Nuclear Signaling and China’s Perception about Nuclear Threat:
How China Handled Nuclear Threats in the Cold War
Tong Zhao
Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Tech
Abstract: This paper seeks to close the gap in current literature about China’s perception
of nuclear threat by reviewing the way in which China dealt with nuclear threats during
Cold War. In particular, the paper examines the dynamic interaction between nuclear
signaling and China’s response to nuclear threats during the three nuclear crises in
China’s history: the Korean War, the First and Second Taiwan Crises, and Sino-Soviet
border crisis in the late 1960s.The analysis shows that during the Korean War although
American nuclear signals were inaccurate and had communication problems the Chinese
were fully prepared for nuclear threat even before the Volunteer Army marched into
North Korea. American nuclear threat did not bring about significant benefit for the U.S.
During Taiwan crises in the 1950s, because of general signaling problems, both the U.S.
and China seriously misunderstood each other’s strategic intentions. China did not really
expect nuclear threat from the U.S. and U.S.’ nuclear threat helped compel China into
concessions. Lastly, in the Sino-Soviet border crisis, the Soviets’ nuclear signaling was
very effective in raising Chinese concerns about nuclear strikes. China’s response to
Soviets’ nuclear threats was unprecedentedly extensive. Its impact on the development of
China’s defense strategy and defense industry was deep and long-lasting.
Introduction
There has been little research that was dedicated to understand the Chinese approach of handling
nuclear threats. It is necessary, however, to study carefully about how China deals with nuclear
threats in order to have an accurate understanding about Chinese perception of nuclear conflicts
and the role of nuclear weapons in China’s security strategy. For this purpose, following sections
1 of this paper will provide a comprehensive analysis about nuclear crises in China’s history from
the perspective of nuclear signaling and response.
This paper will focus only on cases of nuclear threats that were disclosed in open literature since
the objective of this paper is to study the dynamic interaction between nuclear signaling and
response. Secret nuclear threats that were issued through confidential channels and that have so
far been kept undisclosed to the public will have to be excluded from this discussion. As a result,
this paper will review and analyze nuclear signaling and China’s response to nuclear threats in
all major nuclear crises in China’s history: the Korean War, the First and Second Taiwan Crises,
and the Sino-Soviet border crisis in the 1960s.
Korean War: Inaccurate Nuclear signals
The interaction between the U.S. and China regarding the threat of nuclear strike has not been
comprehensively studied by existing literature. This section draws upon open-course record and
reveals that both Truman and Eisenhower administrations seriously considered using nuclear
weapons to achieve military advantage on the battlefield and China was fully aware of the
possibility of nuclear strike. However, there was a distinctive disconnection between American
nuclear signals and China’s reception and understanding of these signals. The outcome of
Korean War unjustifiably reinforced President Eisenhower’ perception about nuclear coercion.
China’s perception about nuclear weapons was also tested and affected during the course of the
conflict.
Declassified documents reveal that the main motivation behind both Truman and Eisenhower
administrations’ nuclear strike planning was to achieve military advantage on the battlefield
rather than deterrence through massive retaliation. Internal discussion within Truman
administration about using nuclear weapons was initiated shortly after war erupted on the
peninsula. After Chinese troops crossed the border into North Korea in October 1950 and drove
UN forces into a desperate retreat in November, the need to quickly turn the situation around
drove the U.S. closer than ever to using nuclear weapons. On a November 30 news conference
President Truman warned that, “We will take whatever steps are necessary to meet the military
situation,” and later added, “That includes every weapon that we have.” When asked by a
reporter whether that implied a consideration of using atomic weapons. The president responded,
2 “There has always been active consideration of its use. I don’t want to see it used.” 1 President
Truman’s such statement became one of the mostly reported during the Korean War and
attracted wide attention across the globe.
In March 1951, prior to an expected large-scale ground attack by China, President Truman
agreed to the military’s request to transfer a number of atomic weapons to Air Force custody. In
April, B-29 bombers with complete nuclear explosive devices were dispatched to Guam. 2 Within
the administration, some high-rank officials and senior military officers were particularly
supportive for using nuclear weapons. General Douglas MacArthur, for example, requested
thirty-four atomic bombs for use against targets both on the peninsula and on mainland China.
His plan also included using nuclear waste for laying a belt of radiation across major supply
routes of Chinese Volunteer Army. 3 On the operational level, the U.S. conducted a series of
simulation exercises of tactical nuclear attack starting from 1951. More than 12 thousand soldiers
participated in one of these exercises. 4 Many soldiers were deployed to areas close to ground
zero in order to have a good assessment about the efficacy of nuclear attack. 5
After President Eisenhower took office in 1953, the planning for using nuclear weapons became
even more intensive. As reflected in his massive retaliation doctrine, President Eisenhower
seemed more aggressive in promoting nuclear use in Korean War than his predecessor. He
personally involved in a number of serious discussion and planning of nuclear strike. All these
efforts ultimately led to the birth of NSC Action 794 in May 1953 which got the U.S. closest to
launching a nuclear strike against the Chinese and North Koreans. 6
Obviously, not all these internal planning and discussion was make available to the Chinese
during the war. In fact, only on two occasions did the U.S. explicitly threaten nuclear use against
the Chinese. The first message of nuclear threat was delivered by President Truman on the
1
Truman, Harry S. 1950. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, p. 727. Lou, Jiawei. 2009. US Nuclear Threats during the Korean War. Journal of Jixi University 9 (3):105. 3
MacArthur, Douglas. 1984. Reminiscences: Douglas MacArthur Memoir. Translated by Translation Group of the Department of History at Shanghai Normal University. Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, p. 282. 4
Soman, Appu K. 2000. Double‐Edged Sword: Nuclear Diplomacy in Unequal Conflicts: The United States and China, 1950‐1958. Westport: Praeger Publishers, pp. 79‐80. 5
Chen, Hua. 1998. The Sixth Secret about China's Nuclear Weapons: China Faces Nuclear Threat. Great Technology (Z1):30‐31. 6
Betts, Richard K. 1987. Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, pp. 37‐42. 2
3 November news conference in 1950. As mentioned above, President Truman’s statement of
“active consideration of its (nuclear) use” shocked the world and even sent British Prime
Minister Clement Attlee to Washington to express his serious concern. Chinese leaders clearly
got the message too, since President Truman’s remarks appeared in headlines all over the world.
