Violence-promoting Islamist
extremism in Sweden
Violence-promoting Islamist
extremism in Sweden
Säkerhetspolisen
This report constitutes the Swedish Security Service’s response to the Ministry of
Integration and Gender Equality’s assignment to describe violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden, as well as radicalisation processes and tools and strategies that can be used to counter radicalisation. The overriding objective of this
report is to contribute to a nuanced and factually accurate debate based on the
information and assessments presented.
The main conclusions of the report are that violence-promoting Islamist extremism
and radicalisation do exist in Sweden and constitute a potential threat that should
not be underestimated. However, at present, these phenomena remain limited and
should mainly be addressed with more focus on preventive measures. Given the
substantial similarities in how and why people become radicalised, regardless of
ideological affiliation, it should be possible to better coordinate preventive efforts
and countermeasures. Prevention should not only be pursued by players on all
levels – national, regional and local. The players in civil society should also be involved and, in a broader perspective, so should all citizens of society.
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This report is available for download from www.sakerhetspolisen.se
Production: Swedish Security Service
ISBN: 978-91-86661-05-2
Typography: Eurostile, Swift
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Foreword
Just over a year ago, the National Council for Crime Prevention and the Swedish Security Service, commissioned by the Swedish Government, presented a report on violence-promoting extremism in the white power and the autonomous movements.
The Government then assigned the Security Service to describe violence-promoting
Islamist extremism in Sweden, the radicalisation processes discernible in violencepromoting Islamist circles in Sweden and the tools and strategies that can be used
to counter radicalisation. This report is a presentation of that assignment.
This report constitutes the most extensive public account to date of violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden. Transparency was a guiding principle when
compiling the report. I would like to take this opportunity to thank those who
generously shared their time, knowledge and experience in cooperation with the
Security Service. There are also many people from within the Security Service who
were involved in the preparation of the report, whom I would like to thank as well.
During the year, the assignment has been debated and questioned on multiple occasions in various media. Now that the report is finished, we hope that the debate
will continue, preferably based on the information and the assessments that we are
now presenting. Lively public debate is what characterises a vital democracy and a
vital democracy is the best way to prevent violence-promoting extremism in all its
forms.
Stockholm, November 2010
Anders Danielsson
Director General
Head of the Swedish Security Service
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Table of Contents
Summary7
1Assignment
13
1.1 Formulation and interpretation of assignment
1.2Method
1.3 The Security Service’s remit
1.4 Terminology discussions and delimitations
1.5Structure
14
15
19
22
25
2 Why people become radicalised
27
2.1 Radicalisation – a social process
2.2 Radicalisation routes
28
37
3 The situation with regard to radicalisation into violence-promoting
Islamist extremism in Sweden
3.1 People who have become radicalised 3.2 Primary radicalisation processes
3.3 Impact of international developments on radicalisation processes in Sweden
40
41
43
45
4 The extent and nature of violence-promoting Islamist extremism in
Sweden47
4.1 Objectives, messages and motivation
4.2Actions
4.3 Networks, functions and roles
4.4 Active individuals
4.5Environments
4.6 Practical requirements
4.7 Violence-promoting Islamist extremism in nearby countries 48
49
54
57
61
63
63
5 The players’ intent and capability to conduct security-threatening
activities66
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
The players’ intent
The players’ capability
Factors deemed to affect the players’ intent and capability
Threats against Sweden and Swedish interests with regard to terrorism
6 Countering radicalisation
67
69
70
73
75
6.1 Existing measures
6.2 Requests for and concerns regarding measures 6.3 Proposals for tools and strategies
76
83
93
7 Concluding reflections
99
References106
Table of figures
Figure 1 Age distribution
58
Figure 2 Distribution of registered address by type of region Figure 3 Distribution of crimes resulting in punishment
Figure 4 Social structure illustrating confirmed connections between the individuals 59
60
61
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Summary
Scope and method
This government-commissioned report by the Swedish Security Service contains a
description of violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden, discernible radicalisation processes and tools and strategies for countering radicalisation. The
report uses the term violence-promoting Islamist extremism to describe the type of
security-threatening activities motivated by Islamist arguments and which ultimately aim to use violence or threats of violence to push society in an undemocratic
direction. The Swedish Security Service defines radicalisation as the process leading
to an individual or a group supporting or engaging in ideologically motivated violence as a method of promoting their cause.
Empirical descriptions of violence-promoting Islamist extremism and radicalisation processes presented in this report are mainly a result of systematic processing
and analysis of existing Security Service material. In order to balance the need for
an up-to-date picture with operational considerations (e.g. respecting the secrecy
applying to ongoing investigations), focus has been placed on data from 2009. The
report also includes information from publicly available sources, such as public
agency reports and academic papers.
The Swedish Security Service has also worked along two parallel lines with people
whose experiences and knowledge are deemed relevant to the report. To obtain a
stakeholder perspective, we have met with representatives of Muslim interests as
well as with individual practising Muslims. We have also discussed the issue from
a professional perspective with scholars, the community police and others engaged
in crime prevention or involved in helping people leave violence-promoting groups.
The views put forward have made a valuable contribution to the report, especially
in terms of tools and strategies for use in countering radicalisation. The proposals
presented from a stakeholder as well as a professional perspective are also in line
with the empirical evidence presented by the Security Service. The external perspectives thereby strengthen the conclusions of the report.
Violence-promoting Islamist extremism
A number of networks based on a violence-promoting Islamist extremist ideology
are active in Sweden. Most of them focus on action and propaganda against foreign
troops in Muslim countries and against governments they see as corrupt and not
representing what the networks consider to be the only true interpretation of Islam. Individuals active in these networks engage in activities aimed at supporting
and facilitating terrorist offences in other countries. They do so in various ways,
such as spreading a violence-promoting message, recruiting more active supporters, through financial or practical support, joining and training with armed Islamist extremist groups or planning and carrying out attacks. The areas currently of
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interest to such individuals in Sweden are Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan/Pakistan and
North Africa.
Specialisation on an individual level as well as on network level may lead to the
emergence of particular functions, such as recruiters, intermediaries, web administrators or fundraisers. These functions, however, are neither static nor strictly
defined, and most active members carry out several tasks. Individuals returning
to Sweden with experiences from training and/or using violence in other countries
also play a prominent role in the networks. Whether aware of it or not, such returnees are seen as role models who inspire others keen to attend training camps
or otherwise support violence-promoting Islamist extremism, and therefore often
contribute to increased support activities in Sweden. Increased knowledge and
larger international contact networks give returnees a special status, resulting in
some of them having set up their own networks after returning to Sweden.
The group of active members on whose actions the descriptions in this report are
based consists of just under 200 individuals. According to Security Service information, these individuals participated in or supported violence-promoting Islamist extremism in 2009 or later, when they were registered as domiciled in Sweden. Most
of these individuals are male, although ages and backgrounds vary. Several women
affiliated with violence-promoting Islamist circles are also assessed to share the
violence-promoting ideology, but in most cases do not engage in activities directly
linked with security-threatening activities.
There are confirmed connections between at least 80 per cent of the members of
the group, mainly in the form of friendship relations. This illustrates the significance of social connections, especially in the context of how people are drawn into
these circles. The fact that these people are connected does not, however, make
them one coherent network capable of fully coordinating its resources and working
towards the same goal.
As a majority of active members are registered as domiciled in Sweden’s three major cities, violence-promoting Islamist extremism could be described as an urban
problem. However, where a person is domiciled does not necessarily show where
they actually live or carry out their activities. One characteristic of violence-promoting Islamist extremism is that activities may take place in several different
environments. These may be physical as well as virtual locations, open as well as
closed environments, and informal as well as formal groups. It follows from this
that there is no clear connection between this type of security-threatening activity
and specific geographical locations.
Over the past few years, internet forums have become increasingly important to
violence-promoting Islamist extremism. These forums function as media organs,
information channels and platforms for spreading messages and making contact.
Information technology is widely used to convince and to recruit others into a
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violence-promoting ideology, as well as for anonymous and secure communication
with those already involved. Individuals in Sweden can access and come into contact with violence-promoting messages and influential ideologues without a physical context. By providing a simple and low-cost alternative, the internet has also
enabled sophisticated and extensive propaganda campaigns aimed at particular target groups.
By and large it is easier to characterise the most frequently occurring contexts as
social rather than physical. The places involved are often those where many young
people gather, whether in actual meeting rooms or in chat rooms. Violence-promoting Islamist extremism is also more frequent in contexts marked by alienation and
difficult social circumstances.
Radicalisation processes
The individuals on whose activities this report is based have all been through a radicalisation process. However, there is no given answer as to how and why radicalisation happens. Most scholars, though, agree that this is a social process and that it
is possible to identify substantial similarities in radicalisation processes in various
ideological contexts. There are similarities in both the push and pull factors that
may increase the likelihood that a person becomes radicalised. The reason why radicalisation processes may display similarities in spite of differing ideological contexts is that the main causes are often social and emotional rather than ideological.
Radicalisation in violence-promoting Islamist contexts does occur in Sweden, albeit
to a limited extent. It takes place mostly among individuals and groups, and is not
a problem on a societal level. There is nothing in the Security Service’s material to
indicate that radicalisation is on the increase. The majority of people radicalised in
Sweden are males in the age group 15 to 30. Most of them were born or grew up in
Sweden, and it is here that they come into contact with violence-promoting ideologies and groups.
Radicalisation often takes place among groups of friends where a yearning for excitement and a fascination with violence are predominant. They often lack contact
with established violence-promoting networks and are primarily inspired by global
violence-promoting Islamist rhetoric. Group dynamics is important, and intense
socialising and watching violence propaganda is common.
Others are instead radicalised through contacts with individuals or groups that already promote violence. They may have contacted these people themselves, or they
may have been contacted in contexts otherwise lacking any connection to violencepromoting messages.
It also happens that individuals linked to established violence-promoting circles
use youth groups or small associations as arenas for radicalisation. This could hapViolence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden
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pen in connection with conferences or meetings where violence-promoting messages are spread, in closed environments, to those deemed susceptible.
A small number of individuals self-radicalise, mainly through the internet. These
individuals often lack previous contact with established violence-promoting networks and groups, but are in some cases lured into such groups. This means that
also self-radicalisation requires social interaction, albeit online and not face to face.
The fascination with violence and the yearning for excitement is a common characteristic for these individuals, just as for those radicalised in a group of friends.
The threat from violence-promoting Islamist extremism
The threat from violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden is currently not
a threat to the fundamental structures of society, Sweden’s democratic system or
Central Government. A relatively limited number of people are involved in violencepromoting Islamist extremism, and there is nothing to indicate that the number
of people radicalised in Sweden is on the increase. In other words, while violencepromoting Islamist extremist groups do not pose a threat to Swedish society they
are nonetheless a threat to individuals and groups, especially in other countries.
Individuals are known to travel from Sweden with the intent of joining violencepromoting Islamist extremist groups abroad to take part in training and, in some
cases, unlawful acts of violence organised by such groups. This makes these individuals a concrete security threat in the countries concerned, regardless of whether
they themselves engage in unlawful acts of violence or enable others to do so. Such
actions also risk damaging Sweden’s international reputation. Sweden is bound by
international law to ensure that Swedish nationals or others residing here do not
pose a threat to other countries, and that Sweden does not become a base for terrorism.
Since the London bombings in 2005, no Islamist-motivated terrorist attacks have
been carried out anywhere in the European Union. However, a number of planned
or attempted attacks, most of them in the UK, Denmark and Germany, have been detected and averted. Together with an increasing number of explicit threats against
Europe expressed in al-Qaida’s rhetoric and propaganda, these attempted attacks
show an increased focus on Europe as the target of attacks linked to violence-promoting Islamist extremist networks. The level of threat, however, varies considerably
between EU countries, a handful of which are assessed as facing a higher level of
threat than others.
Causes and drivers
A number of factors assessed to potentially fuel radicalisation or otherwise affect
the threat from violence-promoting Islamist extremism are likely to remain relevant for the next few years.
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The most serious potential threat to Sweden is the long-term effects of individuals
from Sweden choosing to travel abroad to join violence-promoting Islamist extremist groups. In our assessment, this type of travel has seen an increase lately and
there are currently no signs of falling interest in joining foreign groups. Not only
does time spent with such groups increase participants’ capability, it also risks having an effect on their intent. Several foreign groups who used to have a local or
regional agenda have increasingly come to use arguments based on global violencepromoting Islamist ideologies, thereby making more arenas and targets appear legitimate to them. A situation involving a higher number of returnees from foreign
violence-promoting Islamist extremist groups is assessed to have a potentially negative effect on the threat to Sweden.
The interaction between local and global factors has also come to play an everincreasing role in radicalisation and violence-promoting Islamist extremism in
Sweden as well as internationally. The Danish Mohammed cartoons and the publication in Sweden of drawings of the Prophet Mohammed as a dog are examples of
local events that may fuel radicalisation globally. Since the first publication in the
autumn of 2007, several cases of controversial depictions of the Prophet have been
noted in Sweden. Protests have targeted not only those seen as responsible for the
various images but also Sweden as a country. In some cases, protesters make no
difference between the various targets of their criticism. This may have an impact
on Swedish as well as foreign players and their intent to act in various ways against
the country or the people perceived as insulting or supporting insults of Islam.
On the whole, increased polarisation in society may also reinforce the feeling of
discrimination and stigmatisation among disenfranchised groups. This may be one
factor facilitating radicalisation and recruitment of individuals into violence-promoting groups.
Tools and strategies
The main conclusions of the report are that violence-promoting Islamist extremism
and radicalisation do exist in Sweden and should not be underestimated as potential threats. The currently limited occurrences should be countered mainly by an
increased focus on preventive measures. This may be coupled with measures to
facilitate for people to leave violence-promoting Islamist groups (de-radicalisation).
Any such measures should however be initiated and carried out by civil society
players. Given the substantial similarities in how and why people radicalise, regardless of ideological affiliation, it should be possible to better coordinate preventive efforts and countermeasures targeting various extremist groups. Experiences
and knowledge gained from crime prevention initiatives in general should also
play a more prominent role. Not only should public agencies on all levels – national, regional and local – engage in the preventive work, so also should civil society players and, in a larger perspective, all citizens.
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One important part of this work is the promotion of constructive options for people
who would otherwise risk being radicalised or finding themselves in some other
destructive context. The fact that radicalisation into violence-promoting Islamist
extremism is reinforced by segregation and perceived exclusion is evident from the
Security Service’s own material and has also been pointed out by representatives
from both the stakeholder and professional groups consulted for this report. Initiatives aiming to improve people’s situation in terms of employment, housing and
education therefore serve as examples of efforts that may yield positive results in
a number of areas, such as reducing the risk of radicalisation. Also, strategies to
improve people’s lives in general are less likely to fuel radicalisation as they do not
stigmatise any particular group.
The report also shows that for most people who are radicalised, this process was initiated at a fairly young age. Preventive measures should therefore primarily target
young people, who are also the ones described as being most susceptible to radicalisation attempts. Unlike in other violence-promoting extremist groups, people active
in violence-promoting Islamist networks remain active as they grow older. In other
words, this commitment is not a typical teenage phenomenon that active members
will grow out of, which again highlights the importance of measures aiming to prevent people from becoming radicalised. As countermeasures are always more effective the earlier they are taken, close interaction between schools, social services and
the community police, enabling them to exchange information and draw on each
other’s knowledge, is a critical success factor for effective preventive efforts at the
local level.
Civil society players also have an important role in this. It is evident both from the
Security Service’s material and from external contacts that individuals and organisations in the Swedish Muslim community in particular have an opportunity to
contribute to preventing and countering radicalisation. It has, for instance, been
pointed out on several occasions that a deeper knowledge of Islam may reduce the
risk of radicalisation or contribute to de-radicalisation; a finding which is also consistent with Security Service data. Practising Muslims may thus, in their capacity
as religious authorities, counterbalance violence-promoting propagandists active
in Sweden and abroad. This, however, does not mean that Swedish Muslims as a
group have a greater responsibility than other Swedes to prevent and counter radicalisation in violence-promoting Islamist groups. All organisations working with
young people need encouragement and help to challenge those representing and
advocating undemocratic and violence-promoting ideologies.
At the end of the day, preventing and countering radicalisation is everyone’s
responsibility, as citizens and members of society.
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1 Assignment
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On 11 February 2010, the Swedish Government commissioned the Swedish Security
Service to compile a report on violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden
(Government decision IJ2010/262/DEM). The Security Service continuously works
to prevent and counter all kinds of violence-promoting extremism, regardless of
ideological nature. Accordingly, the content of the assignment entails no new or
expanded mandate for the Service. With this report, the Security Service hopes to
contribute to a nuanced and factually accurate debate on violence-promoting Islamist extremism.
This chapter begins with a description of the assignment and how the Security
Service interpreted it. The method is then described, followed by an account of the
Security Service’s remit in relation to violence-promoting Islamist extremism. This
is followed by a discussion of the central concepts and delimitations of the report
and a presentation of its structure.
1.1Formulation and interpretation of assignment
Pursuant to the Government decision (IJ2010/262/DEM), the Security Service is to
compile a report that describes:
1.
2.
3.
Violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden
The radicalisation processes that can be discerned in violence-promoting
Islamist circles in Sweden
The tools and strategies that can be used to counter radicalisation.
The Security Service interpreted these three points and broke them down into more
specific questions. The overall objective of the report is to contribute to a nuanced
and factually accurate debate regarding violence-promoting Islamist extremism by
answering these questions based on the Security Service’s own information and assessments.
The Security Service uses the term violence-promoting Islamist extremism1 to describe the type of security-threatening activities2 motivated by Islamist arguments
and which ultimately aim to use violence or threats of violence to push society in
an undemocratic direction.
The questions prepared and answered in the report concerning the first point of the
assignment are:
What are the goals and objectives of the security-threatening activities?
How are the activities conducted?
1 For further terminology discussions, see Section 1.4.
2 Security-threatening activity is not a legally defined term. However, it may involve criminal activities as well as activities that can evolve into terrorist offences or financial crimes. For a more in-depth discussion on how and why
the Security Service monitors violence-promoting Islamist extremism, see Section 1.3.
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How many people can be tied to the activities?
How can these people be described?
What circles and surroundings do the activities take place in?
What is required in order to conduct the activities?
What intent3 and capability4 to conduct security-threatening activities are
these people assessed to have at present?
While there are various views and perspectives on what violence-promoting Islamist extremism means, it must be emphasized that this report presents the Swedish Security Service’s view of violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden.
Radicalisation is also a concept that can be interpreted in many different ways and
thereby easily gives rise to misunderstanding. This report refers solely to violencepromoting radicalisation.5 The Security Service judges central elements in radicalisation processes to be relatively similar, regardless of the ideological context in
which a person is radicalised. Consequently, some of the radicalisation processes,
as well as tools and strategies for combating radicalisation, will be discussed in general terms.
The questions prepared and answered in the report concerning the second and
third points of the assignment are:
What general mechanisms affect radicalisation?
How can typical radicalisation processes be described?
What is the situation with regard to radicalisation in violence-promoting
Islamist circles in Sweden?
How can people who are radicalised in these circles be described?
What examples of prior experiences from Sweden and other countries are there
in terms of preventing and countering radicalisation?
What requests and proposals for measures are there from a stakeholder perspective6 and a professional perspective7?
What tools and strategies does the Security Service consider to be most suitable to prevent and counter radicalisation, based on the description provided
in this report?
1.2Method
This report is based on systematic processing and analysis of information and knowledge that was available to the Security Service. Much of the materials and methods
3
4
5
6
Intent means the will and intention of a player (a person or a group) to carry out a certain act.
Capability refers to what is required for a player to realise his or her intent.
For further discussion and the Security Service’s definition of radicalisation, see Section 1.4.4.
The stakeholder perspective refers to representatives of Muslim interests and individual practicing Muslims. For a
more in-depth description, see Section 1.2.3.
7 The professional perspective refers to individuals who can contribute relevant knowledge and experience based on
their professional practice. For a more in-depth description, see Section 1.2.3.
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are protected by secrecy, which means that it is not possible for external reviewers
to examine the method and the reliability of the conclusions. That said, the materials and method will be described as clearly and in as much detail as possible.
1.2.1Material
The report is based on two main kinds of material. The description of violencepromoting Islamist extremism as well as radicalisation and radicalisation processes
of violence-promoting Islamist circles in Sweden is largely based on the Security
Service’s own information and assessments. The Service’s information gathering
was not expanded on the basis of the Government assignment, but rather the report builds on analyses of existing material gathered using regular methods and
in the scope of the Service’s ordinary activities. No source references are provided
for these parts of the material. The remaining questions in the report are answered
with the help of information from publicly available sources and information that
came forth in the Security Service’s external collaboration (see Section 1.2.3).
In terms of the Security Service’s material, focus was on 2009. This means that all
relevant information from 2009 is included in the material the report is based on,
while information from earlier and later years is included insofar as it is relevant
to the context. The picture given in the report was based on 2009 in order to balance the need for an up-to-date picture against operational considerations (such
as investigation secrecy). For information to be made public, it also had to be sufficiently processed and analysed to enable adequate assessment, which often requires some time to have elapsed.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are based mainly on the Security Service’s own material. This
material primarily consists of information gathered directly from security-threatening activities, i.e. not second or third-hand information. It was also extremely
important to the Security Service that the information that was to form the basis
of the report was to the furthest possible extent corroborated by information from
various independent sources. Consequently, information may be lacking that could
be relevant, but which due to time limitations could not be processed sufficiently
to enable confirmation or an assessment of reliability. As a whole, these considerations are deemed to increase the relevance of the material to suit the purpose of the
report and to answer the questions posed for the report.
Considering the fact that the activities presented primarily come from a single year,
the question arises as to how representative the material is over time. The report
describes the activities of a very limited number of people. These people do not
represent a random sample either, but rather are included because they figure in
the Security Service’s monitoring based on suspicions of participation in securitythreatening activities. Consequently, analysing trends in a statistical sense is not
meaningful, but the Security Service believes that the security-threatening activities conducted in 2009 did not generally differ from previous years. Moreover, there
are unavoidable hidden statistics in these contexts. However, the Security Service
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judges that the hidden statistics in this case are insignificant relative to the number
of known players. The total number of individuals in Sweden who are active in violence-promoting Islamist extremism is estimated at a few hundred, which means
that the material, consisting of nearly of 200 people, represents a significant part of
the estimated total number of players. In summary, the Security Service’s material
is judged to be highly relevant since it is comprised of primary sources and includes
a large proportion of those involved in this kind of security-threatening activity.
The report also contains information from publicly available sources. These are
mainly reports from other public agencies and organisations, as well as books and
articles in the research fields of Islamology, terrorism, radicalisation, political violence and social movements, to name a few. Direct source references in the text
clearly indicate what information, assessments and proposals are gathered from
this kind of source. The research presented in the report is, however, to be viewed
as a small illustrative selection from a number of very extensive areas, rather than
as a comprehensive review of them. This material forms the primary basis of the
theoretical discussion of radicalisation in Chapter 2 and the examples and proposals in Chapter 6 of how radicalisation can be countered and prevented. The relevance of this material cannot be considered to be as high as the Security Service’s
own information since it is mainly comprised of “secondary sources”, which means
the interpretations of other public agencies and researchers rather than unprocessed information. In addition, a large proportion of this information is relatively
abstract and does not specifically concern Swedish conditions. Because this material should accordingly be viewed as less relevant, the conclusions drawn on the
basis of it are not as clear and reliable as those based on the Security Service’s own
information.
1.2.2 Processing of Security Service material
The material that consists of the Security Service’s own information was compiled
using a multiple-step selection process. In an initial step, the Service’s information
system was systematically searched using a number of keywords to identify activities that are indicative of violent Islamist extremism. The matches generated by the
search were then qualitatively processed. The information deemed to be relevant to
the assignment was checked against information on civil registration and degree of
involvement in violence-promoting activities. As a result of this, the basic information only includes individuals with a Swedish personal identity number and a registered Swedish address and who engaged in violence-promoting Islamist extremism
in 2009 according to Security Service information that was corroborated to the
furthest possible extent. The requirement of a connection to Sweden only slightly
reduces the sample size, since nearly all the individuals involved in violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden are Swedes. To conclude, Security Service
employees not involved in the selection process carried out a qualitative review of
the results with the aim of increasing the reliability of the material’s delimitation.
