, 'At a Dead End: Russian Policy and the Russian Far East', in Demokratizatsiya:
The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 17 No2 (Spring 2009), p. 122.
36
disparate to be of any effectiveness on the world stage. This is not at all surprising
however, considering that historically, Russian elites have always had an inflated
view of their own greatness as a means of compensating for their weaknesses. 70
However, the formula for contemporary hostility towards the West is based upon
amongst other things, a dislike of the Western support of the so-called 'colour
revolutions' in Georgia and Ukraine bolstered by a seemingly endless supply of
money coming from the doubling of oil prices from 35 to 72 dollars per barrel
between 2004 and 2006.71 Blank reaffirms this point and goes further by suggesting
that in the context of its presence in East Asia, overblown Russian rhetoric is 'really
about the great global power that its leaders want and imagine… thus, (it) is very
much an identity project.72
Yet as we will see, this 'identity project' falls down when confronted with the facts on
the ground in Siberia and the Far East; few people make the long trek to the region
for its climate or scenery. The draw of natural gas and oil is the same impulse which
brought settlers eastward in the eighteenth century, that of resources. In this respect,
Moscow has failed to develop the regions’ infrastructure and retain jobs and thus,
people. In looking at the economic structure of the RFE, it would appear that selling
off these natural resources would be about the only thing that could create revenue in
the short to medium term. There is a poor manufacturing base, high transportation
costs linked to sheer distance from markets and a crumbling physical infrastructure,
all of which conspire together to thwart local enterprise. Moreover, the Chinese have
begun to fill this void by stepping in and importing anything from food to consumer
durable goods.73
An example of China’s increasing economic dominance in the region can be found
by looking at the East Siberian Pacific Ocean Pipeline (ESPO). The initiative, agreed
in 2008 will supply China with Russian oil and was signed in the context of Russian
oil companies such as Rosneft appealing to the China for loans to bail them out of
70
The classic example of this would be the creation of so-called 'Potemkin Villages' named after
minister Grigory Potyomkin who supposedly had false facades of settlements constructed in order to
impress Catherine II as she surveyed her newly won lands in the Crimea in the late 18th Century.
71
Robert Levgold, (ed.), Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty First Century and the Shadow of the
Past, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 6.
72
Blank, 'At a Dead End: Russian Policy and the Russian Far East', p. 122.
73
Kim Iskyan, ‘Selling Off Siberia’, in Slate, 28th July, 2003.
37
difficult circumstances. As it stands, most oil exports arrive to China by rail and the
fact that the Chinese stepped in to fund the project themselves is evidence that native
Russian enterprises are losing competitiveness in respect to their neighbours. When
combined with early figures for 2008 which showed that China had invested 415
million USD in Russia as a whole compared to a negligible 14.5 million in return,
this example shows how Russia is becoming increasingly dependent on Chinese
capital investments in regional infrastructure which undermines its control over its
own resources in the Far East.74
The specific deal for the ESPO pipeline involves a total 25 billion USD being
transferred to both Russia’s Rosneft and Transneft oil companies which will secure
oil shipments for China for whom the return benefits are immense. Aside from a
favourable negotiated price, the pipeline is a strategic gain for China as it diversifies
its energy import portfolio, spreading the risk of a cut off in supply elsewhere as well
as fulfilling the social task of providing employment in the north eastern border
region of Daqing during troubling economic times.75 (see fig 2.4)
Looking at the bigger picture, the deal has allowed Beijing to gain serious
geopolitical advantages over Moscow in the region because of the detremental effect
that the global economic crisis is having on the latter's economy and on Moscow's
ability to control the RFE. Having opened up to Chinese investment, Moscow has
reversed its longstanding policy towards the Far East and the precedent set by this
deal opens the door to a huge expansion of China’s strategic profile in the region,
with the blessing of the Kremlin. Blank argues that the creation of a new regional
order in the RFE well underway with China set to become the regions security
manager, ensuring foremost that its portfolio of investments are safe and secure
while Moscow takes a backseat.76
This paradigm represents not just an emergent Chinese economic dominance in the
region, but an absolute failure of Russian policy. Ostensibly, the aim of the Kremlin
was to use revenue from natural resources to develop and secure the region, serving
74
Blank, 'At a Dead End: Russian Policy and the Russian Far East', p. 122
Alexander Lukin, ‘Russia to Reinforce Asian Vector’, in Russia in Global Affairs, No.2, (AprilJune, 2009), p. 4.
76
Stephen Blank, ‘China’s Russian Far East’, in The Jamestown Foundation China Brief, Vol. 9, Issue
16, p. 1.
75
38
to integrate Russia into northeast Asia as a major player. 77 Having failed to do this
during times of plenty, it has turned to China during a crisis and signed away much
of its assets, thus hindering ‘Russia’s quest to be recognised as an independent and
key player in Asia’.78
2.5 Rogue Oblasts and Independence Movements
Officially, the Russian Federation is a 'semi presidential Republic', in which the
President and Prime Minister both exercise power. Despite this, it has been referred
to as a ‘parademocracy’, in which groups outside the political process such as
oligarchs and local barons have a large impact on political decisions.79 The concept
of far flung federalised subjects, such those in the Far East, being ruled by insider
groups that flout centralised laws and edicts goes far back in Russian history. Ivan
IV (Ivan the Terrible) who proceeded to immediately aggrandize Russian territory
after being crowned the first tsar in 1547, left a legacy in terms of political structures
which remains to this day, as he was the first leader to introduce the idea of selfmanagement in isolated rural areas. This period has been dubbed by Andreas
Kappeler the ‘beginning of the Russian multi-ethnic empire.’80
Nikolai Petrov and Darrell Slider provide an excellent description of the political
development of peripheral regions during the time of the USSR and the
contemporary Russian Federation. The authors attribute responsibility to Stalin for
allowing what they term ‘family circles’ or cliques to attain power which insulated
them from politics in Moscow, giving them a free hand in many aspects of
governance.81 This was further exacerbated during the Yeltsin years, during which
even more powers were outsourced to the periphery as a result of the poor political
and financial standing of the central government. It was not until the arrival of
Vladimir Putin to power that the situation began to change. Putin has eliminated the
77
Lavrov, Sergei, ‘The Rise of Asia and the Eastern Vector of Russian Foreign Policy’, in Russia in
Global Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 3, (July-Sept, 2006), p. 77.
78
Blank, Stephen, ‘China’s Russian Far East’, p. 3.
79
Richard Sawa, ‘Putin’s Leadership’ in Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain,
(Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield Inc., 2007), p. 16.
80
Kappeler, The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History, p. 14.
81
Nikolai Petrov and Darrell Slider, ‘Putin and the Regions’, in Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect,
Future Uncertain, (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield Inc.), 2007, p. 76.