However, it is questionable whether the message China got was indeed what President Truman
really meant. After pressed by reporters, he gave the offhand statement about nuclear weapons
without foreseeing that his words would be easily read out of context and considerably
misinterpreted. It is unlikely that the president intended to issue a nuclear threat on the news
conference because internal debates within his administration around the possible use of nuclear
weapons had largely been negative by that time. In fact, the press secretary quickly clarified that
the president’s statement did not indicate any change in U.S. policy and no authority to use
nuclear weapons had been delegated. However, this clarification apparently did get much
attention of the media. 7 As a result, although President Truman did not intend to deliver a serious
nuclear threat against China, all Chinese literature points out that the Chinese understood the
message as a deliberate and full-blown nuclear threat. 8
The second serious nuclear threat that the U.S. sought to deliver to China was attempted by
Eisenhower administration in May 1953. Historical scholars believe that in order for the Chinese
to get the message that if they did not back off nuclear strike could be imposed upon them,
administration officials might have used multiple channels of communication. Firstly, they made
this statement at the Panmunjom truce talks. Secondly, on his visit to India on May 20, Secretary
of State Dulles said the same thing to Nehru whom he believed would then tell the Chinese. 9
Thirdly, they used a “contact” in Hong Kong to pass the word on to Beijing. 10 And lastly, Jiang
Jieshi and the government on Taiwan were used to deliver the message. 11
In this case, the intention was clear. However, there was no evidence that any of these channels
worked as expected to bring the message to Chinese leaders. Indian Prime Minister Nehru
7
Ibd, p. 34. See, for example, Lou, Jiawei. 2009. US Nuclear Threats during the Korean War. Journal of Jixi University 9 (3):105. 9
Slany, William Z, Lisle A Rose, and Neal H Petersen. 1984. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952‐1954. edited by U. S. D. o. State. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, pp. 1068‐1069. 10
Gerson, Louis L. 1967. John Foster Dulles. New York: Cooper Square Publishers, p. 146. 11
Keefer, Edward. 1986. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the End of the Korean War. Diplomatic History 10 (3):280. 8
4 categorically denied that he ever passed any nuclear threat on to the Chinese. 12 His assistant also
confirmed his assertion. 13 Some Chinese scholars also pointed out that there is not any indication
in Chinese declassified documents or American government record that any of the other methods
was indeed used to send the message and there is no evidence that Chinese leaders actually
received the nuclear warning through any of these channels. 14 Therefore, although the second
American nuclear threat during the Korean War against China was clearly intended, the
communication of the nuclear signal and the actual delivery of the nuclear message were in
serious question.
On the Chinese side, their response to nuclear threat did not seem particularly connected to
occasional American nuclear signals. The Chinese had a good expectation about U.S. nuclear
threat even before they went into Korea. In September 1950 the acting chief of staff of China’s
People’s Liberation Army, General Nie Rongzhen held a meeting with Indian ambassador km M,
Panikkar and told him that China was prepared to intervene if Western troops crossed the 38th
parallel. When Panikkar warned him of the possibility of American nuclear strike, the general
stated:
“We have calculated all that,” he said. “They may even drop atom bombs on us. What
then? They may kill a few million people. Without sacrifice a nation’s independence
cannot be upheld.” He gave some calculations of the effectiveness of atom bombs and
said: “After all, China lives on the farms. What can atom bombs do there? Yes, our
economic development will be put back. We may have to wait for it.” 15
As early as August 1950 – more than two months before Chinese troops entered North Korea –
Chinese leaders discussed the situation on the Korean Peninsula on a Central Politburo meeting
and reached the conclusion that a Korean war can take several forms including a brief conflict, a
protracted war, an all-out war, and an atomic war. On the Ninth Meeting of the Council of the
Central People's Government on September 5, Mao Zedong emphasized that if a Korean war
broke out, it was more likely to be an all-out war than a limited war, more likely to be a
12
Lewis, John Wilson, and Litai Xue. 1988. China Builds the Bomb. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, p. 14. Brune, Lester Hugo. 1996. The Korean War : Handbook of the Literature and Research. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, p. 289. 14
Deng, Feng. 2010. A Stiff Gaming: The United States, China and the End of the Korean War. World History (4):20. 15
Panikkar, K. M. 1955. In Two Chinas: Memoirs of a Diplomat. London: George Allen & Unwin, p. 108. 13
5 protracted war than a brief conflict, and more likely to be an atomic war than a conventional war.
As a result, he stressed, “We must be fully prepared.” 16 After the conference, China’s Air Force
units and air defense troops were redeployed to protect major cities in Northeastern provinces
and along the coast line. Important industrial facilities and strategic materials were also relocated
from Northeastern provinces to provinces that are further away from the Korean border. 17
It is clear that before the U.S. made its first nuclear threat against China in November 1951 and
even before Chinese Volunteer Army entered North Korea, Chinese leaders were already fully
aware of possible American nuclear attack or threat. Leaders of the Chinese Volunteer Army
took a number of serious efforts to deny the potential benefit of using nuclear weapons by the
U.S. on the battlefield. They particularly stressed the importance of preparing for defending
against nuclear weapons and biological weapons. 18 One of the tactics they used was to dig
tunnels deep into the ground and build walls outside tunnel entrances to protect themselves from
nuclear strike. They also deliberately built their own fortifications close to the enemy so that the
U.S. would be concerned about nuclear weapons killing their own forces. 19 As Chief of the Staff
of the U.S. Army General J. Lawton Collins confessed, such defensive measures and tactics
employed by the Chinese were very effective in dissuading the U.S. from using nuclear
weapons. 20
In this sense, President Truman’s statement about active consideration of nuclear use was not
truly shocking to the Chinese and served at best to confirm their existing expectation about U.S.