The systematic selection process, the various quality controls and the involvement
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of several employees in various stages of the process and in the assessment work all
contribute to relatively high reliability in the processing of the material.
In summary, the Security Service’s information constitutes relevant material for
the questions concerning the empirical description of violence-promoting Islamist
extremism and radicalisation in Sweden. The material was then processed using a
reliable selection process. The conclusions drawn based on this material – which
are mainly presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 – are therefore deemed to have a high
degree of reliability, although this reliability cannot be extended too far into the
future.
1.2.3External collaboration
As a part of the method, the Security Service chose to cooperate with organisations,
authorities and researchers. This collaboration was conducted along two parallel
lines with the aim of obtaining both a stakeholder perspective and a professional
perspective on the content of the assignment. The proposals made from a stakeholder as well as a professional perspective with regard to tools and strategies to
counter radicalisation are also in line with the empirical evidence presented by the
Security Service. The external perspectives thereby strengthen the reliability of the
conclusions of the report.
For the stakeholder perspective, special meetings were held where this assignment
was discussed with representatives of Muslim interests and individual practicing
Muslims. Since representatives for Swedish Muslims are often drawn into the public debate regarding violence-promoting Islamist extremism, and to some extent
are also held responsible for this, the Security Service is of the opinion that it is not
only natural but also important that they be given the opportunity to express their
views of the problems addressed in the assignment.
Altogether, 25 meetings of this kind were held, and the number of participants
at each meeting varied from one to seven people. In addition to all national associations for practicing Muslims, the Security Service spoke with representatives of
Muslim associations in various parts of the country and a small number of private
individuals. The meetings took place as part of the Security Service’s outreach activities which involve regular meetings with people on various topics. When opinions and perceptions arising from these meetings are presented in the report, this is
clearly indicated in the text, but the people involved remain anonymous. A special
compilation of the proposals and requests put forward in the discussions regarding
prevention efforts and possibilities of countering radicalisation is presented in Section 6.2.1.
The professional perspective was obtained largely through a workshop on violencepromoting Islamist extremism arranged by the Security Service on 24 September 2010.
The participants were people who, through their professional practice, could contribute relevant experience and knowledge on these issues from a broad perspective. The
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invited researchers represented such disciplines as sociology, psychology, political
science, law, intellectual and scientific history, religious science, social anthropology and social psychology. The participants also included community police, crime
prevention workers, psychologists and representatives of organisations that help
people leave violence-promoting groups. In total, 21 invited individuals participated in the workshop. The opinions put forward in the workshop guided the remaining work on the report and are compiled in Section 6.2.2 in the form of requests
and proposals of how radicalisation can be countered.
For the Security Service, the collaboration along these two lines was very valuable
and undoubtedly contributed to improving the report. The requests and proposals
presented in Section 6.2 are, however, based on the outlook of those involved and
are not necessary shared by the Security Service. Including proposals other than
just those backed by the Security Service is significant since this highlights the differences in opinion and perspective that somewhat characterise the debate about
these issues. None of the participants in this collaboration process were given the
opportunity to study the contents of the report in written form during the course
of the work. Consequently, they have not had the opportunity to state an opinion
on the text and are therefore in no way responsible for it. The Security Service is the
sole responsible party for the information, assessments and conclusions presented.
1.3The Security Service’s remit
Pursuant to Section 2 of the Ordinance with Instructions for the Security Service
(2002:1050), the Security Service is tasked with leading and conducting police activities within the National Police Board with the aim of preventing and exposing
crimes against national security and with combating terrorism. This means that
the Service has a responsibility to prevent, and, where appropriate, investigate certain crimes, such as terrorist crimes. In order to carry out the responsibility to
investigate these crimes, the Service has policing powers. The most central part of
this responsibility is, however, that the Service is to prevent violations of national security and terrorist crimes. Consequently, the Service’s remit includes monitoring violence-promoting Islamist extremism, since this constitutes a securitythreatening activity that can lead to terrorist crimes being committed.
1.3.1 Preventing crime
The emphasis in the Security Service’s operations is on preventing violations of
national security and terrorist crimes. The consequence of a strongly preventive
focus is that in the Service’s security intelligence work it is not always as easy to
see clear connections to concrete crimes or to criminal activity as it is with other
police authorities.
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An important part of the Security Service’s prevention efforts is to ensure that
Sweden does not become a refuge for those who can conceivably constitute a threat
to security. The Service therefore functions as a consultation body for the Swedish
Migration Board and other public agencies concerned with visa, residence permit
and naturalisation applications. Based on what is known about a foreign citizen’s
background, contacts and activities, the Service comments on whether that individual may constitute a security risk. These comments can either be made at the
request of the public agency in question or on the Service’s own initiative if there is
information to indicate that a certain individual is on the way to or already in Sweden. If the Service believes that a particular person constitutes a threat to security,
an objection is made to that person’s application. However, the final decision is not
made by the Security Service. The Service objected to 11 of the asylum applications
and naturalisation applications reviewed in 2008 and 10 applications in 2009. In
both cases, this corresponds to approximately 0.02 per cent of the total number of
asylum and naturalisation applications for those years.
Since 2003, the Security Service has also conducted preventive work in the form
of outreach activities.8 The aim is to establish direct contact and build trusting
relationships between the Service and strategically important players on the local
level over the long term. Another way of conducting prevention efforts is by trying
to reduce the potential recruitment base for violence-promoting individuals and
networks by providing information. By making factual information available to the
media, the Service aims to show what risks are associated with, for instance, travel
to an area of conflict to join an armed extremist group, and thereby hopes to be
able to reach out to such prospective travellers and their families.
The Security Service also holds voluntary talks with individuals, often adolescents,
at risk of being drawn into security-threatening activities. Those called to these
talks are not suspected of any crimes. The talks are a part of the prevention work
and are intended to provide information about current legislation and what risks
that individual would be exposed to by continuing with a certain activity. This can
also involve talking to someone so as to be able to dismiss information received as
erroneous. Sometimes, talks are also held with family members and other relatives
of individuals who are at risk of being pulled into security-threatening activities,
since relatives have better chances of influencing the person in question and his or
her behaviour. These talks are also hoped to function as a first step for individuals
who wish to leave violence-promoting circles.
In order to effectively prevent crime, the Security Service also conducts security intelligence operations. This is done through targeted gathering, processing, analysis
and communication of information, with the intention of preparing threat and
vulnerability assessments. These assessments are then used to underpin decisions
enabling the Service or other public agencies to take action to prevent or disrupt
criminal or security-threatening activities.
8
For a more detailed description of the Security Service’s outreach activities, see Section 6.1.1.
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1.3.2 Investigating crime
If there is reason to believe that a crime subject to public prosecution has been
committed, an investigation shall be initiated pursuant to Chapter 23, Section 1, of the Code of Judicial Procedure. The investigation establishes who can
be reasonably suspected of the crime, if there are sufficient grounds for prosecution and, if so, the investigation prepares the case for the main proceedings
in court. Violence-promoting Islamist extremism is, however, not a crime classification in itself, but a kind of security-threatening activity that in certain cases can be criminal, but need not necessarily be so. However, these activities
may constitute a crime in the planning stage, such as preparation or conspiracy
to commit terrorism under the Act on Criminal Responsibility for Terrorist Offences (2003:148). It may also be a crime under the Act on Criminal Responsibility for the Financing of Particularly Serious Crime in Some Cases, etc. (2002:444).
The current Swedish Act on Criminal Responsibility for Terrorist Offences dates
from 2003 and is based on the definition of terrorist offences common to all EU
member states. In order to be classified as a terrorist offence, Section 2 of the Act
requires that the crime9 can seriously damage a state or an international organisation, and is carried out for any of the following purposes:
1.
2.
3.
To seriously intimidate a population or a section of a population
To unduly compel a public body or an international organisation to take or abstain from taking a measure
To seriously destabilise or destroy fundamental political, constitutional,
economic or social structures in a state or an international organisation.
The Financing Act, which also covers the financing of terrorist offences, entered
into effect in 2002. It is based on a UN convention adopted by the General Assembly
in 1999.10 At the time of writing this report, 11 people have been prosecuted either
for offences against the Act on Criminal Responsibility for Terrorist Offences or
for offences against the Act on Criminal Responsibility for the Financing of Particularly Serious Crime in Some Cases, etc.
On 21 April 2010, the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) passed the Government bill
regarding penal measures to prevent terrorism (Bill 2009/10:78). This means that
the existing terrorist legislation will be supplemented by a new Act to enter into
effect on 1 December 2010.11 This Act is based on two previous international agree9
Actions that may constitute terrorist offences under Section 3 of the Act on Criminal Responsibility for Terrorist Offences include murder, manslaughter, aggravated assault, kidnapping, unlawful deprivation of liberty, gross infliction
of damage, arson and grave arson, devastation endangering the public, sabotage and gross sabotage, hijacking
and maritime or aviation sabotage, airport sabotage, spreading poison or contagion, unauthorised dealing with
chemical weapons, and wilful weapons offences.
10 International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism (1999). The Convention entered into effect
on 10 April 2002.
11 The Act on Criminal Responsibility for Public Provocation, Recruitment and Training concerning Terrorist Offences
and other Particularly Serious Crimes (2010:299).
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ments: the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism and the
most recent Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, from 2008. The
objective is to prevent terrorism to a greater extent by declaring as criminal offences actions that can typically lead to the commission of terrorist offences, namely
public provocation and recruitment to terrorism, and training for terrorism (Bill
2009/10:78, p. 11). The new Act is assessed to encompass a wider range of activities,
which will be punishable at an earlier stage. Penal liability will be set by precedence. However, the constitutionally protected freedom of the press and freedom
of speech are not affected by the new Act, as is especially emphasized in the preparatory documents to the Act (Bill 2009/10:78, p. 28).
1.4Terminology discussions and delimitations
This section is intended to create a common starting point for the report by presenting the Security Service’s view of the terminology that constitutes the main focus
under the Government assignment: violence-promoting, extremism, Islamism and
radicalisation. In exceptional cases, these terms are used in the report with a different meaning than the Service’s, such as in references to literature or discussions
where people may have a different view of the meaning of a term. Through the
discussion of these terms, it becomes clear what delimitations apply to the report,
i.e. what phenomena will not be discussed.
1.4.1“Violence-promoting”
The Security Service uses the adjective “violence-promoting” to distinguish actions
and activities that may be a threat to security, such as supporting or participating
in ideologically motivated acts of violence, from those that are not violence-promoting, but may be problematic from other perspectives. The latter category covers,
for instance, antidemocratic actions such as not recognising the equal worth of all
people, allbeit without using or supporting violence. These actions are nonetheless
a problem for those affected, as well as for society in general. However, they are
not a matter for the Security Service, which in this context only has a mandate to
monitor activities that are or may develop into security threats. In accordance with
both the Service’s general remit and the Government’s specific assignment, only
violence-promoting activities are discussed in this report.
The term “violence-promoting” can be used to describe both the content of certain
material (such as a speech, a text or a film) and people’s behaviour. If material
is described as violence-promoting, it means that the contents of the material do
not only indicate an acceptance of the use of violence, but also support the use of
ideologically motivated violence to promote a cause. When the Security Service
describes an individual as violence-promoting, it means that this individual is repeatedly assessed to have exhibited behaviour that not only accepts the use of violence, but also supports or engages in ideologically motivated violence to promote a
cause. Being violence-promoting should not be confused with being violence-prone;
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violence-promoting behaviour may entail long-term support of violent actions committed by others, even though the individual himself never engages in violence.
1.4.2“Extremism”
The words “extreme” and “extremism” can be used in several different ways, often
to indicate something or someone that is on the far end of a hypothetical scale – an
extreme. The Security Service uses the word “extremism” to describe movements,
ideologies or individuals that do not accept a democratic social order. Some of
them use or support violence to steer society in a different direction. The Security
Service’s mandate and responsibility only encompasses the latter, smaller category.
Violence-promoting extremism occurs in both political and religious ideologies. The
Security Service currently monitors violence-promoting extremism in white power
circles12 and autonomous circles13, as well as violence-promoting extremism of a
nationalist, separatist or Islamist nature. The Government assignment is limited to
the issue of violence-promoting Islamist extremism. However, violence-promoting
extremism in white power circles and autonomous movements were described in
an earlier report jointly authored by the National Council for Crime Prevention
and the Security Service (National Council for Crime Prevention & Security Service
2009).
1.4.3“Islamism”
The adjective “Islamist” has its root in the word “Islamism” – in contrast to Islamic,
which is formed from the word “Islam”. Islamism is often used to differentiate
between those who adhere to Islam and consider themselves to be Muslims and
those who support a view where Islam is perceived as an entire social order and
thereby includes political perspectives. The latter are often called Islamists (Hjärpe
2004, p. 100). However, the term has been criticised for having major similarities
to the word Islam, which has led some in society to recommend instead the term
Muslim extremism, with the aim of shifting focus from the religion to the perpetrators behind the acts.
The term Islamism is also problematic because it is often used as a collective name
for all the political ideologies based on Islam, although these often exhibit significant differences. Among individuals and groups that identify themselves as Islamists are those who accept and are politically active in existing parliamentary
systems, as well as those who entirely distance themselves from secular political
systems, and the entire scale in between. Among Islamists, there is likewise a whole
12 The white power movement comprises organisations, networks, groups and individuals with extreme right and
racist views that have proven themselves prepared to use threats or violence to achieve their political objectives,
i.e. primarily an ethnically homogeneous Sweden.
13 The autonomous movement comprises networks, groups and individuals with anti-democratic, extreme left views
that have proven to be prepared to use threats or violence to achieve their political objectives, a society without a
government apparatus or a market economy.
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range of individuals and groups, from those who entirely reject violence to those
who commit violent acts as means to an end.
“Islamism” and “Islamist” can, in other words, refer to widely varying activities
and ideologies, a large number of which have no violence-promoting element at all
and are consequently not of interest to this report or the Security Service’s activities in general. There are also examples of Islamist movements that turn to violence
to achieve their objectives, but do so only in a local or regional arena. These thereby
differ crucially from violence-promoting Islamist extremist networks with a global
agenda. These locally and regionally-focused movements will not be discussed in
this report.
Instead, the report focuses on violence-promoting Islamist extremism that is generally motivated and justified using arguments and ideas that have seen a global
spread in the past decade. According to these ideas, Islam is under attack from
both Western countries and from what are perceived as corrupt Muslim leaders
who do not represent the interpretation of Islam that the advocates of these ideas
consider to be the only true interpretation. Influential ideologues and leaders of
terrorist networks therefore encourage Muslims the world over to defend their religion from the perceived attack. This defence is often presented as a global fight to
introduce widespread Islamist governance by toppling the Muslim regimes believed
to be corrupt and throwing out all Western presence (primarily military presence)
from Muslim countries.
Another key component is that the fight to defend Islam is not necessarily limited
to specific locations or even specific enemies, but rather can be fought on multiple
levels in parallel. This is how, for instance, terrorist attacks against civilian targets
outside conflict zones are justified. In an interview broadcast on the al-Jazeera TV
channel just prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Osama bin Laden illustrated this
mindset by depicting entire categories of people as enemies and thereby as legitimate targets:
”…any of the hypocrites in Iraq, or Arab rulers who have helped America in their murder of
Muslims in Iraq, anyone who approved of their actions and followed them into this Crusader
war by fighting with them or providing bases or administrative support, or any other kind of
backing, should be aware that they are apostates who are outside the community of Islam; it is
therefore permitted to take their money and their blood.” (Aaron 2008, p. 80).
These fundamental ideas and perceptions are then used and developed in various
ways in various contexts. In this report, Islamism as a term or ideology will not
be discussed in more detail. As a police service tasked with preventing and combating terrorism, the Security Service’s focus is on the security-threatening activities and individuals in Sweden, not on the arguments and ideas used to motivate and
justify these activities. In light of what is known regarding the majority of the
individuals whose activities form the basis of this report, the Security Service also
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shares the view presented in a British report (Bartlett, Birdwell & King 2010). There,
the authors claim that the ideology as such can only partially explain why certain
individuals begin to promote violence. This does not mean that the ideology lacks
significance. All it means is that a person’s support for a certain school of Islamist
thought does not by definition imply that the person will support or use violence.
1.4.4“Radicalisation”
Use of the term “radicalisation” has increased substantially in the 2000s. However,
since there is no recognised and generally accepted definition, it is still a disputed
concept (Neumann 2008, p. 3). One reason that the concept of radicalisation can be
perceived as vague is that some users see it as inherently violence-promoting, while
others see it as describing a broader phenomenon. When radicalisation is perceived
as a broader phenomenon, this is often because radicalisation that does not promote violence is seen as a first step towards violence-promoting radicalisation (see
e.g. Ranstorp & Dos Santos 2009).
Applying an excessively broad definition of radicalisation, including an anti-democratic but not violence-promoting behaviour, would mean that a large number of
people could be labelled as radicalised, even though many would never participate
in or even support violence. In order to keep measures intended to reduce radicalisation from having the opposite effect, radical beliefs expressed in ways that do
not promote violence should be treated as social problems, not as security problems
(Bartlett, Birdwell & King 2010, pp. 7, 14).
For the Security Service, the concept of radicalisation is limited by the same factors
that govern the rest of our work: preventing security-threatening activities. Accordingly, radicalisation that is not violence-promoting is not a part of this report
or the Service’s day-to-day activities. The Service has therefore come up with a
stricter definition of radicalisation: the process leading to an individual or a group
supporting or engaging in ideologically motivated violence as a method of promoting their cause. Unless otherwise indicated, this meaning of radicalisation applies
when the Security Service uses the term.
1.5Structure
This introduction is followed by a chapter that presents theoretical reasoning on
the issue of why people become radicalised. This includes both a discussion of general mechanisms that affect radicalisation and a presentation of typical paths to
radicalisation.
Chapter 3 describes in general terms the individuals who become radicalised in a
violence-promoting Islamist context in Sweden. Four main radicalisation processes
are then presented as well as the significance of external factors to radicalisation
processes in Sweden.
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Chapter 4 describes the security-threatening activities conducted in Sweden by
people who underwent a radicalisation process. It begins with a description of the
aim of the activities and how they are motivated, which is followed by a presentation of commonly occurring actions. After that, networks, functions and roles are
described. The active individuals themselves as well as their circles and practical
considerations are also described in this chapter, which is concluded by a brief international view.
Chapter 5 begins with a description of the intent and capability of the players (individuals or groups) whose activities form the basis of the report. A number of factors
are then described that are deemed to influence the intent and capability of these
players. Finally, the current threat assessment concerning terrorism targeting Sweden and Swedish interests is presented briefly.
Giving a variety of examples, Chapter 6 provides a presentation of earlier measures
to counter radicalisation and violence-promoting extremism in Sweden and internationally. This is followed by a review of proposals and requests for measures presented from a stakeholder as well as from a professional perspective in the Security
Service’s external collaboration. The chapter is concluded with proposals of how
society can prevent and counter radicalisation.
The last chapter of the report provides some reflection on radicalisation and violence-promoting Islamist extremism based on the main conclusions of the report.
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2 Why people become radicalised
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Radicalisation is no new phenomenon, but rather something that has been a cyclical occurrence in various ideological contexts, at least since the end of the 19th
century.14 However, it has been increasingly used as a term in the past decade by
researchers, politicians and journalists in both Sweden and other European countries. In spite of this, there is no agreement on a common definition of the term
“radicalisation”, or even a common perception of the radicalisation process and
the causes behind the phenomenon (Kühle & Lindekilde 2010, p. 22). This means
that the public debate on radicalisation and its underlying causes is complex and
characterised by misunderstanding since different speakers often have completely
different perspectives.15
This chapter discusses the issue of why people become radicalised. Most of the
chapter consists of fundamental, theoretical reasoning on radicalisation and radicalisation processes, which is mainly gathered from research and literature in the
field. There is also a presentation of four typical radicalisation paths or processes in
violence-promoting extremism, which have been defined by the National Council
for Crime Prevention and the Security Service, based on empirical material, and
supported by research (National Council for Crime Prevention & Security Service
2009).
2.1Radicalisation – a social process
A summary of what is currently known about radicalisation16 shows that there is
no unambiguous answer to how and why radicalisation occurs but that significant
similarities between radicalisation processes in different ideological contexts can
nonetheless be identified. Similarities can be seen in the push and pull factors that
affect radicalisation as well as in certain phases during the radicalisation process.
These similarities are rooted in the fact that the main reason that some young
people seek out extremism in different forms often involves social and emotional
causes, rather than the ideological content. They have also given rise to four typical
radicalisation routes that are presented in Section 2.2 and are based on experiences
from political as well as religious extremism.
At the same time, researchers disagree on a number of factors, such as whether the
crucial reasons why a person is pulled into criminality or security-threatening activities are internal or can be found in factors in his or her surroundings. Likewise,
the possibility and the potential benefit of being able to identify a common personality type, characteristic or background for people who are radicalised are discussed. Moreover, attempts to divide radicalisation processes into distinct stages or
phases have failed to establish how many phases there would be, what they would
involve, and what makes a person move from one phase to the next.
14 For a more detailed description of these routes into radicalisation, see Chapter 7.
15 For the Security Service’s view and definition of the concept of radicalisation, see Section 1.4.4.
16 This report does not aspire to be a comprehensive review of radicalisation literature, but gives a basic introduction
only.
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2.1.1 Push and pull factors
Similarities between radicalisation processes in various ideological contexts are
found among push factors (i.e. the conditions of the person or in the person’s own
life that can increase the likelihood of radicalisation) and pull factors (i.e. the conditions in the group in question or in the ideological context that can increase the
likelihood of radicalisation). Push and pull factors exist on different levels, ranging
from a person’s feelings and characteristics to events on a global level. It is important to remember that neither push nor pull factors give rise to radicalisation
per se. They function more as risk factors that enable a person to become radicalised, although this far from always happens. They can also be described as examples of factors that are necessary but that are not the sole explanation for why a
person ends up in violence-promoting extremism (Sageman 2004, p.135).
Examples of push factors:
Perceived global injustices
Perceived oppression (of ethnic group, country or religion)
Discrimination (of oneself or others)
Marginalisation (of oneself or others)
Identity-seeking or difficulties to combine different identities
Seeking meaning
Difficult or destructive family circumstances
Societal involvement
Personal trauma or tragedy
Fascination with violence
Seeking excitement
Low self-esteem
Desire to make a difference
Frustration over inadequacy of democratic channels.
Examples of pull factors:
Sense of power or control
Significance or status in the group
Social intercourse or friendship
Sense of belonging
Meaningfulness
Clear life rules to live by
Security
Attractive ideological arguments
Loyalty among the group’s members
Conviction that one stands for what is right and fights evil
Sense of adventure
Respect.
These experiences and feelings are not unique to those who choose to support or
commit violent acts, but rather are shared by many people. However, there must
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be interaction between these and other factors for someone to become violencepromoting. Some believe that radical Islamist movements that do not promote violence are also a gateway to violence-promoting extremism (Husain 2007). However,
a British report on the difference between radicalisation that promotes violence
and radicalisation that does not do so states that the radicalisation processes of
individuals convicted of terrorism were far from always a natural progression from
having radical views to promoting violence. What distinguished those who began
promoting violence was instead that their radicalisation process was characterised
by a culture of violence, group pressure and a code of honour in the group where
violence was a way to achieve higher status (Bartlett, Birdwell & King 2010, p. 12).
The significance and the relative weighting of various push and pull factors also
vary between different individuals. For some, the ideological push factors – mainly
a longing for activism, whether social, political or religious – are of key importance.
These individuals often play a leading role in the violence-promoting movements
and many establish their own networks. In his studies of violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Europe, Norwegian researcher Petter Nesser therefore calls
these individuals entrepreneurs. Most individuals who are active in violence-promoting extremist networks – the supporters – appear, however, to begin promoting
violence through a more passive process. This rarely includes an active choice to
get involved, but may instead be based on personal problems, a search for identity,
loyalty to friends and relatives, alienation and a lack of alternatives, adventure and
juvenile rebellion (Nesser 2010, p. 88). The common denominator of white-power
movements, autonomous networks, violence-promoting Islamist groups, criminal
youth gangs, football hooligans and, to some extent, religious sects is that they can
all offer some kind of affirmation, protection, sense of belonging and adrenaline
kicks (Odén 2008, p. 6).