39
direct election of governors, instead appointing direct ‘presidential representatives’
to head what have been termed, ‘Federal Districts’ encompassing various different
numbers of federal subjects. The primary aim of this was to reinforce the preeminence of federal law and bring the regions closer to Moscow. Yet, it has been
argued that as a result of Putin’s KGB background, his short term vision of enforcing
a strict hierarchical, vertical power structure is bad news for Russia as the reforms
are beginning to mirror the over centralisation seen during Soviet times.82
Vladimir Gel’man elaborates on the development of the contemporary situation,
describing the current system as a unique centralised sub national party authoritarian
one, dominated by patron-client ties and the machinery of the United Russia party. 83
This situation is explained by D. G. Seltser, who breaks down the change in makeup
of local government from the Yeltsin era to 2010. (see fig. 2.5) He reaffirms the
previously mentioned idea that under Yeltsin, the regions developed independently
of one another and indeed Moscow, and he notes that the type of individuals taking
local power have evolved from communist party officials (CPSU) to being those who
had become wealthy during the 1990s, essentially the oligarch class. Effectively, the
answer to the question Seltser has posed for himself in his research, ‘who governs?’
is thus; ‘representatives of business elites and the managers hired by them, in
essence- local clans.’84
The alienation of the local citizenry by these groups and the stranglehold on wealth
creation by local administrations run by self interested elites is prescient in the minds
of ordinary Russians if the result of a survey undertaken by PBN Company, an
organisation which collates data in Russia and the CIS countries for Western
interests, is anything to go by. When asked what the most important thing was that
should be done to improve the business environment, 88% of respondents declared
‘reducing corruption at all levels of government’ to be the most pressing issue.85 This
clearly displays the commonly known link between local governance structures and
82
Ibid, p. 93.
Vladimir Gel’man, ‘Subnational Authoritarianism in Russia’, in Russian Analytical Digest, No. 67,
(9th Nov. 2009), p. 4.
84
D.G. Seltser, ‘Who governs? The Transformation of Sub-Regional Political Regimes in Russia
(1991-2009), in Russian analytical Digest, No. 67, (9th Nov. 2009), p. 8.
85
‘Reform Needs Survey 2006’, PBN Company, in Current Russian Statistics, SRAS (School of
Russian and Asian Studies), Jan 2007.
83
40
corruption. The clan like insider set up does little to endear local populations to
official governance structures.
According to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the country is made up of
83 federal subjects possessing varying degrees of independence.86 These are
important to clarify in order to make sense of the political make up of the Far Eastern
Federal District, which itself is comprised of 9 separate regions:
•
The Sakha Republic, like all Russian republics, has its own constitution,
president and parliament. It is nominally independent, but represented by the
Russian Federation in Foreign Affairs and was set up as the intended home of
the ethnic Yakuts.
•
The Amur, Sakhalin and Magadan Oblasts are examples of the most common
administrative unit in the Federation. Each one has a federally appointed
governor and locally elected legislature and usually named after the largest
city in the province.
•
Kamchatka, Primorsky and Khabarovsk are termed Krais, which are
technically the same as Oblasts, but the term remains as in the past they were
originally frontier regions.
•
The Chukotka Autonomous Okrug in the far north east of the region
possesses more autonomy than an Oblast, but less than a republic due to the
fact that it is inhabited by a sizeable ethnic minority, the Chukchi.
•
The Jewish Autonomous Oblast is an anachronistic remnant of the USSR,
created by Stalin ostensibly as a homeland for the Jews to pursue Yiddish
culture within a socialist framework. Despite this, today the population is
roughly 90% ethnic Russian.87
In the Far Eastern Federal District, the question of the effectiveness of the centrality
of Moscow’s leadership is often raised. This region in particular, is lead by corrupt
local elites and political leaders who have played upon peoples’ fears of foreign
encroachment; specifically Chinese, while siphoning money away for themselves.
For example, Eugenii Nazdratenko, head of the Sakhalinskaya Oblast threatened to
86
87
www.consultant.ru/popular/cons/1_3.html (The Constitution of the Russian Federation)
Data retrieved from http://www.statemaster.com/encyclopedia/Federal-subjects-of-Russia.
41
singlehandedly block border demarcation talks with China as recently as 1997 but
was brought back into line by the Kremlin.88
In a series of articles published in online Slate magazine entitled 'Where Russia
Meets China', journalist Joshua Kucera lays bare the shifting trends of the region. He
succeeds through a combination of sobering statistics, interviews with local
politicians as well as anecdotal encounters, in providing us with an insight into the
socioeconomic and political make-up of the region. One section which stands out in
particular is an illuminating interview with Mikheil Kulekhov, head of the 'National
Alternative of Siberia', a group dedicated to achieving Siberian independence from
Russia. Although groups such as these are so small as to be relatively insignificant,
the sentiments expressed by Kulekhov are indicative of sentiment throughout the
‘Asian’ part of Russia. He bases his argument on three concepts; geography,
economics and the cultural uniqueness of the region which is, ‘further from Moscow
than it is from New York or London… we’re so far away that it is easy to see that
we’re a different country’.89
In Vladivostok, further east again, there was recent social unrest due to a decree laid
down by Moscow which curtailed the importing of Japanese cars, affecting many
locals whose businesses relied on the trade.90 This can be read as criticism of Putin’s
short sighted approach to regional reintegration. Laying down federal law in such a
heavy handed fashion can firstly tend to alienate people who have become used to
little government interference in their daily lives and secondly and more importantly,
fails to note the reality that most trade in eastern Russia is not with Europe, but with
Asia.
Disillusionment among the local populace in the region regarding official state
bodies and institutions runs deep. In a recent interview published in the official
Kremlin paper of record, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Deputy Prosecutor General Yuri
Gulyagin notes that the rate of crime in the Far Eastern Region is 23 percent higher
than the average for the rest of the country. The reason he attributes for this is that,
‘citizens are not satisfied with the courts, the quality of judgments’ and what he
88
Gilbert Rozmanm, ‘Russia in Northeast Asia: In Search of a Strategy’, p. 348.
Joshua Kucera, ‘Where Russia Meets China’, in Slate (Jan 1st, 2010).
90
‘Stalled Factories and Fireside Chats’, in The Economist, (21st Feb., 2009).
89
42
terms the ‘excessive closeness’ of the judicial system, the latter an open criticism of
the insider clique mentality prevalent in the area discussed previously. Furthermore,
in a stinging rebuke of the police and the legal system, Mr Gulyagin summed up the
prevalent attitude thus; ‘Instead of real action to protect citizens, law enforcement
officials continue to seek various ways to conceal the crimes from the records and
manipulate statistical reporting’.91 In this context, it is unsurprising that the local
population still feels alienated and distanced from Moscow.
During times of global economic turmoil, the detrimental effects of the issues
discussed above have become amplified as Federal funding dries up. As we have
seen on the macro level, Russia’s unwillingness to come to terms with its relative
weaknesses on the world stage has left it vulnerable in dealing with China.
Furthermore to put it bluntly, demographically the country in general and RFE
specifically is facing disaster. Policies such as the repatriation of ethnic Russians
have clearly failed and unless a manageable amount of migration is tolerated, the
region could easily become bereft of people within a short period of time.