nuclear threat. There is no evidence that China made any change to its previous military planning
after U.S. issued such threat. China continued to carry out its military offensives despite the
nuclear threat and it’s clear that President Truman’s nuclear threat was largely ineffective
although in fact he might not have intended to issue a nuclear threat in the first place. 21
16
The History of Korean War. 2000. Beijing: Military History Research Department, Academy of Military Science, p. 153. 17
Qi, Dexue. 1991. Korean War Decision‐Making. Shenyang: Liaoning University Press, p. 58. 18
Ibid, p. 58. 19
Lou, Jiawei. 2009. US Nuclear Threats during the Korean War. Journal of Jixi University 9 (3):105. 20
Slany, William Z, Lisle A Rose, and Neal H Petersen. 1984. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952‐1954. edited by U. S. D. o. State. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, pp. 817‐818. 21
Betts, Richard K. 1987. Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, p. 35. 6 The second nuclear threat was even less successful. As mentioned above, it is very likely that
China never received the nuclear message from the U.S. More importantly, Chinese policies
thereafter did not point to any linkage between the nuclear threat and China’s shifting negotiation
strategy. Since 1952 China began to seek an early ending of the war and started taking a flexible
position toward the issue of prisoner exchange which had been blocking progress of negotiations
at Panmunjom. Stalin’s death in March 1953 led to a considerable restructuring of Korean policy
on the Soviet side and further pushed China for making compromises in negotiations. 22 The U.S.
nuclear threat in May 1953, even if successfully delivered, could hardly be responsible for
China’s shift of negotiation strategy and the ultimate conclusion of the armistice agreement.
First and Second Taiwan Crises: Unexpected Nuclear Threat
U.S. nuclear threat signals during the First and Second Taiwan Crises were much more explicit
and unequivocal than in the Korean War. Based on open sources, the U.S. used at least three
ways to deliver the nuclear message: public statement, nuclear test, and forward deployment of
tactical nuclear weapons.
After Chinese forces seized Yijiangshan Island and Dachen Island in early 1955, Secretary of
State Dulles stated during a televised address on March 8 that the U.S. military was armed with
new, powerful, and accurate weapon systems and its military had the capacity to completely
destroy military targets and cause no damage to civilian centers. He pointed out that the U.S.
deterrence capability and its resolve to use this capability in response to military provocation
were essential to deal with China. In particular, he warned that China should not treat the U.S.
just as a “paper tiger”. 23 After Dulles’ statement, President Eisenhower further confirmed
possible use of nuclear weapons in Asia. On March 16, a reporter asked Eisenhower for his
comment on Dulles’ view that tactical nuclear weapons would be used in general war in Asia.
Eisenhower responded: “Now, in any combat where these things can be used on strictly military
targets and for strictly military purposes, I see no reason why they shouldn’t be used just exactly
22
Zhu, Mingquan. 2001. "China Was Frightened to Step back by US Nuclear Threats": A Myth or History? Fudan Journal (Social Sciences) (1):125‐130; Deng, Feng. 2010. A Stiff Gaming: The United States, China and the End of the Korean War. World History (4):13‐21. 23
Tao, Wenzhao. 2004. History of Sino‐U.S. Relations, 1949‐1972. Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House. 7 as you would use a bullet or anything else.” 24 In retrospect, he wrote in his memoir that: “I
hoped this answer would have some effect in persuading the Chinese Communists of the strength
of our determination.” 25 Following Eisenhower’s remarks, Vice President Nixon also publicly
stated that tactical nuclear weapons were in fact conventional weapons and would be used
against the source of any offensive attack. 26
Besides official statements, the U.S. also used nuclear tests as a demonstration of its nuclear
capability and the resolve to use nuclear weapons. On February 13, 1955, just as the Chinese
launched offensives to take over Dachen, Eisenhower approved Operation Teacup to undertake a
series of tests of tactical nuclear weapons. For the purpose of pressing China, he ordered the tests
be announced publicly. 27 According to Chinese sources, during the Second Taiwan Crisis in
1958, the U.S. also significantly increased the frequency and scale of their nuclear tests. In
October alone 25 nuclear devices were detonated, which was perceived by the Chinese as an
“explicit nuclear coercion”. 28
The third way for the U.S. to deliver the nuclear message was through forward deployment of
tactical nuclear weapons. In 1957 the Matador nuclear cruise missiles were deployed in Taiwan.
The missile could deliver a 20 kiloton warhead to a range of about 965 km and had the potential
to hit Chinese troop concentrations around Xiamen (Amoy). 29 In September 1958 President
Eisenhower ordered the deployment of 8-inch howitzers capable of firing nuclear shells to
Jinmen (Quemoy). Again, for the purpose of pressing China, he mandated the deployment should
be made visible to the Chinese. 30 Other military operations could also signal the military
intention of the U.S., either directly or indirectly, such as the raising of alert status of bombers
24
Eisenhower, Dwight D. 1959. Dwight D. Eisenhower: Public papers of the presidents, 1955. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 332. 25
Eisenhower, Dwight D. 1963. Mandate for Change, 1953‐1956, The White House years. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, p. 477. 26
Zhao, Xuegong. 2004. Nuclear Weapons and American Policy toward the First Taiwan St rait Crisis. American Studies (2):10. 27
Ambrose, Stephen E. 1984. Eisenhower: the President. London: G. Allen & Unwin, pp. 245‐246. 28
Chen, Hua. 1998. The Sixth Secret about China's Nuclear Weapons: China Faces Nuclear Threat. Great Technology (Z1):33. 29
Kristensen, Hans M. 2011. Nukes in the Taiwan Crisis. Federation of American Scientists 2008 [cited February 10 2011]. Available from http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/05/nukes‐in‐the‐taiwan‐crisis.php. 30
Guo, Xuetang. 2004. American Nuclear Coercion Policy toward China and Chinese Response: A Study of the Two Taiwan Crises during the 1950s. Fudan American Review (00):253. 8 and forces on Guam by the Strategic Air Command during the 1958 crisis, 31 but there is no
evidence that the U.S. deliberately did so to send the Chinese a message or the Chinese at that
time had the technical capacity to pick up such signals.