2.1.2 Why do some become active and not others?
For several decades, research on activism and social movements has tried to answer
the question of why some people choose to become active while others – the majority – choose not to. A fundamental prerequisite for activism is what researchers
call biographical availability. This is defined as a lack of commitments and obligations that infringe on the time that a person could otherwise devote to involvement
in a group or a movement. Such commitments may, for instance, be full-time employment, marriage and family obligations. Consequently, the individuals having
the greatest biographical availability are young people, which is a group that is also
dominant among activists (Olesen 2009, pp. 7, 10–11).
Social ties to people who are already active are what several researchers point out
as being central to activism in general (Olesen 2009) and to radicalisation and affiliation with violence-promoting extremist groups in particular. In a comparison
between studies of Christian revivalist movements, ultra-left terrorist groups in
Germany and Italy and Islamist movements in Egypt, it was noted that all these
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groups grow through social networks. Initially, the network is more significant
than the ideology (Sageman 2004, pp. 126–135).
Accordingly, it is social ties to friends, family, colleagues or other acquaintances
that are often the reason that people are pulled into violence-promoting extremist
groups. Commitment and a sense of obligation towards the group are initially established by these ties rather than by a strong devotion to the ideology (Atran 2010,
p. 4; Bartlett, Birdwell & King 2010, p. 20). As Magnus Ranstorp puts it: the recruitment process occasionally precedes the actual radicalisation process (Ranstorp
2010, p. 7). The radicalisation process can in turn be described as a type of socialisation process (National Council for Crime Prevention & Security Service 2009, p.
145). The realisation that the ties between people in violence-promoting extremist
circles are primarily social, or at least were social from the beginning, is significant
to the understanding of radicalisation as such. This realisation is also significant
to how preventive and counteractive measures should be designed for maximum
effect.
A common notion is that radicalisation and recruitment to violence-promoting Islamist extremism takes place through special emissaries for organisations. However,
researchers point out that radicalisation in the Western World is instead often a
horizontal phenomenon that spreads among friends, rather than a vertical one
going down from leaders through hierarchical organisations (Atran 2010, p. 3). In
a study of 172 violence-promoting Islamist extremists, Marc Sageman notes that
three fourths of them either had social ties to somebody already involved in the
extremist group, or became involved together with friends or relatives (Sageman
2004, p. 113). This has similarities to other violence-promoting circles, where it has
been noted, for example, that young people with siblings or other relatives around
them who are members of criminal gangs run a substantially greater risk than
others of being pulled into criminal networks themselves (SOU 2010:15, p. 52). Accordingly, the likelihood that a person will accept radical ideas depends largely on
the extent to which friends or relatives do so and the extent to which these people
are perceived as role models (Bartlett, Birdwell & King 2010, p. 12).
This means that there are many more people who share the feelings and experiences that may constitute risk factors for radicalisation than are actually radicalised
(see Section 2.1.1). A crucial instigating factor is that, regardless of how receptive a
person is to a certain message, it must be presented by somebody, preferably somebody the person already trusts. The importance of existing social ties applies to an
even higher degree to “high-risk activism”, i.e. activism that entails substantial
risks to the participants (such as risk of injury or imprisonment). Groups involved
in high-risk activism, such as violence-promoting extremism, cannot always openly
recruit members in the same way as activist movements that do not promote violence do. Security awareness among the high-risk activists also means that in their
recruitment process they mainly make use of networks based on well-established
trust. (Olesen 2009, p. 15).
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2.1.3 Significance of the group
Most researchers believe that most radicals are radicalised as a part of a collective.
Collectives are most often small and informal groups or gangs of friends with members from the same school, youth centre, workplace, sports club or some other social forum (including internet forums). This means that the choice to support and
participate in acts of violence is rarely an individual choice, but very often linked
to participation in a network of friends. This is true to an even greater extent if the
friendship is initially activity-oriented, which can be illustrated by the fact that a
surprisingly large proportion of the young people who are radicalised are teammates in a sports context (della Porta 2009, p. 16; Atran 2010, pp. 3, 7).
A question often posed within criminological research is to what extent interaction with criminals is a cause or an effect of a person’s own criminality. There are
many indications that it is a matter of a mutual effect, meaning that the criminally
inclined seek out like-minded people and that socialising in criminal circles reinforces the individual’s will and ability to commit crime (SOU 2010:15, p. 53). In
many cases, there is also an internal code of honour or behaviour under which
those who exhibit the most violent tendencies enjoy the highest status (Bartlett,
Birdwell & King 2010, p. 32).
Within criminal circles and groups involved in high-risk activism or other clandestine activities, the ties between the members are often very strong and of an
emotional nature. Individuals who are active in various kinds of violence-promoting extremist groups often describe the other group members as a second family
or a brotherhood (Olesen 2009, p. 16). For those who are on the verge of joining
a violence-promoting group, it may also be difficult to resist the attraction of the
intensive friendship ties formed there (which are almost comparable to the bonds
of friendship between comrades-in-arms). This is especially true if the person feels
isolated from the rest of society at the time. These strong bonds between the members of the group also offer an alternative explanation to why people can use violence against strangers; most people are generally prepared to go to further lengths
based on the love of someone close than on the hate of an outsider. This underlying
motivation behind acts of terrorism, from the individual perpetrator’s perspective,
could then be described as love of one’s own group rather than hate of others
(Sageman 2004, pp. 135, 155–156).
The same feelings of loyalty and closeness are basically what keep people from
quitting once they have joined a group (Sageman 2004, p. 155). Many members
of extremist groups do not have lives beyond this context, but rather are isolated
and have no ties to outsiders (Olesen 2009, p. 16). The official Swedish Government
report on criminal groupings refers to conversations with former gang members
that revealed that life together with criminal friends can sometimes be described
as a drug addiction (SOU 2010:15, p. 134). Consequently, the same inner drive to
want to get out of crime is needed as is necessary to quit substance abuse. The drug
comparison is also used in a French study of Islamist radicalisation (Beski-Chafiq et
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al. 2010, p. 22) where one of the interview subjects describes the origin of radicalisation as follows: “A radical, it’s like a drug addict. It’s the match of a product, an
individual and an environment.”
2.1.4 Significance of ideology
Based on what has been established in this section so far, it is easy to get the impression that the ideological context within which a person is radicalised is not
important at all. This is not the case, however: the ideology plays a significant
role in radicalisation, but is not the decisive factor for the majority of those who
become radicalised. One of the fundamental conditions for a person to become
radicalised is, however, that there are violence-promoting ideologies – or rather
ideologues – in the person’s surroundings or which they come into contact with
on the internet. In a study conducted by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC)
in the United Kingdom, it was initially confirmed that there was no clear pattern
in terms of background factors (such as population density and proportion of the
population with a Muslim cultural background) that distinguished the cities in
which violence-promoting Islamist extremism existed from cities in which it did
not exist. However, it was found that, in all cities that had violence-promoting Islamist extremism, there was also a clear influence from charismatic leaders (Cilluffo,
Cozzens & Ranstorp 2010, p. 31).
However, it does not matter much to the radicalisation process as a whole which
violence-promoting ideology is involved. A black-and-white, uncompromising view
of the world is a central element of all ideologies that can inspire radicalisation. According to these ideologies, the world is divided up into those who represent what
is right and those who represent evil through their unacceptable lifestyles. The
ideological components of the radicalisation process are largely based on emotional
allusions to the fight between good and evil, where all means are acceptable in the
fight for the good. In order for the ideological indoctrination to work, it is usually
necessary that the person introduced to violence-promoting reasoning with the
aim of him or her being radicalised lacks the knowledge or the courage necessary
to question the reasoning (Bartlett, Birdwell & King 2010, p. 31; Ranstorp 2010, p.
7; Atran 2010, p. 6).
Besides violence-promoting ideologies, radicalisation also requires a lack of distractions (such as social activities that take time or attention) or alternative sources of
information in the form of good and knowledgeable role models. Such role models
can be family members or others perceived to be authority figures (Bartlett, Birdwell & King 2010, pp. 33–34). However, an actual lack of alternative voices is not a
requirement. According to della Porta, a person or group can obtain an altered view
of the world through the interaction of two factors: affective focusing and cognitive
closure (della Porta 2009, p. 18). When a person focuses all of his or her feelings
on a small group of people, it is ultimately only the members of the group and the
message conveyed there that the person dares to trust. The more the affective focusing increases, the greater the cognitive closure to alternative messages.
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Changes in a person’s world view often coincide with increasing isolation from the
surrounding society. This is justified by the dangers of subjecting oneself to false
doctrines because only one’s own group is seen as representing the right ideological interpretation. This is how alternative world views are developed, regardless
of whether it involves ultra-left movements in the 1970s or Islamist groups in the
2000s. These views rest on distinct gaps between right and wrong, and between
those who have the right answers (one’s own group) and the unenlightened with
distorted views (everyone else) (Olesen 2009, p. 14). This phenomenon can to some
extent also be described using the term “group-think”, which is commonly used
as an explanation of why bad decisions are sometimes made in some situations. It
involves a group of like-minded people in an enclosed context discussing and affirming each other’s views with no critical thinking whatsoever. This often ends up
with the group adopting a more extreme position than before the beginning of the
discussion (Bartlett & Miller 2010, p. 24).
The occurrence of conspiracy theories in extremist circles is also a factor that can
further reinforce the radicalisation process and the process of isolation from the
rest of society, according to a recently published British report (Bartlett & Miller
2010). Conspiracy theories worsen the malicious view of “the others” and thereby
increase the gap between “us” and “them”. At the same time, they discredit alternative versions of chains of events that do not correspond to the group’s ideology.
Ultimately, the only solution might be to resort to violence since reasoning does not
have any effect on those running the perceived conspiracy.
2.1.5 Self-radicalisation or radicalisation mainly over the internet
Radicalisation is most often a result of social interaction. However, “self-radicalisation” also occurs, although to a very limited extent. “Self-radicalisation” means
that people develop an interest in and adopt a violence-promoting ideology on their
own, without prior contact with violence-promoting circles. In most cases, this is a
matter of the person studying violence-promoting messages on the internet. Today,
there are a number of internet forums for violence-promoting ideologies where
people share films, provide tips on where to find various statements and convey
news of relevance to the ideological context in question. Accordingly, the question
is whether it is really a matter of self-radicalisation or if the radicalisation is the
result of social interaction on the internet instead of at a physical meeting place.
There are examples of those who have been bullied or otherwise excluded and who
are perceived as inhibited in social contexts, but who find a social community on
the internet. Some of these individuals obtain a new sense of self-confidence on the
internet, and exaggerate their own significance and experiences. This is facilitated
by the more permissive social community and the possibility of anonymity that
exists on the internet through, for instance, various user identities and code names.
For other people, the first step into a self-radicalisation process may arise from a
general fascination with violence and violent films. The propaganda that is spread
in violence-promoting Islamist circles generally contains a lot of violence and is
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expressed in e.g. films – often from conflict areas such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia – which aim to glorify acts of violence and the groups that commit them. The
film clips are often accompanied by songs where the lyrics legitimise and justify
violence and pay tribute to martyrdom. Since all films posted on al-Qaida-related
forums convey a violence-promoting Islamist message in some form, their main
purpose is assessed to be propaganda. The largest category by far among these films
is nonetheless pure attack films, according to a report from the Norwegian Defence
Research Establishment (FFI) (Finsnes 2010, pp. 17–19). However, like the other risk
factors, a fascination with violent films does not in itself mean that the person becomes or is at risk of becoming radicalised.
Although the self-radicalisation process begins privately, there are very few people
who remain alone in their convictions. Self or internet-radicalised individuals commonly actively seek out like-minded people in a later phase, and thereby often
come into contact with more established violence-promoting circles. They may also
form their own groups with others in the same situation.
In the vast majority of cases, personal, physical meetings are a part of the final phases of radicalisation. This is particularly true in cases where the violence-promoting
behaviour is on the way to taking a more serious turn, such as the mounting or
planning of acts of violence (Atran 2010, p. 3). However, there are isolated examples
of radicalisation that led to acts of violence involving multiple perpetrators without
them having met in person. One such example is the planning of the fire attack
against an Iraqi polling station in Kista outside Stockholm in December 2005.
2.1.6De-radicalisation
The opposite of radicalisation is de-radicalisation, which is the process leading to
someone abandoning their violence-promoting ideas. When talking about de-radicalisation, sometimes a distinction is made between distancing oneself from the
violence-promoting ideology in terms of actions and in terms of thinking – changing behaviour (disengagement) or changing conviction (de-radicalisation).17 Changing behaviour means that one breaks contact with the violence-promoting group or
distances oneself from violence-promoting and criminal acts, but still keeps one’s
radical convictions. A more comprehensive definition of de-radicalisation includes
abandoning the actual ideology in addition to a distancing from ideologically motivated violence-promoting and criminal acts. A person can abandon the violencepromoting ideological conviction, but continue to be involved in violent crime, and
nonetheless be viewed as de-radicalised – as long as the criminal and violent acts
are not ideologically motivated. For the Security Service, in accordance with the
task of preventing security threatening activities, the primary concern is for violence-promoting individuals to change their behaviour. However, de-radicalisation
in itself is not a task for the Security Service, but rather primarily a challenge for
17 See for instance Horgan 2009.
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players in civil society.18
In the same way that radicalisation depends on push and pull factors on the individual, group and societal levels (see Section 2.1.1), de-radicalisation is affected by
corresponding factors. Similarities can also be found between de-radicalisation and
factors that cause criminals to quit their criminal activities. These factors can be
described as “the combination of individual motivation, events in the individual’s
social surroundings and structural circumstances” (SOU 2010:15, p. 134). The most
important pull factor for de-radicalisation appears to be the person’s longing for
a normal life outside the violence-promoting circles. More concretely, this may involve the longing for a family, children and work.
The personal pull factors sometimes interact with external push factors. This may
involve factors on a group level (such as dissatisfaction with leaders, other members or double standards in the group) or on a societal level. On the societal level,
attention and legal action by police authorities and social pressure, for instance,
may cause someone to question their support of the violence-promoting circle and
the risks it entails. Group factors and other external factors are, however, rarely
the only reasons why a person becomes de-radicalised, but rather they function
more often as a triggering factor. These factors may also contain a component of
compulsion, and although de-radicalisation can be initiated both voluntarily and
involuntarily, a sustainable change in views has to be voluntary.
As external factors can initiate and drive a de-radicalisation process, interest in
investigating what specific measures facilitate de-radicalisation has grown.19 At the
same time, it is important to emphasize that action by authorities – policing authorities or not – can have the opposite effect and instead drive the radicalisation.
Attention from policing authorities can, for instance, increase the sense of being
unjustly pointed out or reinforce the black-and-white world view.
De-radicalisation should not be viewed as a definitive or static condition, and there
is always a risk that the de-radicalisation process is interrupted or that radicalisation recurs. World events and perceived insults to Islam (see Section 3.3) are examples of circumstances that can affect de-radicalisation processes in a negative
direction.
18 For a more detailed discussion of de-radicalisation in comparison with other measures to counter radicalisation,
see Chapter 6.
19 See for instance Swedish National Board for Youth Affairs (2010). Avhopparverksamhet: Ungdomsstyrelsens
analys och förslag på hur samhället kan stödja unga avhoppare. [Help leaving extremism: National Board for Youth
Affairs’ analysis and proposals for how society can support young people trying to leave.]
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2.2Radicalisation routes
In the work to prevent and counter violence-promoting extremism, the Security
Service has identified three typical cases – or routes as they can be called – for how
and why people become radicalised: the delinquent’s route, the brooder’s route and
the family’s route. These typical cases were developed using the Security Service’s
own material and based on research on radicalisation. In cooperation with external
researchers, the National Council for Crime Prevention later supplemented these
with another typical case – the contact-seeker’s route.20
It is important to emphasize that these typical cases were created to facilitate understanding of how an individual becomes radicalised. They therefore provide a
simplified view of the reasons for radicalisation. The individuals who become radicalised rarely belong to only one of the categories, but rather often have characteristics of several of them.
The four routes into radicalisation are:
1)
The delinquent’s route
2)
The brooder’s route
3)
The family’s route
4)
The contact-seeker’s route.
2.2.1 The delinquent’s route
The delinquent often has a problematic background with an insecure childhood
that turned into a troubled adolescence with an early criminal debut. Drug abuse is
not uncommon. In some cases, there are elements of domestic violence and abuse,
and the person has little trust in the adult world. In other cases, experiences of
war and conflict in another country have traumatised the person. Such social, and
sometimes psychological, problems contribute to the person becoming aggressive
and violating the rules and norms of society to get attention, seek excitement or
establish an identity.
A search for excitement and a fascination with violence are common for the delinquent. The person often also has personal experience of using violence as a solution
to conflicts and problems, which means that the step to using ideologically motivated violence is short.
Once the delinquent comes into contact with ideologically driven, violence-promoting individuals, the radicalisation process begins. As the new fellowship grows
deeper, the person’s contacts with non-radical individuals and old contacts also
decrease. The delinquent, who feels like an outsider and is on edge with society,
seeks fellowship and, in connection with socialising into a new group, becomes re-
20 All four typical cases are described in the report on violent political extremism published jointly by the National
Council for Crime Prevention and the Security Service [National Council for Crime Prevention & Security Service
2009, p. 146].
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ceptive to the group’s message. This kind of person is also very much attracted by
a black-and-white world view that offers simple answers and makes it easy to find
one’s way through life.
2.2.2 The brooder’s route
The brooder’s route is characterised by searching. The brooder also tends to have
difficulties finding his place in society. In some cases, the person was bullied or
lonely in his school years. However, instead of becoming outwardly aggressive, the
brooder turns inward and seeks answers by reading and contemplating. The brooder avoids violence and conflict and, before coming into contact with any violencepromoting ideology, has the desire to adapt to society through education and conventional family life.
The brooder has often had a secure childhood where discussion, improvement and
questioning were encouraged. This often contributes to an early interest in politics,
religion or ideology and a desire to discuss such issues. Consequently, it is near at
hand for the brooder to choose an intellectual route into extremism. Literature and
personal ideas of injustices in society as well as a sense of frustration may make the
brooder receptive to radicalisation.
Some people in this category can be viewed as self-radicalised21, and the social fellowship arises in these cases only after the person has found an interest in the
violence-promoting ideology. The meeting with the ideology and the ensuing radicalisation is often the result of a realisation or a personal upheaval. Accordingly, it
is primarily due to perceived social and political injustices that the brooder seeks
out a radical social context for ideological reasons.
2.2.3 The family’s route
In contrast to the two earlier routes, the family’s route is not characterised by
problems adjusting to society, but rather by acceptance of radical notions in one’s
immediate surroundings. A person radicalised in this way grew up surrounded by
radical individuals, which results in the radical being seen as the norm. Radicalisation therefore does not mean an abrupt break since the person does not actively
seek a new context. Although this route does not necessarily need to go through
the family, it often goes through the immediate social surroundings: relatives, family friends and classmates. Even if the actual family is not the source of the radicalisation, there is a passive acceptance for some radical ideas among the family
members.
Individuals in this category have often had a relatively isolated childhood with
few contacts outside the family sphere or the immediate social relations, e.g. in a
segregated environment. Moreover, they have not actively questioned the radical
21 For more information on self-radicalisation, see Section 2.1.5.
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message in their immediate surroundings or sought out other contexts, but rather
prefer socialising with like-minded people.
2.2.4 The contact-seeker’s route
Those radicalised into extremism through the contact-seeker’s route are characterised by seeking contact with a person or a group. In contrast to the brooder and
the delinquent, the contact-seeker is not attracted by excitement or ideas, and in
contrast to those who are radicalised over the family’s route, the contact-seeker
has no prior experience of radical ideas. The contact-seeker is instead drawn into
a group based on a need for closeness or fellowship. The contact-seeker may either
want a closer relationship with a person who is a member of the group or be attracted by the social interaction and solidarity offered by the group. As a rule, it is
therefore by chance that the contact-seeker is drawn into an extremist group but
also into which extremist group that he is drawn, since it is not the group’s message or activities themselves that attract.
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3 The situation with regard to
radicalisation into violencepromoting Islamist extremism
in Sweden
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The Security Service assesses that radicalisation into violence-promoting Islamist
extremism occurs in Sweden today, but to a limited extent. It takes place mostly
among individuals and groups, and is not a problem on a societal level. This assessment is shared by most people we collaborated with who were speaking from
a stakeholder perspective. However, there are different views on the issue: whereas
some of them view the phenomenon as a serious problem that is also growing,
others believe that radicalisation does not occur at all. In the Service’s material,
though, there is nothing that expressly supports the view that radicalisation is
growing in Sweden today. The Service deems that the number of individuals who
have become radicalised in a violence-promoting Islamist context instead appears
to remain relatively constant from year to year.
As there are no clearly defined boundaries between the different stages in the radicalisation process, the Security Service cannot provide exact figures for radicalisation. However, information available in 2009 led to the assessment that some
20 new individuals had become radicalised in Sweden. At the same time, people
become radicalised or for other reasons leave violence-promoting Islamist circles,
which is why the total number of active individuals is not assessed to increase significantly from year to year. Geographically, radicalisation takes place throughout
Sweden. There is some concentration in Stockholm and in southern and western
Sweden, with Malmö and Gothenburg as geographic centres. This concentration
most likely has mainly demographic causes.
This chapter is mainly based on the Security Service’s own information and assessments and is introduced with a general description of the individuals that the
Security Service deems to have recently become radicalised in Sweden. This is followed by examples of the main radicalisation processes that can be distinguished in
violence-promoting Islamist circles. The chapter ends with an account of external
factors of significance to radicalisation.
3.1People who have become radicalised
3.1.1Age
The majority of those who have become radicalised in a violence-promoting Islamist context in Sweden are between the ages of 15 and 30. There are a few examples
of individuals under the age of 15 who have shown interest in violence-promoting Islamist extremism, and there is information to indicate occasional suspected
attempts to recruit people under the age of 15. Violence-promoting Islamist extremism, however, is not a phenomenon specific to young people in the same way
that applies to white-power circles and autonomous circles in the sense that it
is mainly young people who are active (National Council for Crime Prevention &
Security Service 2009). Although the actual radicalisation phase often occurs prior
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to the age of 30, many individuals continue to be active at an older age.22 There are
also examples of a small number of individuals in other age groups who have become radicalised. As described in Section 2.1, however, young people are particularly receptive to the type of rhetoric and mechanisms common to the radicalisation
process. This perception is also shared by the majority of the Muslim representatives, researchers and other people that the Security Service cooperated with during
the work on this report.
3.1.2Gender
Significantly more men than women have been noted as being active in violencepromoting Islamist circles in Sweden. Consequently, more men than women are assessed to have become radicalised. The gender imbalance indicated by the Security
Service’s material may, however, be due in part to the fact that women most often
do not carry out acts that have a direct connection to security-threatening activities, although the women’s activities often support and enable the men’s activities.
At the same time, it should be noted that there is information on women having become radicalised and also participating in activities in violence-promoting circles.
Based on known cases, the women who have become radicalised have had, with few
exceptions, a relationship with a violence-promoting man and could therefore be
characterised as contact-seekers.
3.1.3Background
There are examples of individuals from other countries who were already radicalised when they arrived in Sweden. The great majority of those identified as active
within the scope of violence-promoting Islamist extremism have, however, become
radicalised in Sweden. Among the latter, there is a certain overrepresentation of
individuals with at least one foreign-born parent. Most of these follow the route of
the delinquent, but there are also individuals in this group who follow other routes.
People with no previous connection to Islam or Islamism have also become radicalised. Among them, the brooder and the delinquent appear to be rather evenly
distributed. For those who can be described as brooders, interest in the ideology
has led to them choosing to support violence. For those who can be viewed as delinquents, the violence-promoting message has instead been the primary attractor,
while Islamism as an ideology has been secondary. People who are not rooted in
and lack knowledge of Islam are assessed to be generally more receptive to violence-promoting messages.