Economically speaking the region is a one way street. Years of infrastructural neglect
have stymied development, culminating in the sale of natural resources to Chinese
companies for quick money. From a political perspective, having examined the
makeup and behaviour evident in the local system of government, there is not much
confidence inspired in the notion that the money gained from the ESPO pipeline will
be used to drag the region’s infrastructure up to standard. Furthermore, the clannish
nature of the system combined with a reformed Federal government sending decrees
down from above has undoubtedly left the local populace feeling cold towards their
leaders, leading some to question the feasibility of a continued connection with
Moscow.
These are the primary issues facing the RFE. In the following chapter, the economy
and society of the cross border region will be examined to determine the extent of
interaction at a human level between the Russian and Chinese frontier peoples.
91
‘Far East Law Enforcers Manipulated Figures’, in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 6th May, 2010, Retrieved
Online http://www.rg.ru/2010/05/06/reg-dvostok/gulyagin-anons.html.
43
Chapter Three: A Changing Society
44
Having identified issues facing the RFE, it is now necessary to deal with the trans
border region at large by incorporating the neighbouring Chinese province of
Heilongjiang into the scope of the study. By employing the discipline of political
science with an emphasis on geography, different types of cross border theoretical
frameworks will be analysed in order to determine the closest definable type of trans
boundary region which the RFE and North-eastern China comprises.
Furthermore, the developing trends and issues identified thus far raise further
questions which require a micro level on the ground analysis which will be applied to
the framework. The case study employed in this respect which best compares and
contrasts socioeconomic, demographic and political trends is that of the comparison
of two neighbouring cross border cities. By analysing the experience of
Blagoveshchensk, Russia and Heihe, China this chapter will determine the extent of
interaction between the two peoples on the ground. The aim will be to demonstrate
that despite the best efforts of the official Russian government, citizens from both
jurisdictions have been interacting and mingling to a large extent for some time and
that seismic shifts in the societal makeup of the broader region are already well
underway. From here, the study pans out to identify general cross border trends from
the region at large including migration patterns and intermarriage to demonstrate the
degree to which the border region is already interconnected.
3.1 Cross Border Regions: A Theoretical Framework
There is ongoing debate within the field of political science incorporating geography
which concerns the nature of international state border regions. Much has been
written about universal concepts of integration through economics, migration
patterns etc. as observed for example in Eurozone member states and Ryzhova and
Simutina make the case that these can be applied with varying degrees of intensity to
the neighbouring administrative divisions of Russia’s Amur Oblast and China’s
Heliongjiang province.92 In order to evaluate the degree to which this region is a
genuinely trans boundary one, it is necessary first to define the characteristics which
they exhibit and apply them accordingly.
92
N.P., Ryzhova and N.L. Simutina, ‘The Russia-Chinese Border: Alienated-CoexistentInterdependent?’ in Russian Polity: The Russian Political Science Yearbook, (2007-2008), p. 1.
45
There are two main strands in the discourse on this subject, the traditionalist and the
post modern, the former being the one most applicable in this case. Throughout the
course of the twentieth century, the very concept of the term ‘border’ has evolved in
meaning from a rigid permanent line of demarcation to something more fluid. The
previous discussion regarding the sense of detachment which locals feel from
Moscow is particularly relevant in this context. As Ryzhov and Simutina state:
‘Under the conditions when a state is removed from the centre of
international life, and international communication is replaced by
transnational (communication) which can be performed with or
without a state, borders are no longer dominant dividing lines between
nation states... turning into centres of cross-border institutions,
markets and spaces’93
Taking the traditionalist approach, American scholar O.J. Martinez divides
border regions into three distinct definitions: alienated, co-existent and
interdependent based upon factors such as topography, distance from the
country’s centre, demographic characteristics and economic development.94
An alienated borderland is one in which interaction is effectively nonexistent
and the residents of neighbouring states perceive each other as ‘outsiders’.
This definition could have been applied to the Sino-Russian frontier for the
twenty years following the Sino-Soviet split, during which interaction
through official channels ground to a halt, yet this is no longer the case.95
An integrated borderland is one in which there are no barriers for the
movement of goods or persons, augmented by a fully integrated economic
system and in which the residents feel that ‘they belong to a single social
system’. Of course the RFE and North-eastern China are nowhere near this
level of interaction which is far more representative of the so called
‘Benelux’ countries within the European Union and indeed the Eurozone,
than the emergent cross border system across the Amur River.
93
Ibid
Óscar Jáquez Martínez, Border People, Life and Society in the US Mexico Borderlands, (Tuscon,
1998), p. 11.
95
Ryzhova and Simutina, The Russia Chinese Border, p.2.
94
46
An additional method of interpreting borderlands is the post modern
approach, advocated by Finnish scholar A. Appadurai who focuses on the
idea of locality and perception, based upon constructivist tenets. As one of
the newer branches of political science, constructivism maintains that reality
as we perceive it is socially constructed and essentially fluid, an idea which
includes nation states and their boundaries which are open to continued
reassessment. Appadurai claims that transmigrational flows have a greater
effect on the development of border regions than any other factor, primarily
due to the fact that ‘new forms of national identity emerge which are not
strictly linked to the administrative-territorial division’ and which serve to act
as ‘translocal communities... where members retain their special ideological
connection with their origin.’96 The application of this paradigm for the RFE
is inconclusive as there is little evidence which suggests the motives of
Chinese migrants in the region. Even Ryzhova and Simutina state that the
directions of analysis prescribed by the postmodernist paradigm are not on
the research agenda in Russia at the moment.97 Perhaps they should be.
However, the paradigm which resonates most with the current regional Sino
Russian interactive relationship is what Martinez terms a ‘co-existent’
borderland which occurs when ‘conflicting contiguous states manage to
reconcile or mitigate the existing controversies before them.. which leads to
the improvement of the social and economic situation in the borderlands.’ 98
Furthermore, he cautions that it can also be an obstacle to the development of
the region if, ‘the purposeful policy of the respective central authorities is
based upon the fear that too close relations with neighbours might undermine
the country’s integrity’.99 This is pertinent regarding current policy making,
particularly by Russia and shall be investigated subsequently.
3.2 Case Study: A Tale of Two Cities
96
A., Appadurai, ‘The Production of Locality’, in Counterworks: Managing the Diversity of
Knowledge, R. Fardon (ed.), (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 210.
97
Ryzhova and Simutina, The Russia Chinese Border, p. 2.
98
Ibid
99
Martinez, Border People, p. 128.
47
The Russian city of Blagoveshchensk, with a population of almost 220,000 was
founded in 1856 as a military encampment.100 Located along the northern bank of the
Amur River, it is unique in that it is the only administrative centre in the Russian
Federation which is located on a border, in this case the 800 metre stretch of the
Amur River itself which separates Russia from China. Economically, it is
representative of the Amur Region in general in that primary industry is predominant
with energy, timber, agriculture and raw materials dominating the market. 101
Moreover, at a distance of 7,895 kilometres from Moscow, it is far closer to Beijing,
Tokyo and many American cities than its own capital city.