China obviously was fully aware of the nuclear message. Chinese press reported American
statement and operations and vehemently condemned the “blatant nuclear blackmail”. 32 Chinese
leaders responded fiercely. In September 1958, for example, Mao Zedong made the following
statement on a supreme state conference: “Such tactics of the Americans can only be successful
on those opportunists who are prepared to surrender under the pressure of American atomic
bombs, hydrogen bombs, food, and money. From the perspective of our people who are making
history, all the magic weapons in the hands of the Americans are just rubbish that is going to be
swept away.” 33 On the one hand, such firm stance against the nuclear threat greatly inspired
Chinese people. Within several days more than two hundred million people across the country
took to the streets to demonstrate their anger and resolve against the U.S. “blackmail”.34 On the
other hand, China’s extremely strong reaction also revealed that Chinese leaders were generally
unprepared for U.S. nuclear threat and to certain extent were caught in surprise by Washington’s
tough position. Compared with China’s preparation for potential nuclear strike prior to and
during the Korean War, China did not seem expecting nuclear threat from the U.S. to follow its
shelling of a number of off-shore islands. In 1955, only after U.S. officials publicly threatened
nuclear strike did Chinese leaders rush to put their forces on higher alert to increase their
defensive capability. 35 As a matter of fact, China was not only surprised by U.S. nuclear threat,
but generally unclear about the rationale behind American military intervention and the overall
American strategy. 36 Clearly, China’s response to American nuclear threat reveals important
miscalculation and misunderstanding about Washington’s strategic thinking and planning.
31
Betts, Richard K. 1987. Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, p. 71. Kalicki, J H. 1975. The Pattern of Sino‐American Crises : Political‐Military Interactions in the 1950s. London: Cambridge University Press, p. 180‐192. 33
Chen, Hua. 1998. The Sixth Secret about China's Nuclear Weapons: China Faces Nuclear Threat. Great Technology (Z1):33. 34
Ibid, 33‐34. 35
Liu, Tong. 2009. 1955: What Went on behind the Scene of the First Taiwan Crisis. Tong Zhou Gong Jin (6):52. 36
Guo, Xuetang. 2004. American Nuclear Coercion Policy toward China and Chinese Response: A Study of the Two Taiwan Crises during the 1950s. Fudan American Review (00):253; Liu, Tong. 2009. 1955: What Went on behind the Scene of the First Taiwan Crisis. Tong Zhou Gong Jin (6):52. 32
9 On the part of the U.S., its perception about Chinese intentions was also seriously mistaken.
Officials in Washington reached the consensus that China’s shelling of off-shore islands was a
prelude to a much larger offensive campaign with the intent to seize not only Dachen or Jinmen
but also the entire Taiwan and the Penghu Islands (Pescadores). Therefore, the U.S. needed to do
everything possible to stop Chinese aggression otherwise they would take Jinmen and then
occupy Taiwan and after that the entire region including Japan and Philippines could be
destabilized and fall into their hands. 37 The domino theory made the danger over Taiwan Strait
look very real in American eyes and justified the use of tactical nuclear weapons in defense of
off-shore islands.
However, it is hardly the case that Chinese had such intentions when they decided to shell the
islands. Official documents revealed that the primary objective behind the first artillery
campaign starting from September 1954 was to protest against and prevent the U.S. moving to
reach a military defense agreement with Taiwan and to signal China’s position and resolve
against U.S.’ support for Taiwan. 38 As for the second artillery campaign starting from August
1958, the Chinese motive was to retaliate against the Nationalists’ military harassment along the
coast, protest against American intervention, prevent a permanent separation of Taiwan from the
Mainland, and to protest against U.S. invasion in Lebanon. 39 In both cases, the Chinese had no
military capability to “liberate” Taiwan and they well understood that. 40 Chinese military
planning before the First Taiwan Crisis also pointed to China’s limited military objective. On
August 13, 1954, Central Military Committee set the guideline for future military operation: “We
will seize the weakest off-shore islands; make sure we will succeed; and gradually we will take
other off-shore islands. From this year, our plan is to gradually liberate off-shore islands along
the coast of Zhejiang and Fujian Provinces by 1957.” 41 During the Second Taiwan Crisis, Zhou
Enlai once explained to Soviet Embassy Counselor N. G. Sudarikov that China’s artillery
37
Eisenhower, Dwight D. 1965. Waging Peace, 1956‐1961, the White House Years. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, p. 294. 38
Guo, Xuetang. 2004. American Nuclear Coercion Policy toward China and Chinese Response: A Study of the Two Taiwan Crises during the 1950s. Fudan American Review (00):244. 39
Jiang, Changbin, and Ross Robert. 2000. Moving from Confrontation to Relaxation: A Further Inquiry of Sino‐U.S. Relations during the Cold War. Beijing: World Knowledge Publishing House, p. 56. 40
Lewis, John Wilson, and Litai Xue. 1988. China Builds the Bomb. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 41
Liu, Tong. 2009. 1955: What Went on behind the Scene of the First Taiwan Crisis. Tong Zhou Gong Jin (6):48. 10 campaign was only to punish the Nationalists’ forces and prevent the U.S. from planning a TwoChina policy. Zhou assured him that China did not seek to liberate Taiwan immediately. 42
There is also evidence which points to China’s efforts – through third part channels – to
communicate its strategic intentions to the U.S. One month before the First Taiwan Crisis Mao
Zedong met with the British Labor Party delegation and hinted to them that China did not seek to
maintain an adversarial relationship with the U.S. if the U.S. stopped its military intervention and
political manipulation in East and Southeast Asia. 43 In early January of 1955, after the artillery
campaign began but before China launched offensives to seize Yijiangshan Island, Zhou Enlai
took the opportunity of UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld’s visit to China to express
China’s support for any effort to ease international tensions and asked Hammarskjöld to help
convey China’s position and views to others who might care. 44 One month later, when meeting
with Sweden and Indian ambassadors Zhou stated that China would not refuse direct talks with
the U.S. at international conferences because it was the U.S. who created these tensions. 45 Later,
Zhou repeated China’s willingness to solve the Taiwan crisis peacefully at Yangon with
Burmese Prime Minister U Nu and at Bandung during the Asian–African Conference. However,
only Zhou’s speech at Bandung Conference got picked up and widely reported by the press.