In cases where people have moved between various violence-promoting subcultures, it is clear that the violence-promoting message is in focus. There are a number of individuals who have gone from criminal gangs, and in some cases also from
other violence-promoting or extreme ideologies, to violence-promoting Islamist extremism. Based on known cases, the most common move to violence-promoting
22 For a general description of those active in violence-promoting Islamist extremism, see Section 4.4.
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Islamist extremism appears to take place from white-power circles. In these cases,
the people concerned have already been a part of a violence-promoting circle and
some of them have also used violence. Most of them can accordingly be described
as delinquents.
As described in Section 2.1, feelings of exclusion and discrimination appear to work
as driving forces for radicalisation. These factors are also assessed to be the most
common drivers for individuals radicalised in a violence-promoting Islamist context in Sweden. Segregation and unemployment are other recurring examples of
drivers of radicalisation in Sweden.
3.2Primary radicalisation processes
3.2.1 Small, loosely composed groups and gangs of friends
Small and loosely formed groups of a social nature – most easily described as gangs
of friends – is a common context where young people in particular become radicalised in Sweden. What is characteristic for these gangs is that they are not usually
founded on or linked to established violence-promoting circles and networks. They
are therefore inspired mainly by global violence-promoting rhetoric, and the first
meeting with a violence-promoting message may occur on the internet. Internationally known ideologues and propagandists spreading violence-promoting messages play a central role. A current example of such a source of inspiration is the
English-language publication Inspire, linked to al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula.
It is clearly targeted at a group that has neither knowledge of Arabic nor contacts to
established violence-promoting Islamist networks. A number of texts by the American-Yemeni ideologue Anwar al-Awlaki, among others, have been published in
Inspire. Al-Awlaki also currently appears to be one of the international ideologues
that are of major significance to radicalisation in the Western World today, and his
lectures and statements have spread globally in a short time. An important factor
in this is assessed to be that both Inspire and al-Awlaki use the English language as
a means to reach out to a larger target group than before.
An overriding characteristic of the groups of mainly young people that undergo a
radicalisation process together is that there is a clear fascination with violence and
a campfire romanticism, which also characterises their social interaction. There are
also clear parallels here to radicalisation in white-power circles. It has been recounted that interaction is intensive, and that people together watch and experience a
rush from what they call “jihad films”.23 In the Service’s dialogue with individuals
representing a stakeholder perspective, this way of being radicalised was fittingly
23 The Arabic word “jihad” means “strive” or “endeavour”. The term is used to describe a spiritual endeavour that
mainly concerns the striving of every Muslim to live according to the will of God. It may also be used in the sense
of a holy war in the defence against those who threaten Islam. Violence-promoting Islamist groups assume this
interpretation in order to legitimise various kinds of violent acts.
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described as a type of game where the participants bait one another, and ultimately
some turn fantasy into reality. The search for excitement is an important component and group dynamics play a central role.
3.2.2 Through contacts with established violence-promoting players
People can also become radicalised as a result of coming into contact with established violence-promoting networks and circles on their own or in a group. It
could be that they have initiated contact with violence-promoting players, or that
established circles and networks have actively sought out new supporters. In the
cases where violence-promoting networks have actively sought out new recruits,
the most common scenario seems to be that one or more people in the established
group had the task of bringing in the new recruits and convincing them of the
group’s message.
In the Security Service’s collaboration with individuals representing a stakeholder
perspective, various views were put forward as to how the contacts are established.
Some believe that it is less common that people initiate contact with violence-promoting circles since these may be difficult to identify and find for the uninitiated.
Others believe that it is more common for young people to seek out the violencepromoting circles than being sought out by recruiters. In the Security Service’s
material, there is no express evidence that one way would be more common than
the other.
3.2.3Groups with some contact with violence-promoting players
Besides the established networks and circles, radicalisation attempts also occur in
youth groups and small associations. These types of groups and associations are not
expressly violence-promoting. However, some individuals or parts of groups may be
violence-promoting and thereby contribute to the radicalisation of others.
In some cases, contacts to established violence-promoting players and networks
also exist in this type of group, particularly with people who are skilled at convincing others. For example, sometimes people from the networks travel to official conferences and meetings with the aim of arranging parallel lectures with a
violence-promoting Islamist content for specially invited guests. These lectures are
not a part of the official agenda and are deemed to take place without the approval
of the organisers.
3.2.4Self-radicalisation
Individuals can also be radicalised with little or no contact with established violence-promoting radical circles and networks. This kind of self-radicalisation has
often occurred, or at least been initiated, on the internet, which means that the
person does not lack social contacts in practice, but that contacts exist in virtual
environments. In some cases, such people are invited into established networks or
groups after a while. This may occur both through them being actively sought out
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calised individuals seeking others who are like-minded. Also in these cases, initial
contact with established players and networks takes place online.
Fascination with violence and search for excitement are common features of selfradicalised individuals, as is also the case for those radicalised in a group of friends.
3.2.5Atypical contexts
Some contexts are sometimes described as special breeding grounds for violencepromoting Islamist extremism. Examples that are sometimes brought up are language schools or Islamic education in Muslim countries. However, the Security
Service has not identified any clear connection between studies in a Muslim country and radicalisation. There are examples of individuals drawn into violencepromoting networks during their period of study abroad, but in these cases the
radicalisation can almost always be linked to fellow students and extracurricular
activities rather than the school’s teachers or curricula. There are also examples
of individuals who were active in violence-promoting Islamist networks in Sweden
and who chose to leave the violence-promoting ideology after having studied Islam
at centres of learning abroad. Increased knowledge of Islam is one particular feature that may work as a way out of the violence-promoting circles, and this is one
of the reasons why the violence-promoting networks wish to keep their supporters
isolated.
Prisons are another environment that is sometimes described as a gateway to violence-promoting Islamist extremism (for example, see Korteweg et al. 2010, p. 35).
However, in the Swedish context, the Security Service assesses that this occurs only
in very few cases. When radicalisation is nonetheless deemed to have occurred in
Swedish prisons, this has often involved individuals who adopted violence-promoting Islamist extremism in prison and then distanced themselves from it when
released.
3.3Impact of international developments on radicalisation
processes in Sweden
The general push and pull factors described in Section 2.1 are assessed to have remained more or less constant over time in a Swedish context. However, the Security
Service believes that the impact from international developments that acted as pull
factors in radicalisation into violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden has
partially changed in the past 20 years.
It is often said that there has been a shift from a regional or local arena to a global one in terms of violence-promoting Islamist extremism, and this is also clear
in the Swedish context. The possibility of comprehensive information distribution
in a global media landscape contributes to news having a very rapid international
spread, and to people far from the events reacting and in some cases acting. Internationally known ideologues also pick up on relevant events, which are set into and
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contribute to forming a global agenda.
In the Security Service’s dialogue with those who represent a stakeholder perspective, a point brought up was that resistance to regimes in former home countries
attracted people in Sweden and the rest of Europe to join violence-promoting Islamist groups or networks. At the beginning of the 1990s, some Swedes with origins
in North Africa became involved in the conflict between the regime and the armed
Groupe islamique armé (GIA) movement in Algeria. The situation in Afghanistan,
Bosnia and Chechnya functioned in the same way as driving factors for radicalisation processes in Sweden.
The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and the subsequent negative attention
that was often directed at Muslims have been described as a watershed acting as
a significant driver of radicalisation in Sweden. After these events and the US-led
invasion of Iraq in 2003, global violence-promoting Islamist messages in particular
have constituted a source of inspiration and an ideological platform, and have functioned as an attractor in terms of radicalisation in Sweden as well.
A report on radicalisation in violence-promoting Islamist circles in Italy shows that
events in remote conflicts may be of major significance to the sense of global discrimination of Muslims, and also reinforce negative perceptions in one’s own daily
life (della Porta & Bosi 2010, p. 45). Since around 2006, the conflict in Somalia has
been of substantial significance to radicalisation in a Swedish context. Through interaction between global al-Qaida-influenced ideology and a local agenda, the conflict in Somalia also illustrates what can be viewed as interplay between global and
local developments as drivers. Sometimes, the expression “globalisation” is used to
emphasize the convergence of global and local interests, at the expense of national
interest. The global messages motivate standpoints and action in local conflicts.
Events in recent years that have been perceived as insults to Islam and Muslims in
general, such as the Danish Mohammed cartoons or the drawings of Mohammed as
a dog that were published in Sweden, are other examples of events that tie together
global ideology with local events.24 Foreign ideologues picked up on both these
events, which, with the help of a global violence-promoting Islamist rhetoric, were
presented as a part of what some people call the “war on Islam”.
24 For an assessment of how these and similar events affect the intent and capability of violence-promoting Islamist
players, see Section 5.3.2.
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4The extent and nature of violencepromoting Islamist extremism in
Sweden
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This chapter is mainly based on the Swedish Security Service’s information on the
almost 200 individuals who participated in or supported violence-promoting Islamist extremism in 2009 using Sweden as a base. Section 4.7 is the exception and
briefly describes the situation in other countries based on publicly available materials. The chapter begins with an account of the main objectives of and motivations
for the activities conducted in violence-promoting Islamist groups. This is followed
by a description of typical actions, an overview of network structures, and the functions and roles that the actions can give rise to. Then follows a general description
of the activists, environments where their activities can take place and practical
requirements necessary for activities to take place. In conclusion, a brief overview
of the situation in other, nearby countries is provided for illustrative purposes.
4.1Objectives, messages and motivation
Describing objectives, messages and motivation for all individuals or groups in Sweden that support or exercise violence-promoting Islamist extremism is, of course,
impossible. However, there are some trends and tendencies that can be described
on a more general level. As initially pointed out, general Islamist messages are not
discussed in this description, but rather only ideas that are tied to violence-promoting extremism.
Violence-promoting Islamist players in Sweden focus on action and propaganda
against foreign troops in Muslim countries and against governments they see as
corrupt and not representative of what they consider to be the only true interpretation of Islam. Their objective is to introduce a certain type of Islamist governance
in various areas through violence. The main areas of interest to such individuals in
Sweden are Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan/Pakistan and North Africa. Perceived insults
to the Prophet Mohammed and/or Islam often give rise to strong and occasionally
violent reactions. Examples of such courses of events are the Danish Mohammed
cartoons and the drawings of Mohammed as a dog that were published in Sweden.25
The majority of those active in violence-promoting Islamist groups in Sweden are
in relative agreement that violence is legitimate in conflict areas under certain
circumstances. However, there is greater disagreement as to what specific targets
are legitimate. There are those who believe that violence is permitted only against
foreign military targets while others claim that all opponents, including civilians,
are legitimate targets. There are also examples where groups from one’s own country with different views, such as Shiites in Iraq or government loyalists in Somalia,
are seen as the main opponents and hence legitimate targets for attacks. In general,
one can say that those who are considered to stand in the way of the establishment
of Islamist governance are also perceived as legitimate targets for violence. Outside
the conflict areas, there is disagreement among Swedish players as to where and
25 Perceived insults are also discussed in Sections 3.3 and 5.3.2.
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against whom it is legitimate to use violence. A few individuals are deemed to support violent action in Europe as well.
People in violence-promoting Islamist groups often present a black-and-white world
view where they perceive themselves to be under attack. The message spread is often about violent acts not only being legitimate, but also desirable, and violence
is commonly glorified and romanticised. Dying for Islam and thereby becoming a
martyr is presented as the most beautiful thing that can be achieved, and violencepromoting Islamist ideologues refer to promises of what awaits martyrs in the afterlife. Accordingly, the main message spread concerns the importance of actively
defending Islam, but propaganda on the importance of financially and morally supporting mujahideen is also included.26
The motives for involvement in a violence-promoting Islamist movement differ
from person to person. Some individuals have a more nationalistic reason, and are
dedicated to supporting violence in one country or region only. Others focus on
the global struggle and the choice of a geographic area is then secondary. However,
ideological conviction is not always the main driving force, which may instead be
excitement-seeking or family or friendship loyalties.
4.2Actions
Violence-promoting Islamist extremism can manifest itself through a number of
different acts. In the Sweden of today, the majority of these acts aim to support and
facilitate terrorism in other countries in various ways. The exact action is limited
only by the activists’ own creativity. This section should therefore not be seen as
an exhaustive description, but rather only as a general presentation of some of the
currently most common acts:
Convincing and recruiting
Providing practical assistance
Financing
Joining armed Islamist extremist groups
Planning or carrying out attacks.
4.2.1 Convincing and recruiting
Convincing a person that a violence-promoting ideology is right – in other words
intentionally trying to radicalise someone – can, for example, take place by referring them to a certain internet website or to texts that support the ideology in question. From there, the person is guided on to literature or sermons by self-appointed
26 Mujahideen is the plural form of the Arabic word mujahid. Mujahid literally means “one who strives” and in Islamic
tradition has been a name for those who are involved in the fight to defend Islam. The term is used in a romanticising manner by violence-promoting Islamist groups to describe those who, using violence, defend Islam from a
perceived attack. In these circles, the term is used with the approximate meaning of “holy warrior”, and can refer
to those who take part in armed conflicts and those who carry out attacks outside the conflict zones.
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ideological authorities communicating a violence-promoting message. In a meeting
within the scope of the Security Service’s collaboration with people representing a
stakeholder perspective, it was described how certain events covered by the media
(such as news about the humanitarian situation in Gaza) can make young people
more easily influenced and thereby increase recruitment opportunities.
There are various approaches that a network or a group that supports violencepromoting Islamist extremism can try in order to draw in new recruits. Initial contacts between established players and potential new members usually take place in
more or less official surroundings, virtual or physical, which do not otherwise have
any connection to violence-promoting messages. This can occur in prayer rooms,
association meeting places and on websites and other forums that provide information on Islam and function as communication platforms. When contact is made in
larger prayer rooms and associations, this is almost always done against the will of
the leadership or without their knowledge. It is also something that usually occurs
discretely and in the periphery of official gatherings rather than openly. The violence-promoting message is not initially clear, but is gradually introduced. This is
a way of seeing who is receptive to the message and shows interest. When interest
is incited, the recruiting process usually continues in closed circles. For instance,
this can take place on password-protected internet forums, in a home environment
or in other premises to which the driving individuals have access for their personal
use. When the person has finally accepted the message, the network presents acts
that the person is expected to carry out.
An alternative approach is to advocate a violence-promoting Islamist message
already from the beginning, in order to attract new supporters. This takes place
mainly on the internet, probably because the person behind the violence-promoting message can remain anonymous there. From the Security Service’s dialogue
with stakeholders, it emerged that a recruitment process can also begin by seeking
out individuals who can be of use to the network, such as those with IT skills.
The network then asks for small favours, such as creating a website. If the person
appears to be receptive, the violence-promoting Islamist message is gradually unveiled to him.
As described in Section 2.1, social factors are of major significance in radicalisation
contexts. An established group does not only offer new points of view, but more
importantly a social fellowship. The individuals already in the group are often careful to be inclusive and caring towards new members. The established environment
contributes to making the person feel safe and appreciated. The members of violence-promoting groups largely keep to themselves, and social interaction is intensive.
They often live together in shared premises or in the home of any group member
who happens to have a place to live. The majority of their time is spent with the
group. They also arrange activity trips and set up internet forums where those invited can upload and discuss material.
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This social isolation contributes to making the indoctrination especially effective.
Newcomers are prevented from having contact with outsiders who are considered
to have a negative impact, such as those who represent an alternative social context
(like family members). The more established individuals influence and control the
newcomers and repeat the message that everyone that does not follow God’s will
are at risk of being punished. Fear generally plays a very significant role in terms
of religious extremism, where leaders and others can use threats and promises
concerning the afterlife. This fear, together with the fact that many have broken
contact with former friends and thereby lack a social context outside the violencepromoting group, contributes to it being difficult to question and leave violencepromoting circles.27
Network leaders are also often eager for supporters not to meet or debate with
renowned, knowledgeable imams or other Muslim authority figures, since the network leaders are aware that they risk losing control of their supporters if these gain
more knowledge of Islam from other sources. Through takfir, 28 those in violencepromoting Islamist extremist groups in some cases exercise the right to declare
Muslims with opinions different from their own as non-Muslims.
There are also a few examples of economic incentives being a part of the radicalisation process, something that has been mentioned in the Security Service’s dialogue
with stakeholders. It is said, for instance, that newcomers’ costs are paid by established members in the group and that this can thereby become a way of influencing
people with poor finances.
4.2.2 Providing practical assistance
Individuals and groups that wish to support terrorist networks in other countries
can also contribute in ways other than funding. This may involve sending material that is needed on site, mediating contacts or organising travel for those who
are to join an armed Islamist extremist group. It may also involve providing false
passports or other identification documents, or acting as the front person for those
who themselves do not want to be visible in various contexts. Those with IT skills
can also assist by creating and administering websites and web forums.
4.2.3Financing
Support for violence-promoting Islamist extremism may also take the form of financial contributions to terrorist activities abroad, in other words financing. Collections can take place in public meeting places, although in such instances the
final recipient is rarely stated. Money that is being collected for the stated purpose
of being donated to charity in specific countries is sometimes in fact being used to
support the activities of a terrorist network. Consequently, those who donate mo27 For theoretical reasoning on this, see Section 2.1.
28 The concept of takfir means taking the right to declare somebody to be kafir, i.e. an infidel or non-Muslim. Takfir is
used by violence-promoting Islamist groups to justify violence and acts of terrorism against those who are perceived
as enemies of Islam.
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ney in these contexts are rarely aware of the actual purpose of the collection. However, if the collection takes place in closed forums, it is more common that those
who contribute money know what it is for.
People are also encouraged to contribute financially on special internet forums.
The money can then be transferred to recipients abroad in various ways, such as
through some kind of payment service or by courier. Couriers may be used either
for security purposes to avoid traceability, or if the final recipient of the money is
in a country or an area that does not have a well-developed financial system.
Financial support goes mainly to foreign terrorist groups and their local activities.
There are also cases where donations are made to people who want to travel to join
foreign armed Islamic extremist groups and attend training camps. Relatives of
people imprisoned or killed due to their participation in violence-promoting Islamist extremism may also obtain financial support from other supporters. Support
from Sweden goes in several directions from various groups and circles, but currently it mainly involves support of terrorist activities in Somalia and Iraq.
How the money is ultimately used is often unclear. It is rarely specified whether
the donated money goes to support the families of the deceased, to spreading propaganda or to pay for an attack. In some cases, this may be because neither those
who donate the money nor those who collect it know exactly how it will be used.
Legally proving intent to collect and forward money with the aim of financing acts
of violence is therefore very difficult. Not only is it complicated to follow the path
of the money from sender to recipient, the issue of intent is also central and difficult to prove.
There are networks which are mainly concerned with contributing money to terrorist activities abroad. These networks have sometimes made collections together
with networks in other European countries in order to support a certain terrorist
organisation. In these cases, special collection meetings are usually organised to
raise money. In a few cases, money earned from business or criminal activities was
used to finance foreign terrorist activities.
4.2.4 Joining armed Islamist extremist groups
People who have embraced a violence-promoting Islamist message are sometimes
attracted by the idea of going to a conflict area to join an armed Islamist extremist
group there. Their intent is to defend Islam against a perceived attack where it occurs and by using violence. For a few individuals, the ultimate purpose of joining an
armed Islamist extremist group may be to participate in a suicide attack.
Travelling to join an armed Islamist extremist group is a phenomenon that has
received more media attention in recent years, but which has occurred in Sweden
at least since the 1990s. In most cases, the visitors attend training camps led by the
group and then carry out assignments on behalf of the group. However, some camp
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destinations are basically accessible only to those with prior experience of handling
weapons since not all groups provide such training.
In virtually all currently known cases of Swedes who wish to join armed Islamist extremist groups, travel to Somalia or to the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan is involved. Usually, the act in itself is of primary significance, not where one travels or which group one joins. However, in some cases, the
choice of destination can be affected by nationalism. The importance of international trends and the area that is currently most discussed in violence-promoting
circles should not be underestimated either. Iraq and Chechnya are examples of
destinations that were previously popular, but now hardly attract any Swedes.
The choice of final destination is also affected by what travel routes currently are
functional and safe. Some destinations demand more preparations and established
contacts, which means that they are less accessible. One reason for this is that
some countries have higher security and better border control than others. In some
cases, it is possible to fly directly into the country while in others, more advanced
routes are necessary that require help from local players. For security reasons, the
travellers are not always aware of the entire route in advance or even the exact final
destination. Changing the final destination for various reasons during the journey
has also been known to occur.
In general, some form of contact is needed in order to successfully travel to a conflict zone and join an armed Islamist extremist group there. Such contacts can be in
the conflict zone and/or in Sweden. Although some individuals are known to have
successfully made the whole journey without prior contacts, this is considered rare.
For security reasons, not all groups accept people without recommendations from
somebody with established contacts.
People typically travel alone or in twos, and most often without notifying their
parents or siblings. The training camps often provide ideological education as well
as physical and basic military training for the participants. Having undergone
training, they often participate in the activities of the Islamist extremist group in
question. This often means participating in various violent missions, but may also
involve contributing to propaganda on behalf of the group in their capacity as a
Westerner. Moreover, there are instances of individual Swedes having advanced to
achieve high positions, such as commander, in foreign terrorist organisations.
Experiences from other countries show that certain individuals who have received
training and gained experience abroad have later tried to carry out or have carried
out acts of violence in their home countries.29 In some such cases, this was the ex-
29 For a more in-depth discussion of how foreign experiences and contacts can influence the intent and capability of
violence-promoting Islamist players, see Section 5.3.1.
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press purpose of the trip, which in other words was all about building expertise to
carry out attacks in the home country or another country outside the conflict zone.
4.2.5 Planning or carrying out attacks
To date, Sweden has been relatively spared from attacks, especially if one only takes
Islamist-motivated attacks into account.30 In 2006, three individuals were charged
with attempt and conspiracy to commit a terrorist offence after having planned
and carried out a firebomb attack against an Iraqi polling station in Kista outside
Stockholm. In the district court, one of the perpetrators was convicted of attempt
and conspiracy to commit a terrorist offence, and another was convicted of aiding
and abetting an attempted terrorist offence and of conspiracy to commit a terrorist offence. The third was convicted of conspiracy to commit a terrorist offence.
However, the court of appeal changed the classification to attempted arson and
conspiracy to commit arson, of which two of the perpetrators were convicted while
the third was fully acquitted.
A small number of Swedish individuals are, however, assessed to have participated
in both the planning and execution of terrorist attacks in other countries, usually
in connection with them travelling there to join a local group and participate in
the group’s activities. The targets of attacks mounted abroad in which Swedish individuals were involved have to-date not had any connection to Sweden or Swedish
interests, but were instead chosen based on the agenda of a local player.
4.3Networks, functions and roles
Decentralisation is a distinguishing characteristic of the international violencepromoting Islamist extremism that has emerged during the 2000s, the ideology of
which is inspired by al-Qaida. In contrast to both older Islamist terrorist groups and
terrorist organisations driven by other ideologies, there are today very few, if any,
clearly delimited organisations with a hierarchical command structure and clear
rules for membership. Supporters of today’s version of violence-promoting Islamist
extremism are instead organised into more or less loosely composed networks that
in theory follow the same ideology, but in practice conduct independent activities.
These networks can also shift over time, with regard to members, focus and level
of activity. Al-Qaida is described by Mattias Gardell in part as “a kaleidoscopically
shifting constellation of more or less frequently collaborating groups and individuals” (Gardell 2005, p. 242), and in part as a brand similar to Nike and Armani that
sells well and thereby gives rise to pirate copies (Gardell 2005, p. 272).
The existence of these local networks is also variable. They can emerge, conduct
activities for some time and then be dissolved, sometimes with surprising speed
(Gardell 2005, p. 245). In some cases, people who have not previously had any con30 An example of a major terrorist attack in Stockholm is the occupation of the West German embassy in 1975, by
perpetrators from the ultra-left German Red Army Faction.
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tact with violence-promoting Islamist extremism create their own network with
people in their surroundings, after having come into contact with violence-promoting messages (often on the internet). Some established foreign terrorist networks
also encourage Muslims, mainly young people, to get organised and contribute to
or participate in violence-promoting extremist activities in their daily lives.