Directly across the river lies the Chinese city of Heihe, part of the Heiliongjiang
province of China which has a current population of 187,000 from the most recent
estimate.102 Economically speaking, the city benefits greatly from its proximity to
Russia as Chinese businesses are able to take advantage of disparities between the
ruble and the yuan as well as decreased production costs in China by selling products
to Russians at a lower price than they can buy themselves at home. (see fig. 3.1)
The emergent trends in the area serve as a microcosm of the economic, demographic
and social situation which is representative of the broader RFE region in general.
Writing in Foreign Policy, Kucera sums up the regional dynamic in one line, ‘this
part of the country (is) strategically important, badly under populated and right next
to a China bursting at the seams.’103 Although Blagoveshchensk and Heihe are the
largest two cities along the 7,400 kilometre long border between China and the CIS
states, trade was not officially initiated until 1987. The area was the epicentre of a
protracted territorial dispute between the USSR and PRC over islands located along
the Amur River. As a result, between 1965 and 1984, there was no cross border
contact whatsoever which went as far as having the presence of Chinese and Soviet
100
2002 Russian Census, Retrieved Online http://perepis2002.ru/ct/html/TOM_01_04_1.htm
(08/05/2010).
101
‘Russia by the Numbers’, Official Website of the Government of the Russian Federation
(Economic Situation of the Amur Region) Retrieved Online: http://government.ru/eng/russia/31/
(11/06/2010).
102
Natalia Ryzhova, and Grigory Ioffe, ‘Trans-border Exchange between Russia and China: The Case
of Blagoveshchensk and Heihe’, in Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 50, no.9, 2009, p. 349.
103
Daniel Kucera, ‘Don’t Call Them Twin Cities’, in Foreign Policy, 28th Dec., 2009.
48
soldiers guarding the riverbanks.104 However, since the fall of the USSR, subsequent
reforms have seen the border gradually become more and more permeable.
The two cities share some similarities in that they are both peripheral relative to their
respective major national population and economic centres. Furthermore, both areas
are dominated by agriculture and primary industries while at the same time are let
down by inefficient second rate Communist era industries and state regulated natural
resources.105 However, this is where the similarities end in economic terms. When the
output figures for the Amur Oblast and Heilongjiang are compared, the GDP of the
Chinese area is a full twenty three times greater than that of its Russian
counterpart.106 107 (In 2007, the GDP of Amur Oblast was estimated at the equivalent
of 3,871.9 million USD whereas that of Heilongjiang was 92,829.1 million USD).
Moreover, even though the city of Blagoveshensk has a higher GDP than that of
Heihe, this gap is being shortened extremely quickly. In the past ten years the
Russian city experienced GDP growth of 28%, whereas its Chinese counterpart saw a
much more impressive tenfold increase in its output of goods and services.108
Nevertheless, in order to give some sense of context to these figures, we need to
superimpose the demographic figures for the same areas. (see fig. 3.2)
Disparities between population densities for the two regions are extreme. Despite its
outlying status, Heilongjiang has a population density of 84.2 people per square
kilometre, which if it were a country, would be similar to that of Greece or Romania.
In stark contrast, Amur Oblast only has a density of 2.4 per square kilometre which is
analogous to the almost uninhabited territory of Western Sahara.109
110
Furthermore,
despite the fact that at a glance, both cities have reasonably similar populations, this
belies the demographic dynamics concurrently at work. The head count in
Blagoveshchensk has remained relatively stagnant between 1989 and 2002, growing
104
‘Chinese set out stall for Russia: The city of Heihe is now booming thanks to a lively cross-border
trade with the former Soviet Union’, in The Independent, 17th March, 1994.
105
Rhyzova, Ioffe, ‘Trans border Exchange Between Russia and China’, p. 352.
106
Amurskiy Statisticheskiy Yezhegodnik (Statistical Yearbook of Amur Oblast), Amurstat, 2008
Retrieved Online www.stat.amur.ru (07/05/2010).
107
Heilongjiang Statistical Yearbook 2007, Harbin, China, 2008. Retrieved Online,
www.chinadatacentre.org (07/05/2010).
108
Ryzhova, Ioffe, ‘Transborder Exchange Between Russia and China’, p. 352.
109
Amurskiy Statisticheskiy Yezhegodnik (Statistical Yearbook of Amur Oblast), Amurstat, 2008.
110
Heilongjiang Statistical Yearbook 2007, Harbin, China, 2008.
49
from 205,000 to 213,000, whereas the population of Heihe has exploded from 66,000
to 174,000 in the years 1982 to 2008.111
3.3 The Road to Nowhere
The chequered past of the two cities is clearly evident along both banks of the river.
As Kucera states, ‘in contrast to Heihe’s glitzy, welcoming facade, Blagoveshensk’s
barely lighted waterfront promenade features a Soviet era World War II memorial
that consists of a gunship with its barrels aimed across the river, toward China’.112
The symbolic contrast of this image is representative of even deeper differences
however. Journalistic, scholarly and anecdotal evidence are all critical to varying
degrees of the attitude of the official Russian authorities towards the potential for
cross border exchange and the process of integration with its counterpart across the
river.
The Chinese authorities have their sights set on the idea of an emergent ‘twin city’
setup with liberalised trade and travel agreements facilitated by an open border. They
have even gone so far as to designate Heihe a free economic zone and have removed
the visa requirement for Russian citizens wishing to travel south.113 However, the
Russian response has been less than accommodating towards this desire as Chinese
citizens must still fill out lengthy visa applications to be allowed into Blagoveshensk.
Kucera points towards a myriad of seemingly innocuous rules and regulations which
the Amur authorities have in place to stymie development and which are
representative of the official Russian attitude towards the Chinese in the region in
general. According to the author, the ferry licence issued for crossing to Heihe was
given to a politically connected local monopoly whose pricing scheme is exorbitant
when compared to the Chinese operator working in the opposite direction.
Furthermore, whereas in Heihe, signage appears in both Chinese and Russian to
better facilitate interaction, the same is not the case on the other side of the border.114
Perhaps the most prominent example of this disparity between goals is the case of the
proposed road bridge which would properly connect the two cities, facilitating much
111
Ryzhova, Ioffe, ‘Transborder Exchange Between Russia and China’, p.352.
Kucera, ‘Don’t Call Them Twin Cities’, in Foreign Policy.
113
Ryzhova, Ioffe, ‘Transborder Exchange Between Russia and China’, p. 353.
114
Kucera, ‘Don’t Call Them Twin Cities’, in Foreign Policy.