American misunderstanding about China’s strategic intention was not very surprising,
nonetheless, taking into consideration of mixed signals from China. One and half months before
the 1954 artillery campaign, People’s Daily released an editorial entitled “We Must Liberate
Taiwan”. The objective, as Chinese leaders later claimed was to emphasize China’s sovereignty
over Taiwan and express China’s firm opposition to foreign intervene in Taiwan. 46 However, the
strong rhetoric in the editorial impressed the Americans who believed the danger that China
would seize Taiwan was real and imminent. 47 There was no record of serious debate within the
Eisenhower administration about China’s strategic intentions behind the bombardment.
42
Jiang, Changbin, and Ross Robert. 2000. Moving from Confrontation to Relaxation: A Further Inquiry of Sino‐U.S. Relations during the Cold War. Beijing: World Knowledge Publishing House, p. 60. 43
Zhu, Chongfei. 2010. Sino‐U.S. Information Communication in the First Taiwan Crisis. Shi Ji Qiao (9):45. 44
A chronicle of Zhou Enlai. 1998. Beijing: Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee, p. 439. 45
Ibid, p. 447. 46
Pei, Jianzhang. 1994. History of People's Republic of China, 1949 ‐ 1956. Beijing: World Knowledge Publishing House, p. 337. 47
Soman, Appu K. 2000. Double‐Edged Sword : Nuclear Diplomacy in Unequal Conflicts: the United States and China, 1950‐1958. Westport, Conn: Praeger, p. 122. 11 Nonetheless, the U.S. rushed to draft and sign the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan in
December. The Chinese were clearly outraged by the treaty. People’s Daily immediately released
another editorial entitled “Chinese People will Never Stop from Liberating Taiwan”. 48 Shortly,
Chinese forces attacked and seized Yijiangshan Island as another show of resolve and protest. 49
From American perspective, China’s taking over of the island was a prelude to larger and more
ambitious attacks. Discussions about using nuclear weapons to defend off-shore islands became
increasingly intense. 50
Despite mutual misunderstandings about strategic intention, American nuclear signals did
contribute to the ending of crises by pressing China to take cautious actions and make
concessions. In both crises, when American vessels intervened by escorting the Nationalists’
ships Mao ordered explicitly that Chinese forces should only attack the nationalists’ troops and
ships but never attack American vessels without his permission. 51 In both crises, China’s
decisions to step back and ease tensions were all made after the U.S. issued explicit or implicit
nuclear signals. For the First Taiwan Crisis in particular, there were no other good explanations
for Zhou Enlai’s offering of talks with the U.S. at the Bandung Conference. The U.S.’ military
threat – and its nuclear threat in particular – appeared to be an important behind China’s
conciliatory policies.
Sino-Soviet Border Conflict: Successful Nuclear Coercion
As Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated since the late 1950s, their historically-troubled border areas
emerged as a new source of dispute between the two countries. Seeking to settle the border
problem, China and Soviet Union held a series of talks from February to August in 1964. Against
the general hostile environment at the time, those talks failed to reach any significant result. At
the last meeting on August 15, disappointed Chinese delegation warned their Soviet counterparts
if Moscow kept refusing to offer any compromise Beijing might seek to solve the problem
48
Chinese People will Never Stop from Liberating Taiwan. 1954. Peoples Daily, December 9, 1954. Zhao, Xuegong. 2004. Nuclear Weapons and American Policy toward the First Taiwan St rait Crisis. American Studies (2):105. 50
Betts, Richard K. 1987. Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, pp. 54‐55. 51
Guo, Xuetang. 2004. American Nuclear Coercion Policy toward China and Chinese Response: A Study of the Two Taiwan Crises during the 1950s. Fudan American Review (00):253; Liu, Tong. 2009. 1955: What Went on behind the Scene of the First Taiwan Crisis. Tong Zhou Gong Jin (6):48. 49
12 through other means. 52 Moscow was shocked and believed the Chinese were going to solve the
issue by violence. 53 On September 15, when meeting with Japanese parliament members,
Khrushchev claimed would use everything including “the most advanced weapons” to defend its
territory. 54 Such statement was perceived by the Chinese as the first hint of possible Soviet
nuclear strike against China. 55
Soviet military officials were outraged by China’s tough position on border issue and were
convinced that the Chinese were trying to regain control over the territories that they lost during
Tsarist times. They swore to defend their “sacred territories” and pushed Soviet political leaders
to agree to deploy more troops toward the Chinese borders. After Brezhnev took office in 1964,
Soviet Union began to significantly increase their military presence along Chinese borders –
from about ten divisions to more than forty divisions. In February 1966, Soviet Union and
Mongolia signed a mutual assistance treaty, paving way to Soviet military presence in the
country. Over years, Soviet Union built military bases, roads, airports, and missile launch
facilities in Mongolia, posing a great security threat to China. 56 The deployment of Soviet
strategic bombers and missile forces in Mongolia was clearly seen by the Chinese as a serious
threat and security concern. Mao Zedong stated in a meeting with the Japanese Communist Party
leader Miyamoto Kenji that: “The Soviets established bases for atomic weapons and hydrogen
bombs in Outer Mongolia. They have two divisions there. They are also increasing their troops
in Kazakhstan next to the borders with Xinjiang… We have to be prepared that the Soviets and
Americans may join hands to divide and occupy China: Along the line of Huaihe River and
Longhai Railway, the Soviets take Northern China and the Americans take the south.” 57
Within the next couple of years, Soviet military presence in Mongolia and along Chinese borders
increased to 54 divisions with about 1 million soldiers. They also built missile bases in
52
Chen, Donglin. 2004. The Nuclear Button Was Almost Pressed: U.S. and Soviet Union's Plans to Conduct Nuclear Strikes against China in 1964 and 1969. A Broad View of CPC History (3):8. 53
Peng, Xuetao, and Ruifeng Zheng. 2008. Sino‐Soviet Military Clash over Zhenbao Island: A Crisis Management Perspective. Archives World (10):33. 54
Chen, Donglin. 2004. The Nuclear Button Was Almost Pressed: U.S. and Soviet Union's Plans to Conduct Nuclear Strikes against China in 1964 and 1969. A Broad View of CPC History (3):8. 55