A number of networks based on a violence-promoting Islamist extremist ideology are active in Sweden. Some networks focus especially on some of the acts described in Section 4.2. For example, a network might specialise in financing terrorist
activities carried out by others, or have the contacts necessary for arranging secure
travel routes for those who wish to join terrorist groups abroad. Specialisation may
also occur in networks through an allocation of specific functions or roles to some
people. However, it should be emphasized that these roles are neither statistically
or strictly delimited. The vast majority of active individuals carry out several acts,
in multiple functions or roles. The functions and roles described in this section are:
Recruiters
Intermediaries
Information officers and web administrators
Fundraisers
Returnees.
4.3.1Recruiters
There is usually someone in the network who is particularly adept at convincing
others to accept a violence-promoting message, and who is then given the function
of a recruiter. Those recruited in Sweden are most commonly recruited by other
Swedes. It is most often not a matter of recruitment for special assignments; people
are mainly recruited to a social network where more specific tasks become clear
over time.
Recruiters are often people who are skilled at establishing contact with young
people because young people, mainly young men, are the most common target
group. There is also information to indicate that recruiters pick out precisely the
young people most receptive to a violence-promoting message. Recruitment predominantly takes place through personal meetings, usually at physical meeting
places, but contact is also made online.
4.3.2Intermediaries
Some people have a special ability to establish and maintain contacts. They function like network hubs and often have the right contacts both with other violence-promoting Islamist circles in Sweden and with corresponding circles in other
countries. They also often have contacts with people in high positions in more established terrorist networks abroad. Accordingly, such a person becomes the one
that ensures that others get in touch with each other. The “intermediary” is the
person to contact if one wants to travel to a training camp and needs a contact
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person on site. This also applies if one needs to contact somebody who can contribute financially to the trip or if one needs help to obtain a passport. Sometimes, but
not always, the intermediary has spent time in a training camp or with a foreign
terrorist network and has thereby established an extensive network of contacts.
4.3.3 Information officers and web administrators
Other ways of supporting violence-promoting Islamist extremism can be by creating and/or operating websites, forums or blogs. This may involve administering a
website by determining its structure, updating materials on the forum, changing
the forum’s structure, suspending users, appointing moderators, etc. The forum
functions as a meeting place for likeminded individuals where they can personally
communicate with each other or comment on each other’s posts. The website includes propaganda materials. There may also be instructions on how to prepare for
participation in training camps, and links to manuals about how to make explosives. Websites or blogs can be operated on someone’s own initiative or at the request of a network in Sweden or abroad.
4.3.4Fundraisers
A person who gathers funds has an important function in networks that support violence-promoting Islamist extremism. The collections often take place in a
closed circle, such as an association. In such cases, not just anybody is addressed,
but rather those who have a similar ideology (i.e. those already initiated). Among
those who donate money, some may be aware of the real purpose while others
might not. A network may decide how much money should be collected and the
amount each member can reasonably be expected to contribute. A fundraiser may
ensure that special fundraising meetings are arranged and also travel to collect
money elsewhere.
Raising money does not demand money of one’s own as much as good contacts,
with those who are willing to donate money as well as with people on site who can
receive the money and distribute it to the right recipients. The person who collects
the money is far from always the one who ensures that it reaches the right recipient in cases where it is transferred to armed Islamist extremist groups abroad. If
the money is sent by courier, somebody must personally travel with the cash and
hand it over to the final recipient. Some people function solely as middlemen for
and do not raise funds that will go to terrorist activities. Fundraising is sometimes
also coordinated between different countries (also see Section 4.2.3).
4.3.5Returnees
Some individuals who join a terrorist organisation abroad have no intention of returning to Sweden. They may intend to settle abroad and bring their family with
them when they travel. Having attended training camps, they are active in various
ways in the terrorist organisation that they have joined. Moreover, in recent years,
a small number of individuals have died when acting for armed Islamist extremist groups. Others choose to return to Sweden for various reasons. In some cases,
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they return only temporarily for bureaucratic reasons or to earn money to live on
abroad. In other cases, their return is more permanent and may, for instance, be
because the living conditions abroad were not what they had imagined. Another
possibility is that the targets for the group’s activities were expanded to include
Sweden also.
The Security Service assesses that the majority of individuals who return to Sweden with experience of training and/or the use of violence from other countries
continue to be involved in violence-promoting Islamist activities also after returning home. These returnees are usually awarded a special status based on their
international experiences, and some have established their own networks based on
this. Whether intentional or unintentional, a “returnee” functions as a role model
and an inspirer of others who want to travel abroad to training camps or otherwise
support a terrorist organisation. The returnee can contribute contacts, knowledge
of travel routes, conditions on site, preparation tips and security awareness. However, after returning to Sweden, some people have distanced themselves from the
violence-promoting ideology and no longer want to be involved in the circles that
promote violence-promoting Islamist extremism.
4.4Active individuals
The description of violence-promoting Islamist extremism in this report is based
on the activities conducted by almost 200 active individuals, who according to the
Security Service’s monitoring participated in or supported violence-promoting
Islamist extremism in 2009 or later and were registered residents of Sweden at
the time.31 These individuals have been known to the Security Service for various
lengths of time, on average 4-5 years. The span stretches from those who were identified relatively recently to a small number of individuals who have figured in the
monitoring for many years.
4.4.1Gender, age and nationality
Most of those who participate in or support violence-promoting Islamist extremism
are men, but a small number of women are also represented. An overwhelming
majority of the women who are themselves active in violence-promoting Islamist
networks in Sweden are wives or ex-wives of men who are active in these circles.32
The average age is 36, but there is a wide variation and the distribution between
the age groups33 is quite even (see Figure 1). Altogether, these people come from 25
different countries, of which Sweden is the third most common country of birth.
Of those born abroad, approximately 60 per cent are currently Swedish citizens and
have been citizens on average for just over 12 years.
31 For a more in-depth discussion of the selection and delimitations of the report, see Section 1.2 on method.
32 For a specific discussion of women in the networks, see Section 4.4.2.
33 The intervals have been chosen so as not to point out the youngest and oldest among those active.
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Figure 1Age distribution (per cent)
Age groups
> 50
< 29
11,5
30.9
28.8
40-50
28.8
30-39
4.4.2 Women in the networks
Violence-promoting Islamist circles in Sweden are generally dominated by men,
and women are in a distinct minority among those monitored by the Security Service. This is probably because the women involved in violence-promoting Islamist
circles usually do not carry out acts that have a direct link to security-threatening
activities. However, several of the women undoubtedly embrace the violence-promoting message, and there are examples of women who participate in convincing
and recruiting others (mainly other women) and raising money to support armed
Islamist extremist groups abroad. It is also very uncommon in an international
perspective that women themselves travel to training camps or engage in violence.
Women are also considered to have an important role to play by supporting their
men in their activities and raising their sons to become mujahideen. Wives of men
in violence-promoting Islamist circles often help to convince newcomers and make
them feel at home. In some cases, the women organise themselves in separate
women’s associations or networks where part of the objective is to conduct support
activities. Women whose husbands have travelled abroad to join an armed extremist group are automatically awarded a high status in the networks. If a woman
was married to a man who died during such a trip, her status is raised further.
Other men usually accept considerable responsibility for ensuring that she is then
provided for.
However, it is important to realize that many women are unaware that their husbands are involved in violence-promoting Islamist activities. In cases where they do
know, it could also be an active choice on their part not to express their opinions
on or to counter this.
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4.4.3Registered home address and employment
A majority of the individuals concerned are registered residents of one of Sweden’s
major cities. Otherwise, mainly large cities and suburban municipalities are the
most common domiciles.34 Approximately half live in the Stockholm area, and the
rest are spread throughout Sweden (see Figure 2). However, it should be pointed
out that this information is based on these individuals’ registered home addresses,
which do not necessarily correspond to the city or town they are actually in. Nor
should this be interpreted as a description of where the activities take place (see
Section 4.5). The active individuals represent a number of different professions and
occupations, including commercial traffic, handcrafts, administration and studies.
Consequently, there are large variations in income.
Figure 2Distribution of registered address by type of region (per cent)
Registration region
Other
2.8
Large towns
25.3
62.4
Metropolis
9.5
Suburb municipalities
4.4.4Criminality
The security-threatening activities mainly engaged in by people in violence-promoting Islamist circles in Sweden do not appear in Swedish crime statistics since they
primarily take place in other countries. However, one third of the active individuals figure either in the police database of persons subject to criminal proceedings
or in the criminal records registry35 and almost 30 per cent had been sentenced to
34 The municipal grouping according to the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions was used for the
break-down.
35 The Police database on persons subject to criminal proceedings mainly contains information on individuals age 15
or over who are suspected on reasonable grounds of a crime under the Penal Code, or for other criminal acts for
which more severe punishment than fines is prescribed. The criminal records registry mainly contains information on people who have been punished for crime either through a court judgement, decision, penal court order,
breach-of-regulations fine or otherwise.
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more severe penalties than fines. Altogether, crime that can be linked to financial
gain constitutes just over one third of the crimes these individuals were convicted
of. This category of crime includes fraud, economic crime (such as tax crime, accountancy fraud and benefit fraud), smuggling, theft and shoplifting. As illustrated in Figure 3, violent crime 36, weapons violations and threats also make up just
over a third. Among the remaining types of crime, drugs and traffic violations are
the most common. Slightly more than 40 per cent of the individuals sentenced to
penalties are listed only once, although it is equally common for one person to be
listed four or more times. Most of those who are listed multiple times appear to be
focused or specialised on one or two crime categories, while only a few of them are
what can be described as versatile criminals.
For the majority of these crimes, there is not enough evidence to indicate that they
were ideologically motivated and the figures should therefore be viewed as crimes
that these individuals commit in addition to actively supporting terrorism in other
countries. The lack of confirmed ideological connections to the crimes represented in these statistics is also the reason why the focus of the report is not on Swedish crime statistics, but rather on Sweden-based activities conducted in support
of violence-promoting Islamist extremism. This focus is in accordance with the
Government assignment.37 The description of these individuals’ criminality is only
included as an additional way of describing them and their background.
Figure 3Distribution of crimes resulting in penalties (per cent)
Other
Crime types
Traffic violations (gross)
Drugs violations
Fraud
Financial crime
6
3
Smuggling
5
3
16
9
Violent crime
22
20
Theft / Shoplifting
11
5
Threats
Weapons violations
36 The violent-crime category includes violence against people or property. The latter case concerns only a small
number of crimes.
37 This constitutes a significant difference from the previous report on violent political extremism (National Council for
Crime Prevention & Security Service 2009), which was entirely based on the listings of the people concerned in
the Police database on persons subject to criminal proceedings and the criminal record registry. The explanation is
that for the people included in the previously issued report, it was mainly events, places and people in Sweden that
were the targets of the ideologically motivated crime. The targets for the people covered by this report are almost
always abroad.
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4.4.5Contacts
Of the just under 200 individuals, at least 80 per cent are socially interconnected, mainly in the form of friendships, as presented in Figure 4. This percentage
is in all likelihood underestimated, since only confirmed and direct links are included in this figure. This image of the social structure illustrates the theoretical
reasoning presented in Section 2.1 on the importance of social relationships in violence-promoting extremism, primarily regarding how individuals are drawn into
these circles. However, it should be emphasized that all of these ties are not equally
strong. In other words, violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden is not
made up of one single interconnected network or of circles that have the capacity
to fully coordinate their resources and work towards the same goals, in contrast to
hierarchical terrorist organisations such as the PKK.
Figure 4 Social structure illustrating confirmed connections between the individuals.
4.5Environments
In the Security Service’s assessment, there are no environments that can characteristically be linked to specific violence-promoting Islamist extremism. Instead,
such activities take place both at physical places and in virtual environments, in
open and closed forums and in informal and formal associations. In the meetings
held within the scope of the Security Service’s collaboration with individuals representing a stakeholder perspective, it was mentioned on several occasions that the
activities aiming to convince and recruit others often take place in environments
where many young people gather. This is also in line with the Security Service’s
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information. As noted in Section 2.1, a perceived exclusion can increase a person’s
receptiveness to radicalisation attempts. Several people that the Security Service
worked with from a stakeholder perspective also felt that violence-promoting Islamist extremism primarily occurs in environments where people’s social needs are
not met, or as one person put it: “in environments where subcultures thrive”.38
A significant part of the activities currently also take place on and with the help of
the internet. Information technology is widely used to convince and recruit others
into a violence-promoting ideology, as well as for anonymous and secure communication with those already involved. By simplifying matters and lowering costs for
the activities, the internet has also enabled sophisticated and extensive propaganda
campaigns aimed at particular target groups.
A significant part of the virtual environments comprises forums that are mainly
media organs for violence-promoting Islamist extremist groups and function as a
source of news, practical information and advice. The forums especially function
as a channel where the group can address their message to supporters and anyone
interested.39 They constitute a public space for supporters in various parts of the
world, which means that the groups are no longer dependent on traditional media
such as TV and newspapers to reach out to an audience.
Above all, the forums provide publicity for leaders or important ideologues, and
may, for example, include propaganda films in various languages. Romantic illustrations of martyrdom form a central part of this kind of propaganda. Long, glorifying biographies of individuals who joined armed extremist groups and then died
when performing acts of violence are other common features. Violent romanticism
is also tangible. Images and films showing attacks and the victims of various kinds
of violent acts are often published.
Besides functioning as an information channel, forums offer an opportunity for
supporters to become known to each other. When supporters are made visible in
this way, this creates opportunities for those who actively seek to recruit others. Forums also offer a platform to get messages across or to build contacts. This enables
users – without necessarily being a part of physical environments with connections
to terrorist organisations – to exchange ideas with likeminded individuals and thereby feel like a part of a movement sharing a common identity. In this way, forums
may be of particular significance as radicalising environments for individuals that
have been radicalised more or less on their own (also see Section 2.1.5).
38 This quote is taken from a conversation in the Security Service’s collaboration with people representing a stakeholder perspective.
39 An example of such a forum is al-Qimmah, which has served as a news and communications channel for Somali alShabaab. The forum’s impact on the conflict in Somalia is described in a UN report from March 2010. See Report
of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1853 (2008), S/2010/91, p. 29 ff.
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4.6Practical requirements
Depending on the act to be carried out, the practical requirements of course vary
enormously, both in terms of costs and complexity. In practical terms, the easiest
action is trying to convince and recruit others, as this generally does not require
anything other than access to a discrete physical or virtual environment where
the violence-promoting message can be presented once the person is deemed to be
receptive to it (see Section 4.2.1). Planning an attack is often the most complicated
action.
For an act to be carried out, there must be intent (without which the act cannot be
motivated) and capability. Depending on the act, capability may involve physical
condition as well as language skills or other special expertise (such as having a commercial driving licence, knowledge of the area or weapons training). Contacts and
some financial resources are examples of capabilities required almost regardless of
what is to be done. Huge sums are usually not necessary, and individuals sometimes finance their actions using their own income.
Moreover, there must also be an opening (in the form of access to a target) and an
opportunity to act. This may include, for instance, internet forums, since they offer
opportunities to try to convince and recruit others.
4.7Violence-promoting Islamist extremism in nearby countries
This section provides a brief overview of how violence-promoting Islamist extremism manifests itself in countries close to Sweden. The countries were chosen
based on geographic proximity and general cultural similarities, and because they
have openly confirmed the existence of violence-promoting Islamist extremism.
The information in this section is collected only from openly available, public sources. It is not intended as a formal comparison between different countries, but is
included for illustrative purposes only.
4.7.1Denmark
In Denmark, as in Sweden, the violence-promoting Islamist circles are assessed to
consist of relatively few people. Just as in Sweden, the greatest threat is also assessed to come from individuals who were born and/or raised in Denmark (CTA
2008a). A third similarity with Sweden is the potential threat from individuals who
travel to join foreign violence-promoting Islamist extremist groups and participate
in training camps and in some cases illegal acts of violence orchestrated by these
groups (CTA 2010). For example, in December 2009, a man who grew up in Denmark carried out a suicide attack in a hotel in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia.
This resulted in more than 20 fatalities, including four ministers of the Somali
transitional government (Somali minister died after attack 2010). Attack planning
and attempted attacks also took place in Denmark, for instance against cartoonist
Kurt Vestergaard in January 2010 (CTA 2010). There is also financing of terrorism in
and from Denmark. This financial support goes mainly to foreign groups, but ecoViolence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden
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nomic support is also provided to violence-promoting extremist activities in Denmark (CTA 2008b).
4.7.2Norway
Similarly to Sweden and Denmark, relatively few people are assessed as belonging
to violence-promoting Islamist extremist circles in Norway. A change that has occurred in recent years, like in Sweden, is that violence-promoting Islamist networks
and circles have become more ethnically diverse. Activities are largely focused on
supporting violence-promoting Islamist extremist groups abroad, usually with a
local or regional agenda. In more concrete terms, this support involves raising and
transferring funds to foreign Islamist extremist groups. The support networks also
work to spread propaganda, help with the forgery of identification documents and
contribute materials (PST 2010b). On 8 July 2010, three individuals were apprehended in Norway on suspicion of conspiracy to commit terrorist offences. The case
is said to have connections to the United States and the United Kingdom, and the
three individuals are alleged to have ties to al-Qaida (PST 2010a).
4.7.3Germany
In its latest annual report, the German security service, Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), deems that the greatest threat to Germany’s domestic security
remains that posed by violence-promoting Islamist extremism. A change that has
taken place in recent years is that an increasing number of the active individuals
in violence-promoting Islamist networks were born or raised in Germany. This is
in line with the Swedish situation, where the majority of these activists were born
or raised in Sweden. As in Sweden and Denmark, there is also a serious problem
in Germany with people travelling to join armed Islamist extremist groups to participate in training and in some cases also carry out illegal acts of violence. The
year 2009 saw an increase in the number of people in violence-promoting Islamist
circles who travelled from Germany to Pakistan, and some of them are suspected of having undergone training linked to terrorism in the border zone between
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The total number of people who have travelled from
Germany in the past two years with the aim of undergoing terrorist-linked training is estimated at around 200. There is concrete information indicating that 65 of
them have, in fact, completed this training (BMI 2009).
4.7.4 The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, local networks that support terrorist activities within the
country’s borders have weakened and become less active. Some networks have shifted their focus to supporting violence-promoting extremism outside the Netherlands, for instance by travelling to join armed Islamist extremist groups or supporting these groups financially. Just like in Germany, but in contrast to Sweden,
the majority of such individuals from the Netherlands travelled to the border zone
between Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, in 2009, the Dutch intelligence and
security service, Algemene Inlichtigen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD), noted that
armed Islamist extremist groups in Somalia receive support from individuals in the
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Netherlands. Somalia is now seen as a possible and attractive destination for young
people who want to join a foreign violence-promoting Islamist extremist group
(AIVD 2010a).
The current situation in the Netherlands has changed compared to that of a few
years ago when a trend of increasing radicalisation was noted in violence-promoting Islamist circles in the country. One manifestation of this trend was the murder
of Theo van Gogh in November 2004. However, since 2006, the threat from these
circles decreased despite the occurrence of new perceived insults to Islam, such
as Geert Wilders’ film Fitna and the Dutch military presence in Afghanistan. This
development is probably due to several factors. The violence-promoting Islamist
networks in the Netherlands previously had a very strong local base and were built
around a number of strong charismatic leaders. In recent years, several of these
leaders have been arrested, deported or have voluntarily left the country, which
has substantially reduced new recruitment to the networks. Mosques are also assessed to have become more attentive to suspected radicalisation activities and have
publicly distanced themselves from such activities (AIVD 2010b).
4.7.5United Kingdom
In contrast to Sweden, as well as the other countries in Section 4.7, the British
situation is characterised by attempted attacks and attack planning against domestic targets. More than a dozen attempted terrorist attacks have been prevented
in the country since 2001. The threat is deemed to come mainly from al-Qaida
and al-Qaida-related groups, as well as groups that share al-Qaida’s ideology, but
lack direct contacts. Al-Qaida has recruited individuals from the UK who have attended training camps in Pakistan and subsequently returned to the UK and established new networks. The attack on London’s underground in July 2005 was
the first Islamist-motivated suicide attack in the UK and is an example of British
bombers carrying out attacks at home after training in Pakistan (Pursue prevent
protect prepare 2009).
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5The players’ intent and capability
to conduct security-threatening
activities
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The Security Service monitors violence-promoting Islamist extremism since it is an
example of security-threatening activities. For a threat to exist, a player (a person or
a group) must have both intent and capability. A player who intends, for example,
to carry out an attack, but lacks the capability does not constitute a threat. Similarly, a player who has the capability to carry out an attack is not a threat if there
is not intent. By influencing the intent or reducing the capability of the players,
the Security Service is constantly striving to reduce the threats that are assessed to
exist. It is often easier to reduce a player’s capability, such as through prosecution,
but the Security Service also tries to influence individuals’ intent through preventive efforts.
Focus in this chapter is on the description of intent and capability of those whose
activities are described in the report. In addition, a number of factors are presented
that are judged to influence intent and capability of these people as well as the current assessment of threats to Sweden and Swedish interests in terms of terrorism.
It should be emphasized that both intent and capability of individual players as
well as the overall assessment of threats to Sweden and Swedish interests can
change at any time. Possible influencing factors include events in the individuals’
own lives as well as in their surroundings, both local and global. Changes in capability can take a long time, while changes in intent can be rapid. Consequently, it
is possible that the situation will look different a year or even a few months from
now. This chapter reflects the autumn 2010 assessment of intent, capability and
threats.
5.1The players’ intent
Altogether, the general intent of the people covered by this report is assessed to
be to support armed Islamist extremist groups abroad (see Section 4.2 for a closer
description of acts). At present, these groups are primarily al-Shabaab in Somalia
and al-Qaida-related groups in North Africa, Iraq and Afghanistan/ Pakistan. This
means that the majority do not constitute a direct security threat to Sweden. Support activities are, however, a requirement necessary for terrorism to arise, develop
and be maintained (Horgan 2008, p. 86). Consequently, the activities conducted in
Sweden underpin activities that are security-threatening and dangerous to society.
This should not be taken to mean that there are no activities that constitute a direct
threat to Sweden and Swedish interests, or to foreign interests in Sweden. However,
the extent of these activities is deemed to be limited.
5.1.1 Security-threatening activities in other countries
A small number of individuals in Sweden have the overall objective of using violence to overthrow certain governments in Muslim countries that are not perceived
to represent what these people believe to be true Islam. The objective is to replace
these governments with new leadership based on a certain interpretation of sharia. These individuals are to be considered key players with relatively extensive
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experience in established violence-promoting Islamist circles. In a broader context,
the main purpose of the violence-promoting activities is to end what is viewed as
foreign – often Western – occupation of Muslim land. Most players are thereby
assessed to have the intention of either participating in various ways themselves
(a small number of individuals) or through their activities supporting securitythreatening activities in other countries (a larger number of individuals).
Within both of these groups there are different views of which targets are considered to be legitimate and which are not. For example, more members believe that
it is legitimate to use violence against military targets than to use violence also
against civilians. Others believe that all targets are legitimate even if this involves
violence to citizens of their own country, including women and children. There are
also examples of individuals who intend to commit acts of violence against other
Muslims, such as those who belong to different religious denominations. This reflects an often overlooked fact that the greatest threat from violence-promoting
Islamist extremism, in global terms, is to other Muslims.
The individuals who travelled and plan to travel to conflict zones are assessed to
have the intention of joining violence-promoting Islamist extremist groups with
the aim of training for or participating in illegal acts of violence. This means that
they intend to contribute to and carry out acts of violence themselves, with the
aim of achieving the objectives of the recipient group. The majority of those who
recently travelled and succeeded in joining armed groups are assessed to currently
have no intention of returning to Sweden.
5.1.2 Security-threatening activities in Sweden
There are a small number of individuals assessed to have come so far in their radicalisation that they could develop the intent to resort to violence and carry out
attacks in Sweden. Factors that can influence them to develop such intent could,
for example, be events perceived to be provocative or insulting, either in their local
area or elsewhere in the world. There are also a few individuals who may possibly
act on the initiative of or orders from individuals outside Sweden.
A number of individuals in Sweden are assessed to be involved in the financing of
violence-promoting Islamist activities (see Section 4.2.3). It is assessed that they
intend to contribute to the financing of violence-promoting Islamist extremism in
e.g. Somalia and Iraq. This intent includes general support to groups and individuals (such as financial donations to the relatives of those captured or dead) as well
as more specific contributions to the travels of individuals or security-threatening
activities in a conflict zone.