112
50
greater levels of movement of goods and people. There is evidence that as early as
1994, the Chinese have been the ones pushing for its construction while the Russians
have been intransigently blocking it. Zhao Pei Xing, Mayor of Heihe in 1994 is
quoted as saying;
‘It is because of the instability of the Russian situation. During my
two years as mayor, the government officials of Amur state have
changed three times. Each time they start at the beginning of
negotiations with us about the bridge. At last they have agreed it is
quite necessary.’115
While it is understandable that delays would be inevitable considering the
internal political turmoil within the Russian Federation at this time, the fact is
that little progress has been made during the interim 16 year period. Both
Kucera and Ryzhova refer to Russian procrastination and ‘heel dragging’
over the project which has still not begun construction.116 117
The present situation is unique and can be attributed to the contrasting attitudes of
Russia and China regarding their future vision for the region. There is no coherent
policy from the Russian administration regarding cross border commerce and
exchange, yet the demand clearly exists which has pushed a lot of trade into the
black market and also semi official ‘grey market’ channels. In order to examine this
trend, it is necessary to take a look at the economic breakdown of the region and
incorporate migration trends as well to determine the degree to which the border is
permeated on an actual human level, leaving aside official politics for a moment.
3.4 Cross Border Socioeconomic Trends
115
‘Chinese set out Stall for Russia’, in The Independent, 17th March, 1994.
Kucera, ‘Don’t Call Them Twin Cities’, in Foreign Policy.
117
Ryzhova, Ioffe, ‘Transborder Exchange Between Russia and China’, p. 352.
116
51
The economic activities of Chinese citizens north of the border vary across a broad
amount of sectors. Official employment statistics from 2006 state that 3.2% of the
labour force in the Amur Oblast is indeed Chinese, yet this figure masks a greater
number of gastarbeiters who do not register in the statistics and are mainly involved
in manual labour. Furthermore, the working standards provided for Chinese workers
differ greatly from their Russian counterparts regarding the expected number of
working hours and holiday eligibility. Despite this, there is an emergent Chinese
entrepreneurial class involved in the following industries.
The retail trade is the most lucrative form of cross border exchange and is dominated
by what is termed ‘the suitcase trade’, which is basically the selling of goods sourced
in China to Russians at a cheap price. This is undertaken by individuals who cross
the border with small amounts of goods, literally in suitcases, over and over again
and are difficult to include in a statistical analysis. Furthermore, city markets or rynki
in Blagoveshchensk are staffed primarily by Chinese salespeople. This particular
situation provides another good example of the federal government regulating an
area in the RFE without taking into account the reality on the ground. In 2006, the
authorities in Moscow decreed that the numbers of foreigners working in such
markets should be reduced to 40% of the total and to be reduced to zero by 2008.
Local authorities however found a way around this law by redesignating the markets
to malls, thereby avoiding what would be disastrous effects for the local economy
and highlighting the importance of Chinese labour.118
Elsewhere in Blagoveshchensk, there is a heavy Chinese presence in the public
catering industry. The ratio of Chinese to non Chinese restaurants is 7:3 for a number
of reasons, mainly due to the fact that they are less expensive than rival
establishments.119 This figure carries societal ramifications as well as over time the
predominance of Chinese eateries will contribute to the intermingling of Russian and
Chinese culture along the border. However as it stands, many of these businesses,
although Chinese owned, are actually fronted by Russians as it is still difficult for a
Chinese person to legally own a business north of the border.120
118
Ryzhova and Ioffe, Transborder Exchange between Russia and China, p. 355.
Natalia Ryzhova, Peculiarities of Transmigrant Adaptation in the ‘Twin Cities’ of
Blagoveshchensk and Heihe, Retrieved Online http://www.inocenter.ru/eng/news/doc/natalia_ryzhova.pdf (04/05/2010), p. 4.
120
Ibid.
119
52
Agriculture is a special case, as it has been in decline in the RFE following the
collapse of the USSR due to poor productivity levels, but also a chronic shortage of
labour. There are a number of Chinese agribusinesses and farmers involved in
comprehensive agricultural land use on the Russian side of the border.121
Another sector in which Chinese activity exists is that of mineral extraction and illicit
logging which is notorious in that existing regulations tend to be overlooked and
laws are not enforced. The reason for this, although not officially admitted, is that
there is much to be gained for citizens of both countries, many of whom are
politically connected, who wish to cooperate for profit. The following is a quote
taken directly from a statement prepared by the Procurator of the Amur Oblast;
‘The Chinese engage in logging, in violation of Russian law and aided
by Russian collaborators. Thus in 2003, a Blagoveshchensk based
firm secured business visas for 59 Chinese nationals, all of whom
turned out to be engaged in logging in .. Amur Oblast... In the Zeya
district of the oblast, 102 Chinese citizens worked in logging in
violation of Russian law.’122
This would appear to be yet another example of Russian and Chinese individuals
working together for their own personal gain, while undermining official views. In
fact, the logging industry in the region is particularly plagued by corruption. A
survey undertaken by the independent Environmental Investigation Agency found
that the majority of the wood which is supplied to American retailer, Wal-Mart is not
sourced in China as advertised, but rather from illegal Russian sources.123
The official view of the Russian authorities towards Chinese migration is one of
suspicion, even fear. Media reports often exaggerate figures and are quick to use
terms such as ‘zheltaya ugroza’ or, the yellow peril and going so far as to provide
reports that up to 50% of the population of Blagoveshchensk is ethnically Chinese
and that there exist entire Chinese villages north of the border which do not appear
121
Ryzhova and Ioffe, Transborder Exchange between Russia and China, p. 357.
Ibid, p. 359.
123
‘Stolen Forests: Inside the Covert War on Illegal Logging’, in The New Yorker, 6th Oct. 2008,
Retrieved Online, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/10/06/081006fa_fact_khatchadourian
(01/05/2010).
122
53
on maps.124 Yet, as Kucera states, with support from the evidence of the sheer
amount of interaction between the two peoples, these fears are more representative of
the establishment in Moscow and the state run media than the actuality in the RFE.
The other side of the coin of course concerns the movement of Russian citizens
southward into China, specifically the city of Heihe. Many are involved in what
Ryzhova terms the ‘grey market’ through which Chinese goods are imported in small
quantities clandestinely to avoid duties and tariffs, which is essentially another
appendage of the aforementioned ‘suitcase trade’. Furthermore, a number of
Russians act as entrepreneurs south of the border, although the dynamic is different
to their Chinese counterparts. Once again, the asymmetric level of business
regulation across the border explains the pattern of development. In the ‘free
economic zone’ of Heihe, it costs 65,000 USD to register a company with foreign
capital. However, in Russia it is a mere 400 USD.125 The result is rather predictable,
Chinese capital is flowing northwards along with Chinese goods whereas the Russian
side is experiencing a flight of capital and net exports of its raw materials.
Moreover, the type of migration undertaken by Russians is vastly different from a
socioeconomic perspective. Unskilled labourers make up a tiny percentage of the
Russian Diaspora in Heilongjiang. Instead, university graduates made up from the
educated middle class are travelling in the opposite direction to their unskilled
neighbours. This trend appears to be reflected in the courses taught in regional
universities. At the Amur State University, more Russians are learning Chinese than
English as a second language, a significant development. According to Victor
Dyatlov of the University of Irkutsk, ‘the only direction we can move in is
integration and cooperation between Russia and China. But we don’t know what
form that integration will take’.126
Furthermore as the two peoples cross paths, a trend of intermarriage, mostly between
Russian women and Chinese men is emerging. There are a number of reasons which
explain this particular dynamic. As a direct consequence of China’s one child policy
enacted in 1978, the ratio of males to females in the country is increasing at an
astronomical rate which, according to official estimates will see up to 30 million
124
Kucera, ‘Where Russia meets China’, in Slate, 30th Dec, 2009.