Ibid. 56
Peng, Xuetao, and Ruifeng Zheng. 2008. Sino‐Soviet Military Clash over Zhenbao Island: A Crisis Management Perspective. Archives World (10):33. 57
Chen, Donglin. 2004. The Nuclear Button Was Almost Pressed: U.S. and Soviet Union's Plans to Conduct Nuclear Strikes against China in 1964 and 1969. A Broad View of CPC History (3):8. 13 Transbaikal area – making as many as one-third of their strategic missiles capable of striking
Chinese targets. Fifty nuclear-capable long-range bombers and 400 medium-range bombers were
deployed to Far Eastern bases by early 1968. 58 All these military maneuvers including the
deployment of nuclear forces were intended to demonstrate Soviets’ resolve to defend their
borders. However, as Mao’s remarks to Miyamoto Kenji reveals, these military deployments
were indications of the Soviets’ aggressive intentions including plans to invade and occupy
China.
The most serious nuclear signals from Soviet Union came in 1969. In March, Chinese and Soviet
armed forces clashed over Zhenbao (Chen-pao) Island. Because the Chinese were well prepared,
the Soviets suffered more casualties. They threatened to retaliate. Shortly, Soviet newspaper Red
Star released an editorial asserting that Soviet Union would launch destructive nuclear strikes
against “today’s adventurists”. 59 This was the first explicit Soviet nuclear threat.
Months later, as tensions along the borders continued to increase, some Soviet military officials
including Minister of Defense Andrei Antonovich Grechko were reported to propose using
nuclear weapons against China. Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Vasilyevich Ogarkov
disagreed and suggested a limited strike on China’s nuclear facilities. Many other top officials
opposed the idea of using nuclear weapons. Without being able to reach a consensus the Soviets
decided to test the reaction of the Americans and their East European allies before they took
action. Soviet diplomats, therefore, began to approach their counterparts on possible “surgical
strike” against Chinese nuclear facilities. The response, however, was very much negative. These
countries not only opposed the idea but quickly released the message to China. 60 On August 28,
the Washington Star – an American newspaper – prominently published a report revealing that
“Soviet Union Plans Surgical Nuclear Strike on China”. 61
On the operational level, the Soviets placed the deputy head of the Strategic Rocket Forces as the
commander of the Far East Military District.62 From late August to the end of September, the
Soviet Far East Air Force was put on high alert. The U.S. detected the stand-up of the Soviet Air
58
Ibid. Chen, Hao. 2010. Zhou Enlai in Zhenbao Island Incident. Extensive Collection of the Party History (1):15. 60
Ibid, p. 16. 61
Yu, Yi. 2009. Sino‐Soviet Nuclear Crisis Caused by Zhenbao Island. FRIEND (12):48. 62
Gelman, Harry. 1982. the soviet far east buildup and soviet ruisk‐taking against China. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, pp. 37‐38. 59
14 Force and CIA disclosed this Soviet maneuver at a background press briefing. 63 Apparently, the
Chinese were alerted. 64
During the 1969 crisis the Soviets delivered mixed and inconsistent nuclear signals on several
occasions, however. In September, when the tensions were extremely high and the Chinese were
preparing to defend a nuclear strike, the Soviets made a gesture to ease tensions. Alexei Kosygin
– Chairman of the Council of Ministers approached Chinese delegations at Ho Chi Minh’s
funeral at Hanoi and asked to meet with Zhou Enlai. On September 11, on his way back to
Moscow, Kosygin made a detour and met with Zhou at a Beijing Airport. During their three and
half hours of meeting, Kosygin reassured Zhou that Soviet Union had no plan of launching
nuclear strikes against China’s nuclear facilities. Beijing appeared relatively eased by Kosygin’s
reassurance. 65 However, several days after the meeting, a Soviet journalist Victor Louis – widely
recognized as a spokesman for Soviet government – wrote a report in a London newspaper. The
report cited “well informed sources in Moscow” as asserting that “Russian nuclear installations
stand aimed at Chinese nuclear facilities”, and the Soviets had a “plan to launch an air strike on
Lop Nor.” Louis warned in his report that: “whether or not the Soviet Union will dare to attack
Lop Nor, China’s nuclear center, is a question of strategy, and so the world will only learn about
it afterwards.” 66 Louis’s story again made China become very concerned about Soviet surprise
nuclear strikes. 67
With limited available records and literature, it is hard to tell with high confidence how serious
the Soviet nuclear threat really was. A close examining of the Soviet nuclear signals, however,
tends to suggest that these signals might have been deliberately coordinated as a means of
coercing China into concessions. No hard evidence exists that shows the Soviets were really
determined to strike China with nuclear weapons if China had not made substantive
compromises. To the contrary, internal discussions among top Soviet officials only began several
63
Kissinger, Henry Alfred. 1979. White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, pp. 183‐184. Peng, Xuetao, and Ruifeng Zheng. 2008. Sino‐Soviet Military Clash over Zhenbao Island: A Crisis Management Perspective. Archives World (10):34. 65
Chen, Hua. 1998. The Sixth Secret about China's Nuclear Weapons: China Faces Nuclear Threat. Great Technology (Z1):38. 66
Gelman, Harry. 1982. the soviet far east buildup and soviet ruisk‐taking against China. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, p. 40. 67
Chen, Hua. 1998. The Sixth Secret about China's Nuclear Weapons: China Faces Nuclear Threat. Great Technology (Z1):38. 64
15 months after the clash over Zhenbao Island, and voices in favor of nuclear strikes never prevailed
in the Politburo. 68 Soviet nuclear signals, on the other hand, were already out there well before
substantive discussions about nuclear strike took place in Moscow. More importantly, it is hard
to imagine that if Moscow really aimed at a surprise strike against China it would release its plan
to not only the U.S. but a number of Eastern European countries without expecting that some of
these countries might pass the message on to Beijing (which they did, as it turned out). Its
nuclear signals were delivered clearly and loudly, through almost all possible means and
channels at Moscow’s disposal: newspaper editorial, radio broadcast, public statement, nuclear
deployment, stand-up of nuclear forces, and third-channel communication.