Some of those active in Sweden also have a distinct intent to expand their own network by convincing others of the violence-promoting message and recruiting new
members. This may involve both general recruitment for networks in Sweden and
recruitment for special tasks or journeys in order to participate in illegal acts of
violence abroad.
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5.2The players’ capability
Currently, a small number of individuals in violence-promoting Islamist extremist
circles in Sweden are assessed to have the capability to carry out acts of violence
in the form of attacks. It is less likely that there are individuals who have the capability to carry out large-scale attacks. There are more individuals who have the
capability to carry out violent acts against people and property on a smaller scale,
although this does not include all of the just under 200 active individuals.
5.2.1Experience of using violence
A number of individuals in Sweden are confirmed to have experience of weapons
training and combat in other countries. Here, training does not refer to compulsory
military service, but rather combat and weapons training including the handling of
explosives with the aim of establishing the capability to carry out terrorist attacks.
Most of these individuals are currently outside Sweden. This group also includes a
number of individuals whose experience dates back to the 1990s, which is why it
is assessed as less relevant. However, relatively many of the active individuals are
assessed to have no or only very little capability in terms of training or experience
of combat and weapons handling.
5.2.2 Financial capability
Most of the active individuals have some financial capability. These range from
those with limited private finances to those with good access to financial means
through business activities, for instance. Good capability may also involve contacts
who can assist with fundraising, or contacts with distribution channels and funding intermediaries. Since this usually involves small sums, and the collection and
channelling of funds often takes place according to the principle “every little bit
helps”, economic capability does not necessarily mean having substantial private
means. A large number of the active individuals are therefore assessed to have at
least some financial capability. Another important aspect of economic capability is
the ability to get others to contribute financially. Individuals with this ability often
play on the sense of solidarity others have and their desire to help those who are
perceived to be in need, while the money may actually be used to support terrorist
activities.
5.2.3 Contact networks and capability to obtain equipment
Most of those with extensive experience of violence-promoting Islamist extremist
circles in Sweden, especially those with international experience and those who are
considered returnees, see Section 4.3.5, have access to significant contact networks.
These contact networks are both national and international. A small number of
players also have contacts in criminal groups outside the violence-promoting Islamist circles and thereby the capability to obtain various types of equipment, including weapons and explosives. In addition to this, there is information to indicate
that violence-promoting Islamist networks are cooperating more extensively than
before.
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Direct contacts also exist between individuals in Sweden and individuals at various
levels within foreign terrorist groups and networks (such as al-Shabaab in Somalia
and al-Qaida-related groups in the border zone between Afghanistan and Pakistan
as well as in Iraq and North Africa). Through their contacts, these individuals have
access to a broad spectrum of capabilities that benefit the activities. This may, for
instance, involve contacts that can assist those who want to travel abroad to join
an armed Islamist extremist group. These individuals can then, through their own
or other’s contacts, gain access to knowledge of travel routes, human smuggling
and document forgery, as well as distribution channels for false travel and identity
documents. In terms of financing, such contact networks may also provide distribution channels and recipients for the funds raised.
5.2.4 Capability to convince and recruit
As with the ability to get others to want to donate money, a number of individuals
are assessed to have a good personal ability to make contacts and to engage others.
These often have the responsibility for trying to recruit new members. Besides the
personal ability to establish contacts, a number of individuals also have access to
various kinds of platforms to spread messages and come into contact with others.
For example, through their function or professional role, some individuals have
both the authority and the opportunity to make personal contacts, or have access
to association facilities and similar physical platforms. Others have access to or operate and administer websites and other internet-based forums, channels that are
very valuable both for spreading the violence-promoting message and for recruitment. Since international contacts and experiences often provide a certain status
and authority, this should also be considered an important ability with regard to
the recruitment of new members.
5.3Factors deemed to affect the players’ intent and capability
The most recent issue of Europol’s annual terrorism report (TE-SAT 2010) confirms
that ethno-nationalist or separatist organisations are still behind an overwhelming
proportion of the terrorist attacks carried out in the EU. At the same time, the
Member States deem that Islamist motivated terrorism constitutes the greatest
threat, since it generally aims to carry out indiscriminate mass-casualty attacks.
Since the London bombings in 2005, no Islamist-motivated terrorist attacks
have been carried out anywhere in the European Union. However, a number of
attempted attacks or attack preparations have been detected and averted, several of
which were in the UK, Denmark and Germany. Together with an increasing number of explicit threats against Europe expressed in al-Qaida’s rhetoric and propaganda, these attempted attacks show a greater focus on Europe as the target of
attacks linked to violence-promoting Islamist extremist networks. The intended
approach in a number of cases also indicates that these players no longer strive for
spectacular and large-scale attacks only, but rather also use small-scale attacks carried out by individual perpetrators.
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Threat assessments for violence-promoting Islamist extremism vary significantly
between various EU countries, of which a handful are assessed to be facing a higher
threat level than others. It is impossible to say exactly how the threats to Sweden
and Swedish interests will develop in the future. There are, however, a number of
factors that may have an impact on the threat from violence-promoting Islamist
extremism. This section describes some key factors that may affect the intent and/
or capability of Swedish players. These influencing factors will probably remain
applicable in the next few years. However, it should be emphasized that the threats
to Sweden and Swedish interests concerning terrorism can be affected by more factors as well as by players with a different ideological conviction.
5.3.1 Foreign experiences and contacts
The most serious potential threat against Sweden is the long-term effects of individuals from Sweden choosing to travel abroad to join violence-promoting Islamist extremist groups and participate in training, and in some cases illegal acts of
violence, led by such groups.40 The Security Service has noted a recent increase in
such travel and currently sees no signs that the interest in joining foreign groups
is beginning to decline. Over the past five-year period, information indicates that
just over 30 individuals travelled from Sweden for this purpose. This development
is difficult for the Service to counter effectively. Under Swedish law, it is not illegal
to participate in training camps unless it can be proved that this constitutes preparation or conspiracy to commit a terrorist offence. The preventive talks held by
the Service in this context have also shown that it is difficult to influence people’s
intentions.
Although individuals have travelled from Sweden for the purpose of joining foreign
armed Islamist extremist groups since at least the 1990s, it is assessed that such travels could have more serious consequences to the threats to Sweden in the future.
One reason is that an increasing number of foreign groups who previously pursued
mainly a local or regional agenda are to a greater extent beginning to use reasoning
from global violence-promoting Islamist ideologies to justify their own activities.
The intent of the Swedish individuals who join these groups may be influenced to
the extent that more arenas and more targets are perceived as legitimate in the
fight to defend Islam (see Sections 1.4.3 and 4.1 for further discussions of targets
and objectives). Their capability can also of course be raised after a stay in a training
camp.
Many of the Swedish individuals who travelled to join foreign Islamist extremist
groups are not assessed to intend to return to Sweden in the foreseeable future,
but those who choose to return are assessed to constitute a potential threat from
several different perspectives. These “returnees” often play a special role by virtue
40 For a more detailed description of travel in order to join violence-promoting Islamist extremist groups, see Section
4.2.4.
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of the status they are given within violence-promoting Islamist circles. They often serve as role models and inspiration for others to travel or otherwise support
violence-promoting Islamist extremism themselves. Consequently, a returnee can,
intentionally or unintentionally, contribute to more extensive support activities in
Sweden. They can also convey knowledge and facilitate contacts between people in
Sweden and foreign violence-promoting Islamist extremist networks.
An extensive contact network can in itself pose a potential threat since existing
communication channels, which are currently mainly used for support, could in
the future also be used to plan attacks (if such intentions should exist). International experience shows that several attacks that were planned or carried out in the
EU in the 2000s were linked to individuals who participated in training camps run
by violence-promoting extremist networks outside Europe. This does not mean that
all returnees with such experiences will participate in the planning of attacks on
targets in Europe. It is however assessed that a situation involving a higher number
of returnees from foreign violence-promoting Islamist extremist groups could have
a negative effect on the threat to Sweden.
5.3.2 Perceived insults to Islam
In the autumn of 2007, drawings were published in Sweden that portrayed the
Prophet Mohammed as a dog. The artist and the editor-in-chief of the newspaper
that initially published the drawings were threatened, in some cases by people with
links to violence-promoting Islamist circles. The drawings were mentioned in both
national and international media and the issue was also discussed in forums on the
internet. The publication also received attention from a high level representative
of al-Qaida in Iraq, which meant that Sweden as a country was mentioned for the
first time in violence-promoting Islamist contexts. Since then, several cases of controversial portrayals of the Prophet Mohammed have received attention in Sweden,
most recently in the spring of 2010.
The reactions have targeted not only those seen as responsible for the various images, but also Sweden as a country. In some cases, the various targets of criticism
are not differentiated. Altogether, this indicates that foreign violence-promoting
Islamist players are probably paying more attention to Sweden and Swedish interests than before and that the view of Sweden has probably changed in a negative
direction. It is deemed possible that Sweden may in the future be seen as a country
that would typically insult Islam, similarly to the way several European countries,
including the Netherlands and Denmark, are seen. This may lead to an increase in
threatening statements against Sweden and Swedish interests, which in turn could
affect intent among Swedish as well as foreign players. In this respect, it is important to realise that it is how an incident is perceived, and described, that is important to the development of a potential threat, rather than what really happened.
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5.3.3 Swedish military efforts
Military efforts in Muslim countries have played a part in increasing the threat in
countries that contribute military troops. That said, the individuals this report concerns currently show little interest in Swedish military efforts. The Swedish military presence in northern Afghanistan does not appear to contribute to an increase
in radicalisation in any tangible way. Nor does Sweden’s involvement in military
efforts in Kosovo and off the Somali coast appear to have sparked more interest
among violence-promoting Islamist circles in Sweden. However, this could change
if Swedish soldiers or others with whom they cooperate are perceived to insult Islam or Muslims in any way.
5.3.4 Swedish politics
Violence-promoting Islamist networks in Sweden are generally relatively uninterested in Swedish politics. However, in some other European countries, the existence of xenophobic parties, as well as debates on bans on building minarets and
on clothes that cover one’s face, ultimately contribute to increasing radicalisation
in violence-promoting Islamist circles. Above all, it is a matter of whether society
and public debate are perceived to be increasingly polarised. Increased polarisation may reinforce the feeling of discrimination and stigmatisation among affected
groups, which may in turn facilitate radicalisation and recruitment of individuals
into violence-promoting groups.
5.4Threats against Sweden and Swedish interests with regard
to terrorism
Historically, the threat to Sweden and Swedish interests with regard to terrorism
has been low. However, for several years there have been certain exceptions to this
assessment, e.g. regarding Swedish interests in certain countries and certain foreign interests in Sweden. On 1 October 2010, the Security Service announced that
the threat level with regard to terrorism targeting Sweden had been raised, from a
low to an elevated threat level. The decision to raise the threat level was based on
documentation from the National Centre for Terrorist Threat Assessment (NCT).41
The NCT continuously assesses the threat to Sweden and Swedish interests, which
can consequently lead to a revision of the threat level.
The assessment of the elevated threat to Sweden was based on intelligence information regarding changes in the nature of activities in some groups in the country, activities that are assessed to target Sweden. The threat level was elevated in light of a
specific, but not immediate threat. Compared with some other European countries,
the threat level in Sweden is, however, still low. There is no information to indicate
an increased terrorist threat targeting Swedish interests in the rest of Europe.
41 The NCT is a permanent working group of the Counter-Terrorism Co-operation Council (for more information on
the Council, see Section 6.1.1). The NCT has representatives from the National Defence Radio Establishment, the
Military Intelligence and Security Directorate, and the Security Service.
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Note that Section 5.4, in contrast to the other sections of the report, is not limited
to covering solely violence-promoting Islamist extremism. The threat level indicated applies to the general threat from terrorism and is not broken down into ideological contexts.
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6Countering radicalisation
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As noted in Chapters 3-5, both radicalisation and other activities take place in violence-promoting Islamist circles in Sweden, although the threat from individuals
in these circles should not be exaggerated. This means that measures to counter
violence-promoting Islamist extremism and radicalisation should be prioritised,
and focus in this work should be on preventive measures with the aim of keeping
these phenomena from increasing. This may be coupled with measures to facilitate
leaving violence-promoting Islamist groups (de-radicalisation). Any such measures
should, however, be initiated and carried out by civil society players.42
The Security Service and other law enforcement agencies work under a clear and
limited mandate with regard to radicalisation and can therefore only contribute
individual puzzle pieces, not the entire solution. Effective prevention must take
place on different levels. This means that several society players have an opportunity and thereby a responsibility to be involved in the work to prevent and counter
radicalisation.
This chapter first gives some examples of Swedish and international initiatives that
describe various ways of handling the need to prevent and counter radicalisation.
This is followed by proposals and requested measures in this area, presented from
two perspectives: people speaking as stakeholders (in their capacity as representatives of Muslim interests or as individual, practicing Muslims), and people speaking
as professionals (in their capacity as, for instance, researchers, police officers, investigators or project managers). The chapter ends with a discussion of tools and
strategies enabling players at various levels and in various roles in society to contribute to countering radicalisation.
6.1Existing measures
The Government has commissioned two separate reports that aim to survey existing initiatives to prevent and counter violence-promoting extremism, both in
Sweden and internationally. The National Board for Youth Affairs has been commissioned to investigate activities that in various ways help young people leave
groups that promote threats and violence in order to achieve political objectives
(Government Decision IJ2009/2331/DEM). The Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR) has been commissioned to survey local efforts to counter
and address extremism (Government Decision IJ2009/2136/DEM). For a complete
survey and description of existing initiatives, please refer to these reports.43 The examples in Section 6.1 are taken from activities that the Security Service was already
aware of or became aware of during the work on this report.
42 De-radicalisation is discussed in more detail in Section 2.1.6.
43 Swedish National Board for Youth Affairs (2010). Avhopparverksamhet: Ungdomsstyrelsens analys och förslag på
hur samhället kan stödja unga avhoppare; [Help leaving extremism: National Board for Youth Affairs’ analysis and
proposals of how society can support young leavers] Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (2010).
Lokala insatser mot våldsbejakande politisk extremism: en exempelskrift. [Local measures against violence-promoting political extremism: examples.]
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6.1.1 Initiatives in Sweden
In Sweden, the Government has drawn up a national strategy to address the threat
from terrorism (Government Communication 2007/08:64), but in contrast to some
other countries, Sweden does not have any national strategy to counter the phenomenon of extremism or radicalisation as such.44 Although a majority of those who
have become radicalised or are active in violence-promoting Islamist extremism
have a connection to one of the metropolitan regions Stockholm, Gothenburg and
Malmö, the Security Service is not aware of any local or regional prevention efforts specifically targeting violence-promoting extremism. However, all three major cities actively engage in crime prevention efforts, often with a focus on juvenile delinquency and/or organised crime and criminal gangs. The examples below
therefore involve national initiatives carried out by government agencies or civil
society players, and which are more or less focused on preventing and countering
violence-promoting extremism. It should be emphasized that this is not an exhaustive description of preventive and counteractive measures in Sweden. The examples
are not arranged in any specific order and should not be perceived as action recommendations.
Counter-Terrorism Co-operation Council
The Counter-Terrorism Co-operation Council is a collaboration between 14 Swedish
government agencies with the objective of strengthening Sweden’s ability to counter terrorism.45 The Council was created on the initiative of the Security Service, the
Director General of which convenes the meetings and heads the Council’s work.
The first meeting was held in February 2005. The Council’s work involves drawing
up action plans for various events and incidents so as to strengthen interagency
coordination in the area.
In 2010, the Counter-Terrorism Co-operation Council primarily engaged in developing its work in light of the EU strategy to counter terrorism
and the Government’s national strategy to address the threat of terrorism.
Through this, the Council aims to improve the agencies’ collective ability to:
Prevent recruitment into terrorism
Avert threats from existing players
Protect from terrorism
Handle the consequences of a terrorist attack.
With regard to tools and strategies to counter radicalisation, the Council’s strategy
44 A nearby example is Denmark, whose action plan is described in more detail in Section 6.1.2.
45 The Economic Crime Authority, the National Defence Radio Establishment, the Armed Forces, the Prison and Probation Service, the Coast Guard, the Migration Board, the Civil Contingencies Agency, the National Police Board,
the Radiation Safety Authority, the Security Service, the Defence Research Agency, the Transport Agency, the
Customs and the Prosecution Authority.
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work to prevent recruitment into terrorism is of particular interest. It states that
for a terrorist attack to take place, individuals would have to adopt violence-promoting ideologies and be prepared to support or use ideologically motivated violence.
The preventive work therefore aims to reduce not only the established violencepromoting players’ ability to recruit, but also their potential recruitment base. The
idea is to make it more difficult for people who are already violence-promoting to
attract new supporters, and to make fewer people receptive to and attracted by
violence-promoting ideologies.
The Security Service’s outreach activities
The Security Service has conducted outreach activities since 2003. The objective of
these activities is to establish direct contacts with strategically important players
on the local level, such as community police, city district councils and associations.
One particular objective is to create good relationships with Sweden’s practicing
Muslims. In the wake of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and the prejudice that many Muslims then faced, and still face, the Security Service aims to show
that it is there to serve everyone, as an obvious cooperation partner. It is hoped
that the outreach activities will lead to a dialogue that will ultimately contribute to
countering potential outbreaks of radicalisation and extremism.
The outreach activities were initially conducted on a small scale, and the first contact was made with Muslim umbrella and national organisations. Over time and
through long-term trust-building measures, regular meetings have come to take
place with both national organisations and local congregations both in Stockholm
and in the rest of the country (based on the Security Service’s regional activities in
Umeå, Uppsala, Örebro, Gothenburg and Malmö).
Within the framework of the outreach activities, active efforts are also made to increase the knowledge of Islam in the Police. The community police, local decisionmakers and other public agencies concerned are also encouraged to increase their
own contact with Muslim groups so as to establish a better dialogue.
Outreach activities give the Security Service an opportunity to exchange knowledge
with important cooperation partners, and contribute to answering questions and
avoiding misunderstanding, which is a part of preventive efforts in a broader sense.
The experience shows the importance of the Security Service being able to offer
concrete support and help in various issues and thereby show that the cooperation
is based on more than just words. Through a long-term effort to build trust and
relationships with representatives of Muslim organisations, the Security Service
hopes to create a climate where radicalisation and violence-promoting extremism
can be prevented through cooperation.
Centre for information on destructive subcultures (CIDES)
The CIDES project, conducted at Fryshuset in Stockholm, aims to spread knowledge
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about “destructive subcultures” with the aim of preventing their occurrence, and
to reduce the recruitment to and facilitate leaving these circles. Examples of destructive subcultures include violence-promoting extremism, criminal gangs and
violent groups within football supporter clubs.
The project has set up a network with representatives from, for instance, the National Board of Health and Welfare, the Police, the Swedish Prison and Probation
Service, schools and universities, and decision-makers who work on various levels
with issues relating to young people. In the network, these people can exchange
experiences, identify problems together and work to find solutions.
In addition, young people have been involved in the work through the establishment of three youth councils in Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö. The objective
of the youth councils is for young people from disadvantaged environments – from
which members in destructive subcultures are often recruited – to concretise and
formulate the problems they experience in their daily lives and make suggestions
on how they believe problems should be addressed.
Initiatives to facilitate leaving certain groups
At Fryshuset, other projects are conducted to counter recruitment and make it easier for people to leave various violence-promoting circles. The oldest and therefore
probably most known project is Exit, which is based on a Norwegian initiative and
has existed since 1998. Exit aims to make it easier to leave white-power circles by
providing concrete support to young people who want to leave. This is done by providing contact persons, assistance in contacts with public agencies and help in establishing a new identity. Exit also provides counselling and training for professional
groups that work with young people, and gives support and guidance to parents of
young people who are active in white-power circles. Several those who work with
the project have a background in these circles themselves.
Passus is a sister project to Exit that, using the same method, seeks to facilitate leaving criminal gangs, support former gang members’ rehabilitation into society and
prevent young people from ending up in criminality. A part of this is supporting
their families. Here too, there are employees with personal experience, in this case,
experience of organised crime. Another organisation that to some extent can provide support to those who wish to leave such organisations is the volunteer organisation Kriminellas revansch i samhället, KRIS (Criminals’ Return into Society,
CRIS) that offers a new social network to addicts and criminals who wish to lead a
drug-free and honest life.
Hjälpkällan and Föreningen Rädda Individen (FRI) are examples of associations that
target those who wish to leave closed religious movements. From a crime prevention perspective, there is a large difference between these movements and criminal
gangs or violence-promoting extremist networks. However, since the convincing
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and recruitment processes often show major similarities with other kinds of extremism, learning from efforts to prevent recruitment to religious extremism is of
interest. Although these associations mainly offer support and help to leavers, they
also engage in information efforts and support to families. Like Exit and Passus,
many of the employees also have a background in a closed movement, although in
this case a religious one.
6.1.2 International initiatives
In the same way that the Swedish examples do not constitute a comprehensive description, the following presentation is not intended as a complete survey of international initiatives to counter radicalisation. An attempt at such a survey was made
in a UN report from 2008, where programmes and initiatives to counter radicalisation and extremism are described based on questionnaire answers from slightly
more than 30 Member States (CTITF 2008). Based on the responses received, the
report authors identified 11 action themes: cooperation with civil society, programmes focused on prisons, education, promotion of intercultural dialogue, handling of social and financial inequities, global programmes for countering radicalisation, measures to counteract radicalisation using the internet, changed legislation,
rehabilitation programmes, information efforts and educating public agencies engaging in measures to counter radicalisation.
In this section, three of these types of measures will be described more closely:
national action plans, training efforts for particularly affected professional groups
and rehabilitation programmes. This selection should not be perceived as a recommendation of these measures in preference to others, but rather is only one way of
showing various types of tools and strategies.
National action plans – Denmark and the UK
The Danish action plan A common and safe future, published in January 2009, aims
to prevent radicalisation and extremist perceptions from spreading among young
people (Government of Denmark 2009). It contains a large number of initiatives divided over seven focus areas, including direct contact with young people, dialogue
and information, efforts in disadvantaged residential areas as well as initiatives in
prisons. Some notable initiatives include a greater focus on radicalisation within
the SSP collaboration (schools, social services and police, who are often described as
key players in crime prevention in general), increased efforts to counter discrimination, enhanced democracy education, efforts in disadvantaged residential areas and
cooperation with sports clubs in these areas.
As early as in 2008, Denmark was appointed by the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove, as the leading country in the Union with regard to
de-radicalisation. This responsibility involves gathering and spreading knowledge
on de-radicalisation. In 2009, a project on targeted efforts for de-radicalisation was
launched, as part of the implementation of the first initiative of Denmark’s action
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plan. The project (which is predominantly financed by the European Commission)
is run by the Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs in
cooperation with the municipalities of Copenhagen and Aarhus, the East Jutland
Police and the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET). The objective of the
project is to develop individualised tools that can serve as support for young people
leaving extremist circles. The part of the project for which PET is responsible is to
develop a model for how PET can carry out preventive talks with young people in
extremist circles, while the other participants are responsible for developing mentorship programmes.
The UK action plan Preventing violent extremism – winning hearts and minds, published
in April 2007, is intended to strengthen collaboration with Muslim communities
and to isolate, prevent and defeat violent extremism (Department for Communities
and Local Government 2007). In many ways, the British action plan is an example
of a grassroots strategy since the majority of the proposals originate from local
players who themselves come into contact with radicalisation trends in their work
or their communities.
However, much of the local prevention work in the UK has been criticised for not
having achieved the desired results.46 According to critics, tax money has been
wasted on irrelevant or unfocused projects, either because the objective of the prevention work was misunderstood or because ambition and resources were lacking
at the local level. The effort has also been strongly criticised for having contributed
to stigmatising and alienating the UK’s Muslims since the initiatives focusing on
generally improving the social situation are packaged as a part of counter-terrorism
measures. Prevention work in the UK is therefore currently under review, and an
updated counter-terrorism strategy will be published in January 2011. It has already been stated that the review will result in a clear division between crime prevention measures (which the Home Office will remain in charge of) and measures
for improving integration (which will be led by local authorities).