Ryzhova and Ioffe, ‘Transborder Exchange between Russia and China’, p. 360.
126
Kucera, ‘Where Russia meets China’, in Slate, 30th Dec, 2009.
125
54
bachelors in the country by the year 2020.127 The reason for this is that culturally,
couples prefer to have a son rather than a daughter and thus, the abortion rate for
female foetuses has risen sharply.128 Conversely, a trend is emerging among Russian
women in outlying areas in marrying non Russians regardless of where they are
from, as they ‘treat them better’ and tend to avoid the pitfalls of alcoholism and
unemployment.129
The results of this study are fascinating. As we have seen, if we were to superimpose
a theoretical framework upon the region, it would be termed a ‘co- existent
borderland’ in which formerly conflicting states have managed to put aside past
differences while nevertheless remaining somewhat suspicious. The result is an
improvement in the economic and social situation of the populace of the region at
large. Testing this framework, when the dynamic between Blagoveshchensk and
Heihe was examined, the two cities stood out as a microcosm of the cross border
region in general. The story behind the road bridge or lack thereof, linking the two
across the Amur River is not just a metaphor, but a representative example of the
indecisive and suspicious attitude of Russian officialdom towards the Chinese, which
contrasts starkly with the optimistic outlook of their counterparts.
Aside from the clear demographic, economic and political asymmetries demonstrated
along the border, the social changes already underway are wide ranging. Chinese
nationals have set themselves up in key industries north of the border, particularly in
primary industries and interestingly, not just solely as labourers but emergent
entrepreneurs. Conversely, educated Russians have begun making the journey
southwards, where the cost of living is far cheaper and they have even begun
intermarrying with the local Chinese population. All this is occurring despite media
scaremongering and the express wishes of the Kremlin.
The crux of the matter is that integration and co-operation is taking place on an
unprecedented scale and on numerous levels, most of which has not been directly
127
James Reynolds, ‘Wifeless Future for China’s Men’, BBC News, 12th Feb 2007, Retrieved Online,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6346931.stm (10/05/2010)
128
Ibid.
129
‘The Incredible Shrinking People’, in Enigma Variations: A Special Report on Russia: The
Economist, Nov. 29th, 2008, p. 12.
55
facilitated by governmental policies. It would appear that regardless of whether the
Russian government wants it or not, while political structures remain rigid, the face
of the region is changing; socially, economically and demographically and moving
closer towards what could plausibly be described as a ‘post national’ region.
56
Conclusion
The thrust behind this work has been to shed light on the Russian Far East region and
determine what exactly makes it a problem area to this day. The results of this
endeavour have been fascinating. By examining the colonial history of the Russian
Empire’s eastward expansion, we have come to a greater understanding as to how the
Russians view themselves as a nation and how this affects their contemporary
worldview. Having fought off threats from east and west throughout its history,
Russia has developed a unique sense of identity, reinforced by its geographic
features, which precludes it from being defined exclusively as European or Asian.
Nevertheless, when President Putin recently evoked Russia’s ‘common European
civilisational heritage’, the rise of Tsarist Russia in tandem with the other European
Great Empires must have been on his mind. The carving up and humiliation of China
by this power alongside its Western ‘allies’ through the unequal treaties has never
been forgotten, indeed it became the topic of public verbal sparring between the
USSR and PRC when raised by Mao Tse-tung repeatedly throughout the 1950s. An
unproductive relationship reinforced by colonial stereotypes kept tensions high until
the hand of friendship was extended by Gorbachev to the Chinese in his Vladivostok
speech in 1987. By acknowledging the issue of the disputed borderlands, the air was
cleared, thus facilitating the normalisation of relations throughout the 1990s. An
understanding of this historic dynamic is central to having a contextual
understanding of the contemporary situation.
In turning attention to the current predicament of the RFE, we find a region faced
with a multitude of challenges. On a macro level, the unwillingness of the Kremlin to
come to terms with its relative weakness on the world stage has left it open to
manipulation by an increasingly assertive China. There is enough that can be written
about the disastrous demographic situation in the RFE to warrant further study in its
own right. This cannot be over emphasised as the policies of the Federal Government
in trying to ‘secure’ the region by enticing ethnic Russians towards it have clearly
failed. As the country as a whole and the RFE in particular are facing demographic
ruin in the not too distant future, nothing short of a managed influx of immigrants,
57
ostensibly from China, can shore up the numbers. However as we have seen,
government and society at large are still not in a position to accept such a reality.
Compounding these facts, years of mismanagement and infrastructural neglect have
stunted regional growth, and projects such as the ESPO pipeline which will transfer
oil from the region and cash into the hands of the oligarchs behind state owned oil
companies, will do little to improve the lot of the RFE as a whole. Moreover as
demonstrated, the political system is comprised of an insider dominated, clan-like
local governmental system combined with a disjointed Federal Government,
determined to once again assert its dominance by passing ill thought out, top down
edicts. This has left the local populace feeling out of touch with its leaders, even
leading some to question the sensibility of maintaining a connection with Moscow.
By panning out and including the neighbouring Chinese province of Heilongjiang
into the study, we have been able to evaluate the extent to which we are dealing with
a genuinely trans border region. If we were to apply a term from political geography
to the region, it would be that of ‘co-existent borderland’. In other words, an area in
which formerly conflicting states have managed to put aside past grievances while
still retaining a degree of suspicion. Testing this framework, when the dynamic
between Blagoveshchensk and Heihe was examined, the two cities stood out as a
microcosm of the cross border region in general. The story behind the road bridge or
lack thereof, linking the two across the Amur River is not just a metaphor, but a
representative example of the indecisive and suspicious attitude of Russian
officialdom towards the Chinese, which contrasts starkly with the optimistic outlook
of their Asian counterparts.
Aside from the clear demographic, economic and political asymmetries demonstrated
along the border, the social changes already underway are wide ranging. Chinese
nationals have set themselves up in key industries north of the border, particularly in
primary industries and interestingly, not just solely as labourers but emergent
entrepreneurs. Conversely, educated Russians have begun making the journey
southwards, where the cost of living is far cheaper and they have even begun
intermarrying with the local Chinese population. All this is occurring despite media
scaremongering and the express wishes of the Kremlin.
58
Despite its inherent problems and historical baggage, the greater RFE region spans
across the border, taking in parts of North-eastern China. The natural economic
hinterland straddles the boundary and there is ample proof that integration and cooperation is taking place on an unprecedented scale and on numerous levels, most of
which has not been directly facilitated by governmental policies.
It would appear that regardless of whether the Russian government wants it or not,
while political structures remain rigid, the face of the region is beginning to change.
Socially, Russians and Chinese are interacting and intermingling among themselves
largely despite preventative regulations. In economic terms, resources are moving
south while capital is flowing north. Finally, the inevitability of demographic change
means that the RFE is moving closer towards what could plausibly be termed a ‘post
national’ region.