On the Chinese part, they were very much attentive to all Soviet operations and fully captured
almost every single nuclear signal that Soviet Union sent out – intentionally or unintentionally.
As early as 1964, China began to see the Soviet deployment of missile forces near China as a
grave indication of Soviets’ offensive and aggressive intentions. 69 As tensions built up in early
1969, Moscow’s explicit nuclear signals got Beijing’s attention more than anything else. China’s
response to these nuclear threats, as will be discussed below, was very serious and extensive.
One month after the Zhenbao Island clash, China held the Ninth National Congress of Chinese
Communist Party. Among what mostly got discussed on the conference was how China should
prepare itself for a possible military conflict. The political report of the conference emphatically
called upon all Chinese to be fully aware of “the danger that American imperialists and Soviet
revisionists may initiate an all-out war”. The report stressed that: “we should be fully prepared
that they are going to launch a war that is all-out, preemptive, conventional as well as nuclear.” 70
From then on, China responded specifically to almost every nuclear signal. After the Red Star
claimed that the Soviets could launch destructive nuclear strikes against “today’s adventurists”,
Zhou Enlai was greatly concerned about this first explicit Soviet nuclear threat. He immediately
reported to Mao Zedong and suggested that China release a public statement. The statement
should firstly denounce Soviet actions and secondly express China’s willingness to engage the
Soviet Union and to seek a peaceful resolution. Mao agreed and the statement was released on
68
Chen, Donglin. 2004. The Nuclear Button Was Almost Pressed: U.S. and Soviet Union's Plans to Conduct Nuclear Strikes against China in 1964 and 1969. A Broad View of CPC History (3):9. 69
Ibid, p. 5. 70
Liu, Zhiqing. 2009. After Zhenbao Island: A Crisis That Got Revolved. Tong Zhou Gong Jin (11):53. 16 May 24. 71 On August 27 China was informed by some Eastern European countries about Soviets’
plan of nuclear strike. Zhou Enlai believed the information was credible. One day later, the news
was confirmed by Washington Star’s report. Mao and Zhou quickly decided to take a number of
measures to deal with the challenge. China published another statement claiming any attack on
China’s strategic facilities would be a war against China and such aggression would be met with
full resistance by Chinese people. The whole country was mobilized to prepare for a war,
possibly “a nuclear one”. Defending against Soviet Nuclear strikes was one of the primary
objectives. All major cities began to build civil defense facilities and to restore food for
emergency. The Party’s Central Committee issued an emergency document for establishing the
Leading Group for Air Defense with Zhou Enlai as its principal. The Leading Group was
primarily tasked with swiftly evacuating urban population and important factories. All regions
close to the Soviet Union were put on high alert. 72
In the middle of such high tensions, Kosygin’s request for meeting with Zhou was clearly very
desirable to Beijing. As Zhou met with Kosygin on the Morning of September 11, Zhou’s first
inquiry was about the reported Soviet nuclear strike plan and whether Soviet Union is going to
attack Chinese nuclear facilities in a preemptive strike. After Kosygin reassured him that Soviet
Union had no such plans, Zhou apparently appeared released. 73 Nonetheless, Victor Louis’
report on September 18 again made China extremely concerned about surprise nuclear attacks.