Educational initiatives for especially concerned professional groups – community police and prison staff
Community Policing and Prevention of Radicalisation and Terrorism (COPPRA) is
a cooperative project between several European countries, and is financed by the
EU and Belgium. The COPPRA initiative was taken at a meeting of the Terrorism
Working Group (TWG)47 and the work is carried out by a number of EU countries,
including Sweden, under Belgian leadership. The project not only targets religious
extremism, but also right-wing and left-wing groups as well as other ideologically
motivated organisations that may use violence to achieve their objectives.
46 For example, see the committee report from the British House of Commons, Preventing violent extremism (2010).
47 The Terrorism Working Group (TWG) is a working group of the European Council that handles terrorism issues in
Europe. The composition of the TWG delegation group varies. The Swedish representatives in the TWG are from
the Swedish Security Service.
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In its first phase, COPPRA aimed to create a tool enabling police on patrol duty to
detect early signs of radicalisation, to develop a training manual for this purpose
and to identify good examples from various countries. At a meeting in Antwerp in
September 2010, a training package was presented containing a description of radicalisation processes and information on how to establish relationships with the
local community. The objectives for the first phase of the project were assessed to
have been achieved. The material will now be translated into the official languages
of the EU, and will be distributed to the member countries around the beginning of
2011. At the same meeting, a follow-up project was also initiated (COPPRA II) which
is now in the implementation phase. The project aims to train five or six national
instructors from each country so that they can then train police officers in their
respective countries. Sweden will probably participate in this follow-up project
through the National Police Board and the Security Service.
In 2008, a trilateral project was carried out in the same spirit as COPPRA called
Violent Radicalisation: Recognition of and Responses to the Phenomenon by Professional Groups Concerned. The project was carried out by France, Germany and
Austria with the objective of preparing a handbook concerning radicalisation into
violence-promoting extremism in prisons. The handbook is intended for use by
the EU Member States in training personnel working in and around prison environments so that they will be able to identify and address signs of radicalisation
in prisons. The handbook will be a living document and, in the same way as with
COPPRA’s training packages, each country decides if and how they wish to use the
material. Sweden participated, through the Swedish Prison and Probation Service
and the Security Service, in several of the conferences arranged in connection with
the preparation of the handbook.
Rehabilitation and readjustment programmes
In several countries – including Saudi Arabia, Singapore and Malaysia – there are
national programmes that offer psychotherapy, vocational training and religious
education to individuals having been involved in violence-promoting Islamist extremism. Several of these programmes have been influenced by Saudi Arabia’s
de-radicalisation initiatives, since the Saudi rehabilitation and readjustment programmes are those that have been around the longest (since 2004) and are the most
well-financed (Boucek 2008, p. 3). The objective is for those who participate in these
programmes to be de-radicalised and at the same time receive help to return to and
be integrated into society, and to prevent a new generation from becoming radicalised. However, opinions differ as to how effective these programmes are in general.
In Saudi Arabia, a strategy was chosen that is based on providing in-depth knowledge of Islam so as to counteract the ideological messages spread by violence-promoting Islamist extremist groups. Another important element in the de-radicalisation programmes, besides teaching Islam, is psychology studies. The message being
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conveyed to the participants is that they were misled by people who distorted Islam (Boucek 2008, pp. 4, 12). The de-radicalisation efforts in Saudi Arabia initially
focused on prisoners who were assessed to sympathise with a violence-promoting
Islamist ideology, but who had themselves not directly participated in terrorism.
The original target group has since been expanded to also include Saudi citizens
who had been imprisoned at the Guantanamo base and returnees with experience
of combat and illegal acts of violence in Iraq (Porges 2010).
The elements of the de-radicalisation programme that mainly concern readjustment to society also provide assistance in seeking a job or returning to a previous
one. Social assistance may also mean that the prisoners’ families receive financial
support while the breadwinner is in prison so that extremist networks will not be
given the opportunity to offer that help (Boucek 2008, pp. 15, 19-20). Over time, the
participants’ families were increasingly involved so as to contribute to preventing
their family member from relapsing into extremist activities after release (Porges
2010).
Saudi Arabia’s de-radicalisation work has received both praise and criticism. In
June 2010, the Saudi Ministry of the Interior admitted that some 25 of the 120
former Guantanamo prisoners that had undergone the programme had resumed
violence-promoting Islamist extremist activities after release. Of those who had
relapsed, 11 are assessed to have fled to Yemen and joined al-Qaida in the Arabian
Peninsula. At the same time, the Saudi authorities believe that the total proportion
of programme participants who have relapsed into violence-promoting extremism
is only between 10 and 20 per cent. However, it is currently too early to say anything about the long-term effects of the programme (Wagner 2010; Porges 2010).
6.2Requests for and concerns regarding measures
This section presents the measures requested from a stakeholder perspective and a
professional perspective.48 First, there is a presentation of the requests for and the
concerns regarding measures that have emerged in the discussions on violence-promoting Islamist extremism and radicalisation that have been held with representatives for Muslim interests and individual practicing Muslims. After that follows a
description of requests and thoughts that were presented by the participants in the
Security Service’s workshop and in reports and studies. The requests and proposals
presented in Section 6.2 are based on the proposers’ own descriptions of reality and
are not necessary shared by the Security Service. However, including more proposals than just those backed by the Security Service is important as this exposes
the differences in opinion and perspective that to a certain extent characterise the
debate about these issues.
48 For more information on the Security Service’s external collaboration during the work on the report, see Section
1.2.3.
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6.2.1 From a stakeholder perspective
One of the matters discussed in the Security Service’s dialogue with those representing a stakeholder perspective is what tools and measures they would like various
bodies in society to make use of in order to counter radicalisation. Other issues that
have been discussed are whether practicing Swedish Muslims should be involved in
the work against potential radicalisation, and whether anybody other than practicing Muslims can work actively against radicalisation in a good way.
The proposals, requests and points of view presented by a majority of the meeting
participants are grouped and summarised under the headings below.
Countering exclusion
In many conversations, the significance of countering segregation and exclusion
was emphasized since these factors are perceived to increase the likelihood that
people will become radicalised. Through greater integration, it would be possible
to prevent and counter radicalisation.
Exclusion in segregated suburban areas with high unemployment rates is generally
seen as a breeding ground for radicalisation by making young people easily influenced and full of hatred. This makes it easier for those within violence-promoting
Islamist groups to recruit young people. Many people therefore believe that increasing the number of youth centres and giving them more resources, especially in the
suburbs, are important measures that could prevent and counter radicalisation. It
is also important to employ staff who can reach out to young people.
Creating more jobs is also perceived as necessary since unemployment is considered to lead to exclusion, and thereby risks leading to radicalisation. Immigrants,
both men and women, must be given better chances to enter the labour market.
More jobs, especially among young people, are seen as a key factor in countering
radicalisation.
The meeting participants also spoke a great deal about housing policy and the importance of all immigrants not being gathered in one place. People must be given
the chance to move from areas with a high immigrant population, and the municipalities concerned are considered to have a responsibility for ensuring that this
is possible.
Schools and the educational system
Schools are considered as possibly the single most important integration-promoting platform. A majority of the meeting participants believe the schools to play an
extremely important role in preventing and countering radicalisation, since efforts
are assumed to be more effective the earlier they are applied. Opinions differ with
regard to the role schools should play. Some believe that independent religious
schools are an important tool in combating radicalisation because students learn
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about Islam from an early age. Others believe that such schools should be prohibited because they are an obstacle to integration with Swedish society and may
therefore ultimately lead to radicalisation.
However, in general, most of the meeting participants believe that better knowledge of Islam can prevent and counter radicalisation. Several people pointed out
in this context that teaching materials in Swedish schools contain substandard information on Islam. By improving the quality of education, the risk is reduced that
young people will later on be attracted by recruiters who use religious reasoning.
One suggestion is to invite school and university students to mosques with the aim
of teaching them the basics of Islam.
Increasing school funding is also considered something that could reduce the risk
of schools becoming future platforms for recruitment. The meeting participants
believe in continuity in investments in schools and education. All children should
feel that they are equal, regardless of religion or ethnic identity. It is also thought
that young people who are not successful at school may become more receptive to
recruitment. Swedish language skills are also important in increasing integration
and thereby reducing the risk of young people becoming radicalised.
The training of imams was also discussed at the meetings. Many people agree that
there should be an imam training programme in Sweden that ensures Swedish
language skills and knowledge of Swedish legislation, combined with comprehensive religious training.
Information initiatives
The meeting participants would like to see more information and training initiatives also on a general level. Ignorance often leads to fear of what is foreign. Many
Swedes who are not Muslims themselves lack knowledge of Islam, which increases
the risk of misunderstandings. Many meeting participants see it as problematic
that the debate is often focused on what separates Muslims from non-Muslims,
when there are actually more similarities than differences. Outsiders’ insufficient
knowledge of this religion can then reinforce Muslims’ feeling of exclusion. Proposals presented in this context are therefore to let Muslims lecture on Islam at, for
instance, workplaces, schools, municipalities and county councils.
The meeting participants also believed that Swedish public agencies and those who
work with young people need more knowledge about violence-promoting groups.
Many of them do not see radicalisation as a major problem, and also do not appear
to be aware of its potential danger. It is not until something does happen that they
react and then it may be too late.
Another proposal is to translate foreign materials on the internet that, for instance,
explain why suicide attacks are wrong according to Islam. At present, it is very
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easy to find materials on various websites that basically glorify suicide attacks. By
making materials available that point to the opposite, it would be possible to reach
out to and hopefully influence many young people. Muslim associations can also
establish forums, on the internet and elsewhere, where young people can openly
discuss and vent radical opinions as well.
Other requests for informational efforts concern immigrants’ need for information
about society in general and information about social services and citizen’s rights
in Sweden in particular. Many of those who live in the suburbs do not know enough
about how society works, which can lead to misunderstandings. One example given
in this context was that many people with an immigrant background are themselves afraid of the police, and thus when their children get into trouble they do
not dare to ask the authorities for help to address the problems. Immigrants receive some information about society when they come to Sweden, but because this
is provided at an early phase, it is difficult to take in everything that is important.
Consequently, follow-up and further education in this area was requested.
Mass media
Mass media are perceived to play an important role in terms of countering radicalisation. They are perceived as reporting only on negative aspects of Islam and Muslims, which leads to frustration and a feeling of exclusion, mainly among young
people. The meeting participants therefore wished to see more nuanced media reporting that also portrays the suburbs in a positive light and not only emphasizes
what is negative. A concrete suggestion is for the media to portray good role models, such as former criminals who succeeded in leaving a life of crime behind them
or people from the suburbs who succeeded in life. Another suggestion is that the
media maintain continuous contact with Muslim associations, not only in connection with events giving major media attention to Islam and Muslims.
Muslim players
As to who can and should work against radicalisation, most meeting participants
believe that Muslim representatives should absolutely be involved. However, opinions differed as to whether this work should be handled solely by Swedish Muslims
or in cooperation with other players.
Some believed that this work would achieve greater legitimacy if initiated by the
Muslims themselves. Religious reasoning used by people who are not practicing
Muslims may lose legitimacy and, in a worst case scenario, risks having the opposite effect. One possibility is to hold open discussions in connection with the Friday
prayer, in which thousands of Muslims participate each week. This means that messages presented by the imams would reach a very large audience. A problem that
many brought up is that most imams work on a volunteer basis and therefore do
not have much time to devote to working against radicalisation.
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Others believe that cooperation between Muslim and other players in Swedish society is important, and that everyone has an obligation to counter radicalisation.
Faiths other than the Muslim faith should also work against radicalisation, and the
risk of stigmatisation decreases if various faiths work together. The meeting participants also wish for greater understanding from the politicians for the fact that
the Muslim associations work towards the same goals as Swedish authorities, but
that they lack sufficient resources. Several representatives of Muslim interests say
that they have good cooperation with Swedish authorities, but express frustration
over the fact that this often only takes place on the initiative of the Muslim representatives. Contacts between Muslim representatives and social authorities are
perceived as particularly important, and should preferably be established before
problems arise.
In this context, the Security Service’s outreach activities were also mentioned in
positive terms. However, some representatives presented the opinion that it feels
odd, and sometimes also stigmatising, that the only contact Muslim associations
have with Swedish authorities is with the Security Service.
6.2.2 From a professional perspective
The participants in the workshop arranged by the Security Service discussed what
can and should be done to counter radicalisation, and which players can and should
lead and be responsible for the work on preventing and countering radicalisation.
The workshop participants represented professional categories and specialist competencies in various ways relevant to these issues. The proposals presented in the
discussions have been supplemented in this section with thoughts and ideas from
written sources in the form of studies, reports, articles, etc. If there is no source
reference, it means that the proposals were presented verbally at the workshop.
The proposals, requests and points of view presented by several people and written
sources have been grouped and summarised in the headings below.
Schools and the educational system
Also from a professional perspective schools are described as the arena where it
is the easiest and most effective to work preventively. Far too many young people
do not succeed in school, and schools are poor at helping wayward youths. This
can make these young people more receptive to recruitment attempts and thereby
create a breeding ground for radicalisation.
Radicalisation can also be reinforced by conspiratorial and dualistic thinking with
simplified models of what people are like. Several workshop participants consequently believe that schools should instruct in such a way that young people learn
to avoid simplified truths. Schools should also teach more about being critical of
sources. These recommendations are also presented in a report by a British thinktank where the authors suggest a review of the extent to which the educational
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system provides young people with the necessary knowledge and ability to handle
false information (Bartlett & Miller 2010, pp. 38–39).
Information initiatives
The importance of information and education in general was also emphasized at
the workshop. People in professional categories that work directly with disadvantaged young people (such as police officers, teachers, social workers and leisuretime centre staff) need knowledge of how extremist groups operate in order to do
a good job, because early identification of those at risk is of central importance in
prevention. Personal commitment in these roles is also necessary in order to succeed, which makes it important to identify and encourage real enthusiasts so that
the right people work with young people. This work should also be valued higher.
In terms of information directed at young people for preventive purposes, the importance of presenting it by promoting other alternatives is emphasized. Evaluations of drug prevention work were said, for example, to have shown that it is not
effective to go out and talk about what young people should not do, since this often
leads to them doing exactly that. Similarly, it has turned out that information to
young people on right-wing extremism has led to them becoming interested in
those very circles.
Access to alternative information is described by workshop participants as the best,
and perhaps the only, antidote to radicalisation that a democratic society can utilise. Consequently, the most effective way to counter distrust and misunderstanding may perhaps not be government information campaigns, but rather greater
openness. This allows everyone to form their own conclusions and may contribute
to positive ideas being spread among people (Bartlett, Birdwell & King 2010, p. 45).
During the workshop, the need for open arenas and free opinion building was also
emphasized. Society must be open to legitimate forms of protest, even if this could
have foreign policy implications. Accordingly, it must be possible in a society to
allow people to be radical, have deviating opinions and make a difference without
this having serious or violent consequences.
Public players
According to the workshop participants, public players (public agencies, municipalities and county councils) have an obvious responsibility to ensure that schools,
housing and leisure-time activities are functional in this context. An opinion often
expressed is that greater integration in the long run prevents radicalisation into
violence-promoting Islamist extremism. Some researchers point to a difference between the US and Europe in this respect. Most Muslims in the US have succeeded,
to a higher degree than in Europe, in establishing an identity that consists of being
both Muslim and American (Atran 2010, p. 5), or in some cases being even more
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locally rooted, such as being a “Texas Muslim”.49 During the Security Service’s workshop, opinions were also presented that more steps should be taken to strengthen
a Swedish Muslim identity.
An important point to take a stand on is also who is responsible for countering and
preventing radicalisation. Most believe that teamwork is needed, where as many
players in society as possible are involved. Since a majority of those who have been
radicalised and are active in violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden
have a connection to one of the metropolitan regions of Stockholm, Gothenburg
and Malmö (see Section 4.4), workshop participants also see an opportunity for the
three metropolises to take special responsibility for preventing violence-promoting
Islamist extremism. Having a clearly designated public agency or function with
responsibility for radicalisation issues is perceived to have both advantages and
disadvantages, however. In terms of results, it may be a positive thing (for example,
see Ranstorp 2010, pp. 9-10), although several workshop participants point out that
such a designation risks exaggerating the problem. This can in itself have negative
consequences.
Several workshop participants emphasize the possibility of many society players
contributing to preventing radicalisation in a violence-promoting Islamist context
by having a continuous dialogue with representatives of Muslim interests. This can
create a joint preparedness for handling potential crises and conflicts that could
result in increasing radicalisation. Examples of such crises include media-covered
events that may have an effect on young people’s receptiveness to radicalisation
and recruitment (for example, see Section 3.3) and on acceptance of ideologically
motivated acts of violence. In such an event, contacts between authorities and Muslim representatives should be intensified so that they can act quickly and thereby
make it difficult for extremists to take advantage of the situation. The importance
of continuous contact and personal relationships, with police authorities and security services as well, was emphasized by several participants. Trust is often based
on human contact rather than on what services a public agency provides (Bartlett
& Miller 2010, s. 42).
Mass media
Mass media’s significance and responsibility are also emphasized, both concerning
the issues that they choose to focus on and how these issues are described and
packaged. International researchers (see for instance Horgan 2008, p. 91) also believe that one can hardly overestimate the media’s significance in these contexts
or their possibility of preventing new recruitment to violence-promoting networks
and groups by not romanticising the activities conducted by these networks. The
participants in the workshops feel that the media should illustrate integration
49 For example, see the work conducted by the Freedom and Justice Foundation in Texas, http://www.freeandjust.
org.
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issues from a positive perspective in order to show the opportunities and good examples that exist.
Muslim players
The role of Muslim players was the subject of much discussion during the workshop. It is important to enhance the initiatives to counter radicalisation taken by
imams, congregations and other Muslim players, since one way to minimise the
risk of polarisation is for Muslim players to be given a broader role in the prevention work. That Muslim congregations function as social bridge-builders in integration work is also one of the results in a study of more than 100 Swedish Muslim
congregations (Borell & Gerdner 2009). Current research also shows with increasing
clarity that a high degree of religious fervour probably contributes to reducing violent tendencies, which makes more in-depth religious studies appear as a way that
can lead to a rejection of violence (Githens-Mazer et al. 2010, p. 44).
However, the messenger is often just as important as the message. While it is important for public agencies to cooperate with and strengthen Muslim players, there
is a risk that the Muslim players’ credibility will be negatively impacted if they
are perceived to be too closely linked to the state. The British think-tank Quilliam
Foundation can be said to illustrate this dilemma. It was founded by two people
who themselves have a background in a radical Islamist movement that they have
now left. They describe themselves as the world’s first counter-extremist thinktank and strive to counter violence-promoting Islamist extremism by challenging
its ideological message.50 Quilliam has to date received extensive support from the
British government, but has also had to face some criticism, in part because they
are not perceived to have the support of British Muslims in general (Kerbaj 2009).
Consequently, in a report from another British think-tank, public agencies are recommended to refrain from defining what is “good” and “bad” Islam to the furthest
possible extent. This can lead to a number of negative consequences, including reducing the credibility of the “good” representatives (Bartlett, Birdwell & King 2010,
pp. 14, 23). People active in violence-promoting Islamist extremism see the Western
World and those who represent it as the enemy. Therefore, for a message to reach
them, it must come from somebody who is a part of Islam’s symbolic world and
be expressed in religious rhetoric (Kühle & Lindekilde 2010, p. 128). Credibility can
also be linked to being locally based, expressed by Scott Atran as: de-radicalisation,
just like radicalisation, functions better from the bottom up than from the top
down (Atran 2010, p. 7).
At the Security Service’s workshop, it was pointed out that even the label “Muslims”
must be discussed as an issue. The people to whom the term refers are in many re-
50 For more information, see http://www.quilliamfoundation.org.
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spects more different from each other than from those who could be labelled as
“non-Muslims”. Public officials must therefore be aware of this representativity
problem, and not only speak with one single organisation or group. For the same
reasons, non-religious, local leaders should also be involved as partners (Bartlett,
Birdwell & King 2010, pp. 15–16).
Lessons learned from work in other contexts
A recurring theme during the workshop was that all kinds of extremism share similarities, regardless of what ideology they are based on. Above all, radicalisation
and recruitment processes as well as the recruitment base are the same regardless
of extremist group. Which subculture a person is drawn into depends to some extent on which subculture is established in the place where the person lives. Therefore, it is important that violence-promoting Islamist extremism is not associated
with the religion of Islam, but that focus is instead on extremism in itself. For the
same reason, it should be possible to design joint countermeasures, regardless of
what kind of extremism is involved.
Violence-promoting Islamist extremism should in other words be countered in the
same way as other kinds of violence-promoting extremism. It must to some extent
also be treated the same way as other kinds of crime, such as criminal street gangs.
The similarities between a life in gang criminality and a life in violence-promoting
extremism relate both to the way recruitment takes place and the dynamics that
exist in the group (Bartlett, Birdwell & King 2010, p. 15). In addition to experience
exchange, therefore, a British report proposes that there should be a formalisation
of cooperation between radicalisation prevention and counter-gang professionals
on multiple levels. This could involve everything from mixed-personnel working
units and joint action programmes to senior staff transfer and joint strategic planning (Bartlett, Birdwell & King 2010, p. 42).
Previous experience from working to counter recruitment for criminal gangs
shows that intervention should occur as early as possible. In terms of young people,
schools, police and social services – together with parents – are very important
players (SOU 2010:15, p. 55). Research has also shown that besides personal motivation, a stimulating job and a stable and close romantic relationship are two circumstances that are of significance in a person’s choice to abandon crime (SOU 2010:15,
pp. 134–135). During the Security Service’s workshop, it was said that people rarely
leave extremist circles due to ideological doubts, but rather due to a longing for a
quieter life. Regardless of the context, living in a radical environment is reportedly
often very stressful.
Former criminals have also said that the support from people they have confidence
in has been of major importance in managing to leave criminality (SOU 2010:15, p.
134). Constructive, trusting relationships are also the whole basis for the projects
and organisations that provide help for those leaving religious movements or criViolence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden
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minal groups (also see Section 6.1). Exit is currently the only known organisation
whose explicit focus is to support those who wish to leave or have left violence-promoting extremist groups (National Board for Youth Affairs 2010, Appendix 2, p. 13).
In other words, there is no formal organisation in Sweden that conducts activities
explicitly and specifically focused on facilitating for those who wish to leave violence-promoting Islamist extremist groups. However, there are activities and targeted efforts in some unofficial contexts towards people whom those in their surroundings feel have adopted an unacceptable view on ideologically motivated violence.
In terms of an expansion of such leaving-support activities, a varied picture is given
by the National Board for Youth Affairs needs analysis. The need for support to those
leaving white-power circles is clear, while there are conflicting views as regards
support to those leaving autonomous networks. Responses related to the need for
support for those leaving violence-promoting Islamist extremist groups, however,
give the most unclear picture. The respondents in the National Board for Youth
Affairs questionnaire found it difficult to imagine what leaving violence-promoting
Islamist extremism would involve. The issue has also been perceived as provocative
and as an attempt on the part of society to help people leave Islam. The responses
instead describe a need for better prevention efforts, such as in the form of dialogue and education-based efforts and general integration enhancement measures
(National Board for Youth Affairs 2010, Appendix 2, p. 38).
6.2.3Reflections on joint requests and proposals
The idea of presenting the requests and proposals in Section 6.2 divided into a stakeholder perspective and a professional perspective is to see if there are any significant differences between these groups. Do they see or focus on different things
depending on whether they face these issues in their capacity as professionals or
otherwise in their daily activities? However, the general impression is that there
are more similarities than differences in the problem descriptions, proposed strategies and tools.
Perhaps the most frequently occurring theme in both perspectives is that both radicalisation and violence-promoting Islamist extremism are reinforced, although not
directly created, by segregation and perceived exclusion. Integration enhancement
efforts were therefore proposed from both perspectives as a general preventive
measure, and enhanced integration was consequently not only assumed to prevent
radicalisation, but also criminality in general. Examples of such measures primarily concerned labour market policy, housing policy, social service issues and measures to ensure the provision of constructive leisure activities.