59
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Annex I: The Russian Federation- Background
Notes
67
Political Background and Regional Makeup
There are 83 federal subjects according to the Constitution of the Russian
Federation.130 These are comprised of:
•
21 Republics: Each has their own constitution, president and parliament.
They are nominally independent but represented by the Russian Federation in
Foreign Affairs. They were set up as the intended homes of ethnic minorities.
•
46 Oblasts (provinces): These are the most common administrative unit in
the Federation. Each one has a federally appointed governor and locally
elected legislature. They are usually named after the largest city in the
province.
•
9 Krais – (territories): These are technically the same as Oblasts, but the term
remains as in the past they were originally frontier regions.
•
1 Autonomous Oblast: The Jewish Autonomous Oblast. This anachronistic
remnant of the USSR was created by Stalin in 1934 ostensibly as a homeland
for Jews to pursue Yiddish culture within a socialist framework. Today the
population is roughly 90% ethnic Russian.
•
4 Autonomous Okrugs – (districts): These districts have more autonomy
than Oblasts but less than Republics. They are home to large ethnic
minorities.
•
2 Federal Cities – Moscow, St. Petersburg.
Land area: 17,075,400 km/sq. (or twice the size of Canada), spanning 11 time
zones.
Population: 142 Million as of Jan 1st 2002.131 The next census scheduled to be taken
in October 2010 has been suspended until 2013 ‘as a result of the current financial
crisis’.132
130
www.consultant.ru/popular/cons/1_3.html (The Constitution of the Russian Federation)
www.gks.ru/scripts/free/1c.exe?XXXX09F.2.1/010000R
132
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090918/156176042.html RIA Novosti (Russian State Owned News
Service) Retrieved on 16.02.2010.
131
68
Resources: The territory of the Russian Federation contains 25% of the worlds
unfrozen fresh water, the worlds largest forest reserves, as well as large mineral
deposits. Oil and gas are plentiful, particularly in Siberia and the Far Eastern Region.
Membership of International Organisations
The Russian Federation continues the legal personality of the USSR.133 (For example,
it retained the USSR seat at the United Nations Security Council) It is also a member
of the following organisations:
G8: Group of eight including Russia, United States, United Kingdom, Canada,
France, Germany, Japan and Italy.
G20: Group of twenty large world economies.
APEC: Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation organisation.
CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States. A collection of former Soviet States.
SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. An intergovernmental mutual security
organisation.
Russia is also a nuclear power and party to the Non Proliferation Treaty. (NPT)
Russian Economy
Following the fall of the USSR, Russia faced two main obstacles, i) macroeconomic
stability (implementing fiscal and monetary policies and ii) economic restructuring
(ensuring strong institutions, banks, property rights, legal codes). The opening of
domestic markets to foreign trade was key to these goals.
133
Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (&th ed.) (London:
Routlidge, 1997), p. 166.
69
From 1991, Yeltsin engaged in ‘shock therapy’ – in which price controls were lifted
which resulted in millions being impoverished and hyperinflation taking hold. As
Russia retained the legal personality of the USSR, it also took on its external debt,
despite having half the population it once had.
State owned businesses were privatised with a wealthy criminal elite gaining
possession of assets for far less than what they were worth. Many took billions from
these acquisitions out of the country resulting in huge capital flight. The largest
single source of income is from energy revenue.
A Concise History from Kievan Rus’ to the Russian Federation
The original state of Kievan Rus', which now makes up modern day European
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, was established by the Vikings who ruled over the
eastern Slavs. It became one of the most populous and successful states in Europe
throughout the 10th and 11th centuries under Vladimir the Great and his son Yaroslav
the Wise, during which time the conversion to Orthodox Christianity occurred. This
has been termed the Golden Age of Kiev.
Through the 11th and 12th centuries, the state was chipped away by Turkic invasions,
infighting, migration and feudalism and finally destroyed by the Mongol Invasion
which resulted in the establishment of the Golden Horde State.
The Grand Duchy of Moscow emerged as the most powerful successor state from
Kievan 'Rus. In 1380, under Prince Dmitri Donskoy the Mogol-Tartars were defeated
for the first time at the Battle of Kulikovo. His successor Ivan III (Ivan the Great)
threw off their hold entirely and united Northern and Southern 'Rus. After the fall of
Constantinople in 1453, the rise of Muscovy continued as they claimed the legacy of
the Eastern Roman Empire, adopting the double headed eagle coat of arms.
Ivan IV (Ivan the Terrible) was crowned the first Tsar in 1547 and proceeded to
aggrandize his territory. It is worth noting that he was the first to introduce the idea
of self-management in isolated rural areas which would influence the future political
70
makeup of the country. This period has been dubbed by Andreas Kappeler the
‘beginning of the Russian multi-ethnic empire.’134
His reign was marked by expansion in the east and defeat in the west in the Livonian
Wars against the Polish – Lithuanian Commonwealth. It is as early as this that we
can identify a common theme in Russian history; defeat in the West resulting in a
turn towards the east. This would occur again after the Crimean War and following
the 1905 Russo-Japanese war, driven in part by the desire to become a great naval
power by finding year round open ports.135
The 1600's have been described as the 'Time of Troubles' as they were characterised
by famine, civil war and the rule of foreigners. The Poles were eventually forced out
of Moscow in 1612 by Russian volunteers led by Kuzma Minin and Prince
Pozharsky. The Romanovs, a new dynasty acceded to the throne the following year.
Helped by the Cossacks, warriors on horseback, Russia continued to grow
throughout the 17th century. In 1654, the Ukrainian leader Bohdan Khmelnytsky
asked for Ukraine to be under the protection of the Russian tsar Aleksey I. The
acceptance of this proposal led to a war between Poland and Russia in which Ukraine
was split between the two. Concurrently, the Cossacks spread eastwards colonising
the territory of Siberia as far as the Pacific coast, which remained true to the tradition
of eastern Slav settlement of land towards the east.136
Peter I (Peter the Great) proclaimed Russia an empire in 1721. Under his reign,
Russia defeated Sweden and secured its much sought after ports in the west. St.
Petersburg was proclaimed capital and western influences began to filter through.
Elisabeth I (1742 – 1762) oversaw Russian participation in the Seven Years War in
which they annexed Prussian territory and even took Berlin, but it was returned
under Peter III.
She was succeeded by Catherine II (Catherine the Great) who reigned from 1762 –
1796, during which time she incorporated most of the former Polish – Lithuanian
134
Kappeler, The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History, p. 14.
Keylor, William R., The Twentieth Century World (4th ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001), p. 10-11.
136
Kappeler, Andreas, The Russian Empire, p. 38.
135
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commonwealth into Russia, extending into Central Europe. To the south the
Ottomans were defeated as well as the Crimean Khanate, gaining the Crimea and
areas of the caucuses. This was expanded upon by Alexander I (1801 – 1825) who
took Finland as well as parts of the Ottoman Empire.