Two days after Louis’ report was published, Zhou wrote a secret letter to Kosygin stating that
both sides have the responsibility to make sure that they wouldn’t use their armed forces
including nuclear forces to attack each other. 74
Without an explicit pledge from the Soviet Union that they would launch nuclear attacks, China
continued to do everything they could to defend against possible nuclear strikes. As October 1 –
China’s National Day approached, Beijing was even thinking about cancelling the annual
celebration and public gathering on Tiananmen Square in case the Soviet Union chose that day to
strike Beijing. Mao disagreed and said that would show China’s fear and weakness. As a result,
China decided to keep the annual celebration but at the same time to move up the previously
71
Chen, Hao. 2010. Zhou Enlai in Zhenbao Island Incident. Extensive Collection of the Party History (1):15. Ibid, p. 16. 73
Ibid, p. 17. 74
Chen, Hua. 1998. The Sixth Secret about China's Nuclear Weapons: China Faces Nuclear Threat. Great Technology (Z1):38. 72
17 scheduled nuclear tests to earlier dates. On September 23 and 29 China conducted two nuclear
tests. Unlike previous tests, this time China made no public announcement at all after the tests. In
Chinese calculation, the tests would show Chinese resolve to fight any aggression; also, China’
uncommon silence after the tests would keep the Soviets uncertain about Chinese intention and
therefore make them unable to launch a strike over the next few days. 75 Therefore, the Chinese
decision to conduct two nuclear tests immediately before October 1 for the purpose of making
sure the Soviets would not dare to launch the strike on the National Day demonstrates that from
Chinese perspective, the dangers of Soviet (nuclear) strike was real and imminent. Immediately
after the National Day celebration, all major senior Chinese officials and important government
agencies were evacuated from Beijing to inner provinces across the country. As an effort to show
China’s resolve to resist nuclear strikes, Zhou Enlai emphasized in his speech on the National
Day Reception Dinner that: “we must be fully prepared against American imperialists’ and
Social-imperialists’ war threats – including nuclear war threats. If they dare to impose war upon
Chinese people, we will firmly resist, until we win.” Mao Zedong also personally wrote a
National Day slogan, which was very rare. The slogan read: “All peoples around the globe
should unite against war launched by imperialists and social-imperialists, and against wars that
use nuclear weapons in particular! If this kind of war breaks out, all peoples should use
revolutionary wars to defeat their wars of aggression. We should be prepared now!” 76
As the date for the re-opening of Soviet-China border talks at Beijing approached, China was
very concerned that the Soviets might use this opportunity to land troops rather than diplomats at
Beijing airport and initiated a surprise attack – like what they did to Czechoslovakia in 1968. As
a result, on October 18 Lin Biao – Vice Chairman of the Central Military Committee ordered all
armed forces into high-alert status, the nuclear missile forces included. This marked the most
intensive response of China to Soviet Union’s nuclear threat and was also the only time in
China’s history that Chinese nuclear forces were put on high alert. Two days later, as Soviet
officials landed in Beijing and the border negotiation reopened, tensions gradually reduced.
However, because border negotiations failed to bring about significant results over the next few
years, Soviet Union continued stationing armed forces including nuclear forces in regions close
75
Zhang, Shude. 2008. Decisive Decision Making under Nuclear Threat. Party & Government Forum (4):39. Peng, Xuetao, and Ruifeng Zheng. 2008. Sino‐Soviet Military Clash over Zhenbao Island: A Crisis Management Perspective. Archives World (10):35. 76
18 to China. China’s perception of nuclear threat from the Soviets persisted into the 1970s and 80s.
In response, China continued its efforts of building civil defense projects and training its military
for defending against nuclear attacks. China’s input into these projects over the next couple of
decades was huge and unprecedented. 77
Conclusion
Seeking to close the gap in current literature about China’s perception of nuclear threat, this
paper reviews the way in which China dealt with nuclear threats during Cold War. In particular,
the paper examines the dynamic interaction between nuclear signaling and China’s response to
nuclear threats during the three nuclear crises in China’s history: the Korean War, the First and
Second Taiwan Crises, and Sino-Soviet border crisis in the late 1960s.The analysis shows that
during the Korean War although American nuclear signals were inaccurate and had
communication problems the Chinese were fully prepared for nuclear threat even before the
Volunteer Army marched into North Korea. American nuclear threat did not bring about
significant benefit for the U.S. During Taiwan crises in the 1950s, because of general signaling
problems, both the U.S. and China seriously misunderstood each other’s strategic intentions.
China did not really expect nuclear threat from the U.S. and U.S.’ nuclear threat helped compel
China into concessions. Lastly, in the Sino-Soviet border crisis, the Soviets’ nuclear signaling
was very effective in raising Chinese concerns about nuclear strikes. China’s response to Soviets’
nuclear threats was unprecedentedly extensive. Its impact on the development of China’s defense
strategy and defense industry was deep and long-lasting.
The analysis also points to a number of other interesting observations. Firstly, because of Mao
Zedong’s well-known “paper tiger” statement about nuclear weapons, there is a long-lasting
debate among scholars about China’s perception of nuclear weapons. Some scholars believe
Chinese leaders were rarely really concerned about nuclear strikes. A close review of China’s
response to nuclear threats in this paper, however, shows that the opposite might be more
accurate. If the nuclear signals were clear and explicit, China’s response would be very serious:
in most cases China would make every effort to defend against nuclear strikes.
77
Rong, Yu, and Yuan Hong. 2009. From Counter Nuclear Deterrence Strategy to Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Strategy: the Evolution of China's Nuclear strategy. Contemporary Asia‐Pacific Studies (3):120‐132. 19 Secondly, China’s nuclear strategy was clearly not a strategy of deterrence by the 1970s. China
was fully aware that its preliminary nuclear capabilities would not be able to deter nuclear strikes
from a super power. In Zhou Enlai’s meeting with Kosygin during the peak of Sino-Soviet crisis
in 1969, Zhou never hinted at a nuclear retaliation when facing serious Soviet nuclear threat.
Instead, Zhou reassured his Soviet counterpart that China would stick to the No-First-Use pledge.
In October, China’s nuclear forces were for the first time (and the only time in history) put on
high alert, but the order was given secretly, 78 showing no intention of trying to deter the Soviets
at all.
Last but not least, the analysis shows that in both the Taiwan Crises in the 1950s and the SinoSoviet crisis in the late 1960s China was pressed to make compromises in face of nuclear threats.
This adds weight to the argument that nuclear weapons indeed have important coercive power in
international conflicts. China’s perception about nuclear weapons would inevitably be influenced
by its experience in these crises, which will have important impact on its current and future
nuclear strategies and policies.
78
Rong, Yu, and Yuan Hong. 2009. From Counter Nuclear Deterrence Strategy to Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Strategy: the Evolution of China's Nuclear strategy. Contemporary Asia‐Pacific Studies (3):120‐127. 20