There is general consensus as well concerning the central preventive role of schools,
especially in preventing young people from being drawn into violence-promoting
extremist circles. More resources for schools and thereby more help for disadvantaged students is therefore a general proposal. However, views differed in terms of
more specific measures. From a professional perspective, the possibility of offering
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better training in source criticism and information evaluation is discussed. However, those in the stakeholder group would like to see better education on Islam in
Swedish schools. Not only is knowledge of religion one way of making it more difficult for recruiters to mislead young people, but knowledge is also a way of avoiding
misunderstandings based on an erroneous view of Islam.
It is also generally expressed that teamwork is required, involving many players, to
prevent radicalisation and violence-promoting extremism. Both perspectives view
Muslim players as central. Depending on how one views the prevention work, however, the necessary composition of players varies. Some people from the stakeholder perspective feel that it is only up to Muslim players to counter radicalisation
since the necessary religious arguments cannot be used by non-believers.
In conclusion, there is a general concern that Muslims may be stigmatised. All steps
to counter and prevent radicalisation in violence-promoting Islamist circles must
be taken in such a way that they do not in themselves contribute to increasing radicalisation. In this context, the significance and responsibility of the mass media
are emphasized. A continuous dialogue between Swedish authorities and Muslim
associations is mentioned as an example of how the risk of misunderstanding can
be minimised.
6.3Proposals for tools and strategies
The proposals for tools and strategies to counter radicalisation presented here by
the Security Service are based on three basic conclusions. Firstly, security-threatening activities in the form of violence-promoting Islamist extremism and radicalisation take place in this context in Sweden today, and constitute a concrete threat to
people in other countries as well as a potential threat to people in Sweden. Secondly,
the existence of both radicalisation and violence-promoting Islamist extremism is
currently limited in Sweden. Nor are there any indications in the Security Service’s
material that the number of people radicalised or the total number of active individuals is on the way up. Thirdly, there are significant similarities in how and why
people become radicalised, regardless of their ideological affiliation.
Based on these conclusions, efforts to prevent and counter violence-promoting Islamist extremism and radicalisation should be prioritised, with a focus on preventive
measures. The objective of prioritising measures to prevent radicalisation and violence-promoting Islamist extremism is to stop these phenomena from growing into
major problems for society. Efforts to facilitate de-radicalisation, such as activities
to help those leaving extremist circles, may function as a complement to prevention efforts, but should not constitute the main strategy. Measures for facilitating
de-radicalisation are also problematic in that they risk having the opposite effect
by driving radicalisation instead. Prevention instead of trying to de-radicalise active
individuals is also more resource-effective. Firstly, prevention reduces the need for
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resource-intensive measures in the future, and secondly, de-radicalisation is more
difficult and thereby more expensive than prevention.
The similarities noted between various kinds of violence-promoting extremism,
and to some extent criminality in general, mean that there are also both economic
and efficiency benefits in coordinating prevention work. Measures designed to prevent and counter violence-promoting extremism in general also have the advantage
of not stigmatising a single group and therefore do not risk serving as a driver of
radicalisation.
A clear preventive and general crime-prevention focus in the work to counter radicalisation highlights the limitations of the legal system and the opportunities, and
thereby responsibilities, of other society players when it comes to contributing to
preventing violence-promoting extremism in all its forms.
To highlight the responsibilities of various players, the proposals are presented
based on a division into the categories of national players, regional and local players, civil society players and all citizens of society.
National players
In both theoretical literature on radicalisation and the Security Service’s own material (see Section 3.1.3), experiences of exclusion and discrimination, together with
segregation and unemployment, are some of the most commonly occurring drivers of radicalisation. This has also been noted in the Security Service’s external
collaboration (see Section 6.2). Improving people’s situation in terms of employment, housing and education thereby appears to be one of the major and overall
tasks of national players. Measures that promote integration are assessed to reduce
not only people’s receptivity to radicalisation and recruitment attempts by established players in violence-promoting Islamist extremism, but also the risk that young
people radicalise each other for a lack of more constructive leisure-time activities.
Measures for improving people’s circumstances also serve not only to combat radicalisation in violence-promoting Islamist circles, but often function in a crime-prevention capacity in general. The report on local efforts against violence-promoting
extremism prepared by the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions
(SALAR) also confirms that broad preventive and promotive efforts are the most
successful in the long term (SALAR 2010, p. 39).
As perceived stigmatisation of Muslims as a group can act as a driver of radicalisation (see Section 2.1), steps should be taken to reduce the ‘us-and-them’ feeling.
National players, together with players from civil society, therefore have a responsibility to contribute to strengthening people’s identity as Swedish Muslims.
In the Security Service’s external collaboration, the importance of dialogue and
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vention work, was emphasized from both perspectives. For the dialogue to be credible and create trust, it is important to establish contacts at an early stage, before
an urgent need for communication arises. This point is also reflected in SALAR’s
publication under the heading “Always collaborate – not just when it is absolutely
necessary” (SALAR 2010, p. 38). Cultivated contact channels and trusting relationships can be decisive to the outcome of crisis situations in a critical phase. This probably also applies to earlier stages in a course of events. However, dialogue should
not only take place with established players, but also with young people, with the
aim of getting them involved in the work of improving their situation.
Regional and local players
In many places in Sweden, established crime-prevention work and measures against
recruitment to e.g. criminal gangs are already in place at a local level. Approaches
to radicalisation, regardless of political or religious context, and how it can be prevented and countered could be included in this work to a greater extent. Such initiatives may be of particular use to the metropolitan regions of Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö since a majority of those who are involved in violence-promoting
Islamist extremism have connections to one of these regions (see Section 4.4.3).
Based on the Security Service’s material, it is also apparent that for most people
who are radicalised, this process is initiated at a relatively young age (see Section
3.1.1). Preventive measures should therefore primarily target young people, who
are also described as the most receptive to radicalisation attempts. In contrast to
other violence-promoting extremist groups, individuals in violence-promoting Islamist networks also continue to be active as they get older (see Sections 3.1.1 and
4.4.1). In other words, this commitment is not a typical teenage phenomenon that
active members will grow out of, which again highlights the importance of measures aiming to prevent people from becoming radicalised.
As countermeasures are always more effective the earlier they are applied, close
cooperation between schools, social services and the community police in terms of
exchanging information and drawing on each other’s knowledge is a critical success factor for effective preventive efforts at the local level. If possible, this work
should also be conducted across sectors and be based on the needs of the individuals. In this context, SALAR encourages local players to focus on the individual, not
the ideology (SALAR 2010, pp. 38-39).
Schools are unanimously described in the Security Service’s collaboration as important arenas for formative work that can contribute to preventing radicalisation
(see Section 6.2). Concrete examples of measures include teaching critical thinking,
analysis of propaganda techniques and credibility assessment of internet sites.
Schools also need to be given sufficient financial and professional resources in order to handle the debate on violence-promoting extremism in various forms, when
considered necessary.
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Besides schools, access to youth centres and meaningful leisure-time activities is a
way of promoting constructive life choices and thereby preventing young people
from becoming receptive to radicalisation and recruitment attempts. Promoting
constructive social contexts for young people is a way of reducing the risk of them
being pulled into a radicalisation process, because social ties appear as one of the
most common ways that people come into contact with violence-promoting Islamist networks. This is indicated by both research (see Section 2.1.2) and in the Security Service’s material (see Section 4.4.5).
An important endeavour in many metropolitan areas is the contact-creation efforts
conducted by community police and community workers. By being out evenings
and weekends and “talking with those who want to talk with us”51, they have the
possibility of getting to know the young people and over time developing a trust
that, in extension, can contribute to preventing and countering radicalisation.
Schools, social services and police are all examples of institutions where it is crucial to have the right people in outreach and contact-creating functions. These
people should possess both authority and legitimacy, mainly with young people,
and should also be passionate about these issues. In order to ensure their continued
commitment, it is important to raise the status of this preventive work. At the same
time, there has to be a balance, so as not to jeopardise the continuity and effectiveness of the efforts by making them too dependent on certain individuals.
Beyond the general prevention efforts, the “SSP players” (schools, social services
and police) also have a responsibility to identify, as early as possible, which young
people are at risk of adopting violence-promoting ideologies, and which young
people are viewed as leaders who could entice others into violence-promoting contexts. The Security Service’s information indicates that many of the young people
who have been radicalised have undergone their radicalisation process in a gang
of friends (see Section 3.2.1). Experiences from the Netherlands and the UK (see
Sections 2.1.4 and 4.7.4) indicate that violence-promoting Islamist extremism in
these countries largely emerges around a number of charismatic leaders. Identifying these early on, in order to apply countermeasures, could thereby prevent more
young people from being drawn into violence-promoting extremist contexts.
In order to do so, those who work with young people in schools, the social services
and the police need to be equipped with knowledge of violence-promoting ideologies and what form radicalisation and recruitment processes can take, something
that emphasizes the importance of information and training efforts in this area.
51 Quote from a participant in the Security Service’s workshop.
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Civil society players
SALAR’s report emphasizes that the work to prevent radicalisation and violencepromoting extremism must be conducted through several different channels and
from several different perspectives at the same time in order to be effective (SALAR
2010, p. 39). Civil society players are very important in this context, as emphasized
from both perspectives in the Security Service’s external collaboration. The strong
Swedish tradition of engaging in associations may, for example, play an important
role in that cooperation between people and groups from different backgrounds
and contexts generally contributes to greater understanding and diversity. Today,
there are already numerous examples of active collaboration and interaction between various associations, but further commitment and cooperation should be encouraged, including cooperation between various faiths (see for example the House
of God project in SALAR 2010, p. 34). Cooperation between Muslim and non-Muslim
associations can also contribute to creating and strengthening a Swedish Muslim
identity. Sports clubs, where many young people are active, are important in this
context.
It is evident both from the Security Service’s material and from external contacts
that Swedish Muslims have a particular role to play in preventing and countering
radicalisation. It has, for instance, been pointed out on several occasions that a
more in-depth knowledge of religion may reduce the risk of radicalisation or contribute to de-radicalisation; a finding which is also consistent with Security Service
data (see, for example, Sections 3.1.3, 3.2.5 and 6.2). SALAR’s report also emphasizes the special opportunity that practicing Muslims may have in their capacity
as religious authorities by serving as the antithesis of ideologues propagating violence-promoting messages both in and outside Sweden (SALAR 2010, p. 22). This,
however, does not mean that Swedish Muslims as a group have a greater responsibility than other Swedes to prevent and counter radicalisation in violence-promoting Islamist circles. All organisations working with young people need encouragement and help to challenge those representing and advocating undemocratic and
violence-promoting messages.
Activities to help people leave extremist circles have not been conducted to any extensive degree or in a formal manner with regards to violence-promoting Islamist
extremism, but could serve as a complement to prevention and counter-measures.
In terms of these activities, however, it is important that they are initiated and
conducted by civil society players, rather than public players, a fact which was
also pointed out in the Security Service’s external collaboration. International experiences and studies also show that the messenger’s own legitimacy has a major
effect on the message (see Section 6.2.2).
All citizens of society
However, efforts to prevent and counter radicalisation are ultimately about
everyone’s responsibility to contribute to a society that is more open, safe and
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democratic. Issues concerning integration and immigration in general, as well as
Muslims in particular, are often discussed from an us-and-them perspective, which
can be a contributing cause of radicalisation. It is important that public debate not
stigmatise individual groups, but is instead conducted in a fact-based and nuanced
manner.
For this to be possible, accurate and balanced information must be available and
promoted. This reduces the risk of myths developing about the phenomenon of
violence-promoting Islamist extremism, and, again, also the risk of stigmatising
Muslims. The importance of factual and nuanced news coverage to counteract the
romanticism of violence also applies in other ideological contexts, which is a fact
pointed out in the report Violent political extremism (National Council for Crime
Prevention & the Security Service 2009, p. 153).
It is also important to create arenas for legitimate protests, such as by establishing
various kinds of forums where young people can openly discuss and air their opinions. By creating forums where more radical opinions can be challenged by objective arguments from respected players, young people who might otherwise turn to
more obscure arenas may hopefully be won back. Society has nothing to gain from
sweeping uncomfortable opinions under the rug and pretending that they do not
exist.
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7Concluding reflections
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In this report, the Swedish Security Service has compiled its knowledge with regard
to violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden and radicalisation processes
in these environments. The report also contains an assessment of the intent and
capability of individuals to support or commit ideologically motivated acts of violence, in other words, the threat that these individuals constitute. In addition, proposals are presented regarding tools and strategies for countering radicalisation.
Rather than re-summarising the report (a summary was provided in the introduction), the idea of this concluding chapter is to go a step further and present more
overall reflections.
These reflections are based on the report’s main conclusions: that violence-promoting Islamist extremism and radicalisation do exist in Sweden and should not be
underestimated as potential threats. The currently limited occurrences should be
countered mainly by an increased focus on preventive measures. The objective of
this chapter is to present the problems, provide a more nuanced picture of and demystify the activities currently conducted in violence-promoting Islamist circles in
Sweden. The discussion also touches on how society can address these phenomena
by working more with communication and promoting constructive alternatives.
Presentation of problems
The Government assignment to the Security Service to compile knowledge of violence-promoting Islamist extremism and radicalisation can be seen as an example
of a generally perceived need for information regarding these phenomena. In the
past decade, research has grown considerably regarding terrorism in general and
violence-promoting Islamist extremism and radicalisation in particular. Governments and other political bodies have also contributed to the knowledge bank by
developing strategies and action plans to counter these phenomena. An illustrative
statement about terrorism research is that at least one book about terrorism is published every six hours (Bartlett, Birdwell & King 2010, p. 46).
Many questions remain unanswered, perhaps mainly with regard to radicalisation.
According to the Danish researchers Lene Kühle and Lasse Lindekilde, for example,
the foundations of the research community’s understanding of radicalisation processes appear shaky. They also question the relevance of the concept of radicalisation in many contexts. Despite (or thanks to) the uncertainty that still exists
regarding the radicalisation concept, extensive activities are being conducted in
this area, both politically and in terms of research. This primarily concerns how
radicalisation should be countered (Kühle & Lindekilde 2010, p. 13).
On a more basic level, however, one should ask the question of what exactly should
be countered. In a report to the European Commission, a group of European researchers writes that there will always be a certain number of radical individuals in
every society. Nor are large radicalisation waves that contain violence-promoting
elements anything new for most European countries from a historic perspective
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(European Commission’s Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation 2008, p. 7). Although the use of radicalisation as a concept and an area of research and policy did
not have its major upswing until the 2000s, radicalisation can nonetheless be seen
as an almost unavoidable social phenomenon.
Consequently, instead of viewing radicalisation as a suddenly appearing problem
that needs to and can be solved, it should be treated as a dilemma. A dilemma
will not necessarily have a solution that satisfies all parties, but rather involves
something that must be taken into account and handled as best one can. One question that arises is what the consequences would be if radicalisation was nonetheless
in some cases treated as a problem. Can the steps taken to solve the problem be
perceived as discrimination and stigmatisation of disadvantaged groups, and consequently come to fuel radicalisation?
In the course of compiling this report, the Security Service faced criticism not only
because the Government had decided that this assignment was to be carried out
at all, but also because of its formulation; to describe violence-promoting Islamist
extremism. Singling out Islamist extremism, in contrast to a more overall area
such as religious extremism, is perceived as stigmatising by several Muslim representatives with whom the Security Service spoke. Other people with whom the
Service has had a dialogue (such as researchers) also found the choice of limiting
the assignment to include only Islamist extremism unfortunate. However, some
of those the Security Service has been in contact with, including Muslims, believe
that the report constitutes an important part of the preventive work to increase the
knowledge about violence-promoting Islamist extremist groups and the ideas these
groups stand for.
A more nuanced picture
The overall objective of this report is to contribute to a more nuanced and factually accurate debate on violence-promoting Islamist extremism by carrying out the
Government’s assignment. One way of doing this is by presenting a more nuanced
picture of violence-promoting Islamist extremism to contrast the rather simplistic
image given in the media, where the threat is either severely understated or exaggerated. In this context, the Security Service has often been asked whether violence-promoting Islamist extremism constitutes a major problem in Sweden today.
To answer that question, it is necessary to differentiate between “major” in the
sense of wide-spread and “major” in the sense of serious. As hopefully clarified in
Chapters 3, 4 and 5, neither radicalisation nor violence-promoting Islamist extremism are wide-spread phenomena in Sweden today. A relatively limited number of
people carry out the acts that can be described as violence-promoting Islamist extremism, and there is nothing pointing to an increase in the number of people radicalised into violence-promoting Islamism in Sweden. Although violence-promoting
Islamist extremism is not a wide-spread phenomenon, it is nonetheless a serious
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problem. The consequences of the terrorist offences that these activities can lead to
mean that there must be zero tolerance.
The threat from violence-promoting Islamist extremism is not a threat to the fundamental structures of society, Sweden’s democratic system or Central Government. In other words, violence-promoting Islamist extremist groups do not conduct
activities that threaten society in Sweden today, nor are they assessed to have the
intent or capability to do so in the medium term. Despite this, they may constitute
a security threat to both individuals and groups, particularly in other countries.
The activities conducted in Sweden consist of mainly support activities benefiting
armed Islamist extremist groups abroad (see the detailed description in Chapter 4).
Those who travel to join such groups also constitute a concrete threat to people in
those countries, whether they participate in illegal acts of violence themselves or
enable others to participate. Among those who are at risk of being affected are both
local government representatives, international troops and civilians. On another
level, Sweden’s international reputation also suffers since Sweden has an obligation under international law to ensure that Swedish citizens and others residing in
Sweden do not constitute a threat to other countries. Sweden also has an obligation
as a country not to serve as a base for terrorism.
Demystification
The prevailing spirit of the time often contributes to creating trends, as is also the
case with violence-promoting extremism and how the security-threatening activities conducted are perceived by the surrounding society. These trends not only apply to the distribution of resources for fighting violence-promoting extremism, but
also to how ideologically motivated violence is justified. Most violence-promoting
extremist groups strive for public attention, and Islamist-motivated acts currently
appear to receive the most publicity. This has not always been the case, however.
In the 1890s, a large-scale workers movement arose that caused a broad radicalisation wave throughout Europe, in the aftermath of which anarchist and revolutionary groups also used methods that can be described as terrorism. This marginalised
phenomenon was, however, widely condemned by both workers and trade unions.
Later, in the interwar period, the economic downturn in many countries created
an environment conducive to polarisation, xenophobia and anti-Semitism. A rising
tide of radicalisation benefited especially fascist groups who made use of terrorist
tactics (European Commission Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation 2008, p. 8).
Following World War II, it was instead the anti-colonialist movement and the New
Left movement that gave rise to a new radicalisation wave. This wave soon met with
resistance in the form of emerging right-wing extremist groups who claimed to
defend the traditional values criticised by the left-wing movement. These disparities constituted a breeding ground for violence-promoting extremist groups on the
ideological outer edges (European Commission Expert Group on Violent RadicalisaViolence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden
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tion 2008, p. 8). It is difficult to foresee what ideas will initiate future radicalisation
waves, but it is highly likely that such waves will occur.
The point of this retrospective is not just to make it clear that radicalisation has
taken place before, and in other ideological contexts. The objective is also to clarify the fundamental similarities that exist and thereby demystify radicalisation
in an Islamist context. Firstly, radicalisation mainly exists in circles characterised by a wide-spread sense of real or perceived injustices in a certain population
group. Secondly, radicalisation always takes place at the intersection between a
radicalisation-promoting environment and a personal trajectory. What is required
for someone to actually begin promoting violence is concrete personal experiences that increase their receptiveness to violence-promoting messages, social ties to
violence-promoting individuals, and a socialisation process characterised by group
dynamics. Thirdly, in each radicalisation wave, the proportion of people who have
supported or themselves used violence has always been very small (European Commission Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation 2008, pp. 9–10). These observations
correspond with the view of radicalisation in violence-promoting Islamist circles
that the Security Service presents in this report.
Given the similarities between radicalisation and recruitment processes in particular, in various ideological contexts, radicalisation in violence-promoting Islamist
circles should not give rise to the concern and bewilderment regarding countermeasures which in some cases have characterised the social debate. The fact that
violence-promoting extremism is motivated by Islamist reasoning does not mean
that society must discard knowledge and experiences gathered in other ideological
contexts or in crime-prevention work in general. Here, it can be mentioned that
Knut Storberget, the Norwegian Minister of Justice, announced at a meeting in Oslo
on 17 October 2010 that the Norwegian government has prepared an action plan to
fight religious extremism, based on the same methods that are used on right-wing
extremist circles (Norwegian plan against religious extremism 2010).
Major gains can be made by exchanging experiences and coordinating efforts, especially in terms of the preventive work, preventing young people in particular from
becoming receptive to violence-promoting extremist messages. Once someone has
become involved in a violence-promoting extremist group, more than general measures are needed to make them leave the group. In this situation, measures must be
specifically adapted to the person’s own needs and circumstances in order to have a
chance of succeeding. The fact that there are various ways into violence-promoting
extremism also means that there are various ways out of it, which is described in
detail in the Security Service’s and the National Council for Crime Prevention’s
report on violent political extremism (National Council for Crime Prevention &
Security Service 2009).
How then should a democratic society address the inescapable dilemma of radicalisation and violence-promoting extremism? Chapter 6 highlights that focus must
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be on preventive work for these phenomena not to increase in extent. Two general reflections have recurred time and again and from various perspectives during
work on the report and in the Security Service’s collaboration: the importance of
communication and of promoting constructive alternatives. These reflections can
also be said to form the basis of several proposals for preventive measures.
Communication
In this context, communication may, for example, involve initiating and maintaining a continuous dialogue between Muslim representatives and representatives
within various sectors of society. In the best case, such dialogue not only creates
direct communication channels, but can also contribute to mutual trust between
different players in the long term. This is especially important in a crisis situation.
Comparing the Danish (Mohammed caricature) crisis and the Swedish (Mohammed-as-dog drawing) crisis, researchers Göran Larsson and Lasse Lindekilde claim
that there are two important reasons that the Swedish crisis did not immediately
escalate to a global level as it did in the Danish case. Firstly, Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt himself initiated meetings with ambassadors from Muslim
countries and with Muslim representatives, as well as a visit to the Stockholm Mosque. Secondly, there is a structure of national associations and umbrella organisations that can speak for many Swedish Muslims (Larsson & Lindekilde 2009, pp.
372, 376).
Communication may also entail an opportunity under legitimate and constructive
forms to express discontent and protest against the policies pursued in Sweden or
in other countries. This is especially important for young people, whose frustration
over injustice and oppression risks being manifested in criminal acts more often
than adult frustration does. The possibility of channelling these young people’s
commitment and feeling of solidarity into constructive expressions is also a way of
increasing interest in social issues and democracy. In general, investing in dialogue
should not only be seen as a tool to prevent extremism and criminality, but also as
a strategy to invigorate Swedish democracy, for its own sake.
Promotion of constructive alternatives
Seeing and focusing on the inherent value of the measures taken to prevent and
counter radicalisation involves adopting a promotive instead of a counteractive perspective. By creating an environment where it is difficult for radicalisation to take
root in the overall population and by promoting constructive ways for people to
get involved in the issues they are passionate about, it is possible in most cases to
prevent not only radicalisation and violence-promoting extremism in themselves,
but also criminality in general. Besides the inherent value provided in the form
of improved circumstances, this is resource efficient for society as a whole in the
long term. As measures for creating constructive conditions in people’s daily lives
do not need to be tailored to the problems they are intended to combat, these meaViolence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden
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sures are preferable from a socio-economic perspective. They also have the potential to create positive synergy effects. Another advantage is that measures that aim
to generally improve people’s conditions do not risk stigmatising individual groups
that may feel singled out if measures to prevent violence-promoting extremism and
terrorism are directed only at them.
The promotive perspective again highlights the limited role played by not only the
Security Service but also by the entire legal system in this context. Besides dialogue and outreach activities, police and judicial players enter the playing field only
when the problem has already been confirmed – and has also gone so far that it is
a matter of suspected criminal activities. The promotion of constructive alternatives must instead begin far earlier, which means that other players should also be
involved. By definition, promotion is a cross-sector approach where the individual
is in focus. The resources this requires in the short term must be weighed against
the resources required to handle the consequences of potential failure.
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Swedish Security Service
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