In alliance with Prussia and Austria, Alexander I fought and defeated Napoleon’s
France in 1812, representing the country at the Congress of Vienna in 1820. Officers
from the wars attempted to bring back ideas of Liberalism, the reaction to which was
a strict clampdown by the reactionary tsars; particularly Nicolas I (1825 – 1855)
which when combined with the effects of the Crimean War left Russia behind the
rest of Europe socially, economically and militarily.137
Reforms initiated by Alexander II (1855 – 1881) especially the abolition of serfdom
in 1861 accelerated industrialisation but there was still much catching up to do.
Many socio-economic conflicts were aggravated during Alexander III’s reign (18811894) and under his son, Nicholas II (1894-1917).
The revolutionary socialist movement gained mass support throughout this time as a
result of harsh working conditions and no workers rights. In what became known as
'Bloody Sunday' in Jan. 1905 troops opened fire on demonstrators in St. Petersburg.
This combined with Russia's defeat to Japan, led to an uprising. Although it was put
down, it led to Nicholas II having to concede major reforms such as freedom of
speech and assembly, the legalization of political parties and the creation of the
Duma, the Russian Parliament.
From 1914, Russia suffered heavily during WWI. The populaces distrust of the
authorities combined with high casualties resulted in the Revolution of 1917 led by
democratically elected councils known as 'Soviets'. This 'February Revolution'
overthrew the monarchy, replacing it with a Provisional Government. This shaky
coalition proved ineffectual and was overthrown by the Bolsheviks in October of the
same year led by Lenin. Russia had become the world’s first socialist state. Lenin
immediately withdrew Russia from the war under the Treaty of Brest Litovsk.
137
Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon, p. 253.
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What followed was the Russian civil war (1917 – 1923) between the Bolsheviks
(reds) and the white armies made up of loosely aligned anti communists and allied
powers.
War Communism during this period meant that everything was nationalised for the
war effort including all industry, small businesses and surplus farm produce. This
caused great unrest and was responded to with Lenin’s NEP (New Economic Policy)
in which some private trade was allowed benefitting mainly richer peasants (kulaks).
Societal changes included the ‘emancipation’ of women as abortion and divorce were
legalised, which served to increase the workforce. Organised religion was strongly
discouraged.
Under Stalin a constitution adopted in 1924 established a federal system of
government based on a succession of soviets set up in villages, factories, and cities in
larger regions. This pyramid of soviets in each constituent republic culminated in the
All-Union Congress of Soviets. But while it appeared that the congress exercised
sovereign power, this body was actually governed by the Communist Party, which in
turn was controlled by the Politburo from Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union,
just as it had been under the tsars before Peter the Great.
Stalin went on to abolish the NEP and begin the first of his Five Year Plan’s in 1928.
The intent was for Russia to catch up with the rest of the developed world by
encouraging industrialisation and centralising agriculture. Peasants were forced from
the land and many starved through these policies, fleeing to the cities, they increased
the urban population hugely in a very short time.
Control was further centralised through the Great Purges in which many previous
supporters of Lenin were executed. Internal Exile was used as punishment for
‘dissidents’ who were sent to the Gulags in Siberia. From 1938 to 1939, USSR
fought border wars in Manchuria against the Japanese.
Following WWII which saw almost 20 million Soviet war dead, the Cold War
emerged form disagreements between Stalin and President Truman during the
Potsdam conference. (Russia wanted buffer states between itself and Germany) In
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1949, NATO formed which was eventually matched by the Warsaw Pact. This was a
hugely important year, Russia tested its first atomic bomb and the Chinese
Communist Party under Mao Tse-tung took control of China.
Russia retained its dominance in Eastern Europe with the 1956 crushing of the
Hungarian Revolution, 1968 Prague Spring and was against the Solidarity movement
in Poland throughout the 1980s. The Cold War saw the USSR becoming militarily
involved against the US in a number of proxy conflicts including Korea and
Vietnam.
The 1970s were marked by a process of détente with the West. Also, countries
independent of the established bi-polar system began to wield more power. A
landmark agreement was reached with the United States though the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT I, II).
The USSR became embroiled in the nine year Afghanistan war in 1979. Throughout
the 1980s, Gorbachev announced perestroika and glasnost in an effort to engage with
the west. By 1990, the planned economy became unsustainable (food queues etc.)
and corruption was rife. A power struggle ensued between Yelstin and Gorbachev
with Yeltsin elected president of Russian SSR in 1990. He wanted Russia separate
from the Soviet Union. The subsequent coup against Gorbachev resulted in the end
of the Soviet Union 1991.
The Russian Federation as the main successor state to the Soviet Union, particularly
in its outlying areas is still faced with a need to modernise in order to not just catch
up with the rest of the developed world, but to survive intact as a State. In effect, the
study of Russian expansionism, fulfilling the criteria which Dominic Lieven sets out
for ‘Empire’, has in an international context been the study of ‘relative weakness’. 138
138
Lieven, Empire:The Russian Empire and its Rivals, p. 187.
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Annex II: Tables, Maps and Graphs
75
Fig. 1.1 Kievan Rus’ at its greatest extent in the 11th Century.
Fig 1.2: The Chinese Empire as it stood in 1820 superimposed with the current border of the
PRC.
76
Fig 1.3 The Russian Empire as it stood in 1866.
Fig 1.4: The Route of the Trans-Siberian Railroad which solidified Russia’s Eastward
Expansion.
77
Fig 2.1 Forecasted Population Decline over the next forty years in the Russian Federation.
Fig. 2.2 Population density per square kilometre on a regional basis in the Russian
Federation.
78
Fig. 2.3 Russian GDP since the fall of the Soviet Union.
Fig 2.4 Map of the East Siberian Pacific Ocean Pipeline
79
Fig. 2.4 The Dynamics in the Makeup of Russia’s Mayors from 1991 to 2005
Fig 3.1 Map showing the general location of Blagoveshchensk, Heihe, and other nearby
locations.
80
Fig. 3.2 The greater Amur/Heilongjiang area with geographical features.
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Acknowledgments
Throughout my undergraduate studies, I developed an interest in both contemporary
Russian and Chinese studies, two fields which I was fortunate to be able to combine
together in my postgraduate work at the Diplomatic Academy.
I would like to thank in particular, my supervisor Prof. Thomas Row for his
assistance in my research and for providing me with incredibly helpful suggestions
and sources.
Thanks also to both Prof. Gerhard Mangott whose excellent courses and seminars on
modern Russia were always relevant and thought provoking and Prof. Alexia
Fürnkranz-Prskawetz of the Vienna Institute of Demography whose seminar
combining economics and demographics inspired me to take up this particular topic.
I would also like to thank my parents, Deirdre and Michael for their constant support
all throughout my education. This work simply would not have been possible without
their help.
Thanks also to my many friends who have helped me throughout the course of this
work through stimulating and fruitful conversations on the topic matter.
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Pledge of Honesty
On my honour as a student of the Diplomatic Academy, I submit
this work in good faith and pledge that I have neither given nor
received unauthorised assistance on it.
__________________________
Eoin Heaney
83